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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called for building economic might and resolving tension with the South in a New Year's address. The message broadcast at 9:05 a.m. by the North's Korean Central TV and Korean Central Broadcasting Station marked the first New Year's message by a North Korean leader in 19 years since North Korean founder and Kim's grandfather Kim Il-sung delivered one in 1994, the year of his death. In the English script of the address, released later by KCNA, Kim was quoted as urging the South Korean government to follow through on previous inter-Korean joint declarations. "All the Korean compatriots in the North, South and abroad should launch a dynamic struggle to carry out to the letter the June 5 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration," Kim said. Kim called them "great reunification programs common to the nation in the new century and milestones for peace and prosperity," according to KCNA's English script. Kim also urged his country and the South to prioritize "the great national cause of reunifying the country" and said "by holding fast to the ideals of independence, peace and friendship, we will, in the future too, strive to develop relations of friendship and cooperation with the countries that are friendly to our country." The leader noted that the country's most important task is to "build an economic giant," calling for an increase in production, especially in the sectors of agriculture and light industry. "Agriculture and light industry remain the major fronts for economic construction this year," Kim was quoted as saying. "All economic undertakings for this year should be geared to effecting a radical increase in production, and stabilizing and improving the people's living standards." Praising the country's successful launch of a long-range rocket in December, he said, the launch helped "carry out the instruction of Kim Jong-il with credit and fully demonstrate the
high level of space science and technology, and overall power of Juche Korea,” referring to the country’s guiding ideology. (Yonhap. “Kim Jong-un Calls for Building Economic Power, Resolving Tension with South,” January 1, 2013) North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address struck an unaccustomed friendly note. Under his father Kim Jong-il, the customary New Year’s editorials in the state press rarely missed a chance to slander South Korea and its main ally the U.S. when there had been an election in the South. Kim Jong-un’s speech was by far the most conciliatory yet. The Korea Institute for National Unification said it brings hope of improved inter-Korean relations ahead of the launch of the Park Geun-hye administration. A close aide to Park said it was a "good sign," even though the North is probably just testing the new South Korean administration’s appetite for dialogue. Still, the aide added, "I don’t see any need to downplay its significance." Kim’s call for "reconciliation and unity" with South Korea did not come without strings attached. "All Korean compatriots in the North, South and abroad should launch a dynamic struggle to carry out to the letter the June 5 Joint Declaration and the Oct. 4 Declaration," he said, referring to inter-Korean declarations signed under the two progressive administrations of the South. Five years ago, North Korea went through unofficial channels to check if Seoul was willing to adhere to the Oct. 4 declaration signed by former President Roh Moo-hyun, which included a call to replace the armistice that ended the Korean War with a proper peace treaty. But then president-elect Lee Myung-bak insisted on a fresh set of conditions to resolve the North Korean nuclear standoff and get Pyongyang to embrace reforms, which led to a quick deterioration in relations. Kim stressed that the most important task is to "build an economic giant" and improve the lives of North Koreans. "All economic undertakings for this year should be geared to effecting a radical increase in production, and stabilizing and improving the people’s living standards," he said. Here too, he broke with tradition by addressing the economy before political and military issues. He used the word "people" 59 times and "economy" 24 times, way ahead of references to nation founder Kim Il-sung (11 times), Kim Jong-il (14 times), "socialism" (18 times), the "juche" or self-reliance doctrine (13 times) and the "songun" or military-first doctrine (six times). The relative scarcity of references to the songun doctrine, the brain child of Kim Jong-il, is also interesting. "In Kim Jong-il’s day, the songun ideology pervaded all state affairs, but now it seems to be restricted to the field of defense," said Cho Dong-ho at Ewha Womans University. "The ideology is losing its luster." (Chosun Ilbo, “Signs of Change in Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s Speech,” January 2, 2013)

Kim Jong-un New Year’s speech: “…Our reliable scientists and technicians successfully launched the artificial earth satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2, carrying out the instruction of the General with credit and fully demonstrating the high level of space science and technology and overall national power of Juche Korea. That we successfully manufactured and launched the scientific and technological satellite by entirely relying on our own efforts, technology and wisdom was an event of national jubilation that raised the dignity and honor of the Sun's nation onto the highest level and a great event which inspired all the service personnel and people with confidence in sure victory and courage and clearly showed that Korea does what it is determined to do. … The officers and men of the People’s Army and the People’s Internal Security Forces made breakthroughs on all major fronts of building a thriving country with the mettle of “At a go” and did many good things for the happiness of the
people, thereby living up to the expectations and trust of the Party and people. Although the situation was acute and complicated and severe natural calamities hit the country in succession last year, our army and people made great strides in their efforts to build a thriving socialist country and improve the people's living standards by displaying an indomitable will and waging an unyielding struggle. … The building of an economic giant is the most important task that comes to the fore in the present stage of building a thriving socialist country. We should further consolidate the successes achieved so far in economic construction to raise the status of our country to that of an economic giant in the new century, thus realizing the wish of the great General who devoted all his life to making our people well off with nothing to envy in the world. In the same manner as we demonstrated the dignity and might of Songun Korea through the manufacture and launch of the Juche-based application satellite, the entire Party, the whole country and all the people should wage an all-out struggle this year to effect a turnaround in building an economic giant and improving the people's standard of living. "Let us bring about a radical turn in the building of an economic giant with the same spirit and mettle as were displayed in conquering space!" -- this is the fighting slogan our Party and people should uphold this year. All sectors and all units of the national economy should launch a vigorous general offensive to boost production in hearty response to the Party's militant slogan. All economic undertakings for this year should be geared to effecting a radical increase in production and stabilizing and improving the people's living standards by solidifying and making effective use of the already-built foundations of the independent national economy. By adopting decisive steps to shore up the vanguard sectors of the national economy and the sectors of basic industries, we should develop coal-mining, electric-power and metallurgical industries and rail transport on a preferential basis and provide a firm springboard for the building of an economic giant. We should make innovations in coal-mining and metallurgical industries in particular so as to revitalize the overall economy of the country. The success in economic construction should be manifested in the people's standard of living. We should direct great efforts to bolstering up the sectors and units that have a direct bearing on the people's livelihoods and increasing production there, so as to give them more benefits in living. Agriculture and light industry remain the major fronts for economic construction this year, too. We should fulfil this year's plan for grain production without fail by concentrating nationwide efforts on farming and raising the efficiency of agricultural production by dint of scientific and intensive methods. We should take concrete measures for the supply of raw and other materials to light-industry factories and thus increase the output of quality consumer goods. We should decisively bolster up livestock, fish and fruit farming to provide the people with a better, more bountiful diet. The soldiers of the People's Army and the shock-brigade members who volunteered to work at the reclamation site of Sepho tableland in response to the Party's call should achieve miraculous successes and perform heroic feats in this year's campaign to open a bright prospect for carrying the Party's grand nature-remaking plan to completion at an earlier date. … All sectors of the national economy should make scrupulous arrangements for economic planning and guidance to boost production by tapping every possible reserve and potentiality, and work out in a scientific way the immediate plans and long-term strategies for stage-by-stage development and push ahead with them in a persistent manner. We should hold fast
to the socialist economic system of our own style, steadily improve and perfect the methods of economic management on the principle of encouraging the working masses to fulfil their responsibility and role befitting the masters of production, and generalize on an extensive scale the good experiences gained at several units. ... The military might of a country represents its national strength; only when it builds up its military might in every way can it develop into a thriving country and defend the security and happiness of its people. We should put continued stress on increasing our military might under the great banner of Songun, reliably safeguard the security and sovereignty of the country and render services to assuring regional stability and global peace. ... An important issue in putting an end to the division of the country and achieving its reunification is to remove confrontation between the north and the south. The past records of inter-Korean relations show that confrontation between fellow countrymen leads to nothing but war. Anti-reunification forces of south Korea should abandon their hostile policy against their fellow countrymen, but take the road of national reconciliation, unity and reunification. Respecting and thoroughly implementing the north-south joint declarations is a basic prerequisite to promoting the inter-Korean relations and hastening the country’s reunification.

All the compatriots in the north, south and abroad should launch a dynamic struggle to carry out to the letter the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration, great reunification programs common to the nation in the new century and milestones for peace and prosperity. The reunification issue should be solved by the concerted efforts of our nation in an independent manner." (KCNA, “New Year’s Address Made by Kim Jong-un,” January 1, 2013)

The number of North Koreans aged over 65 reached 2.09 million as of October 1, 2008, or 8.7 percent of the 24.05 million in total population, according to the country’s Population Census, published by the North’s Central Statistic Bureau in 2008 with assistance from the United Nations Population Fund. A country with 7 percent or more of the population representing the aged is considered an aging society. As of 2008, the portion of the aged people in South Korea stood at 10.3 percent. The most populated region was South Pyongan Province with 4.05 million, or 17.4 percent of the total population, followed by the capital city of Pyongyang with 3.25 million and South Hamgyeong Province with 3.06 million. More than 60 percent of its people represented the urban population, with the remaining 17.4 percent tied to the rural regions, according to the data. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Enters Aging Society: Data,” January 1, 2013)

The government has embarked on a plan to acquire the Global Hawk—a high-altitude, long-distance unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft—from the United States to enhance the Self-Defense Forces’ ability to collect information, Yomiuri Shimbun has learned. The planned introduction of the cutting-edge drone would bolster Japan’s intelligence capabilities, enabling it to more effectively cope with the increased pressure by China over the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture, according to government and Liberal Democratic Party sources. The Global Hawk would also enhance the SDF’s ability to gather information on North Korea, the sources said. The plan is to be incorporated into a review of the fiscal 2011-2016 Mid-Term Defense Program to be conducted by the administration of Prime Minister Abe
Shinzo, the sources said. Under the current five-year plan, formulated under the Democratic Party of Japan, the introduction of unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft was labeled a matter for long-term study. The Abe Cabinet, however, appears willing to adopt a speedier time frame for studying the advisability of equipping the SDF with unmanned spy drones, apparently in response to pressure from LDP lawmakers. Proponents point to the increase in incidents involving Chinese government vessels and aircraft around the Senkakus, some of which have infringed on Japanese waters and airspace. Developed by U.S. defense contractor Northrop Grumman Corp., the Global Hawk can fly at a high altitude of about 18,000 meters, and is equipped with precision sensors and radar that can track suspicious vessels or gather intelligence. Unlike the Predator, which is armed with missiles and other weapons, the Global Hawk has no offensive capabilities, and specializes solely in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR. The 14.5-meter-long aircraft has a wingspan of about 40 meters, according U.S. Air Force data. Introducing the Global Hawk, which is piloted remotely by a crew of three on the ground, would enable the SDF to fill loopholes in its surveillance capability, the sources noted, as the drone can fly continuously for more than 30 hours. In addition to security purposes, the aircraft could be used to collect information on radiation contamination, they said. The government and senior LDP leaders are looking to obtain from one to three Global Hawks by fiscal 2015, before the current midterm defense program ends, the sources said. The study would also examine introducing a ground-based remote control system for the aircraft, they said. The Japanese and U.S. governments agreed in August to study the possibility of having U.S. drones fly surveillance flights over waters surrounding Japan. If the SDF were to acquire the drone, the surveillance areas would be broadened significantly due to information sharing with the U.S. military, which would strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, according to the sources. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Government Eyeing Purchase of U.S. Spy Plane; Global Hawks Would Cover China, N. Korea,” January 1, 2013)

