Gary Samore: “In the case of North Korea the Libya model is unrealistic. It is not plausible that the North Korean regime, given their perception of the world, will give up their missiles, chemical, biological and nuclear programs in exchange for better relations. They view them as essential for their survivability. The best you can do is to achieve limits.” (Michael R. Gordon, “Giving Up Those Weapons: After Libya, Who Is Next?” New York Times, January 1, 2004, p. A-10)

North Korea has agreed to allow a U.S. delegation to visit its nuclear complex at Yongbyon next week ahead of likely negotiations with its neighbors and the United States. The delegation would be the first to see the site since North Korea expelled foreign weapons inspectors a year ago. Members of the U.S. delegation say it includes Sig Hecker, director from 1985 to 1997 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which produced the first U.S. nuclear bomb and still constructs weapons. Hecker has been told he can visit Yongbyon, where the North Koreans restarted a reactor last year and may have reprocessed used fuel to make plutonium for a half-dozen bombs. (Barbara Slavin, “North Korea Oks U.S. Visit to Complex,” USA Today, January 2, 2004) President Bush read article. “I didn’t authorize this,” he told NSA Condoleezza Rice. “Shut it down.” Rice called SecState Powell, who called Senator Joseph Biden (D-DL) to pass along the message. But in a later call to Biden, Powell said he told the White House he didn’t have the authority to block the trip, but the White House wanted it shut down. “Are you, sir, saying that it would be unhelpful for them to go,” asked Biden. “No, I can’t say that. I’m just telling you what I’m told to communicate,” replied Powell. “Fine,” said Biden. “They’ll go.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 198)

Sig Hecker, John Lewis and Jack Pritchard in Yongbyon: “This is not a U.S. government-sponsored trip, said someone involved in the planning. “The U.S. government has no say. Nor were they asked to say yes or no to the trip itself.” J. Adam Ereli, DOS spokesman: “There’s a limit to what I can say, simply because it’s not our
deal. ... Any efforts that complicate prospects or undertakings to reconvene the six-party talks and to achieve forward movement in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program aren’t helpful.” Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi go at same time. (Steven R. Weisman, “Private Group Prepares Visit to North Korea,” New York Times, January 3, 2004, p. A-1) “When a US congressional delegation’s visit to North Korea was proposed in October last year, the North Korean side had prepared to show on the spot, through an inspection of Yongbyon nuclear facilities in accordance with the delegation’s wish, the finished reprocessing process of nuclear fuel rods and how the plutonium acquired from this process was being used. Although the congressional delegation’s visit to North Korea was cancelled due to White House opposition, the deferred inspection of Yongbyon nuclear facilities is expected to take place during the current visit by nuclear experts.” Chosun Sinbo (Tokyo) “U.S. Delegation of Nuclear Experts Visits the DPRK,” January 8, 2004) D.P.R.K. FoMin spokesman characterized the visit as “an opportunity to confirm the reality and ensure transparency. ... The United States compelled the DPRK to build [a] nuclear deterrent. We showed this to Lewis and his party this time.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for the D.P.R.K. FM on U.S. Professor’s Visit to Yongbyon Nuclear Facility,” January 10, 2004) Told “at Yongbyon you will see the importance of a freeze,” they were shown the reactor in operation and the cooling pond empty of spent nuclear fuel. Hecker was handed two glass jars of what his hosts said was plutonium. First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan categorically denied it had a program to make highly enriched uranium, however. The D.P.R.K. “has nothing to do with any HEU program,” he said. “We have no program, no facilities you are talking about, or scientists trained for this purpose.” (Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi, “North Korea: Status Report on Nuclear Program, Humanitarian Issues, and Economic Reforms,” A Staff Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 23, 2004) He expressed willingness to explain any “data” on enrichment that the United States presented, a stance the North reaffirmed in talks with China. Pritchard briefing on nine hours with Kim Gye-gwan: “First of all was a flat denial that they ever had a program, don’t have a program, and then said that’s a topic they certainly were willing to talk about once the United States sat down with them. But he went further in his denial in terms of the clarity of it, saying that not only do we not have any program; we have no equipment and we don’t have any scientists, we never had scientists trained in that area, we rely on the natural uranium and the plutonium program that they have.” On the freeze, “Vice Minister Kim’s point in this was we recognize this not the endgame, but quite clearly there has to be some initial steps.” “You may recall through press reporting over the past year that the North Koreans have consistently in advance told the United States, and then later publicly, what they intended to do with their nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. To begin with, they were going to ask the I.A.E.A. inspectors to leave. They were going to unseal the seals, remove the cameras, restart the reactor, remove the spent fuel rods, reprocess them. At one point they came back and said, we initially intended to reprocess the spent fuel rods for safety reasons, but now, because of the hostile U.S. policy, we are going to do that to extract plutonium to make a nuclear deterrent.” “We went to the spent fuel pond storage facility. This is where the 8,017 or so spent fuel rods had been canned and safeguarded by the I.A.E.A. until a year ago in December. ... The spent fuel storage pond was empty. There are no spent fuel rods there. ... The canisters were empty.” “They did make a comment ... saying in the case of Libya and
Iran, both initially said, no, we don’t have a WMD program, and the U.S. said, yes, you do. And he said in this case we’re saying, yes, we do have a WMD program; the United States is saying, no, you don’t” [Laughter] “China had set a goal for the second meeting of reaching an agreed statement on the North Korea nuclear problem. ... In the end, the United States and North Korea could not find a set of words that would overcome their profound substantive differences and corrosive mutual mistrust. So China signaled a couple of weeks ago that the talks could proceed even if a statement was not possible at this time.” North says they already have a security alliance with Russia and China: “There is, however, a tactical element here where the North Koreans, in preparation for eventual discussions with the United States, are increasing the value of the freeze that they have put out there, and at the same time attempting to decrease the value of what the United States is potentially prepared to offer in terms of a multilateral security guarantee.” “Time is not on the U.S. side,” he quotes Kim Gae-gwan as saying. “The lapse of time will result in the quantitative and qualitative increase in our nuclear deterrent.” Kim also said, “How is that we can prove that we don’t something we don’t have?” (Transcript, “The North Korea Deadlock: A Report from the Region,” Brookings Institution, January 15, 2004) Hecker testimony: “We confirmed that the 5 MWe reactor is operating now. ... “We drove past the 50 MWe reactor site twice. We confirmed there is no construction activity at this site. There were no construction cranes on site. The reactor building looks in a terrible state of repair. The concrete building structure shows cracks. The steel exhaust tower was heavily corroded, as was other steel equipment at the site. The building was not closed up and resembled a deserted structure. ... We immediately confirmed the fact that all fuel rods were no longer in the pool because many of the canisters were missing and many were open. ... When I expressed concern that some of the canisters were still closed, they took the extraordinary step of allowing me to pick one at random [all done under water in the pool] to demonstrate that there were no fuel rods remaining even in the closed canisters. ...Although we could not see the plutonium glove box operations, they took the extraordinary step of showing us the ‘product’ from what they claimed to be their most recent reprocessing campaign. In a conference room following the tour, they brought a metal case that contained a wooden box with a glass jar they said contained 150 grams of plutonium oxalate powder and a glass jar they said contained 200 grams of plutonium metal for us to inspect. The glass jars were fitted with a screw-on metal lid and were tightly taped with transparent tape. (The plutonium’s alpha radiation is easily stopped by the glass jar.) The green color of the plutonium oxalate powder is consistent with plutonium that has been stored in air for some time. The plutonium metal ... that they claimed was scrap from a casting from this reprocessing campaign. ...The glass jar (very thick-walled) was reasonably heavy and slightly warm .... It was radioactive ... Even if we could confirm that the product we were shown is plutonium, we would not have been able to confirm that it came from the most recent campaign without additional, more sophisticated isotopic measurements that would let us identify the age of the plutonium. The director of the NSC confirmed this by stating, “you would have to measure the americium to plutonium-241 ratio to determine its age.” (Prepared testimony of Siegfried Hecker, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, January 21, 2004) Explaining the rationale for the visit, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman’s statement said “transparency serves as a basis of realistic thinking and, at the same time, a basis for solving the issue.” It went on,
“We never employ a sleight of hand. Whenever an opportunity presented itself, we opened to the public our fair and aboveboard nuclear activities as they were and informed the U.S. side of them through a diplomatic channel.” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, p. 399)

1/4/04 Kan Naoto, leader of opposition DPJ, proposes that government invite Kim Jong-il to Japan to “know whether they wasn’t to resolve” the abduction and other issues. (Kyodo, “DPJ Head Calls for Inviting N. Korea Leader Kim to Japan,” January 4, 2004)

1/5/04 Poll of 800 adults find 39% call US biggest threat to peace in Korea, 33% North Korea, 12% China and 8% Japan, compared to 1% US, 44% North Korea, 15% Japan and 4% China in 1993 survey. Those in their 20s broke down 58% US and 20% North Korea; in their 30s 47% and 22%; in their 40s 36% and 34%, in their 50s 18% and 52%. (Chosun Ilbo, “US More Dangerous Than NK? Most Seem to Think So,” January 12, 2004)


1/6/04 KCNA on freeze: “The DPRK advanced a productive proposal to put into practice measures of the first phase if the U.S. found it hard to accept the package solution all at once. These measures are for the U.S. to delist the DPRK as a sponsor of terrorism, lift political, economic and military sanctions and blockade on it and for the U.S. and neighboring countries of the DPRK to supply heavy oil, power and other energy resources to the DPRK in return for its freeze of nuclear activities. The DPRK is set to refrain from test and production of nuclear weapons and stop even operating nuclear power industry for a peaceful purpose as first-phase measures of the package solution.” (KCNA, “KCNA Urges U.S. Not to Shun Core Issue at Six-Way Talks, January 6, 2004)

SecState Powell says North Korea's latest offer “was an interesting statement. It was a positive statement. They, in effect, said they won’t test and they implied they would give up all aspects of their nuclear program, not just weapons program.” (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Remarks with Tunisia's Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahia, January 6, 2004)

Kim Un-yong, MDP National Assemblyman and former IOC vice president, tells investigators he provided $1.1 million to North to facilitate athletic cooperation. (Chosun Ilbo, “Kim Un-yong: US$1.1 Million Went to North Korea, January 6, 2004)

In Democratic presidential debate, Howard Dean says, “This president is about to allow North Korea to become a nuclear power. The danger is not that the North Koreans will immediately attack us. The real danger is that they will do what Pakistan is accused of: they will sell that weaponry to terrorist or other countries like Libya or Pakistan for hard currency. That is a major national security threat, and this president is not defending this country the way he ought to by refusing to engage in these kinds of deliberations because the hard-liners in this administration believe that somehow North Korea is going to fall.”
Kim Guen-tae, floor leader of the Uri Party wants Kim Dae-jung to be special envoy to the North: “How glad the nation would be if Mr. Kim, a man of great wisdom and wide experience were to work to help bring peace to the peninsula.” (Ryu Jin, “Kim Dae-jung Courted As Special Envoy to N. Korea,” Korea Times, January 7, 2004)

China’s Fu Yong in a meeting with Japan’s Yabunaka Mitoji and South Korean officials in Seoul last week said China is not convinced of U.S. claims that North Korea has a clandestine program to enrich uranium, say U.S. officials who have been briefed on the discussions. Chas Freeman says the administration is paying the price for its Iraq claims: “Post-Iraq, the credibility of U.S. intelligence is not very high” around the world. Sun Weide, spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington, said, “China has never taken part in DPRK’s nuclear program. We have no knowledge of DPRK’s nuclear program or its capabilities. We do not know if DPRK has a HEU program. According to our understanding, the Japanese are not completely aware of the situation, either.” (Glenn Kessler, “Chinese Not Convinced of North Korean Uranium Effort,” Washington Post, January 7, 2004, p. A-16)

Senior ROK FoMin official: “I think the North keeps presenting the proposal as the North believes it is constructive, but there is still a rift among concerned countries on the steps to settle the nuclear tension. Washington refuses to be seen to offer compensation or rewards to Pyongyang by agreeing to the North’s demands for a package deal.” (Seo Hyun-jin, “N.K. Repeats Offer to Freeze Nukes,” Korea Herald, January 7, 2004)

White House official: “Our ultimate goal is a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID). If North executes it, we can talk about ‘the possibility’ to ease its worries. The guarantee of the North Korean regime is possible even at an early point in the negotiating process. Supply of energy will [follow] a bit later when tangible progress has been made. It is also possible for North Korea to establish diplomatic relations and conclude peace treaties with the countries concerned, including the U.S. However, the door of [the] nuclear issue must be opened first to reach the goal.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “The U.S.’ Nuclear Policy: Current Strategy Revealed by the White House,” January 7, 2004)

Sam Brownback (R-KS) in speech in Tokyo says abduction issue “has to be part of any six-way talks” and calls on Japan to continue raising it. (Sato Takeshi,” U.S. Senator Urges Japan to Raise Abductions at 6-Way Talks,” Kyodo, January 7, 2004) In interview, he says, “Appeasement has gotten us nowhere. That’s why I suggest a different route.” “The Chinese leadership is growing in their frustration with North Korea – it’s a weight on them. It’s important Japan push China on this. China’s growth is dependent on foreign investment. North Korea doesn’t play well into that equation because they threaten several nations that are major investors in China.” (Hirayama Ayako, “Brownback: China Has Key Role in Fixing North Crisis,” Yomiuri Shimbun, January 8, 2004)

*Rodong Sinmun* signed article “calls on the north and the south to take practical actions to settle the Korean nation’s confrontation with the U.S. in its struggle to defend peace on the Korean peninsula and achieve the country’s reunification. The U.S. is chiefly to blame for the harassed peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the article says, adding: The U.S. does not want the Korean peninsula to be reunified and it is not pleased with the improved inter-Korean relations.” (KCNA, “*Rodong Sinmun* on Practical Ways for Peace and Reunification of Korea,” January 7, 2004)

1/8/04

North Korea sought a secret meeting in Beijing with Nagakawa Shoichi, minister of economy, trade and industry, as well as his predecessor, Hiranuma Takeo late last year, sources close to bilateral affairs say. The request was delivered to LDP lawmaker Hiratsawa Katsuei. “I have not heard anything about a request for a meeting,” says Nakagawa. “It would be quite absurd if North Korea is harboring such an idea.” (Japan Times, “Pyongyang Sought Talks with Trade Chiefs,” January 8, 2004)

China has come up with a new draft that six parties accept an initial freeze which can then be turned into “complete abolition,” negotiation sources say, by including both phrases, “freezing of the nuclear program” and “denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.” (Kyodo, “China Proposes N. Korean Nuclear Freeze as 1st Step,” January 8, 2004)

SecSt Powell: “What is absolutely essential is for us to move forward. We need a clear statement from the North Koreans that they are prepared to bring these programs to a verifiable end. We have made it clear in response to North Korean concerns and the comments we have received from our colleagues that security assurances are appropriate, and we believe we have good solid ideas on how to provide those assurances. That’s the opening step, and that’s what we’re anxious to see in the next round of talks, then we can get into how one goes down that road and what the needs of the North Korean people are and how those needs can be addressed. But what we can’t do is say, ‘You have been doing things that are inconsistent with your obligations, and now we’re going to pay you to stop doing it.’ We have to begin with, ‘We’re not going to do it, and we’re not going to do it in a verifiable manner.’ And in return for that, we will describe the kind of security assurances we will give. And they also have to make it clear that what they’re doing is permanent because we don’t want to have this -- see this movie again.” (State Department transcript, January 8, 2004)

1/9/04

DPRK FoMin spokesman on Libya model: “United States is hyping recent developments in some Middle East countries, cases orchestrated by itself. It is seized with hallucination that the same would happen on the Korean peninsula and some countries echo this ‘hope’ and ‘expect’ some change. This is nothing but a folly of imbeciles utterly ignorant of the DPRK’s independent policy. …To expect any ‘change’ from the DPRK stand is as foolish as expecting a shower from clear sky. Explicitly speaking, the recent developments in those countries only reinforce the DPRK’s firm
belief in the validity and vitality of its Songun policy. It is the historical truth that peace is won and defended only with strength.” (KCNA, Spokesman of DPRK FM Dismisses Any Change from DPRK as Ridiculous,” January 9, 2004)

1/11-12/04 US-led PSI exercise Sea Saber in Arabian Sea mimics 12/02 seizure of NK Scuds

1/12/04 TV broadcast of FoMin spokesman: “We would like to make clear one more time that if the Bush administration truly intends to resolve the nuclear issue with simultaneous actions in accordance with a package deal and is will to agree on compensation in return for freezing as first-phase measures, we are also willing to freeze our nuclear activities based on graphite-moderated reactors as a starting point for denuclearization.” (FBIS, East Asia, “DPRK-TV Carries DPRK FMS Remark on ‘Willing to Freeze’ ‘Nuclear Activities,'” January 12, 2004)

1/13/04 North’s Red Cross asks South for half million tons of fertilizer, increase of 200,000 tons. (Chosun Ilbo, “N. Korea Asks for Record Amount of Fertilizer,” February 6, 2004)

1/13/04 At press conference, Pres Roh response to criticism from unnamed diplomats, “These officials will be replaced so there will no longer be obstacles to pursuing my foreign policy.” Cho Hyun-dong, director of the North American Division, was discovered to have made comments critical of the president and “Taliban.” Vice FM Kim Jae-sup and Wi Sung-lac, North American Affairs Bureau dir-gen could also be replaced. (Kim So-young, “Roh Vows to Replace Officials on U.S. Policy,” Korea Herald, January 14, 2004) FM Yoon Young-kwan resigns, taking responsibility. “Some MOFAT officials have failed to break with [U.S.-]dependent policy practices and did not fully understand the spirit and direction of the new government’s independent diplomatic policy,” said Jeong Chan-young, Roh’s personnel affairs manager. (Dong-A Ilbo, “Foreign Minister Forced to Resign Over ‘Independent Diplomacy’ Controversy,” January 15, 2004) “I have emphasized the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance because it is a very useful tool for peaceful relations between North and South Korea, said Yoon in a farewell speech. “Some legislators referred to this as knee-jerking. However, kowtowing to the U.S. must be distinguished form utilizing the U.S. as a diplomatic asset.” Brent Choi, JoongAng Ilbo: “It started with Cho Hyun-dong, a director in the North American Affairs bureau under Yoon making an extremely offensive remark against the incumbent president Roh: ‘Once President Roh and his Our Open Party fail in the April General Election the president could revert back to just taking care of two ministries (Ministry of the Science and Technology and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries).’ President Roh enraged at such remarks (and more) went to confirm the rumor and in the process, the media caught on. The president expected Yoon to reprimand the official in question but he did no such thing thus, leading the Blue House to take the matter into its own hand and discharge Yoon instead.”(Brent Choi, “Don't Misunderstand the Firing of South Korean Foreign Minister” NAPSNet, February 4, 2004) [Last straw was Yoon’s failure to give credit to Roh for negotiating Yongsan base agreement.]

1/13-17/04 Four Japanese FoMin officials in Pyongyang to discuss abduction issue, first visit since 2002. (AFP, “Japanese Officials Visit North Korea to Discuss Kidnap Issue,” January 14,


1/16/04 Ruling coalition and DPJ agree to enact revision of foreign exchange law, authorizing government to stop remittances and restrict trade to North Korea without U.N. sanction. (Kyodo, “Japan’s N. Korea Sanctions Bill to Pass through Diet,” January 16, 2004)

Ban Ki-moon replaces Yoon as ROK foreign minister.


1/18/04 In confirmation Rice says North Korea among “outposts of tyranny.” (Department of State, Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-Designate Condoleezza Rice, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 18, 2004)

1/19/04 Kim Jong-il tells Wang Jiarui, head of CCP central committee, there are “positive movements” in relations with Japan. (Takahara Kanako, “China Relays Pyongyang Overture,” Japan Times, January 24, 2004)


1/21/04 Bush cites Libyan example in State of the Union: “Nine months of intense negotiations involving the United States and Great Britain succeeded with Libya, while 12 years of diplomacy with Iraq did not. And one reason is clear: For diplomacy to be effective words must be credible - and no one can now doubt the word of America.” A longtime Republican adviser to Bush says the impact of “axis of evil” speech and Iraq invasion was “dramatically overblown” and that Qaddafi had begun moving to end his isolation several years ago when he turned over suspects in the Lockerbie airplane bombing case. (David E. Sanger and Neil MacFarquhar, “Bush to Portray Libya As Example,” New York Times, January 20, 2004, p. A-1)

IISS report says it is “impossible” to reach firm conclusion about nuclear capability but “it would be imprudent to conclude that North Korea does not have nuclear weapons.” (AFP, “‘Imprudent’ to Think North Has No Nukes: IISS,” January 21, 2004; text of Samore CFR briefing, January 23, 2004)
Japanese official quotes FoMin Kawaguchi as telling Pres Roh, “I believe North Korea has sent several positive signals recently.” (Reuters, “Japan Says North Korea Sending Positive Signals,” January 21, 2004)

1/22/04 TCOG in Washington. Discuss six-party talks. (James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), p. A11) Deputy FM Lee Soo-hyuck describes conclusion: “If North Korea freezes its nukes and agrees that it will dismantle its nuclear programs, South Korea, the United States and Japan are willing to take corresponding measures according to our coordinated steps.” (Seo Soo-min, “Six-Way Talks Must Include NK’s Uranium Program,” Korea Times, January 25, 2004)


Biden (D-DL) in speech at Arms Control Association: “The administration’s inattention and ideological rigidity has left America less secure today than it was three years ago. … We have to assume they [8,000 fuel rods] have been reprocessed and that could provide plutonium for six to eight more nuclear weapons. … It’s time to get serious about negotiations. … North Korea must dismantle its nuclear programs and stop selling missile technology. But we won’t achieve that unless the president instructs his officials to negotiate in good faith and gives them the leeway to do so.” (Barry Schweid, “Biden Urges Consideration of Nonaggression Pact to Halt North Korea Nuclear Program,” Associated Press, January 28, 2004)

1/29/04 Dep SecState Armitage in Beijing

Lower house of Diet authorizes sanctions against North Korea. “Having a diplomatic card like this would not necessarily negatively affect the future course of the six-party talks,” says negotiator Yabunaka Mitoji. (Takahara Kanako, “Japan Turns up Heat on North Korea as Sanctions Bill Clears Lower House,” Japan Times, January 30, 2004)

1/30/04 DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Dismissing this as a wanton violation of the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration in which both sides committed themselves to observe international law and not to do any act of threatening the security of the other side, the statement continued … Japan is pushing the DPRK-Japan relations to an unpredictable phase by legislating on economic sanctions against the DPRK as a state policy. Its move will not be confined to this. This development will bring peace and
stability in Northeast Asia to a catastrophic phase and further deteriorate the situation on the Korean peninsula that has grown tense due to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the US. ... As Japan sows so shall it reap. The DPRK will not remain a passive onlooker to Japan's act of seriously infringing upon its sovereignty and putting Tokyo's hostile policy into practice through economic sanctions and blockade while talking about its participation in the six-way talks, but take necessary counter-measures against it. It is the DPRK's mettle to return retaliation for retaliation and react against the hard-line policy with the toughest measure." (KCNA, "DPRK FM Blasts Japan's Adoption of ‘Amendment to Law on Foreign Exchange,'" January 30, 2004)

Roh replaces NSA Ra Jong-yil with Kwon Chin-ho, former deputy head of NIS. Advisor for national defense, Kim Hee-sang, who had sought to send more troops to Iraq, also replaced with Yoon Kwang-ung, head of the Emergency Planning Committee. Deputy chief Lee Jong-seok, who favors foreign policy more independent of U.S., fortified. (Shim Jae-yun, "S. Korea to Move Further from US," Korea Times, January 30, 2004)


Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “While advocating a diplomatic and peaceful solution to the nuclear issue, the U.S. let loose a string of provocative remarks that the 'nuclear crisis in North Korea is an issue that might be referred to the UN Security Council and it might prompt the SC to discuss the possibility of sanctions against it' ... The nuclear issue between them is a direct product of the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK. It deteriorated as the United States threatened the DPRK, a non-nuclear state, with nukes and attempted to mount a preemptive nuclear attack on it. However, the U.S. has delayed and obstructed the solution to the issue, insisting on its assertion that 'the DPRK should abandon its nuclear program first.' If the U.S. truly stands for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue, it should not insist on its unreasonable assertion but accept the DPRK-proposed package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions." (KCNA, “Double-Dealing Tactics Can Never Work on DPRK,” January 30, 2004)

Australian delegation in Pyongyang. FM Downer says on February 4 that Vice FM Kim Yong-il "confirmed that North Korea's offer to 'freeze' its nuclear activities in return for certain 'reciprocal measures' was only the first step in a process which would lead to the eventual dismantlement of its nuclear-weapons program." (Nicholas Kralev, "U.S., North Schedule 6-Way Nuke Talks in Beijing," Washington Times, February 4, 2004)

KEDO executive decides to protest North Korea's refusal to let it remove construction equipment from Kumho. In statement, KEDO says, “As we have made clear, we see no future for the light-water reactor project.” (AFP, KEDO Holds Board Meeting on Suspension of N. Korean Nuclear Project,” January 31, 2004)

BBC-TV airs documentary on “lethal chemical weapons tests against civilians,” says Lord Alton, chair of British-North Korea parliamentary group. FO minister Baroness Symons says, “We have made representations yesterday as a result of the program to the embassy here in London. The embassy has denied that any such activities take place in North Korea. They have refuted all the allegations made.” The minister added, “Until we can engage properly on the nuclear issue, we are very unlikely to make some real progress on the issues around human rights.” (Andrew Evans, “North Korea Challenged on ‘Civilian Chemical Weapons Tests,’” Scotsman, February 3, 2004)


During Kelly visit to Seoul, senior U.S. official says, “Our assessment of the uranium enrichment did not come from what the North Koreans said. There is no doubt in the U.S. government there has been important work going on for a long time, on a significant scale, on uranium enrichment. ... We firmly and quietly want to see some progress on that as well as on other parts of the problem as the six-party talks unfold.” (Lee Jae-hak, “U.S. Dismisses Denials by North Korea on Uranium,” Chosun Ilbo, February 2, 2004)


North Korea agrees to hold next round of six-party talks on February 25. “Judging from the current situation, no matter how long the winter may be, spring will eventually arrive,” says DPRK’s Kim Ryong-song, in Seoul for 13th ministerial. “The fact that the U.S. is coming to the talks at all seems to indicate that it has reached a certain understanding about our basic demands.” (Christopher Marquis and Norimitsu Onishi, “North Korea Agrees to Resume Talks with U.S. Over Arms,” New York Times, February 2/3/04

2/4/04


FM Ban Ki-moon: “A nuclear freeze alone is not enough, but if that is a short stage leading towards the elimination of the nuclear programs and is accompanied by verification, we are willing to take corresponding measures.” “We are willing to guarantee North Korea’s security and provide energy and other economic assistance.” (Seo Soo-min, “Seoul to Reward NK Nuclear Freeze,” Korea Times, February 5, 2004)

North prepared to freeze reactor, reprocessing plant in Yongbyon, allow IAEA inspectors back, in return for just resumption of heavy fuel oil shipments, not all the three conditions it attached in December statement, sources here said. (Sakajiri Nobuyoshi, “Pyongyang to Propose Nuclear Program Freeze,” Asahi Shimbun, February 6, 2004)

2/5/04


2/6/04


2/8/04  Hwang Jang-yop invw with Tokyo Shimbun: “In 1996, I heard from Jon Pyong-ho, a party secretary in charge of logistics industries, that Pyongyang needed to buy plutonium to be used in making nuclear weapons.” Jon later went to Pakistan for a month and after returning said North Korea no longer needs plutonium because it can now make nuclear weapons with uranium-235. (Yoo Dong-ho, “Old Hand to Lead NK Delegation to Six-Way Talks,” Korea Times, February 8, 2004)


2/7-10/04  Kim Gye-gwan at China’s invitation, met with FM Li Zhaoxing and Executive Vice FM Dai Bingguo, says DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Both sides had an exhaustive discussion of a series of issues of mutual concern including the issue of bilateral relations, nuclear issue and the issue of six-way talks. They admitted the reasonability of the package proposal of simultaneous actions for the solution of the nuclear issue and the DPRK-proposed ‘reward in return for freeze,’ the first-phase measure, and agreed to take joint actions to make substantial progress in the next round of the six-way talks.” KCNA, “DPRK and China to Take Joint Action in Upcoming Six-Way Talks,” February 10, 2004

Kim Gye-gwan also showed understanding of “the need to eliminate suspicions” by having talks cover HEU. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Hints at Allowing Inspections of Nuclear Facilities,” February 21, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The United States is now hyping the story about the ‘transfer of nuclear technology’ to the DPRK by a Pakistani scientist in a bid to make the DPRK’s ‘enriched uranium program’ sound plausible. This is nothing but a mean and groundless propaganda. This is so sheer a lie that the DPRK does not bat an eyelid even a bit.” [Not the tech transfer but the program] (KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman Refutes U.S. Story about “Transfer of Nuclear Technology” to DPRK,” February 10, 2004)

2/10/04  WFP cuts food aid to North until end of March because it got just 140,000 tonnes instead of 485,000 it sought and has just 3,000 tonnes left of 40,000 it needs in a month. (James Kyenge and Guy Dinmore, “Food Aid to N Korea Cut Amid Anger over Arms,” Financial Times, February 10, 2004, p. 6) Massod Hyder says WFP has enough on hand to feed 100,000 of the 6.5 million it normally feeds. (Edward Cody, “Food Shortages Plague N. Korea,” Washington Post, February 14, 2004, p. A-22)

Keith Luse: “We need to know whether North Korea transfers nuclear know-how to the military government of Myanmar and how the construction of nuclear reactors in Myanmar is going.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “Concerns over Nuclear Cooperation between North Korea and Myanmar,” February 10, 2004)
Bush calls on other regimes to follow Libya: “Colonel Ghadafi made the right decision, and the world will be safer once his commitment is fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his example. Abandoning the pursuit of illegal weapons can lead to better relations with the United States, and other free nations. Continuing to seek those weapons will not bring security or international prestige, but only political isolation, economic hardship and other unwelcome consequences.” He expands mission of PSI to “direct action against proliferation networks”: “America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most deadly weapons. … “We’re determined to confront these threats at the source. We will stop these weapons from being acquired or built. We’ll block them from being transferred. We’ll prevent them from ever being used.” (White House, “Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” National Defense University, Fort McNair, February 11, 2004)

After talks in Bangkok, North to resume repatriation of Korean War remains for first time in five years. (Dong-A Ilbo, “North Korea Agreed to resume Repatriation of American Soldiers,” February 13, 2004) KPA Panmunjom Mission spokesman says “the US is misleading the public opinion by asserting that the talks served as a platform where its unilateral demand was met. At the talks the DPRK side did not meet the requests of the US side to transport the equipment and materials to be used for excavation and remains by its military transport plane for a security reason but allowed its overland transport of them via Panmunjom. The DPRK side did not have any discussion on the issue of American survivors raised by the US side after ruling it out.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for KPA Panmunjom Mission Refers to Results of DPRK-US Talks on Remains of US Soldiers,” February 20, 2004)

Japanese delegation led by Tanaka Hitoshi in Pyongyang including Yabunaka Mitoji, met with Kang Sok-ju, Kim Gae-gwan, agree to continue dialogue. (Asahi Shimbun, “Japan, N. Korea Near Accord on Next Round,” May 3, 2004) A senior MOFA official: “The only thing they said was the five abductees must return to North Korea.” DPRK FoMin spokesman: DPRK “said if the Japanese side raises again the ‘abduction issue’ at the next round of six-way talks the DPRK side will resolutely shut out Japan’s participation in the talks as requested by the army and the people of the DPRK and this will bring everything to a collapse. … As regards the abduction issue, the DPRK side branded the detention of five abductees in Japan by the Japanese side in breach of the promise it had made to the DPRK … It clarified its stand that the issue of the dead admits of no further argument as it has already been probed. (KCNA, “Statement of the Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Vantage Point, March 2004, pp. 53-54) The North severely criticized Japan saying it betrayed Pyongyang by refusing to return the five abductees. It threatened to refuse Japan’s participation if it raised the abduction issue in six-party talks. Kang Sok-ju told them, “You came here after you passed your sanctions bill, didn’t you?” (Funabashi Yoichi, “Point of View: North Korea’s Ninja Tricks Have Their Limits,” Asahi Shimbun, February 24, 2004)

Michael Green: North Korean commitment to CVID the goal, “not a partial pretend” like a freeze. The freeze is their way of trying to avoid a commitment to CVID. PSI is a “clear source of pressure. “We are not taking the Libya model and superimposing it on
North Korea, but there are useful lessons.” Kim Jong-il thinks he can retain his weapons and still get benefits. We’re forcing him to confront this choice. Sticks that U.S. has are very big. Carrots can’t be delivered: Congress won’t approve. In October 2002 it was clear that bilateral talks won’t work. [Because Japan and South Korea didn’t buy it?] Condi called some of us in and said we had to have multilateral talks. “This came from the Oval Office. It didn’t percolate up from the bureaucracy.” Kaesong gives them a vision of but Jeong Se-hyun told them they won’t move forward until nuclear issue resolved.[?] We made clear in talks we don’t have a policy on regime change. “We are not prepared to promise them normal relations up front.” We studied all the security assurances and found the Ukrainian useful because it was a statement of political intent. Chuck Jones will represent NSC at the 2nd round.

National Assembly approved dispatch of 3,000 ROK troops to Iraq. US-ROK defense consultations begin the next day, spending most of its time on transfer of U.S. command from Yongsan and South Korean assumption of responsibility for Joint Security Area.

2/13/04
Asst SecState Kelly: “We and the other parties realize that moving away from isolation and estrangement toward openness and engagement will be a major undertaking and we are willing to help. Everyone knows that establishing the grounds for normalcy and peaceful co-existence will be difficult. However, we have no choice but to make every effort to try -- and that’s why President Bush at the APEC meeting last October made clear our willingness to document multilateral assurances of security. But, this process of transformation must begin with a fundamental decision inside the D.P.R.K. North Korea needs to make a strategic choice -- and make it clear to the world as Libya has done -- that it will abandon its nuclear weapons and programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.” (Kelly, “Remarks to the Research Conference - North Korea: Towards a New International Engagement Framework, Washington, February 13, 2004)


2/15/04
Investigators have discovered that the nuclear weapons designs obtained by Libya through a Pakistani smuggling network originated in China, exposing yet another link in a chain of proliferation that stretched across the Middle East and Asia, according to government officials and arms experts. The bomb designs and other papers turned over by Libya in November have yielded dramatic evidence of China’s long-suspected role in transferring nuclear know-how to Pakistan in the early 1980s, they said. The Chinese designs were later resold to Libya by a Pakistani-led trading network that is now the focus of an expanding international probe, added the officials and experts, who are based in the United States and Europe. The packet of documents, some of which included text in Chinese, contained detailed, step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit atop a large ballistic missile. They also included technical instructions for manufacturing components for the device,
the officials and experts said. "It was just what you’d have on the factory floor. It tells you what torque to use on the bolts and what glue to use on the parts," one weapons expert who had reviewed the blueprints said in an interview. He described the designs as "very, very old" but "very well engineered." U.S. intelligence officials concluded years ago that China provided early assistance to Pakistan in building its first nuclear weapon -- assistance that appeared to have ended in the 1980s. Still, weapons experts familiar with the blueprints expressed surprise at what they described as a wholesale transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to another country. Notes included in the package of documents suggest that China continued to mentor Pakistani scientists on the finer points of bomb-building over a period of several years, the officials said. China’s actions "were irresponsible and short-sighted, and raise questions about what else China provided to Pakistan's nuclear program," said David Albright, a nuclear physicist and former U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq. "These documents also raise questions about whether Iran, North Korea and perhaps others received these documents from Pakistanis or their agents." The package of documents was turned over to U.S. officials in November following Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi’s decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction and open his country’s weapons laboratories to international inspection. The blueprints, which were flown to Washington last month, have been analyzed by experts from the United States, Britain and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog. Of the many proliferation activities linked to Khan’s network, the selling of weapon designs is viewed as the most serious. The documents found in Libya contained most of the information needed to assemble a bomb, assuming the builder could acquire the plutonium or highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear explosion, according to U.S. and European weapons experts familiar with the blueprints. At the same time, one of the chief difficulties for countries trying to build nuclear weapons has been obtaining the plutonium or uranium. Libya appeared to have made minimal progress toward building a weapon, and had no missile in its arsenal capable of carrying the 1,000-pound nuclear device depicted in the drawings, the officials said. However, weapons experts noted, the blueprints would have been far more valuable to the other known customers of Khan’s network. "This design would be highly useful to countries such as Iran and North Korea," said Albright, whose Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security has studied the nonconventional weapons programs of both states. The design "appears deliverable by North Korea’s Nodong missile, Iran’s Shahab-3 missile and ballistic missiles Iraq was pursuing just prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War," he said. Such a relatively simple design also might be coveted by terrorist groups who seek nuclear weapons but lack the technical sophistication or infrastructure to build a modern weapon, said one Europe-based weapons expert familiar with the blueprints. While such a bomb would be difficult to deliver by air, "you could drive it away in a pickup truck," the expert said. The device depicted in the blueprints appears similar to a weapon known to have been tested by China in the 1960s, officials familiar with the documents said. Although of an older design, the bomb is an implosion device that is smaller and more sophisticated than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Implosion bombs use precision-timed conventional explosives to squeeze a sphere of fissile material and trigger a nuclear chain reaction. Pakistan’s first nuclear test in 1998 involved a more modern design than the one sold to Libya.
Albright said the Libyan documents "do not appear to contain any information about the nuclear weapons Pakistan has built." The documents at the center of the investigation were handed over to IAEA inspectors in two white plastic shopping bags from a Pakistani clothing shop. The shop's name -- Good Looks Tailor -- and Islamabad address were printed on the bags in red letters. One of the bags contained drawings and blueprints of different sizes; the other contained a stack of instructions on how to build not only a bomb but also its essential components. The documents themselves seemed a hodgepodge -- some in good condition, others smudged and dirty; some professionally printed, others handwritten. Many of the papers were "copies of copies of copies," said one person familiar with them. The primary documents were entirely in English, while a few ancillary papers contained Chinese text. The package also included open-literature articles on nuclear weapons from U.S. weapons laboratories, officials familiar with the documents said. Strikingly, although most of the essential design elements were included, a few key parts were missing, the officials and experts said. Some investigators have speculated that the missing papers could have been lost, or hadn't yet been provided -- possibly they were being withheld pending additional payments. Others suggested that the drawings were simply thrown in as a bonus with the purchase of uranium-enrichment equipment -- "the cherry on the sundae," one knowledgeable official said. Libyan scientists interviewed by international inspectors about the designs said they had not seriously studied them and were unaware that anything was missing. As Libya had no suitable missile or delivery system for a nuclear weapon, the scientists might have decided to delay work on bomb designs until other parts of their weapons program were further advanced, one knowledgeable U.S. official said. U.S. and European investigators said there were many similarities among the other nuclear-related designs and components found in Libya and Iran, suggesting they were provided by the same network. As for who delivered the material to the Libyans, a European official who has studied the question said the connection to the Khan network was indirect. "The middleman is quite invisible. The middleman has covered his tracks very well." The evidence of China's transfer of nuclear plans to Pakistan confirms something that U.S. officials have believed since at least the early 1980s. A declassified State Department report on Pakistan's nuclear program written in 1983 concluded that China had "provided assistance" to Pakistan's bomb-making program. "We now believe cooperation has taken place in the area of fissile material production and possibly nuclear device design," the report said. (Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, "Libyan Arms Design Traced Back to China: Pakistanis Resold Chinese-Provided Plans," Washington Post, February 15, 2004, p. A-1)

Meeting of Bush's senior advisers decides to reject freeze, insist on dismantlement of both plutonium and enrichment programs, and not specify the sequence and timing of security assurances. Energy assistance can occur only after North Korea has moved decisively to meet U.S. demands: "If they've taken specific steps, and they are crying for help, we're not going to do it, but other parties could come to us and we'll talk about it." South Korean officials have warned U.S. officials that focusing on HEU this round will be asking too much from the North. "The objective is like Libya -- not us hunting and chasing [weapons] and working out a partial arrangement about a freeze or working out some kind of pay-as-you-go installment plan for taking apart their weapons program, but a commitment to dismantle the whole thing," the senior official
said. One official says North Korean diplomats have approached Asian diplomats and, while still denying the program, have asked what they could get by disclosing it. “Bold approach” has not been refined beyond the two-page document derived from work of lower-level officials in 2002. “We will not lay down a sheet of paper because it has not been agreed to internally in the U.S. government,” said one official. “We will dangle it out there but with no specifics.” Another official likened the U.S. presentation to Chinese brush painting: “We’ll probably paint in a little more of the painting and answer some of the questions about how this works. But we’re not going to paint them a Western landscape with every detail that is some kind of road map.” (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Will Stand Firm on N. Korea,” Washington Post, February 16, 2004, p. A-17)

Under SecSt Bolton after meeting with Wang Yi in Beijing: “I don’t think our position has changed from what it’s been for quite some time…. The issue really is whether North Korea is prepared to make the commitment for the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its programs. … I think the Libya case shows how one goes about giving up weapons of mass destruction.” (Stephanie Joo, “U.S.: No Concession to North Korea,” Associated Press, Washington Post, February 16, 2004)

ROK Amb Han Sung-joo: “The second round of talks can make progress even if North Korea does not admit the existence of its nuclear program based on highly enriched uranium.” (Ryu Jin, “HEU Issue Not to Impede 6-Way Talks,” Korea Times, February 16, 2004)

Playing hardball, Tokyo says no normalization talks unless eight family members of five abductees arrive for permanent stay in Japan. Japan has proposed joint team to establish whereabouts of ten Japanese North Korea says are dead and will also inquire about 20 other suspected abductions. “I hope the negotiators push strongly for an unconditional visit,” said Abe Shinzo, LDP secy-gen. (Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Gets Tough on North Korea,” February 16, 2004) Koizumi met with Tanaka Hitoshi and Yabunaka Mitoji on February 15, told them “I would like to see achievements as soon as possible.” (Japan Times, “Tokyo to Seek Talks in March with Pyongyang,” February 16, 2004)

2/17/04 LDP panels endorsed outline of a bill to ban designated North Korean ships from entering port but there are doubts whether it will pass because of divided opinion within the ruling LDP-New Komeito coalition. LDP Dietman Yamamoto Ichita says they are trying to create “diplomatic cards.” Abe Shinzo wants bill enacted but PM Koizumi tells reporters pressure alone will not work: “We have to have dialogue and pressure.” Yabunaka Mitoji says, “It is functioning as pressure.” (Kyodo, “LDP Panels Endorse Bill Outline to Ban Entry of N. Korea Ships,” February 17, 2004; Takahara Kanako, “LDP Panels Endorse Bill on North Korea Ship Ban,” Japan Times, February 17, 2004)

2/19/04 Kelly background briefing: “Once the process is under way, once the commitment is there, there are lot and lots of steps in between. … There were a variety of terms – simultaneous actions, parallel actions, coordinated steps … And so where we are now is that there’s no particular joint statement that needs to be the solution … but everybody recognizes that this is a process in which words and words will come
together and actions and actions will come together towards the goal that I outlined. ...The goal of these talks is by no means some kind of freeze or halt because, first of all, such a thing may not be complete; it may or may not be verifiable; and it certainly would be reversible, and we don’t want that. ... Security assurances are the sort of detail that come along after, when the process is getting going. I don’t intend to table any details. I do intend to talk about the kind of elements we think would go into a security assurance that would really bear out the commitment the president made last October.” (State Department Background Briefing, text)

DOS spokesman Richard Boucher: “We’ve made clear a freeze might be valuable.” He adds, “Our goal was to eliminate these programs, and indeed, if all the parties accept the goal of a denuclearized peninsula, there’s no way to do that without eliminating all these programs. I think all the parties have recognized that goal and therefore it strikes me as logic that whatever the value of a freeze as a step along the way, that the goal had to be elimination.” (DoS Briefing, February 189, 2004)

Top ROK official: “I am aware that North Korea has expressed its willingness through a third country to discuss the issue of HEU with the United States.” (AFP, “North Korea Willing to Tackle Uranium Issue with US: Report,” February 19, 2004) “This is not a joint proposal with the United States and Japan, but it has been much coordinated with the two countries as we have consulted on specific positions of the respective parties.” (Seo Hyun-jin, “Seoul Details Plan on N.K. Disarmament,” Korea Herald, February 20, 2004)

Senior ROK official: “The Seoul delegation will present more specific terms regarding a nuclear freeze and corresponding rewards, such as the security guarantees towards the North.” (Ryu Jin, “Seoul to Present NK with Specific Rewards,” Korea Times, February 20, 2004) Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck: “If a nuclear freeze is the beginning of nuclear elimination or a process towards it, then at the point the freeze is implemented, we can provide corresponding measures that North Korea has been demanding.” “Verification is included in the process of a nuclear freeze, so of course its existence will be revealed.” [HEU?] Joining Lee on delegation will be Cho Tae-yong, dir-gen of newly established Task Force on the North Korea Nuclear Issue and adviser Wi Sung-lac, former dir-gen of North American Affairs and now Policy Coordinator for the NSC. (Choi Jie-ho, “Seoul Upbeat Ahead of 6-Way Nuclear Talks,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, February 20, 2004)

Visiting senior Bush admin official [Bolton] says US won’t take North off list of terrorist states as long as the abduction issue is unresolved and will “definitely express support” at 6-way talks for Japan’s stance. (Asahi Shimbun, “N. Korea Stays on Terror List If Abductions Not Solved,” February 20, 2004)

Kim Jong-il asked Park Kwang-sang, president of KBS, on August 12, 2000 for videotapes of documentaries: “I don’t have a recording of the episode about President Park Chung-hee. I want to see it.” He said of Park’s move to make himself president for life: “Under the circumstances, Park had no choice. Democracy is not a good thing if it leads to anarchy.” He lashed out at Park’s successors: “All Chun Doo-hwan did was take
over the presidency. Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam wrecked the country.” He told Park Kun-hae he would visit her father’s grave if he came to South Korea. He praised the economic growth under Park and apologized for the assassination attempt. Former MinUnif Park Jae-kyu says at a meeting in September 2000, Kim told him normalization talks with Japan held just before had gone smoothly and added, “North Korea can get economic assistance if it improves its relationship with Japan.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “North Korean Leader Puzzles the World,” February 20, 2004)

North Korea must agree to dismantle HEU as well as plutonium program as a prerequisite for any assistance. “Khan’s statements have made it imperative that this program be dismantled right away,” said an administration official. (Steven R. Weisman and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Urges North Korea to End Nuclear Work,” New York Times, February 20, 2004, p. A-8)


2/20/04 Decision made at the highest levels that “the criteria for success is that the North Koreans don’t walk out,” says a U.S. official. Officials are hoping at best for regular meetings, which could take the form of lower-level working groups. “The motto is ‘Do no Harm.’ This is a placeholder to get us through the election.” (Glenn Kessler, “Hopes Lowered for U.S.-N.Korea Talks,” Washington Post, February 20, 2004, p. A-16)


Funabashi Yoichi: “First, Washington became cautious about drawing a ‘red line.’ Although North Korean nuclear armament remains a red line, the United States made the line somewhat blurry. If it made the line too clear, it could force itself into taking military action against North Korea. Second, it started to attach greater importance to multilateral frameworks, in particular six-party talks that include Japan and Russia. … But the problem is that all of the six parties involved seem content just to hold the talks and lack the drive to seriously reach a settlement. As it is, the United States is too busy dealing with Iraq and doesn’t want to rock the boat before the presidential election in the fall. While China appears to feel the burden of playing the host, it also seems to enjoy appealing to audiences both at home and abroad that it is playing the leading role. Meanwhile, South Korea seems to regard the six-party talks as an attempt to contain U.S. hard-line policy toward North Korea. Russia is mainly interested in building oil and gas pipelines and a railroad from Siberia to the Korean Peninsula. It doesn’t care as long as it can keep its seat in the six-party talks. … But whenever the United States shows a tough stance, North Korea tends to soften toward Japan. Senior Foreign Ministry officials, including Dep FM Tanaka Hitoshi, visited Pyongyang last week. Talks ended on Friday, but there has been no word about progress made. … Still, it is unlikely that North Korea would walk out of the talks. At least while six-party talks are going on, it can rest assured that it would not be attacked by the United
States. There is a chance that the Democrats could win the presidential election. What better way is there to stall for time than to keep the six-party talks going?” (Funabashi Yoichi, “Point of View: Does Kim Jong-il Want Kerry in the White House?” Asahi Shimbun, February 21, 2004)

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Powell: “They might be able to freeze, but it can’t be a freeze standing alone.” He bars reward for freeze. (Steven R. Weisman and David E. Sanger, “North Korea May Get Aid If It Pledges Nuclear Curb,” New York Times, February 25, 2004)

TCOG in Seoul discusses common position for second round of six-party talks. (James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), p A11)Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck briefs reporters on ROK three-stage proposal: in phase one, an agreement in principle in which North Korea would declare its willingness to eliminate all its nuclear activities and the United States would declare its willingness to provide security assurances; in phase two, a freeze that, if cast as “a step to dismantlement” and verified, would be accompanied by a “coordinated” response such as resumption of heavy fuel oil deliveries and other compensation; in phase three, verified elimination. Provisional security assurances become permanent as dismantlement is complete. “The fundamental position of the three countries at this round is that all nuclear programs, including the highly enriched uranium program, must be dismantled.” “A freeze is meaningless by itself,” he said. “It is only meaningful when it is the first step to dismantlement.” (Jack Kim, “South Korea Eyes 3-Stage Plan to End North Crisis,” Reuters, February 23, 2004)

Chosun Sinbo (Tokyo): “In early February, immediately after the announcement of opening the second round of six-party talks, the United States expressed an attitude that it was willing to examine the DPRK’s freeze proposal. When the talks were drawing closer, however, [the US] began to bring up the rumor of ‘enriched uranium program,’ which the DPRK has consistently denied. … It is indeed a contradiction in logic that the United States, which claims to be ‘worried’ about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, is focusing on the ‘enriched uranium program, ignoring a force that has become a reality – the nuclear deterrent. If the United States sticks to ‘the dismantlement of the nuclear program’ first in the upcoming talks … it is inevitable [for the DPRK] to show off its nuclear deterrent in its physical reality.” (Kim Chi-yong, “Second Round of Six-Party Talks - Showdown for a Volley of Offense and Defense on the Nuclear Issue, February 23, 2004, FBIS, February 24, 2004)

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DCI Tenet: “North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear program into at least a bargaining chip and also international legitimacy and influence. … The 8000 rods the North claims to have processed into plutonium metal would provide enough plutonium for several more. We also believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale uranium-enrichment program based on technology provided by A.Q. Khan … The multi-stage Taepo-dong 2 - capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload – may be ready for flight-testing.” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “The Worldwide Threat 2004,” February 24, 2004)
Second round of six-party talks in Beijing: Kelly: "The U.S. seeks complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of all the DPRK nuclear programs, both plutonium and uranium." (Karasaki Taro, "N. Korea Offers to Give up Nukes," Asahi Shimbun, February 27, 2004) Kim said the North was ready to freeze its plutonium program as a step to dismantlement and that the freeze "will be followed by inspections." He posed two questions: Is the U.S. willing to put in writing the statements of President Bush that the U.S. has no intention to invade North Korea and no hostile intentions? If North Korea carries out complete, irreversible dismantlement of nuclear weapons program, what kind of actions will the U.S. take in response? "Unfortunately, Kelly failed to answer these questions," a Chinese participant [Yang?] told me. "He just repeated what he said before." The Chinese concluded, "Kelly came to Beijing with his hands bound. He had no authorization to say any words beyond his guidance. Kim Gye-gwan came to Beijing with greater authority than Kelly did." (Daniel Sneider, "Dangerous Deadlock," San Jose Mercury News, March 18, 2004) Kelly reaffirmed Bush's pledge of multiparty security assurances, but said nothing about putting them in writing or providing electricity and insisted it would take more than the elimination of nuclear arms and missiles for the United States to normalize relations. "Missiles, conventional forces and human rights concerns could be discussed, and progress could lead to full normalization." In the plenary session, he said, "We do not have highly enriched uranium." In a bilateral with Kelly he denied having a program or the materials necessary for a program. (Glenn Kessler and Philip Pan, "N. Korea Repeats Uranium Denial," Washington Post, February 26, 2004, p. A-14) Kim Gae-gwan said U.S. allegations about the HEU program were "without foundation in fact." (Philip Pan, "Nuclear Talks Clouded by N. Korea's Denial of Enrichment Effort," Washington Post, February 25, 2004, p. A-20) U.S. proposed discussing replacement of armistice with permanent peace mechanism in parallel with normalization talks, but only after North makes steady progress on dismantling. (Kyodo, "U.S. Eyes Permanent Peace Mechanism for Korean Peninsula," May 2, 2004) "If the US insists on putting forward fictitious calls on a highly enriched uranium program, this will only result in prolonging of the nuclear question," Xinhua quotes a DPRK spokesman as saying. "If the US administration had not put forward a hostile policy against North Korea, naming it as part of the ‘axis of evil,’ and broken the October 1994 DPRK-US Agreed Framework, then the present nuclear problem would never have emerged." (AFP, "North Korea Denies Uranium Program, Casting a Pall over Crisis Talks," February 24, 2004) Kim asked Kelly to show evidence of HEU program. Kelly replied, "If I were to give you all that information it might make it easier for you to conceal it." Kelly adds, "It was clear by the conclusion of the talks that this is now very much on the table." (Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 2, 2004) Kelly testified in his opening remarks, "We discussed Libya’s example with our North Korean counterparts, and we hope they understand its significance. Once North Korea’s nuclear issue is resolved, discussions would be possible on a wide range of issues that could lead to an improvement in relations." Lee Soo-hyuck tabled three-stage ROK proposal. In the first stage, the North would state “its willingness to dismantle its nuclear program” and the United States would state “its readiness to provide security guarantees.” Then “North Korea would take a step towards dismantling its programs by freezing its nuclear activities.” North Korea would then get “energy aid and other rewards” once inspectors have verified the freeze and the North
presented “a definite timetable from a freeze to complete dismantlement,” UnifMin elaborated. (Paul Kerr, “Six Nations Square Off over North Korea,” Arms Control Today (March 2004), p. 34) “Russia and China, together with us, clearly expressed their willingness to join in energy aid, Lee later said. “The United States and Japan expressed their understanding and support for this.” (AFP, “N. Korea Offers to Freeze Nuclear Program; US Says Talks Promising,” February 27, 2004) Washington, insisting on elimination, opposed a freeze and refused to join in providing heavy fuel oil, but Kelly, edging beyond his instructions, called the proposal “creative.” (Philip P. Pan and Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Says U.S. Demand Is Stalling Nuclear Talks,” Washington Post, February 27, 2004, p. A-24.) Kelly said the U.S. “understood and supported” the offer of energy assistance by others. (Joseph Kahn, “U.S. and North Korea Agree to More Talks,” New York Times, February 29, 2004, p. 9) With no U.S. promise of electricity, Kim Gae-gwan backtracked. “We don’t plan to include our civilian nuclear program for peaceful purposes in the freeze and dismantlement.” (Yonhap, Press Conference by Kim Gye-gwan, February 28, 2004) Kelly, in turn, withdrew the offer of security assurances and, on new instructions from Washington approved by Vice President Dick Cheney, acting in Secretary of State Powell’s absence, said that continued U.S. support for the talks depended on North Korea’s commitment to CVID. If not, U.S. goodwill could run out, he warned, and all options remained on the table. US opposition to reference to security assurances in draft led China to give up trying to get an agreed joint communiqué. Sandbagged by Cheney, Powell struck back. After China said the U.S. would be isolated because the North had agreed to the statement, Powell got Bush to issue new instructions to Kelly to extend the talks for another day and to emphasize U.S. patience and flexibility. (Glenn Kessler, “Bush Signals Patience on North Korea Is Waning,” Washington Post, March 4, 2004, p. A-14; Kyodo, “Wording on Security Assurances Dropped from 6-Party Draft Statement, March 5, 2004) Cheney late on the night of February 26 persuaded President Bush to draft new, more hard-edged instructions for U.S. negotiators in Beijing -- which Secretary of State Powell only learned about the next day. The original instructions to the delegation said that any joint statement issued after the talks must include language on a “complete, verifiable irreversible dismantlement” of North Korea’s weapons, known in the diplomatic world by the shorthand of “CVID.” But the North Koreans had rejected that during the talks. The chief U.S. negotiator, Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly, reported back about the impasse, wondering if the delegation instead should try to obtain a bland diplomatic statement short of original U.S. goals. With Powell and his deputy, Richard L. Armitage, away at a black-tie event, Bush drafted new instructions with Cheney’s input. The instructions -- which in diplomatic terms suggested the administration’s “continued support” of the six-nation talks was in jeopardy unless the U.S. demands were met -- were dictated over the phone by White House official Michael Green to the delegation, bypassing the standard State Department cable system. Powell and Armitage did not find out about the new instructions until they woke up next morning, and Powell began fielding anguished calls from his Asian counterparts. The Chinese foreign minister told Powell the North Koreans were now willing to sign a more generic statement calling for continued talks. That afternoon, Powell pulled Bush aside before a luncheon with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and argued for accepting a statement that the U.S. government 12 hours earlier said was unacceptable. Bush reluctantly agreed -- but, despite Chinese
assurances, the North Koreans rejected it anyway. (Glenn Kessler, “Impact from the Shadows,” Washington Post, October 5, 2004, p. A-1) Stephen Yates, Asian affairs specialist on Cheney’s staff, recalls, “There was niggling about what was in the joint statement and not. And it looked like the joint statement was something that could be held up to appear strikingly similar to a return to the Agreed Framework.” He reported that to Cheney. “And he did have a strong opinion that this is no time to show weaknesses. Given the appearance of walking back what standards we would require on counterproliferation was the wrong signal to send. And if that is where the negotiations are going, that’s a mistake.” Deputy SecState Armitage thought he had agreed with Deputy NSA Hadley on the instructions to Kelly, but that is when Cheney met privately with Bush and toughened them up. (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 205) But on Saturday the North offered a last-minute change of its own in the draft, “all parties acknowledge differences remain and agree to narrow those differences in further discussion.” (Daniel Sneider, “Dangerous Deadlock,” San Jose Mercury News, March 18, 2004) At dinner on the 25th hosted by FM Li Zhaoxing, Kim and Kelly had a heated discussion. (Kyodo, “China, U.S., N. Korea Hold Heated Discussion during Dinner,” February 25, 2004) DPRK statement on 25th [2nd day] sharply criticizes US hard-line stance: “Although the U.S. bellicose forces are keen to impose tougher economic sanctions on the DPRK while persisting in their political and ideological offensives to isolate and stifle it, it remains unfazed by the threat. Rodong Sinmun Tuesday says this in a signed commentary. It goes on: ... There is no need for the DPRK to get anything by threatening someone nor for it to get its ‘system guaranteed’ by someone. Everything is going well in the DPRK.” (KCNA, “DPRK Unfazed by Any Threat of Tougher Economic Blockade,” February 25, 2004) PRC FoMin spokesman Liu Jiancao says, “Right now, the parties are in the process of carrying out intensive consultations on a document, so the hope still exists.” Powell tells Senate Budget Committee yesterday, “The results of the first two days of meetings are positive.” (Jack Kim and Jonathan Ansfield, “North Korea Talks Plagued by Contradictions,” Reuters, February 27, 2004) North proposed last-minute revision to chairman’s statement, adding the clause, “differences remained” into the point that participants “enhanced their understanding of each other’s positions.” (Karasaki Taro, “Talks End with Little Headway Made,” Asahi Shimbun, March 1, 2004) “North Korea is not ready to drop all its nuclear programs,” says Russian dep FM Losyukov. “North Korea is ready to drop its nuclear defense [weapons] program, but some countries are not satisfied with that.” Russia and China are willing to let them conduct “scientific research into nuclear energy.” (Philip P. Pan and Glenn Kessler, “Korea Arms Talks Bring No Agreement,” Washington Post, February 28, 2004, p. A-14) U.S. delegation informed North it “might” be willing to negotiate a “permanent peace mechanism” after resolution of nuclear issue, State acknowledged on May 3, 2004. (Paul Kerr, “North Korea Nuclear Talks: If at First You don’t Succeed, Meet Again,” Arms Control Today, (June 2004), p. 32)

Kim Gye-gwan tells reporters after the talks, “We made it clear that if the principle of package settlement based on simultaneous actions is not possible in a single attempt, ‘word for word’ measures [agreement in principle] can be implemented as a first-step measure. If this is carried out, then we can freeze our nuclear development plan and corresponding measures should be taken. A nuclear freeze is the first step toward
A U.S. official dismissed the HEU denial: “The DPRK did say and has said that it will dismantle its nuclear programs. The devil, of course, is in the details.” Asked about its willingness to give up its military but not its peaceful nuclear programs, he says, “The problem is, I am not aware of any peaceful programs in the DPRK.” (Teruaki Ueno and Jonathan Ansfield, “N. Korea Talks End with Deep Divisions Laid Bare,” Reuters, February 28, 2004)

Kim and Yabunaka met for about 80 minutes on the sidelines of the talks and agreed to continue government-level dialogue on the abductions. (Kyodo, “6-Nation Talks Begin with Gaps between N. Korea, U.S.,” February 25, 2004) DPRK and Japan held bilaterals all four days. If Koizumi gets kin of 5 too soon, attention will turn to fate the 10. (Kobayashi Kakumi, “Focus: Lack of Progress on Abductions Likely to Hurt Koizumi Govt,” Kyodo, February 28, 2004) Kim told Yabunaka “progress in the abduction issue is correlated with the nuclear issue and U.S. relations.” (Karasaki Taro, “Analysis: Kim’s Abduction
Instead of joint statement, Wang Yi issues chairman’s statement summarizing the parties’ points of accord: “1. The second round of six-party talks was held in Beijing among the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from 25th to 28th of February, 2004. 2. The heads of delegations were Mr. Wang Yi, vice minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC; Mr. Kim Kye-gwan, vice minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK; Ambassador Mitoji Yabunaka, director-general for the Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Ambassador Lee Soo-Hyuck, deputy minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK; Ambassador Alexander Losiukov, vice minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; Mr. James Kelly, assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of State. 3. The Parties agreed that the second round of the six-party talks had launched the discussion on substantive issues, which was beneficial and positive, and that the attitudes of all parties were serious in the discussion. Through the talks, while differences remained, the Parties enhanced their understanding of each other’s positions. 4. The Parties expressed their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula, and to resolving the nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue in a spirit of mutual respect and consultations on an equal basis, so as to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the region at large. 5. The Parties expressed their willingness to coexist peacefully. They agreed to take coordinated steps to address the nuclear issue and address the related concerns. 6. The Parties agreed to continue the process of the talks and agreed in principle to hold the third round of the six-party talks in Beijing no later than the end of the second quarter of 2004. They agreed to set up a working group in preparation for the plenary. The terms of reference of the working group will be established through diplomatic channels. 7. The delegations of the DPRK, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the USA have expressed their appreciation to the Chinese side for the efforts aimed at the successful staging of the two rounds of the six-party talks.” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Chairman’s Statement for the Second Round of Six-Party Talks,” February 28, 2004 [NAPSNET text]) Japanese official says agreement to take “coordinated steps … to address related concerns” is a reference to abductees. (Sato Takeshi, “No Breakthroughs at 6-Way Talks, But Dialogue to Continue,” Kyodo, February 28, 2004)

Los Alamos experts say samples from 1998 Pakistan nuclear test contained plutonium, not HEU that Pakistan said they used to make weapons, and say it may have come from North Korea in return for help from A.Q. Khan. “It could only have come from one of two places: China or North Korea,” said one intel official. “And it seemed like China had nothing to gain.” Robert Einhorn says it was “speculation” that North Korea provided plutonium for the test. “It’s conceivable that Pakistani testing was providing data that was benefit to the North Koreans but hard evidence doesn’t exist on it.” A senior Clinton administration defense official disagreed. “We thought the most plausible explanation was that it was a joint test,” he said. “But there was nothing that formed compelling evidence.” (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test,” New York Times, February 27, 2004, p. A-10)
2/29/04 DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. again insisted on its old assertion about the DPRK’s abandoning its nuclear program first, saying that it can discuss the DPRK’s concerns only when it completely scraps its nuclear program in a verifiable and irreversible manner. ... This threw a big hurdle in the way of the talks. It also absurdly asserted that it can not normalize relations with the DPRK unless missile, conventional weapons, biological and chemical weapons, human rights and other issues are settled even after its abandonment of all its nuclear programs. ...Any further six-way talks will not prove helpful to the solution of the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. unless the U.S. shows its will to make a switchover in its policy toward the DPRK. ...In spite of this situation we consented to the time to open the next round of the six-way talks and to the issue of organizing a working group proceeding from the sincere and patient stand to seek a negotiated peaceful solution of the nuclear issue at any cost. ...The U.S. seems to waste time in a bid to attain its political purpose but any delay in the solution of the nuclear issue would cause nothing unfavorable to the DPRK. This would give us time to take all necessary measures with an increased pace.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks,” February 29, 2004)

In Democratic presidential debate, Dan Rather asks about North Korea. Kerry: “There is a deal to be struck. And what is quite extraordinary is that this administration did not follow up on the extraordinary work of Bill Perry, of ... President Clinton, and the work that they did to actually get inspectors and television cameras into the Pyongyang reactor. Now they’re gone. Edwards: “I will go back immediately to dialogue.” Rather: Would you be prepared to subdue North Korea if we learn unequivocally they have nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them? “I would never take that option off the table. ... But the problem is, we weren’t leading the discussions. ... The South Koreans were making proposals; others were making proposals. We weren’t leading.” (Text)

3/1/04 In televised speech to the nation, Roh says, “Whether we are pro-U.S. or anti-U.S. cannot be the yardstick to assess ourselves. Step by step, we should strengthen our independence and build our strength as an independent nation.” (Choe Sang-hun, “S. Korean Chief Seeks Less U.S. Reliance,” Associated Press, March 1, 2004) “If there’s one piece of advice I’d give to Japan, it’s that while citizens and one or two politicians engrossed in their own popularity may frequently make reckless statements that hurt us, at least national leaders shouldn’t.” (Chosun Ilbo, “Roh Slams Japanese PM in March 1st Speech,” March 1, 2004)

South to give North 200,000 tonnes of fertilizer (worth $60 million) it requested, set aside $40 million for infrastructure in Kaesong. (AFP, “South Korea Gives North Korea Fertilizer, Construction Aid,” March 1, 2004)

Annual report on International Narcotics Control Strategy says it is “highly likely, but not certain, that Pyongyang is trading narcotic drugs for profit as state policy,” citing seizures by Australia of 125 kilos of heroin on Pong Su and 50 kilos of metamphetimines in Pusan on Chinese ship in June. (AFP, “US Attacks North Korea’s ‘State’ Drugs Trafficking Policy,” March 1, 2004)
Kim Sa-nae, wife of Kang Thae-yun, DPRK economic counselor in Islamabad and a leading arms dealer, shot to death by North Koreans near A.Q. Khan's home in 1998, ten days after Pakistan nuclear test, was part of 20-member delegation of engineers and scientists invited to witness the test say former staff members at Khan's lab. “She was in fact killed by the North Koreans on the grounds that she was in touch with certain Western diplomats,” says an Indian official. The cargo plane carrying her body home on was owned by the Pakistani air force and had P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, technical data and uranium [hexafluoride] on board. (Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi, “Death of N. Korean Woman Offers Clues to Pakistani Nuclear Deals,” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 2004)

3/2/04

Departing from his prepared text, Powell underscored U.S. patience and flexibility in a speech at the Heritage Foundation in an effort to keep the talks from breaking down: “The United States, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia have made it clear to North Korea that a better future awaits them, that none of these nations is intent on attacking them or destroying them or exhibiting hostile intent toward them; instead, we want to help the people of North Korea who are in such difficulty now, but it must begin with North Korea’s understanding that these programs must be ended in a verifiable way. And if North Korea takes the necessary steps, as we move forward, North Korea will see that the other members of the six-party group and the rest of the world will welcome them and do everything we can to help them.” (Reuters, “Powell Appears to Dangle Carrot to North Korea,” March 2, 2004; Powell, Text of Annual B.C. Lee Luncheon Lecture to the Heritage Foundation)

In an impromptu meeting with FM Ban Ki-moon, according to North American Affairs Bureau chief Kim Seok, Bush asked four questions: how Korea views the last round of six-party talks (Ban saw some positive signs), whether Korea thinks the North will abandon its nuclear programs (ultimately it will), whether the Korean people are still uneasy about the U.S. troop redeployment (they are), and whether the North and South can communicate by telephone (Ban told him there were 38 official contacts last year). (Chosun Ilbo, “Bush Meet with FM Ban,” March 3, 2004)

Ruling coalition to introduce bill authorizing ban on North Korean ships calling on ports. A senior New Komeito official says, “A law stipulating a ban would be a bargaining chip in talks with North Korea. The government should decide whether to use the law or not.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Coalition to Submit Legislation Allowing Ban on N. Korea Ships,” March 2, 2004)

In letter to Brownback, AFSC, Mercy Corps and others says his bill “politicizes and complicates urgent humanitarian issues” and “could put refugees at risk.” (Text of Letter dated March 3, 2004)

Tom Malinowski, Human Right Watch: “The most difficult challenge lies in whether more direct efforts can be made to ease repression inside North Korea itself. In facing this challenge, the first conclusion I come to is that further isolation of North Korea will not help. ... The more outsiders we can get into North Korea ... the better. Such contact could help break through the wall of isolation and disinformation the North Korean government has built between its people and the world. It could help to create
among North Koreans a consciousness that a different existence is possible. This is the essential first step if there is to be any internal pressure for change in the country.” (Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, March 2, 2004)

3/2-5/04


“They made the proposal that we should start thinking about cooperating on electric power in Kaesong, but we don’t think the time is appropriate,” says UnifMin spokesman Han Sang-il. (Jack Kim, “North’s Proposal to Discuss Electricity Rebuffed,” Reuters, March 3, 2004)

3/3/04

Asst SecState Kelly: “The D.P.R.K. needs to make a strategic choice for transformed relations with the United States and the world -- as other countries have done, including quite recently -- to abandon all of its nuclear programs. We also made clear that there are other issues that, as the nuclear issue begins to unfold, can be discussed with the U.S. Missiles, conventional forces, and serious human rights concerns could be discussed, and progress could lead to full normalization. ... The North Koreans came to the table denying a uranium enrichment program. It was very clear by the conclusion of the talks that this is now very much on the table.” (Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, March 3, 2004; Korea Herald, “Bush Confident of N.K. Nuclear Settlement,” March 3, 2004)

Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi report sees problems with relying too much on China in six-party talks.

“China may be sugar-coating messages transmitted to the United States and North Korea to keep everyone happy and on board,” they write. “China may be papering over very significant differences that only come to light when the six parties come together, and then the revelations come as a jolt to both sides.” (Carol Giacomo, “Caution Raised about China Role with North Korea,” Reuters, March 3, 2004)

At House Budget Cmte meeting, New Komeito’s Urushibara challenges Koizumi over sanctions, “There is no point in giving the government a new sword if they are never willing to draw it.” Koizumi replies, “Using swords isn’t the only way to defeat one’s enemies. It would be best to move forward without drawing our sword.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Govt Wary over Pressure on N. Korea,” March 5, 2004)

3/4/04

Roh releases security policy calling for transfer of OPCON, revision of SOFA, turning six-party talks into a regional security forum. (Chosun Ilbo, “Gov’t Makes Public Future Security Policy,” March 4, 2004) Roh tells reporters, “In fact, the United States wants us to join it in severing dialogue and exchanges with North Korea and putting pressure on the North. ... We, however, think it is more favorable for us to adopt a strategy of dialogue and engage North Korea concurrently. ... We will begin a program for North Korea’s economic development and opening which will enhance cooperative relationships in Northeast Asia, help consolidate a regime of peace, and establish an economically cooperative network or community in the region.” (Nelson Report, March 4, 2004)

3/4-5/04 New CIA estimate briefed to White House concludes A.Q. Khan sold North Korea “the complete package,” said a senior US official, all it needed to make weapons from uranium hexafluoride and centrifuges to one or more wahead designs. “What we are getting is second-hand accounts, which means the Pakistanis may be editing it,” said one senior US diplomat. Khan’s transactions traced to the early 1990s under Benazir Bhutto. US intelligence does not know where the site or sites are or when it would be operational. North Korea may only be assembling a few hundred centrifuges a year. “The best guess is still in the next year or two, but it is a guess,” said one senior US official with access to the report. North Koreans worked at Khan’s lab in the late 1990s. A lengthy timeline of transfers included some shipments on Pakistani military aircraft. US satellites repeatedly photographed Pakistani cargo planes at an airfield in Pyongyang then believed to be picking up missile parts. “We suspected there was a quid pro quo, and there was a lot of speculation on the nuclear side. But there was no evidence.” By the late 1990s Khan had converted the one way trade in missile technology to two-way trade involving uranium hexafluoride and centrifuges. The estimate was disclosed to closest allies, including Japan. (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Widens View of Pakistani Link to Korean Arms,” New York Times, March 14, 2004, p. 1)

In Diet debate on legislation to bar North Korean ships from Japanese ports, Koizumi had an exchange with an opposition party lawmaker who argued, “There is no point giving the government a new sword if [it is] never willing to draw it.” Koizumi parried the blow, “Using swords isn’t the only way to defeat our enemies. It is best to move forward without drawing the sword.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Government Wary Over Pressure on N. Korea,” March 5, 2004)

3/5/04 New IRBM based on Soviet SS-N-6 technology has improved range and accuracy. Widespread speculation holds that North has developed smaller nuclear warheads. Andrew Feickert, “Missile Survey,” Congressional Research Service, March 5, 2004)

Powell: “There is no sense of urgency.” Jack Pritchard says Pyongyang would rather take its chances with Kerry than negotiate with Bush. Nicholas Eberstadt of AEI says, “The administration is presuming it will have more options concerning North Korea further down the line.” (George Gedda, “Newsview: U.S., N. Korea Decide to Wait,” Associated Press, March 10, 2004)

3/8/04 Rodong Sinmun: “At the talks the U.S. repeated its assertion of ‘scrapping nuclear program before dialogue,’ while making no positive change in its stand. The DPRK cannot but call into question the U.S. insistence on ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of nuclear program.’ … The U.S. demand for ‘complete dismantlement of nuclear program’ is an essential ambition to wrest the nuclear deterrent force from the DPRK free of charge to disarm it and overthrow its system. In other words, it is a brigandish logic for ‘scrapping nuclear program before overthrowing the DPRK’s system.’ … Now that the U.S. is persistently forcing the ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible
dismantlement of nuclear program’ upon the DPRK, turning aside from the latter’s elastic and most magnanimous proposal, the DPRK cannot but demand the U.S. completely withdraw its troops from south Korea in a verifiable way and make the ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible security assurance’ guaranteeing the adoption of peace agreement and normalization of relations.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun on Key to Settlement of Nuclear Issue,” March 8, 2004) Minju Joson: “The delay in the settlement of the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. will be unfavorable to the U.S. alone. During the time given, the DPRK will take all necessary measures with an increased pace.” (Reuters, “North Korea Making Good Use of Talks Delay - Daily,” March 9, 2004)

Powell in invw: A few FSOs are not as “dedicated as I would like” them to be. Jack Pritchard “is an example in point. Jack was here for a couple of years. He was an expert in these matters, and he thought we ought to be moving in another direction, and I said, ‘No, the president wants us to do it this way.’ And he left, and now he’s writing long, tortured articles about how we are doing it wrong. Fine – you do it on the outside. But if you are here, do it our way.” Nicholas Kralev, “Diplomats Fight Their Stuffed-White-Short Image,” Washington Times, March 8, 2004)

DCI Tenet asked at Senate Armed Services Committee if North Korea will follow Libya’s lead, said, “Low likelihood at this point. It’s a good example but I don’t know that others will follow the lead.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea Unlikely to Follow Libya’s Example, CIA Chief Says, March 11, 2004)


3/10/04 DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The United States is advertising that the six-way talks achieved a ‘success’ in a bid to calm down the bitter domestic and foreign criticism of its act of hamstringing the settlement of the nuclear issue and prevent an atmosphere unfavorable to the forthcoming presidential election from being created. The recent talks could not yield any results due to the fundamental difference between the DPRK and the U.S. in their stands. The U.S. talked about ‘talks without any precondition’ whenever an opportunity presented itself. But at the recent talks the U.S. only repeated the assertion that ‘the DPRK should scrap its nuclear program first’ with which it came out at the tripartite talks and the six-way talks held last year, refusing to show any will to make a switchover in its policy. ... Refuting the groundless accusation made by the U.S. against the DPRK over ‘enriched uranium program,’ he said the DPRK has never admitted it. The U.S. far-fetched assertion about this program is intended to attack the DPRK under that pretext just as it did against Iraq, he noted, and continued: The U.S. reckless stance only pushes the DPRK to further increase its nuclear deterrent force.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK FM Denounces U.S. Reckless Stand at Six-Way Talks,” March 10, 2004)
Christopher Hill, current ambassador to Poland, will replace Thomas Hubbard. (Choi Jie-ho, “U.S. Reported Set to Replace Seoul Envoy,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 10, 2004) [Rumsfeld says to Hill, “I hope you’re not another one of those whiny ambassadors.” DG 7/22/04]

3/11/04
KCNA: “A rumor is afloat on the international arena that the DPRK is driving the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. to a quagmire in the hope that if Bush is voted down, it would be possible to settle the nuclear issue more favorably. The Washington Times on March 6 in an article titled ‘North Korea hopes Bush to resign’ said that north Korea is hoping President Bush from the Republican Party to fail in the U.S. presidential election slated for November and step down. We do not care where such opinion came from. But we cannot but clarify that this is nothing but sheer misinformation as it is an expression of utter ignorance of the independent nature of the DPRK's diplomacy. It is clear that this misinformation is aimed to serve the purpose of speaking for the present U.S. administration which finds itself in a difficult position after being bitterly censured at home and abroad for driving the DPRK-U.S. relations to the lowest ebb and coming out to the second round of the six-way talks without any proposal. … The DPRK does not care at all whether a candidate from the Democratic Party is elected or a candidate from the Republican Party is elected in the United States because it is a matter to be decided by the U.S. voters. … Whoever elected U.S. president should be willing to make a switchover in its policy toward the DPRK, drop the hostile policy toward it and express readiness to coexist with it. This is a main point.” (KCNA, “KCNA on U.S. Foolish Way of Thinking,” March 11, 2004)

3/12/04
National Assembly impeaches Roh; PM Goh Kun assumes his duties. (Park Song-wu, “National Assembly Impeaches President Roh,” Korea Times, March 12, 2004) In poll 72.8% of Koreans say impeachment is “wrong” or “very wrong.” Only 11.1% say Roh should step down right away. (Ryu Jin, “7 Out of 10 Oppose Impeachment,” Korea Times, March 12, 2004)

Reiss: “The United States and our partners expect an unambiguous indication from North Korea's representatives to the Six-Party Talks that their country is committed to permanent non-nuclear status and is prepared to completely dismantle all its programs, subject to international verification. …We want North Korea to understand one thing: The United States is committed to achieving a more “normal” relationship with a “normal” North Korea. But we cannot even begin the journey toward improved relations so long as the North clings to its nuclear programs. …As the President and Secretary Powell have stated, we are prepared to join our partners in documenting a multilateral assurance to North Korea in the context of its implementation of an effective verification regime that will assure us that its nuclear program will not be reconstituted. But is North Korea equally prepared to explain to us just why it wants this assurance? And above all, precisely why our providing a document will lead it to alter its legacy of bad – and often illegal – behavior? …Why, then, does Pyongyang expect us to believe that assurances have such value? Are we to believe that it will surrender its tangible nuclear weapons program for an intangible promise of security? North Korea must recognize that the very best guarantee of its security is not a piece of paper, but a strategic determination to join the mainstream of the region – with all of the myriad trade, diplomatic, and cultural contacts this would entail. …Consider North Korea's demands
for economic assistance, food, energy, and recognition. We are prepared to help on all these fronts if North Korea is responsive to our concerns. But what is North Korea doing to make it possible for the international community to help with any of these things? The North says it wants financial assistance? Well, then, what further economic reform and restructuring measures is it prepared to take? The wage and price reforms that North Korea finally initiated in July 2002 were a start. But they have led to high inflation and created other social problems. Is the North prepared to remake its capital markets? To reform outdated Leninist modes of economic management? Will it right the extremely inappropriate imbalance between guns and butter that has long characterized the very essence of the North Korean state? Without adopting international standards, North Korea cannot possibly expect international lenders to assist it in reforming its economy. The North says it wants more food aid? Well, then, is it prepared to allow the World Food Program to apply the same monitoring and access conditions it applies to other recipients? Will it allow Korean-speaking international staff to conduct on-site inspections without days of advance notice? Will it allow access to all counties throughout North Korea? We are not making special requests here. These are WFP’s standard operating procedures for countries all over the world. The North says it wants energy assistance? Well, then, is it prepared to explain how it would manage supply and demand? To ensure fairness in the distribution and management of energy? To manage its grid? To adequately promote conservation? To wean politically-favored units off of the excess use of limited power? The North says it wants us to recognize its sovereignty? Well, then, is it prepared to welcome the presence of foreign diplomats into North Korea? To allow them to walk the streets of Pyongyang, Kaesong, and Wonsan without official minders and function the way they do in nearly every country around the world? To meet and speak with ordinary North Koreans?”


Information from A.Q. Khan suggests he supplied “equipment for centrifuges for over a decade ending in 2001,” said one senior official. Another says it is unclear he supplied centrifuges that far back, but there was “information exchanges” and discussions about “parameters of cooperation” on HEU as far back as 1991, said another. (Carol Giacomo, “N. Korea Nuclear Program Older Than First Believed,” Reuters, March 12, 2004)

3/15/04

3/17/04
LDP and Komeito agree to submit bill to Diet banning North Korean ships from Japan’s ports intended as a “negotiating card” with the North. (Kyodo, “Ruling Parties to Submit N. Korea Ship Ban Bill to Diet,” March 17, 2004)

KCNA says, “The U.S. is chiefly to blame” for impeachment. “The U.S. egged [on] the South Korean political quacks, obsessed by the greed for power, to stage such an incident in a bid to install an ultra-right pro-U.S. regime there.” (Reuters, “North Korea Says U.S. Engineered Roh Impeachment,” March 17, 2004) UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun
said, “It is very regret[able] that the North is trying to portray that the United States is behind the impeachment.” (Ryu Jin, “Seoul Regrets Pyongyang’s Remarks on Impeachment,” Korea Times, March 18, 2004)

3/19/04 3,600 ROK troops to deploy to Najaf, not Kirkuk. (Ryu Jun, “Troop Dispatch Delayed with Changed Location,” Korea Times, March 19, 2004)

Pm Kopizumi says he will explain to the Japanese people that Japan needs U.S. help in dealing with threats from North Korea so they will understand why he supports the United States over the war in Iraq. (Kyodo, “Koizumi to Tell People N. Korea Threat Led Him to Back U.S.,” March 19, 2004) Senior LDP official: it was a deal: Japanese troops to Iraq in exchange for U.S. support for Japan’s position of dealing with North Korea. (Asahi Shimbun, Kokuren yori Bei’ no meian,” March 19, 2004)


3/24/04 FM Li Zhaoxing meets with KJI, first Chinese FM in Pyongyang in five years. (AFP, “Chinese FM Meets with North Korea’s Kim Jong-il,” March 24, 2004) “The two sides agreed to work together to push forward the process of six-party talks and use dialogue to peacefully settle the issue,” Li told reporters. FoMin spokesman Kong Quan said, “They have reached extensive consensus.” [on draft joint statement?] Ning Fukui, China’s new envoy to the DPRK, said, “North Korea also hopes that the working groups can be set up soon to solve some concrete problems.” (Associated Press, “China: N. Korea Willing to ‘Push Forward’ on Nuke Talks,” USA Today, March 25, 2004) FM Li quoted as saying, “I learned the North said it had an intention to give up its ‘nuclear power industry’ as well as its nuclear weapons, if corresponding measures are appropriately provided to them.” (AFP, “North Korea Willing to Give Up All Nuclear Facilities,” April 4, 2004)

North Korea Human Rights Act introduced by Jim Leach (R-IA) (Text)

3/25/04 Powell: “Success in diplomacy is often most advantageous when it's incomplete. That may sound strange, but all I mean is that it's possible to overdo things -- that there are ways of winning that can turn victory into defeat. Examples of overreach fill history books. Fortunately, there are also examples in those books of getting it right. Another way to put this principle is that an adversary needs an honorable path of escape if we’re to achieve our main policy goals without using force. Some adversaries will never take that avenue of exit, of escape -- Saddam Hussein being a perfect example. A cornered adversary may lash out, and our eventual success at arms, if it comes at all, could be a pyrrhic victory. The diplomacy of the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates this. By offering to remove U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey that we’d scheduled for removal anyway, President Kennedy gave Chairman Khrushchev a way out. He took it. Our success was incomplete. We didn’t get the Soviets altogether out of Cuba at that time. We didn’t get Fidel Castro out of power, as we know. …The DPRK North Korean
leadership has been trying to generate a crisis atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula. It’s part of a pattern of extortion that the DPRK has practiced over many years. It wouldn’t be diplomatic for me to lay out all of our tactics in dealing with North Korea, but it’s telling no secrets out of school to say that the President’s been very patient. All options remain on the table, but we’ve focused our efforts on persuasion, so we get back to principle number one.” (Colin Powell, “Remarks at the 2004 Annual Kennan Institute Dinner, Woodrow Wilson Institute for International Scholars, March 25, 2004, DOS Text)

Matthew Daley, DAS for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at DOS, tells House East Asia Subcommittee, “We have reason to believe that the DPRK has offered surface-to-surface missiles” to Myanmar. “We have raised this issue of possible missile transfers with senior Burmese officials and registered our concerns in unambiguous language.” Keith Luse, Lugar aide, had warned last month of need to pay “special attention” to the North’s growing relationship with Myanmar. (AFP, “US Accuses North Korea of Seeking to Sell Missiles to Myanmar,” March 25, 2004)

3/29/04


3/30/04


Bolton testimony contradicts Reiss on “other issues of concern”: “We do not raise these issues because we want to set the bar higher for any negotiated settlement with North Korea. While our long-term goal remains the peaceful reunification of the peninsula, we know that any interim solution will require a comprehensive change in North Korean behavior.” Rep. William Delahunt (MA) asked about a recent New York Times article that reported “the most active exchange of nuclear missile technology between North Korea and Pakistan occurred between 1998 and 2002.” Bolton said, “I’m not going to comment on newspaper reports about intelligence assessments, particularly when they are wrong.” (Testimony by Under Secretary of State John Bolton to the House International relations Committee, March 30, 2004)
3/31/04  LaPorte testimony: “There is little evidence that any significant threat to the regime exists.” USFK Commander Gen. Leon J. LaPorte, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 31, 2004

North Korean engineer says documents on alleged gas chamber experiments he smuggled out were fake. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea: Alled Gas Chamber Witness Says He Lied,” Associated Press, March 31, 2004)

46.1 percent of South Koreans polled say aid to the North should be maintained, 16.9 percent say increase it, 32.7 percent say reduce it. (Ryu Jin, “6 of 10 Support Assistance to NK,” Korea Times, March 31, 2004)

4/1-2/04  Yamasaki Taru, Koizumi confidante, and Hirasawa Katsuei of LDP in Dalian meet in secret with Jong Thae-hwa, DPRK representative in normalization talks. Hirasawa, sec-gen of Rachi Giren, bipartisan Diet group on abduction issue, who had also met with Jong in December, is forced to resign as parliamentary secretary at Ministry of Home Affairs for acting without authorization. (Kyodo, “Hirasawa Gives up Post; Yamasaki Sees Early N. Korea Talks,” April 2, 2004) In interview, Hirasawa says five abductees do not have to return to North for kin to be released. (Asahi Shimbun, “N. Korea Drops Provisos on Return of Abductee Families,” April 5, 2004) LDP Sec-Gen Abe Shinzo says resumption of working-level talks by month’s end a “high probability.” Hirasawa tells kin of abductees that major progress has been made. North says Japan had breached Tanaka Hiroshi promise that abductees would return after visit. (Kyodo, “Abe Seeks Talks with N. Korea to Resolve Abduction Issue,” April 3, 2004) Koizumi says on April 5, “It was not that I or the Foreign Ministry asked” Yamasaki and Hirasawa to meet the North Koreans. [Did Fukuda?] “It therefore does not make it double-track [track two] diplomacy.” (Kyodo, “Koizumi Denies N. Korea Sees 2-Track Approach in Diplomacy,” April 5, 2004) In dinner meeting with Diet members joined by Koizumi on April 7, Yamasaki reveals Jong told him North Korea will allow abductees’ kin to go to Japan unconditionally. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Offers to Allow Abductees’ Kin to Go to Japan Freely,” April 8, 2004) Jong warned if Japan enacts bill to prevent port calls by North Korean ships, it would be unable to resolve the abduction issue for twenty or thirty years. “It is clear that they intended to have Mr. Yamasaki convey this message to Prime Minister Koizumi,” says Abe Shinzo. “But regardless of whether a working-level meeting between Tokyo and Pyongyang is held, the bill must be debated thoroughly according to prescribed rules and enacted during the current Diet session.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “N. Korea Issued Threat over Bill to Ban Port Calls,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 4, 2004) Yamasaki also delivered a personal message to Koizumi from Kim Jong-il, “I want to normalize relations by resolving all nuclear, abduction and missile issues in two and a half years, while Koizumi is in office as prime minister.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Yamasaki: North Korea Will Let Abductees’ Families Leave,” April 9, 2004)

4/2/04  Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “Recently the United States and some other countries concerned came out with a ‘conception of the Northeast Asian Security Organization’ with the six-way framework for the solution to the nuclear issue in mind. But it is a premature idea as it is far removed from the reality. …The immediate task for security in Northeast Asia is to build bilateral confidence among the regional countries
through the removal of hostile relations and mistrust. The debate on creating the Northeast Asia security organization is an issue which may be taken up in a distant future when this crucial task has been carried out. ... The DPRK will not pay any attention to ‘the conception of the Northeast Asian Regional Security Organization’ far removed from the reality but make every possible effort to increase the capacity for self-defence to effectively cope with the U.S. and Japan’s immediate threat of aggression.” (KCNA, “‘Conception of Northeast Asian Security Organization’ Termed Premature,” April 2, 2004)

“Japan should not be partial to the United States,” Kono Yohei, speaker of the lower house, said in interview, but “needs to discuss matters more thoroughly with its Asian neighbors and make diplomatic efforts to settle problems. I’m not sure the country really made enough effort to do that.” (Hayano Toru, “Koizumi Needs to Listen to Those around Him,” Asahi Shimbun, April 3, 2004)

4/5/04
FM Kawaguchi Yoriko agrees with FM Li Zhaoxing to hold regular trilateral meetings with South Korea. (Japan Times, “Japan, China Agree on Regular Meeting Including South Korea,” April 4, 2004)

4/7-8/04
TCOG in SF. Discuss agenda for six-party talks. Agree on need to start working groups (James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), p A11)

4/10-15/04
Cheney in Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul to seek backing for U.S. stance. He tried to get China to act. Signalling U.S. impatience, he said “time is not on our side.” He told the Chinese U.S. will offer no concessions. Chinese urged flexibility. (Glenn Kessler, “Cheney to Reassert U.S. Position on Taiwan’s Status,” Washington Post, April 14, 2004, p. A-20) In speech at Fudan University, he warns of arms race in Asia. “We worry that, given what they’ve done in the past and given what we estimate to be their current capability, that North Korea could well, for example, provide [nuclear weapons] to, say, a terrorist organization.” (Doyle McManus, “Cheney Makes Clear U.S. Is Not Willing to Bend on North Korea,” Los Angeles Times, April 16, 2004) According to a source familiar with Cheney’s discussions, the immediate problem in North Korea’s slowness in agreeing to form working groups unless it gets aid from China and South Korea. Beijing had earlier delivered about $50 million in aid, including heavy fuel oil and a promise of a glass factory, as an inducement to attend the February round. The probable focus of the next round would be a North Korean offer to suspend, not dismantle, its nuclear program and insistence that any suspension be understood as the first step to dismantlement. (Edward Cody and Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea’s Kim Reportedly in China for Talks,” Washington Post, April 20, 2004, p. A-13) “The mission of the trip was to urge the Chinese to lean a bit more forward on things related to North Korea,” recalled Cheney’s Asia staffer Stephen Yates. (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 208)

4/12/04
A.Q. Khan has told interrogators he saw three nuclear devices in secret underground plant in North Korea five years ago. Cheney had been briefed and was expected to cite intelligence in meeting with Chinese. He provided a "shopping list" of everything it needed to produce thousands of centrifuges. “We think they’ve pretty much bought everything on the list, with the possible exception of a few components,” said one U.S.
official. “Asia can ignore a lot of things when it deems it convenient,” said Kurt Campbell. “But these reports make it very hard for the regional powers - China, South Korea, and Japan - to pretend publicly that North Korea doesn't already have a significant nuclear capability.” If the country already has a few nuclear weapons, some administration officials say, a few more would not make a strategic difference, but Samuel R. Berger says, “It’s an untenable argument. There’s a difference between two or three and eight, and it’s called the market in weapons for global terrorists.” (David E. Sanger, “Pakistan Says He Saw North Korean Nuclear Devices,” New York Times, April 13, 2004, p. A-12) Cheney “brought to the attention” of Chinese leaders the Times report and warned “time is not necessarily on our side,” says senior administration official. (Joseph Kahn, “Cheney Urges China to Press North Korea on A-Bombs,” New York Times, April 14, 2004, p. A-3) He conditions support for six-party on “real results.” (New York Times, “North Korean and Chinese Leaders Meet,” April 14, 2004, p. A-6)

4/13/04 U.S. will turn over Outpost Ouellette inside DMZ to ROKs. (Kim Hyung-jin, “U.S. Troops to Stop Patrolling DMZ, Ending 50-Year Role,” Yonhap, April 13, 2004)


The EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004

4/18/04 DPRK FoMin spokesman: “According to press reports, Cheney pulled up the DPRK, asserting that it poses a threat to peace and it is so dangerous as to spread nuclear and missile technology to such terrorist organizations as ‘Al Qaeda.’ He also blustered that the U.S. remains unchanged in its stand to demand ‘north Korea completely dismantle its nuclear program in a verifiable and irreversible manner,’ it is a top priority to put pressure upon north Korea to abandon its nuclear program and it will be an effective alternative to apply economic sanctions against it if it goes ahead with its nuclear program. These outcries are nothing new to the DPRK. It considered Cheney as a mentally deranged person steeped in the inveterate enmity towards the system in the DPRK long ago as he is the boss of the neo-conservative forces in the U.S. … It is quite understandable that the U.S. can not sleep in peace, terror-stricken by ‘Al Qaeda,’ but its unreasonably linking the DPRK to such organization is an expression of total ignorance and nothing but a far-fetched attempt to justify its hostile policy
towards the DPRK. Action is inevitably followed by reaction. The DPRK is seriously contemplating a measure to counter the U.S. off-repeated demand that it scrap its nuclear program first.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts Cheney’s Anti-DPRK Remarks,” April 18, 2004)

John Kerry: “Within weeks of being inaugurated, I will return to the U.N. and I will literally, formally rejoin the community of nations and turn over a proud new chapter in America’s relationship with the world, which will do a number of things. Number one, change how we’re approaching North Korea.” (NBC, “Meet the Press,” transcript, April 18, 2004)

4/19/04 DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK resolutely denounces the resolution, which does not deserve even a passing note, as a product of the U.S.-orchestrated political plot to isolate and stifle the DPRK. The resolution is, in essence, a product of politicization and selectivity of human rights. As already reported, the EU at a session held last year unilaterally abandoned the favorable process of all forms of dialogue and cooperation with the DPRK in the field of human rights and passed a resolution on human rights abuses in the DPRK all of a sudden. This year again it railroaded another resolution full of lies and fabrication through the session, interfering in the internal affairs of the DPRK.

This glaringly proves that the EU has openly joined the U.S. in its moves to achieve its sinister political purpose to slander the inviolable social system in the DPRK and force it to change its political system, instead of seeking genuine dialogue and cooperation with it in the field of human rights.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts EU’s Anti-DPRK Resolution,” April 19, 2004)


International Department of CPC Central Committee announces visit on April 21: in “a friendly and candid atmosphere” they agreed on “jointly pushing forward the six-party talks process, so as to make contributions to the eventual peaceful solution.” Kim “said the DPRK side sticks to the final nuclear weapons-free goal.” (Text) Kim told Chinese, say Japanese government sources, he would not accept calls for “complete scrapping” but would continue “carrying out nuclear programs for peaceful purposes.” He went to talks to “discuss ways to compensate North Korea for its freeze on the nuclear development program.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Kim: North Won’t End Nuclear Program, May 10, 2004) He ate Peking duck with Jiang Zemin at a restaurant near Tiananmin Square. “I don’t think China likes this kind of diplomacy,” Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University, said on keeping the visit secret.