Eric Schmidt will be traveling to North Korea on a private, humanitarian mission led by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson that could take place as early as this month, sources told the Associated Press. The sources, two people familiar with the group’s plans, asked not to be named because the visit had not been made public. Since stepping aside as CEO, Schmidt has served as Google’s executive chairman, largely responsible for the company’s external relationships with policymakers, business partners and governments around the world. And in recent months, Schmidt had been working with Jared Cohen, a former U.S. State Department policy and planning adviser who heads Google’s New York-based think tank, on a book about the Internet’s role in shaping society. “The New Digital Age” is due to be published in April. Schmidt’s message: The Internet and mobile technology have the power to lift people out of poverty and political oppression. The visit also follows North Korea’s announcement that an American citizen of Korean descent has been jailed in Pyongyang on suspicion of committing “hostile” acts against the state. Conviction could draw a sentence of 10 years of hard labor under North Korea’s penal code. Kenneth Bae, identified in North Korean state media by his Korean name, Pae Jun Ho, is the fifth American detained in North Korea in the past four years. The exact circumstances of his arrest were not clear. KCNA said he was taken into custody in
Rason, a special economic zone in the far north near China and Russia, while on a tour of the area. Richardson, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations who often serves as an envoy to countries that do not have diplomatic relations with the United States, will try to meet with North Korean officials, and possibly Bae, to discuss the case, the sources said. Also leading the trip is Kun “Tony” Namkung, an Asian affairs expert who has made numerous visits to North Korea over the past 25 years. Namkung also serves as a consultant to the AP. Even before late leader Kim Jong Il’s death a year ago, North Korea indicated interest in repairing relations with Washington. Last year, a group of North Koreans even paid a visit to Google headquarters in Mountain View, California. (Associated Press, “Google Exec Chairman to Visit N. Korea,” January 2, 2013) “He planned to visit North Korea earlier but the schedule was delayed in consideration of the sensitive mood to do with the North’s long-range rocket launch,” a Seoul official said. “I understand the visit is purely for a private purpose and has no bearings with business,” he added. (Korea Herald, “Google’s Schmidt May Visit N.K.,” January 3, 2013) “We are aware that he is planning a personal visit,” ministry spokesman Cho Tai-Young told a regular press briefing. Cho said Seoul was “not aware” of either the timing or the reason for Schmidt’s trip to Pyongyang. “We know of Schmidt’s visit to the North only as a private visit. So there is no specific comment to be made from our government,” he added. Google has so far refused officially to confirm the visit, which was reported by the Associated Press and Wall Street Journal as being part of a humanitarian mission led by former New Mexico governor Bill Richardson. The US State Department criticized the visit, stressing that it was a private mission. “Frankly we don’t think the timing of this is particularly helpful,” State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said. “They are not carrying any messages from us.” (AFP, “S. Korea Confirms Goggle Chairman’s N. Korea Visit,” January 3, 2013)

A total of 1,508 North Koreans defected from their country and entered South Korea during 2012, compared with the corresponding figure of 2,706 in 2011, according to the data released by Seoul’s Unification Ministry. The 2012 figure is the first to drop below the 2,000-level since 2006. Inflows of North Korean defectors reached the highest level in 2009 with 2,929 coming to the South. A total of 215 North Koreans defected to the South in December, the highest monthly number for 2012, while the lowest number of 84 North Koreans came here during February, according to the data. Officials attributed last year’s sharp decrease to the North’s border control, which was tightened significantly following the death of leader Kim Jong-il in December 2011 due to security concerns. The ministry said a total of 24,613 North Korean defectors are now residing in the South. (Yonhap, “N. Korean Defector Arrivals Fall by Nearly Half in 2012,” January 2, 2013) North Korea sank the Navy corvette Cheonan and shelled Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 in protest against Seoul’s refusal to provide economic aid, a senior Cheong Wa Dae official here claimed. [?] The official told reporters the Lee Myung-bak administration attempted several times to arrange a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il but was unwilling to pay the price the North demanded. Incensed, the North then sank the ship and shelled the island. The claims from the outgoing administration came a day after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un struck an unusually conciliatory note in his New Year’s address and are being read as a warning for the incoming government not to be taken in by his rhetoric. "The Lee administration has met several times with North Korean officials to discuss a summit,"
the official said. "But North Korea demanded tens of thousands of tons of rice and fertilizer in exchange and we refused." North Korea wanted some US$500-600 million worth of rice and fertilizer aid, he said. The official did not say whether Pyongyang also wanted cash. "The watershed moment in inter-Korean relations was the sinking of the Cheonan in March of 2010," he said. Talks were held even after the sinking, but North Korea refused to admit it was behind the attack, the official added. President Lee Myung-bak in a speech on Aug. 15, 2009 said the South was ready to start talks with North Korea "any time and at any level." A week later, a North Korean delegation visited Seoul for the funeral of former President Kim Dae-jung, who held a landmark summit with Kim Jong-il in 2000. The North Korean delegation told Lee that Pyongyang was willing to hold a summit. In October that year, presidential Chief of Staff Yim Tae-hee held a secret meeting in Singapore with Kim Yang-gon, the director of the North Korean Workers Party's United Front Department. The North Koreans again demanded $500 million worth of rice and fertilizer aid. Additional talks behind the scenes were held in the border town of Kaesong on November 7 and 14 of that year, but ended without progress. "At the time, Won Tong-yon, a ranking member of the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, even presented a rough draft of a summit agreement, which contained demands for tens of thousands of tons of rice and fertilizer, and we couldn’t accept that," a source said. Another source said if Seoul had agreed to provide the aid, the North would have demanded cash at every step of the process until the summit took place. In January 2010, after the secret contacts ended and North Korea realized that it was impossible to extract any aid from Seoul, it vowed to launch a "holy retaliatory war" against the South and fired multiple artillery rounds at the Northern Limit Line, a de facto maritime border on the West Sea. Two months later, on March 26, the North sank the Cheonan, and in November it shelled Yeonpyeong Island. "The government could not improve relations with the North by excusing its attacks on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island," a high-ranking government official here said. (Chosun Ilbo, "Cheonan Sinking Was ‘Revenge for Refusing Aid,” January 3, 2013) North Korea strongly denounced South Korea's national security advisor, calling him a traitor and a bad element who, it said, only worked to justify Seoul's hostility toward Pyongyang. The harsh criticism came two days after a local daily here published a recent interview with the top presidential advisor for national security, Chun Young-woo, in which he claimed the incumbent South Korean government has fundamentally changed the nature of relations between the divided Koreas. The North's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea said Chun has only offered "false claims" that sought to justify what it called "the Lee Myung-bak administration’s hostility toward the North." "The reckless remarks made by the person who claims to have come up with the so-called ‘North Korea policy’ and supervised its implementation clearly show the heinous intention of the Lee Myung-bak group," the committee said in a report carried by KCNA. "The outcome of the so-called 'North Korea policy' held by the traitor group is truly severe," it said. The North Korean committee also claimed Chun's remarks were only an attempt to discourage Seoul's incoming Park Geun-hye administration from adopting a different, apparently more flexible, approach toward the North. (Korea Herald, “Pyongyang Calls Seoul's Chief Security Advisor a ‘Traitor,’” January 6, 2013)
South Korean President-elect Park Geun-hye's incoming government faces a tough road ahead to resolve a number of troublesome North Korea issues amid deadlocked inter-Korean relations. Essentially, Park prioritizes North Korea's denuclearization to mend ties with the South. She has repeatedly vowed to seek improved ties with the North without compromising the South's national security or sovereignty. North Korea's denuclearization is a key word for Park's North Korea policy, though detailed plans have not officially been made known. Over and over again, Park has promised her administration will push ahead with massive economic cooperation projects toward helping the impoverished North Korea with a policy called "Vision Korea Project" if the two Koreas build up trust and if there is substantial progress in the North's denuclearization. The president-elect herself calls all these procedures for improving inter-Korean relations the "Korean Peninsula Trust Process." Park also emphasizes the need for a balanced policy toward Pyongyang, somewhere between the outgoing government's tough policy and previous liberal governments' engagement policy. She has the notion that although Lee's hard-line stance against North Korea is widely seen as unsuccessful, the "sunshine policy" by previous liberal presidents also failed to persuade the North to give up its nuclear and missile programs. "I will depart from the diplomacy between the soft-line and hard-line policies, and pursue a balanced North Korean policy," Park said on the campaign trail, hinting at her more flexible North Korean policy ideas. Park, however, will still not be free to rule out conservatives' demand that the North first show concrete evidence of no future aggression. The president-elect says full-scale economic cooperation with the North is possible only after Pyongyang takes serious steps toward ending its nuclear programs and sufficient "trust" is built up between the sides -- an indication that she prefers a measured reconciliation and opposes unconditional aid to buy what she calls "fake peace." The first South Korean woman elected to the five-year presidency has also pledged to depart from outgoing President Lee's hard-line North Korea policy, in which the Seoul government has refused to engage with the North without the socialist country's apologies for the deadly 2010 attacks on the South Korean Navy vessel Cheonan and the border island of Yeonpyeong. Park has said she is willing to hold a summit with the North if necessary for the peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. "Talks (with the North) require no preconditions, and I can meet with (North leader) Kim Jong-un if that can help improve inter-Korean relations," Park said during her election campaign, underlining her willingness to resume ties with the North. Park's ambitions also include installing liaison offices between Seoul and Pyongyang, investing in the North's special economic zones, and strengthening joint economic and resources development projects with the North. Separate from political issues, the new government will also seek humanitarian assistance, a reunion of separated families between the divided Koreas, and the repatriation of prisoners of war captured during the 1950-53 Korean War and abducted South Koreans after the war. The plan also details constructing infrastructure in North Korea such as electricity, transportation and telecommunications, Seoul's support for North Korea's admittance to international financial organizations. It also calls for Seoul's cooperation for the North's inducement of foreign investment, and South Korea's advance into the North's economic special zones such as Rason and Hwanggumphyong, and the increased economic cooperation for North Korea among neighboring countries, including China and Russia. The new South Korean
government will go ahead with the efforts to improve North Korea’s dismal human rights through international coordination. North Korea has long been labeled one of the worst human rights violators in the world. The regime does not tolerate dissent, holds hundreds of thousands of people in political prison camps and keeps a tight control over information reaching the outside world. Park’s new government will likely abide by the previous basic agreements reached between the two Koreas. The outgoing Lee administration has not shown its willingness to fulfill the inter-Korean accords due to the North’s belligerent behavior. (Yonhap, “New Seoul Gov’t Will Likely Seek N. Korean Policy Based on Trust and Balance,” North Korea Newsletter, No. 243, January 3, 2013)

South Korean President-elect Park Geun Hye on Friday told Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s special envoy, Nukaga Fukushiro, that her country wants to build good ties with Japan while not neglecting lingering historical issues. Park was quoted by Nukaga as saying that she wants to re-establish conciliatory and cooperative ties between the two sides at the same time as they face up to the past, an apparent reference to a host of historical issues that have plagued bilateral relations since Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. Nukaga also conveyed to Park the intentions of Abe, who took the government helm in late December, to reset ties and get them back on a solid track under their new administrations. The envoy further urged Park to visit Japan as soon as her schedule allows, to which she responded positively. Nukaga, a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and secretary general of a Japan-South Korea lawmakers’ friendship association, arrived in Seoul in the morning to present Park with a letter from Abe. Two senior members of the bilateral association, LDP lawmakers Takeo Kawamura and Ichiro Aisawa, also attended the meeting with Park. The Japanese delegation was slated to hold talks later with South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Kim Sung Hwan. "I want to convey the prime minister’s thoughts that Japan’s relations with South Korea are of primary importance for the stability of East Asia," Nukaga, a former finance minister, told reporters earlier. "I’d like to act as a bridge to make this year a good one for both of our countries." Their visit was greeted by a gruesome protest by one South Korean man, who stabbed himself in the abdomen with a knife before the envoy had touched down at Seoul’s Gimpo International Airport, local authorities reported. The man is believed to be Kim Chang Geun, 62, the same individual who rammed his truck into the gate of the Japanese Embassy last July to protest Tokyo’s sovereignty claim to Takeshima, known as Dokdo in South Korea. He was hospitalized but his condition was not immediately known, they said, adding four others took part in the protest. (Kyodo, “Park Eyeing Positive Ties with Japan: Abe’s Envoy,” January 4, 2013)

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo ‘s Cabinet will maintain the Diet-endorsed 1995 apology issued by then-Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi over Japan’s wartime aggression, but offer a separate “future-oriented” statement, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide told a group of reporters. During an interview with The Japan Times and other media outlets, Suga, Abe’s right-hand man, said the Abe administration intends to uphold the Murayama statement. "At the same time, we’d like to consider issuing a statement that will suit the 21st century," Suga said, adding such a future-oriented statement "is necessary, given the peace and stable economy in Asia." Suga also said
the Abe administration plans to set up an advisory panel to look into Japan’s exercise of its right to collective self-defense. Suga said, without elaborating, that any new written statement by Abe, if issued, won’t supersede the Murayama declaration but will be a separate remark. It was not clear if Abe’s statement would touch on Japan’s wartime history. Suga meanwhile said he will invite other historians to study issues related to the 1993 statement by then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei, who admitted the wartime Japanese government and military were responsible for forcing women and girls into sexual slavery at Japanese military in frontline brothels. The females are euphemistically referred to in Japan as the “comfort women.” Abe and some right-leaning politicians have tried to play down the responsibility of the government and military, saying no historical documents have been found to prove that Japanese authorities “forcibly recruited,” or for instance, kidnapped, those females during wartime. During September’s party presidential race, Abe initially indicated he might revise the Kono statement if he became prime minister, but recently has toned this down and has only said he will consult historians. The Abe Cabinet’s pragmatic stance was also clear in the latest statement over South Korea’s deportation of a Chinese man suspected of throwing a Molotov cocktail at the wall of Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine. He had been charged with also committing a similar act against the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, and Tokyo had failed in its demand for his extradition. Earlier Friday, Tokyo protested Seoul’s move to send the man back to China. Suga meanwhile said South Korea is “a very important neighbor” and Tokyo will try to “build a bilateral relationship of mutual trust” despite recent diplomatic rows. (Yoshida Reiji, “Abe to Leave Murayama War Apology Declaration Alone, Eye ‘Future-Oriented’ Statement, Suga Says,” Japan Times, January 5, 2013)