I’ve heard that during his visit to Beijing,” says a high-level U.S. official, “North Korean leader Kim Jong-il told the Chinese Guidance Division of the Communist party, ‘I'm concerned that the U.S. stance toward us will be aggravated following next November’s presidential election.’ … We are focusing on whether or not it is true and the origin of the rumor.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “Kim Jong-il Worries about U.S. North Korea Policy Post-Election,” April 29, 2004)

Bush: “The only way to convince Kim Jong-il to disarm is to get China very much involved in the process, which we have done. It wasn’t easy because China felt it was the U.S. responsibility and they really didn’t want to have equity in the process.” (Annual Convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 21, 2004, FDCH E-Media text)

“This year’s North Korea nuclear crisis has been postponed – to be rescheduled at a date more convenient for the political calendar.” “It’s like they are just going through the motions,” says Charles L. Pritchard. “They have merely obtained their interim goal which is to keep Korea off the front pages.” “The North Korean reading is that the political tea leaves have changed. They are hoping for a Kerry victory, and in the meantime, they are moving toward becoming a nuclear power,” says Donald Gregg. “It matches Bush’s belief that he will be reelected and that the revalidation of a reelection will allow him to move toward a tougher policy on North Korea. This creates a dangerous situation.” (Barbara Demick, “N. Korean Nuclear Issue Simmers on the Back Burner,” Los Angeles Times, April 20, 2004) “The administration is just trying to kick this can down the road,” says Jonathan Pollack of the Naval War College. “In a funny way, I think both we and the North Koreans are waiting for November.” (Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Real Nuclear Danger,” New York Times, April 21, 2004, p. A-23) [right on Bush, wrong on DPRK]


Visiting North Korean, Jo Sung-su, North American affairs director, told U.S. scholars, “If the U.S. shows us that it is ready for co-existence, the nuclear problem can be resolved. Why would we need nuclear weapons if we no longer feel threatened. It is as simple as that.” (Selig Harrison, “Time for a Fresh Start on North Korea,” Financial Times, April 21, 2004, p. 13)

exceptional and humanitarian measure.” (Kyodo, “Japan May Give More Aid to N. Korea for Accident Victims,” April 26, 2004) South offers $20.3 million. (Kim Kwang-tae, “Seoul to Offer $23.4 Bln Won in Aid to N.K. Blast Victims,” Yonhap, April 28, 2004) KCNA announces arrival of aid from South Korean Red Cross. (KCNA, “First Batch of Relief Goods from South Side Here,” April 29, 2004) “This weekend we heard first-hand reports about the devastation and loss of life caused by a train accident in North Korea on April 22, 2004. We are saddened by these reports. Our thoughts and prayers are with the victims of the incident and with the families that have suffered terrible loss. We have received the findings of an international assessment team, and will provide $100,000 through the Red Cross to purchase supplies for those left homeless by the accident. We are also prepared to provide medical supplies and equipment, as well as a team of specialists in emergency medicine to work with the North Koreans, if they are needed. We provide all humanitarian aid in disasters based on need without regard to political issues.” (White House, Statement by the Press Secretary, April 26, 2004) Chargé Mark Minton says aid offered through the New York channel. Han Song-ryol says he accepted, “The United States expressed its intention to provide through the International Red Cross $100,000 in funds to purchase necessities for the victims of the Ryongchon accident.” Han adds, “In that the basic problem in the relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK is mistrust and misunderstanding, if we can build trust through contacts like this, it will help.” (Chosun Ilbo, “N. Korean Aid May Improve DPRK-U.S. Ties: N. Korean UN Ambassador,” May 5, 2004) Officials investigating the accident now believe it was an assassination attempt triggered by a mobile phone. “They still don’t know who planted the explosives, if indeed there were any,” said one official. “It’s very difficult to find any sign, as they would have used only a small amount to detonate a huge amount of ammonium nitrate. You don’t even need TNT to detonate it – it is just enough just to create a high temperature.” (Sergey Soukhorukov, “Train Blast Was ‘a Plot to Kill North Korea’s Leader,’” Daily Telegraph (U.K.), June 13, 2004) In the weeks after the mysterious Ryongchon train explosion that killed a dozen Syrian weapons scientists in North Korea on April 22, 2004, the Canadian Office of Foreign Affairs announced they were investigating reports that an Israeli Mossad spy travelling on a stolen Canadian passport was in North Korea around the time of the blast. Zev William Barkan was last seen in late April in Pyongyang, North Korea, after travelling there from Beijing using a Canadian passport issued under the name Kevin William Hunter, according to the Toronto Globe and Mail and other media reports. “The Canadian passport of Kevin William Hunter was said to have been reported stolen in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou on April 11, 2004”—11 days before the massive blast, measuring 3.6 on the Richter scale, at Ryongchon. “Israel Mossad agent in North Korea?” read the headline in the August 4 Jerusalem Post, adding “New Zealand passport scam takes Canadian twist.” The Canadian Press reported “Federal officials are investigating whether a suspected Israeli spy is travelling in Asia on a stolen Canadian passport.” It said “agencies are checking allegations that Zev William Barkan – embroiled in a New Zealand espionage caper – is using a Canadian passport issued under the name Kevin William Hunter.” “That part of the story’s being checked,” said Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Reynald Doiron. “All of that being put together, we should have a clearer picture.” Foreign Affairs spokesman Reynald Doiron told Canadian CTV television that “We are checking the information. We know some of the answers but not all of them and we are determined to get to the bottom of this.”
Barkan was at the time wanted by police in New Zealand in an espionage scandal that had erupted in the weeks before the North Korean train explosion. The rare public spy scandal captured New Zealand headlines on April 17 when two Israeli Mossad agents were charged with attempting to illegally obtain New Zealand passports for the use of the Mossad operative Zev Barkan. When two other Mossad operatives were arrested, Barkan, who was in New Zealand between March 3 and 20th, vanished. As part of the plot, Barkan attempted to assume the identity of a severely disabled New Zealand man with cerebral palsy. In an effort to secure the passport, Barkan obtained the man’s birth certificate and applied for a passport under his name, but his American accent raised the suspicions of a New Zealand official which sparked authorities to investigate. New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff told New Zealand radio that Barkan was a former Israel Defence Force diver and diplomat assigned to Israeli embassies in Vienna and Brussels between 1993 and 2001. New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark has said there was “no doubt whatsoever” that the men were spies. Secret cable from the American embassy in New Zealand confirmed U.S. officials knew the arrested men were Mossad agents. “We have very strong grounds for believing these are Israeli intelligence agents,” the cable, released in 2009 by WikiLeaks, said. “While Prime Minister Helen Clark would not confirm which service employed the men, she noted that if one were to lay espionage charges then one would have to be prepared to offer the kind of evidence in court which our intelligence agencies do not like coming forward to display.” One New Zealand news organization reported that “Barkan is being investigated by Macau and Chinese Immigration for his movements in April/May. The investigation includes his alleged use of the U.S. passport in the name of Zev Barkan and a second Canadian passport in the name of Kevin Hunter - which was stolen in Guangzhou China on April 11th.” The court arraignments on April 16 revealed that two Israeli’s were arrested on charges of attempting to obtain a New Zealand passport and Zev William Barkan had “fled the country and authorities concede they would not know where to find him.” But soon reports placed Barkan in Pyongyang, North Korea in late April, according to the Sydney Morning Herald and others, travelling on a stolen Canadian passport. And the unlikely saga only became more curious in the ensuing weeks and months. New Zealand, Canadian, Israeli and Australian media reported that Mossad agent Zev William Barkan was reported seen in Pyongyang working “as a security adviser for the North Korean government” where he was negotiating a contract to build a security wall along the border with China with Israeli-manufactured motion detectors and night vision equipment. Unconfirmed accounts citing an “Asian-based NGO closely linked to New Zealand intelligence networks” at a conference in Japan on issues of North Korean refugees, said “Israeli agents, including Barkan, had entered into North Korea under the guise of security consultants” in April. New Zealand news site scoop.com quoted “a senior NGO chief executive with Global-Protect All Children” as saying “Barkan is there negotiating details of an extensive contract for design and technical equipment to support a security wall project, including- but by no means limited to - Israeli produced motion sensors and night vision equipment.” “Barkan flew from Beijing to Pyongyang at the end of April. He was allegedly travelling on a Canadian passport issued in the name of Kevin Hunter, which had been reported stolen at the Canadian Consulate in the Southern Chinese city of Guangzhou in mid April.” The account said Israeli experts were conducting a “feasibility study on a security fence along the 1500 KM North
Korea China border.” New Zealand believed Barkan “was trying to secure a ‘clean’ passport for use in a sensitive Israeli undercover operation in the region, less risky than a forged passport,” according to the Sydney Morning Herald. Canada was already sensitive to Israel’s spy services carrying out black espionage operations under the cover of fraudulent Canadian passports. The Israeli government officials offered no comment on the case, but the Canadian investigation of Barkan followed another investigation Canada carried out only the previous week to determine why one of the two Israeli’s convicted in the passport scandal had used a Canadian passport, rather than an Israeli one, to enter New Zealand in 1999. During his 2004 visit to New Zealand, he entered the country using his Israeli passport. Canadian authorities concluded that the arrested Mossad agent was a “legitimate citizen,” a dual Canadian-Israeli national, and that the Canadian passport he held was “genuine.” But in 1997, seven years earlier, Israel-Canadian relations were rocked after two Mossad agents carrying Canadian passports were caught trying to kill Hamas leader Khaled Mashal in Jordan. Mashal was injected in the ear with a poisonous toxin. Jordan immediately seized two Mossad agents posing as Canadian tourists and surrounded another six who had fled to the Israeli embassy. Under the threat of execution and an embarrassing public spectacle after being caught red handed, an Israeli doctor was dispatched by airplane to Amman with an antidote for the poison which was administered to the murder target Khaled Mashal, who survived. The deal forced Israel to release from prison Hamas founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin. After that diplomatic embarrassment, Israel promised Canada in 1997 that it would cease using Canadian passports. After the Canadian Foreign Ministry announced they were investigating reports that Barkan was travelling on a Canadian passport in North Korea, New Zealand’s foreign minister, Phil Goff, said: “I have read with interest the Canadians are following up allegations he may have traveled at some point on a stolen Canadian passport. When he came to New Zealand my understanding was he was travelling on a U.S. passport. Clearly there would be co-operation between police forces in different countries to try to get to the bottom of these things.” “The passports that Mossad agents tried to obtain illegally might have been reserved for an assassination operation in a third country, which would have caused irreparable damage to New Zealand,” Foreign Minister Phil Goff was quoted speculating to Ha’aretz. In July 2004, a New Zealand media outlet reported a detailed, but unconfirmed account of how the fugitive Mossad agent, Barkan had fled New Zealand to North Korea. In an article headlined “NGOs Claim Wanted Israeli Agent Barkan In North Korea”, the report said “Zev Barkan the suspected Israeli Mossad agent on the run from New Zealand Police has been sighted in North Korea, according to an Asian-based NGO closely linked to New Zealand intelligence networks.” The account went on to allege, “Zev William Barkan turned up in Pyongyang as an Israeli security adviser in April, within weeks of fleeing from New Zealand prior to a suspected Israeli spy ring being sprung for attempting to illegally acquire a New Zealand passport.” The reports of the pilfered Canadian passport in Guangzhou, the Chinese city near the North Korean border, was only 11 days before the blast at the Ryongchon train station. On April 22, 2004, a massive explosion tore through the train station in Ryongchon, North Korea, nine hours after North Korean ruler Kim Jong-il passed through returning from a trip to China. Wide speculation that the blast was a botched assassination attempt has lingered for years. A number of sources say that North Korean investigators had concluded the explosion...
was an attempt on the leader's life, but more logical evidence points to sabotage directed at the cargo of sophisticated missile components destined for Israel's enemies in Syria. The explosion destroyed 40 percent of the town and had the fingerprints of an Israeli intelligence operation. It was later discovered that a rigged cell phone triggered the blast, which also killed a dozen Syrian missile technicians working for the Syrian Center for Scientific Research. Meanwhile, on May 24, 2004, Chosun Ilbo reported that a North Korean official visiting China said the North Korean National Security Agency had "concluded that rebellious forces had plotted the explosions." The paper quoted North Korean sources saying security agencies had determined "that cell phones had been used in triggering the explosion and reported to the North Korean leader that the use of cell phones should be banned for the sake of the leader's safety." On May 19th, North Korea abruptly halted the entire nationwide mobile phone service and confiscated all the 10,000 cell phones in the country. Mobile phone service was not resumed for another five years. Reports emerged in the following days that North Korean investigators had found a damaged cell phone wrapped in duct tape near the site of the blast. In July, the two Israeli men were convicted in a New Zealand court of the Israeli intelligence passport acquiring scam and sentenced to six months imprisonment by the Auckland High Court and ordered to pay NZ $100,000 to a cerebral palsy charity. New Zealand High Court Judge Justice Judith Potter said: "It's difficult to see why anyone would want a false New Zealand passport unless it was intended to be used in a way ancillary to some other offending (law)." She said: "That offending is likely to be serious or perhaps very serious." The New Zealand judge may have been prescient. In January 2010, Zev Barkan was again fingered by authorities, this time the government of Dubai, in a highly publicized scandal when Mossad operatives were caught on video carrying out the assassination of a senior Hamas leader. One of the 32 men named for the Dubai murders was Zev Barkan, who was still wanted in New Zealand for the passport scandal six years earlier. "Former Israeli diplomat to New Zealand Zev William Barkan leads a life akin to that of novelist Frederick Forsyth's Jackal - emerging from the shadows only to be named by authorities in connection with various crimes before again disappearing," wrote New Zealand's Fairfax Media in July 2011. Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was killed in a Dubai luxury hotel room in January 2010 by Mossad operatives using Australian, British, Irish, French and Dutch passports, many of them apparently surreptitiously copied from unsuspecting travelling tourists who now had warrants for their arrests for murder. The killers were all caught on hotel video cameras, some dressed in wigs and sports attire carrying tennis rackets as they stalked the guerrilla leader from the lobby to the elevators to the hallway outside his room. Within an hour of the assassination, all 32 had departed Dubai airport for different cities in Europe. Barkan, born in 1967 in Washington, D.C. and holds dual U.S. and Israeli citizenships, entered New Zealand on an American passport. He was cited by the Sydney Morning Herald as trafficking in passports stolen from foreign tourists in Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar and was said to operate a security business in Thailand. Barkan had an American accent, according to New Zealand officials, and told people he came from Washington, D.C., where his family was in the "windows and doors" business. The Sydney Morning Herald also reported he was born in the U.S. and his given name was Zev Bruckenstein, where his father was director of religious studies at a synagogue in Washington, D.C. Other aliases he has used include Zev William Barkan, Ze'ev William Barkan, and Lev
Bruckenstein. He told acquaintances in New Zealand that he was an American and his name was Jay. Dubai officials believe he was travelling on a fraudulent French passport using the name Eric Rassineux. In 2005, the year after the New Zealand passport scandal and the train explosion in North Korea, Barkan was back in the news. “He goes to Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Thailand and deals with gangs who rob tourists of their valuables and passports,” an aid worker told the *Sydney Morning Herald* in 2005. “Barkan is mostly interested in passports and there have been a number of Australian passports.” After disappearing from New Zealand, unsubstantiated media reports from Cambodia accused Barkan of running a studio making snuff and porn movies in a town on the Mekong River North of the capital, Phnom Penh, where students and tourists from New Zealand and Australia were lured by promises of movie stardom. New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff told the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz that “The passports that Mossad agents tried to obtain illegally might have been reserved for an assassination operation in a third country, which would have caused irreparable damage to New Zealand.” New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark said “The New Zealand government views the act carried out by the Israeli intelligence agents as not only utterly unacceptable but also a breach of New Zealand sovereignty and international law. The Israeli agents attempted to demean the integrity of the New Zealand passport system and could have created considerable difficulties for New Zealanders presenting their passports overseas in future.” She added: “New Zealand condemns without reservation these actions by agencies of the Israel government. The Israel government was asked for an explanation and an apology three months ago. Neither has been received.” When reporters for the New Zealand Herald tracked down Ze’ev Barkan’s family in October 2004, they were not well received. Ze’ev Barkan is married to a woman called Irit and they live the village of Shoham, 15 miles from Tel Aviv. The woman who answered a reporter’s telephone call identified herself as Irit, but said she did not know a Ze’ev. His father, Yossef Barkan was more direct. “Stop calling here, you hear me. I’ve nothing to do with this business. Goodbye.” (Nate Thayer, “The Odd Case of a Lone Israeli Spy and North Korea,” NKNews, June 20, 2013) A report from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported, the explosion came from “contact of two wagon trains carrying ammonium nitrate with a wagon containing fuel oil. Each wagon contained 40 MT [metric tons] of eammonium nitrate en route to a construction site for the Pakma-cheolsan irrigation project. This resulted in a massive explosion creating a large crater and leveling everything in a 500 m [meter] radius.” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, p. 402)
New NIE to be completed within a month will raise estimate of North’s nuclear weapons from “possibly two” to at least eight, say U.S. officials involved in preparing it. Intell officials have broadly concluded HEU program will be operational by 2007. (Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Nuclear Estimate to Rise,” Washington Post, April 28, 2004, p. A-1)

John Kerry statement: “Today’s report that North Korea has significantly increased its nuclear weapons capability under this administration’s watch underscores how their failed policies have made America less safe. Even after the North Koreans made their intentions clear over a year ago by ejecting international nuclear inspectors, the administration dithered and blistered while Kim Jong-il has reportedly quadrupled his nuclear arsenal. There is simply no excuse for the administration’s unwillingness to take realistic steps to address this growing threat. While President Bush says he’s running out of patience with the North Koreans, we are running out of patience with his complete lack of progress in getting the North Koreans to disarm. It is past time for the administration to put aside its failed approach and engage in meaningful negotiations that will lead to a comprehensive resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis.”


DPRK FoMin spokesman: “As already known, the DPRK side advanced the flexible proposal ‘reward for freeze’ as the first-phase measure at the last round of the six-way talks taking into consideration the fact that there exists no confidence between the DPRK and the U.S. and Washington is not yet ready to accept the proposal for a package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions all at once.

A bright prospect will be opened for the solution of the nuclear issue if Pyongyang commits itself to scrap its nuclear weapons program in return for Washington’s announcement of its commitment to renounce its hostile policy toward the former on the principle of ‘verbal commitment’ and ‘action for action’ and the U.S. and the countries concerned make compensation for Pyongyang’s freeze of its nuclear program.

The U.S. seems to stick to its stand to demand Pyongyang’s CVID of its nuclear program. But that will only throw a higher hurdle in the way of the talks.

The U.S. is putting pressure upon the DPRK, talking about ‘irreversible’ or something like that although it is not a defeated nation. If the U.S. insists on this stand, the DPRK does not feel any need to sit at the negotiating table with it.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Meeting of Working Group of Six-Way Talks,” April 29, 2004)

2003 annual report on Patterns of Global Terrorism cites abduction issue for the first time as an issue. In briefing the press, Cofer Black, DoS Coordinator for Counterterrorism says the U.S is “deeply concerned” about the abductees. “We are very mindful of the abduction issue, and we are pressing the North Korean government to resolve this and to present all the information that they know. (Kyodo, “U.S. Mentions Abductions for the First Time in Terrorism Report,” April 29, 2004) QUESTION: Sung Kim of the SBS, Korea. Was there any particular reason why the Japanese abduction issue was included in the North Korea section for the first time this year, despite the fact that the issue was ongoing for
like several years? Was there any request from the Japanese Government or anything like that? **AMBASSADOR J. COFER BLACK:** The United States, the Department of State thought it was important; it was a key issue; and that's why we included it. We also -- we feel great sympathy for those that were abducted, for their families. It's a tragic, sad story of heartbreak, and we thought it was important to put it there also as a vehicle that we would use in our interaction with the North Koreans to continue to press them for -- to make a complete accounting in terms of the relatives of these abductees that remain behind in Korea. (DoS, Briefing by J. Cofer Black, Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Terrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Foreign Press Briefing Center, April 29, 2004)

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4/30/04 GNP leader Park Guen-hye says she'd consider serving as “special envoy” help resolve nuclear standoff. (Park Song-wu, “GNP Leader May Visit NK as Special Envoy,” April 30, 2004)


DPRK FoMin spokesman: “It is preposterous for the U.S. to cite the DPRK as a ‘sponsor of terrorism’ in the report raising again the ‘issue of abducted Japanese.’ This once again, convinces us that the hostile policy of the Bush administration towards the DPRK remains unchanged and can never alter. The ‘abduction issue,’ which the U.S. is talking about as a new ‘subject for discussion about terrorism,’ is an issue between the DPRK and Japan and it had already been solved through the publication of the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration. It is, therefore, none of its business.” (KCNA, “U.S. Accusations against DPRK over ‘Issue of Terrorism’ Denounced,” May 3, 2004)

5/4/04 Kim Yong-nam: “We don’t think he [Bush] is at all serious about resolving the nuclear issue with us in a fair way, since we obviously can’t accept ‘CVID first.’ My feeling is he is delaying resolution of the nuclear issue due to Iraq and the presidential election. But time is not on his side. We are going to use this time 100 per cent effectively to strengthen our nuclear deterrent both quantitatively and qualitatively. Why doesn’t he accept our proposal to dismantle our program completely and verifiably through simultaneous steps by both sides?” In step one, said Kim Gye-gwan the North would freeze its plutonium program in exchange multilateral energy aid, an end to U.S. economic sanctions, and removal from the U.S. list of terrorist states. “This would be the first step toward complete dismantlement,” Kim said, “if the U.S. becomes our friend.” Inspectors would be granted the access necessary to confirm how much plutonium had been reprocessed; the plutonium could then be placed under controls and further reprocessing could be prohibited. Initially he excluded the reactor from the freeze, but
later said that that was negotiable. Kim Yong-nam: “The only reason we are developing nuclear weapons is to deter American preemptive attack. After all, we have been singled out as the target for such an attack and we are the justification for the development of a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons. We don’t want to suffer the fate of Iraq. … We make a clear distinction between missiles and nuclear material. We’re entitled to sell missiles to earn foreign exchange. But in regard to nuclear material, our policy past, present and future is that we would never allow such transfers to al Qaeda or anyone else. Never.” Paik Nam-soon: “Let me make clear that we denounce al Qaeda, we oppose all forms of terrorism and we will never transfer our nuclear material to others. Our nuclear material is solely for our self-defense. We denounce al Qaeda for the barbaric attack of 9/11, which was a terrible tragedy and inflicted a great shock to America. Bush is using that that shock to turn America against us, but the truth is that we want and need your friendship.” One of my interlocutors said Pyongyang might reconsider its demand for a binding security guarantees if a new administration proved less hostile than the present one. The presence of U.S. diplomats and businesses inPyongyang might be a better guarantee against a preemptive strike that a paper security assurance.Kim Yong-nam: “There’s no deadline in the negotiations. We’re patient. But if the United States doesn’t alter its position, we can’t foresee what will happen and we’ll have to decide about testing when the time comes.” Asked about the deterrent, KimGye-gwan said, “That’s a confidential military matter. But remember that the bomb dropped by the U.S. at Nagasaki was made after four months of preparation. It’s now a half century later, and we have more up-to-date technologies, so you can come to your own conclusions on the matter.” Paik Nam-soon: “I don’t think mere devices and the possession of nuclear material constitutes a genuine deterrent. When we say deterrent, we mean a capability that can deter attack.” (Selig Harrison, “Inside North Korea: Leaders Open to Ending Nuclear Crisis,” Financial Times, May 4, 2004, p. 3)

Mohamed El Baradei told the Council on Foreign Relations, “What I worry about with North Korea is that it sends the worst signals to would-be proliferators: that if you want to protect yourself, you should accelerate your [nuclear] program - because then you are immune in a way. People will sit around the table with you. And if you do not do that fast enough, you might be subject to preemption” - referring, of course to the military action in Iraq. (Mohamed El Baradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times (New York: Henry Holt, 2011), p. 94)
grave decision” by Japan. (Kyodo, “Abe Wary about Koizumi’s Pyongyang Visit to Pick up Abductees’ Kin,” May 9, 2004) Sankei Shimbun quotes government source, “Koizumi approved the plan of supporting North Korea with medicine and food in case the return to Japanese families remaining in North Korea is resolved.” (Dong-A Ilbo, Koizumi Considering Call on North Korea around May 23,” May 9, 2004) On May 11 Abe again urged caution about Koizumi’s going to Pyongyang just to retrace the abductees’ kin. “It means using the strongest card for the nation,” he said in a speech in Iwakuni. “If there is no prospect for really resolving the overall abduction issue, it will not lead to a visit soon.” (Kyodo, “Senior Lawmakers Urge Caution on Koizumi, N. Korea Trip,” May 11, 2004)

Fukuda resigns as chief cabinet secy after Yamasaki end-run on abductees. (James L. Schoff, Political Fences and Bad Neighbors (Cambridge: IFPA, June 2006), pp. 8-9)

North is building two underground launch sites in Yangduk, western Pyeongan and in Hocheon in northeast Hamgyong for an IRBM capable of 4,000-mile range, reach Guam, even Hawaii. (Joo Sang-min, “News Focus: North Korea Builds up Missiles,” Korea Herald, May 5, 2004) “We presume these bases to be for a new kind of ballistic missiles – not Nodongs or Scuds,” a ROK official told Chosun Ilbo. (Barbara Demick, “N. Korea May Have a Missile That Can Hit Guam,” Los Angeles Times, May 6, 2004) North also is preparing to test missile engines. (Kim Min-seok, “North Appears Set to Test New Missile Engines,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 5, 2004)


GNP Chair Park Geun-hye signaled GNP shift on North Korea when she said recently: “The GNP’s goal in policies toward the North is to secure peace and achieve inter-related development.” A Chosun Ilbo poll of GNP lawmakers found 65% in favor of maintaining the sunshine policy. (Lee Jo-hee, “News Analysis: Is GNP Calling a Truce with North Korea?” Korea Times, May 6, 2004)

“This administration has adamantly refused to deal directly with North Korea, and they are not going to make any progress until that happens,” Jack Pritchard said in an interview. “And there have been no red lines. We have never said ‘if you do this here are the consequences.’ Now they may have developed as many as six nuclear weapons to add to the two that they confirmed that they have.” As James Kelly, the State Department’s top official on Asia, prepared for the three-party talks, Pritchard said he had drafted negotiating instructions that would allow Kelly to engage in “pull-aside,” or informal discussions,
with the North Koreans. The proposal for pull-aside discussions, he says, were cast aside after Kelly convened an interdepartmental meeting and hard-liners from Vice President Dick Cheney's staff and the Defense Department objected. Pritchard was later asked to help organize the current six-party talks. Those negotiations do allow for informal side conversations between American and North Korean officials, but they stop short of the fuller dialogue Prichard believes is necessary to produce an agreement rolling back North Korea’s nuclear program. (Michael Gordon, “Warnings Go Unheeded over North Korean Threat,” International Herald Tribune, May 7, 2004)


5/8/04 KCNA lengthy memorandum on nuclear issue in Japan: “Japan has long pursued nuclear weaponization … taking advantage of its focus of attention to the nuclear issues in other countries. Japan’s nuclear weaponization has been pushed ahead at the phase of practical implementation, going beyond the stage of discussion. … In 1976 Japan got the U.S. approval for the development of nuclear energy for civilian use in return for signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Then it was privileged to get the supply of highly enriched uranium under more loose inspection system than that applied to other allies. Finding it unable to develop other nuclear reactors due to the U.S. control over the nuclear development, Japan squandered a colossal amount of money in developing new type conversion reactor which relies on raw uranium shipped from Canada as major fuel and has operated it without stop since 1979. This made Japan relatively independent of the U.S. control in the field of nuclear development. Since the early 1980s Japan’s nuclear reactors have become indigenous 100 per cent and acquired the technology of nuclear fission and fusion. In fact, it clawed its way up to the status of quasi-nuclear weapons state. According to the ‘white paper on nuclear energy’ issued by the Japanese government in 1993, Japan had 16 nuclear power plants and 46 reactors in operation. This put Japan next to the U.S. and France in terms of general designing capability of nuclear equipment. A particular mention should be made of the fact that the Japanese reactionaries put Monju, the first fast breeder reactor capable of massively producing nuclear-capable plutonium, on a normal operation on April 5, 1994. Moreover, it has operated a new uranium enrichment plant in Rokkashomura, Aomori Prefecture, since May 1992. It is now stepping up the construction of a big spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant capable of reprocessing 60 per cent of the total amount of nuclear waste churned out from across the country. … It is a serious miscalculation and foolish dream if Japan thinks it can hide truth behind its nuclear issue and achieve its wild ambition for nuclear armament by hyping other’s ‘nuclear issue,’ it concluded.” (KCNA on Truth about Japan’s Nuclear Issue,” May 8, 2004)

5/9/04 Administration official says allies have their own reasons for talking to North. “I think we’re not too far out of line here,” noting working group talks would offer “tremendous opportunities” for direct talks. “I think there is opportunity enough for dialogue. We don’t think that has been a major obstacle to moving on.” The U.S., Japan and South Korea are “in the same bed but with different dreams,” said Takesada Hideshi, professor at the National Institute for Defense Studies. “Japan and the U.S. are united,
but there is a gap between those two countries and South Korea,” he said. “North Korea has already succeeded in drawing South Korea to the North’s side. … Now it’s trying aggressively to hammer a wedge between Bush and Koizumi.” (Anthony Faiola, “South Korea and Japan Reaching Out to North Korea,” Washington Post, May 9, 2004, p. A-25)

5/10/04


National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea issues statement critical of possible second Koizumi visit to Pyongyang without getting prior agreement from families because of differences among kin. (Karasaki Taro, “Insight: Talk of Koizumi Visit to North Korea Divides Families,” May 12, 2004)

5/12/04

Dep PermRep Han Songryol in invw says a treaty is needed to end U.S. “hostile policy” which motivated North to develop nuclear weapons. Only than can North “negotiate disarmament issues” because otherwise the U.S. can “reverse” any security assurances while it is disarming. All other bilateral issues could be addressed at that point. (Paul Kerr, “North Korea Nuclear Talks: If at First You don’t Succeed, Meet Again,” Arms Control Today, (June 2004), p. 31)

5/12-15/04

Working group of six parties meets, with Saiki Akitaka, deputy director of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Joseph DeTrani, special envoy for peace on the Korean Peninsula, Ning Fukui of China, Li Gun, North American affairs bureau chief, Cho Tae-yong of ROK, Valery Sukhinin of Russia. Talks focus on “corresponding measures” or what North calls “compensation” for freeze. (Ryu Jin, “Allies Seek Breakthrough in Nuke Talks,” Korea Times, May 12, 2004) “Their positions are even tougher than they were several days ago,” says Sukhinin. (Reuters, “North Korea, U.S. Tougher at Nuclear Talks – Russia,” May 12, 2004) “There are still some major disagreements,” said Chinese FoMin spokesman Liu Jianchao. (Chosun Ilbo, “China: Major Disagreements Surface at N. Korean Nuclear Talks,” May 14, 2004) Vice FM Dai Bingguo meets with six-party delegation heads. “According to our delegation, all sides agreed to meet again, but no concrete date for a second working group meeting has been set and it will be decided through diplomatic channels,” an East Asian diplomat close to the talks said. “The Chinese side will coordinate.” Li Gun says, “We have had serious discussion at the talks. We confirmed that a common view has been formed that there would be reward for us in return for freezing the nuclear weapons program.” People’s Daily quotes a North Korean official, “Without aid and security guarantees, North Korea cannot consider the U.S. demand for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of its nuclear program.” (AFP, “China Vows to Coordinate New Talks on NKorea Despite Lack of Progress,” May 15, 2004) DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK’s proposal of ‘reward for freeze’ commanded support and sympathy from the majority of the participants in the meeting for its justice and fairness. However, the U.S. again pressurized the DPRK, not a defeated country, to accept CVID. … If the U.S. persistently seeks to waste time, pressurizing the DPRK to change its political system and disarm itself under the signboard of ‘peaceful talks,’ the DPRK will be left with no
option but to use it as a means for building stronger nuclear deterrent force.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Working Group Meeting of Six-Party Talks,” May 15, 2004) When asked which nuclear facilities it would freeze, Li Gun reportedly said, “We know that you’re interested in that particular matter.” He was noncommittal. “If we do freeze one of the facilities, what would you offer in return?” The others were noncommittal, including South Korea, which did not repeat its offer of electricity. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Can Koizumi, Kim Break North N-Impasse?” May 18, 2004) In a meeting with Li Gun, Joseph DeTrani said provide the LWR could be “one element” of a U.S. response if the North abandoned their nuclear program. “The North Koreans raised it,” said one official. “They said, ‘If we address the [HEU] program, what would that mean for the light-water reactor program?’” A U.S. official familiar with the talks who is opposed to providing the LWR says, “We’ve been that route before,” adding that DeTrani went beyond his talking points. “There is no way we should be going back to this,” Henry Sokoloski says. “We were good enough to unplug this.” (Bill Gertz, “U.S. Considers Reactor Deal with North Korea,” Washington Times, May 19, 2004) A “total and complete lie,” an administration official says. “There was no hallway conversation.” (Nelson Report, May 19, 2004) South Korea proposed replacing CVID. “North Koreans have a knee-jerk reaction to the expression CVID and feel threatened by it,” an official familiar with the talks said. (Ryu Jin, “Seoul Seeks Softer Line on Nuke Issue,” Korea Times, May 24, 2004; Choi Soung-ah, “Seoul seeks Eased N.K. Nukes Terms,” Korea Herald, May 24, 2004) DOS official says the U.S. delegation “clarified its position quite a bit” during bilateral contacts. PRC FoMin spokesman sees “new contents in the statements of all parties” although “parties still have different views on the scope of denuclearization and the ways of verification.” (Paul Kerr, “North Korea Nuclear Talks: If at First You don’t Succeed, Meet Again,” Arms Control Today, (June 2004), p. 31)

North agrees to N-S first general-level military talks since war. (AFP, “Two Koreas to Hold Military Talks on May 26: Official,” May 12, 2004)

In speech to OECD, Kim Dae-jung says, “Because there is a lack of trust between the two countries, they must both act simultaneously or in parallel.” (Yoo Dong-ho, “DJ Calls for Direct NK-US Dialogue,” Korea Times, May 12, 2004)


In response to question by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), “Isn’t the budget for underground nuclear weapons going way further than just a simple research?” SeDef Rumsfeld responds, “North Korea, Iran and other countries are building nuclear facilities underground and as a countermeasure, we give priority to conventional methods; however, it is also worth studying additional methods.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “Research on Nuclear Weapons to Destroy Bunker Is Necessary,” May 13, 2004)

Rodong Sinmun commentary: “The U.S. Department of State recently released an ‘2003 annual report on terrorism,’ in which it listed again some countries including the DPRK as ‘sponsors of terrorism’ and even brought forward the ‘issue of abducted
Japanese’ to obtain a lever to put pressure upon the DPRK. The ‘issue of kidnapped Japanese’ over which the U.S. is making quite a noise is the one between the DPRK and Japan which was already solved through the publication of the Pyongyang declaration between the two countries and, therefore, it is none of its business. Nevertheless, the U.S. is trying to internationalize it and egging Japan, a junior ally, on ... This proves that as long as the U.S. pursues the hostile policy toward the DPRK, it would cook up other case than the ‘abduction issue’ to attach the label of terrorism to the DPRK and justify its moves to internationally isolate the latter.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun on U.S. Persistent Anti-DPRK Moves,” May 12, 2004)

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Dep PermRep Han Song-ryol, in Interview, says peace treaty among “all the countries with troops on the Korean peninsula” would be way to resolve nuclear standoff. “Back-channel, secret or any kind of direct talks in my opinion could produce tremendous significant differences,” he said. (Barbara Slavin, “North Korea Suggests Peace Treaty to Settle Nuclear Dispute,” USA Today, May 13, 2004, p. 8)

Japan prepares for talks with DPRK on May 15. Abe Shinzo, LDP gen-sec. urges Koizumi to be cautious. (Kyodo, “Japan Ready to Hold Dialogue with North Korea on Saturday,” May 13, 2004)

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Koizumi to see Kim Jong-il May 22, chief cabinet secy Hosoda Hiroyuki says. “As summit will be held, I think we can certainly expect progress.” Eight kin may return with on plane with him. (Kyodo, “Koizumi to Visit N. Korea May 22 to Meet Kim Jong-il,” May 14, 2004) “This Koizumi visit to Pyongyang is motivated by the upper house elections and to lessen the impact of the pension problem,” said Nishioka Tsutomu, a leader of an abductee support group. “Why does he have to go now?” (Anthony Faiola, “Japan, N. Korea to Hold Talks,” Washington Post, May 15, 2004, p. A-12) Japan asks U.S. to pardon Robert Jenkins, who defected in 1965 and later married an abductee, Soga Hitomi. (Japan Times, “Japan Asks U.S. to Pardon Abductee’s American Husband,” May 16, 2004) Some diplomats think he should be promised a minimal prosecution as a favor to Japan. “If the guy had gone off to Canada and lived a full and wonderful life, that would be one thing,” says Jack Pritchard. “But the chances of this guy having had anything but a miserable life are very slim.” (Barbara Demick, “From GI to Pawn in 39 Years,” Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2004) One high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said: “The prime minister’s decision leapfrogs the scenario of events we had envisioned.” That scenario was based on talks in Beijing on May 4-5 by Dep FM Tanaka and dir-gen Yabunaka, which envisioned Tanaka visiting Pyongyang next weekend to resume talks with Kang Sok-ju. If those talks produced signs of a comprehensive resolution, Koizumi was then to have visited the following weekend. (Asahi Shimbun, “Return to North a Big Gamble,” May 17, 2004) Koizumi gained Bush’s support for his planned visit in talks by telephone, chief cabinet secy Hosoda told an evening television talk show. He had been expected to discuss “special consideration” for Jenkins, Japanese government sources said. (Kyodo, “Bush Backs Koizumi’s Plan to Revisit N. Korea,” May 17, 2004) He will also ask that four hijackers of JAL plane in 1970 be extradicted. Tokyo believes they were involved in abduction of Arimoto Keiko in 1983 in Europe. (Kyodo, “Koizumi to Renew Call for N. Korea’s Extradiction of Ex-Hijackers,” May 18, 2004) Koizumi will tell Kim Jong-il he’ll try to normalize relations
before his term ends if abduction issue resolved. He will propose commission to clarify what happened to ten other abductees. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Koizumi to Tell North Korea He Will Try to Normalize Ties,” May 19, 2004) Forensic medicine expert accompanies Koizumi. (Asahi Shimbun, “Forensic Expert Will Also Go to N. Korea,” May 21, 2004) Koizumi had planned to go in March, but he wanted to wait for Kim’s reaction to communications sent in February before deciding. On February 9 the Diet enacted the revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, authorizing sanctions. Still, when Tanaka and Yabunaka went to Pyongyang on February 11, a senior official said, “North Korea intended to accept his visit.” But soon the North reconsidered and opposed the visit. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Koizumi’s Long Road to Pyongyang Talks,” May 25, 2004)

Constitutional Court strikes down impeachment, restoring Roh to presidency. (Anthony Faiola, “Court Rejects S. Korean President’s Impeachment,” Washington Post, May 14, 2004, p. A-12) “The decision was made by the ‘Constitution Court’ but in fact it was prompted by the south Korean people,” the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland said in a bulletin. “This clearly shows again that the U.S. colonial rule and pro-American flunkyist act of the conservative forces can no longer work in south Korea and no force on earth can block the will and desire of the people for independence, democracy and reunification.” (KCNA, “CPRF Secretariat on Decision to Reject ‘Motion on Impeachment,’” May 16, 2004)

Reiss, dir of policy planning: “Even as we seek progress in these talks, we also have an historic opportunity to build on them, and thus capture the promise of cooperation among the region’s major powers. Whether it is energy security or environmental pollution, shared transnational and economic interests increasingly bind at least five of these Six Parties together. If the 20th century was marked by the struggles among the powers, we now have an opportunity to define a new pattern of cooperation in Northeast Asia, while addressing common challenges as a group. By building on our experience with the North Korean nuclear issue, we five can hold out to Pyongyang the prospect of joining in this cooperation if it makes the right strategic choice - to embrace the economic dynamism that has transformed the rest of the region while passing North Korea by.” (Mitchell Reiss, “Remarks to the Asia Foundation,” May 14, 2004)

Choe Yong-kun, DPRK Vice-Min of Construction and Building Materials, and six other economists to visit Seoul this month, Unif Ministry announces. (Choi Jie-ho, “North Korea Is on Political and Economic Offensive,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, May 14, 2004)


Kim Yong Nam, chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly and No. 2 to Kim Jong Il, told me that “we don’t think Mr. Bush is at all serious about resolving the nuclear issue with us in a
fair way, since we obviously can’t accept ‘CVID first.’ My feeling is, he is delaying resolution of the nuclear issue due to Iraq and the presidential election. But time is not on his side. We are going to use this time 100 percent effectively to strengthen our nuclear deterrent, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Why doesn’t he accept our proposal to dismantle our program completely and verifiably through simultaneous steps by both sides?”

How would a phased deal work? In step one, explained Foreign Minister Paik Nam Soon and his aides, North Korea would freeze its plutonium program in exchange for multilateral energy aid, an end to U.S. economic sanctions and the removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorist states, which would open the way for World Bank and Asian Development Bank aid. The terms of the freeze, they said, would depend on what the United States is prepared to do in return. Thus, if the payoff in energy aid is big enough, inspectors could have the access necessary to confirm how much plutonium has been reprocessed, and the plutonium could then be placed under controls. Further reprocessing could be prohibited, and formal pledges not to transfer nuclear material or to test a nuclear device could be written into the agreement. North Korea has suggested that negotiations on the freeze begin in Beijing during the May 12 meeting, said Paik. But that doesn't seem likely. The United States wants the agenda restricted to CVID.

Could the United States and its allies ever be sure that a closed society like North Korea actually lives up to a denuclearization agreement? I told my North Korean interlocutors that no U.S. president could give Pyongyang the binding “no attack” pledge it has sought. To my surprise, one of them said that Pyongyang might reconsider its demand for a security guarantee if a new administration proved less hostile than the present one. After all, the presence of U.S. diplomats and businessmen in Pyongyang after the normalization of relations might be a better guarantee against a pre-emptive strike, he said, than any agreement written on paper. “If you really end your hostility, and give up the goal of regime change,” he added, “the formalities will no longer be important.” (Selig Harrison, “Riding a Tiger in North Korea,” Newsweek, May 17, 2004)

Roh names Lee Ju-heum, dep dir-gen for FoMin Asian Affairs Bureau as one of 16 secretaries. (Korea Herald, “Presidential Office Appoints Secretaries,” May 18, 2004)

Rep Mark Kirk (R-IL): “If we reach agreement on visiting North Korea, we will discuss measures of expanding food provisions, supporting hospitals and medical resources, and providing help in the agricultural area.” He adds, “I also had a discussion with President Bush on the issue, explaining that food provisions should not be discontinued. This plan to visit North Korea came from consultation with other government officials.” (Radio Free Asia, “U.S. Legislators Seek North Korea Visit,” May 17, 2004)

5/18-19/04 Vice FM Kung Sok-ung and Amb to Britain Ri Yong-ho attend IISS conference in London.
5/20/04  Vice FM Kung Sok-ung in London for talks with junior minister Bill Rammell. (Kim
Sengupta, “Britain Urges North Korea to Take ‘Gaddafi Route’ on WMD,” The
Independent, May 20, 2004)

UN special envoy Maurice Strong in Pyongyang.

A May 19-22 poll by the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification finds
49.1 percent of university students believe U.S. the biggest barrier to unification, 35.7
say Japan. China was seen as most in favor of unification. 87.1 per cent complained
about unequal relationship with U.S. but more than seven of ten supported keeping
U.S. troops in Korea. (Yoo Dong-ho, “Many Students Believe US Big Barrier to
Unification,” Korea Times, June 2, 2004)

5/21/04  KCNA: “At the meeting, the DPRK side put forward the reward for freeze proposal as
the first phase action to attain the general goal to denuclearize the Korean
peninsula and maintained a sincere stance to solve the issue at all costs. It proposed
to have an in-depth discussion on the specific and practical issues related to the
nuclear freeze including the objects to be frozen, the duration of freeze and the
method to verify it and the time to freeze facilities. This proposal includes the core
issues that should be implemented at the first phase for the solution of the DPRK-U.S.
nuclear issue. The U.S. side, however, again insisted that the DPRK abandon its ‘nuclear
program’ first, i.e. CVID, and argued it would not discuss the ‘reward for freeze’
proposal or other offer unless the latter accepts the former’s demand. This attitude
brought the discussion to a failure. As the U.S. assertion was rebuffed at the meeting,
U.S. Secretary of State Powell talked rubbish that the U.S. would put increased
international pressure upon north Korea to disarm itself. … The increasing U.S. nuclear
threat to the DPRK, not a defeated nation, compelled it to build a nuclear deterrent for
self-defence. For the U.S. to force the DPRK to dismantle its "nuclear program" first is,
therefore, little short of a brigandish demand for laying down arms and unconditionally
submitting to it and scrapping all its nuclear plans for a peaceful purpose. The DPRK-
U.S. nuclear issue was caused by the United States and has become complicated in the
historic process. Its solution is, therefore, possible only when the U.S. will drop its
hostile policy toward the DPRK and accepts the latter’s offer for reward for freeze the

Wada Haruki, “Japan-North Korea Diplomatic Normalization and Northeast Asian Peace,” Zmag, May
21, 2004): “In advancing their anti-North Korean campaign, one that it soon tied to
national sentiments, weekly magazines such as Shukan bunshun, which invariably
criticized North Korea and opposed the negotiations leading to Japan-North Korea
diplomatic normalization, joined monthly magazines such as Shokun! (published by
Bungei shunshu) and Seiron (published by the Sankei shinbun company) in their attack
on the Foreign Ministry, the Prime Minister’s office, and the ‘pro-North Korean faction.’
The leaders of this movement, NARKN represented by Sato Katsumi, and AFVKN
represented by Hirosawa Katsuei, comprised a third element. These groups were
shocked by both the September 2002 Koizumi-Kim summit held in Pyongyang and the
Pyongyang Declaration that the two leaders signed. They immediately sought to
reclaim their influence over North Korean policy matters. [They] accused the
government of failing to examine the death reports on the eight deceased abductees, and insisted that they may still be alive. They further attacked Hitoshi Tanaka, the Foreign Ministry official who conducted the negotiations that led to Koizumi’s eventual visit to Pyongyang. These two groups wielded a heavy influence over the Diet, political parties, and the mass media. ... Opposed to Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihito’s 1992 statement of apology to Korea, NARKN chairman Sato Katsumi formed a national committee around the belief that “Japan is not an invading country” [Nihon wa shinryaku kuni dewa nai]. In his March 2002 book, Why is Japanese foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula weak? Sato directly criticized Tanaka Hitoshi’s tenure as head of the Northeast Asia Bureau for admitting that “in the past Japan made mistakes.” Araki Kazuhiro, then the National Council’s First Secretary General and subsequently Special Representative for Investigations of Missing People, parroted the words of the Korean Kim Wan Seop’s In defense of the pro-Japanese that Araki translated, by claiming that Japan’s colonial occupation contributed to Korean welfare. Abe Shinzo was the Deputy Secretary General of the “Diet Members League for Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the War’s End” when the League blocked the Diet Resolution of Remorse and Apology drafted in 1995 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end. The Diet League’s Chairman Okuno Seisuke and Secretary General Itagaki Tadashi (son of Itagaki Seishiro, prominent military figure in the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria from 1931) reasoned that the previous war was ‘one fought for Japan’s survival and prosperity as well as for Asian peaceful liberation.’ He opposed any reflection or compensation by Japan. Abe opposed the Diet resolution and did not participate in the vote held at the plenary session. There is also little doubt that he opposed Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi’s views on this matter. In 1997 Abe formed the "Association of Young Diet Members Concerned with Japan’s Prospects and History Education”. This group declared that there was no comfort women issue. Thus, not only was Kono Yohei’s August 1993 statement calling for reflection and compensation mistaken, but the comfort women issue should be stricken from school textbooks. Later, NARKN chairman Nakagawa Shoichi served as the Association’s chairman, and Abe its secretary general. ... Slander and attacks directed toward those who had supported and worked toward realizing Japan-North Korea normalization succeeded in casting normalization in negative terms. This negative campaign began in the weekly magazines. An article that appeared in the October 3, 2002 issue of Shukan Bunshun, titled “To the politicians, bureaucrats, and analysts who left the eight to die: apologize for every single death attributable to your great crime” accused those who turned their backs on the abductee issue of “trampling on the desperate appeals of the families.” The article directly named Anami Koreshige and Yokota Kunihiko of the Foreign Ministry, Kanemaru Shin, Kato Koichi, Nonaka Hiromu, and Nakayama Masaki of the LDP, Kan Naoki, Ishii Hajime, and Hatoyama Yukio of the DPJ, Social Democratic Party (SDP) leader Doi Takako, as well as Yoshida Yasuhiro, and Wada Haruki. This became the prototype. Bungei Shinju’s November issue, which appeared on the newsstands in October, carried an article by Sankei shinbun reporter Ishii Hideo on the “New pro-North Korean intellectuals: A record of non-reflective reckless statements.” Ishii wrote: “It is not just that the Japanese government lacks a policy; it is also that the politicians, intellectuals, and newspapers have been dragging their feet.” Specifically named in his
article were Doi Takako, Fuwa Tetsuzo, Nakayama Masaki, as well as Yoshida Yasuhiko, myself, and the Asahi shinbun."

5/22/04

2\textsuperscript{nd} Koizumi-Kim summit - NK invites Koizumi to lunch but instead brings own lunchbox, offending NK so that summit lasts just 1 hour - Kim tells Koizumi “I would like to sing a song in a duet with President Bush to the limit of my voice.” (Yomiuri Shimbun 12/30/04; Yoshida Yasuhiko, East Asian Review, March 2005, p. 41 “I told [Kim] face to face, ‘If you compare what you gain from nuclear weapons and what you gain from dismantlement of your own nuclear program, there would be difference of heaven and earth.’ Kim replied he was committed to eventual denuclearization. He said he wanted others in the six-party talks “to play music” so the DPRK and U.S. “can dance well.” He wanted his negotiator to talk to the United States so much that the envoy’s “voice will become hoarse.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea’s Kim Told Koizumi He Is Eager for Talks with U.S.,” June 22, 2004) After 90-minute meeting with Kim Jong-il, a pledge of $10 million in medical supplies and 250,000 tons of food, no meal or communiqué, PM Koizumi wins the right to have eight kin rejoin abductees in Japan, flies home with five children of abductees on board. Soga Hitomi was free to go but “Jenkins was very concerned that if he went to Japan he would be handed over to America,” Koizumi said. “I said I would make the best efforts for them to live as a family in Japan, but Jenkins wasn’t persuaded.” Koizumi will arrange for his wife and two children to meet him in a third country. (Akiko Yamamoto and Philip Pan, “N. Korea Frees 5 Children of Kidnapped Japanese,” Washington Post, May 23, 2004, p. A-18) “I emphasized strongly to Kim Jong-il that there is very little to gain in terms of energy aid or food aid by possessing nuclear weapons,” Koizumi told reporters in Pyongyang. He added, “We must normalize our abnormal ties. It is in the interests of both countries to change our hostile relation into a friendly one, our confrontational ties into cooperative ties. That is why I went to North Korea a second time.” (James Brooke, “North Korea and Japan Sign a Deal on Abductions,” New York Times, May 23, 2004, p. A-11) Critics cite failure to get any further account of ten abductees the North said had died. “This is the worst result. …I feel betrayed,” says Yokota Shigeru, a spokesman for the abductees. “I am aware of the criticism that I did not meet expectations,” Koizumi told relatives of the abductees, “But instead of deciding not to go because I could not solve everything, I decided to go.” (Barney Jopson, “North Korea Visit Fails to Lift Koizumi,” Financial Times, May 24, 2004, p. 3.) Koizumi promises not to impose sanctions if North abides by the Pyongyang Declaration. (Kawata Takuji, “Kim Trumps Koizumi in Summit Card Game,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 23, 2004) “North Korea broke its promise over the nuclear weapons issue. In that sense, the country has not honored the Pyongyang Declaration,” says Abe Shinzo. “Therefore, Japan should impose economic sanctions.” He and other senior LDP and DPJ Diet members vow to enact bill banning North Korean ships for Japan’s ports. A LDP leader on abductee issue, Hiranuma Takeo says, “It is necessary to impose sanctions if North Korea doesn’t make any move to normalize diplomatic ties after we pass the bill.” Ozawa is critical: “It’s obvious that the aid was linked to the family members coming to Japan. It has created a bad precedent for future negotiations.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Politicians Blast Koizumi Trip,” May 23, 2004) Kim cancelled an afternoon meeting. “It was their say when the talks would end,” deputy chief cabinet secy Yamazaki Masaaki tells a television talk show. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Took Lead in Summit, Says Koizumi Aide,” May 23, 2004) “We need to make a
breakthrough in stalled talks,” he said on his departure. (Kanako Takahara, “Nation Waits As Koizumi Jets to Pyongyang,” Japan Times, May 22, 2004. Koizumi had originally scheduled the meeting in March but it was postponed at Pyongyang’s behest. Yomiuri Shimbun, “Koizumi’s Long Road to Pyongyang Talks,” May 25, 2004) Kim Jong-il reaffirmed what his diplomats had said at the last round, no more: “He clearly stated that the objective was denuclearization. He further stated very clearly that freezing of the nuclear program is to be accompanied by verification.” Koizumi was upbeat, “I felt personally that North Korea is interested in moving forward in a positive way with six-party talks.” (David Pilling, “N. Korea ‘Ready to Abandon Nuclear Arms’ – Koizumi,” Financial Times, June 8, 2004, p. 8) “We agreed to conduct another investigation into the ten [other abduction], with Japanese officials involved this time, and try to gain results as soon as possible.” The North agreed to allow Japanese forensic experts to be involved. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Abductees’ Kin Arrive in Japan; 5 Reunited with Parents,” May 23, 2004) They also agreed to resume talks on normalizing relations. Kim Jong-il was similarly upbeat. He spoke of “the historic mission facing us politicians to improve the abnormal D.P.R.K.-Japan relationship” and saw “no insoluble problems if the two countries . . . buckle down to settling them.” Kim underscored his aim in normalizing relations with Japan was to coax the United States into ending enmity. “Progress in improving the bilateral relationship would largely depend on what attitude and stand the ally of Japan would take.” (KCNA, “Report on Meeting and Talks between Kim Jong-il and Koizumi,” May 22, 2004) Poll shows 63 percent of Japanese approved Koizumi trip but 70 percent did not like the outcome. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “63% Support Koizumi-Kim Talks, Says Poll,” May 24, 2004) Kyodo poll shows 68 percent approved trip; 54 percent oppose Koizumi’s saying Japan would not impose sanctions. (Kyodo, “68% Positive on Koizumi’s Trip, 84% Say Abductions Unresolved,” May 24, 2004) Talks can resume unconditionally without new information on the whereabouts of ten abductees, Koizumi tells Diet. “A full account of the ten mission people will be sought in normalization talks.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Koizumi: Normalizing Ties Independent Issue,” May 27, 2004) Kim harshly accused Japan of “rehashing the abduction issue, which had been settled” and remarked sarcastically, “I thought the Japanese prime minister was stronger.” The visit and Yasuki are both examples of Koizumi’s identity politics: to “reover Japan.” When identity politics become too emotional it is difficult to reconcile with neighbors. (Funabashi Yoichi, “Koizumi’s Trip a Poor Showing Rich in Meaning,” Asahi Shimbun, May 27, 2004)

In a telephone conversation with President Bush, Koizumi passed along Kim’s request for direct talks and urged him to accept, but Bush demurred. (Won-Jae Park, “Bush, ‘Kim Jong-il Is a Liar,’” Dong-A Ilbo, June 16, 2004) Koizumi tells reporters on June 7 Kim “clearly stated that the objective was denuclearization. He further stated very clearly that freezing of the nuclear program is to be accompanied by verification.” Prodding Bush, he adds, “I believe North Korea wants this to happen. It is up to the U.S. to make a decision of what sort of approach it should take. It could be either in the form of six-party talks or a more discreet way of talking to each other.” (David Pilling, “N Korea ‘Ready to Abandon Nuclear Arms’ – Koizumi,” Financial Times, June 8, 2004, p. 8) [James Brooke, “Japan Leader Calls on North Korea to Dismantle Nuclear Program, New York Times, June 8, 2004, p. A-5 misses the point completely]
North Korea “secretly provided Libya with nearly two tons of uranium in early 2001,” in the form of uranium hexafluoride, says an unidentified senior U.S. official, passing on information from Pakistaniis who had supplied nuclear technology to Libya and North Korea and who made the claim in interviews with the International Atomic Energy Agency. [They had a interest in deflecting blame from themselves. Two days before publishing an apologia for its flawed coverage of Iraq, the New York Times was again making the very same mistakes.] The intelligence community is having a “heated debate” on “how far North Korea had progressed” in its nuclear programs. [A critical issue in the debate is whether North Korea has a facility to turn the ore into uranium hexafluoride. Otherwise, Pakistan could have shipped UF6 to Yongbyon to test its centrifuges, after which the North could have returned the cask to Pakistan, where it was refilled for Libya, and hence have telltale traces of North Korean Pu.] “International atomic inspectors suspect that the Libyan shipment of uranium hexafluoride may have come from such a facility,” the Times notes, “though it is possible it was processed elsewhere, European diplomats and American officials say.” [Pakistan] The uranium hexafluoride was enriched to one percent U-235, two tons of which would yield enough U-235 for one bomb. [The uranium hexafluoride was not enriched. “The agency has analyzed samples of the UF-6 from both cylinders,” reports the I.A.E.A., “and has confirmed that one is natural uranium and the other depleted (0.3 percent U-235).” The uranium hexafluoride provided to Libya, if enriched, would not yield enough U-235 for a bomb.] (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Evidence Is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium,” New York Times, May 23, 2004, p. A-1) A U.S. official told AP that U.S. intelligence was “still pursuing” the alleged North Korean link “to see how much truth there is to it” and needed more information to “disprove” that Pakistan was the source. (George Jahn, “N. Korea’s Role in Nuke Market Questioned,” Associated Press, May 23, 2004)


Poneman and Gallucci: “So why should we offer Pyongyang another deal? ...Three lessons from the last nuclear crisis might help find a way. Go after the bomb material. September 11 showed that Cold War doctrines of containment and deterrence won’t work. U.S. diplomats must go after the North Korean program urgently, not just watch it crank out bomb-grade material as they negotiate about how to negotiate. Present a clear choice. We should offer the North security assurances and energy assistance if it verifiably gives up its nuclear program under more ambitious monitoring than in 1994. As with Libya, showing a path to improved relations could prove pivotal. We should also tell the North that failure to accept that offer will result in international sanctions, and enlist the Chinese and other key players to help enforce them. Design a package that leaves us better off, even if Pyongyang cheats.” (Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci, “U.S. Should Offer a Deal to N. Korea,” Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2004)
LDP, DPJ agree to introduce bill barring North ships from calling on Japan’s ports. (Kyodo, “Ruling Bloc, DPJ, Agree on Bill to Ban N. Korean Ships,” May 25, 2004)

WFP announces it is short of food for North Korea, has to halt supply this month. (JoongAng Daily, “World Food Program Short of Aid for North,” May 25, 2004)

“News that North Korea may have joined an international black market selling uranium hexafluoride to Libya, was a Page 2 article on Monday for South Korea’s five most influential newspapers. Instead, journalistic excitement here is vibrating around a meeting on Wednesday between a North Korean general and a South Korean general, the first such meeting since the Korean War, half a century ago. Once again, Seoul and Washington are separated by a deep panic gap. [how about a fact gap?] While the United States struggles to ascertain whether North Korea is crossing an invisible line concerning its nuclear activities, South Korea struggles to keep the peace on the peninsula. ... With few voices critical of North Korea heard on television, radio or in schools in recent years, South Koreans increasingly tell pollsters that they do not see North Korea and its nuclear arms programs as threats. ... some critics see South Korea slowly moving to a neutralist policy toward North Korea. ... Kyodo contended on May 15 that when South Korea joined talks with Japan and the United States, ‘the topic of Khan-related intelligence was not put on the table, apparently due to fears it could end up in Pyongyang through Seoul.’” (James Brooke, “South Korea Stakes Its Future on Keeping Peace with North,” New York Times, May 25, 2004, p. A-3)

N-S military talks end with nothing more than agreement to meet again on June 3. South had a one-star navy officer, Commodore Park Chung-hwa, as chief delegate in hopes of negotiating CBMs along NLL in the West Sea. (AFP, “Two Koreas End High-Level Military Talks, Agree to Meet Again,” May 26, 2004) South proposed a direct phone line between naval commanders, a common radio frequency to be used by vessels of both coast guards, establishing visual signals for both sides to use, information exchange on fishing activities, and enforcing discipline on fishing boats. The North demands an end to propaganda broadcast on DMZ loudspeakers. The DPRK delegation was led by Read Adm Ahn Ik-san, director of policy. (Kim Min-seok and Choi Jie-ho, “Stars Meet in the North, JoongAng Ilbo, May 26, 2004)

“All negotiation presupposes that the adversary’s position is taken into consideration. However, in the ‘arm-wrestling contest’ between Washington and Pyongyang, that is far from the case. Without in any way whatsoever exonerating the regime for its violations of fundamental rights, the least that one can say is that North Korea’s position is either unknown, ignored, or dismissed as “irrational”. The ‘criminal state’ rhetoric and demonizing hyperbole lead to an underestimation of the coherence of North Korea’s position. ... Seen from Pyongyang, Bush’s objective is the collapse of the regime through military coercion and economic strangulation. Nuclear weapons would therefore be the regime’s only deterrent and only ‘trump card’ in negotiations. Washington asserts that the Clinton administration entered into this kind of a deal with the 1994 agreement (a freeze on North Korean plutonium production in exchange for oil deliveries and two of the light water nuclear generators more difficult to divert to military purposes), but that Pyongyang violated its word by starting up a secret uranium enrichment program. ...
But for the moment, at issue is a pilot, not an operational program. Why? At the end of the 1990s, North Korea had every reason to feel it had been ‘duped’ by the 1994 agreement. The generators’ construction was four years behind schedule and Washington had not kept its side of the bargain: to refrain from resorting to nuclear weapons threats, to begin to normalize relations between the two countries, and to lift sanctions. Thinking that the regime would founder before it would have to honor the agreement, Washington made a calculation that proved to be mistaken and that has paralyzed American policy for several years.” (Philippe Pons, “The Iraq ‘Lesson’ Also Applies to Pyongyang,” Le Monde, May 26, 2004)

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Lim Dong-won lecture to Korean Council for Unification Education: “Unless there is trust, complete verification is never possible and it will take too much time. The nuclear standoff will be resolved when there is a security environment which calls for no nuclear weapons.” He was under instructions not to include a visit to Kim Il-sung’s resting place at Kumsusan Memorial Palace on the itinerary. Kim Jong-il notified us as he was going to a dinner hosted by Kim Dae-jung that Kim did not have to pay homage. He whispered in Lim’s ear, “You won.” (Yonhap, “Remittance to N. Korea Result of Intelligence Maneuvering: Ex-NIOS Chief,” May 28, 2004)

Kerry prefigures June 1 West Palm Beach speech, “New Strategies to Meet New Threats” with two interviews May 28: Bush’s “almost myopic” focus on Iraq has made Americans “less safe” by letting North Korea and Iran speed up their nuclear programs. (David E. Sanger and Jodi Wilgoren, “Kerry Says Focus on Iraq Endangers U.S.” New York Times, May 30, 2004, p. 10) 2nd: Six-party talks are a “fig leaf” to cover lack of a coherent policy on North Korea. “I would do the six-party, but I would engage in bilateral discussions,” he said. “I would keep them both going.” Advisers like Perry and Berger “had no illusion that Kim Jong-il was probably cheating over here and [creating] trouble over there, but they were getting the process of dialogue to get a verification structure,” he added. “You are better off engaged in that effort than disengaged.” (Glenn Kessler, “Kerry Sauys Security Comes First,” Washington Post, May 30, 2004, p. A-1)

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KCNA: “The New York Times on May 22 carried a false story that north Korea sold weapon grade uranium to Libya in early 2001 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently obtained clear evidence that it was provided by north Korea. There has been, in fact, no deal in enriched uranium between the DPRK and Libya. The U.S. much ado about the DPRK’s illegal sale of uranium hexafluoride is a sheer fabrication.” (“KCNA Refustes Information about ‘Illegal Sale of Uranium Hexafluoride,’” May 29, 2004)

Kerry speech in West Palm Beach: the administration “essentially negotiated over the shape of the table while the North Koreans allegedly have made enough new fuel to make six to nine nuclear bombs. ...We must be prepared to talk directly to North Korea. This problem is too urgent to allow China, or others at the table, to speak for us” (John Kerry, “New Strategies to Meet New Threats,” speech in West Palm Beach, June 1, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The top leaders of the DPRK and Japan at a summit meeting and talks on May 22 exchange wide-ranging views on all the issues arising between the two countries including the issues of implementing the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration and restoring the bilateral confidence. In this regard the DPRK is taking note of a series of practical and constructive moves taken by the Japanese side recently. The DPRK favorably appreciates a congratulatory message sent by Prime Minister Koizumi to the 20th Congress of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, in particular, in which he expressed his intention to make the utmost effort to normalize Japan-DPRK ties.” (KCNA, DPRK FM Spokesman on Stand to Implement Spirit of DPRK-Japan Summit,” June 2, 2004)

Perry at Cheongju University: “The administration said it would ‘not tolerate’ a nuclear weapon program in North Korea but in the last 16 months since the Kelly meeting in Pyongyang, they have taken no action to stop the North Korean program. The six-power meetings have been at the initiative of the Chinese and the Americans have not demonstrated any sense of urgency in those meetings.” (Korea Herald, “Perry Urges Joint Stance on N. Korea,” June 2, 2004)

North prepares to install barbed wire along border with China and began confiscating mobile phone of officials and individuals in late May. (Joo Sung-ha, “North Korea Sets up Barbed Wire along Chinese Border,” Dong-A Ilbo, June 2, 2004)


DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Bush was reported to have said ‘Mr.,’ politely addressing our headquarters of revolution at a press conference held at the White House on May 31. We take note of this. We keep a tab on a string of vituperation let loose by high-
ranking officials of the U.S. administration against the DPRK even some days ago. If Bush's remarks put an end to the scramble between the hawkish group and the moderate group in the U.S., which has thrown the Korean policy into a state of confusion, it would help create an atmosphere of the six-party talks." (KCNA, “Spokesman for Foreign Ministry on Bush's Remarks,” June 3, 2004)

Diet lower house passes bill barring port visits of North Korean ships.

Koizumi’s diplomacy shows moderate pressure on North Korea works - and can be used to limit not only weapons development but also drug trade. Threat to curtail trade got release of kin. North is likely to become target of regional initiative to restrict drug trade. (Victor Cha and Chris Hoiffmeister, “North Korea's Drug Habit,” New York Times, June 3, 2004, p. A-27)


DPRK FoMin spokesman: “It is well known that the Bush administration announced the measure to stop the provision of heavy oil to the DPRK on November 14, 2002 under the pretext of the non-existent issue of ‘enriched uranium program’ and halted the LWR construction on December 1, 2003. In this regard the DPRK, considering that the Bush administration unilaterally and completely scrapped the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework adopted in October 1994, took a corresponding measure and additional measures are now expected to be taken. ... The point is why the U.S. is now talking about the issue of LWR construction again though it is long since it discarded the issue by itself. ... There can be no relationship based on confidence with the U.S. administration as it scrapped the AF whose core issue is the provision of LWRs, throwing away the document signed by its president like a pair of old shoes. It is necessary to settle any issue with the U.S. through a one-to-one agreement on the principle of simultaneous actions. That was why the DPRK put forward a formula calling for a simultaneous package solution to the nuclear issue and a ‘reward for freeze’ proposal as the first phase action.” (KCNA, “Sophism of U.S, and KEDO about ‘Fate’ of LWRs under Fire,” June 3, 2004)

KCNA: “An agreement on the prevention of accidental conflicts in the West Sea, the suspension of propaganda in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and the removal of propaganda means was reached at the talks Friday. The agreement said:

The Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK and the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea held the second round of the north-south general-level military talks on Mt. Solak resort on June 3 and 4, 2004 and agreed upon the following points:

1. Both sides have agreed to exert joint efforts to achieve military detente and lasting

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peace on the Korean peninsula.

2. Both sides have agreed to take the following measures from June 15, 2004 to prevent accidental conflicts in the West Sea:

   First. Both sides shall strictly deter vessels from standing in confrontation with each other in the West Sea.

   Second. Both sides shall refrain from taking any unreasonable physical actions against each other’s warships and civilian vessels in the West Sea.

   Third. Both sides shall use 156.8,156.6MHz ultrashort mobile radios with a view to barring their ships from standing face to face with each other due to navigation error, ship wreck and rescue, etc. and wiping off mutual misunderstanding.

   Fourth. Both sides shall institute and apply regulations on flags and light signals as necessary supplementary means.

   Fifth. Both sides shall share the view that accidental conflicts may occur in the course of intercepting and inspecting fishing boats of third countries illegally catching fish in sensitive waters of the west sea and shall cooperate with each other in the efforts to seek a diplomatic solution to this issue and exchange information about the movements of the illegal fishing boats.

   Sixth. Views on the matters raised in the west sea shall be exchanged for the time being through telecommunication lines available in the west coastal area.

   In order to ensure smooth and swift telecommunications to prevent conflicts in the west sea, both sides shall extend the communication lines from the existing telecommunication lines in the west coastal area to have in place their separate lines in the areas under the control of the north and the south till August 15 in order to set up telecommunication liaison offices in each other’s areas and cooperate with each other in the efforts to modernize them.

3. Both sides decided to stop propaganda in the areas along the MDL and remove its means from there in order to defuse the military tension on the Korean peninsula and dispel mistrust and misunderstanding between the armies of the two sides.

   First. Both sides shall stop all propaganda activities through loud-speakers, bulletin, leaflets, etc. in the areas along the MDL from June 15 which marks the fourth anniversary of the historic June 15 North-South Joint Declaration.

   Second. Both sides shall remove all the propaganda means at three phases from the MDL area till August 15, 2004.

      a. Both sides shall remove those things in the section from MDL Marker No. 0001 to No. 0100 including the area under the control of the north and the south in the west coastal area and Panmunjom area on a trial basis at the first phase (from June 16 to 30).

      b. The second phase (from July 1 to 20) shall include those things in the section from MDL Marker No.0100 to No. 0640.

      c. At the third phase (from July 21 to August 15) all the propaganda means shall be eliminated from the section from MDL Marker No. 0640 to No. 1292.

   Third. Upon the completion of the phased removal of the propaganda means, both sides shall inform each other of its results, inspect and confirm the results of their removal in each other’s area. They may verify the results each other, if necessary.

   Fourth. Upon the completion of the phased removal of those means both sides shall open it to the media.

   Fifth. Both sides shall in no case set up again such propaganda means and resume
4. Both sides have agreed to hold military talks as a follow-up measure to implement the above-said agreed points to the letter.” (KCNA, “Second North-South General-Level Military Talks Held,” June 4, 2004)

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N-S economic talks agree to open roads across DMZ by October, test two rail lines in October, set up joint agency to run Kaesong by the end of June. KEPCO will complete power lines to Kaesong by late September, South to provide 400,000 tons of rice. (AFP, “Two Koreas Agree to Open Cross-Border Roads, Test-Run Railways,” June 6, 2004) North Korea’s delegation drove to the meeting through the DMZ. (Dong-A Ilbo, “North Korea’s Delegation Heading for South through Donghae Road,” June 3, 2004)

6/4/04

North Korea has the right to peaceful nuclear program if it fulfills all IAEA requirements, says Russia’s first deputy FM Vyacheslav Trubnikov tells Itar-Tass. (Itar-Tass, “North Korea Has the Right for Peaceful Nuclear Program – Trubnikov,” June 4, 2004)


Perry invw: after election Bush will seek support of other parties for regime change. (Chosun Ilbo, “Perry Expects Changes in U.S. North Korea Policy,” June 4, 2004)

6/5/04

US plans to withdraw one-third of 37,000 troops in Korea before the end of next year as part of Global Posture Review, ASD Richard Lawless informs ROK Sunday night. (Anthony Faiola and Bradley Graham, “U.S. Plans Major Cut of Forces in Korea,” Washington Post, June 8, 2004, p. A-1) In June 3 poll 52.6 percent of South Koreans say pullout won’t affect security. 57.5 percent oppose sending ROK troops to Iraq. (Yoon Won-sup, “Most Koreans Unconcerned by US Troop Pullout: Poll,” Korea Times, June 8, 2004) South Korean official with vast experience in U.S. relations says, “The problem is not how many troops are cut. The greatest problem is that such an extremely important decision was made without adequate policy coordination between the United States and South Korea.” Asked about a new joint declaration on security by U.S., Japan, ROK, a South Korean says, “If the three countries strengthen cooperation, it could split the six-party talks into China-Russia-North Korea and Japan-U.S.-South Korea camps.” (Funabashi Yoichi, “Japan-US-South Korea Joint Declaration on Security: A New Framework for a New Era,” Asahi Shimbun, June 8, 2004)

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6/7/04

KCNA: “The ‘bill banning the entry of specified foreign ships into port’ was railroaded by the Liberal Democratic Party, the New Komeito Party and the Japanese Democratic Party through Japan’s House of Representatives on June 3, according to a news report. …What matters is that such bill was passed through the House of Representatives at a time when there has been an atmosphere of positive change in the relations between the two countries since the DPRK-Japan summit meeting on May 22. This move of the
Japanese right-wing conservatives, therefore, can not be interpreted otherwise than a deliberate sinister attempt to spoil the hard-won positive atmosphere, displeased with it. ...It is by no means fortuitous that Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosota at a press conference on June 1 said that the policy of the Japanese government is not to invoke the law banning the entry of specified foreign ships into Japan even after its adoption so long as north Korea implements the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. His remark can be interpreted as a reflection of the Japanese people’s desire to support the outcome of their prime minister’s Pyongyang visit and see the restoration of the bilateral confidence.” (“KCNA on Japan’s Legislation on Sanctions against DPRK,” June 7, 2004)

6/8/04  Koizumi tells Bush, “I have confirmed that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has a more [keen] recognition of the acquirable profits from a policy of nuclear abandonment than in the past,” a high-level White House official disclosed. Kim also explained, “North Korea has occasionally stated things like ‘we don’t really want to have nuclear weapons, but we are forced to because of the hostile policy of the U.S.’ The important thing is that Kim Jong-il has [directly] stated that he doesn’t want nuclear weapons at this time.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “U.S.-Japan Summit Discusses North Korean Nuclear Problem,” June 9, 2004) “I told him face to face, ‘If you compare what you gain from nuclear weapons and what you gain from dismantlement of your own nuclear program, there would be a difference of heaven and earth.” (David E. Sanger, “About-Face on North Korea: Allies Helped,” New York Times, June 24, 2004, p. A-12)  A Japanese official provided a slightly different version of what Koizumi told Bush over lunch, that when Koizumi pressed Kim that giving up his weapons would be beneficial, Kim replied that “he sees the point but he feels unease about U.S. intentions and the use of threatening words by the U.S., as North Korea and Kim Jong-il interprets them.” Kim added that “in order to solve this lack of communication, he wants to have direct dialogue with the United States.” The U.S. official said Koizumi agreed with Bush that “we’d throw away all the leverage we have on them” by holding bilateral talks. (Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea May Be Relaxing Position,” Washington Post, June 9, 2004, p. A-16)  Kim told Koizumi he wants other participants in six-party talks “to play music” so North Korea and the U.S. can “dance well.” He wants the North to talk to the U.S. so much that his negotiator’s “voice will become hoarse.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea’s Kim Told Koizumi He Is Eager for Talks with U.S.,” June 12, 2004) “He [KJI] is an untrustworthy liar,” Bush tells Koizumi. “I cannot trust such a country. I will only talk to them if there are witnesses.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “Bush: ‘Kim Jong-il Is a Liar,” June 16, 2004)


Source says, “Stressing that the United States and North Korea remain far apart, China is suggesting the possibility of postponing a third round of six-party talks.” (Teruaki Ueno, “Six-Party North Korea Talks May Be Delayed - Sources,” Reuters, June 8, 2004)
In interview, Dep FM Zhou Wenzhong says, “We know nothing about the uranium program. We don’t know whether it exists. So far the U.S. has not presented convincing evidence of the program.” “The United States is accusing North Korea of having this or that, and then attaching conditions” to negotiations, he said. “So it should really be the U.S. that takes the initiative.” The North Koreans “argue they cannot do all this for nothing and feel they must be compensated,” he said. “The U.S. still insists on CVID, and there are some problems in this area.” (Joseph Kahn and Susan Chira, “Chinese Official Challenges U.S. Stance on North Korea,” New York Times, June 9, 2004, p. A-12)

ASD Lawless interview: “They were the first to complain about the plan to relocate our forces and realign our forces south of the Han River,” he said of the North Koreans. “Thye suggested that we would be adding to our combat power by doing that.” The U.S. one official said, has “no good military options” against the North. The 12,500 cut was a net reduction. “At the same time that folks would be flowing out of South Korea, different types would be flowing in.” John Bolton said of delay in six-party talks in interview: “I’m just hoping the North Koreans haven’t come to the conclusion that they are going to wait until the end of November to get serious.” (Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Defends Plan to Reduce Forces in South Korea,” New York Times, June 9, 2004, p. A-?

6/9/04

A foreign diplomat says North last month successfully tested a Taepo-dong 2 missile engine. U.S. intel agencies think the size of the combustion trace and the amount of liquid fuel used suggest it was a Taepo-dong 2, the source said, adding the test may have been conducted for negotiating leverage at six-party talks. (Lee Young-jong and Brian Lee, “North Succeeds in Missile Tests, Diplomats Say,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 9, 2004)

FM Ban Ki-moon appeals for Uri party to support ROK troops dispatch to Iraq. Rep. Jung Chung-rai says, “Do we have to strengthen the Korea-US alliance for another 50 years? Is it not enough with the unequal partnership over the past half century?” (Korea Herald, “Uri Party Agonizes over Troop Dispatch,” June 9, 2004)

Lim Dong-won says Kim Jong-il had planned to visit Seoul in the spring of 2001 but called it off, Kim told him, because he was told George Bush would take a hard-line policy that would threaten the North Korean regime. (Chosun Ilbo, “Former NIS Head Says N. K. Leader Had Planned S.K. Visit in 2001,” June 9, 2004)

U.S. official [Lawless]: “I think our failure to reach an agreement is frustrating for us because we are mindful of our timeline because of the new National Assembly.” (Choi Jie-ho, “U.S. Is Irked at Breakdown of Base Talks,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 9, 2004)

North Korea’s economy grew at 1.8% last year, according to Bank of Korea. (JoongAng Ilbo, “North Korea’s GDP Growth Estimated at 1.8%,” June 9, 2004)

Lee Bok-gu, missile engineer who defected in 1997, enters U.S. from ROK via Canada on June 9 seeking asylum, but wife was arrested on June 25 and held near Syracuse.

6/11/04 Nam Sung-u, dep chmn of General Assn of Korean Residents, informally named to North’s delegation for normalization talks. (Kyodo, “Chonryon Member to Be Part of N. Korean Team in Talks with Japan,” June 11, 2004)


6/12/04 South Korea is drawing up a “comprehensive plan” for it and others to provide North Korea substantial energy aid if it dismantles its nuclear program, says an ROK official. “But we must first convince the United States and Japan of the need for assistance at this point.” In a speech in London this week, Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck said, “When, and under what conditions, North Korea gives up nuclear ambitions depends on the contents of reciprocal measures that the country can win in exchange for abandoning nukes.” (Choi Soung-ah, “Seoul May Offer Energy Aid to N.K.,” June 12, 2004)

6/10-12/04 One day after its Navy command issued a strongly worded statement accusing the South of increasing the number of warships along the NLL, North Korea showed a “sincere attitude” on first day of working-level N-S military talks in Kaesong, says UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun. (Kim Hyung-jin, “Koreas Hold Working-Level Military Talks amid High Hopes,” Yonhap, June 10, 2004) North and South sign agreement on concrete measures to avert accidental clashes on land and sea, including a hotline between naval vessels and end propaganda broadcasts. (AFP, “Two Koreas Agree Measures to Avoid Accidental Armed Clashes,” June 12, 2004)


6/15/04 North agrees to new round of six-party talks on June 23-26. Okayuma Jiro, Japan FoMin spokesman: “We have no indication to demonstrate that the U.S. has become more flexible.” Japan “closely shared” U.S. stance and would continue pressing for
DPRK FoMin spokesman: "As we have declared on several occasions, it is important for the U.S. to abandon its policy for isolating and stifling the DPRK and take a bold political decision to co-exist with the latter if the six-party talks are to yield practical results and open a landmark phase for the settlement of the nuclear issue between them. The U.S. attitude toward the DPRK-proposed ‘reward for freeze’ will become a touchstone discerning the U.S. real intention for the settlement of the nuclear issue. The prospect of the settlement of the issue entirely depends on the U.S. Nothing will be expected from the forthcoming talks if the U.S. persistently insists that the DPRK accept CVID, a demand which can be forced on a defeated country only. (KCNA, Spokesman for DPRK FM Ministry on Third Round of Six-Party Talks, June 15, 2004)

On fourth anniversary of N-S summit, Pres Roh breaks with CVID to promise huge infusions of aid: “Inter-Korean cooperation will be accelerated if the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved, and we are preparing comprehensive and concrete plans for that.” South will help it “build infrastructure and enhance industrial production capacity, which will develop North Korea’s economy in an epochal manner.” (International Herald Tribune, “Seoul Vows Major Aid If North Cedes Arms,” June 16, 2004)

Ri Jong-hyuk, vice chmn of Asia Pacific Peace Cmte, in Seoul for conference marking summit, meets with Pres Roh, Kim Dae-jung. Shim Jae-yun, “Roh Offers Aid If N. Korea Scraps Nukes,” Korea Times, June 16, 2004, p. 1) Ri: “An allied relationship is important, but more important is North and South relations,” he told conference marking anniversary. “Cooperation with a friendly country is possible but the basis of all should be national cooperation.” KDJ: “the point of the six-party talks is the U.S. and North Korea, the two main parties, must come to an agreement. ...Because there is a great deal of distrust between the two, both should act simultaneously, or in parallel.” (Yoo Dong-ho, “DJ Calls on US to Guarantee NK’s Security,” Korea Times, June 16, 2004, p. 4) Ri visits IT facility lines of Samsung Electronics and SK Telecom along with a digital TV broadcasting center. (Chosun Ilbo, “Chief N.K. Delegates Uses Visit to Tour Major IT Facilities,” June 17, 2004)

“We are in danger of shattering this alliance by our own policies. This is the United States jeopardizing political support for alliance in a democratic country,” Sigal told The Korea Herald. Sigal pointed to a series of U.S. policies toward the North that “do not make sense” as the key threat to the alliance and said there has been a long standing difference between the Bush administration and the government of South Korea. “There is a profound change underway on the Korean Peninsula and it is irreversible. So I think there are benefits in security terms to Korea, Japan and the United States by going the cooperative route. Now the Bush Administration obviously didn’t see it that way and all they succeeded in doing was getting the North Koreans stepping up their nuclear armament programs.” “The North Koreans have said a lot of interesting things at the negotiating table but the United States seems to have its ear plugs on. Everyone’s gotten it except for the Americans. So it’s time for the Americans to play and play seriously at the negotiating table,” Sigal said. On the issue of growing
anti-American sentiment in South Korea that may possibly hinder the future of the Seoul-Washington alliance, Sigal said the situation is “very serious” and began with the Korean public’s dislike of American policies. “If we don’t change policy within the next year or so, I think this is going to turn into a very different kind of circumstance in which increasingly America will be seen as a country that is an impediment to reconciliation between North and South.” Donald Gregg saw the alliance at one of its “most difficult times” because of differences over North Korea. “A number of things that happened, including a generation change on the attitude toward North Korea and the overall changes to South Korea’s perception of the North, allowed Korea to be more into ‘rehabilitation’ than ‘punishment’ for the Kim Jong-il regime,” Gregg told The Korea Herald. “But the U.S. perception of North Korea is still ‘dangerous’ and now, with continued trouble in Iraq, Washington is more committed to getting what they want out of North Korea with a stronger position.” (Choi Soung-ah, “N.K. Issues ‘Jeopardize’ Korea-U.S. Alliance: Experts,” Korea Herald, June 16, 2004)

Sankei Shimbun, quoting military source well-acquainted with news on North Korea, reports six representatives including Iranian nuclear physicist and computer experts visited North Korea last month to prepare joint experiment of nuclear triggering device. “The experient is to investigate the fluctuations of highly dense neutrons that cause nuclear disruption,” it said. “Data obtained through this experiemtn is vital in manufacturing nuclear bombs.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “Japanese Newspaper: ‘North Korea-Iran Preparing a Joint Nuclear Detonation Experiment,” June 15, 2004)

Cui Yingjiu, North Korea specialist at Beijing University: “If the United States can agree or can accept that some fuel oil or other aid can be given by other parties, in exchange for North Korea announcing a freeze on its nuclear weapons program and its acceptance of IAEA inspections, then this would be a step forward. This is a possibility.” (AFP, “North Korea Could Accept IAEA Inspections in Six-Party Talks: Analysts,” June 16, 2004)

DOS spokesman Richard Boucher: “We don’t have any intention of rewarding North Korea for things it never should have done to begin with.” (Ryu Jin, “Seoul Seeking Real Progress in Nuke Talks,” Korea Times, June 16, 2004) U.S. official says, “There are some battles still going in” within the administration but a decision has been made to stick with CVID. Donald Gregg: “The longer the U.S. refuses to enter into negotiations, the higher the price becomes for [improved relations with Pyongyang], while the dangerous prospect of North Korea becoming a permanent nuclear power steadily increases.” (Guy Dinmore and Andrew Ward, “US ‘Will Keep up Pressure’ on N Korean Atom Projects,” Financial Times, June 16, 2004, p. 2)

Gov. Bill Richardson on trip to Seoul and Tokyo calls for U.S. compromise on freeze. He says he has been in touch with North Korean officials in Pyongyang as recently as two weeks ago. “If we don’t reach an interim agreement to suspend the [re]processing, they could have ten nuclear weapons, and the talks may break down by this time next year.” “If you talk to the Chinese, they are especially growing frustrated with this process. They want to see results next week,” he said. If there is no clear progress, we don’t know if the nations involved will stick with the framework” of six-party talks. (Anthony Faiola,

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Vaclav Havel op-ed: “Now is the time for the democratic countries of the world – the European Union, the United States, Japan, South Korea – to take a common position. They must make it clear that they will not offer concessions to a totalitarian dictactor. They must state that respect for basic human rights is an integral part of any future discussions with Pyongyang. Decisiveness, perseverance and negotiations from a position of strength are the only things that Kim Jong-il and those like him understand.” (Vaclav Havel, “Time to Act on N. Korea,” Washington Post, June 18, 2004, p. 29)


6/7/04

David Asher, Kelly aide, who began working on North Korea’s illicit activities in 2003, drafted a memo to create an interagency task force to target these activities. The idea was thrashed out with Kelly and Armitage, who recalled, “We could do this and we can really hurt the elite on this without further hurting the people. And will you support this? Kelly was there in my office, and I said basically, ‘Yeah, let’s write it up.’ And we took it to Powell and told him and he said, ‘Yeah.’” David Straub and Jim Foster who succeeded him on the Korea desk were both opposed. Powell rushed aside their objections, “You couldn’t push this stuff under the table and say we can’t do anything about this because it would affect the negotiations. These guys were counterfeiting our money, they were running drugs, they were doing a lot of illicit things. And so it seemed like we had them cold and we had to use it, and we did.” Stephen Yates, Cheney’s aide on Asia, recalled, “Part of the psychology of what was going on was the State Department team – Powell, Armitage, and the people who worked for them – saying ‘We know we’re tough, we can handle this, we’re the policy-makers and implementers, just get out of hair, trust us, trust where we’re going.’” John Bolton and Bob Joseph opposed the scheme, said Lawrence Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff. “I think Bolton and some others thought this was a threat to PSI because it had every prospect of being effective.” Armitage recalled, “We had a little trouble selling it in the NSC and others. In fact, I went and sold it with [Deputy NSA Stephen] Hadley at a deputies meeting. And Hadley didn’t like Asher, and others there, particularly the non-pro [non-proliferation] people didn’t like him very much. And I told David, ‘Sit in the back and don’t say a fucking word on this. If anyone else asks anything, don’t answer,’ because David is his own worst enemy sometimes.” They kept the Illicit Activities
Initiative top secret and held meetings at a secure room at the State Department. (Chinoy, *Meltdown*, pp. 212-15)

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Kelly testimony: “The working group met June 21-22, the plenary June 23-26. ... We held a two-and-a-half-hour discussion with the D.P.R.K. delegation. Some press accounts indicated that, during that meeting, the North Korean delegation threatened to test a nuclear weapon. The North Koreans said that there were some, not identified, in the D.P.R.K. who wanted to test a nuclear weapon and might presumably do so if there was not progress in the talks. ... Under the U.S. proposal, the D.P.R.K. would, as a first step, commit to dismantle all of its nuclear programs. The parties would then reach agreement on a detailed implementation plan requiring, at a minimum, the supervised disabling, dismantlement and elimination of all nuclear-related facilities and materials; the removal of all nuclear weapons and weapons components, centrifuge and other nuclear parts, fissile material and fuel rods; and a long-term monitoring program. We envisage a short initial preparatory period, of perhaps three months' duration, to prepare for the dismantlement and removal of the D.P.R.K.‘s nuclear programs. During that initial period, the D.P.R.K. would: provide a complete listing of all its nuclear activities, and cease operations of all of its nuclear activities; permit the securing of all fissile material and the monitoring of all fuel rods, and permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons/weapons components and key centrifuge parts. These actions by the D.P.R.K. would be monitored subject to international verification.” (Kelly testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 15, 2004)

6/22/04

“President Bush has authorized a team of American negotiators to offer North Korea, in talks in Beijing on Thursday, a new but highly conditional set of incentives to give up its nuclear weapons programs the way Libya did late last year, according to senior administration officials. ... Under the plan, outlined by American officials on Tuesday evening, in response to pressure from China and American allies in Asia, the aid would begin flowing immediately after a commitment by Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, to dismantle his plutonium and uranium weapons programs. In return, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea would immediately begin sending tens of thousands of tons of heavy fuel oil every month, and Washington would offer a ‘provisional’ guarantee not to invade the country or seek to topple Mr. Kim’s government.” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. to Offer North Korea Incentives in Nuclear Talks,” *New York Times*, June 23, 2004, p. A-3) Bush rejected a proposal by the State Department to offer security assurances when South Korea resumed HFO shipments after SecDef Rumsfeld objected. (Philip P. Pan and Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Offers Plan to End North Korea Nuclear Crisis,” *Washington Post*, June 23, 2004) The exact wording according to a Hudson Institute report was “a provisional multilateral security assurance that would include no intention to invade or attack, and a commitment to respect the territorial integrity of all parties.” Quoting U.S. officials, the *Asian Wall Street Journal* reported, “The overture was championed by ... Powell, who began pushing for a concrete proposal the week before the talks started, inspired by a draft plan by diplomats from South Korea. But those in the administration who favor taking a tougher line appear to have succeeded in paring back the offer so that it contained little that was entirely

VP Cheney and SecDef Rumsfeld intervene at the last minute to toughen Asst SecState Kelly’s talking points for third round of six-party talks. After Straub had circulated his draft interagency, officials from the ROK NSC met in mid-June with U.S. officials and worked out a joint position calling for an interim freeze. Cheney then told his aides to remove any reference to a freeze - whatever it was called. Rumsfeld objected to a six-month dismantlement phase and instead insisted on three months. “For the third round, I drafted an initial presentation that tried to push the envelope a little. ... Just shortly before we left, all of a sudden we got a brand-new paper from [NSC counterproliferation director] Bob Joseph [with backing] from the EWhite House. And we were told, ‘This is what you’re going to do.’” (Chinoy, Meltdown. pp. 216-17)


6/23-25/04 At third round of six-party talks, U.S. makes first proposal. “We did think it was a good time to offer a proposal because colleagues and allies urged us to do so,” said one administration official. (Joseph Kahn, “North Korea Is Studying Softer Stance from the U.S.,” New York Times, June 24, 2004, p. A-12) Bush made the offer “because he had little choice: his Asian allies, picking up signals that the government of Mr. Kim may finally be willing to make a deal, were quietly beginning to negotiate a separate peace.” “But perhaps just as notable as Mr. Bush’s turnabout is what is missing: the kind of threats that surrounded his confrontation with Saddam Hussein last year. ... There is no appetite in Asia or in the White House for such a risk, and the North Koreans know that.” “The turning point came in the last two weeks. Japan’s primeminister ... returned from a meeting with Mr. Kim, whom he paid handsomely for releasing the relatives of Japanese kidnapped by North Korea years ago. (David E. Sanger, “About-Face on North Korea: Allies Helped,” New York Times, June 24, 2004, p. A-12) Right up to minutes before the talks opened there was disagreement over the U.S. proposal. State had included an offer to give up efforts at regime change but this was deleted by Rumsfeld and other hardliners, the Asian Wall Street Journal reported on June 27. (Choi Soung-ah, “U.S. Policymakers in Major Controversy over N.K. Security Guarantee,” Korea Herald, July 2, 2004) DOS spokesman Richard Boucher: “Since these talks are about denuclearization and complete denuclearization, the United States felt it important to come forward with a proposal, which we have done in Beijing today, on how to achieve that, on how to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the nuclear programs that have caused so much concern. What we have described in the talks is a practical series of steps to achieve that goal. The process would begin with a North Korean commitment to dismantle all its nuclear programs. The parties would agreed to a detailed implementation plan that would require the supervised disabling, dismantlement and elimination of all nuclear-related facilities and materials, the removal of all nuclear weapons and weapons components, centrifuge and other parts, fissile material and fuel rods, and long-term monitoring programs. The process would involve a short
preparatory period for dismantlement and removal which would include the disabling of nuclear weapons components and key centrifuge parts, the permanent and verifiable dismantlement and removal of North Korea's nuclear programs would follow the brief period. At the same time, the parties would be willing to take steps to ease the political and economic isolation of North Korea. Steps would be provisional or temporary in nature and only yield lasting benefits to the North Koreans after the dismantlement has been completed.” (DOS briefing, June 23, 2004, text) “During this phase [the three-month preparatory period] we would require the DPRK to give a full listing of its nuclear activities,” said senior U.S. official. Asked if North Korea had again denied having a uranium program, the U.S. official said, “That is correct.” (AFP, “U.S. Makes New Proposal in Nuclear Talks; N. Korea Offers Freeze,” June 24, 2004) Under the plan, immediately after North Korea’s commitment to dismantle its programs, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea (but not U.S.) would begin shipping thousands of tons of HFO every month and the U.S. would offer a “provisional” guarantee not to invade or topple the regime and begin direct talks on lifting economic sanctions, providing longer-term aid and retraining of scientists. “Our allies have been telling us that they think Kim Jong-il is ready for a test of his intentions,” one of Bush’s most senior national security aides [Rice] said in a interview June 22. “They probably would reject even a better offer, figuring that after the election they have a chance of dealing with someone other than George Bush,” said one senior Asian allied official who has been urging the White House to make an offer. “And of course they can use the extra time to work on making more bomb fuel, if they haven’t finished that process already.” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. to Offer North Korea Incentives in Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, June 23, 2004, p. A-3) In apparent bid to blunt charges it has been inflexible, U.S. drops use of the term CVID. “It is an acronym that seems to inflame sensibilities, so we don’t feel it’s necessary to use that term,” a senior official said. “Essentially the U.S. side believes it’s time to make some progress.” (Mark Magnier, “U.S. Shows Flexibility in Nuclear Talks,” Los Angeles Times, June 24, 2004) “We envisage a short initial preparatory period, of perhaps three months’ duration, to prepare for the dismantlement and removal of the DPRK’s nuclear programs. During that initial period, the DPRK would: provide a complete listing of all its nuclear activities, and cease operations of all of its nuclear activities; permit the securing of all fissile material and the monitoring of all fuel rods; permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons, weapons components and key centrifuge parts. These actions by the DPRK would be monitored subject to international verification. ...Under our proposal, as the DPRK carried out its commitments, the other parties would take some corresponding steps. These would be provisional or temporary in nature and would only yield lasting benefits to the DPRK after the dismantlement of its nuclear programs has been completed. These steps would include: upon agreement of the overall approach, including a DPRK agreement to dismantle all nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner subject to effective verification, non-U.S. parties would provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK; upon acceptance of the DPRK declaration, the parties would provide provisional multilateral security assurances, which would become more enduring as the process proceeded; begin a study to determine the energy requirements of the DPRK and how to meet them by non-nuclear energy programs; begin a discussion of the steps necessary to lift remains sanctions on the DPRK and on the steps necessary for removal
of the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. ... Of course, to achieve full integration into the region and a wholly transformed relationship with the United States, North Korea must take other steps in addition to making the strategic decision to give up its nuclear ambitions. It also needs to change its behavior on human rights, address the issues underlying its appearance on the U.S. list of state sponsoring terrorism, eliminate its illegal weapons of mass destruction programs, put an end to the proliferation of missiles and missile-related technology, and adopt a less provocative conventional force disposition.” (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings: “Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” Prepared Statement of James Q. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 2004)