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Under North Korea’s new leader, Kim Jong-un, human rights activists and South Korean officials say, it has become increasingly difficult to smuggle refugees out of the country, contributing to a sharp drop in the number of North Koreans reaching South Korea in the past year. The government began to jam the Chinese cellphone signals that activists relied on to coordinate their smuggling operations with collaborators in the North. North Korea also deployed equipment to trace cellphone signals. The Rev. Kim Seung-eun said he could measure the increasing difficulty of smuggling people out of North Korea by the higher cost of bribing North Korean soldiers on the Chinese border to look the other way. “They demand not only more cash, but also all kinds of things for themselves and their superiors,” said Kim, a South Korean human rights activist who helps North Koreans flee their totalitarian homeland and resettle in the South. “They’ve developed a taste for South Korean goods, too.” The number of refugees has never been particularly large, since most North Koreans are so impoverished they find it all but impossible to raise the money to attempt an escape. But the tightening of controls at the Chinese border led to a fall of about 44 percent from the previous year in the number of refugees reaching South Korea in 2012. The total was 1,509, according to South Korean government data. Lately, the Chinese also appear to have tightened their control at the river border to help protect their client government. “The crackdowns in China and North Korea came in tandem,” said Mr. Kim, who manages a network of activists and smugglers from his Caleb Mission church in Cheonan, a city about 60 miles south of Seoul. “It’s become more difficult for my people to operate in North Korea and China.” North Koreans have
also developed an appetite for outside news and entertainment. “If early defectors fled North Korea for sheer ‘survival,’ an increasing number of North Koreans reaching South Korea flee for ‘a better life’ than they had in the North,” Kim Soo-am, an expert on North Korean refugees at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, recently wrote. A group of 15 North Koreans that the Caleb Mission team in Cheonan had smuggled out in early December included a striking example of one such defector: a 29-year-old woman who yearned to become a television celebrity. “She had watched so many South Korean soap operas that she developed an illusion about life in South Korea,” Kim said, pointing out a particularly well-dressed woman in a photograph of the 15 North Koreans. “When we smuggled her out of North Korea, she was already wearing nothing but South Korean-made clothes.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Fleeing North Korea Is Becoming Harder,” New York Times, January 5, 2013, p. A-7)

Sources at the unification ministry said the 2013 budget allocates 1.09 trillion won ($1.02 billion) for the government’s inter-Korean cooperation fund, up from some 1 trillion won in 2012. (Kim Young-jin, “More Funds Set for N. Korea,” Korea Times, January 3, 2013) In addition, the Unification Ministry’s budget would be increased by 4.4 percent to 222.2 billion won. Last year, the government spent 69.4 billion won (US$65.2 million), or 6.9 percent of the 1.006 trillion won set aside for the inter-Korean cooperation fund, according to the data from the Unification Ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs. The fund was created in 1991 to support humanitarian and economic exchanges between the divided Koreas. In 2008, the fund’s execution rate plunged to 18.1 percent from 82.2 percent the previous year. The rate has since hovered below 10 percent, at 7.6 percent in 2009, 7.7 percent in 2010 and 4.2 percent in 2011. Last year, the fund was used to support construction projects in the inter-Korean industrial complex in the North’s border city of Kaesong, as well as for financial aid and loans for inter-Korean businesses, humanitarian projects and the construction of an inter-Korean youth exchange center. (Yonhap, “Execution of Inter-Korea Cooperation Fund Below 10 Percent for 4th Year,” January 6, 2013)

The U.S. government is taking action to put the brakes on movement in the Japanese government headed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to retreat on historical statements it has made, Nikkei reported. “In response to indications that the Japanese government could alter the historical position contained in the [Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei] Kono Statement of 1993, which acknowledged that the Japanese military had forced women into sexual slavery, the US government is calling for prudent action. U.S. officials communicated this message to multiple high-ranking Japanese government officials last year,” the Japanese paper reported. According to the paper, a high U.S. government official said “If Japan attempts to alter the Kono Statement, the U.S. government will have no choice but to take some kind of concrete action.” The paper interpreted this ‘concrete action’ as likely being the issuance of a statement expressing the American government’s concerns. In explanation of the move, the paper said, “Since revision by Abe’s administration of Japan’s historical stance could severely damage the relationship with neighboring countries such as South Korea and China, the U.S. government is concerned that this might compromise stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which it regards as a priority.” In an interview with the Sankei Shimbun newspaper on December 31, 2012, Abe made a reference to the (Prime Minister) 1995
Murayama Statement, in which Japan showed remorse for and apologized for its colonization of Korea. “The statement was made on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war. Seeing that time has passed and we are now in the 21st century, I want to make a forward-looking statement from my cabinet, a statement that is appropriate for our time. To achieve this, I plan to form a committee of experts and review our options.” Regarding the Kono Statement of 1993, Abe said, “I will listen to the opinions of experts and consider our course of action under the oversight of the Chief Cabinet Secretary.” (Jeong Nam-ku, “U.S. Trying to Rein in Japan’s Attempt to Deny Its History,” Hankyore, January 7, 2013)

South Korea will speed up the development of longer-range missiles capable of striking all of North Korea and deploy them as early as possible, an official on the presidential transition team said. “We will work toward quickly putting in force ballistic missiles with the range of 800 miles,” said Kim Jang-soo, who has been named to oversee external affairs and North Korean policies for President-elect Park Geun-hye. “Reviewing our security readiness is a pressing matter.” Kim, a former defense minister, was responding to an inquiry about Seoul's course of action in light of Pyongyang’s successful launch of a long-range rocket last month. During her presidential campaign, Park had stressed the need for a fast deployment of long-range missiles to ensure active and preemptive deterrence against North Korean military provocations. (Yonhap, “S. Korea to Push for Quick Deployment of Long-Range Ballistic Missile,” Korea Herald, January 7, 2013)

North Korea is moving to give mineral resources development rights to Chinese companies in return for pledges to upgrade its backward infrastructure, sources with ties to North Korea and Chinese businesses said. Such moves come as the impoverished North that does not have many manufactured goods to sell abroad wants to use its relatively abundant anthracite coal, iron ore and gold reserves as economic bargaining tools. Local Chinese business insiders in Shenyang said Hunan Investment Co., secured the right to develop the Unsan gold mine in North Korea in exchange for supporting a project to build a 30-story luxury hotel and highway in the country. China's Hunchun trading company has reached a similar deal with Pyongyang Moranbong Co. to develop a gold mine in Chagang Province near the North Korea-Chinese border, the inside sources said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Linking Mineral Resources Development with Infrastructure Building,” Korea Herald, January 7, 2013)

South Korea has no intention at all of asking Japan to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel, a senior South Korean foreign ministry official said, denying a Tokyo Shimbun report a day ago that Japan has proposed handling South Korea’s spent nuclear fuel rods, according to Yonhap. Responding to report, the unidentified official was quoted as saying, “The government has not even considered such a plan.” Japan plans to bring its long-delayed Rokkasho reprocessing plant on line this year. (Kyodo, “S. Korea Won’t Ask Japan to Reprocess Its Spent Nuclear Fuel: Yonhap,” January 7, 2013)

North Korea is "sincerely" interested in improving ties with Washington and "encouraged" by South Korean president-elect Park Geun-hye’s offer of a summit, former New Mexico governor Bill Richardson said. (Chosun Ilbo, “N. Korea
'Encouraged' by Park's Overtures,” January 11, 2013)

Google chairman Eric Schmidt said he had told North Korea it would not develop unless it embraces Internet freedom, as he returned from a controversial visit to the communist state. Efforts to "strongly urge" North Korea, a highly secretive and tightly-controlled country, to increase the use of the Internet were “the main success of the visit”, said Bill Richardson, the former New Mexico governor. Schmidt said he told North Korean officials they should open up the country’s Internet "or they will remain behind." "As the world becomes increasingly connected, their decision to be virtually isolated is very much going to affect their physical world, their economic growth and so forth, and it will make it harder for them to catch up economically," Schmidt said. "Once the Internet starts, citizens in a country can certainly build on top of it. The government has to do something. It has to make it possible for people to use the Internet which the government in North Korea has not yet done." "We strongly urged the North Koreans to proceed with a moratorium on ballistic missiles and possible nuclear test," Richardson said. The delegation did not meet leader Kim but had a "series of very frank discussions" with officials on “the current level of tension in the peninsula”, he said, adding: "The North Koreans need to temper their nuclear development." There were discussions about Kenneth Bae, an American of Korean descent who was arrested in November, but the delegation did not meet him personally as he was being held too far from Pyongyang, Richardson said. "We were informed that his health was good and that the judicial proceedings would start soon. That is encouraging," he added. (Neil Connor, “Google’s Schmidt Urges N. Korea Internet Freedom,” AFP, January 10, 2013) "We think that both sides need to move in new directions," Richardson told reporters today. "We think that it’s important that the North-South dialogue be revived. We think that it’s important that the United States and North Korea start having some positive bilateral discussions. We need dialogue, not confrontation on the peninsula." Asked by NBC News on Bae’s current status, Richardson said that while he was unable to visit the 44-year old tourist, he had been assured by North Korean officials that his legal rights and personal well-being would be protected. "We pushed to make sure that there were strong protections for Kenneth Bae both in the judicial process and personally," said Richardson, “another encouraging development was that they told me the judicial precedence would happen soon." Richardson also said that a letter from Bae's son would be passed on to him in prison. (Ed Flanagan, “Google Boss Opens N. Korea Dialogue But No U.S. Prisoner Release,” NBC, January 10, 2013) As a work of propaganda, the images that North Korea circulated this week showing Google’s executive chairman, Eric E. Schmidt, touring a high-tech incubation center are hard to beat. With former Gov. Bill Richardson of New Mexico at his side, Schmidt, who is fond of describing the Internet as the enemy of despots, toured what was presented as the hub of the computer industry in one of the world’s most pitiless police states. It is unclear what the famously hermetic North Koreans hoped to accomplish by allowing the visit. But the photos of the billionaire entrepreneur taking the time to visit the nation’s computer labs were bound to be useful to a new national leader whom analysts say needs to show his people that their impoverished nation is moving forward. It will matter little, those experts say, that the visitors were bundled against the cold, indoors – a sign of the country’s extreme privation – or that the vast majority of North Koreans have no access to computers, much less the Web beyond their country’s tightly controlled borders.
The men’s quixotic four-day trip ended today much the way it began, with some analysts calling the visit hopelessly naïve and others describing it as valuable back-channel diplomacy at a time when Washington and Pyongyang are not on speaking terms (again). “I’m still spinning my wheels to figure out a plausible motivation for why they went,” said Daniel Pinkston, a North Korea specialist at the International Crisis Group. Schmidt and Richardson insist they accomplished some good — showing the world has not forgotten the plight of an American detained in the North, and at least trying to nudge the tightly sealed nation a bit closer to the fold of globally connected nations. “As the world becomes increasingly connected, their decision to be virtually isolated is very much going to affect their physical world, their economic growth and so forth,” Schmidt told reporters after arriving at Beijing International Airport. “We made that alternative very, very clear.” Others were less kind. Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, took to Twitter to call the self-appointed delegation “useful idiots,” and John R. Bolton, a former United Nations ambassador, said the delegation was unwittingly feeding the North Korean propaganda mill as it sought to burnish the credentials of Kim Jung-un, the nation’s leader, who is in his 20s. “Pyongyang uses gullible Americans for its own purposes,” Bolton wrote in The New York Daily News. As if on cue, the North Korean news media hailed the visit by “the Google team” — which included Jared Cohen, who leads Google’s think tank — highlighting their visit to the mausoleum where Kim’s grandfather and father lie in state. There, Richardson and Schmidt “expressed admiration and paid respect to Comrade Kim Il-sung and Comrade Kim Jong-il,” Rodong Sinmun said. Kim spent some of his teenage years at a Swiss boarding school, where he was exposed to Western culture and technology. At home, he has emphasized science and technology to help build “a strong and prosperous nation.” He wants to computerize the country’s antiquated factories, many of which have been idled by a lack of fuel and raw materials. He has even stressed following “global trends” by reaching out to other countries and using the Internet to acquire technological know-how from overseas. Last November, he recommended horseback riding to offset the occupational hazards of working with computers. Despite such talk, the government remains openly hostile toward the Internet; the country is a reliable member of the annual “Enemies of the Internet” report issued each year by Reporters Without Borders. And under Kim, North Korea has intensified a crackdown on other forms of outside information, including the DVDs and thumb drives smuggled from China that often carry banned South Korean soap operas. Given the government’s obsession with keeping out any information that could undermine its grip on power or the Kim family’s personality cult, analysts say North Korea is unlikely to embrace Schmidt’s global connectivity dream any time soon. “When Kim Jong-un talks about using the Internet, he means a one-way traffic of information: getting information North Korea needs,” said Kim Kwang-in, head of the North Korea Strategy Center, a research institute in Seoul. “It does not mean North Korea will open itself up to the Internet. It is not ready to — and cannot — adopt such reforms yet.” (Andrew Jacobs, “Visit by Google Chairman May Benefit North Korea,” New York Times, January 11, 2013, p. A-10)