South Korea, having worked with the Americans on the U.S. proposal, took it a step further. They proposed a “concept paper” of their own which lengthened the period of the freeze to six months and did not preclude nuclear energy or U.S. shipments of heavy fuel oil, suggesting key openings for compromise. Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck told reporters, “First, North Korea, must, within a certain period of time, report all of its nuclear programs and ... outline its freeze. Secondly, it must prove it has stopped all nuclear activities, sealed all its spent fuel rods and submitted to inspections by international agencies. Then, lastly, North Korea must follow through with complete dismantlement in a short time frame.” When Pyongyang agrees to the plan, Washington must take it off the list of state sponsors of terrorism and provide other compensation. (Choi Soung-ah, “S. Korea Offers Energy Aid If N.K. De-Nukes,” Korea Herald, June 24, 2004) Park Sun-won in NCAFP paper: “Within six months of freeze, the dismantlement process shall begin. The parties have agreed to provide provisional security assurance while the nuclear freeze and dismantlement are under way, and to provide more enduring security assurance once the dismantlement is completed. The provisional security assurance will be provided at the beginning of the freeze and it will be given in the form of multilateral declaration that will include no intention to attack, invade, or seek regime change. The parties will provide heavy fuel oil and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK during the freeze period. The parties will launch a study project to determine energy requirements of the DPRK. The US and DPRK will soon begin dialogue on terrorism and economic sanctions for the purpose of the eventual lifting of the sanctions. The parties have agreed to make efforts to remove obstacles on the way towards the normalization of diplomatic relations and will significantly improve the environment for economic cooperation between the DPRK and the international community.” The DPRK said that “all materials converted as a result of reprocessing since its withdrawal from NPT on January 10, 2003 would be subject to a freeze.” (Park Sung-won, senior director, strategic planning bureau, ROK National Security Council, “Where Do We Stand? ROK Perspective,” August 9, 2004)

US stance that any energy assistance had to be non-nuclear put it at odds with Seoul, which had already spent substantial sums constructing the nuclear power plants promised the North in the Agreed Framework. As South Korea’s unification minister put it just after the third round, “It is quite a severe demand from the United States that North Korea should give up the use of nuclear power even for peaceful purposes.” (Kyodo, Interview with Jeong Se-hyun, June 28, 2004.) Japan commits to provide energy aid on three conditions: the North discloses information on all its nuclear programs, freezes them and allows inspections. [Not abductions] (Kyodo, “Japan Offers to Give Energy Aid If N. Korea Meets 3 Conditions,” June 24, 2004)
offered to exchange “words for words” and “action for action.” Words for words meant an agreement in principle that if Washington “gives up its hostile policy,” it will “transarently renounce all nuclear-weapons-related programs.” Action for action meant phased reciprocal steps starting with a freeze on “all facilities related to nuclear weapons,” a shutdown of its reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. The freeze covered “even products achieved through reprocessing,” [meaning Pyongyang would put the 1994 plutonium back under inspection]. In return, Pyongyang insisted on “compensation-for-freeze measures.” Hyon Hak-pong: “We once again made it clear that if the United States gives up its hostile policy against us through action, we will transparently renounce all our nuclear weapons-related programs. [We] presented a concrete plan on nuclear freeze, on the premise that if the United States withdraws the CVID demand and accepts our demand for reward. The targets for freeze we are talking about shall include all the facilities related to nuclear weapons. Even products achieved through reprocessing shall be included. Also, the freeze stipulates that nuclear weapons shall no longer be manufactured, transferred, or tested. … Freeze must be accompanied by reward corresponding to it and will be determined depending on whether it is rewarded or not. It is because reward is an indispensable factor of confidence building. At the point of freeze, the United States shall participate in providing energy that has a two million-kilowatt capacity; remove us from the list of the terrorism sponsoring states; lift economic sanctions and blockade against the DPRK. We clearly elucidated that if the United States substantially takes part in providing energy along with other anticipating countries, we are willing to show flexibility in our demand related to removing us [DPRK] from the list of terrorism sponsoring states and [lifting] economic sanctions and blockade. (In Kyo-chun, “Full Text of DPRK Spokesman’s 25 June News Conference at Six-Way Talks,” Yonhap, June 25, 2004) "The United States and North Korea were in consultations for more than two hours,” says Cho Tae-yong, ROK delegation dep chief, from 3 to 5:10 p.m. on second day. (Chang Jae-soon, “U.S., N. Korea Hold Private Talks for Over Two Hours,” Yonhap, June 24, 2004) Kim Gye-gwan told Kelly “some persons” in the North want to test,” said a U.S. official. "It was not phrased as a threat, but we made clear that we certainly would not welcome any such thing.” (Kyodo, “U.S. Officials Play Down N. Korea Nuclear-Test Remarks,” June 25, 2004) “Some people in their country said that to get our attention, not to actually threaten us,” said a senior U.S. official [Kelly]. A South Korean official said there was only a suggestion the North might “one day carry out such a test. Our perception is that the remarks did not mean a direct threat,” he said. “Such North Korean references are not new.” (Choi Soungs-ah, “No Breakthrough in Nuke Talks: U.S.” Korea Herald, June 26, 2004) Six parties make last-ditch effort to draft a joint statement. Under North Korea’s own freeze, it would “no longer produce, test or transfer nuclear weapons,” said a diplomatic source in Beijing. (Ryu Jin, “6 Parties Make Last-Ditch Effort for Joint Statement,” Korea Times, June 25, 2004) China is trying for joint statement, but Kelly is reluctant, prefers a chairman’s statement. (Kobayashi Kakumiu and Ota Masakatsu, “N. Korea Nuclear-Test Threat Weighs on 6-Country Talks,” Kyodo, June 25, 2004) Chairman’s Statement: The heads of delegations were Mr. Wang Yi, Vice Foreign Minister of China; Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Foreign Minister of DPRK; Ambassador Mitoji Yabunaka, Director-General for Asian and Oceanean Affairs of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Ambassador Lee Soo-hyuck, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of ROK; Ambassador
Alexander Alekseyev, Special Envoy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; Mr. James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of State. 3. In preparation of the Third Round of the Six-Party Talks, two sessions of the Working Group were held in Beijing from May 12 to 15 and from June 21 to 22, 2004. The Parties approved the Concept Paper on the Working Group in the plenary. 4. During the Third Round of the Talks, the Parties had constructive, pragmatic and substantive discussions. Based on the consensus reached at the Second Round of the Talks, as reflected in its Chairman’s Statement, they reaffirmed their commitments to the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and stressed the need to take first steps toward that goal as soon as possible. 5. The Parties stressed the need for a step-by-step process of ‘words for words’ and ‘action for action’ in search for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue. 6. In this context, proposals, suggestions and recommendations were put forward by all Parties. The Parties welcomed the submission of those proposals, suggestions and recommendations, and noted some common elements, which would provide a useful basis for future work, while differences among the Parties remained. The Parties believed that further discussions were needed to expand their common ground and reduce existing differences. 7. The Parties agreed in principle to hold the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing by the end of September 2004, at a date to be decided through diplomatic channels with due consideration to the proceedings of the Working Group. The Parties authorized the Working Group to convene at the earliest possible date to define the scope, duration and verification as well as corresponding measures for first steps for denuclearization, and as appropriate, make recommendations to the Fourth Round of the Talks.” (“Chairman’s Statement of Third Round of Six-Party Talks,” Xinhua, June 26, 2004) U.S. official describes the talks as “some good, some bad and some ugly.” North promised to “carefully study” the U.S. offer. (Joseph Kahn, “U.S. Cites Scant Progress in Nuclear Talks with North Korea,” New York Times, June 26, 2004, p. A-3) DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Unlike the previous talks each party advanced various proposals and ways and had a discussion on them in a sincere atmosphere at the talks. Some common elements helpful to making progress in the talks were found there. This time the U.S. side said that it would take note of the DPRK’s proposal for ‘reward for freeze’ and seriously examine it. An agreement was reached on such issues as taking simultaneous actions on the principle of ‘words for words’ and ‘action for action’ and mainly discussing the issue of ‘reward for freeze.’ This was positive progress made at the talks. ...The reward which the DPRK delegation called for should include such issues as the U.S. commitment to the lifting of sanctions and blockade against the DPRK, the energy assistance of 2,000,000kw through the supply of heavy oil and electricity, etc. The DPRK’s proposal for ‘reward for freeze,’ the first-phase action for a package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions, is the only way of seeking a step-by-step solution to the nuclear issue as it took into consideration the present conditions in which there is no confidence between the DPRK and the U.S. ...The DPRK delegation had exhaustive negotiations with the U.S. side for nearly two and half hours on the sidelines of the talks. ...The U.S. side recognized the reward for the freeze and advanced what it called ‘landmark proposal.’ ... And it was fortunate that the U.S. did not use the expression of CVID but accepted the principle of ‘words for words’ and ‘action for action’ as proposed by the DPRK. A scrutiny into the U.S. ‘proposal’ suggests that, to our regret, it only mentioned phased demands for
disarming the DPRK. Its real intention was to discuss what it would do only when the DPRK has completed the unilateral dismantlement of its nuclear program. A particular mention should be made of the fact that in its proposal the U.S. raised the issue of ‘period of three months’ preparations’ for dismantling the nuclear program but it could not be supported by anyone as it totally lacked scientific and realistic nature.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-Party Talks,” June 28, 2004)

6/24/04 Moon Chung-in, chair of Presidential Northeast Asia Era Committee: “We are planning to build the Northeast Asia Center for Peace and Disarmament as soon as possible, which will produce ideas and policies for institutionalization of a permanent peace regime.” (Yonhap, “Gov’t to Set up Disarmament Center for Regional Peace Regime,” June 24, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. made public its plan to cut down part of its troops stationed in south Korea but is massively shipping latest weapons and war means into south Korea under the ‘arms buildup plan’ that calls for spending 11 billion dollars. … This clearly proves that the ‘arms reduction measure’ does not mean any switchover in the U.S. Korea policy but is aimed at retaining a ‘qualitative edge’ to stifle the DPRK by force. … The DPRK … is left with no option but to strengthen the measures to cope with the U.S. ‘qualitative edge.’” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. ‘Arms Reduction,’” June 24, 2004)

6/?/04 NSA Rice in Beijing, tells CMC Chmn Jiang Zemin and Pres Hu Jintao “A.Q. Khan was not engaged in academic research” and that “North Korea has a highly enriched uranium program.” (Washington Times, July 14, 2004) (Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of WMD and Missiles, Congressional Research Service Report, November 15, 2006, p.25)

6/26/04 Loudspeakers on DMZ dismantled; sign board to be pulled down today. 15,280 South Koreans visited North Korea this year, double the number in 2000. “Ten years ago anyone who went north was painted pink. Today, anyone who does not go north is not a real Korean,” said Kenneth Quinones, director of the Korean Peninsula Program at Action International. “You could call it engagement; you could call it neutrality,” Victor Cha said in Seoul this week. “We don’t know what South Korea’s grand design is.” (James Brooke, “2 Koreas Sidestep U.S. to Forge Pragmatic Links,” New York Times, June 26, 2004, p. A-1)

6/27/04 Rodong Sinmun signed article gives detailed account of attempts by “U.S. imperialists to mount a nuclear attack on the DPRK during the Korean war.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun on U.S. Attempted Use of Nuclear Weapons during Korean War,” June 27, 2004)


IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei after meeting with Russian FM Sergei Lavrov” “He is going to North Korea this week. I told him he can tell them I’m ready to come any time and discuss

“We are building energy transmission lines to the North Korean border,” says Sergei Darkin, governor of Pacific Maritime province. If Putin “gives us the task of transmitting energy to North Korea next year, we will be ready to do that.” At a conference in June to discuss energy-sharing, DPRK officials agreed to provide basic data on its electric power system to the Korea Electrotechnology Research Institute, an ROK government body. Russian and Korean energy planners also studying gas pipeline. Selig Harrison says it New York Times, July 4, 2004, p. A-6

6/29/04 PM Koizumi in Nihon Keizai Shimbun interview: “If possible, I want to realize the normalization of diplomatic relations within two years.” (Reuters, “Japan PM Wants N. Korea Diplomatic Ties in 2 Years,” June 29, 2004)


6/30/04 Kim Dae-jung in meeting with Jiang Zemin, chair of PRC central military commission says, “Even after North Korea’s nuclear issue becomes solved, the six-nation should continue as a permanent cooperative body for the peace of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.” (Kang Kap-saeng, “Kim and Jiang Confer on North,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 30, 2004)

Young Koreans see U.S. as “main enemy” by 57.9% in their 20s, 46.8% in their 30s and 36.3% in their 40s. Those over 50 say North Korea by 52.5% in Research & Research and Gallup Korea survey, finds Professor Koh Sang-doo of Yonsei University. (Chosun Ilbo, “For Young Korea, U.S.’Main Enemy,’” June 30, 2004)

PRC Liberation Army newspaper reports China and DPRK sign a border collaboration agreement to ensure border security, “a follow-up to last year’s change of armed police force to the regular army as border guards.” [It calls into question report by Hong Kong newspaper last September that purpose was pressure on North Korea] (Dong-A Ilbo, “North Korea and China Signed a Border Collaboration Agreement,” June 30, 2004)

Aminex PLC, a British oil and gas company, signs deal for oil and gas exploration in DPRK. (Text of press release, September 22, 2004?)

7/1/04 FM Ban Ki-moon, Paek Nam-sun have one-hour meeting. Ban tells Paek, “I am glad that the foreign ministers of South and North Korea have a chance to meet and discuss ways of cooperating like this after four years since July 2000.” Paek says, “It’s shameful that two people who use the same language and share the same culture had to come to a foreign country to talk to each other.” Ban asks Paek to have one on one with Powell. (Ryu Jin, “Seoul Suggests Direct Diplomatic Channel with NK,” Korea Times, July 1, 2004) Ban suggests establishing a standing diplomatic channel and invites Kim

In cabinet reshuffle, Chung Dong-young named Unification Minister and Kim Kuen-tae Minister of Health and Welfare. [Consolation prize] (Seo Hyun-jin, “Roh Replaces Three Ministers,” Korea Herald, July 1, 2004)

DPRK economy grew by 1.8% in 2003, compared to 1.2% in 2002, says Bank of Korea. “The economic reforms can be termed relatively successful. The country has manged to face the major challenges and its economy has grown steadily. The energy supply has improved somewhat and efforts have been made to increase production capacity since the implementation of the reforms,” said Park Seom-sam chief economist of the BOK’s North Korean Economic Studies Division. (Rambabu Garikipati, “N.K. Economy in Better Shape after Reform,” Korea Herald, July 1, 2004)


Convicted spy Robert Kim returns home after serving seven and a half years for espionage. (Chosun Ilbo, “Biography of Robert Kim Released,” July 23, 2004)

Powell, acting on his own, arranged a twenty-minute “chance meeting” with FM Paek Nam-sun at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei, the highest-level contact with Pyongyang since the Bush administration took office. (Christopher Marquis, “Powell Meets Foreign Minister of North Korea to Discuss Arms,” New York Times, July 2, 2004, p. A-12) Paek told Powell the DPRK “will not regard the U.S. as a permanent enemy if the U.S. gives up its current ‘hostile policy,’” said DPRK FoMin official Chung Song-il. (Ryu Jin, “US, NK Discuss Nuke Issue,” Korea Times, July 2, 2004) He says Paek told Powell, “If the United States is in a position to improve bilateral relations, the DPRK also will not regard the US as a permanent enemy.” Powell tells press, U.S. is willing to match North “deed for deed,” if North goes first: “As we follow the principle of word for word and deed for deed, we have to see deeds before we are prepared to put something on the table.” (AFP, U.S., N. Korea Inch Closer on Nuclear Standoff As Powell Meets FM,” July 2, 2004) Chung says, “North Korea has no plans to meet Colin Powell for now. But if there is a proposal from the United States to meet with Minister Paek, he will be ready to have a talk.” (Yonhap, “N. Korean Willing to Meet Powell on Sidelines of ASEAN Meeting,” June 30, 2004) Paek began by reading a prepared statement that repeated word for word what Kim Gae-gwan had presented in Beijing. He told Powell, “The [U.S. suspects we would evade dismantlement [of the North’s nuclear program], while we suspect you will attack us if we freeze. If the U.S. takes positive steps to participate in offering rewards, such as supplying energy, lifting sanctions, or taking us off the terrorism list, we will move toward dismantlement. If the U.S. studies our proposal carefully and participates in the rewards, a breakthrough is possible.” Powell replied, “We are studying carefully. My view and the president’s view is that we have made progress but there is a long way to go. We have no intention to invade or attack and no hostile intent. The U.S. has relations with many countries with whom we have serious differences and with whose ideology we disagree. The U.S.
wants to see action. We can enter into a **provisional security agreement**. A freeze must be linked to dismantlement as well as ultimate removal.” Later Powell told Paek, “Statements that you will test make it more difficult. We need to build trust and move forward.” Paek replied, “You have convinced me this can be resolved smoothly. If both sides have the attitude of resolving this issue, it can be resolved smoothly. **We have never said officially that we would test. We don’t have a uranium enrichment program and we are willing to prove it. If the U.S. renounces its hostile policy, we are willing to clear this issue up.**” *(Chinoy, *Meltdown*, pp. 219-20)*

Koizumi on normalization on Nippon Television Network: “The sooner the better. It would be good if we can make it within one year.” *(Kyodo, “Koizumi to Work towards Normalizing N. Korea Ties in One Year,” July 2, 2004)*

**7/3/04**

FM Kawaguchi Yoriko meet FM Paek. DPRK official tells press afterward Paek confirmed Charles Jenkins agreed to reunion with his wife Soga Hitomi and family in Jakarta and that North had begun investigation into the whereabouts of ten abductees it had previously said were dead or had not entered the country. *(Fukushima Kyoji, “North Takes Lead on Normalizing Ties,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 4, 2004)* Washington rebuffs Tokyo’s requests that it not prosecute Jenkins, but Koizumi asks NSA Rice on July 7 to keep discussing the issue. “I understand it is a difficult situation,” Koizumi tells reporters. “But given the relationship of trust between the United States and Japan, I think we need to find a path toward a resolution that is satisfying to both parties.” *(Mari Yamaguchi, “Former N. Korean Abductee Leaves for Reunion,” Associated Press, July 8, 2004)* Soga and Jenkins reunited July 9. Jenkins will visit Japan. “Our current judgement is that Mr. Jenkins’ physical condition is very serious. We will check [it] and provide treatment and surgery as swiftly as possible,” says Chief Cab Secy Hosoda on July 15. “It is possible that we will give him treatment without a final accord [with the U.S.] on the matter. It is ... an emergency escape or a life-saving measure.” Jenkins “is classified as a deserter and the U.S. will seek custody as and when he comes to Japan,” says Ambassador Howard Baker on July 15. “Now that leaves several blanks in there. Whether the U.S. will do that, I have no instructions on that.” *(Kyodo, “Gov’t to Bring Jenkins, Family to Japan As ‘Emergency’ Step,” July 15, 2004)*

**7/?/04**

North and Russia held talks in early July to improve Trans-Siberian rail link to Rajin, ROK Unification Ministry official reports. *(Park Song-wu, “N.K., Russia Agree to Modernize Rail Link,” *Korea Times*, October 11, 2004)*

KOTRA data shows China now accounts for 18.1 percent of ROK exports and 12.25 percent of imports. *(Lee Chang-kyu, “Economic Relations between Korea and China,” KEI External Issues, p. 69)*

**7/?/04**

Gallucci interview by CFR: “U.S.-China relations are, comparatively, as good as they’ve been in recent memory. I think we should all be happy about that, although I would put a little asterisk there. I have been a little concerned, and I think others have too, about the extent to which the United States has subcontracted a critical security issue in Northeast Asia - North Korea - to the Chinese. This is, for now, diplomacy...
working out well, but I don’t know if America’s image is as good as it could be when we
failed to engage directly and leave the Chinese to take the lead.”

7/7/04

U.S. tracks North Korean ship from Nampo with cargo that includes counterfeit
cigarettes. U.S. tells ROK government, which decides not to act, but U.S. Coast Guard
contacts ROK Coast Guard, who alerted customs officials. When the ship arrives in
Busan, they seize several containers of counterfeit cigarettes. (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp.
220-21)

7/5/04

In statement released by KCNA, DPRK says it is prepared to repatriate four Japanese
Red Army members in 1970 hijacking who sent a letter saying they want to go home.
(Andrew Ward and David Ibison, “N. Korea Ready to Hand Back Japanese Terrorists,”
Financial Times, July 5, 2004) Song Il-ho, in meeting with lower house member, says
North will cooperate in repatriating the four. (Kyodo, “N. Korean Official Receptive to

Colonel-level N-S talks open. MoD spokesman B-Gen. Nam Dae-yeon urges North to implement
tension-reduction agreements along DMZ, NLL. (Yonhap, “Koreas Talk on Hotline
Failures,” Korea Times, July 5, 2004)

7/7/04

Japan has approached DPRK about working-level contacts to resume normalization
talks, said a diplomatic source in Seoul. The North had proposed that the main
agenda be Japan’s pledge to supply 250,000 tons of rice. (Park Shin-hong, “North
Korea, Japan Seeking Diplomatic Ties,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 7, 2004)

DefMin Cho Young-kil briefs National Assembly that North Korea is deploying IRBMs
with 3,4000 km (1800-2500 mile) range. Sources say it is constructing two bases, one
in Yangdok County in South Pyongyang province and the other in Hochon County in
North Hamgyong province. (Yoo Yong-won, “N. Korea Has Deployed Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missiles,” Chosun Ilbo, July 7, 2004; Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea
Deploying New Missiles with Longer Range, South Says,” Washington Post, July 9,

7/9/04

NSA Rice in meeting with FM Ban Ki-moon quoted as saying “North Korea will be
surprised how much will be possible” if it gives up its nuclear program completely.
(Hwang Doo-hyung and Chang Jae-soon, “‘So Much Is Possible’ If P’yang Gives up
Nuclear Ambitions: Rice,”Yonhap, July 9, 2004)

NSA Rice in Seoul says U.S. could delay plan to reduce 12,500 troops in South. (Shim Jae-yun, “U.S.
May Delay Troop Pullout,” Korea Times, July 9, 2004)


Dep PermRep Han Song-ryol invw: “We are not interested” in Rice’s offer. “The U.S. offer of ‘nuclear dismantlement first, compensation later’ is not a new issue,” he said. “We have been consistently asking for a simultaneous parallelism.” (Hong Kwon-heui “North Korea ‘Not Interested in Surprising Compensation for Nuclear Dismantlement,” Dong-A Ilbo, July 13, 2004)


Senate Intelligence Cmte critique of pre-Iraq intelligence “assumption train” leads to take-it-slow approach to North Korea instead of preemption. “It hurts us, no question,” says a senior aide to Bush. “We already have the Chinese saying to us, ‘If you missed this much in Iraq, how are we supposed to believe the North Koreans are producing nuclear weapons.” (David E. Sanger, “Bush’s Preemptive Strategy Meets Some Untidy Reality,” New York Times, July 12, 2004, p. A-10)


7/13/04  Unification Ministry announces 100,000 tons of rice loaned to the North will be delivered overland for the first time. (Yoo Dong-ho, “100,000 Tons of Rice to Be Given to NK,” Korea Times, July 13, 2004)

7/14/04  DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK will dismantle its nuclear weapons program only when conditions for it are created by the U.S. drop of its hostile policy toward the DPRK. To this end, it wishes to wipe out mistrust and build confidence between the DPRK and the U.S. by implementing the measure of "reward for freeze," to begin with. The DPRK will naturally return to NPT if the Korean peninsula is denuclearized and those fundamental elements, which compelled the DPRK to pull out of the treaty, are consequently removed. It is the unshakable stand of the DPRK that it can not stop its nuclear activities for a peaceful purpose before this happens. …As already clarified by the DPRK, a freeze is the first phase leading to the final dismantlement of its nuclear program and the freeze is bound to be accompanied by an objective
verification. **By verification the DPRK means monitoring the state of freeze.** The issue of inspection of the nuclear facilities and nuclear substance of the DPRK is something to be discussed only at the phase of dismantling its nuclear program. It is very illogical to argue about inspection from the phase of freeze.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman on DPRK’s Stand on Nuclear Freeze and Way of Verification,” July 14, 2004)


Vice FM Choi Young-jin calls in China’s ambassador, Li Bin, to protest “the distortion of Goguryeo history” by China’s government and press and urged China to “take measures on this matter in good faith so as not to hinder the future of relations.” Chinese scholars who set up a “Northeast Asia Project” in 2002 portrayed it as part of China. Xinhua called it as a “subordinate state that fell under the jurisdiction of Chinese dynasties and was under the great influence of Chinese politics and culture.” The PRC FoMin web site used to read, “The Korean Peninsula before the 1st century B.C. was ruled by the powers Silla, Baekje and Goguryeo.” The revised version deletes the reference to Goguryeo. (Choi Jie-ho, “Fight over Goguryeo Flares,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, July 15, 2004)

7/15/04

Asst SecSt Kelly testifies in SFRC: Lugar opening statement: “I am particularly interested in his [Ashton Carter’s] analysis as whether and how he might apply programs like the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to North Korea?” Bidn: “Have you spelled out to the North Koreans just what aspects of a transformed relationship can be expected form each of these steps in addition to the process laid out for disarmament of its nuclear program? In other words, where do diplomatic relations, Nunn-Lugar type assistance, trade relations, economic assistance, fit in ...”

Carlin: “Footnotes in intelligence community documents are like unpleasant noises at a banquet. As a general rule, they are frowned upon. No one would say so exactly, but everyone knows that taking a footnote—unless it is on a highly technical subject—is a sign of ill breeding. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department
of State has long been considered particularly ill bred; it takes a lot of footnotes. … Dissenting INR footnotes have often been borne of frustration. No one expected them to change anyone’s mind. They became an effort to speak for the record and, even more important, to preserve some intellectual integrity in the analytical process. That is not always easy to do because of the games that are sometimes played to make a footnote look stupid. Are there instances when the text has been changed after the fact, so that the footnote looks pointless and will have to be removed in a final clearance meeting, not because the point of contention has been resolved, but because the dissent has been out flanked? Could such things happen? Could bears sleep in the woods?” (Robert Carlin, “Told You So: The Life and Times of a Footnote,” unpublished draft)

7/19/04 New Vice UnifMin Rhee Bong-jo was presidential secy for inter-Korean affairs during 2000 N-S summit. (Yonhap, “North Korea Expert Becomes Vice Unification Minister,” July 19, 2004)


Under SecSt Bolton in Seoul sees FM Ban but does not talk about PSI, stresses Libya as a model for peaceful resolution, not pressure: “I know both President Roh Moo-hyun and President George W. Buush are very eager to have a peaceful diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. … The case of Libya has shown concretely the benefits that can flow if North Korean leader Kim Jong-il makes the strategic choice not to invest in WMD.” [Were his talking points cleared by Armitage?] (Ryu Jin, “Bolton Renews Call for Libyan Model for NK Nuke Resolution,” Korea Times, July 20, 2004; Yoo Dong-ho, “Pyongyang Should Leearn Lesson from Libya: Boston,” Korea Times, July 21, 2004)


7/22/04 At informal summit with Koizumi on Cheju, Roh seeks greater Japanese role in resolving nuclear issue. Koizumi says “If North Korea implements the Pyongyang Declaration in a sincere manner, it [normalization of relations] would be possible within a year.” (Aoki Naoko, “Ties with N. Korea Could Be Normalized in One Year: Koizumi,” Kyodo, July 21, 2004) Roh says, “If the North Korean nuclear problem is resolved, we made clear that South Korea and Japan will cooperate” to aid North. (Jack Kim and Masayuki Kitano, “Japan, S. Korea to Aid N. Korea after Nuclear Resolution,” Reuters, July 21, 2004)

House passes North Korea Human Rights Act by voice vote. (Chosun Ilbo, “U.S. House Unanimously Passes North Korea Human Rights Act,” July 22, 2004) It authorizes $2 million for each of next four years for grants to NGOs to promote human rights in
North Korea, increases radio broadcast to 12 hours a day, supports humanitarian assistance but only with certification that aid reaches intended beneficiaries, bars USG nonhumanitarian assistance without certification of “substantial” human rights progress, full disclosure of all information on Japanese and South Korean abductees, reform of its prison camp system, authorizes $20 million a year for next four years in NGO aid to refugees and migrants, orders facilitating of asylum for North Korean refugees. (Text)

Li Gun in New York for conference of National Committee on American Foreign Policy expects to meet DeTrani. (Yoo Dong-ho, “NK Negotiator to Visit Washington, Korea Times, July 22, 2004)

Nautilus report: "Options for Rehabilitation of Energy System and Energy Security and Energy Planning in the DPRK"


U.S. will donate 50,000 tons of agricultural commodities to WFP’s 2004 emergency food program for North Korea. (Richard Boucher statement, DoS, July 23, 2004)

7/24/04 DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. ‘landmark proposal’ was nothing but a sham offer. In a word, the U.S. proposal is, in its essence, is a mode of forcing Libya to scrap its nuclear program first, a mode veiled with word ‘landmark.’ The U.S. proposal does not reflect at all the principle of ‘words for words,’ ‘action for action’ which the U.S. had already promised to observe. Moreover, it says nothing of the U.S. commitment to give up its hostile policy toward the DPRK, a stumbling block lying in the way of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, and specific ways to do so. …The goal to denuclearize the Korean peninsula can be achieved only when the U.S. gives up in practice its more than half a century old hostile policy towards the DPRK. In response to the DPRK’s clarification of its goal to denuclearize the peninsula, the U.S. should commit itself to give up its hostile policy towards the former, lift the economic sanctions and blockade against it, delist it as a ‘sponsor of terrorism’ and directly take part in the 2 million kw energy compensation as the first phase measure to fulfill the commitment.

**Whether the U.S. takes part in the project to make reward for the DPRK’s nuclear freeze or not is the key to the settlement of the nuclear issue.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Dismisses U.S. Proposal,” July 24, 2004)**

7/25/04 After pulling down the last propaganda billboard on DMZ, the North in last propaganda broadcast says, “We, from one blood and using one language, can no longer live separated. We must ut the earliest possible end to the tragedy of national division.” 216 U.S. troops will soon withdraw from Joint Security Area at Panmunjom and consolidate military installations from 41 to 23. “The South’s new relationship with the North has change the nature of the South Korean-U.S. alliance, and we are still
trying to figure out what the new one will look like,” says Bong Geum-jun, former senior policy adviser in the UnifMin. “The truth is, we have a better relationship with the North and feel less threatened by them. That also means we feel less of a need to rely on the U.S.” (Anthony Faiola, “As Tensions Subside between Two Koreas, U.S. Strives to Adjust,” Washington Post, July 25, 2004, p. A-16)

KCNA: U.S. committed over 1,200 cases of aerial espionage from January to June this year. (KCNA, “Over 1,200 Cases of U.S. Aerial Espionage,” July 25, 2004)

7/26/04

In 1,100-word letter to U.N. sec-gen Kofi Annan, Col-Gen. Ri Chan-bok, North’s representative at Panmunjom, says, “It is our view that a war in Korea is almost unavoidable as long as the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK goes on.” He adds, “Such a massive arms buildup of the U.S. prompted the KPA side to judge that the U.S. preparations for a preemptive attack on the DPRK have reached their height.” He adds, “A preemptive attack in such relations of belligerency as those between the two countries cannot be a monopoly of the U.S.” (Reuters, “N. Korea Writes Annan, Demands U.S. Troop Pullout,” July 26, 2004) “If the UN acknowledges itself to be a signatory of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the UN should duly implement Article 60 … and settle the withdrawal of all foreign forces as soon as possible. However, if the UN claims that the US forces used its name only but the actual signatory to the Armistice Agreement was the United States, the UN should take practical actions to dismantle the UN Command established by the United States.” (KCNA, “Full text”)

7/27/04


DPRK FoMin spokesman: ‘The bill, setting out the so-called ‘countermeasure,’ went the lengths of mentioning financial and material support to the efforts to topple the DPRK’s system and pressurizing even its surrounding countries to take part in the drive to
achieve the aim. ...The U.S. regards the nuclear issue and the ‘human rights issue’ as two levers in executing its policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK. It is working hard to ‘change the system’ in the DPRK under the pretext of ‘human rights issue.’...All facts suffice to prove that the U.S. has neither intention to renounce its hostile policy toward the DPRK nor slightest willingness to co-exist with it. Now that the U.S. makes ceaseless political provocations against the DPRK with such bitter antipathy and hostility toward its political system, the DPRK is compelled to ponder over whether there is any need to continue dialogue with the U.S. for the settlement of the nuclear issue at the moment. The reality reinforces our conviction that it is the only way of protecting the sovereignty of the country and defending socialism which guarantees our life to increase its physical deterrent force for self-defence to cope with the U.S. evermore undisguised hostile policy toward it. The DPRK can never overlook the U.S. act of seriously hurting the dignity of the DPRK, a sovereignty state, and interfering in its internal affairs under the pretext of the fictitious ‘human rights issue’ in the wake of its foolish talk about applying the same method to the solution of the nuclear issue as done in Libya.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Refutes U.S. Accusations against It over ‘Human Rights Issue,’” July 27, 2004)


8/2/04 KCNA: Torrential rains hit North Korea. “At least 100,000 hectares of paddy and non-paddy fields were submerged or washed away and dwelling houses for more than 1,000 families and public buildings destroyed in over 70 cities and counties of South Phyongan, South Hwanghae, Kangwon, Ryanggang and other provinces from July 1 to 25.” (KCNA, “DPRK Hard Hit by Torrential Rain,” August 2, 2004)

Takemi Keizo, LDP chair of Uppper House committee for diplomacy and defense in 2001-02 and leader of bipartisan group calling for new defense policy, in interview: ‘Some say Japan should be like Britian, which almost always goes along with the United States in the arena of intenraitonal politics. ...But I think Japan cannot simply copy British diplomacy because Tokyo and Washington may not always share common interests. The Japanese government won’t be able to get the people’s support as long as the country’s interests are different from those of the United States. ...Japan should not so easily jump to revise Article 9 of the current Constitution. Pcifism, the backbone of the current Constitution, has wide support among the people and should be respected. ... I am concerned that support at the grass-roots level for the current U.S.-Japan alliance has weakened conspicuously while the two countries have lost sight of their strategic goals [Iraq]. If thecredibility of our alliance is undermined, more and
more Japanese, including left-wingers and liberals as well as young Japanese, will advocate Japan's cutting the alliance with the United States and taking its own approach in international politics. Once that happens, Japan's possession of nuclear weapons would be in sight. ... Whether the United States sides with Japan [over the Senkakus] will be a litmus test of the credibility of the two countries' alliance." (Hara Manabu, “A Partnership inReview: Arms Curb, Despite athe Need for Review, the U.S. Alliances Is Vital for a Nuclear-Free Japan as China Rises,” Asahi Shimbun, August 2, 2004)

8/3/04


8/5/04


8/6/04

Christopher R. Hill takes over from Thomas Hubbard as ambassador to ROK. (Korea Herald, “U.S. Amb. Hubbard Leaves Seoul,” August 6, 2004)

“From our point of view, we are ready for any kind of cooperation in any field with North Korea,” Ambassador Uzi Manor said in an interview. “If we get a positive response from them, of course we shall welcome it and we shall try to do our best, the same as we do with other countries.” Israel established relations with South Korea in 1962, but has no formal ties with the North. (Yonhap, “Israel Envoy Expresses Hope for Diplomatic Ties with North Korea,” August 6, 2004)

8/7/04

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The Japanese government announced on August 3 that it would sponsor a ‘joint naval exercise’ off Tokyo Bay in October according to PSL. ...It is clear that the exercise to be staged under the pretext of ‘checking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the sea’ is a product of the Bush administration's sinister attempt to escalate its policy to isolate and blockade the DPRK. ...It has now become clear that the U.S. seeks to solve the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. by force, not through dialogue and negotiations. This compels the DPRK to take corresponding counter-measures. It cannot but take a serious view of the ‘joint naval exercise’ the Japanese authorities plan to sponsor at the
instigation of the U.S. Japan’s behavior diametrically runs counter to the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration in which both sides committed themselves not to take any action against each other’s security.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK FoMin Blasts ‘Joint Naval exercise’ To Be Hosted by Japan,” August 7, 2004)

8/8/04

New NIE appears to be written far more cautiously, says it does not know where 8,000 fuel rods are. Samore of IISS says many analysts in the intelligence agencies believe that a “whiff” of nuclear byproduct detected by a U.S. spy plane last year was evidence reprocessing was under way but others note that the experiment was never successfully repeated. “You can’t assume a linear progression,” said one senior U.S. official. “It’s very frustrating,” said one former official who left the administration recently [JP] that it has failed to draw clear red lines. (David E. Sanger, “Diplomacy Fails to Slow Advance of Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, August 8, 2004, p. A-1) “Those who leaked the reports likely want the negotiations to hit an immovable obstacle,” said Peter Hayes. (Reuben Staines, “NK Nuke Talks Stalling ahead of U.S. Elections,” Korea Times, August 11, 2004)


8/9/04

Senior MOFAT official downplays senior Bush administration official’s remark that it would consider “all the tools available” to frustrate the North’s nuclear ambitions. (Ryu Jin, “Seoul Downplays US Rhetoric on NK Nukes,” Korea Times, August 9, 2004)

Li Gun, Han Seong-joo, and Joseph DeTrani meet on margin of NCAFP seminar in New York. Lower-level reps from China and Japan attend the seminar. (Reuben Staines, “Two Korea, US Hold Informal Nuke Talks in NY,” Korea Times, August 10, 2004) Kim Tae-gil, DPRK Institute of Disarmament and Peace, “Regional Security in Northeast Asia,” August 9, 2004, p. 5: “It is essential to change the present armistice system, the constant state of war danger between the DPRK and US, the warring parties into a peace system.” Li Gun: “The U.S. maintains the position of no rewards for freeze because, should the U.S. recognize freeze as an action step, it has to share the burden of taking corresponding measures. ...It is only too clear that the situation may go downturn if the U.S. continues to neglect the pragmatic approach in resolving the nuclear issue, but merely ... insists on ‘first giving up of nuke.’ ...Time is not necessarily working in the U.S. interest. With the passing of time, our internal projects would be continued.” (Li Gun, “Conceptual Points on the Nuclear Issue,” NCAFP, August 9, 2004, pp. 6) U.S. proposes working-level meeting. (KCNA, Spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry on Prospect of Six-Party Talks,” August 16, 2004)

8/11-12/04

Working-level Japan-DPRK talks held in Beijing. North Korea gave Japan a verbal interim report on the abductees. Song Il-ho said on arrival that the investigation is “still going on.” Japanese government sources said it could withhold aid if the North gives insufficient information. (Aoki Naoko, “N. Korea Fails to Give Full Report on 10 Missing Japanese,” Kyodo, August 11, 2004) The report said who was involved in the investigation, ten officials from the police and ten officials from local authorities, and
what activities were being undertaken -- examination of resident registrations, inspection of related locations and a request for documents from the intelligence agency that carried out the abductions. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “North Korean Inaction Hampers Closer Ties,” September 18, 2004) Saiki Akitaka, dep dir-gen. of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanic Bureau told reporters after the talks, “We are not satisfied with the results of the investigation put forward this time.” Chief Cab Secy Hosoda Hiroyuki said, “There was absolutely no progress on concrete details ... of their whereabouts ... and we can only regard it as insufficient.” The North also indicated it was not opposed to handing over four members of the Japanese Red Army Faction. The other five either died or have already returned home. (Aoki Naoko, “Japan-N. Korea Talks End, Sept. Talks Proposed,” Kyodo, August 12, 2004) Tokyo is wary that further talks might founder on abduction issue. “Now’s not the time to resume bilateral talks for the normalization of diplomatic relations,” said a senior MOFA official. (Miura Makoto, “N. Korea Weighs Opinion in Japan,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 13, 2004)


8/12/04  Powell: “They want to believe that if they didn’t have this program, that the United States would not invade them. We’re not going to invade them with this program or without this program. ...Now, with respect to North Korean desires, what we have said is that we want to help North Korea but we are not prepared to start putting real benefits on the table in response to a promise to do something. We have seen this kind of tactic with the North Korean negotiators in the past. Now, some of our colleagues in the six-party talks are willing to put forward fuel and maybe other help to the North Koreans. Some of our party -- our colleagues are putting forward food now. ...This should not be something that is holding up progress. Since other members of the six-party talks have said they would put something up front to assist North Korea with its fuel and energy needs, that should be enough. The United States has said up front as we start down this road we will provide assurances with respect to our lack of a hostile intent and our assertion and statement that we have no plans to invade or attack, and this will all be part of an agreement that we will enter into over time.” (Secretary of State Colin Powell, Roundtable with Japanese Journalists,” August 12, 2004, text)

Goguryeo ancient dynasty controlled upper part of the Korean peninsula and what is now Manchuria from 37 B.C. to 668 A.D. “there seem to be several reasons behind China’s action, but perhaps the mlst important point is that China needs to unify its diverse ethnic groups in preparation for possible changes in Northeast Asia’s security circumstances,” said Lee Myeon-woo of Sejong Institute. “The country is worried that a unified Korea may claim its Manchuria Territory where millions of ethnic Koreans reside now. Also, it may be seeking ground to justify its intervention if North Korea collapses or a major change takes place in Northeast Asia.” (Kim So-young, “News Analysis: Why Hasn’t Korea Gone Hard-Line with China?” Korea Herald, August 13, 2004)

**8/16/04** DPRK FoMin spokesman: “As the DPRK has already clarified more than once, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the goal the DPRK wants to achieve and its stand to seek a negotiated peaceful solution to the nuclear issue remains unchanged. ... The U.S. side clarified its policy stance that there can be no reward for the DPRK’s freeze of its nuclear facilities and is reasserting CVID, reneging on all the agreements and shared understanding reached at the last talks. The U.S. went the lengths of claiming that a military option has not been completely removed from the table, while asserting that the DPRK’s non-existent enriched uranium program and all other nuclear programs should be scrapped and the human rights, missile, conventional armed forces, religious and all other issues should be solved if the DPRK-U.S. relations are to normalize after the settlement of the nuclear issue. The present development stuns and disappoints the DPRK. ...Recently the U.S. House of Representatives adopted the ‘bill on human rights in north Korea’ in a bid to provide a financial and material guarantee for the overthrow of the system in the DPRK and force the third country to carry out it. The Bush administration spearheaded the massive abduction of people from the north and is leading the joint naval exercises according to PSI. It is massively shipping into south Korea latest war equipment worth 13 billion dollars under the pretext of "reduction" of the U.S. forces. What is this if it is not a hostile policy? It is clear that there would be nothing to expect even if the DPRK sits at the negotiating table with the U.S. under the present situation. Now that the process of the six-party talks is retracting from the desired direction due to the U.S. attitude and nothing can be expected from the next round of the talks, it is clear such talks for the form’s sake would be helpful to no one. The United States hastily proposed to have a meeting of the working group for the six-party talks in New York when the two sides were having a multilateral exchange of views in New York in the mid-August. This clearly indicates that the U.S. is, in actuality, not interested in making the dialogue fruitful but only seeks to give an impression that it makes efforts to solve the issue.” ...A nuclear freeze is possible and it can lead to the dismantlement of the nuclear program only when the situation develops in the direction of the U.S. dropping hostile acts against the DPRK. On the contrary, these acts are escalating. This prevents the DPRK from freezing its nuclear facilities, much less dismantling its nuclear program. As mentioned above, the U.S. has destroyed itself the foundation for the talks, making it impossible for the DPRK to go to the forthcoming meeting of the working group. The U.S. side is spreading a sheer rumor that the DPRK is delaying the talks in anticipation of the results of the U.S. presidential election. This is profound confusing of right and wrong. This rubbish only betrays the utter ignorance of the DPRK. Who will become a next U.S. president is the Americans’ interest. It has nothing to do with the DPRK. ...What is urgent at the moment is for the U.S. to clarify its will to participate in the undertaking to make reward and show its willingness to give up in practice its hostile policy towards the DPRK and thus lay down a foundation for negotiations. (KCNA, “Spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry on Prospect of Six-Party Talks,” August 16, 2004)

8/18/04  President Bush at campaign event in Wisconsin says others in the six-party talks have to say “to the tyrant in North Korea, disarm, disarm.” (White House, President’s Remarks at Ask President Bush Event, August 18, 2004)

PRC FoMin spokesman Kong Quan: “We believe the parties have the willingness to continue to promote the procedure of peaceful talks.” (Hu Xiao, “Nation Calls for Calm to Continue Six-Party Talks,” China Daily, August 19, 2004, p. 1)

8/20/04  As U.S. pressed to isolate North, Asian and European countries engaged it. U.S. under pressure from others in six-party talks had to make a proposal. “They were drifting away from the U.S.’s line, and the U.S. was becoming isolated,” said Moon Chung-in. “They were fed up with America’s failure to come up with a concrete plan, and the Americans realized it.” Germany led efforts to engage has opened first cultural center in Pyongyang. “We can call this a breakthrough,” said Uwe Schmelter, director of the Goethe Institute in Seoul who negotiated the Goethe Information Center. “For a country that has been labeled as isolated, reclusive and unchanging, a change is a change.” MOFA director of policy planning Moon Ha-yong said, “We hope the [human rights] bill won’t have any bad effect on the Korean peninsula.” Kim Yeon-chul, adviser to the UnifMin, said, “The scope and frequency of our talks have been increasing,” -- 38 meetings in 2003 for a total of 106 days. (Norimitsu Onishi, “North Korea Is Reaching Out, And World Is Reaching Back,” New York Times, August 20, 2004, p. A-1)

8/22/04  Don Gregg, who visited North Korea early this month, says it wants the U.S. to resume providing HFO as a condition for freezing its nuclear weapons program. (Yonhap, “N.K. Demands Heavy Fuel Oil in Return for Nuke Freeze: Ex-Envoy,” August 22, 2004)

8/23/04  South Korea tells IAEA scientists produced a small amount of near-weapons grade HEU. “It became clear to the South Koreans that there would environmental samples taken and the truth would be discovered,” said a diplomat with knowledge of the disclosure. “So they decided they better disclose it first themselves.” (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “South Koreans Say Secret Work Refined Uranium,” September 3, 2004, New York Times, p. A-1) Chang In-soon, president of Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, says in inw, laser experiment “purely scientific in nature” tried around three times producing about 0.2 grams with average level of 10 percent enrichment. (Kyodo, “S. Korea Uranium Enrichment Experiment Conducted 3 Times,” September 4, 2004) “We don’t think it was a government policy to develop nuclear arms,” Chief Cab Secy Hosoda Hiroyuki said. “But this suggests that what should have been under tight control of the IAEA was actually not.” (James Brooke, “South Koreans Repeat: We Have No Atomic Bomb Program,” New York Times, September 4, 2004, p. A-3) “It will be difficult to prevent the spreading of an arms race in the region sue to the South’s nuclear experiment,” said Dep PermRep Han Song-ryol. (Yonhap, “NK to Take Issue with SK Uranium Enrichment,” September 8, 2004) On August 19 Cho Chang-beom, ROK amb to IAEA, told U.S. officials it had filed report with IAEA about uranium laser separation but asked them “to help keep the information secret.” The U.S. urged
him to disclose the information because it would “for sure be leaked” to the press by IAEA officials. The ROK said it had told IAEA inspectors in the past and the IAEA was interviewing past and present staff to check. The ROK tried to stop the IAEA from reporting it to the Board of Governors, even vaguely threatening to set back El Baradei’s quest for a third term. Once it was clear it would be reported to the Board, Western diplomats said, the ROK urged that the IAEA report only the separation and delay reporting uranium metal conversion or plutonium reprocessing in a hot cell 22 years ago. (Mark Hibbs, “ROK Claimed IAEA Knew of U Work, Pressed for No IAEA Board Report,” Nucleonics Week, September 30, 2004, pp. 1, 7-8, 14-15)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Bush during his recent election campaign in Wisconsin state [August 18] again let loose such outbursts as hurling malignant slanders and calumnies at the supreme headquarters of the DPRK. He asserted that it is necessary for the U.S., China, Japan, south Korea and Russia to unite and they are urging ‘the tyrant’ to disarm himself. This can not be construed as remarks made by a politician with sound reason and sensibility to reality but as a base tongue-lashing that can be made only by the stupid. …This clearly proves that the DPRK was quite right when it commented that he is a political imbecile bereft of even elementary morality as a human being and a bad guy, much less being a politician. …The Bush group has betrayed its true colors once again though it is directly responsible for properly laying a foundation for the talks. This made it quite impossible for the DPRK to go to the talks and deprived it of any elementary justification to sit at the negotiating table with the U.S. The reality today substantially convinces the army and people of the DPRK that the Songun policy of the Workers’ Party of Korea is entirely just and heightens their faith and confidence in it.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts Bush’s Reckless Remarks,” August 23, 2004)

8/24/04 KCNA: “Bush is, in fact, a thrice-cursed fascist tyrant and man-killer as he revived the fascist war doctrine which had been judged by humankind long ago and is now bringing dark clouds of a new Cold War to hang over our planet and indiscriminately massacring innocent civilians after igniting the Afghan and Iraqi wars. It is the greatest tragedy for the U.S. that Bush, a political idiot and human trash, still remains in the presidential office of the world’s only ‘superpower,’ styling himself ‘an emperor of the world.’ In a word, his vituperation discloses his cunning political ploy to mislead the world public opinion and bring down the inviolable political system of the DPRK, come what may. … Bush’s open brigandish demand that the DPRK disarm itself simply reveals the true intention of the U.S. to settle the DPRK-U.S. nuclear issue by bringing down the former’s system, not through dialogue. The U.S. is staging even ‘Ulji Focus Lens-04’ joint military exercise aimed to unleash a war against the DPRK after massively shipping up-to-date war equipment into south Korea, blustering that a military option has not been completely removed from the table. This clearly indicates that the U.S. option is not dialogue but showdown. Now that the U.S. has clearly revealed its true intention, the DPRK can no longer pin any hope on the six-party talks and there is a question as to whether there is any need for it to negotiate with the U. S. any more. …It is the DPRK’s firm resolution and conviction in sure victory to react to confrontation with confrontation and return a preemptive attack with a preemptive strike.” (KCNA Terms Bush Fascist Tyrant,” August 24, 2004)
Bush invw says he won’t “tolerate” nuclear weapons in North Korea or Iran but declined to say what he meant by “tolerate.” He gave no hint that his patience was limited or that he might try preemption. “I don’t think you give timelines to dictators.” He endorsed diplomacy: “I’m confident that over time this will work - I certainly hope it does.” Kerry invw argued that North Korea “was a far more compelling threat in many ways, and it belongs at the top of the agenda.” (David E. Sanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, “Bush Dismisses Idea That Kerry Lied on Vietnam,” New York Times, August 27, 2004, p. A-1)

Paul Kerr invw with admin official: “We won’t do HFO b/c it’s a vestige of the AF that sits badly with Congress. It’s too much trouble to get support from congress. Avoiding this gives us (exec branch) more control over the process.NK doesn’t care if we do HFO or not, it’s been put forward as an attempt to not respond to the June offer. They know we’ll do future energy assistance. …We have a plan on verification that’s been blessed at the principals’ level. We’re discussing how it would work with others Russia and Japan have best expertise on this. We’re not ready to roll it out yet. Need to get to the fine print. …We have written drafts on them [security assurances]. Conditions are that it not be a treaty, and it not interfere with SK and Japan alliances and it be multilateral not bilateral. We’re willing to discuss it within those parameters. The agreement should anticipate a future agreement to replace the armistice (but not be legally binding).”