Production at the Kaesong Industrial Complex grew 17.5 percent last year from a year earlier as South Korean firms employed more North Korean workers, which raised output, Seoul’s Unification Ministry said. The total output by the 123 South Korean
firms operating in the inter-Korean economic project zone is estimated to have reached US$470 million during the one year period, according to data released by the ministry handling inter-Korean affairs. The total number of North Korean workers employed at the industrial park in the North Korean border city of Kaesong, rose to 53,507 as of the end of 2012, up from 49,866 a year earlier, according to the data. (Yonhap, “Output from Kaesong Complex Jumps 17.5% On-year in 2012,” January 10, 2013)

1/10/13
Senior officials from the State Department, Pentagon and White House will travel to Seoul and Tokyo next week to urge key allies Japan and South Korea to mend strained ties that have hurt security cooperation. The two Northeast Asian democracies have fallen out over a territorial dispute and Japan’s attitude toward its colonial past. Top U.S. diplomat for East Asia, Kurt Campbell, said today the U.S. will urge “care and caution” in that maritime dispute. The tiny islands called Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese, are controlled by Japan but also claimed by China and Taiwan. Tensions intensified after Tokyo bought the islands from their Japanese private owners in September. The U.S., which could be compelled under treaty obligations to assist Japan in event of a conflict, has since called for “cooler heads” to prevail, but the dispute rumbles on. Abe may disavow a 1993 statement in which Japan apologized for the suffering of so-called “comfort women” during World War II risks riling South Korea. The U.S. will be quietly urging Abe’s government against such a step, said Victor Cha, a former White House director of East Asia policy. But he added that the U.S will not want to be seen as publicly mediating a touchy historical dispute. “You will never succeed and both sides will end up hating you for it,” Cha said. (Matthew Pennington, “U.S. Urges Allies Japan, S. Korea to Mend Ties,” January 10, 2013)

1/11/13
KCNA: “It is a basic prerequisite for advancing the inter-Korean relations and accelerating the reunification of the country to respect the north-south joint declarations and implement them. Rodong Sinmun Friday says this in a bylined article. The article goes on: The June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration serve as great programs for reunification common to the nation in the new century and milestones for peace and prosperity as they paved a wide avenue for realizing the reconciliation and unity of all Koreans by developing the north-south relations. Whether one respects or denies the north-south declarations and whether one implements them or not is [the] basic criteria to distinguish reunification from division and patriotism from treachery. The Lee Myung Bak group of traitors in south Korea brought the inter-Korean relations, which had developed favorably under the banner of the June 15 joint declaration, back to those in the confrontation era. These moves for escalating confrontation are intolerable as they are acts of treachery quite contrary to the basic spirit of the north-south joint declarations and the aspiration of the fellow countrymen for reunification. The inter-Korean relations cannot be a plaything of the anti-reunification forces any longer. The confrontation between compatriots must be terminated as soon as possible. In order to remove the confrontation between the north and south and dynamically advance the reunification movement, all Koreans at home and abroad should positively support the joint declarations and turn out as one in the nationwide struggle to preserve and implement them. They should never allow any attempt at shunning and opposing the
DPRK Foreign Ministry memorandum: “It is now 60 years since the gunfire of war stopped roaring, but the war has not terminated legally. There remains a fragile state of ceasefire of neither peace nor war on the Korean Peninsula which has yet to build up a mechanism to ensure peace. The U.S. has gone defiant against the DPRK Government in its consistent stand and effort to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and tries to maintain the state of ceasefire. Lurking behind this is the ghost of the Cold War, i.e., "UN Command." The U.S., according to its new defense strategy, is trying to transform the "UN Command" into a "multinational forces command" which would serve as a matrix of the Asian version of NATO. The ulterior motive of the new U.S. defense strategy, released for the first time in January 2012, is to encircle and put a military curve on other big power in Asia so that the latter can not grow to make a resistance to it.

The U.S., in order to get round the stiff resistance from the countries concerned, is trying to form combined forces instead of opting for a new one by playing tricks to revive the functions of the "UN Command", which is nothing more than just the name. Behind the recent attempts of the U.S. to revive the functions of the "UN Command" lie its strategic self-interests to make south Korea a forward base for the domination of the Asia-Pacific region and hold fast to it as a cannon fodder for an aggressive war under the changed situation. It is also on a step-by-step basis that preparations have been under way to expand the operational sphere of the "UN Command" to the whole of the Asia-Pacific region. If any move is allowed to establish a collective military bloc in the Asia-Pacific region, this would inevitably trigger off a countervailing force from other countries which are placed under the target of this bloc. If this is the case, it is par for the course that this region, too, would plunge into a theater to take sides with as in Europe with the revival of the Cold War and increased danger of a thermonuclear war beyond any measure. Under this worst case of scenario, it is none other than south Korea that would suffer most. The "UN Command" is primarily an unjust tool which only misused the name of the UN. All this bears no relation with the consensus of the UN member states. The “UN Command” is all the more a subsidiary organ of the U.S., which bears no relevance with the UN. The 30th session of the UN General Assembly held in November 1975 adopted two resolutions on the dissolution of the "UN Command." If we look at the composition of the then "UN Command," it was no longer the multinational forces but the U.S. Command which has only the U.S. troops stationed in south Korea. As soon as the Armistice Agreement was signed, member states of the UN who participated in the Korean War withdrew their forces, to the exclusion only of the U.S. The U.S. asserted that the dissolution of the "UN Command" would be possible only when another mechanism to maintain the Armistice is set up. But, the current state of ceasefire is not maintained by the "UN Command" in practice. In March 1991, the U.S. made an unannounced decision of replacing the chief delegate to the "UN forces" at the Military Armistice Commission with the south Korean army general, a post so far occupied by the U.S. army general. As the "UN forces" lost its power of representation, the Military Armistice Commission
was virtually put in a state of paralysis. Eventually, the delegation of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, the member of the Korean-Chinese side of the Military Armistice Commission, withdrew in December 1994 and the DPRK side formed the Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) to maintain the ceasefire on behalf of the former DPRK-Chinese side. As time passed, the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) failed to maintain their positions of neutrality which they had at the time of signing the Armistice Agreement. With this, the NNSC could no longer carry out its functions. This has led to the complete fall of the previous armistice mechanism and the “UN Command” was reduced to a scarecrow with no party left to deal with. It was since then that all the issues related to the running of the state of ceasefire are discussed and disposed of between the KPA and U.S. military authorities rather than between the DPRK-China and the “UN Forces.” Both sides of the DPRK and the U.S. have made an effective control of the state of ceasefire for decades of years and this reality proves that there is no longer any reason to withhold the dissolution of the “UN Command.” Even from the viewpoint of replacing the Armistice Agreement with the peace treaty, the “UN Command” stands in the way as the legacy of the Cold War that would bring no good but only harm. According to the Armistice Agreement, the issue of ensuring the lasting peace is to be negotiated only at a political conference at a level higher than that of military commanders. The actual political superior of the "UN Command," a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, is not the UN but the U.S. administration. As the facts show, there were many discussions and agreements between the concerned parties on changing the state of ceasefire to a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula where we can find no mention of any method which presupposes the existence of the "UN Command." Despite that, the "UN Command" still exists today and, on top of that, it is trying to revive as a tool of war to be used by multinational forces. This is an issue that can never be overlooked from the perspective of ensuring the security in the Asia-Pacific region including the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is claiming that the DPRK’s effort to bolster its national defensive power is causing tension in the region. This is nothing but an imprudent trick to cover up the aggressive nature of its Asia-Pacific strategy. Whether the U.S. immediately dismantles the "UN Command" or not will serve as the acid stone in deciding whether the U.S. will maintain or not its anti-DPRK hostile policy, whether it wants peace and stability or the revival of the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region. The DPRK will continue to strengthen its deterrence against all forms of war, thereby actively contributing to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the rest of Asia until the U.S. makes a right choice.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Memorandum,” January 14, 2013)

North Korea should first refrain from provocative acts and abide by international obligations before demanding the dismantlement of the United Nations Command (UNC) and the signing of a peace treaty on the peninsula, a U.S. official said. “The United States has made clear that we are prepared to engage constructively with North Korea if it chooses to live up to its own commitments, fulfill its international obligations, deal peacefully with its neighbors, and refrain from acts that threaten regional and international peace and stability,” the official told Yonhap. The official dismissed speculation that the U.N. response to the launch is tapering off due to China’s uncooperative attitude and more urgent global issues such as Mali and Syria. “We are
working closely with six-party talks partners, United Nations Security Council member states, and other countries on a clear and credible response" to the launch, the official said. The official was responding to a "memorandum" issued by the North's foreign ministry. (Yonhap, “U.S. Tells N. Korea to Stop Provocations before Call for Peace Treaty, “ January 15, 2013)

1/14/13  Navi Pillay, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, called for an international inquiry into human rights offenses committed by North Korea. Ms. Pillay pointed to North Korea's "elaborate network of political prison camps," believed by human rights organizations to hold 200,000 prisoners. The camps not only punish people for peaceful activities, but also employ "torture and other forms of cruel and inhumane treatment, summary executions, rape, slave labor and forms of collective punishment that may amount to crimes against humanity," she said. When Kim Jong-un succeeded his father as the leader of North Korea in December 2011, there was some hope that the change would lead to a relaxation of harsh policies, Ms. Pillay said, but "we see almost no sign of improvement." Instead, she said, North Korea's self-imposed isolation had "allowed the government to mistreat its citizens to a degree that should be unthinkable in the 21st century." Human rights groups have been lobbying for an international investigation over the past year, and they hope to persuade Japan to sponsor a resolution at the next session of the Human Rights Council in March that would create a commission of inquiry. Both the council and the United Nations General Assembly passed resolutions condemning North Korea in 2012 by consensus, unopposed even by China, the North’s closest ally. Ms. Pillay expressed concern that international preoccupation with North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons programs had diverted attention from human rights abuses that have "no parallel anywhere in the world." "What we are trying to do is put human rights as a priority in the international debate on North Korea," said Juliette de Rivero, Geneva director of Human Rights Watch, one of more than 40 organizations in the International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea that are backing the inquiry. "Right now it’s nearly invisible." (Nick Cummings-Bruce, U.N. Official Urges Scrutiny of North Korea,” New York Times, January 15, 2013, p. A-9)

1/15/13  Alexandre Mansourov: "Kim Jong Un also made some progress in implementing one of his first policy priorities, infrastructure improvement, including the repair and expansion of the national road network and air transportation facilities in Pyongyang and all provincial capitals. Whereas his father crisscrossed the nation by train and almost never flew by plane (and therefore the country’s dilapidated highways and airports were left in disrepair), Kim Jong Un prefers to travel by car and likes to fly. Critics say renovating local airports, repaving roads, opening new gas stations, and building new motels and hotels serve only the interests of government elites and foreign tourists. This may be true today but these are long-term infrastructure investments that everyone will eventually benefit from, even ordinary North Koreans who cannot dream about using them at present. It is worth remembering that the US Interstate Highway System was originally built as a network of ground transport routes for military supplies and troop deployments in case of an emergency or foreign invasion. But on the critical issue of economic reform, while change may have been in
the air, in my judgment, the current regime does not yet have any clear understanding of how to restructure the agricultural sector and revive the backbone of the North’s industrial economy—large-scale state-owned enterprises. Nor does it have a viable approach to rebuild the nation’s finances, pay down its debts, and get back to planning for the future. Also, despite Kim’s emphasis on the Cabinet’s centrality in economic management at the expense of both the party and the military, little progress has been made in the way the government directs the country’s economy. Despite early expectations that the new regime would enunciate a comprehensive “New Economic Policy,” outside observers were left disappointed at the lack of serious action on the ground. But too much was also made of the regime’s reported promise of some sort of agricultural reform (the so-called June 28 policy measures) and rumors of new pricing and wage regulations for small- and medium enterprises, as well as impending monetary reform; all to no avail. That said, Kim Jong Un’s effort to strip the Korean People’s Army of its economic management role, dismantle its business empire, and hand it over to the civilian authorities was encouraging. It is reminiscent of a similar process that took place in China in the late 1990s when the then President Jiang Zemin ordered the People’s Liberation Army to get out of business, forcing the military to divest itself of a mind-numbingly complex web of thousands of commercial interests that spanned pharmaceuticals, autos, and telecommunications. If Kim Jong Un continues to divest the military of its economic assets and shift resources from the munitions industry to the civilian economy in the coming year, the KPA will lose its economic clout. As a result, the North Korean Cabinet will be better positioned to spur overall economic growth as well as to fulfill Kim Jong Un’s inaugural promise of raising the living standards of the North Korean people in the future. The regime’s strong interest in promoting foreign trade and investment and developing special economic zones with Chinese collaboration was also unmistakable. This was demonstrated with new vigor when Pyongyang broke ground on the Hwanggumyong and Wihwa Islands Economic Zone in June and its grey cardinal Jang Song Thaek held unprecedented economic talks with Chinese leaders in Beijing last August. North Korea’s increasing economic exposure to China is important not only because it provides the regime with the economic lifeline it needs to survive, but also because it diminishes the country’s economic isolation, plugging the North into the world’s second largest economy. That, in turn, not only provides it with access to Chinese capital, technology, policy advice and managerial expertise, but also allows Pyongyang to benefit from global economic trends and to pursue a path of socio-economic development largely independent of the ROK, US and Japan and more in line with the so-called Beijing consensus.”