Summary The report is one of many about alleged covert North Korean co-operation with Burma, which has repeatedly denied there are any North Koreans in the country. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

1. (S) SUMMARY: North Korean workers are reportedly assembling “SAM missiles” and constructing an underground facility at a Burmese military site in Magway Division, about 315 miles NNW of Rangoon, according to XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . This unsolicited account should not
be taken as authoritative, but it tracks with other information garnered and reported via XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Summary.

2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX

3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX some 300 North Koreans are working at a secret construction site west of Mimbu, Magway Division, in the foothills of the Arakan Yoma mountains. (Comment: the number of North Koreans supposedly working at this site strikes us as improbably high. End comment.) The XXXXXXXXXXXX claims he has personally seen some of them, although he also reported they are forbidden from leaving the construction site and that he and other "outsiders" are prohibited from entering. The XXXXXXXXXXXX was confident that XXXXXXXXXXXX had the ability to distinguish North Koreans from others, such as Chinese, who might be working in the area. The exact coordinates of the camouflaged site are not known, but it is reportedly in the vicinity of 20,00 N, 94,25 E.

4. (S) The North Koreans are said to be assembling "SAM missiles" of unknown origin. XXXXXXXXXXXX the North Koreans, aided by Burmese workers, are constructing a concrete-reinforced underground facility that is "500 feet from the top of the cave to the top of the hill above." He added that the North Koreans are "blowing concrete" into the excavated underground facility.

5. (S) The XXXXXXXXXXXX is supposedly engaged in constructing buildings for 20 Burmese army battalions that will be posted near the site. Of these, two battalions are to be infantry; the other 18 will be "artillery," according to this account.

6. (S) [XXXXXXXXX]

7. (S) COMMENT: The [XXXXXXXXX second-hand account of North Korean involvement with missile assembly and military construction in Magway Division generally tracks with other information Embassy Rangoon and others have reported in various channels. Again, the number 300 is much higher than our best estimates of North Koreans in Burma, and exactly how the XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly came to see some of them personally remains unclear. Many details provided XXXXXXXXXXXX match those provided by other, seemingly unrelated, sources.

8. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: We cannot, and readers should not, consider this report alone to be definitive proof or evidence of sizable North Korean military involvement with the Burmese regime. The XXXXXXXXXXXX description made no reference at all to nuclear weapons or technology, or to surface-to-surface missiles, ballistic or otherwise. XXXXXXXXXXXX This account is perhaps best considered alongside other information of various origins indicating the Burmese and North Koreans are up to something ) something of a covert military or military-industrial nature. Exactly what, and on what scale, remains to be determined. Post will continue to monitor these developments and report as warranted. McMullen
8/28/04  ROK is unable to confirm death of Koh Young-hee, mistress of Kim Jong-il, after long illness. North two weeks ago suddenly closed its northern border to foreign tourists. On August 22 National Defense Committee severely restricted the number of telephones that could be used to call foreign residents and embassies. [Counters Onishi?] (James Brooke, “A Mystery about a Mistress in North Korea,” New York Times, August 27, 2004, p. A-3)

9/2/04  In speech to GOP convention Bush omits South Korea from the list of allies in Iraq. On September 8, FM Ban Ki-moon said, “On numerous occasions, U.S. officials in Seoul and Washington have told us that Korea’s omission had nothing to do with our alliance and that they are very grateful for Seoul’s troop dispatch to Iraw.” (Reuben Staines, “Bush’s Omission Not to Weaken Alliance: U.S.” Korea Times, September 8, 2004)

9/6/04  Last four remaining Japanese Red Army Faction hijackers of a JAL passenger jet in 1970, aged 56 to 60, tell Kyodo, “Our existence has been a major issue in bilateral relations, and we are ready to return to Japan even if it results in a long detention.” (Japan Times, “Last JAL Hijackers Ready to Come Home,” September 6, 2004)


9/8/04  Nighttime explosion rocks Yanggang province in northeast North Korea. “We’ve seen reports of this explosion, but based on the information we have, it was not any kind of nuclear event,” Powell says on Fox News Sunday. He is skeptical about an October surprise. (AFP, “North Korea Did Not Conduct Nuclear Test: Powell,” September 13, 2004) “It was no nuclear explosion or accident,” FM Paek Nam-sun tells visiting British FCO junior minister Bill Rammell. “It was a deliberate, controlled detonation to demolish a mountain [for a hydroelectric dam] in the far north of the country.” September 9 was the 56th anniversary of the DPRK. (James Brooke, “North Korea Offers to Show Site of Blast to Diplomats,” New York Times, September 14, 2004, p. A-14) DPRK Vice FM Kung Sok-un agrees to allow British, other ambassadors to visit the site. (Kyodo, N. Korea Invites Diplomats to Blast Site: British Minister,” September 13, 2004) Diplomats from seven countries do so on September 17. DPRK FoMin spokesman: “During the British delegation’s stay in the DPRK, some media spread a false report that the recent big blasting in a power station construction site in the northern part of the DPRK was an ‘explosion accident’ and a ‘nuclear test.’ In this connection, the British side hoped that an on-field inspection of the site would be arranged for the diplomatic corps here, and the DPRK side met this request with pleasure out of good faith.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman on British Foreign Office Delegation’s DPRK Visit,” September 16, 2004)

plan involving denial and deception in order to evade detection by inspectors,” said
one diplomat at the IAEA, which detected it in 1998. (Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer,

Bureau chief-level talks on realignment of forces “boil over” with of U.S. frustration,
Nukaga Fukushima, LDP Policy Council chairman, says to Richard Lawless, deputy
undersecdef for Asian and Pacific Affairs, who replied tongue-in-cheek that the talks
were amicable because the participants did not come to blows. The Japanese
delayed responding, wanting to wait until after House of Councillors elections in July.
They told U.S., “We’d like you to allow us to regard [the plans] as ‘mere ideas,’ not

9/9-10/04 TCOG in Tokyo. Discuss strategy for September round, revelation of ROK nuclear
experiments. (James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books,
(Asahi Shimbun, “Seeking Answers: Japan Plans Sept. 29-30 Abductions Talks,
“September 15, 2004)

9/10/04 North Korean trying to enter South Korean consulate in Beijing is injured by Chinese
guards. (Yonhap, “N. Korean Injured Trying to Enter S. Korean Consulate in Beijing,”
September 10, 2004)

9/?/04 Assistant Secretary James Kelly leads delegation of James Foster, Joseph DeTrani and
Robert Walpole to China to brief on uranium enrichment program. Walpole, CIA top
analyst on nuclear weapons, prepared the briefing opaper, which Foster found less
than compelling. So did the Chinese. Wu Dawei excused himself from attending,
leaving a junior FoMin official to chair the meeting. “We really questioned the
American assessment,” said a Chinese official. “It was hard to reach a conclusion North
Korea had an HEU program.” Said a U.S. official, “This was supposed to be our
breakthrough moment to explain to the Chinese why we were so firm on this thing,
and we just got nowhere with it.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 222-23)

9/?.13/04 Junior minister Bill Rammell in Pyongyang. “They have stopped giving blanket denials.
They actually admit to you face to face they attach far less importance to human rights
than we do. They admit to the existence of re-education through labor camps,”
Rammell tells reporters. It may admit human rights monitors. (Paul Taylor, “Britain
Hopeful North Korea May Admit Rights Team,” Reuters, September 21, 2004) North
tells Rammell it could “never sit at the table to negotiate its nuclear-weapon program
unless truth about the secret nuclear experiments in South Korea is fully probed.”
(Ralph Cossa, “Offer Pyongyang Transparency Challenge,” Japan Times, September
29, 2004)

9/11/04 DPRK FoMin spokesman: “There is strong suspicion that the disclosed experiments
might be conducted at the instruction of the United States as they assume military
nature. The U.S. has applied double standards as regards the nuclear issue. It has
transferred nuclear technology to its ‘allies’ and connived at their nuclear weapon-
related activities and possession of nukes. But it has worked hard to stamp out nuclear
activities for a peaceful purpose after faking up ‘misinformation’ about the DPRK on account of its ideology and system. What matters is whether the U.S. intends to overlook South Korea’s development of nuclear weapons as it did that of Israel. **South Korea is under U.S. nuclear umbrella. It is self-evident that the DPRK can never abandon its nuclear program under such situation.** The U.S. is now employing sleight of hand to hush up the above-said cases. **We cannot but link these cases to the issue of resuming the six-party talks. The cases should be clarified transparently and thoroughly and necessary measures be taken. We will closely follow the expected results of the investigation.** (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK FM on Issue of Uranium Enrichment in South Korea,” September 11, 2004)

Intel reports circulating in recent days warn North Korea is preparing to conduct a nuclear test. Some analysts in agencies that were the most cautious about Iraq findings do not see harbinger of North Korean test. A senior scientist says the evidence is “not conclusive.” No sign of cables but one senior official says, “I’m not sure you would see that in a country that has tunnels everywhere.” Powell on Fox News Sunday: “With respect to reports in the paper this morning that there is activity going on at a potential nuclear test site, we are monitoring this.” Kerry statement on 9/12: “The mere fact that we are even contemplating a nuclear weapons test by North Korea highlights a massive national security failure by President Bush. ...During his administration North Korea has advanced its nuclear program and a potential route to a nuclear 9/11 is clearly visible. (AFP, Kerry Sees ‘Route to a Nuclear 9/11’ in North Korea,” September 13, 2004)

**IAEA dir-gen ElBaradei tells reporters that “the average [uranium] enrichment” was 10 percent U-235, but added that “there could be some higher peak” of enrichment. The work “took place in three separate facilities that had not been declared to the agency.” Chang In-soon, president of the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, told the Washington Post Sept. 8 that none of the enriched uranium contained much more than the average level of U-235. In a 9/16 interview, however, a diplomatic source in Vienna close to the IAEA confirmed a Washington Post report that South Korea has enriched uranium to 77 percent, theoretically enough for a weapon though 90 percent is the usual. The extent of high-level government involvement in the experiments is also unclear at this stage. ROK officials told the IAEA that scientists acting “without the knowledge or authorization of the...government” initiated and carried out the experiments for research purposes, but the Vienna source questioned the accuracy of this claim, pointing out that the experiments were conducted in government facilities. Seoul’s cooperation with the IAEA is also an issue. The source confirmed a Sept. 12 Washington Post report that South Korea had refused more than one IAEA attempt to inspect facilities associated with its laser-enrichment program. A South Korean embassy official interviewed Sept. 23 said that Seoul was not obligated to allow such inspections because it had not yet ratified its additional protocol. As for the plutonium experiments, the Vienna source said the IAEA took samples at a site in South Korea in 1997 and 2003 and found evidence of separated plutonium, adding that South Korean officials disregarded the IAEA’s concerns during discussions last December. The South Korean official said Seoul began “consultations” with the agency after the samples were taken but had trouble providing the necessary information. The government had**
no records of the experiment and the relevant scientists had either died or left the country, the official said. (Paul Kerr, “IAEA Probes Seoul’s Nuclear Program,” Arms Control Today (October 2004), pp. 33-34; Jungmin Kang, Tatsuki Suzuki, and Peter Hayes, “South Korea’s Nuclear Mis-Adventures,” Napsnet, September 10, 2004; Mark Gorwitz, “The South Korean Laser Isotope Separation Experience,” ISIS, September 27, 2004)

9/15/04
A senior U.S. official says North Korea is looking for an extended delay in resuming six-party talks and even told China there was no point in continuing the talks at all. (Barry Schweid, “North Korea Looks to Delay Nuclear Talks,” Associated Press, September 15, 2004)

9/17/04
Rodong Sinmun: “The DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration is a historical document in line with the aspiration and interests of the peoples of the DPRK and Japan in the new century and with the trend of the times, says Rodong Sinmun Friday in a signed article carried two years after the publication of the historic declaration. The declaration serves as a basic document and international legal framework for putting an end to the long-standing abnormal relations between the two countries and normalizing them. …For Japan to redress its past is the most urgent task for solving the outstanding bilateral issues between the two countries and the prospect of the improved DPRK-Japan relations hinges upon this. …It is not an issue which can be solved by efforts on the part of one side only.” (KCNA, “Implementation of DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration Called For,” September 17, 2004)


9/21/04
PRC FoMin spokesman Kong Quan: “The upcoming six-way talks will address South Korea’s nuclear experiments. …The purpose of the talks is the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” (Yonhap, “Six-Way Talks to Address Seoul’s Nuke Experiments: China,” September 21, 2004) Chung Woo-sung, presidential aide for foreign policy rebuts China: “South Korea’s nuclear experiments are not the subject matter to be discussed in six-way talks.” (Yoon Won-sup, “Lab Test Not on Nuke Talks Agenda,” Korea Times, September 22, 2004)


South Korea has 486 on list of citizens abducted by North. “I had hoped initially that the sunshine policy would mean that we had a better chance of seeing our loved ones again, or at least finding out their fate, but we have come to realize just the opposite,” says Choi Woo-young, president of Families of Abducted and Detained in North Korea. His father, seized by a North Korean patrol boat in 1967 while fishing in West Sea, was on a South Korean intelligence list of abductees. (Anthony Faiola, “Abducted

9/22/04

*Rodong Sinmun*: “If the United States ignites a nuclear war, the U.S. military base in Japan would serve as a detonating fuse to turn Japan into a sea of fire.” Japan sends two [Aegis] destroyers and [EP-3] surveillance aircraft to the East Sea. “Activities related to North Korea’s missiles have been detected recently,” says Vice UnifMin Rhee Bong-jo. “Our assessment is that that they are likely part of an annual exercise by a North Korean missile unit. [But] we cannot rule out the possibility of a [Rodong] test firing.” (Andrew Ward, “Tensions Rise as N. Korea Steps up Rhetoric,” *Financial Times*, September 23, 2004) SecSt Powell: “I think it would be very unfortunate if the North Koreans were to do something like this and break out of the moratorium that they have been following for a number of years.” (Reuters, “Powell Warns North Korea Against New Missile Test,” September 23, 2004) Engine test is possible on a new SS-N-6 variant, NHK quotes high-ranking U.S. military official. (Yonhap, “U.S. Detects Signs of N. Korea’s New Missile Engine Test,” September 24, 2004) “My understanding is they right now could shoot it anytime they want,” senior U.S. official says. Some in Washington believe it “expects us to go running to them, begging them to stop.” (Sakajiri Nobuyoshi, “N. Korea ‘Ready’ to Fire off Missile,” *Asahi Shimbun*, September 25, 2004)

PM Koizumi tells DPRK Vice FM Choe Su-hon it is important for the North to follow through on the Pyongyang declaration and asked him to pass that on to Kim Jong-il in a brief chat at a reception hosted by Japan’s ambassador to the U.N. Haraguchi Koichi. (Kosukegawa Yoichi, “Koizumi Sends Message to N. Korean Leader on 2-Way Ties, Nuke,” Kyodo, September 22, 2004)

9/23/04


9/24/04

ROK Ministry of Commerce steps up monitoring to prevent sodium cyanide, precursor chemical for sarin, from reaching North after it finds a South Korean firm sold 107 tons to a Chinese intermediary firm in June-September 2003. (Seo Jee-yeon, “NK’s Chemical Imports Raise Alarm,” Korea Times, September 24, 2004)

Powell, Ban Ki-moon meet at UN.


Japan-DPRK working-level talks. “Their reply was not zero, but no documents were presented as evidence of their efforts [on abductions’ whereabouts],” said Saiki Akitata, dep dir-gen of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau. “The results were very unfortunate and insignificant.” (Aoki Naoko, “Japan, N. Korea Fail to Reach Breakthrough, May Meet in Oct.,” September 26, 2004) North no longer claims Yokota Megumi committed suicide in March 1993, say she was hospitalized until June 1993. (Mainichi Shimbun, “North Korea Backs Down on Yokota Megumi Death Claims,” September 27, 2004) Japan asked North to hand over three agents suspected of kidnapping for interrogation: Kim Se-ho, Sin Guang-su and Abe Kimihiro. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “70% Say Government Wrong to Give North Korea Aid,” October 1, 2004)

Vice FM Choe Su-Hon tells FM Kawaguchi Yoriko in chat at a reception, “Reports on missile launch preparations are all conjecture, rumor and speculation.” (Igarashi Aya, “Missile Reports ‘Just Rumors’/North Korea Dismisses Evidence of Preparations for Test Launch,” Yomiuri Shimbun, September 26, 2004)

Vice FM Choe Su-hon tells UNGA, “We have already made clear that we have already reprocessed 8,000 wasted fuel rods and transformed them into arms.” (Yonhap, “Pyongyang Already ‘Weaponized’ Spent Nuclear Fuel: N. Korean Envoy, September 27, 2004)

Machimura Nobutaka replaces Kawaguchi as FM. (Associated Press, “Japan Foreign Minister Suggests Economic Sanctions to Deal with North Korea,” September 27, 2004) Appointment of former LDP vice pres Yamasaki Taku to be assistant to the PM is designed, as he has said, to “make the prime minister’s office serve as a control tower for the realignment office.” Koizumi is seen as trying to increase his authority over foreign policy. A senior MOFA official cites Koizumi’s May summit in Pyongyang, “It was an idea that a bureaucrat could have never hit upon.”

Under SecState Bolton: “I think it would be fair to say that if, at some point, North Korea continues to stonewall, then I think the Security Council is the next logical step. At some point you have to ask the question, if the North Koreans are not willing to engage seriously, what is the future of the talks?” (JoongAng Ilbo, “U.S. Denounces North Envoy’s Nuclear Threat,” September 29, 2004)

FM Machimura tells reporters,“We have to start thinking about the possibility of imposing sanctions if, after setting a time limit at some point, they are still unable to clear that hurdle.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Sanctions Deadline Eyed for N. Korea,” October 1, 2004)


Japan will delay of 125,000 tons of food aid Koizumi promised North in May 22 summit. (Kyodo, “Japan Set to Delay Decision on Food Aid to N. Korea,” September 29, 2004)

Japan wants to interrogate agents. Chief Cab Secy Hosoda Hiroyuki: “If Pyongyang says it cannot conduct a full investigation due to [the resistance of] agents who carried out the abductions, then we’ll be asking North Korea for its agents to take part in the working-level talks in person.” (Asahi Shim bun, “Tokyo May Request Input from N. Korean Spies on Abductions,” September 29, 2004)

North’s missile programs, used to justify missile defenses, open to question. “It would be a huge technological leap for them, says Joseph Cirincione. “I don’t see the evidence that they’ve made the necessary breakthroughs.” Dennis M. Gormley of Monterey Institute: “You get as many people arguing that their design can’t be that far along as you do people saying yes indeed it can be.” “The fundamental point is, basically, the North Koreans could decide at any time to flight-test a longer-range system,” says Vann H. Van Diepen, senior State proliferation official. “They've been in that configuration literally for years.” (Bradley Graham, “N. Korea Is Used to Justify System,” Washington Post, September 29, 2004, p. A-17)

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and East Asia Institute poll finds 78 percent of Koreans see U.S. as helpful, 13 percent favor indefinite stay of U.S. troops, 6 percent immediate withdrawal, 43 percent for gradual withdrawal and 38 percent for considerable stay. (Chun Young-gi and Min Seong-jae, “Poll Shows Koreans Back Presence of U.S., JoongAng Ilbo, September 30, 2004)

North tells WFP it wants development assistance, not food aid, and moves to expel aid workers. South Korean NGOs also face new restrictions. (Barbara Demick, “North Korea Increases Restrictions on Foreign Aid Groups,” Los Angeles Times, September 30, 2004)

First Presidential debate: LEHRER: New question, Mr. President. Do you believe that diplomacy and sanctions can resolve the nuclear problems with North Korea and Iran? Take them in any order you would like.

BUSH: North Korea, first, I do. Let me say -- I certainly hope so. Before I was sworn in, the policy of this government was to have bilateral negotiations with North Korea. And we signed an agreement with North Korea that my administration found out that was not being honored by the North Koreans. And so I decided that a better way to approach the issue was to get other nations involved, just besides us. And in Crawford, Texas, Jiang Zemin and I agreed that the nuclear-weapons-free peninsula, Korean Peninsula, was in his interest and our interest and the world’s interest. And so we began a new dialogue with North Korea, one that included not only the United States, but now China. And China’s a got a lot of influence over North Korea, some ways more than we do. As well, we included South Korea, Japan and Russia. So now there are five voices speaking to Kim Jong Il, not just one. And so if Kim Jong Il decides again to not honor an agreement, he’s not only doing injustice to America, he’d be doing injustice to China,
as well. And I think this will work. It's not going to work if we open up a dialogue with Kim Jong Il. He wants to unravel the six-party talks, or the five-nation coalition that's sending him a clear message.

LEHRER: Senator Kerry, 90 seconds.

KERRY: With respect to North Korea, the real story: We had inspectors and television cameras in the nuclear reactor in North Korea. Secretary Bill Perry negotiated that under President Clinton. And we knew where the fuel rods were. And we knew the limits on their nuclear power. Colin Powell, our secretary of state, announced one day that we were going to continue the dialog of working with the North Koreans. The president reversed it publicly while the president of South Korea was here. And the president of South Korea went back to South Korea bewildered and embarrassed because it went against his policy. And for two years, this administration didn't talk at all to North Korea.

While they didn't talk at all, the fuel rods came out, the inspectors were kicked out, the television cameras were kicked out. And today, there are four to seven nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea. That happened on this president's watch. Now, that, I think, is one of the most serious, sort of, reversals or mixed messages that you could possibly send.

LEHRER: I want to make sure -- yes, sir -- but in this one minute, I want to make sure that we understand -- the people watching understand the differences between the two of you on this. You want to continue the multinational talks, correct?

BUSH: Right.

LEHRER: And you're willing to do it...

KERRY: Both. I want bilateral talks which put all of the issues, from the armistice of 1952, the economic issues, the human rights issues, the artillery disposal issues, the DMZ issues and the nuclear issues on the table.

LEHRER: And you're opposed to that. Right?

BUSH: The minute we have bilateral talks, the six-party talks will unwind. That's exactly what Kim Jong Il wants. And by the way, the breach on the agreement was not through plutonium. The breach on the agreement is highly enriched uranium. That's what we caught him doing. That's where he was breaking the agreement. (Transcript of nationally televised debate on PBS, September 30, 2004)

10/1/04 Poll on Sept. 27-28 finds 70 percent disapproval of government's humanitarian aid to North Korea; 68 back strict action. Three-fourths of those opposed to aid favored economic sanctions. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “70% Say Government Wrong to Give North Korea Aid,” October 1, 2004)
China tells some in six-party talks that the North “at least attempted to enrich” uranium, a source involved with the talks says. (Kyodo, “China Tells 6-Party Forum Members N. Korea Tried to Enrich Uranium,” October 3, 2004)

Kerry approach to North: “The Bush approach is not a good strategy because he’s focusing just on nuclear weapons. The North Koreans are not going to give up those weapons unless they get something in return that's pretty good,” said Michael O’Hanlon. “But you can’t buy out those weapons. So the only solution is broaden the discussion - as Kerry has proposed - to a wider set of topics.” Fred Carriere of the Korea Society: “The idea that within the larger context the two parties whose interests are most at issue would not engage in direct one-on-one talks defies centuries of diplomatic practice and the idea of just using sticks and no incentives also defies centuries of diplomatic practice.” (AFP, “North Korea Policy Under Scrutiny As White House Race Heats up,” October 3, 2004)

KCNA: “U.S. President Bush, speaking recently at the 59th session of the UN General Assembly, vociferated about the validity of the U.S. aggression on Iraq, contending that it helped liberate the Iraqi people from a dictator. He went to the lengths of stating without hesitation that the U.S. would have attacked Iraq even if it had known that the latter had no weapons of mass destruction. Commenting on this a Rodong Sinmun analyst Monday brands his remarks as outcries of a fascist tyrant steeped in war, murder and plunder, which revealed strong-arm and arbitrary practices and unilateralism utterly ignoring the UN Charter and international law. … The U.S. which has got more arrogant through its aggression on Iraq is intensifying its military moves around the Korean peninsula, directing the sharp edge of its preemptive strike to the DPRK. The situation is becoming more complicated and the danger of war is growing at the moment when the next round of the six-party talks ended abortive owing to the U.S. The U.S. threat of preemptive attack on the DPRK is being carried into reality. This reality leaves the DPRK no alternative but to increase its war deterrent in every possible way with high revolutionary vigilance. No one can tell when the U.S. imperialists would make a preemptive attack on the DPRK as they regard it as a key to the implementation of their strategy of aggression on Asia to stifle the DPRK. But the U.S. should face things squarely. A preemptive attack is not its monopoly. If it dares fire first, not seeing who is its adversary, it will have to pay dearly for it.” (KCNA, “U.S. Threat of Preemptive Attack on DPRK Assailed,” October 4, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman on passage of the “North Korean Human Rights Act”: “the act is one more declaration of the hostile Korea policy which fully disclosed the U.S. real intention to slander and insult the DPRK, a dignified sovereign state, and topple the socialist system chosen by its people. It is nothing strange that the U.S. is hell bent on its hostile Korea policy as it is steeped in the inveterate denial of the DPRK system. The U.S. says this and that about the human rights issue of someone, unaware of its position in which it is being censured as the worst violator of human rights … as it is killing innocent civilians including children everyday after illegally igniting a war against Iraq. … It has already provided strong financial and material support to those organizations hatching plots against the DPRK around it. In the meantime, it is pressurizing some countries to create ample environment for conducting the operation to tarnish the DPRK's international image and bring down its system. …The U.S. has reached a reckless
phase of its efforts to destroy the socialist system in the DPRK, totally denying the co-
existence with it, and thus rendered the dialogue and negotiations for solving the
nuclear issue meaningless. This has deprived the DPRK of any justification to deal with
the U.S., to say nothing of the reason for holding the six-party talks for settling the
nuclear issue. The DPRK is now left with no option but to put spurs to increasing the
deterrent force to counter the U.S. by force to the last.” (KCNA, “U.S. ‘North Korean

Sankei Shimbun on October 10 reports China deployed 10,000 troops to three areas
near the Tumen River to prevent North Korean troops from escaping. (Dong-A Ilbo,
“Strange Atmosphere along Border between North Korea and China,” October 10,
2004)

GNP National Assemblyman Chung Moon-hun discloses ROK plans for coping with
North Korea’s collapse. (Lee Young-jung, “Plan to Cope with Fall of North Divulged,”
JoongAng Ilbo, October 4, 2004)

Kim Dae-jung at Pugwash conference in Seoul: “The U.S. should guarantee the security
of North Korea and should not block it from participating in international community
affairs for economic reasons.” (Yoon Won-sup, “DJ Urges US to Guarantee North
Korea’s Security, Korea Times, October 5, 2004)

Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry not writing off the possibility of
preemptive attacks on Pyongyang, Seoul should take adequate preventive measures
[to stop any U.S. attack].” (Yoo Dong-ho, “US May Launch Surgical Strikes on NK,“
Korea Times, October 5, 2004)

Japan formulates position on base realignment prior to FM Machimura Nobutaka’s trip
to Washington next week. Defense Agency dir-gen Ono Yoshinori: “It is a very difficult
issue, but Japan must think independently in terms of the U.S. military transformation.”
LDP general council chairman Kyuma Fumio: “In reality, it is difficult to gain the assent
[of local governments]. We cannot unilaterally force the bases on them.” (Kyodo,
“Japanese Cabinet Members to Discuss U.S. Realignment Next Week,” October 5,
2004)

Rodong Sinmun denies South Korean accusation it imported 177 tons of sodium
cyanide through China and Thailand to make tabun, saying “Deals in sodium cyanide
are being done among countries on the principle of meeting each other’s needs for
their economic performance and progress.” (Associated Press, “North Korea Defends
Imports of Toxic Chemical,” October 5, 2004)

KCNA: “Selig Harrison, senior researcher at the U.S. International Policy Center, in an
article criticized the Bush administration for hyping up the threat caused by uranium,
asking it if the administration has any evidence to support its assertion that North
Korea has developed weapon-grade uranium enrichment facilities. The story about the
DPRK’s uranium enrichment program much touted by the U.S. is nothing but
groundless and base propaganda. It was a product of the despicable plot hatched by ultra neo-conservatives of the U.S. in the wake of U.S. presidential envoy Kelly’s Pyongyang visit in October 2002. ... It is a trite method employed by the Bush administration to fabricate misinformation and encroach upon the independence of sovereign countries on its basis. This is clearly proved by its aggression against Iraq. It is a widely known fact that the Bush administration first raised the issue of the development of weapons of mass destruction to invent a pretext to invade Iraq, disarmed it through arms inspection and then brought down its legitimate government.” (KCNA: “KCNA Dismisses Story about DPRK’s Pursuance of ‘Uranium Enrichment Program,’” October 5, 2004)

Funabashi on South Korean enrichment: “It’s like the government has admitted its failure to control and monitor nuclear activities,” said a South Korean official. “The amount is not the question. It’s the fact that South Korea violated international rules. Having no such awareness is the most serious problem.” A friend said he was reminded of the South Korean novel “The Rose of Sharon Is in Bloom,” which sold 4.5 million copies. The story goes like this: under Park Chung-hee South Korea secretly develops nuclear weapons. A U.S. intelligence organization, which found out about it, assassinates the leader of the project in an attempt to crush it, but South Korea joins hands with North Korea and successfully develops them. Meanwhile, Japan occupies Takeshima, which leads to war between Japan and the two Koreas. South Korea uses a nuclear missile and wins. A university professor who held a key post in the South Korean government [Han Sung-joo?] told me, “Some people say it’s just a novel. But I feel uneasy with the excessive nationalistic sentiment that is apparent in the story because there is a strong possibility that it could undermine South Korea’s national interests.” (Funabashi Yoichi, “Japan’s Place in the World: S. Korean Interests Must Be Clarified,” Asahi Shimbun, October 5, 2004)

10/6/04

Han Song-ryol said to undercut Kerry’s call for direct talks: “The United States’ real intention is to overthrow North Korea. We cannot talk with the United States, whether it is six-nation talks or bilateral talks.” He says North pays more intention to U.S. policy than to who the next president will be. “We have no plan to enrich uranium,” he said. “We wonder why the South was suspecting us, when South Korea had such a plan.” (Kan Chan-ho and Ser Myo-ja, “North Offers a Dim View of Kerry,” JoongAng Ilbo, October 6, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The point at issue is not how many grams of nuclear substance south Korea has extracted through the experiments or what was the concentration of enrichment. The gravity of the situation lies in that south Korea has pursued in secrecy the nuclear weapons program at the tacit connivance of the U.S. and with its cooperation and has now full access to the nuclear weapons development technology. This can not but be a serious challenge to the efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. ... The reality proves that the nuclear issue of south Korea should be discussed and clarified at multi-lateral negotiations in the future if any discussion is to be made on the issue of denuclearization of the peninsula.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Demands Clarification of S. Korea’s Nuclear Issue,” October 6, 2004)
LDP sets up team to decide whether to impose sanctions on North Korea. (Kyodo, “LDP to Set up Team to Consider Sanctions on N. Korea,” October 6, 2004) Chief cabinet secy Hosoda Hiroyuki says referring nuclear issue to U.N. Security Council an option if six-party talks deadlock. “If it [six-party] does not move, we have no alternative but to make it an international issue with the United States playing a central role.” Japan will impose sanctions only if it will help resolve issues. “They want to normalize diplomatic ties while avoiding economic sanctions. I don’t think they have the intention of leaving the abduction and other issues unresolved.” (Kyodo, “Referring N. Korean Nuclear Issue to UNSC an Option, Hosoda Says,” October 6, 2004)


IAEA dir-gen ElBaradei news conference in Seoul: “These [South Korean nuclear] experiments are completely legal. They are not prohibited per se. The problem is they were not reported [to the IAEA].” (Yonhap, “S. Korea Nuclear Experiments Completely Legal: IAEA Head,” October 6, 2004) “I don’t think we have seen any intentions to develop nuclear weapons,” he said. “What we have seen are experiments that have to do with the separation of plutonium and making uranium. These experiments by themselves are not illegal.” “We are still doing our own investigations to make sure that these experiments have not continued and there is nothing more to it than simple experiments.” (Anthony Faiola, “IAEA Chief Doubts S. Korean Arms Plans,” Washington Post, October 8, 2004, p. A-27)


10/7/04


AsstSecSt Hill at Kwanhun Club asked about rumors of an October surprise surgical strike: “With the exception of Boston Red Sox World Series victory, there will be no October surprises coming from the United States.” (Chosun Ilbo, “U.S. Ambassador Discusses NK Human Rights, Changing Korea-U.S. Relations,” October 7, 2004)

In 18 months Japan has spent “a whopping 250 billion yen” on its own reconnaissance satellites. Last summer it caught an image of a 10-meter wide area near Yongbyon which analysts at the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC) believed was a launching pad. In April it caught the Ryongchon train blast. But last month it got no clear-cut pictures of another massive explosion in the North and Japan had to rely on U.S. images at huge cost. USAF officers at the Defense Agency Building in Tokyo’s Shinjuku
ward decide what images to share, a “pick and choose” approach that led Japan to buy satellites, says a former JDA official. “The U.S. government can restrict the selling of images taken by American satellites if it thinks it would be to its disadvantage.” A JDA official compared U.S. capability and Japan’s to “that of a college student and a kindergartener.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Satellite Spies: Black Hole: Despite the Launching a Astronomically Priced Domestic Spy Satellites, Japan Remains Dependent on U.S. Intelligence,” October 7, 2004)

“The time is not yet ripe, but I expect to have the chance to visit North Korea personally to support the government,” Kim Dae-jung tells Kyunghyang Shinmun. (Jung Sung-ki, “Ex-President Hints at NK Envoy Role,” Korea Times, October 7, 2004)

AF Maj. Gen. Thomas P. Kane briefs reporters on Dorasan praising new rail line and four-lane highway and tenfold jump in N-S road traffic since last summer. Hill in Seoul on industrial park to be inaugurated in two weeks: “I want to stress that the U.S. fully supports the efforts made by South Korea on Kaesong.” PermRep Choe Su-hon told General Assembly last week reunification had not taken place “because the process is unwelcome for the United States and therefore it is dead set against the improved relations and ongoing cooperation activities at all levels between the north and south of Korea.” (James Brooke, “Mixed Messages on U.S. Role As Two Korea Begin Joint Projects,” New York Times, October 8, 2004, p. A-11)

DPRK FoMin spokesman on Han’s 10/6 “clarified the principled stand of the DPRK as regards the six-party talks and the solution to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S., holding the Bush administration accountable for its unilateral abrogation of all agreements reached between the DPRK and the previous U.S. administration over the nuclear issue and the prevailing stand-off on the Korean peninsula. This clarification was made in a statement issued Friday to accuse the Bush group of trying to mislead the public opinion in a bid to shift the blame for the delay of the solution to the nuclear issue between the two countries including the resumption of the six-party talks on to the DPRK and garner voters’ support with the presidential election at hand. Commenting on the stand and attitude of the administration, the statement said that it is the consistent stand of the DPRK government to seek a solution to the complicated and sensitive nuclear issue through bilateral negotiations and added that this stand still remains unchanged. … He disclosed that the Bush administration did not come out to the six-party talks with a willingness to solve the issue from the outset. They used them as a leverage to force the DPRK to stand trial over the nuclear issue, bring collective pressure upon it to bring it to its knees and secure a pretext to attack it by force just as it invaded Iraq, he noted. Noting that any progress in the six-party talks and a prospect of settling the nuclear issue entirely depend on the U.S. switchover in its hostile policy toward the DPRK, the statement asserted that the DPRK does not care who becomes president in the U.S. and that its only concern is what kind of Korea policy the future administration would shape.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman Clarifies DPRK Stand on Six-Party Talks and Solution to Nuclear Issue,” October 8, 2004)

Kerry is more willing to deal. “You have to put some proposals on the table, said Wendy Sherman. “What the president decided when he came in is that he would not
negotiate – like Clinton did – with North Korea because he considers any negotiation with North Korea blackmail. … Senator Kerry understands that it is only blackmail if you are not a tough negotiator and you don’t get more than you give.” [Stop digging!] “The difference between Bush and Kerry come down to Bush believes that you don’t negotiate with evil people,” says Ivo Daalder. “Kerry’s position is that we do negotiate with evil. We did that with the Russians from 1963 until 2001.” Chuck Downs says, “We have to try to keep money from going to that regime, and we have to make that regime realize their backs are against the wall.” “Look what this has gotten us,” says a U.S. official involved in nonproliferation. “It has gotten us four to seven more nukes.” (Farah Stockman, “Candidates Have Two Views on N. Korea,” Boston Globe, October 8, 2004)

Roh at ASEM summit in Hanoi: “Our government plans to provide comprehensive economic assistance to North Korea if the North resolves the nuclear issue.” (Korea Herald, “Roh Says N.K. Nuke Issue Will Be Resolved Peacefully,” October 8, 2004)

Japan, North Korea agree to upgrade bilateral talks to the senior working-level. “We can expect major progress” this time, says chief cabinet secy Hosoda Hiroyuki. (Kyodo, “Japan, N. Korea to Hold Upgraded Talks in Mid-November,” October 8, 2004) Seigura Seiken, dep chief cabinet secy: Yabunaka and Saiki will represent Japan. (Yoshida Reiji, “Pyongyang to Host Next Round of Abductions Talks,” Japan Times, October 9, 2004)

Koizumi doubts sanctions would be effective, prefers dialogue: “I would like to work with patience to get North Korea to respond sincerely.” (Kyodo, “Koizumi Prefers N. Korea Dialogue to Economic Sanctions,” October 9, 2004)


Seoul opposes Japan’s bid for permanent Security Council seat. “We have not been welcoming the attempts to increase the number of permanent members of the Security Council,” says Chung Woo-sung, presidential secy on foreign policy. “What is needed for a hopeful nation is for it to secure the confidence of nearby countries in regards to its willingness and capability to contribute to fomenting reasonable order in the region after obtaining a seat in the Security Council,” Pres Roh said at ASEM summit in Hanoi. (Shim Jae-yun, “Seoul Puts Brake on Tokyo’s UN Bid,” Korea Times, October 10, 2004)

KCNA: “U.S. State Deputy Secretary Armitage was reported to have blustered that if North Korea rejects the resumption of the six-party talks it is possible for the U.S. to refer the issue to the UN Security Council so that it may discuss sanctions. This remark arouses the vigilance of the DPRK. This only reveals the U.S. foolish attempt to shift the blame for the delay of the resumption of the six-party talks on to the DPRK and put
pressure upon it to come out to the talks. … Senior officials of the U.S. State Department are asserting that the DPRK is deliberately delaying the talks, waiting for the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in the hope that the six-party talks can be represented by a better partner from the U.S. This is sheer nonsense. The DPRK is not in a position to come out to the talks because the U.S. has deliberately laid a stumbling block in the way of the dialogue and dropped a check-bar on it. The DPRK's stand to seek a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue remains unchanged. The DPRK set it as its general goal to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, advanced the proposal of "reward for freeze" from a steadfast stand to seek a peaceful negotiated solution to the nuclear issue and has made sincere efforts for its materialization. Had the U.S. accepted the aboveboard proposal, the fourth round of the six-party talks would have already been held and have proved fruitful. The U.S., however, clarified its political stance that there can never be any reward even after the DPRK freezes its nuclear facilities, consistently asserted that the DPRK must accept the CVID in an aim to disarm it and has threatened it, saying that the U.S. has even a military option on the table.” (KCNA, “KCNA Urges U.S. to Rebuild Groundwork of Six-Party Talks,” October 11, 2004)

Roh tells reporters at ASEM summit, “As relevant nations like China, Russia and Japan earnestly wish to see peace on the Korean peninsula and oppose pressure that would result in provoking the North to seek extreme acts, there will be no catastrophic situation regarding the nuclear issue.” (Shim Jae-yun, “Roh Warns against Cornering N.K.,” Korea Times, October 11, 2004)

DPRK announces new insurance and real estate regulations enacted by the Supreme People’s National Assembly on September 21 for South Koreans doing business there. (Kim Kwang-tae, “Amid Nuclear Tension, N.K. Takes Action to Woo S. Korean Investment,” Yonhap, October 11, 2004)

Uri Party chairman Lee Bu-young in speech to press club proposes Kim Dae-jung and Park Geun-hye vist Pyongyang as special envoys. (Kang Min-seok and Min Seong-jae, “Kim, Park Proposed As Envoys to North,” JoongAng Ilbo, October 12, 2004)

10/12/04 Commerce Dept talks in Seoul on transfer of “strategic” machinery to Kaesong. (Yonhap, “Korea, U.S. to Discuss Strategic Goods Shipment to N.K. Complex,” October 10, 2004)

Former cabinet secretariat adviser on abductions Nakayama Kyoko, under consideration for a cabinet post on the issue, says Japan should consider legislation for human sanctions on North Korea on abductees. “I am maintaining close contact with the families and I am determined to have closer connections with them than ever before,” she said. (Kyodo, “Nakayama Calls for Human Rights-Based Sanctions on N. Korea,” October 12, 2004)

10/13/04 KCNA: “The United States and Japan are asserting that the DPRK has a missile test-fire plan. Officials concerned of the governments and militaries of the two countries and their media raised a hue and cry over a threat from a new type medium-range ballistic
missile, saying that north Korean army vehicles, soldiers and missile technicians are massed in the area around the launching base for missile Rodong and there is a sign of possible north Korean fire of a ballistic missile capable of striking the U.S. mainland and Japan proper. The test, production and deployment of missiles are an issue pertaining to the legitimate right of the DPRK. Therefore, the row kicked up by the U.S. and Japan over the DPRK’s missiles can never work on it. **The test, production and deployment of missiles can never pose any threat to others as they are of self-defensive nature. ...** It is the consistent stand and mode of counteraction of the DPRK to keep itself fully ready for both dialogue and war. **The DPRK will increase its military deterrent force in every way, now that the U.S. is becoming desperate in its moves to stifle it by force.**” (KCNA, “KCNA Refutes U.S. and Japan’s Assertion about DPRK’s ‘Missile Test,” October 12, 2004)

Koizumi tells Diet interpellation sanctions an option if North fails to address abduction issue fully. FM Machimura Nobutaka goes further. “North Korea lacked sincerity in the last working-level meeting in September,” he told abductees’ kin. “The next meeting is very important. We have the [economic sanctions] card and it won’t be useful unless we resort to this last measure.” (Kyodo, “Japan Sees Economic Sanctions against Pyongyang As Option,” October 13, 2004)

10/14/04 Ning Fukui, PRC special envoy for Korean Peninsula affairs, in Seoul to meet Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck and Cho Tae-yong, chief of FoMin task force on the nuclear issue. “The Chinese perception is that it would be difficult to hold a fourth round of talks before early November and we also share that view,” says deputy delegate Cho. (Reuben Staines, “6-Party Talks Targeted in Late November,” Korea Times, October 14, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Some forces of the IAEA, however, are becoming all the more undisguised in their moves to cover up the secret nuclear experiments in south Korea as quickly as possible at any cost, deliberately playing down the gravity of those experiments. ...They do not hesitate to use the universally known legitimate nuclear activities of the DPRK as leverage for covering up the south Korean nuclear issue, asserting that it is fundamentally different from the DPRK’s nuclear issue as it does not comparison with the latter. Even Director General of IAEA Baradei is busying himself to create impression that the settlement of the nuclear issue is delayed owing to the DPRK, blustering that the international community is losing patience as regards the DPRK over the issue of the six-party talks and now is the time for the UN Security Council to act. ...Some forces of IAEA should bear in mind the adverse impact their double standards will have on the security in Northeast Asia. We would like to take this opportunity to state that we cannot overlook the irresponsible attitude taken by Baradei, ignoring the reality and forgetful of his duty. He expressed ‘serious concern’ at a time when the south Korean nuclear issue cropped up, but as soon as U.S. State Secretary Powell made remarks defending south Korea he made an about-face and pointed an accusing finger at the DPRK. This goes to prove that he serves the U.S., forgetting his position of director general of IAEA.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman Assails Biased Attitude of Some Forces of IAEA,” October 14, 2004)
Two NK defectors, Chung Sung-il, a doctor, and Jang Sun-young, sister of well-known actress, seeking asylum under Human Rights law passed October 4 and awaiting signing, were taken off a plane bound for LAX in a third country. (Dong-A Ilbo, Two N.Korean Refugees Arrested for Trying to Seek Political Asylum in the U.S.,” October 15, 2004)

KCNA: “The U.S. was reported to have railroaded through Senate ‘North Korean Human Rights Act’ full of articles supporting the administration’s hostile policy toward the DPRK, despite domestic and foreign public concern and opposition to it. ...This goes to prove that the U.S. has become most desperate in its efforts to politicize and internationalize the non-existent human rights issue of the DPRK and thus tarnish its dignified international prestige and image and bring down its socialist system come what may. The U.S. regards the nuclear issue and the human rights issue as the two mainstays of its policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK. So, it is making every desperate effort to realize a regime change in the DPRK under the pretext of human rights performance there.” (KCNA, “KCNA Blasts U.S. Senate’s Passage of ‘North Korean Huamn Rights Act,’” October 13, 2004)

10/15/04

Koizumi: “I don’t want to interfere in an election in a foreign country, but I’d like President Bush to hang in there because he’s a close friend.” Hachiro Yoshio, DPJ spokesman: “What [he] said is not appropriate both in terms of democracy and diplomacy.” (Yoshida Reiji, “Eyebrows, Hackles Raised As Koizumi Backs Bush,” Japan Times, October 16, 2004)

CSIS meeting on post-election policy toward China, Taiwan, North Korea.

10/16/04
KEDO suspension will be extended for another year. (Reuben Staines, “KEDO to Be Kept Afloat for One More Year,” Korea Times, October 15, 2004)


10/17/04
Chief cabinet secy Hosoda says “North Korea is near finalizing development of nuclear weapons,” the first time a Japanese official confirmed North’s claim. (AFP, “Japanese Oficial Says North Korea Holds Nuclear Weapons: Report,” October 17, 2004) In speech in his home prefecture, he says, “There are Nagasaki-type plutonium bombs that have been produced. We need to have them scrapped immediately. At issue now is the uranium enrichment type ... this also should be scrapped.” Hours later he tells the Diet, “I offer a correction in the sense that we haven’t seen actual stuff and they are still under development.” (Kyodo, “Hosoda Corrects Earlier Comments on N. Korea Nuclear Arms,” October 18, 2004)

ROK will ask National Assembly to extend deployment in Iraq for a year. (AFP, “South Korea Wants to Extend Iraqi Troop Deployment by a Year,” October 17, 2004)
10/18/04 Kim Yong-nam in first visit to Beijing since June 1999 tells Wu Bangguo North Korea is committed to hold talks for a peaceful solution to its nuclear programs. (Aoki Naoko, “N. Korea Committed to Talks for Solution to Nuke Problem,” October 18, 2004) FRC FoMin spokesman Zhang Qiyue quotes him as saying “the position of the DPRK concerning six-party talks is unchanged – that is, to solve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula through six-party talks.” He later saw Hu Jintao. (Joe McDonald, “N. Korea Said to Favor Six-Nation Talks,” Associated Press, October 19, 2004)

DefMin Yoon wang-ung says, “If there were signs North Korea was going to launch long-range artillery strikes, our military could defeat [the artillery] in 6 to 11 minutes.” Iraqi artillery was destroyed in 6 to 7 minutes. (Yu Yong-won, “Allies Could Destroy N. Korean Artillery in 6-11 Minutes,” Chosun Ilbo, October 18, 2004)

10/20/04 Choe Young-jin makes unannounced visit to Washington to present ROK case on its enrichment activities. (Kang Chan-ho, “In Pursuit of Nuclear Diplomacy,” JoongAng Ilbo, October 20, 2004)

10/21/04 Powell invw: “There are think tanks all over the place, and there are experts all over the place, and there are those who spent a great deal of their recent career putting in place the Agreed Framework and have a certain commitment to the Agreed Framework. But the fact of the matter is that things had deteriorated before this Administration came in, but they didn’t know it. The assumption was that the Agreed Framework had capped the North Koreans at one or two -- it didn’t grow. And we never were sure, and we’re not -- no one’s ever seen these weapons. But the best Intelligence Estimate is that they probably have one or two. And they thought it was capped at that point. And it was capped. Yongbyon was capped and the plutonium weapons were capped. But what was unknown to the previous Administration, and what was unknown to us for the first year or so until the intelligence became absolutely clear was that the North Koreans were cheating and that they had started to develop enriched uranium techniques and technology and acquiring the wherewithal to move in that direction. …Now, the other part of your question said was, ’Well, you’ve got all these different points of view within the Administration: Those who want to put more pressure, those who want to put less pressure, those who want to negotiate, those who don’t want to negotiate within the six party framework.’ It’s all terribly interesting. All I know is what the President has decided. And he’s the only one I’d listen to. And he’s, he’s decided this. He’s decided it repeatedly over the last year that we would try to solve this diplomatically. No option is off the table. We do want pressure put on North Korea to solve the problem, and we’re using diplomatic pressure and diplomatic encouragement.” (State Department Spokesman, Text of interview with Murray Hiebert and Susan Lawrence, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 21, 2004)

10/22/04 FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. foolishly tries to lay the blame for the delay in the resumption of the six-party talks at the DPRK’s door, advertising the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was its invention. The DPRK is approaching the six-party talks strictly in its interests. In other words, it will attend the talks if they prove helpful to it as it realized them to settle the nuclear issue. For the DPRK to respond to the talks under
the coercion and pressure from someone, though it is well aware that they are of no help to it, has nothing in common with its principled stand. ... The U.S. is becoming evermore undisguised in its hostile acts against the DPRK as evidenced by PSI exercises staged to blockade and stifle the DPRK and the signing of the 'North Korean Human Rights Act' by its president. It has gone the lengths of foolishly working to bring up the nuclear issue for discussion at the UN Security Council. ... If that is not the real intention of the U.S., the DPRK would like to ask the U.S. whether the groundwork of the talks has been restored as demanded by the DPRK, whether it is ready to drop its hostile policy towards Pyongyang and participate in making 'reward for freeze,' the first-phase measure of the proposal for a package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions and discuss south Korea's nuclear issue before anything else with a view to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Resuming Six-Party Talks,” October 22, 2004)

Poneman: “I think we need a clear choice with carrots and sticks, and not mixed up in a big stew ...” “I take the position that we bought for a very reasonable price eight years of no plutonium out of North Korea. If they had been allowed to proceed at the same rate they were going in 1994, they could have 100 nuclear weapons by that time.” (Kyodo, “1994 Architect Urges Quick U.S. Action on N. Korea Nuke Issue,” October 22, 2004)

10/23/04 Powell en route to Tokyo: “We made it clear that we have no intention of invading them, no intention of attacking them, we have no need to. We want to solve this diplomatically. We have no hostile intent. But we also think, heard from the South Koreans, with respect to what they were doing in some minor nuclear experimentation over the years and the IAEA is looking into that with the South Koreans and that should not be an obstacle. There are still questions about what the South Koreans are doing; let that be discussed at the six party talks. And with respect to what benefits might accrue to North Korea for them entering into the arrangement that we laid out in our proposal, they’re well aware of those benefits. There are some early, up-front benefits immediately from the Japanese and the South Koreans. And we have made it clear to them all along that President Bush is committed to assisting the Korean people to a better life and to help the Korean people to deal with their problems of food sufficiency, energy. But we can’t start putting things up front on the table, from our perspective, because we do not think that is the way to ultimately achieve our mutual objective, which is complete removal of a nuclear weapons program and all of its parts from North Korea.”

On North Korean Human Rights Act signed into law last week: “I talked to Senator Brownback this morning. And, it is something that we should talk about. But we have not yet covered it in sufficient detail at all, either within the Department on how to approach it or with our other partners. But we certainly take very much into account the expression of the Congress. And human rights in North Korea is a serious problem, In fact, it is something that should be discussed by the international community.”

On DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Their spokesman laid out three conditions, which they indicated, and I don’t have the words that they used in front of me, but they called three conditions they would like to see dealt with- let me use that expression- before they would
consider returning to talks. And my view of them is that all of the issues that they laid out as conditions are subjects for discussion at the six party talks, not just conditions to have six party talks. We have discussed this hostile attitude issue over and over. And, we have put forward a proposal. And what they are saying is we don’t, rather than coming to the six party talks and discussing our proposal, and we can discuss their proposal, they’re saying, “no, we’ve just added a condition that changes your proposal, so you’ve got to meet this condition.” I don’t think that’s the way to go about this. The way to go about this is bring your three issues, your six issues, your twelve issues to the discussion so they can be raised and discussed with all six parties, as opposed to conditions directed towards the United States.”

On North Korean complaints about PSI exercise next week: “There’s nothing wrong with naval forces coming together to exercise for the purpose of seeing if we can do a better job of keeping the most dangerous cargos from reaching the most irresponsible purchasers of such cargo. It does not threaten North Korea. it does not threaten the sovereignty of North Korea or the welfare of North Korea. It protects the rest of the world. And so they may react in the way you describe, but it is not a hostile act towards North Korea. It is naval exercises in international waterways. And legitimate cargo, either in exercises or in real operations, will not be stopped from enjoying the freedom of the seas.”

(Secretary of State Powell, “Plane Briefing En Route to Tokyo,” Office of the State Department Spokesman, October 23, 2004)

10/25/04 An impasse over North Korea -- before and after the Pyongyang government removed enough plutonium from U.N. supervision to build five or six bombs -- left Bush’s team with a policy that one frustrated participant called “no carrot, no stick and no talk.” Administration officials acknowledge that North Korea and Iran have accelerated their nuclear progress but say the damage dates from decisions made by President Bill Clinton. … “The question is not, ‘Is the status of the pursuit of nuclear weapons more advanced?” Bolton said. “The question is, ‘What would have happened and how much worse would it have been if we hadn’t pursued a more aggressive policy?”… “They made no attempt to get a handle on his activities abroad,” said John Wolf, who was Bush’s assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation until June. Bolton said Bush’s advisers “were continually engaged in a trade-off” between stopping the sales of nuclear technology and learning enough about them “so that when we did move we brought down what we could.” He said, “It was a 51-49 call every day we were going through this.” As London and Washington tried to keep watch in 2001 and 2002, important parts of the black-market network escaped their view. During that period, authoritative sources in both capitals said, Khan’s operation delivered tens of thousands of gas centrifuge parts that brought North Korea to the threshold of unlimited bomb production. It was that unhappy discovery, made in two stages in July and September 2002, that forced North Korea back onto Bush’s agenda when he was trying to keep the world’s focus on Iraq. ... They resolved to stop “paying the North Koreans just to show up at meetings,” and Bush halted U.S. contributions of food and fuel aid under the Clinton agreement. “Having been burned once,” Falkenrath said, Bush’s advisers refused to “start talking about benefits, carrots” for North Korea in exchange for further promises. “They say insanity is to just repeat the same behavior and expect a different outcome,” he said. The president’s advisers agreed that North
Korea must halt its uranium program but could not agree on steps to compel -- or provide incentives for -- Pyongyang's compliance. For the next six months -- a consuming period from the run-up to war in Iraq to the fall of Baghdad -- Bush largely set North Korea aside. His administration took no further action save to organize ongoing six-nation talks that began in August 2003. In the same period, North Korea broke the seals on its stored plutonium, expelled U.N. inspectors, restarted its Yongbyon reactor and withdrew from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. “We had a choice and we played it tough, and so did they, and now we’re stuck,” said a senior intelligence official. Bolton defended the record. “This is quibbling, to say they had two plutonium-based weapons and now they have seven,” Bolton replied. “The uranium enrichment capability gives them the ability to produce an unlimited number.” That program, he said, began when Clinton sought to normalize relations with North Korea and Madeleine K. Albright, his secretary of state, was “dancing in Pyongyang and watching parades.” (Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough Calls,” Washington Post, October 26, 2004)

10/26/04

After meeting with Powell, FM Ban Ki-moon says he suggested they “must come up with a more creative and realistic proposal” to lure the North back to the talks “as soon as possible.” Yesterday FM Li Zhaoxing told Powell China wished “the U.S. side would go further to adopt a flexible and practical attitude.” (Glenn Kessler, “S. Korea Joins China in Criticizing U.S. on N. Korea,” Washington Post, October 27, 2004, p. A-18; Steven R. Weisman, “Discord on North Korea as Powell Finishes East Asia Trip,” New York Times, October 27, 2004, p. A-9) A State Department translator did not initially translate Ban’s comment but the record was later corrected when South Korean reporters complained. The administration has “lost the initiative” on North Korea, said Ken Quinones. “It’s been outsourced to China. They’re calling the shots, not us.” (Barbara Slavin, “South Korea Urges U.S. to Offer North Korea More Incentives,” USA Today, October 27, 2004)

PSI exercise held in waters off Japan. “We are sending a signal to everybody who wants to traffic in weapons of mass destruction that we have zero tolerance for that,” Bolton says in officers’ mess aboard patrol boat Izu. “Our concern is that North Korea is not simply a threat in the region, but its propensity to proliferate weapons of mass destruction technology means that, if they had a potential buyer in the nuclear field, they would sell it.” He links PSI to IAI: “The currency it earns from weapons and drug sales internationally goes to financing their nuclear weapons program.” (James Brooke, “U.S.-Led Naval Exercise Sends Clear Message to North Korea,” New York Times, October 27, 2004, p. A-9)


“Multinational business projects involving North Korea will not produce results in the short-term, but they will surely help the country change and improve their systems, leading to a breakthrough in the nuclear standoff, says Russia’s ambassador to the ROK Teymuraz

ROK military on alert as possible infiltration through hole in fence in DMZ discovered. After no other evidence of intrusion is uncovered, alert ends. (Lee Jae-won, “S. Korea Probe Suggests No Infiltration from North,” Reuters, October 26, 2004)


Beijing police arrests 65 North Korea asylum-seekers, along with two South Korean activists in Democracy Network against North Korean Gulag. FoMin spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue says, “We hope these embassies will refrain from providing refuge to illegal immigrants.” (Reuben Staines, “Beijing Gets Tough with NK Refugees,” Korea Times, October 27, 2004)

Korea Peace Network (KPN), National Association of Korean American (NAKA) and the Korean American National Coordinating Council (KANCC) sponsor ad in New York Times calling U.S. policy toward the North “flawed in that it is devoid of consistency, lacks relevant historical perspective, is insensitive to cultural nuances, and is based on an arrogant stance best described as ‘might is right.’” (Chosun Ilbo, “Pro-N. Korean Groups in U.S. Place Full-Page Ad in NYT,” October 27, 2004)

WFP can better monitor food aid in the North, James Morris tells Foreign Correspondents Club. Now “99 percent” of its requests for visits are approved, compared to 90 percent five years ago. It made 513 monitoring visits last month. (Takahara Kanako, “WFP Better Able to Monitor Food Aid in North,” Japan Times, October 27, 2004)


11/1/04 Han Song-ryol inw: Kerry proposal for bilateral talks a “change in formality” rather than a fundamental shift in U.S. policy. “In essence Pyongyang sees Kerry’s DPRK policy as hostile as Bush’s DPRK policy,” he says. “They both want to disarm DPRK and change Pyongyang’s regime.” “It’s not a matter of who will be elected as the next U.S. president, but rather a matter of who has the political will to change the U.S.’s DPRK policy,” he went on. “Speculation that Pyongyang will resume talks if Kerry wins is totally groundless.” The North sees the new human rights law as a “direct attack on Pyongyang’s socialist regime” and wants it annulled and sanctions eased. “Tinkering won’t change anything. We want to see real some real changes,” he said. “Pyongyang won’t participate in six-party talks unless it sees real changes in these areas.” (Hae Won Choi, “North Korea Lists Terms Necessary for Arms Talks,” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2004, p. A-3)
Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “U.S. State Secretary Powell during his recent junkets to Japan, South Korea and other countries falsified facts, claiming that the six-party talks were put to a stalemate because of the DPRK’s lack of efforts to participate in the talks. This indicates that his Asian trip was aimed to serve a sinister political purpose of convincing the international community of the U.S. willingness to further the six-party talks, shifting the blame for the delay of the talks on to the DPRK and putting collective pressure upon it under that pretext in a bid to bring it to its knees. The resumption of the six-party talks entirely depends on the U.S. attitude toward them. Whether the U.S. renounces its hostile policy toward the DPRK or not is a determining factor of whether the six-party talks may prove successful or whether the DPRK-U.S. relations are pushed to those of acute confrontation. The Bush group’s claim that the DPRK will gain much for coming out to the six-party talks does not reflect its intention to lead the talks to any solution to the problem but is nothing but a crafty trick to attain sinister political and military purposes by employing a delaying tactics. If the U.S. truly wishes a solution to the nuclear issue through the six-party talks and peace on the Korean Peninsula it should drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK and set forth a realistic alternative proposal to accept the principle of ‘words for words’ and ‘action for action’ and the offer of ‘reward for freeze.’” (KCNA, “DPRK to Approach Six-Party Talks in Its State Interests,” November 1, 2004)

ROK navy vessels fired warning shots at North Korean patrol boats in the Yellow Sea. (Kim Min-seok and Min Seong-jae, “South Fires on North Vessel,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 2, 2004) “The South Korean armed forces deliberately committed this armed provocation which may give rise to another skirmish in the West Sea,” a communiqué from DPRK’s navy says. “It was thanks to the high restraint and patience exercised by seamen of the KPA that this incident did not spark off a grave armed conflict.” (Martin Nesirsky, “North Korea Says South’s Navy Staged Provocation,” Reuters, November 2, 2004)

11/2/04 Bush reelected

Kin of abductees petition Koizumi not to hold normalization talks until all the abductees are repatriated. (Kyodo, “Kin Wants No Normalization Talks until N. Korea Until Abductees Return,” November 2, 2004)


11/5/04 DPRK delegation led by Kim Sang-ik, vice-minister of People’s Armed Forces, leaves for ARF. (Yonhap, “N. Korean Delegation Leaves for Beijing for ARF,” November 2,
KCNA reports that Kim told to ARF today, “The present U.S. administration listed the DPRK as part of an ‘axis of evil’ and a target of its preemptive nuclear attack and adopted a policy for stifling it by force of arms. It has persistently resorted to the anti-DPRK hostile acts to bring down its system by mobilizing military forces and all other means. Under this tense political and military situation surrounding the peninsula the DPRK is left with no other option but to increase self-defensive capability in every way in order to firmly defend the sovereignty of the country and the nation. What is essential for completely removing the danger of war from the peninsula and ensuring the regional peace is to put an end to U.S. unilateralism and hegemony among other things, its hostile policy toward the DPRK and military threat, in particular.” (KCNA, “Head of DPRK Delegation on Peace and Security on Korean Peninsula,” November 9, 2004)


LDP, in meeting chaired by Abe Shinzo, approves report by party think tank calling for five-stage economic sanctions, including partial or total suspension of trade, tighter supervision or embargo on remittances and capital transactions and partial or total ban on ports calls by North Korean ships. It confirmed plans to ask municipal governments to review favorable tax treatment of Chongryon, General Association of Korean Residents. (Kyodo, “LDP Approves Report on 5-State Economic Sanctions on North Korea,” November 5, 2004)

Bush expected to increase pressure on North, possibly by going to the U.N. Security Council, something Japan does not want, because heightened tensions may push a resolution of abduction issue to the sidelines. (Takahara Kanako, “U.S. Pressure on North May Sideline Abductee Resolution,” Japan Times, November 6, 2004)

Roh telephones Bush. Blue House statement says, “President Roh proposed making the North’s nuclear problem a joint project to solve with close cooperation and to lay the groundwork for peace on the Korean peninsula and the world.” (Reuters, “S. Korea Urges U.S. to Push for Arms Talks,” November 7, 2004)

IAEA inspectors conclude six-day visit on nuclear experiments. (Yonhap, “IAEA Team Concludes Inspection of S. Korea’s Nuclear Experiments,” November 7, 2004)


North Korean professor tells visiting Chinese from Jilin province that North has given up plans to develop special economic

11/7/04  Largest US-hosted exercise *Checkpoint 2004* in Caribbean to intercept drug shipment


Gavan McCormack, “Koizumi’s Japan in Bush’s World: After 9/11” NAPSNET

In run-up to third round of working-level Japan-DPRK talks, Japan threatens sanctions, says patience is wearing thin. North Korea’s willingness to accept largest delegation yet that includes police and forensic scientists “gives us reason to hope that they are being sincere,” says a high-ranking MOFA official. “Now we have to wait and see if they will be sincere and give us something we can be satisfied with.” FM Machimura Nobutaka tells reporters, I believe they will come forward with some kind of explanation” about the fate of the missing. (Karasaki Taro, “Insight: Tokyo Guardedly Optimistic about Pyongyang Talks on Abductions,” *Asahi Shimbun*, November 8, 2004)

11/9-12/04  Third round of working-level talks with North Korea. Japan seeks material evidence and meeting with Yokota Megumi’s husband. Delegation headed by Yabunaka Mitoji has 19 officials from MOFA, the cabinet secretariat, and the National Police Agency. (Kyodo, “Japan Set to Seek Evidence from N. Korea on Abductions Victims,” November 8, 2004) Passport photos of Arimoto Keiko and video footage of medical records believed to be Yokota Megumi’s were turned over to Japan via its embassy in Beijing, says FM Machimura Nobutaka. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, “Japan-North Korea Talks Set for Nov. 9-12,” November 5, 2004) Machimura: “There’s anger in Japan at Pyongyang’s attitude during the working-level talks. Some stress the need to impose economic sanctions on North Korea immediately. We have to think about measures dealing with North Korea after seeing how it acts at the next working-level meeting.” [Gunning for confrontation] (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, “Govt Prepares Hard Line for N. Korea,” November 9, 2004) At first day talks upgraded to senior official level as Jong Thae-hwa, DPRK rep to normalization talks, joined by Ma Chol-su, head of Foreign Ministry’s Asia Affairs Department. (Kyodo, “Japan, N. Korea to Hold Full Abduction Talks from Wed.,” November 9, 2004) On the 10th, Jin Il-bo, bureau chief of the People’s Security Ministry who oversees the task force on abductions, gives a report. Japanese seeks information on two others who went missing, a 17-year-old woman in 1962 and a 19-year-old man in 1976, which raises the total to 17. (Kyodo, “Japan Hears Report from N. Korea on Abductions,” November 10, 2004) Delegation charters plane to preserve documents, medical records, belongings. Seven cargo containers were removed from the plane. The delegation spoke with the senior North Korean official in charge of the reopened investigation, interviewed people familiar with the abductees, and visited places they were said to have stayed. There does not appear to be any contradiction with the North Korean claim that eight are dead and two never entered North Korea.
They brought back photos, medical records and books related to them as well as cremated remains that may belong to one of the abductees, said lawmakers who attended a meeting with the delegation. They reported that the North Koreans admitted there were incorrect parts in death certificates presented to Japan in 2002 as it hurriedly prepared them. “I can see signs of an effort on the part of the North Koreans, but there are points in which the contents are not something Japan can be satisfied with,” Koizumi told reporters. (Kyodo, “Delegates Bring Ashes, Other Items Back from N. Korea,” November 15, 2004)

A group of 19 officials from the Foreign Ministry and the National Police Agency went to Pyongyang to attend the third round of Japan-DPRK working-level talks relating to the abduction issue from 9 to 15 November. They held talks with their North Korean counterparts for a total of 50 hours, the longest duration in the history of Japan-North Korea talks since 1991. …When Yabunaka, the head of the delegation, Akitaka Saiki, a counselor of the Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau who served as the delegation’s deputy head, and Naoki Ito, director of the North East Asia Division of the Foreign Ministry Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, went into a convention hall together with other members, they found sitting and waiting on the other side of a long table Cho’ng T’ae Hwa of the North Korean Foreign Ministry who served as ambassador in charge of talks with Japan, Ma Ch’o’l Su, director-general of the Foreign Ministry’s No. 4 Bureau, and other officials. The conversation, which started between Yabunaka and Cho’ng T’ae Hwa -- who is being rumored as the man likely to be the first North Korean ambassador to Japan if Japan-North Korea diplomatic relations are normalized -- was shaky from the very beginning.

Yabunaka: “The working-level officials’ talks have been held twice so far -- in Beijing in August and in September. I hope this round of working-level talks held in Pyongyang will certainly turn out to be one that bears satisfactory fruit.”

Cho’ng: “Two years ago when our country admitted that it had abducted Japanese citizens, there was a great decision made by the dear general (Kim Jong Il). Remembering that a path was opened with that great decision by him, we should seek to normalize the diplomatic relations of North Korea and Japan as soon as possible, along the line of the Pyongyang Declaration adopted at that time.”

Yabunaka: “The normalization of diplomatic relations is something that can be achieved only when the abduction issue, nuclear issue, and missile issue are resolved. Indeed, without getting the abduction issue resolved, there can be no normalization of diplomatic relations.”

Cho’ng: “That is not right. It is not right to put a precondition to the normalization of the diplomatic relations of the two countries.” …

In the meeting held in the morning of the second day, Yabunaka strongly demanded Ma Ch’o’l Su arrange for the head and other members of the “Abduction Issue Investigation Committee,” which North Korea claimed was set up in June, to appear before the meeting [for questioning].

As a result, three officers of the committee presented themselves at the meeting in the afternoon. Chin Il Po (age 68), who sat in the middle of the three, was someone who they had never seen before. He was introduced as an officer who began his career at the People’s Security Ministry in 1965 and is currently serving as director-
general for investigations in that ministry. Chin then introduced a bald-headed man of
about 50 years of age, sitting on his left, as a division director (section chief) of the
People’s Security Ministry, and a man in his mid-40s, who sat on his right, as a deputy
division director (assistant section chief).

This [the composition of the investigation committee] made the Japanese officials
very suspicious. The organization, which is thought to have committed the crime of
abducting Japanese citizens at the imperial order of Kim Jong Il, was the State Security
Department, a special [intelligence] organization. If that was the case, what did it
mean to have the people of the People’s Security Ministry, who are no more than street
cops, come to testify?

Chin began the meeting with the following explanation: “Following the DPRK-Japan
summit in May, the people’s security agency (police) and the people’s government
agencies (local government organizations) jointly set up the ‘Abduction Issue
Investigation Committee.’ We have conducted in-depth investigations on related
institutions including special organizations by even making inspection tours of local
agencies a number of times ... [ellipses as published].”

After making this explanation in a pompous manner, he started to brusquely read a
paper that was lying before him.

“I must report with regret that all eight people whose fate was unknown have been
found to have died and that there is no record at all that shows two other persons (Mr.
Hiroshi Kume and Ms. Miyoshi Soga, the mother of Ms. Hitomi Soga) have ever entered
the country.”

Yabunaka turned on Chin in anger: “Ms. Hitomi Soga has testified that she was
abducted together with her mother. She has said that she and her mother were put
on a ship of North Korean nationality together. On the ship was a [North Korean]
woman spy who spoke Japanese fluently, and the three spoke with each other in
Japanese until they landed in North Korea, she has testified.”

[Chin]: “Our investigation has not been able to confirm the entry into the country of
such a person.”

[Yabunaka]: “When the abduction victim herself says she and her mother landed [in
North Korea] together, how can you say that her mother did not enter the country?
Have you really seriously conducted an investigation?”

[Chin]: “Anyway, her entry has not been confirmed.”

This argument kept going back and forth for nine hours into the night, but went
nowhere.

When Yabunaka asked questions about each one of the abduction victims, Chin did
not say a word and the “division director” read his answer from a file of papers he had
ready on the table. Sometimes when the “division director” was at a loss for an answer,
the “deputy division director” replied for him by referring to data drawn out from a big
pile of papers stacked under the table.

The North Korean officials in reply explained living conditions of Japanese
abduction victims, situations of the victims around the time of their death, testimonies
of officials concerned, and whether there were any mementos of the dead left or
not. But the contents of the information provided were not something the Japanese
could accept. Yabunaka strongly demanded that he be allowed to interview the
“husband” of Ms. Megumi Yokota and other witnesses, as well as to see physical
articles of evidence.
[On November 11] Yabunaka and his party then went back into talks with Chin Il Po and his people. They talked for more than six hours during the day, or the whole afternoon of the day. The Japanese officials pointed out that answers they were given on the previous day were questionable, and they asked once again that they be allowed to interview witnesses and be provided with physical evidence.

The “division director” skillfully evaded these embarrassing questions, saying, “Documents have been destroyed because special [intelligence] organizations were involved” or “there is no one who knows about it because it is an old story.”

Finally Yabunaka began to show his irritation, saying, “Your leader (Kim Jong Il) announced in May that ‘we will go back to square one in the investigation.’” Only then did the North Koreans soften their attitude, saying, “Then, we will give a reply by tomorrow.”

The Japanese officials knew five Japanese abduction victims such as Kaoru Hasuike, who returned to Japan two years ago, had said that North Koreans assigned five persons -- a cook, a waiter, an apartment supervisor, a driver, and a guidance official -- to each and every one of Japanese abductees, and that the guidance official reported on the behavior of the abducted Japanese in writing on a routine basis to the State Security Department. As such, the Japanese officials knew that the North Korean officials’ statements saying “there are no documents” or “there are no witnesses” were false.

Japanese officials kept on pressing the North Koreans for a reply, and in the evening the North Koreans made a concession, saying, “If you are going that far, then we will take you tomorrow morning to No. 49 Preventive Hospital where Ms. Megumi Yokota committed suicide.” ...

A physician in his mid-60s, who had been in charge of Ms. Megumi Yokota, came into the room, accompanied by the hospital’s director, and started to explain.

He said in even tones: “Ms. Megumi Yokota became an in-patient of this hospital on 10 March 1994. Around 10 a.m. on 14 April, which was about a month later, she committed suicide by hanging herself from a pine tree while on a stroll of the hospital garden together with me. I did not know it, but she had made a rope by piecing torn clothes together. It was something that happened in a flash while I was away, called into the office by someone ...” [ellipses as published]

Because there was a difference between what he said this time and what he had said when a government investigation team visited the hospital two years earlier, a Japanese official raised his hand to ask a question: “I notice differences between what you say now and what you said two years ago on such details as the date and time of her death. Why is that?”

[The physician]: “The information on the date and time of her death was wrong because an entry in the record relating to the death of the patient was inaccurate.”

[A Japanese official]: “Then, we would like to see the room where the patient, Ms. Megumi Yokota, was accommodated.”

[The physician]: “The only room you can see in this hospital is this room. I cannot let you inspect other rooms in the hospital.”

[A Japanese official]: “Then, will you take us to the place you claim she died and to the place you claim she was buried?”

[The physician]: “Sure, I will do that.”

The place where the physician took the group to was a pine forest in a nearby
garden. There were pine trees spaced two to three meters apart.

The physician stopped walking and pointed his finger at a tree, saying, “This is the tree.” Three lab personnel from the Japanese group, with experience as serving police officers, took pictures of the tree, wondering how the physician could be sure that this was the tree in question when there were scores of other pine trees that all looked alike.

“A public cemetery” the party finally arrived at after a long walk up a mountain path was just a place with mounds.

The party returned to the hotel in the afternoon. Kim Ch’o’l Ho, director in charge of Japan affairs in the North Korean Foreign Ministry, then took the group to a separate room. Waiting there were Kim Ch’o’l Chun -- who North Korean officials claimed was the husband of Ms. Megumi Yokota -- and Kim Hye Kyo’ng, Ms. Megumi Yokota’s daughter, who had first been seen [by Japanese officials] two years before. Kim whispered a word into Hye Kyo’ng’s ear, and then Hye Kyo’ng got up and left the room.

Yabunaka immediately confronted Kim and started to ask questions.

Yabunaka: “Did you go to see Ms. Megumi [Yokota] while she was an in-patient at the hospital?”

Kim: “Yes, I did.”

Yabunaka: “What kind of condition was Ms. Megumi in at that time?”

Kim: “She was in a normal condition.”

Yabunaka: “How did you get to know Ms. Megumi at first?”

Kim: “I wanted to learn Japanese. I came to know her while studying Japanese.”

Yabunaka: “Do you have convincing evidence that you were her husband?”

Then, Kim Ch’o’l Chun presented two pictures he had brought with him.

Kim: “This one is a picture of the family of us three taken on the first birthday of Hye Kyo’ng. The other is a picture of the two of us taken during a sightseeing tour.”

Yabunaka: “Will you give these two pictures to us or let us copy them?”

Kim: “That is impossible.”

Yabunaka: “Then, allow us to take a picture of you or to take a finger-print of you so that we can verify your family ties [to Megumi Yokota].”

Kim: “I cannot let you do that because I am still working for a special [intelligence] organization.”

The questioning of Kim Ch’o’l Chun lasted eventually one and a half hours. When the questioning was completed, Kim looked relieved, and when he came out to the hallway to see the Japanese delegation off, he said in fluent Japanese, though with some Korean accent, “I have been to Japan.”

Late in the evening of 12 November, Yabunaka phoned Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura from the Koryo Hotel to make an interim report. Since Yabunaka was concerned about his call being monitored, he made the report as simple as possible. Mortified by the thought of having to leave [North Korea] without accomplishing anything, he reported his intention to extend his stay in North Korea by two days, and of returning by a chartered flight because of the large number of reference articles he had to carry back home.

Yabunaka is known in the Foreign Ministry as a person of mild manner, but even he exploded finally at a meeting with the “Investigation Committee” held in the morning of 13 November. He began the meeting saying: “We have held talks over many things
for the past three days, but there has been nothing that can be spoken of. I am very unhappy.”

To this statement, the “division director” retorted: “There is a problem of privacy. We cannot present any more witnesses.”

Yabunaka leaned forward and exploded: “What are you saying? What do you mean by privacy? If you want to talk about that, why don’t you talk about the privacy of the abduction victim, Ms. Megumi Yokota, first? Everybody knows that her privacy is more important. Have you ever once thought about how the parents who have lost their daughter through abduction would feel?”

A hush fell over the meeting. When the interpreter of the Japanese delegation hesitated to interpret these words, North Korean delegation chief Chin Il Ho, who appeared to understand Japanese, presented his counterargument:

“If you are going so far, I also have things to say. My father was taken to a battleground, given a pink-color notice for conscription. My mother and I went out to the railroad station everyday to see if father was coming home. But my father never returned.

“It is not just my father who met that kind of misfortune. There were millions of Korean people who met that same kind of misfortune. Can you understand the pain of Koreans?”

That remark made Yabunaka even angrier. He hit back: “What are you talking about? We have not come thus far to hear that kind of old story. We have come here to discuss the abduction issue. If you want to talk about that kind of rubbish we will end the talks. We will return to Japan now.”

Yabunaka, who looked like an angry devil, started to gather his paper files on the table.

It was right at that time that Chin Il Po gave a groan and slumped onto the table, holding his chest with his hands. There was no way for the Japanese officials to see if this “heart attack” was genuine or was just a performance, but the “division director” intervened.

“I think both sides have become too emotional. But we do share your desire to make progress in DPRK-Japan relations. Why don’t we take a break?”

After this episode, the North Korean officials agreed to present “witnesses” demanded by the Japanese delegation one after another. One was a witness in relation to Shuichi Ichikawa, who North Korean officials claim died suddenly from a heart attack at the Songdowo’n beach on 9 September 1979, about one year after he was abducted into North Korea.

The witnesses talked fluently, as if they were automatic recorders, and left the room as soon as they finished making their statements.

With regard to the case of Ms. Megumi Yokota, North Korean officials handed to the Japanese delegation three photographs which they said were given by her husband Kim Ch’o’l Chun. These pictures are the same pictures the parents of Ms. Yokota made public after the delegation returned to Japan from North Korea.

The North Korean officials also presented to the Japanese delegation what they called a file of medical records of Hospital 695 in which Ms. Megumi Yokota is supposed to have been hospitalized before being removed to No. 49 Preventive Hospital. The North Koreans said, “We do not mind if you copy them to take with you.” The medical record, on poor-quality paper bound up with string, was 190-pages long,
and contained hand-written notes of medical doctors. The names of diseases were written in English and German in some places. The Japanese delegation Xeroxed them, although they were aware that the whole thing could be just a fabrication.

It was the evening of 14 November, the last day of the talks. The faces of the North Korean officials were filled with expressions of relief at successfully completing the talks that lasted some six days. Their faces appeared to say: "The two-year-long negotiations with Japan on the abduction issue are finally coming to an end."

But Yabunaka was not at all happy with the "accomplishments" made up to that day. In particular, he could not reconcile himself to the outcome of Ms. Yokota's issue.

So, in making a final farewell, he told the North Korean officials very clearly: "Even after this round of talks, there remain so many points left unclear. We plan to closely examine the things we take home to Japan, and to continue to find out the truth about the abduction issue from North Korea. We hope the 'Investigation Committee' [of North Korea] will continue to cooperate with us."

"The day before yesterday, we met with a person called Kim Ch’o’l Chun who you claim was the ‘husband’ of Ms. Megumi Yokota. But he did not give any replies to our questions that are critical. Now that we are set to leave tomorrow morning, we strongly request that we be given another chance to meet with Mr. Kim Ch’o’l Chun.”

This remark cast a lingering shadow on the faces of the North Korean officials who had taken the matter lightly and thought, "The abduction issue has been resolved." Then, Chin Il Po was not the same person he was the day before. This changed person apparently decided to cajole Yabunaka. He said: "We too take the word of chief delegate Yabunaka as important. In fact, we are now urging Kim Ch’o’l Chun to reconsider his stand. There is an old Korean proverb saying, ‘The repeated stroke will fell the oak.’ We want you, chief delegate Yabunaka, to swing the final stroke.”

Thus, a second meeting between Yabunaka and Kim Ch’o’l Chun was arranged. In the meeting, Kim Ch’o’l Chun handed over what he claimed was a pot containing the bone ashes of Ms. Megumi Yokota.

But this second meeting of Yabunaka with Kim ended almost as soon as it began. A police-related officer, who received the pot of bone ashes from Yabunaka and brought it to Japan, took one look inside it, and sensed immediately that it might be impossible to identify the ashes because the bones had been cremated.

North Korea is a country where the remains of the deceased are always buried. The fact that the “bones were cremated” was so unnatural. Besides, this man who said he was remarried and now has a new family claimed he had “always had the bone ashes of the former wife with him.” That was a claim that could not be accepted. The Japanese officials surmised that all the acts by the North Koreans -- who knew the entire nation of Japan would get upset regardless of whether the bone ashes were determined to be those of Ms. Yokota or not -- were a ploy to emphasize only the fact that “the bone ashes have been handed over” to Japan and this is a fait accompli.

That same evening, Naoki Ito, director of the Northeast Asia Division, was given a pot containing bone ashes of what North Korean officials claimed were those of Kaoru Matsuki. The pot had the Korean name of Mr. Kaoru Matsuki written on it.

According to North Koreans officials, Mr. Matsuki was killed in an automobile accident in August 1996. The remains of what were supposed to be this man were given to a Japanese government delegation two years ago, but identification tests conducted in Japan found the remains to be those of a woman, not a man. …
In the morning of 15 November, Song Il Ho, who came to see the Japanese delegation off at Sunan Airport, said to Yabunaka: “Let us go on to develop the cooperative relationship between the foreign ministries of North Korea and Japan.”

But Yabunaka knitted his brows and spat out: “More thorough-going revelations of truth from your side must come first.”

This remark jarred Song Il Ho very badly. He approached Yabunaka, asking, “Do you plan to hold a news conference today?” and “What do you plan to say in it?” (Gendai, “North Korea’s Farce Not Reported by Newspapers; Asian-Oceanic Affairs Bureau Director-General Yabunaka Was Incensed in Pyongyang; a Full Account of ‘50-hours-Long Closed-Door’ Japan-DPRK Working-Level Talks,” January 1, 2005, FBIS)

11/10/04


Japanese naval aircraft chases unidentified sub near Okinawa chain. Some say it was Chinese. Last night South Korea sent three warnings to the North after a North Korean patrol boat briefly crossed the NLL. (Reuters, “Seoul Sees N. Korea Talks Movement; Japan Sees Sub,” November 10, 2004)

11/11/04

IAEA dir-gen report to Board of Governors: ROK authorities “stated that in the early 1980s laboratory scale experiments had been performed at this facility (KAERI) to irradiate 2.5 kg of DU and study the separation of uranium and plutonium … without the knowledge of the government. …In response to an inquiry, based on open source information, the ROK provided information of 21 October 2004 on an experiment carried out during the period from 1979 through 1981 to assess a chemical exchange process to confirm the feasibility of producing 3% U-235. …Contrary to its earlier statements, the ROK informed the Agency on 23 August 2004, in its initial declaration pursuant to the Additional Protocol, that past activities had involved laser isotope separation of uranium … in three separate experiments between January and February 2000 using laser isotope separation (AVLIS) technology developed by KAERI at Daejeon. …The AVLIS experiments had achieved an average enrichment level of 10.2% U-235 and up to 77% U-235 and had produced 200 mg of enriched uranium. The laser equipment used for the uranium enrichment experiment had been dismantled. …The declaration submitted by the ROK on 23 August 2004 did not include all its conversion activities. Some of the ROK’s activities involving conversion of natural UF4 to uranium metal were revealed only as a result of the Agency’s verification activities. …In November 1997, the Agency detected two particles of slightly irradiated DU with plutonium in environmental samples taken from hot cells associated with the TRIGA III reactor in Seoul. As this was not consistent with any declared activities by the ROK, the Agency began to investigate whether the ROK had conducted any undeclared plutonium separation activities … In December 1999, the Agency initiated consultations with the ROK, but the ROK did not acknowledge at that time having conducted any plutonium separation activity.” (“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement to the ROK”)
In an interview in September, KAERI president Chang In-soon said enrichment levels were 10 percent in a one-time test. The IAEA described the test as the culmination of ten experiments over eight years. (James Brooke, “Report Details South Korean Cover-Up,” International Herald Tribune, November 25, 2004)

“South Korean diplomats will try to convince their U.S. counterparts that it is too early to use the human rights act to put pressure on North Korea,” Woo Seong-ji of IFANS says. (Reuben Staines, “US Mulls Wielding Rights Act against NK,” Korea Times, November 11, 2004)

11/13/04 DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Some American media recently spread nonsensical stories that the six-party talks could not succeed because the DPRK insisted on the bilateral talks between the DPRK and the U.S. only. This is nothing but sophism making profound confusing of the right and wrong. As already known, the six-party talks were realized thanks to the positive initiative of the DPRK and their present deadlock is entirely attributable to the U.S. far-fetched assertion. On various occasions the DPRK clarified that it stands for settling the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. through dialogue and negotiations and it does not stick to the form of the talks aimed to solve it. As for the bilateral talks, the DPRK has neither expected nor waited for them as the U.S. has been opposed to that kind of talks. Accordingly, the DPRK does not feel any need to ask the U.S. for the bilateral talks as it is not ready to hold them.” (KCNA, Spokesman for DPRK FM on Prospect of Resumption of Six-Party Talks,” November 13, 2004)

Roh speech to World Affairs Council in LA: “No one can force South Koreans who rebuilt the country from the ashes of the Korean War to risk war again. Thus, the use of force should have restrictions as a negotiation strategy.” He went on, “Some people seem to anticipate the collapse [of North Korea] but this would also result in a huge disaster to South Koreans as the North could choose a dangerous choice if it faces a threat to its regime.” (Seo Hyun-jin, “Roh Appeals for Softer Bush Stance toward N. Korea,” Korea Herald, November 14, 2004) An administration official said, “Antiproliferation officials expressed an immediate displeasure with President Roh’s Los Angeles remark, but State Department officials seemed to understand to a degree. However, when the president made a denouncing remark on the U.S. in France, a country that is at odds with the U.S. these days, even the doves in the administration started to voice their displeasure.” He unveiled emotional private email messages between State and Defense officials. “President Roh should not expect to be invited to the White House from now on,” one read. (Kim Jung-ahn, “Repercussions of President Roh’s Remarks in Los Angeles and Europe,” Dong-A Ilbo, January 18, 2005)

Powell would have stayed if asked, says a close associate. "He was never asked." Rice wanted Defense, said a national security official who just left the administration. “But the president does didn’t want to change horses in the middle of a war.” Officials who have heard accounts of the case Bush made to her say he argued that their close personal ties would convince allies and hostile nations like North Korea that she was speaking directly for the president and could make deals in her name. “This is what Powell could never do,” said a former official who is close to Rice and sat in on many of the White House situation room meetings. “The world may have liked dealing with Colin – we all did - but it was never clear that he was speaking for the president. We knew it and they knew it.” State Department officials said that events, more than personalities, would be driving the administration in its second term to make diplomatic approached to Iran and North Korea, despite the urgings of conservatives. (David E. Sanger and Steven E. Weisman, “Cabinet Choices Seen As Move for More Harmony and Control,” New York Times, November 17, 2004, p. A-1)

Maurice Strong, senior adviser to UN SecGen Annan: “The U.S. says, ‘we will not accept just a promise of nuclear disarmament. We must have guarantees that it’s actually occurring.’ And the North says the same, ‘We won’t accept just a promise of security. Our nuclear weapons, we don’t need them to attack anyone; we need them to ensure our security. But we’re not going to give them up until we have a viable guarantee of own security.’” He says in an interview, “It’s not just assistance, but that needs to be part of the peaceful settlement and we have to provide humanitarian assistance in the meantime. But the rest of the world has to understand that you’re not going to get a settlement on the nuclear weapons issue except if it is accompanied by an economic package because they want security against attack, first of all, but they also want economic security for their people.” (Choi Soung-ah, “Herald Interview: U.N. Envoy Urges Economic Aid to N.K.,” Korea Herald, November 17, 2004)


In talks at APEC summit in Santiago, Roh tells Bush, “For smooth progress in the six-party talks, Pyongyang, our negotiating partner, should not be made nervous, and officials should refrain from making remarks that appear to cause unease in the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.” Also says, “The North Korean nuclear issue is the most important thing to South Korea. I think it is necessary for the second Bush administration to make the issue its No. 1 priority and resolve the issue by close cooperation between Seoul and Washington in a peaceful diplomatic way…” (Choi Hoon and Min Seong-jae, “Bush, Roh Said to Agree on How to Handle North,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 22, 2004) NSA Kwon Jin-ho describes summit as yielding the “most outstanding outcome ever.” FM Ban Ki-moon says, “The summit meeting is meaningful in that the U.S. has reconfirmed it has no hostile policy on and would not attack North Korea.” (Shim Jae-yun, “News Analysis: Discord Patched, Concerns Linger,” Korea Times, November 21, 2004)
Weeks of reports of defecting generals, antigovernment posters and the disappearance of portraits of Kim Jong-il, Abe Shinzo, leader of the LDP says, “I think we should consider the possibility that a regime change will occur and we need to start simulations of what we should do at that time.” Persistent reports of anti-Kim leaflets and posters gained more credibility when Sankei Shimbun, a conservative paper, publishes a photo of a flyer smuggled out of the North that reads, “Juche philosophy made people slaves.” Douglas Shin, a Korean-American who helps North Koreans flee through China, says his contacts told him posters against Kim had appeared in three cities. A Japanese NGO released a directive smuggled out of the North that cracks down on people in border towns who use cell phones to communicate with foreigners. It reads, “Some residents have contact with people in neighboring countries by hiding mobile phones in places with good reception, like tall buildings and hilltops.” An editor a Monthly Chosun says Chinese officials showed him wanted posters for generals who had defected. Last May LtGen O Se-ok left Chongjin by boat and boarded a Japanese boat in the Sea of Japan and came to the United States, says Araki Kazuhiro, Takushoku University professor. Rudiger Frank wrote that in a September visit to Pyongyang he “found no picture of any leader in my hotel room, as well as Kim Il-sung’s portrait in a conference room where just a few months before images of both father and son could be seen.” He concluded, “We might be witnessing the first step out of many which will eventually lead to the establishment of some kind of collective leadership in the DPRK in the name of Kim Il-sung.” (James Brooke, “Japanese Leader Warns of Fissures in North Korea,” New York Times, November 22, 2004, p. A-3) [More like fissures in Japan with Abe calling for regime change] Abe says, “I think Japan might need to start devising [diplomatic] simulations by including regime change in the country as one of the options.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea ‘Regime Change’ Option for Japan’s Strategy: Abe,” November 21, 2004)