(Alexandre Mansourov, “Kim Jong-un’s Domestic Policy Record in His First Year: Surprisingly Good,” 38North, January 15, 2013)

President Barack Obama told South Korean President-elect Park Geun-hye in a recent message that close cooperation between the two allies will play a pivotal role in coping with grave challenges from North Korea and other pending issues, a spokesman said. Obama made the remark in a congratulatory message delivered to Park when she met with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and other senior American officials, according to Park Sun-kyoo, a transition committee spokesman. “Though we are now faced with grave challenges from North Korea, the close cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. will play a pivotal role in
effectively dealing with the issue of North Korea and other major pending issues,” Obama was quoted as saying. The spokesman spoke in Korean and the English version of the message was not available. (Yonhap, “Obama Says N. Korea Poses Grave Challenges to S. Korea, U.S.: Official,” January 17, 2013)

The abrupt and mysterious resignation of a former member of President-elect Park Geun-hye’s transition team might have been fallout from a behind-the-scenes meeting he arranged with a North Korean official without government approval. An intelligence source familiar with North Korean affairs told JoongAng Ilbo that “a senior ruling party lawmaker close to president-elect Park met with a working-level official of North Korea in Beijing between December 25 and 27. “As far as I know, it was Choi Dae-suk who arranged the closed-door meeting,” the source said. During the meeting, the senior ruling party lawmaker said he wanted to brief a high-ranking North Korean official on the president-elect’s position on North Korean affairs and policies, the source told the paper. But the North Korean official declined the request and said he wanted a handwritten request from Park for such a meeting to take place, the source said. The senior lawmaker told JoongAng Ilbo two days ago that he visited China to meet a North Korean official. On January 18, he withdrew that comment and said he met a Chinese official in Beijing. But he said Choi did not arrange any meeting and that he has “never discussed the visit with Choi.” Choi, a member of Park’s inner circle who was in charge of North Korean affairs for the transition team, stepped down January 12 citing “personal reasons.” Choi said in a private e-mail to friends that his resignation was not related to “individual corruption.” As a renowned expert in North Korean issues, Choi was regarded as the architect of Park’s policies on inter-Korean cooperation. He was also a strong candidate for unification minister. The source assumed that Choi arranged the secret meeting right after the presidential election without approval from Park, the National Intelligence Service or the Ministry of the Unification. Just hours before Choi tendered his resignation, the NIS gave a policy briefing to the transition team. The source said the NIS may have reported the unauthorized visit to the transition team. “During the policy briefing, Choi raised his voice and had an altercation with senior NIS officials regarding North Korean affairs,” an official at the transition team said. “Attendees were perplexed because Choi was known for his calm personality, but he got very aggressive with the NIS.” Choi is known as an advocate of maintaining inter-Korean cooperation regardless of political confrontations. In fact, right after the NIS policy briefing on that day, Choi met with a professor who worked for the main opposition Democratic United Party’s think tank for North Korean affairs. After that, in the afternoon, he also met with a former Unification Minister who worked under the liberal presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. (Kim Hee-jin and Lee Young-jong, “Secret North Meeting May Have Doomed Choi,” JoongAng Ilbo, January 19, 2013)

North Korea was behind the cyberattack that temporarily disabled the JoongAng Ilbo’s Web site and server last year, according to the National Police Agency. The attack was orchestrated by Pyongyang’s Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, South Korean police said. On June 9, 2012, at around 6:30 p.m., the news site (www.joongang.co.kr) was shut down. A photo of a grinning white cat above a statement “Hacked by Is One” appeared instead, along with unknown code in green behind the cat. Following the
cyberattack, the JoongAng Ilbo and the Korea JoongAng Daily lost the databases that store articles and photos and the editing system was damaged, disrupting operations. “We reached the conclusion that the culprit is North Korea,” Jong Seok-hwa, chief investigator of the Cyber Terror Response Center of the National Police Agency, said at a briefing. “At the request of the JoongAng Ilbo, we conducted an investigation over the past seven months,” he said. “The investigation was difficult, because the entire system was wiped out,” Jeong said. “So we traced clues using the online security system and Internet firewall of the JoongAng Ilbo. “As a result, we found two domestic servers the hackers used and 17 other servers used by computers in 10 foreign countries,” he said. “We also detected six malicious pieces of code involved with the hacking.” Through the information on the servers in foreign countries, police analyzed the servers. “The crucial proof is that one of the servers was constantly connected to an IP address of the Joson Telecommunication Company, an affiliate of North Korea’s Posts and Telecommunications Ministry,” Jeong said. Police also found one of the servers was also used in the previous two hacking cases, a three-day distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that crippled 40 Web sites run by the government and private businesses on March 4, 2011, and a massive cyberattack on Nonghyup Bank on April 12, 2011. At the time, police also concluded the North Korean regime was responsible. “Statistically, there’s very little chance that different hackers used an identical server,” he said. “There are about four billion addresses in the world. The hacker in all three cases must be the same person.” (Kim Hee-jin, “North behind Hacking Attack on JoongAng Ilbo,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, January 17, 2013)

The discovery by American intelligence agencies that North Korea is moving mobile missile launchers around the country, some carrying a new generation of powerful rocket, has spurred new assessments of the intentions of the country’s young new leader, Kim Jong-un, who has talked about economic change but appears to be accelerating the country’s ability to attack American allies or forces in Asia, and ultimately to strike across the Pacific. The new mobile missile, called the KN-08, has not yet been operationally deployed, and American officials say it may not be ready for some time. But the discovery that the mobile units have already been dispersed around the country, where they can be easily hidden, has prompted the White House, the Pentagon and intelligence agencies to reassess whether North Korea’s missile capabilities are improving at a pace that poses a new challenge to American defenses. Speaking in Italy, the departing defense secretary, Leon E. Panetta, broke from the usual Obama administration script – which is to write off North Korea as a broke and desperate country – and told American troops that he was increasingly worried about another, longer-range North Korean missile, one that was successfully tested last month and reached as far as the Philippines, and could lob a warhead much farther. “Who the hell knows what they’re going to do from day to day?” Panetta said. “And right now, you know, North Korea just fired a missile. It’s an intercontinental ballistic missile, for God sakes. That means they have the capability to strike the United States.” After he spoke, Pentagon officials said Panetta did not mean to imply that North Korea could now hit the continental United States, although intelligence and military assessments have said that Hawaii is within range. But the North has made progress toward its goal of fielding a missile that could cross the Pacific, a goal the previous defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, warned at the end of his time in office could be
fulfilled by 2016. An intensive study of the long-range missile test-flight conducted by North Korea last month, one administration official said, found that it was “largely a success, if you define success as showing that they could drop a warhead a lot of places in Asia.” The more immediate mystery for the administration, however, is what North Korea may intend with the intermediate-range KN-08, which was first shown off by the North in a military parade last April. At the time, many analysts dismissed it as a mock-up. In fact, it has never been test-flown. But parts, including the rocket motors, have been tested separately, according to officials familiar with the intelligence reports, who described the missile developments on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the assessments. Officials familiar with North Korean missile technology say the KN-08 weapon is designed with a range capable of striking South Korea, Japan and parts of Southeast Asia — although with uncertain accuracy. North Korea is aware that it is a focus of American spy satellites, so the decision to roll the missile around the country to potential deployment sites might well have been partly motivated by a desire to send a message to the United States, or at least to get Washington’s attention — which it did. Officials said that North Korea’s advancements in missile technology were among the most significant reasons that Panetta, as he approached the end of his tenure, had spent so much time in Asia. Much of his effort has been aimed at spurring the development of a regional missile defense system to be deployed with allies, particularly Japan and South Korea. There is no evidence that the KN-08 has been fitted with a nuclear warhead. While North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and in 2009, American intelligence officials have said that the North has not miniaturized a nuclear device small enough to be fitted as a warhead atop its missiles. Some believe that may be the goal of its next test — and perhaps, some intelligence reports speculate, of continuing cooperation on missile design between Iran and North Korea. The Iranians, one official noted, “are grappling with the same issues.” In fact, much remains uncertain about North Korea’s new missile. There was no question where the mobile launching trucks that carried the missile came from: they are Chinese, and almost certainly imported in violation of United Nations sanctions against the North. The new missile, like most in the North Korean arsenal, appeared to be based on Russian technology. (Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, “Movement of Missiles by North Korea Worries U.S.,” New York Times, January 18, 2013, p. A-3)

Kurt M. Campbell, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, called for “cooler heads to prevail” in an emotional quarrel over disputed islands that has raised tensions in Asia. And he urged Japan’s new prime minister, Abe Shinzo, to hold behind-the-scenes talks with South Korea to defuse a separate territorial dispute as well as disagreements over history that have driven a wedge between the two countries, the United States’ two closest allies in the region. Campbell led a delegation that included officials from the Pentagon and White House who are among the highest-ranking Americans to visit Japan and South Korea since conservative, pro-Washington leaders won elections in both nations last month. The delegation arrived here in Tokyo yesterday after a two-day visit to the South Korean capital, Seoul, where Campbell met the president-elect, Park Geun-hye. The main goal of the Asian mission appeared to be coordinating a mutual response to China’s increasingly assertive claims in regional waters, as well to the recent launching of a long-range rocket by
North Korea. Japanese officials said talks today focused on Japan’s continuing standoff with China over the uninhabited island group, known as the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in Chinese, that are at the center of the dispute. Tensions appeared to rise last week after fighter jets from both nations tailed each other in airspace near the islands, raising fears in Washington of a mishap growing into a full-blown military clash that could embroil the United States, which is obligated by treaty to come to Japan’s defense. “We’ve made very clear our desire to see cooler heads prevail and the maintenance of peace and stability over all,” Campbell told reporters. At the same time, he said the United States would not serve as mediator – a sign, analysts said, that Washington wanted to avoid getting drawn too far into the thorny regional disputes. That stance has drawn criticism in Japan, China and South Korea that the United States is not taking enough responsibility for conflicts it helped create by drawing the current borders after breaking up the Japanese empire at the end of World War II. In Tokyo, analysts and politicians said the Americans’ visit was also aimed at soothing ruffled feathers after the Obama administration turned down a request by Abe to visit Washington this month, in what was viewed by some Japanese as an embarrassing rebuff for the new prime minister. U.S. officials said they had simply asked that the visit be delayed until new secretaries of state and defense had assumed their duties. Japanese officials said the Americans also made what amounted to a shopping list of requests before a summit meeting in Washington was possible, including progress on a long-stalled agreement to relocate an air base on Okinawa. The Americans were sent to Tokyo “to communicate the firm commitment of the Obama administration to continuing to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance,” said another member of the delegation, Daniel R. Russel, the National Security Council’s senior director for Asia. The delegation also praised the Abe administration’s efforts to strengthen ties with the United States. At Japan’s request, the two nations began talks today on updating guidelines that were written in 1997 to govern how the American and Japanese militaries would cooperate during a crisis, Japanese officials said. Another goal was to privately urge that the hawkish Abe not worsen ties with South Korea by revising official apologies made by Japan in the 1990s to victims of its early 20th-century militarism, analysts and Japanese politicians said. When asked whether he raised the sexual slave issue in his talks with Japanese officials, Campbell said, “We support the efforts that the Japanese government has taken to reach out to South Korea,” an apparent reference to a special emissary whom Abe sent to Seoul this month to mend fences by meeting with the incoming president. (Martin Fackler, “U.S. Calls for ‘Cooler Heads’ in Dispute over Asian Islands,” New York Times, January 18, 2013, p. A-12)
statement. “This is a compromise,” said one diplomat with knowledge of the negotiations. “The United States will get a formal resolution and widening use of the existing measures. China can say that it has avoided new sanctions.” Another envoy said: “It is just awaiting China's final approval.” (AFP, “U.S., China Agree on N. Korea Sanctions Deal,” January 19, 2013)

SecState Clinton: “On North Korea we shared our joint commitment to strong action in the UN Security Council. I also assured the Foreign Minister that we would continue to support Japan’s efforts to return Japanese citizens who have been abducted by the DPRK. With regard to regional security, I reiterated longstanding American policy on the Senkaku Islands and our treaty obligations. As I’ve said many times before, although the United States does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands, we acknowledge they are under the administration of Japan and we oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration and we urge all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means. We also discussed how we can do more to strengthen our already strong alliance. We discussed base realignment issues. We both want to reduce the impact of our bases on host communities while maintaining the ability to defend Japan’s territory and people and preserve stability and security. We are confident that we can make progress on force realignment in Okinawa, including moving ahead with construction of the Futenma replacement facility. …Now, I am very pleased to announce that we have extended an invitation to Prime Minister Abe to come to Washington to meet with President Obama in the third week of February. …FM Kishida: As for Japan's ties with the ROK are concerned, I indicated our determination to further deepen our relationship with South Korea, taking the opportunity of birth of new governments in both Japan and South Korea. On North Korea, we confirmed that close collaboration be continued between Japan and the United States, as well as between Japan, United States, and South Korea. Specifically referring to the missile launch last December, we agreed to continue with our close cooperation so that the United Nations Security Council takes effective measures as expeditiously as possible. Further, I explained to the Secretary how seriously the new administration is taking with the abduction issue, and sought continued understanding and cooperation by the United States. Secretary Clinton responded by saying that the United States supports the resolution of the abduction problem. Q: (Via interpreter.) I have a question to Secretary and Ministry. China is becoming ever more active in Senkaku Islands and the surrounding area. The missile launch by DPRK also manifests the ever more challenging situation and security environment in the region. In order to enhance the alliance between Japan and the United States, how do you intend to overcome the pending issues between the two countries, such as Futenma relocation, The Hague treaty, and TPP? And how do you intend to utilize the gains from this foreign ministerial meeting to the future of these two – the relationship between the two countries? FM Kishida: (Via interpreter) Then if I may take the floor, first of all, first and foremost, the security environment in the Asia Pacific region is becoming ever more challenging and difficult, and in order to ensure the peace and stability of the region, we not only need to closed ties in the areas of economy and security, but in all areas such as culture and people-to-people exchange to reinforce Japan-U.S. alliance. On the security front, it is necessary that we further
uplift the level of deterrence under the Japan-U.S. security regime. We will coordinate with the strategy of the United States, placing focus on the Asia Pacific to further enhance cooperation in this area. …Clinton: As I said at the outset, we certainly discussed the Senkaku Islands today. And I reiterated, as I have to our Chinese friends, that we want to see China and Japan resolve this matter peacefully through dialogue, and we applaud the early steps taken by Prime Minister Abe’s government to reach out and begin discussions. We want to see the new leaders, both in Japan and in China, get off to a good start with each other in the interest of the security of the entire region. And we have also, as I said earlier, made clear that we do not want to see any action taken by anyone that could raise tensions or result in miscalculations that would undermine the peace, security, and economic growth in this region. So certainly, we are hopeful that there can be an ongoing consultation that will lower tensions, prevent escalation, and permit China and Japan to discuss the range of other issues on which they have important concerns." (DoS, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks with Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio, Washington, January 18, 2013)

People-to-people exchanges between the two Koreas have been drastically reduced during the Lee Myung-bak government’s five-year term, government data showed. The number of North Koreans who visited the South over the last five years was 724, about one-sixth of the figure recorded during the previous administration, according to the data from the Unification Ministry. The number recorded last year was zero for the first time in 14 years. The number of South Koreans who met their separated families in the North plunged to 1,774, a sharp decrease from 14,600 recorded during the former government’s term, the data showed. The total number of North and South Korean people who traveled to each other’s countries was around 664,000, a large increase compared with around 392,000 recorded during the former government. But most of the people that make up the figure are South Koreans, a large portion of who are those working at the inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong. The complex, which opened in 2004, has been exempt from Seoul’s ban on economic cooperation and exchanges with Pyongyang. Thanks to the exemption, the total volume of two-way trade through the complex from 2008-2012 jumped around sevenfold to $6.69 billion. During the previous government, it was around $957 million. As a result, overall trade value rose to $8.94 billion from $5.62 billion. According to the ministry’s data, the number of inter-Korean cooperation projects Seoul signed was 108 while the figure for the previous government was 370. Financial support dropped to 256 trillion won from 1,274 trillion. Among the projects, the number of those related to social and cultural exchanges was only five while the figure under the Roh government was 121. (Sung Sang-ho, “Inter-Korea Exchanges Drop Sharply under Lee,” Korea Herald, January 18, 2013)
who won the peace, and not just the war. **Who turn sworn enemies into the surest of friends.** And we must carry those lessons into this time as well. **We will defend our people, and uphold our values through strength of arms, and the rule of law. We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully. Not because we are naive about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.** (APPLAUSE) **America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad. For no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation. We will support democracy from Asia to Africa, from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for freedom.** And we must be a source of hope to the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice. Not out of mere charity, but because peace in our time requires the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes; tolerance and opportunity, human dignity and justice.” (Transcript of President Barack Obama’s Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 2013)

North Korea has secured technology to develop 10,000-km-range intercontinental ballistic missiles and most of their parts, the Defense Ministry concluded. Announcing its final analysis of North Korean rocket debris retrieved from the West Sea last month, the ministry said Pyongyang had imported 10 ancillary parts from China and four European Union countries to make the three-stage rocket. The ministry did not disclose the names of the EU countries out of concern of possible diplomatic difficulties with them. The parts can also be used commercially and there were no parts made in Middle East states, it added. The authorities are investigating whether the exports contravene U.N. resolutions and other international rules of arms control that ban any missile-related transactions with the North. “Most of the core components for the long-range rocket were indigenously produced. But the North used imported secondary parts such as the temperature sensor, direct-current converter, pressure sensor and electrical wires,” a ministry official said on condition of anonymity. “Despite international sanctions that restrict its efforts to introduce advanced technology and components from overseas, it has greatly advanced its missile technology based on the experience from many experiments.” (Sung Sang-ho, “North Korean Missile Had Chinese Parts,” Korea Herald, January 21, 2013) North Korea is presumed to have the technological prowess to develop a 10,000 kilometer-range intercontinental ballistic missile without foreign help, an analysis of the debris from the North Korean rocket retrieved in South Korea’s West Sea showed on January 21. North Korea independently built most of the key parts of its long-range rocket launched last month, with the exception of some commercially available materials imported from overseas, experts who conducted the analysis said. More than 50 experts, including those from the United States, participated in the intensive analysis starting on December 14.

“Although North Korea was restricted from securing advanced technologies and materials due to the international sanctions, it has honed its long-range ballistic missile technology through several tests and experience,” an intelligence official at Seoul’s defense ministry said, asking for anonymity. The analysis revealed that Pyongyang had used four Rodong missile engines and four vernier engines for the first stage booster to produce 120-ton thrust. About 10 components, including wires, an electric censor
and a power voltage converter were found to have been imported from five countries, including China and European nations, the report said, without disclosing all of their names, citing diplomatic issues. But there were no foreign materials that violated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary guideline shared by 34 countries aimed at limiting exports of delivery systems and related technology for ballistic missiles, it said. “Although there were no imported goods that violate the MTCR, the international community will have discussions about whether to add the imported materials to the list of controlled items,” the official said. Seoul officials said there will be further investigations to figure out whether the five countries violated the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 banning weapons exports and financial transactions between U.N. members and North Korea. The South Korean government plans to submit the report to the U.N. and MTCR members through diplomatic channels, according to officials. The North's Unha-3 rocket is 30 meters long, including a 15-meter first stage, a 9.3-meter second stage, a 3.7-meter third stage, and a 2-meter satellite carrier on top. Together with a 48-ton oxidizer container, the rocket is estimated to weigh 91 tons, the report noted. The rocket itself was made of a mixture of aluminum and magnesium, AlMg6, and used kerosene, a combustible hydrocarbon liquid, as fuel, according to the report. The oxidizer container was made of several patch panels, which showed poor welding and uneven surfaces, an indication that North Korea seems to have no advanced technology in that area, the report said. The outcome of the analysis is significant in that it provided a detailed look at the engines of the North Korean long-range rocket and exact technological level of North Korea’s missile development to the outside world for the first time. The analysis was possible because the South Korean military retrieved the first-stage booster almost intact. (Yonhap, “North Korea Independently Builds Long-Range Rocket: Analysis,” North Korea Newsletter No. 246 (January 24, 2013)

The Security Council unanimously condemned North Korea 15 to 0 for launching a rocket last month, with China taking an uncommon step by joining the criticism. The United States and China said they had worked closely on drafting the resolution, with Security Council diplomats saying they wanted to get it passed before South Korea takes over the monthly rotating presidency of the Security Council in February. Despite China’s rejection of proposals by the United States to add new sanctions, the Obama administration sought to characterize the vote as a tough response. “This resolution demonstrates to North Korea that there are unanimous and significant consequences for its flagrant violation of its obligations under previous resolutions,” said Susan E. Rice, the American ambassador to the United Nations. The measure said the Council “deplores the violations” of previous resolutions, which barred North Korea from undertaking new nuclear or ballistic missile tests. The resolution added four organizations and six individuals to an existing blacklist, including the North Korean space agency, the Korean Committee for Space Technology. It also threatened more measures for any new launchings. China’s ambassador to the United Nations, Li Baodong, emphasized that the resolution stressed the need for negotiations to resume over ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program; known as the six-party talks, they include both Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States. “We believe that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is at a crossroads,” Li said. “There is an opportunity for all stakeholders on the Korean Peninsula to start the diplomatic track.
and to avoid the escalation of tension." North Korea reacted swiftly and angrily to the resolution, threatening to accelerate its military advances, including nuclear weapons, and reject any effort to resume the six-party talks. "We will take measures to boost and strengthen our defensive military power including nuclear deterrence," its Foreign Ministry said in a statement carried by KCNA. (Neil MacFarquhar, “Security Council Condemns North Korea Rocket Launching,” New York Times, January 23, 2013, p. A-6)

UNSC Resolution 2087: “The Security Council,
“Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), “Recognizing the freedom of all States to explore and use outer space in accordance with international law, including restrictions imposed by relevant Security Council resolutions,
“1. Condemns the DPRK’s launch of 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology and was in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);
“2. Demands that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology, and comply with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;
“3. Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear test or any further provocation;
“4. Reaffirms its current sanctions measures contained in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);
“5. Recalls the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by resolution 1874 (2009), and determines that:
(a) The measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II, and the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals listed in Annex I; and,
(b) The measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 2 and S/2012/947;
“6. Recalls paragraph 18 of resolution 1874 (2009), and calls upon Member States to exercise enhanced vigilance in this regard, including monitoring the activities of their nationals, persons in their territories, financial institutions, and other entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad) with or on behalf of financial institutions in the DPRK, or of those that act on behalf or at the direction of DPRK financial institutions, including their branches, representatives, agents and subsidiaries abroad;
“7. Directs the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding situations where a vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s Flag
State or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009);

“8. Recalls paragraph 14 of resolution 1874 (2009), recalls further that States may seize and dispose of items consistent with the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and this resolution, and further clarifies that methods for States to dispose include, but are not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to another State other than the originating or destination States for disposal;

“9. Clarifies that the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) prohibit the transfer of any items if a State relevant to a transaction has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that a designated individual or entity is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item’s transfer;

“10. Calls upon Member States which have not yet done so to report on the measures they have taken to implement the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), encourages other Member States to submit, if any, additional information on implementing the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“11. Encourages international agencies to take necessary steps to ensure that all their activities with respect to the DPRK are consistent with the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and further encourages relevant agencies to engage with the Committee regarding their activities with respect to the DPRK that may relate to provisions of these resolutions;

“12. Deplores the violations of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including the use of bulk cash to evade sanctions, underscores its concern over the supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or through States’ territories of any item that could contribute to activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006) or 1874 (2009) and the importance of appropriate action by States in this regard, calls on States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity, directs the Committee to review reported violations and take action as appropriate, including through designating entities and individuals that have assisted the evasion of sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“13. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“14. Reaffirms its desire for a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation, welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue, and underlines the need to refrain from any action that might aggravate tensions;

“15. Reaffirms its support to the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia;

“16. Calls upon all Member States to implement fully their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

“17. Reemphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

“18. Underlines that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK;

“19. Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take significant action in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test;

“20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”

Resolution Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze

1. PAEK CHANG-HO
   a. Description: senior official and head of the satellite control center of Korean Committee for Space Technology.
   b. AKA: Pak Chang-Ho; Paek Ch’ang-Ho
   c. Identifiers: Passport: 381420754; Passport Date of Issue: 7 December 2011; Passport Date of Expiration: 7 December 2016; D.O.B. 18 June 1964; P.O.B. Kaesong, DPRK

2. CHANG MYONG-CHIN
   a. Description: General Manager of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and head of launch center at which the 13 April and 12 December 2012 launches took place.
   b. AKA: Jang Myong-Jin

3. RA KY’ONG-SU
   a. Description: Ra Ky’ong-Su is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB. Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.