Rodong Sinmun in a signed article: “The U.S. claimed to have withdrawn all the nuclear weapons from south Korea but, in actuality, bolstered its nuclear arsenal there both in quantity and quality. The Bush group blustered that it must not merely wait for the DPRK to collapse as its preceding government did but accelerate its fall by all means including nuclear weapons. ... The U.S. is talking about a “peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue” after working out even a plan to use nuclear weapons in the event of contingency on the peninsula. This is nothing but sheer nonsense and lie. The reality today helps the Korean people keenly realize what just steps the DPRK took to build a deterrent force strong enough to cope with the U.S. moves for a nuclear war in order to protect the destiny and security of the country and the nation.” (KCNA, “U.S. Urged to Drop Its Policy for Stifling DPRK with Nukes,” November 22, 2004)

KCNA: “Western media recently spread misinformation that the DPRK secretly sold fluorine gas to Iran. According to it, the DPRK allegedly transported the gas, main ingredient of nuclear weapons, to Iran by a special plane on May 20 and the gas may be used not only as nuclear fuel but for the production of uranium hexafluoride gas. Explicitly speaking, there had never been any negotiation or dealing between the DPRK and Iran as regards the nuclear issue. The story about the DPRK’s ‘secret sale of fluorine gas’ is another farce orchestrated to tarnish the image of the DPRK on the
international arena. … They floated sheer misinformation that the DPRK secretly sold uranium hexafluoride to Libya in May and this time faked up the above-said story in a bid to link Pyongyang to Teheran. Lurking behind this is a sinister aim to brand the DPRK as a proliferator of nuclear substance come what may, create an international atmosphere favorable for imposing sanctions against the DPRK and secure a justification for realizing its scenario for aggression such as a preemptive attack. This charade is timed to coincide with the Bush administration’s announcement of its ‘policy guidelines’ in which it defined the transfer of nuclear substance as a danger line and threatened to punish the DPRK if it violates the line. The fact goes to clearly prove that the story about the ‘secret sale of fluorine gas’ is nothing but a product of the premeditated plan worked out by the forces hostile to the DPRK in a bid to invent pretexts for isolating and stifling the DPRK one by one.” ("KCNA Refutes Story about ‘Secret Sale of Fluorine Gas’ to Iran," November 23, 2004)

11/23/04  U.S. won’t insist of using the phrase CVID but will not give up on principle of CVID, Asahi Shimbun reports, citing top U.S. official. (Chosun Ilbo, “U.S. Won’t Insist on Term ‘CVID’: Asahi Shimbun,” November 23, 2004)

11/24/04  An “authority” at DOS says six-party talks can evolve into regional security forum and discuss ways to dissolve the cold war structure on the Korean peninsula after resolving the nuclear issue. Nikkei reported on November 19 that NSA Rice visited China in August and conveyed such a opinion to the leader of the country.” A diplomatic source says “Washington is concerned about which influence the ‘unified Korea’ to be born will align its national interest to between the U.S. and China. The emergence of a pro-China unified Korea can bring about a situation in which the U.S. will have to redraw its Northeast Asia strategy.” (Kim Seung-ryun, “Dissolution of the Cold War Structure on the Korean Peninsula after NK Nuke Resolution,” Dong-A Ilbo, November 24, 2004)


11/26/04  KEDO board extends suspension of LWRE project for another year and says, “The future of the project will be assessed and decided by the executive board before the expiration of the suspension period.” (Reuters, “N. Korean Nuclear Power Site Work Suspended Again,” November 26, 2004) Goldschmidt: The commitment to decide instead of termination now sought by Washington a compromise. On 26 November 2004, the [IAEA] board decided not to adopt a resolution on South Korea and, therefore, not to report the case to the Security Council, setting an unfortunate precedent motivated at least in part by political considerations. Nevertheless, the chairman of the IAEA Board concluded that ‘the Board shared the Director General's view that given the nature of the nuclear activities described in his report, the failure of the Republic of Korea to report these activities in accordance with its safeguards agreements is of serious concern’. Since the board is obliged to report any case of non-compliance to the Security Council, not doing so in the case of South Korea could be interpreted as meaning that the board did not consider the breaches to constitute
non-compliance with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Among the reasons for not reporting South Korea to the Security Council, one can highlight the fact that Seoul took the initiative of informing the secretariat that it had discovered, in June 2004, in connection with the submission of its initial declaration pursuant to the Additional Protocol, that laboratory-scale experiments had been carried out by scientists at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) in Daejon. South Korean officials subsequently launched a major diplomatic offensive insisting that the government was not aware of, and did not authorise, these experiments. According to the chairman, ‘the Board welcomed the corrective actions taken by the Republic of Korea, and the active cooperation it has provided to the Agency’ in providing timely information and access to personnel and locations. Moreover, ‘the Board noted that the quantities of nuclear material involved have not been significant, and that to date there is no indication that undeclared experiments have continued’. Political considerations also played a dominant role in the board’s decision. At the time, the much more severe violations committed by Iran had not yet been formally declared by the board to constitute non-compliance, and reporting South Korea would have been politically embarrassing since Seoul was a member of the Six-Party Talks underway to resolve the crisis created by North Korea’s (the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, DPRK) withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003. Thanks to Seoul’s full cooperation in implementing the Additional Protocol, the secretariat was able to report in the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2007 that it had found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. The secretariat has concluded that all nuclear material in South Korea remained in peaceful activities. It is clear, nonetheless, that South Korea was in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement since, in addition to the failures already mentioned, the November 2004 report to the board clearly shows that a number of sensitive activities involving undeclared nuclear material had taken place over an extended period of time and that South Korea initially took some actions which could be interpreted as attempts to conceal past failures. 32… Independently of the decision of principle to consider state-specific safeguards reports as reports of non-compliance, the board should bring the South Korean and Egyptian cases into conformity with this new standard. The board should therefore adopt a resolution acknowledging that the failure by Seoul to declare a number of experiments and activities involving nuclear material as reported to the board in November 2004 constitutes non-compliance with its safeguards agreement (in the context of Article XII.C of the Statute), commending South Korea for its cooperation with the agency in providing access to information, documents, persons and locations, welcoming the fact that all nuclear material in South Korea remained in peaceful activities, and requesting the director general to report this resolution and all reports and chairman’s conclusions relating to South Korea to the Security Council for information purposes only. 28. IAEA, ‘IAEA Board Concludes Consideration of Safeguards in South Korea’, staff report, 26 November 2004, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_korea.html (emphasis added). 29. Ibid. 30. This was done only on 24 September 2005 and it was not until 4 February 2006 that the board decided to report the matter to the UN Security Council. 31. Such a conclusion means that ‘the Secretariat has found no indication that, in its judgement, would give rise to a possible proliferation concern’. IAEA, ‘Safeguards Statement for
At least ten AVLIS-related experiments involving exempted or undeclared nuclear material were carried out between 1993 and 2000 (IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea’, GOV/2004/84, para. 15). In 2002 and 2003 South Korea refused requests by the agency to visit KAERI’s Laser Technology Center (para. 14); it refused to acknowledge in 1999 having conducted plutonium separation experiments (para. 26); and it did not report in August 2004 all past conversion activities (para. 20).44. The secretariat concluded that all nuclear material in South Korea remained in peaceful activities after ‘the Agency was able to clarify all issues relating to past undeclared activities’. IAEA, ‘Safeguards Statement for 2007’, para. 33. How the secretariat reached this important conclusion after the failures and breaches reported to the board in November 2004 (IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea’, GOV/2004/84) is described in Appendix I of the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2007. The latter is unfortunately not publicly available and should be made part of the reports transmitted to the Security Council. (Pierre Goldschmidt, Exposing Nuclear Non-Compliance,” Survival, 51, no. 1 (February/March 2009), pp. 152-53)

11/27/04 “Bold approach” is detailed by sources close to the administration. If Pyongyang had agreed to eliminate its nuclear weapons program, the United States was willing to establish diplomatic relations, sign a peace treaty, provide aid for construction of road, bridges and other infrastructure, and allow the North into the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. It also required Pyongyang to enter into talks on other issues, including force reductions by both sides. It also required that missiles, biological and chemical weapons and human rights be addressed. In return, Washington would review the 1994 Agreed Framework that promised two LWRs, but would provide thermal power plants capable of producing 2,000 MW instead, as well as transmission lines and hydro plants. While the proposal had not been scrapped, whether it would be offered again would depend on Pyongyang. Sources said when Kelly present it, Kang Sok-ju rejected it without studying it in depth. [?] (Sakajiri Nobuyoshi, “U.S. Offer to N. Korea Still Alive,” Asahi Shimbun, November 27, 2004)


DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK has already clarified its stand ever since the disclosure of the case that a thorough probe should be made into south Korea’s secret nuclear activities as it has laid a stumbling block in the way of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and that Pyongyang is compelled to link the issue to the resumption of the six-party talks supposed to take up the issue of denuclearizing the peninsula. A scrutiny into the IAEA’s course of inspection and the meeting of its Board of Governors prompted us to conclude that the U.S. and the IAEA are going to hush up the secret
nuclear-related experiments of south Korea the way they think fit. The U.S. deliberately downplayed the case, not describing it as a serious issue, and unilaterally handled the issue in its interests even before the announcement of the outcome of the agency’s inspection despite the fact that those experiments were made according to the nuclear weapons program pursued by its authorities. The U.S. attitude toward this case stands out in sharp contrast to its persistent pressure upon the DPRK to admit the non-existent ‘uranium enrichment program.’ … If the IAEA does not settle the secret nuclear experiments of south Korea in an understandable manner, this issue will stand out as the most important issue at the six-party talks pending a top priority discussion. It is quite natural for the six party talks to discuss this issue before the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S., taking into consideration the fact that the DPRK is neither IAEA member nor a signatory to the NPT. Double standards as regards the nuclear issues of the north and the south of Korea can never be allowed under any circumstances and it does not stand to reason that the DPRK alone should work for denuclearization. It is illogical for the DPRK to unilaterally dismantle its nuclear deterrent force unless the secret nuclear-related experiments of south Korea are thoroughly probed. Under this situation the DPRK is left with no option but to increase its nuclear deterrent force.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts U.S. and IAEA’s Double Standards,” December 1, 2004) UnifMin Chung Dong-young responds, “At the next round of six-party talks, if an when they are held, we can explain all the processes, beginning with our nuclear experiments, the inspection by the U.N. nuclear watchdog, and the closing of the issue.” (Reuben Staines, “Seoul Willing to Explain Lab Tests to Pyongyang,” Korea Times, December 2, 2004)

Richard Armitage: “I believe they’re looking to see if a new Bush administration may have some softer people in it to see if they can get a better deal,” he said. “It's a mistake.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, December 2, 2004)


Defectors in South Korea voice skepticism about six associations effort to establish a government-in-exile in Japan. “Basically they are too old and don’t have good channels with defectors who have recently fled North Korea and settled in South Korea,” said one. “We also can't understand what their ultimate goal is at the moment.” (Reuben Staines and Park Song-wu, “Defectors in Seoul Skeptical of NK Exile Government,” Korea Times, December 1, 2004)


Reiss, DOS pol plans dir: I think Libya provides an excellent model for North Korea. …We very much want to have the opportunity to explain the details of this model to the DPRK side.” (Chang Jae-soon, “U.S. Wants to Explain Benefits of Libyan Model: Official,” Yonhap, December 2, 2004)

Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy, Ending the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (p. 8): “No evidence has yet been presented publicly to justify the conclusion that facilities capable of producing high-enriched weapons-grade uranium exist in North Korea. ...Given the greater urgency of the threat posed by the plutonium program, the start of the negotiation process should no longer be delayed by the continuation of the stalemate that has resulted from attempting to compel North Korean acknowledgement of a weapons-grade uranium enrichment program.”

Jungmin Kang; Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter, “South Korea’s Nuclear Surprise,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2005) 40-49): “If North Korea was aware of the South’s uranium enrichment research activities in the 1990s (and its intelligence capacities in the South should not be underestimated) then the South’s activities may have helped the North to acquire enrichment capacities of its own.”

Rodong Sinmun signed article: “The U.S. has so far persistently put pressure upon the DPRK while spreading distorted rumors about its nuclear issue. Recently it has gone the length of talking about the red line and threatening ‘a military punishment.’ This is aimed to provoke the second Korean war come what may, charging the DPRK with the ‘possession of nuclear weapons’ and ‘sponsorship of terrorism.’ The Bush forces are extensively setting afloat the wild rumor that terrorists can gain access to the nuclear-related substances of the DPRK and this may gravely jeopardize the security of the U.S. if Pyongyang’s “nuclear program” is not checked, saying it may have produced several atomic bombs at least after it pulled out of the NPT. This is nothing but an anti-DPRK smear campaign pursuant to the scenario of the second Korean war and a trick to secure a justification to provoke a war under the pretext of ‘proliferation of nuclear-related substance’ by the DPRK. ... The U.S. current allegations that the DPRK is not too much interested in the resumption of the six-party talks and it is pursuing the nuclear program while employing a delaying tactics are just part of its propaganda campaign to create the impression that the north’s nuclear red line is surfacing in reality. ...They had better stop crying for the north’s nuclear red line and make a switchover in its policy intended to stifle the DPRK.” (KCNA, “U.S. Talk about North’s Nuclear Red Line Flailed,” December 3, 2004)

Reiss, DOD dir pol plans: “No one, not least the United States, has closed the door to a better relationship with the DPRK. Coexistence remains possible, as does the prospect of contributions by the international community, including the other members of the six-party talks, to improvements in the lives of the people of North Korea.” (“The United States and Korea: A Partnership for Progress,” Sejong Institute, December 3, 2004) In text made public even though his speech was cancelled because of a family emergency, Reiss says sunshine policy elicited almost nothing return, and adds, “We
cannot build a better future for all the Korean people - we cannot fool ourselves - by pretending that Pyongyang shares the same aspirations as we do.” (Ser Myo-ja, “Seoul’s Aid to North Questioned,” JoongAng Ilbo, December 7, 2004)

Mohamed ElBaradei inw: he is now certain that the plutonium once under inspection has now been converted into 4-6 nuclear bombs. “I’m sure they have reprocessed it all.” That goes beyond what the CIA or the administration has acknowledged in public. “Would the North Koreans ever sell their plutonium? I don’t think so, but who knows?” says Robert Einhorn. It becomes more plausible if they think we are turning the screws on them. And it makes the military situation more difficult” because they could hide their weapons. (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “North Korea Said to Expand Arms Program,” New York Times, December 6, 2004, p. A-6)


KEPCO reaches agreement for lines to supply electricity to Kaesong. (Yonhap, “Koreas Reach Accord on Electricity Supply to Kaesong Complex,” December 3, 2004)

DefMin Yoon Kwang-ung tells National Assembly counterbattery radars and air power enable South to engage North’s artillery within 6-7 minutes of hostile action and “should be able to subdue the threat posed by these weapons within an hour or an hour-and-a-half.” (Yonhap, “South Can React to North’s Artillery in 6-7 Minutes: Defense Chief,” December 3, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The ambassador of the Foreign Ministry of China in charge of the Korean Peninsula issue visited Pyongyang from Nov. 24 to 27 during which he had an in-depth exchange of views with officials concerned of the DPRK Foreign Ministry on the issue of the six-party talks. In the meantime, DPRK-U.S. contacts took place in New York on Nov. 30 and Dec. 3. On these occasions we reclarified our stand on the resumption of the six-party talks. We remain unchanged in our stand to seek a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. Our intention is, therefore, to promote the process of the talks in such a way that they can substantially contribute to the denuclearization of the peninsula. The process of the talks came to a deadlock not because we waited for the outcome of the U.S. presidential election or sought talks with the U.S. only. The stalemate was attributable to the fact that the present U.S. administration destroyed the groundwork of the talks, reneging on the agreement reached at the third round of the talks, and, furthermore, has become extremely undisguised in its hostile acts to bring down our system, completely disregarding the DPRK, its dialogue partner and the main party concerned, .... There should be necessary conditions and environment for the resumption of the talks. What is essential for this is for the U.S. to drop its hostile policy aimed at bringing down the system in the DPRK, its dialogue partner, and express its willingness to co-exist with it. This is our consistent stand. Our analysis of the results of the contact in New York prompts us to judge that the U.S. side showed no willingness to change its policy toward us and intends to use the six-
party talks as a leverage for forcing us to dismantle all our nuclear programs including the nuclear development for a peaceful purpose first. ... Under this situation it is clear that the six-party talks will not produce any results. We are not impatient as regards the issue of the resumption of the talks nor would we like to make a hasty final conclusion. As the second Bush administration has not yet emerged, we would like to wait a bit longer to follow with patience what a policy it will shape. It will be good if the U.S. accepts our demand for a switchover in its Korea policy. If not, that will do, [too]. [Answer to Kelly testimony] (KCNA, “DPRK Remains Unchanged in Its Stand to Seek Negotiated Solution to Nuclear Issue,” December 4, 2004)

KCNA: “The United States has recently egged on some media to spread misinformation that Washington’s assertion of the ‘establishment of peace mechanism after the settlement of the nuclear issue’ ... to give the impression that it is interested in the settlement of the Korea Peninsula issue. Lurking behind its assertion is a sinister aim of the Bush administration to bring the system of the DPRK to collapse which would automatically lead to the dismantlement of its nuclear program.... The United States referred to the argument for ‘establishment of the peace mechanism after the settlement of the nuclear issue’ at previous rounds of the six-party talks, but it was not exposed to the media at that time. ... In case the armistice state turns into a peace mechanism, the U.S. cannot but recognize the political system of the DPRK and make a switchover in its policy in the direction of coexisting with the DPRK in peace. If such things happen it would be impossible for the U.S. to attain its aim to realize a regime change in the DPRK which would automatically lead to the dismantlement of its nuclear program. ... A peace agreement to be reached between the DPRK and the U.S. may include a comprehensive solution to the political and military issues between the DPRK and the U.S. and between the north and the south of Korea. ...The establishment of peace mechanism, therefore, is not a quid pro quo to someone ... The U.S. assertion that the issue of establishing a peace mechanism is an issue to be discussed only after settlement of the nuclear issue reveals its black-hearted intention to avoid a solution ...” (KCNA, “KCNA Blasts U.S. Argument for ‘Establishment of Peace Regime after Settlement of Nuclear Issue,’” December 4, 2004)

Selig S. Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?” Foreign Affairs, (January/February 2005) 99-110: “Relying on sketchy data, the Bush administration presented a worst-case scenario as an incontrovertible truth and distorted its intelligence on North Korea (much as it did on Iraq), seriously exaggerating the danger that Pyongyang is secretly making uranium-based nuclear weapons. This failure to distinguish between civilian and military uranium-enrichment capabilities has greatly complicated what would, in any case, have been difficult negotiations to end all existing North Korean nuclear weapons programs and to prevent any future efforts through rigorous inspection. ... If it turns out that North Korea did not cheat after all, the prospects for a new denuclearization agreement would improve, because the Bush administration could no longer argue that Pyongyang is an inherently untrustworthy negotiating partner. At any rate, to break the diplomatic deadlock, the United States urgently needs a new strategy. Washington should deal first with the very real and immediate threat posed by the extant stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium that Pyongyang has reprocessed since the breakdown of the Agreed Framework. Measures to locate and eliminate any
enrichment facilities that can produce weapons-grade uranium are essential but should come in the final stages of a step-by-step denuclearization process. ... The limited evidence that has, in fact, been provided to South Korea and Japan does confirm that North Korea has made efforts to buy equipment that could be used to make and operate centrifuges. This equipment includes electrical-frequency converters, high-purity cobalt powder for magnetic-top bearing assemblies, and high-strength aluminum tubes. In most of these cases, however, it is not clear whether the purchases were ever made and, if so, how much North Korea bought. For example, in April 2003, French, German, and Egyptian authorities blocked a 22-ton shipment of high-strength aluminum tubes to North Korea, the first installment of an order for 200 tons. But no evidence has been presented to establish that any of the order was delivered. Similarly, a U.S. Department of Energy intelligence study reported a North Korean ‘attempt’ to buy two electrical-frequency converters from a Japanese firm in 1999. But the report concluded that ‘with only two converters, [North Korea] was probably only establishing a pilot-scale uranium enrichment capability.’ Again in 2003, Japan blocked a renewed North Korean effort to buy frequency converters, this time three. But as a careful study by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) observed, ‘hundreds’ of such converters would be required for a production-scale enrichment facility equipped with enough centrifuges to make weapons-grade enriched uranium. The IISS study concluded that such “failures in Pyongyang’s procurement efforts suggest that North Korea may still lack key components,” especially a special grade of steel for rotors and caps and rotor bearings. ... Given the nature and scope of its attempts to buy various component parts, it seems clear that North Korea did explore the option of developing weapons-grade enrichment technology. Faced as it has been with technical constraints, however, Pyongyang may well have been forced to scale down its ambitions, limiting its efforts to LEU production, or a pilot HEU program, or no coherent program at all. The North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ri Yong Ho, hinted that this is the case during two seminars held in London during 2004, saying, in the same words each time, ‘We do not have an enrichment program, as such.’ LEU facilities, furthermore, would not violate international nonproliferation norms. Signatories of the NPT are permitted to possess LEU facilities to make fuel for their civilian nuclear reactors if these facilities are open to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. North Korea’s status as an NPT signatory is currently suspended, but it did accept IAEA inspections under the Agreed Framework. Pyongyang may have viewed its LEU facilities in this context—not necessarily as a first step toward a possible weapons program, but as a means of avoiding permanent reliance on foreign-supplied fuel for the two light-water reactors being built to provide electricity under the 1994 freeze agreement. ... Did North Korea, then, cheat on the 1994 agreement with the United States, as the Bush administration has insisted? All of the operative provisions of the accord relate to freezing the North’s plutonium program and make no reference to uranium enrichment. Pyongyang scrupulously observed these provisions until the Bush administration stopped the oil shipments in December 2002. The agreement does, however, reaffirm a 1991 agreement between North and South Korea that banned “uranium enrichment facilities,” making no distinction between HEU and LEU. Pyongyang clearly did violate that accord by pursuing uranium-enrichment efforts (however limited they may turn out to have been) and thus, technically, violated the
1994 Agreed Framework as well. ... The Bush administration, however, has made a much more serious charge: that North Korea has been secretly making nuclear weapons that might be deployed by “mid-decade” and thus cannot be trusted to honor a new denuclearization agreement. If it turns out that Pyongyang has developed no operational enrichment facilities at all—or only LEU, not HEU, facilities—Washington’s claim will be discredited.”

12/6/07 Rich Cizik, National Association of Evangelicals’ vice president for governmental affairs inw: “We’re on a roll,” he said. “Our interests range from religious persecution, such as North Korea, to humanitarian/ethnic conflict in Darfur, to democracy building in the Middle East and issues such as climate change.” (Don Melvin and George Edmondson, “‘Values’ Agenda a Concern,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, December 5, 2004) “We have as a major priority in the coming four years a legislative initiative aimed at toppling the world’s remaining dictatorships.” “The NAE has many important things to do as a religious institution,” he said. “It is a pressing need to solve North Korea’s religious persecution.” (Kim Seung-ryun, “Deep Interest in Religious Persecution in North Korea,” Dong-A Ilbo, December 6, 2004)

12/7/04 Christopher Hill: “As Steve [Hadley] and I sat down on the couch and sie chair, [Condoleezza] Rice entered the office. ...She got quickly to the point. “The administration has fought two wars, and now we are looking for a few diplomats.” ... Condi then asked, “So what would you think about becoming assistant secretary of East Asia and being the U.S. negotiator to the six-party talks?” ... I told them, We have paid a price among the South Koreans for what is perceived as a reluctance to negotiate. I’m a huge supporter of the six-party approach, but within that framework we need to be willing to sit down and talk with the North Koreans. It is not all about our relations with North Korea; I doubt we’ll ever have one or even need to have one., It’s about our other rleationships in the region, especially with the South Koreans, where based on what I was seeing in Seoul, it could use a little refreshing.” ... “That won’t be a problem,” Condi said. “The president understands that and understands that we also need to develop some more effective patterns of cooperation in the region.” (Christopher R. Hill, Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), pp. 195-96)

12/7/04 Roh in Paris: “The United States and some Western countries harbor the idea that the North Korean system should collapse; that is why Pyongyang is nervous and in a crisis mode.” (Choi Hoon and Min Seong-jae, “Roh, in Paris, Is Even More Outspoken on North Korea,” JoongAng Ilbo, December 7, 2004)


12/8/04 In change of policy U.S. will seek “regime transformation,” not regime change or overthrow, through “managed pressure,” national security adviser-designate Stephen Hadley tells visiting South Korean legislators, according to Park Jin. Deputy SecState
Armitage tells them “President Bush has the most patience with North Korea. The U.S. government has no intention of attacking North Korea from the soil of South Korea or any other country. It would be a most irresponsible act.” But it won’t reward bad behavior and will consult allies about bringing the nuclear issue to the Security Council if there is no substantial progress in six-party talks. (Shim Jae-yun, “US Seeks ‘Regime Transformation’ in North Korea,” Korea Times, December 8, 2004)

Chief cabinet secy Hosoda Hiroyuki says DNA testing shows remains not those of Yokota Megumi. In protest Japan freezes shipment of 125,000 tons of food but stops short of imposing sanctions, won’t give WFP food. “We have to conclude that the investigation by North Korea was not the truth,” Hosoda said. “Along with lodging a strong protest, we will ask them to clarify the truth of the matter.” Forensic specialists from Teikyo University said none of DNA matched Megumi’s. Four of five bone fragments belonged to the same person, the fifth to someone else, says Megumi’s father. (Asahi Shimbun, “North Korea Caught in a Lie on Megumi Remains,” December 9, 2004) Abe hands Koizumi draft sanctions resolution. “We will have to mull using dialogue and pressure,” PM Koizumi says. “We would like to wait for a while to see what attitude North Korea takes as we want a sincere response.” (Kyodo, “Japan to Provide N. Korea No Aid Even If WFP Asks,” December 10, 2004) “If we give North Korea one more chance and it fails to respond by the deadlines, we need to strongly urge the government to immediately exercise economic sanctions on North Korea,” Abe Shinzo, acting sec-gen of LDP says in Obihiro, Hokkaido. Says on TV program that “we have no choice but to go up to level 5” barring North’s ships from Japanese ports. (Kyodo, “Sanctions on N. Korea a Must If No Progress on Abductions: Abe,” December 12, 2004; James Brooke, “Japan Threatens to Punish North Korea over Abductee’s Remains,” New York Times, December 14, 2004, p. A-7)

Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy recommends using incentives to entice North Korea to scrap nuclear program, including a “buyout” of plutonium. (Reuters, “Panel Urges U.S. to Sweeten Nuclear Deal for N. Korea,” December 8, 2007)

Jang Sung-taek, husband of KJI’s younger sister, Kim Kyong-hui, purged from position as second in party, ROK intelligence officials tell National Assembly. Rumors began circulating in March. A major restructuring, dissolving the military, economic and agricultural policy bureaus took place in October and November. Promotion of Yon Hyong-muk, former prime minister and veteran economic policymaker to vice chair of National Defense Committee means the cabinet will take over economic and agricultural policy from the party. (Barbara Demick, “Kim Ousts Key relative, a Potential Rival, from N. Korean Government,” Los Angeles Times, December 9, 2004; Choi Won-ki and Jung Chang-hyun, “Sources Say North’s Political Base Gets a Makeover,” JoongAng Ilbo, December 8, 2004)

President Roh at Warsaw University: “Some raise the possibility of regime breakdown in North Korea, but this is an improbable scenario. Neither China nor South Korea wishes to see the North Korean regime fall apart.” (Quoted in Moon Chung-in, “Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six-Party Talks and the Roo Moo-hyun Government,” Asian Perspective, 32, No. 4 (2008), p.p. 78-79)
12/9/04 North can expect “a rich basket” of benefits if it drops its nuclear program, a U.S. official knowledgeable about talks [DeTrani] says. “We are talking about permanent, thorough, transparent denuclearization that is subject to verification.” DeTrani held two meetings with North Korean officials in New York last week. He was in Seoul to brief officials and en route to Tokyo after stopping in Beijing. (Andrew Slamon, “U.S. Hints at Reward to a Disarmed North Korea,” International Herald Tribune, December 10, 2004)

Recent defections include high-level North Koreans. “Not only generals are defecting top China, but many officials, such as cadres below the ministry level,” says Zhao Huji, researcher at the Communist Party School in Beijing. Experts find probable a recent report in the International Herald Tribune quoting a South Korean magazine editor that 130 generals had defected to China. (AFP, “North Korean Generals, Officials Defecting, But Kim Jong-il Still Strong,” December 9, 2007)

12/10/04 U.S. official [DeTrani] told North Koreans in New York if it admits top peaceful use of enrichment, not HEU, and pledges to abandon it, U.S. will accept that as agreement in principle to “complete dismantlement.” (Murayama Kohei, “U.S. Adopts Softer Stance, Accused of Exaggerating N. Korea Nukes,” Kyodo, November 11, 2004) DeTrani accompanied by Victor Cha of NSC urges North to return to six-party talks. “They were saying it was hostile policy,” recalled one member of the U.S. team, “and we said, ‘All right, we’ll go to New York and tell you we don’t have a hostile policy.’” A second meeting is held later that December. (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 228)

Turkey expels two DPRK diplomats arrested for smuggling narcotics from Bulgaria, RFA reports. (Ryu Jin, “Turkey Expels Two NK Diplomats for Drug Smuggling,” Korea Times, December 10, 2004)

Japan reorients defense from Soviet Union to China, North Korea missile threat, Chinese incursion in southernmost islands, cuts tanks and artillery by 600 each, adds squadron of mid-air refueling planes for reaching North Korea, increases investment in missiles, reduces five-year defense spending 3.7 percent to $233 billion, cuts ground troops by 5,000 or 3 percent, reduced combat aircraft by 70 or 12 percent, destroyers by 7 or 13 percent, doubling rapid reaction force to 15,000. (James Brooke, “Japan’s New Military Focus: China and North Korea Threats,” New York Times, December 11, 2004, p. A-3) Japan drops research on long-range precision missile technology from defense program. (Shimoyachi Nao, “Long-Range Missile Quest off Defense Buildup Plan,” Japan Times, December 10, 2004)

Poll finds 75.1 percent favor invoking sanctions against North Korea, oppose extending SDF mission in Iraq by 61 to 32.8 percent, approve Koizumi by 42 percent, down 4.9 percent from November 3. (Kyodo, “Nearly 2 in 3 Oppose Iraq Mission, 3 in 4 Back N. Korea Sanctions,” December 10, 2004)

Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “It was not secret that the Yusin government made it as its policy to develop nuclear weapons in the 1960s-1970s and had secured technical forces and stepped up nuclear armament including the production and preservation of fissionable materials and nuclear war exercises. Scores of years have
since passed. It was proved through the recently disclosed tests of nuclear materials that during the time south Korea pushed forward the development of nuclear weapons behind the screen of ‘threat from the north.’ Therefore, south Korea has presented itself as the force of nuclear threat which has the main features of nuclear armament including extraction of nuclear materials, production of nuclear bombs, the preservation of nuclear warhead vehicles and preparations for a nuclear war. This is the truth behind the south Korean nuclear issue. Its truth has not yet been made clear. But the IAEA tried to put an end to the issue despite the remaining objects of additional inspection to be made for three years, which cannot be overlooked. It is ridiculous that the south Korean authorities have shelved the stark nuclear issue and joined in the U.S. moves to stifle the DPRK, clamoring about the ‘nuclear issue’ of the north. If the south Korean authorities are really interested in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the peaceful reunification of the country, they should not cover up their nuclear issue and join in the outside moves to stifle the north but make clear their nuclear issue and stop developing nuclear weapons at once. Were it not so, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the improvement of inter-Korean relations and regional peace are unthinkable.” (KCNA, “RS on Nuclear Issue of South Korea,” December 12, 2004)

12/12/04 North Korea contracted to export $10 million in missile technology to Iraq. (Kim Seung-ryun, “Hussein’s Missile Contract with North Korea Revealed,” Dong-A Ilbo, December 12, 2004)

12/14/04 DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Recently the U.S. let reptile media and riff-raffs spread the sheer lie that portraits of leader Kim Jong Il are no longer displayed in the DPRK. As this smear campaign proved futile, they floated sheer misinformation that ‘there is confusion within its leadership’ and ‘at least 130 army general officers and high-ranking officials deserted their units in the wake of the defection of ordinary people.’ All this was intended to give impression that a sort of dramatic crisis has occurred in the DPRK. The U.S. false propaganda and psychological operation aimed to slander the DPRK and finally realize a regime change there have, in actuality, gone beyond the tolerance limit. The U.S. seems to foolishly think that its mean psychological operation works on the DPRK and it has done something in its bid to tarnish the image of the DPRK and bring down its political system. However, few would be taken in by such trick of those who are so ignorant as to know north Korea as a peninsula. …It was none other than the Bush administration which listed the DPRK as a target of a preemptive nuclear attack and put PSI in force, thus escalating its moves to isolate and blockade it. Finding it impossible to topple the DPRK by force as it has a powerful nuclear deterrent force, the U.S. faked up the “North Korean Human Rights Act” and adopted it as its policy to realize a regime change in it. It has spread sheer lies through such operation to destabilize its society as massively smuggling transistors and increasing the hours of broadcasting of Voice of Free Asia. It is, however, seriously mistaken. The system in the DPRK is politically stable and is as firm as a rock. It is not such a weak system as those in other parts of the planet that were brought down through Rose and Chestnut Revolutions. …The U.S. frantic smear campaign against the DPRK reminds us of an eve of its aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq. This heightens our vigilance. The hatred of the army and people of the DPRK towards the U.S. is rapidly mounting due to its escalation of the smear campaign to bring down the political system in the DPRK.
Under this situation the DPRK is compelled to seriously reconsider its participation in the talks with the U.S., a party extremely disgusting and hateful." (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts U.S. Psychological Campaign,” December 13, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “As we have already declared, we will seriously reconsider the issue of taking part in the six-party talks together with Japan as long as such premeditated and provocative campaign of the ultra-right forces against the DPRK goes on, the statement said, and continued: If sanctions are applied against the DPRK due to the moves of the ultra-right forces, we will regard it as a declaration of war against our country and promptly react to the action by an effective physical method. …As far as the remains of Megumi Yokota are concerned, her husband directly handed them to the head of the delegation of the Japanese government, which came to Pyongyang for the DPRK-Japan inter-governmental working contact held in November last, free from the interference from the third party at the repeated earnest request of the Japanese side. It is unimaginable that her husband handed the remains of other persons to the Japanese side. Let's suppose he handed the remains of other person to the Japanese side, as claimed by it, then what did he expect from doing so? The ‘results of the examination’ announced by Japan, in the final analysis, make us suspect that they were cooked up according to the political script carefully prearranged to serve a particular purpose.” (KCNA, “DPRK Stand on Japanese Ultra Right Forces-Proposed Sanctions against DPRK Clarified,” December 14, 2004)

KCNA: “The U.S. signed an ‘agreement on atomic energy’ with south Korea in 1956 and has since been deeply involved in the nuclear development and researches in south Korea. It has strictly supervised the nuclear development in south Korea through the U.S.-south Korea "joint committee for cooperation in atomic energy" which met every year. …The experiments of nuclear substance and the manufacture of nuclear weapons in south Korea would have been unthinkable without the U.S. assistance in technology and equipment. …If the denuclearization of the peninsula is to be discussed in a realistic manner at the six-party talks, the nuclear issue of south Korea should be taken up before anything else and the truth behind it be thoroughly probed to make everybody understandable. It is quite natural that the DPRK cannot participate in the talks in which the U.S. will only demand the DPRK ‘scrap its nuclear program first,’ shutting its eyes to the nuclear issue of south Korea which is under its nuclear umbrella.” (KCNA, KCNA Holds U.S. Chiefly Accountable for Nuclear Issue of S. Korea,” December 14, 2004)

Dep SecState Armitage and NSC senior director Michael Green caution Koike Yuriko, state minister for frontier territories, against sanctions. She says they told her that “sanctions are effective when they are shown as a card. But it would be tough once you actually start sanctions.” (AFP, “US Cautions Japan against Sanctions on Unpredictable North Korea,” December 14, 2004)

Cell phones new agents of change in North Korea. Douglas Shin, Korean-American minister sees a cell phone “revolution” if U.S. drops them into the North to bring about regime transformation “Something strange is going on in North Korea,” says Koo Moon-soon, conservative National Assemblyman. A lot of North Koreans are not happy under the dictatorship and are not well off, so loyalty for Kim Jong-il’s regime has lessened and they are beginning to yearn for the outside world. The leadership is having a hard time controlling people through food distributions, prison camps, and executions.” (Donald Kirk, “New Agent of Change in North Korea: Cell Phones,” USA Today, December 15, 2004)

SFRC staffer Frank Jannuzi in Tokyo says unilateral sanctions by Japan would not be beneficial. They “are best viewed not as punishment but as catalyst” for negotiations. “It seems to me that sanctions are a rapidly depreciating asset.” (Kyodo, “U.S. Senate Experts Advises Against Japan Sanctions on N. Korea,” December 15, 2004)

KOTRA reports North Korean trade with China was $1.01 billion in first ten months of 2004, up 40.3 percent on an annual basis from $1.02 billion in 2003, $738 million in 2002, $737 million in 2001, $488 million in 2000 and $370 million in 1999. North Korean exports to China were $425 million in ten months, up 83.6 percent on an annual basis and the trade deficit was $162 million, down from $262 million in the same period last year. (Park Song-wu, “NK-China Trade Volume Hits $1-billion Mark Once Again,” Korea Times, December 15, 2004)

A South Korea plant in Gaeseong manufactures first kitchenware. UnifMin Chung Dong-young were there to mark event. (Chong Bong-uk, “First Products of Inter-Korean Joint Venture,” Vantage Point (January 2005) p. 8)

Ambassador to ROK Christopher Hill at Asia Society says that “we are prepared to talk to North Korea [bilaterally] as part of the six-party process, but we are not prepared to undermine the six-party process.” (Associated Press, “American Ambassador Offers North Korea Limited Talks,” December 16, 2004)

In bilateral in Beijing between Cho Gil-ju, councilor at the DPRK embassy, and Horinuchi Hidehisa, minister at the Japan embassy, North rejects Japan’s finding that remains were not Yokota’s. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Rejects Japan’s Finding That Ashes Are Not Yokota’s,” December 16, 2004)

At ceremony marking first shipment of products made in Kaesong, kettles made by inchon-based Livingart, Ju Dong-chan, in charge of special zones for DPRK says, “The development of the Kaesong park is much later than expected. We should complete 15 factories here by the end of the year since it is a promise to our nation.” (Kim Tae-gyu, “NK Casts Chill on Kaesong Euphoria,” Korea Times, December 16, 2004)

At least 50 DPRK diplomats were arrested for drug smuggling in the past two decades to fund its embassies, a U.S. official says. “There have been some indications the Bush administration may begin to make a bigger issue of this DPRK drug-trafficking,” said


After a summit meeting with Roh Moo-hyun in Ibusuki, Koizumi delays sanctions. “We will have to see how North Korea responds to demands for the truth. Once we have that, we would then consider what sort of sanctions to impose,” he says. (Kenji Hall, “Japan Delays Sanctioning North Korea,” Associated Press, December 17, 2004)

North Korea could test Taepo Dong 2 at “any time” says asst secstate for nonproliferation Stephen Rademacher. (Kyodo, “U.S. sees N. Korea Poised to Test Longer-Range Missile ‘Any Time,’” December 17, 2004)

12/18/04 U.S. conducted 2,100 cases of aerial espionage from January to November, KCNA says. (Associated Press, “North Korea: U.S. Flew 2,100 Spy Flights,” December 18, 2004)

12/20/04 DPRK FoMin spokesman: ‘If the United States more desperately pursues its hostile policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK under the pretext of the ‘nuclear issue’ and ‘human rights issue,’ not showing its willingness to co-exist with the DPRK, the latter will react to it by further increasing its self-defensive deterrent force. … When its ‘North Korean Human Rights Act’ came to be rebuffed and denounced by the international community, the U.S. blustered that the act is not aimed to ‘bring down the system in the DPRK’ but ‘make it change its system’ and it is specifically designed to ‘make it change its economic system.’ The U.S. intention to dare force the DPRK to change its system chosen by the Korean people and defended by themselves is a wanton violation of the freedom of choice and political right of citizens. …The Iraqi incident teaches a lesson that human rights not based on state sovereignty, the human rights not protected by strength, are no more than an illusion and it is the only option for defending the genuine human rights to struggle against their violation by physical strength as long as the U.S. remains unchanged in its policy of using the ‘human rights issue’ as an all-powerful leverage for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and bringing down their systems.” (KCNA, “U.S. Accused of Trying to Bring Down DPRK System,” December 20, 2004)

12/21/04 Hill press conf in Seoul: “I think by regime transformation, the concept there is that we need a regime in North Korea that does change its behavior,” the ambassor to ROK says. “For example, we would like the regime to stop and dismantle its nuclear weapons program. So that would be a transformation.” (Chang Jae-soon, “Regime Transformation Means Change in N.K.’s Behavior: U.S. Envoy,” Yonhap, December 21, 2004)
GNP’s chair Park Geun-hye and Yeouido Institute unveil North Korean Marshall Plan through a “special financial institution” partly funded by the South. The main difference from Roh’s “peace and prosperity” plan is the emphasis on human rights. (*Chosun Ilbo*, “GNP Unveils ‘North Korean Marshall Plan,’” December 21, 2004)

12/22/04

Poll of Diet shows 82 percent favor sanctions on North as soon as possible (313 of 721 respond), 94 percent of Komeito, 86 percent of LDP, 80 percent of DPJ. (Kyodo, “82% of Lawmakers Favor Economic Sanctions on N. Korea: Poll,” December 22, 2004) 63 percent of public favor sanctions; 48 percent approve of Koizumi’s handling of issue; 40 percent did not. (*Asahi Shimbun*, “63% Back N. Korea Sanctions,” December 21, 2004)


12/23/04

EU delegation recommends review of policy toward North including closer engagement and contingency plans for “sudden change.” Strong indications of a power struggle including reports of assassination attempt on Kim Jong-nam. “Jonathan Watts, “Tremors That May Signal Political Earthquake in North Korea,” *Guardian*, December 23, 2004) Michael Horowitz, Hudson Institute, says, “North Korea will implode before next Christmas.” He also mentioned the possibility of a military coup. (*Chosun Ilbo*, “U.S. Scholar Says North Will Crumble Within a Year,” December 24, 2004) In South Korea there are calls to update the contingency plan, code-named Chuingmu 3300, to deal with possible collapse. Japan’s media are full of rumors, most of them untrue, of mass defections. “The idea that North Korea is about to collapse is back in fashion,” said Jeung Young-tai, a member of the KINU team studying its likelihood. Speculation set off by removal last month of KJI portraits from public buildings frequented by foreign diplomats. They were ordered removed by KJI to avoid comparison to Saddam’s cult of personality. But speculation has more to do with political forces outside North Korea – the $24 million authorized in the North Korean Human Rights Act to promote better conditions there, which has reactivated Christian missionaries and other activists who have flooded journalists with email of unsubstantiated rumors about instability. “This is a realistic scenario and something we need to plan for and refine in detail,” said National Assemblyman Chung Moon-hun. “Instead, we’re not even allowed to talk about it.” After Roh said, “It seems there’s almost no possibility North Korea will collapse,” Michael Horowitz accused Roh of “making love to a corpse” and added, “At this stage the only people who believe that

12/7/04 Koizumi-Roh summit.

12/24/04 North rejects Japan’s proposal to send an official to Pyongyang to explain the results of its examination of material evidence and information provided last month on the 10 missing abductees. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Rejects Japan’s Proposal for Meeting on Abductions,” December 24, 2004) Japan warns of “tough step” if North fails to respond to questions it asked about material evidence and onformation it provided on abductions. Koizumi says, “We don’t want to halt the dialogue even though many people say pressure tactics, including economic sanctions, are needed. Japan will strongly demand a sincere response from the perspectives of both dialogue and pressure.” Chief cabinet secy Hosoda Hiroyuki says, “The information and material evidence North Korea provided so far is utterly insufficient to find out the truth about the missing abductees and its investigation lacks credibility.” (Mizumoto Natsumi, “Japan Hints at ‘Tough’ Step, Doubts N. Korean Evidence,” Kyodo, December 24, 2004) Roughly three of four Japanese polled favor sanctions over revelation that remains were not those of Yokota Megumi. (Takahara Kanako, “Public Wants Sanctions – But at What Price?” Japan Times, December 24, 2004) Taguchi Yaeko abducted in 1978 at age 22 lived at a foreign guesthouse with Yokota in 1984-86, according to North, calling into question whether she was the tutor of surviving agent Kim Hyon-hui in 1987 bombing, who testified she was her tutor in Japanese under the alias Lee Un-hae when the two lived together in 1981-84. (Asahi Shimbun, “Pyongyang’s Version Hardly Credible,” December 25, 2004) On December 25 government adopts six-point policy: strongly insist that the North reveal the truth about the missing abductees and repatriate survivors, take strong action depending on the North’s response, freeze remaining 250,000 tons of promised food aid “for the time being,” continue to enforce laws on inspecting North Korean ships, demand a full account of how North Korea indentified the culprits responsible for abductions and how they were punished, including the handover of three suspects in the abductions on the international wanted list as well as the remaining Red Army Faction hijackers, and continue gathering onformation on the missing, says Deputy Chief Cabinet Secy Suguiura Seiken. Evidence provided by North in November included documents on criminal cases against two people but many details were reducted. (Kyodo, “Japan Confirms Six-Point Policy on N. Korea, Includes ‘Tough Step,’” December 28, 2004; Asahi Shimbun, “N. Korea Pressed for Explanation,” December 30, 2004) Cabinet Abduction Issue Task Force 17th meeting agrees to demand swift investigation, detailed explanation of identification and punishment of those responsible for abductions, return of survivors, suspend humanitarian aid, continued strict law enforcement such as ship inspections. (Text in James L. Schoff, Political Fences and Bad Neighbors (Cambridge: IFPA, June 2006), appendix B) On December 25 Japan handed D.P.R.K. diplomats in Beijing a report concluding the North’s effort to show that eight abductees were dead had false evidence including human remains. (Kyodo, “Angry North Korea Threatens to End Dialogue with Japan in Abduction Row,” December 29, 2004)
UnifMin Chung Dong-young in visit to China rebuts Stephen Hadley’s statement, “The U.S.’s idea is to transform the North Korean regime gradually.” Chung says, “There are discussions [within the U.S.] about regime transformation, but it is far from the Korean government’s position. No nation can force others to transform their regimes and cultures by its own standards.” (Pu Hyong-gwon, “North Korea Should Transform Its Regime by Itself,” Dong-A Ilbo, December 24, 2004)


12/29/04 North says Kim Ki-ho who had been head of inspections at 8th Army’s 6th Ordinance Battalion and a 19-year employee of the 8th Army until August 2003, “Made the bold decision to come over to the northern half of Korea.” NIS confirmed his defection. (Reuters, “South Korean with U.S. Army Defects to North, December 29, 2004)

12/30/04 Jack Pritchard in invw says he notified North Korea of a “nuclear red line” – warning of strong measures if it transferred nuclear materials to a third country in an August 2003 meeting, but the U.S. government as a matter of policy has never given the North that message. (Hishinuma Takao, “U.S. Notified N. Korea Told of Danger Line,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 23, 2004)

“North Korea has been going through significant changes in all fields of society and the change will eventually move onto fundamental ones,” concludes a MinUnif report, “Comprehensive Review of the North Korean Economy 2004.” Pool, bowling and computer games are popular. Pyongyong has 24-hour stores, as well as karaoke and cafes. Some university restaurants are selling hamburgers. Central Bank officials have undergone training in finance in Vietnam and China since 2002. KPA commanders are

12/31/04  DPRK FoMin spokesman: “We can neither accept nor admit the results and resolutely rejects them as the government reacts to our good faith with an immoral attitude. … The document called “results of the probe” is peppered with words totally negating the sincere efforts the DPRK has made for the reinvestigation into the issue of abduction and its results. … Now that it has become clear that the Japanese government has openly joined the ultra-right forces in their moves against the DPRK it no longer feels that any DPRK-Japan inter-governmental contact is meaningful. [It will talk to others?] The Japanese government should return the remains of Yokota through an official channel as already demanded by the DPRK side and thoroughly probe into the truth behind the case of the fabricated “DNA test” of her remains and apologize for it. The Japanese government’s above-mentioned warning against the DPRK is a very threatening and despicable provocation as it reminds one of a thief crying “Stop the thief.” As we have already clarified, we are fully prepared to react to Japan’s every provocation with physical strength. (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Japan’s Anti-DPRK Campaign,” December 31, 2004)