4. KIM KWANG-IL
   a. Description: Kim Kwang-il is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity, he has facilitated transactions for TCB and the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

Annex II

Asset Freeze
1. KOREAN COMMITTEE FOR SPACE TECHNOLOGY  
a. Description: The Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) orchestrated the DPRK’s launches on 13 April 2012 and 12 December 2012 via the satellite control center and Sohae launch area.  
b. AKA: DPRK Committee for Space Technology; Department of Space Technology of the DPRK; Committee for Space Technology; KCST  
c. Location: Pyongyang, DPRK  
2. BANK OF EAST LAND  
a. Description: DPRK financial institution Bank of East Land facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine). Bank of East Land has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions. In 2007 and 2008, Bank of East Land facilitated transactions involving Green Pine and Iranian financial institutions, including Bank Melli and Bank Sepah. The Security Council designated Bank Sepah in resolution 1747 (2007) for providing support to Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Green Pine was designated by the Committee in April 2012.  
b. AKA: Dongbang BANK; TONGBANG U’NHAENG; TONGBANG BANK  
c. Location: P.O. Box 32, BEL Building, Jonseung-Dung, Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK  
3. KOREA KUMRYONG TRADING CORPORATION  
a. Description: Used as an alias by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) to carry out procurement activities. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.  
4. TOSONG TECHNOLOGY TRADING CORPORATION  
a. Description: The Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) is the parent company of Tosong Technology Trading Corporation. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.  
b. Location: Pyongyang, DPRK  
5. KOREA RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION  
a. Description: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.  
b. AKA: CHOSUN YUNHA MACHINERY JOINT OPERATION COMPANY; KOREA RYENHA MACHINERY J/V CORPORATION; RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION  
c. Location: Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK  
6. LEADER (HONG KONG) INTERNATIONAL  
a. Description: Facilitates shipments on behalf of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.  
b. AKA: Leader International Trading Limited
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK’s successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 in December last year fully demonstrated its space science and technology and its overall national power. This is a stark fact favored by the world and recognized even by hostile forces, including the United States. In the wake of desperate efforts on the part of the U.S. and its followers to block the victorious advance of the DPRK, they cooked up a “resolution” of the UN Security Council on Tuesday in wanton violation of the inviolable sovereignty of the DPRK.

The U.S.-sponsored "resolution" is run through with hostile steps aiming at banning the DPRK’s satellite launch for peaceful purposes and tightening "sanctions" against it to block its economic development and hamstring its effort for developing the economy and bolstering up defense capability.

The above-said countries insist that the DPRK’s satellite launch is problematic, asserting that “it uses ballistic missile technology” though they know better than any others about the fact that ballistic missile technology is the only means for launching satellite and they launch satellites more than any others. This is self-deception and the height of double-standards.

The essence of the matter is the U.S. brigandish logic that a satellite launch for peaceful purposes by a country which the U.S. antagonizes should not be allowed because any carrier rocket launched by it can be converted into long-range ballistic missile threatening the U.S.

The UNSC is a marionette of the U.S. The UNSC "resolutions" adopted under the pretext of the DPRK's satellite launches are products of its blind pursuance of the hostile policy of the U.S. seeking disarmament of the DPRK and collapse of its social system in violation of the universally accepted international law.

Repeating wrongdoings without courage or responsibility to rectify them are despicable behaviors of cowards deceiving themselves and others. They are putting the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region at greater peril.

The present situation clearly proves that the DPRK should counter the U.S. hostile policy with strength, not with words and that the road of independence and Songun chosen by the DPRK is entirely just.

To cope with the prevailing situation, the DPRK Foreign Ministry declares as follows:

First, the DPRK flatly rejects the unjust acts of the UNSC aimed at wantonly violating the sovereignty of the DPRK and depriving it of the right to launch satellites for peaceful purposes. The hostile forces are seriously mistaken if they think they can bring down the DPRK with sanctions and pressure, and such an attempt will always bring them a disgraceful defeat. The UNSC should apologize for its crime of seriously encroaching upon the independence of a sovereign state, following the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK in disregard of the universally recognized international law, and repeal all the unreasonable “resolutions” at once.

Second, the DPRK will continue to exercise its independent and legitimate right to launch satellites for peaceful purposes while abiding by the universally recognized international law on the use of space for peaceful purposes. Scientists and technicians of the DPRK will develop and launch many more application satellites, including communications satellite, and more powerful carrier rockets essential for
building an economic giant in the same spirit and mettle as were displayed in successfully launching satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2. The DPRK will continuously launch satellites for peaceful purposes to conquer space and become a world-level space power.

Third, the DPRK drew a final conclusion that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized as it has become clear now that the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK remains unchanged. The September 19 joint statement adopted at the six-party talks on the principle of respect for sovereignty and equality has now become defunct and the prospect for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become gloomier, due to the U.S. hostile policy to the DPRK that has become evermore pronounced. There may be talks for peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region in the future, but no talks for the denuclearization of the peninsula.

Fourth, the DPRK will take steps for physical counteraction to bolster the military capabilities for self defense, including the nuclear deterrence, both qualitatively and quantitatively to cope with the evermore undisguised moves of the U.S. to apply sanctions and pressure against the DPRK. The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will reliably defend the security and sovereignty of the country and safeguard the regional peace and stability with the might of Songun. They are full of the steadfast will to take a bold step to root out the source of provocations the hostile forces seek to continue against the DPRK. No force on earth can block the progress of the great people proud of independence, powerful thanks to Songun politics and united closely on the basis of truth.” (KCNA, “DPRK Refutes UNSC’s ‘Resolution’ Pulling up DPRK over Its Satellite Launch,” January 23, 2013)

North Korea said that its nuclear weapon program was no longer negotiable, and indicated that it might conduct its third nuclear test to retaliate against the United Nations Security Council’s tightening of sanctions against the isolated yet highly militarized country. North Korea said that it will take “physical counteraction” to bolster its “nuclear deterrence both qualitatively and quantitatively.” It said, “There can be talks for peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region in the future, but no talks for the denuclearization of the peninsula.” By “physical counteraction,” analysts in Seoul said, North Korea most likely meant detonating another nuclear device to demonstrate advances in bomb-making. After analyzing the debris of the rocket North Korea fired in December to put a satellite into orbit, South Korean officials said that North Korea indigenously built key components of a missile that can fly more than 6,200 miles. Although it was not the first time North Korea issued such strident rhetoric, its posture, coming under the new leadership of Kim Jong-un, threw a direct challenge to President Barack Obama as he starts his second term, and Park Geun-hye, who will be sworn in as president of South Korea next month. After years of tensions with North Korea, both Obama and Park have recently said they were keeping the door open for dialogue with North Korea on the premise that such engagement should lead to the eventual dismantling of its nuclear weapons program. The analysts said Washington would watch whether a new nuclear test involved a uranium device, as opposed to the previous two tests that used plutonium bombs. North Korea has recently revved up efforts to enrich uranium, ostensibly as fuel for its new nuclear
reactor under construction but for practical purposes as a new and more stable source of fuel for nuclear bombs. “A nuclear test is the most likely option for the North,” said Choi Jin-wook, an analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul. In recent months, international experts have detected what appeared to be new tunneling activities and efforts to fix flood damages in the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in northeastern North Korea. Kim Min-seok, spokesman for the Defense Ministry of South Korea, told reporters last month that North Korea could conduct a third nuclear in a short notice once its leadership decided to. North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test in Punggye-ri in 2006 and again in 2009. Each of those tests came as North Korea was protesting a United Nations’ decision to impose more sanctions as punishment for rocket tests. Washington and its allies “know better than any others about the fact that ballistic missile technology is the only means for launching satellite and they launch satellites more than any others,” the North Korean statement said on Wednesday. “This is self-deception and the height of double-standards. The essence of the matter is the U.S. brigandish logic that a satellite launch for peaceful purposes by a country which the U.S. antagonizes should not be allowed because any carrier rocket launched by it can be converted into long-range ballistic missile threatening the U.S.” In recent years, North Korea has made it increasingly clear that it is determined to keep its nuclear weapons at whatever costs, undermining a once-popular belief that the Pyongyang regime’s brinkmanship was a mere bargaining ploy designed to get as many concessions as possible in exchange for nuclear weapons. On Wednesday, blaming Washington’s “hostile policy,” the North said it “drew a final conclusion that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized.” The 2005 deal in which North Korea and the United States agreed in principle upon the dismantling of the North’s nuclear weapons program in return for diplomatic incentives “has now become defunct,” it said. “This is a strong message from North Korea basically saying that no matter how much economic aid it receives, no matter how flexible other countries become, it will be negotiating only on the premise that it will be accepted and treated as a nuclear power,” said Choi. “The North is sending a wake-up alarm to Washington and Seoul if they still believed that they could negotiate an end to the North’s nuclear weapons.” Since her December election, Ms. Park, the incoming South Korean president, has stressed that she would “never tolerate” the North’s nuclear program and that any large-scale economic aid for the North will be possible only after North Korea builds “trust’ through steps towards denuclearization. Analysts said that North Korea’s sense of crisis in the face of international sanctions hardened its determination to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, turning them into a centerpiece of its national pride and sense of empowerment, as seen in its national celebration over the success of its December rocket launching. But that policy in turn further isolated and impoverished the country. “North Korea would consider giving up its nuclear weapons only when it was provided with a comprehensive package of incentives that address its security dilemma,” said Hong Hyun-ik, senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute. “But the United State sand South Korea have never really offered such a package.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Hints at New Nuclear Test in Rebuke to U.N.,” New York Times, January 23, 2013, p. A-5)
Glyn Davies: “**Q:** North Korea hinted earlier today it conduct nuclear test. What is U.S. government response to that? **DAVIES:** I am sorry. I have not read the – I knew there was a North Korean reaction. But did they say that they plan to conduct a nuclear test? **Q:** Hinted. **DAVIES:** They hinted. Well, they have been hinting at that, I suppose, for some time. We think that that would be a mistake, obviously. We call on North Korea, as does the entire international community, not to engage in any further provocations. It is important that they heed the voice of the international community as contained in the Security Council resolution. And again, if they live up to their obligations, in particular if they can get back to the spirit of the September 2005 Joint Statement, and begin to take concrete steps to indicate their interest in returning to diplomacy, they may find in their negotiating partners willing partners in that process. But it is very much up to North Korea, up to the DPRK, to draw the appropriate lessons from this action by the United Nations Security Council, and what I will be doing is discussing with Korean counterparts today, tomorrow and briefly, I think, on the following day, steps that we can take now that the Security Council has acted. It is very important, I think, that all of us act in the spirit expressed by President-elect Park Geun-hye in her Foreign Affairs article that was published several months ago, in which she talked about various paths forward on North Korea. And I am here really to do much more listening than talking to learn more from Korean counterparts about their thinking and to see how we might work together as close allies to deepen our alliance and to find ways forward on North Korea. **Q:** There are clear signs that nuclear test take place anytime soon. **DAVIES:** Yes, I understand you want me to react to this issue of a nuclear test. The truth is, it is up to North Korea whether they test or not. This is not something that they can credibly claim is in reaction to steps taken by the international community. We would call on them not to engage in further provocations, and we are joined by the international community in that appeal. Now is not a time to make the situation on the Korean Peninsula any more tense. Now is a time to begin to think about a path forward away from provocation, a path forward toward peace, toward prosperity, and toward meeting the needs of the North Korean people. And as I say, and as President Obama has articulated, the United States will always extend a hand if North Korea takes the path of peace. So, what I do not want to do is hold all of my discussions with Republic of Korea officials here at the airport with you. I would like to go talk to them. So with your permission, what I will do is go on into Seoul and I look very much forward to my discussions with Korean counterparts.” (Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies, Remarks to the Press at Incheon International Airport, January 23, 2013)

Chinese president-in waiting Xi Jinping’s support today for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will put “considerable pressure” on North Korea, according to a diplomatic source in Beijing. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesmen frequently call for denuclearization and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean Peninsula, but the pressure will be much greater now that China’s leader has directly expressed his commitment. “For North Korea China’s consent to additional sanctions will be very disappointing,” the source added. “But given its dependency on Beijing, Pyongyang will not be able to ignore Xi’s remark completely and go ahead with another nuclear test.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei today called for resumption of the six-party denuclearization talks, even though North Korea thundered
there would be no more talks about abandoning its nuclear program. Hong said achieving peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula through denuclearization is in the "common interest" of countries in Northeast Asia. (Chosun Ilbo, “Xi’s Call for Denuclearization ‘to Put Pressure on N. Korea,” January 24, 2013)

South Korea and the United States are considering slapping their own "additional sanctions" on North Korea in addition to a new U.N. resolution that increased sanctions against the North for its December rocket launch, a senior Seoul diplomat said yesterday. The idea of Seoul and Washington imposing their own sanctions against Pyongyang will be one of the topics for today’s talks in Seoul between Glyn Davies and South Korea’s chief nuclear envoy Lim Sung-nam. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Ponder ‘Additional Sanctions’ against N. Korea,” January 23, 2013)

1/24/13 National Defense Commission statement: “Our successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 was a great jubilee in the history of the nation as it placed the nation’s dignity and honor on the highest plane and a spectacular success made in the efforts to develop space for peaceful purposes recognized by the world. The world people who love justice and value conscience unanimously rejoice as their own over the signal success made by our country, not a big one, by its own efforts. Even space institutions of a hostile country accustomed to have repugnancy towards others could not but recognize the DPRK’s successful satellite launch for peaceful purposes, from a low-profile stance.

This being a hard reality, the U.S. at the outset of the year termed our satellite launch "long-range missile launch," "wanton violation" of the UN resolutions and "blatant challenge" to world peace and security in a bid to build up public opinion on this. Finally, it prodded the UNSC into cooking up a new resolution on tightening sanctions against the DPRK.

The keynote of the resolution was worked out through backstage dealing with the U.S. as a main player and it was adopted at the UNSC with blind hand-raising by its member nations. This goes to clearly prove that the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK has entered a new dangerous phase. This shows, at the same time, that those big countries, which are obliged to take the lead in building a fair world order, are abandoning without hesitation even elementary principle, under the influence of the U.S. arbitrary and high-handed practices, failing to come to their senses.

Moreover, this also indicates that the UNSC, which should regard it as its mission to guarantee sovereign rights and security of its member nations, has turned into a defunct marionette international body on which no hope can be pinned.

The DPRK National Defense Commission solemnly declares as follows as regards the adoption of the entirely unreasonable resolution on the DPRK:

We totally reject all the illegal resolutions on the DPRK adopted by the UNSC.

We have never recognized all forms of base resolutions tightening sanctions cooked up by the hostile forces to encroach upon the DPRK’s sovereignty.

Sovereignty is what keeps a country and nation alive.
The country and the nation without sovereignty are more dead than alive.

The satellite launch was the exercise of an independent right pertaining to the DPRK as well as its legitimate sovereignty recognized by international law.
Therefore, the U.S. and those countries which launched satellites before have neither justification nor reason to find fault with the DPRK’s satellite launch.

They are making a brigandish assertion that what they launched were satellites but what other country launched was a long-range missile. They are seriously mistaken if they think this assertion can work in the bright world today.

The U.S. should clearly know that the times have changed and so have the army and the people of the DPRK.

Along with the nationwide efforts to defend the sovereignty, the DPRK will continue launching peaceful satellites to outer space one after another.

2. As the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK has entered more dangerous phase, overall efforts should be directed to denuclearizing big powers including the U.S. rather than the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The biggest threat to the peace and security on the Korean Peninsula is the hostile policy toward the DPRK being pursued by all kinds of dishonest forces including the U.S. as well as the U.S. huge nuclear armed forces that back the policy.

The army and people of the DPRK drew a final conclusion that only when the denuclearization of the world is realized on a perfect and preferential basis including the denuclearization of the U.S., will it be possible to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and ensure peace and security of the DPRK.

The U.S. is taking the lead in encroaching upon the sovereignty of the DPRK, its allies are siding with it and the UN Security Council has been reduced into an organization bereft of impartiality and balance. Under this situation the DPRK can not but declare that there will no longer exist the six-party talks and the September 19 joint statement.

No dialogue on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be possible in the future even though there may be dialogues and negotiations on ensuring peace and security in the region including the Korean Peninsula.

3. We will launch an all-out action to foil the hostile policy toward the DPRK being pursued by the U.S. and those dishonest forces following the U.S., and safeguard the sovereignty of the country and the nation.

The UN Security Council resolution on expanding sanctions against the DPRK, which was adopted on the initiative of the U.S., represents the most dangerous phase of the hostile policy toward the DPRK.

The army and people of the DPRK will never remain an on-looker to such happenings in which the sovereignty of the nation is encroached upon and the supreme interests of the country are violated.

Under the prevailing situation, the army and people of the DPRK will turn out in an all-out action to defend its sovereignty which is more precious than their own lives and frustrate the moves of the U.S. and its allies to isolate and stifle the DPRK.

The drive for building an economic power being pushed forward by the army and people of the DPRK, the effort to conquer space that has entered a new phase and the endeavors to bolster the deterrence for safeguarding the country and defending its security will all orientate toward the purpose of winning in the all-out action for foiling the U.S. and all other hostile forces’ maneuvers.

We do not hide that a variety of satellites and long-range rockets which will be launched by the DPRK one after another and a nuclear test of higher level which will be carried out by it in the upcoming all-out action, a new phase of the anti-U.S. struggle that has lasted century after century, will target against the U.S., the sworn
enemy of the Korean people.

**Settling accounts with the U.S. needs to be done with force, not with words** as it regards jungle law as the rule of its survival.

The world will clearly see how the army and people of the DPRK punish all kinds of hostile forces and emerge as a final victor while following the just road of defending its sovereignty, convinced of the justice of its cause.” (KCNA, “DPRK NDC Issues Statement Refuting UNSC Resolution,” January 24, 2013)

North Korea said that its threatened nuclear test is directed at the United States. The statement by the North’s National Defense Commission (NDC) came directly after Glyn Davies, U.S. special envoy for North Korea policy, urged Pyongyang to stand down.

“We do not hide that a variety of satellites and long-range rockets which will be launched (by the North) one after another and a nuclear test of higher level which will be carried out in the upcoming all-out action...will target the U.S.,” the NDC said in a dispatch carried by the North’s Korean Central News Agency. It didn’t elaborate what concessions it wants to extract from the U.S. with its nuclear test, but added that the move would aim to “foil” Washington’s “hostile policy.” Korea Institute of National Unification analyst Park Young-ho said the statement was in line with the North’s “aggressive tit-for-tat” strategy toward Washington. Pyongyang wants the U.S. to sign a peace treaty to end the 1950-53 Korean War and withdraw its troops from the peninsula. “The North continues to argue that denuclearization should go alongside a U.S. shift that throws away Washington’s so-called hostile policy,” he said. “The NDC statement falls in line with that.” (Kim Young-jin, “N.K. Says Nuclear Test Aimed at U.S. ‘Concessions,’” Korea Times, January 24, 2013)

Davies: “Why am I here with Syd Seiler of the White House staff and colleagues from the State Department? Because we want to reinforce a message that our President and Secretary of State have sent. That message is that we, the United States of America, are still open to authentic and credible negotiations to implement the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. We are willing to extend our hand if Pyongyang chooses the path of peace and progress by letting go of its nuclear weapons and its multi-stage missiles. If North Korea comes into compliance with Security Council resolutions and takes irreversible steps leading to denuclearization, the United States said we believe our other partners in the Six-Party process will do the hard work with the DPRK of finding a peaceful way forward. So our mission, starting here in Seoul, is to explore ideas for how we might move forward, how might we achieve authentic and credible negotiations. It is very much up to Pyongyang to decide. And here in Seoul especially, we want to stress one key point: Without sustained improvement in inter-Korean relations, U.S.-DPRK ties cannot fundamentally improve. This is why our talks here in Seoul are so important to us. Our alliance with the ROK is strong. It is getting stronger. We look forward with great anticipation to deepening our ties under this vibrant democracy’s new president. …Q: Will these authentic and credible negotiations be unconditional, that they won’t be conditioned on denuclearization? Following North Korean Foreign Ministry statement yesterday, how does this, you know, willingness to continue dialogue fit in? **DAVIES:** Well, our policy toward North Korea has been the same for a while now. It has been a dual-track policy of engagement when possible, pressure when necessary. We are, of course, in a bit of a pressure phase. But I am here
because my role in this as a diplomat representing the United States is to try always creatively to look for ways forward. And we are interested, as we have been all along, as we demonstrated back in 2011 and 2012 through our 10-month effort to talk to North Korea, always interested in trying to find ways forward diplomatically with the North. I think that that has to be ultimately a multilateral process going forward. So, I am not going to get into conditionality for any diplomatic process going forward.

There are obvious things that you know well about. Further provocations are not going to help the process forward. They would only retard it, make it much more difficult for us to engage. It is very important, I stressed this in my statement at the beginning, very important that North-South relations improve, and that is very much up to Pyongyang to accept any overtures it receives, not to further provoke South Korea. So all of these strictures remain in place. All of these conditions remain in place, but beyond that, it does not serve any interest for me to go into further negotiating with North Korea through my discussion here with you today. Q: What’s your prospect about North Korea’s nuclear test? DAVIES: Well, I addressed this at the airport yesterday. Whether North Korea tests or not is up to North Korea. We hope they do not do it. We call on them not to do it. It would be a mistake and a missed opportunity if they were to do it. This is not a moment to increase tensions on the Korean Peninsula. This is a moment to seize the opportunity that has been out there with the new government in Seoul, with the renewal of the mandate of the President of the United States, who has always been interested in finding diplomatic ways forward. This is an opportunity to try to find a way forward in that respect. Q: Can the U.S. government confirm that North Korea is indeed ready for a nuclear test? Because there are reports in South Korea that they are waiting on the political decision. DAVIES: All of you want to write articles about nuclear tests. And you all want to talk about how this is something that North Korea could do in reaction to steps that we take and all of the rest of it. Again, these underground tests, it is not for me to predict whether they will test or not. We hope they do not. We call on them not to do it. It would be highly provocative. It would set back the cause of trying to find a solution to these long-standing problems that have prevented the peninsula from becoming reunited. I think it is very important that they do not test. And I hope you will forgive me, but I am not going to get into talking about what is happening at Punggye, or what is not happening at Punggye, will they test, won’t they test. My point is a diplomatic point, that testing a nuclear device would be a supremely unhelpful and retrograde step by North Korea, were they to choose to do it.” (Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies, Remarks to the Press in Seoul, January 24, 2013)

At his confirmation hearing John Kerry appeared to join the critics who believe the administration has placed too much emphasis on beefing up its military presence in the region, which was bound to alienate China. “We have a lot more forces there than any other nation in the world, including China,” he said. “And the Chinese look at that and say, ‘What’s the U.S. doing? Are they trying to circle us?’ I think we need to be thoughtful in how we go forward.” (Geoff Dyer, “Kerry Trip Sets Tone for Response to North Korea,” Financial Times, April 12, 2013, p. 2) SecState-designate John Kerry confirmation hearing prepared testimony: “American foreign policy is also defined by food security and energy security, humanitarian assistance, the fight against disease and the push for development, as much as it is by any single
counter terrorism initiative. It is defined by leadership on life threatening issues like climate change, or fighting to lift up millions of lives by promoting freedom and democracy from Africa to the Americas or speaking out for the prisoners of gulags in North Korea or millions of refugees and displaced persons and victims of human trafficking.”

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea statement: “The U.S. and its followers cooked up a ‘resolution on tightening sanctions’ at the UN Security Council by terming the DPRK’s satellite launch for peaceful purposes an inter-continental ballistic missile launch.

The fabrication of ‘the resolution’ this time represents the height of the hostile policy toward the DPRK and moves to escalate the confrontation with the DPRK as it is the last-ditch efforts of the hostile forces displeased with the ever-increasing authority and national power of the DPRK. What should not be overlooked is that the south Korean puppet group of traitors took the lead in fabricating the ‘resolution.’ … In view of the prevailing grave situation the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea solemnly declares the following counter-measures against the south Korean puppet group, representing the towering anger and unanimous will of the army and the people of the DPRK and all other Koreans.

Now that the south Korean puppet conservative group is more desperately kicking up a racket against the DPRK over its nuclear and missile issues with the U.S., there will be no more discussion on denuclearization between the north and the south in the future.

In this connection, we declare complete nullification of the ‘Joint Declaration on Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula’ adopted in 1992 and its total invalidity.

The joint declaration already proved a dead paper long ago due to the moves of the U.S. and the puppet group for a nuclear war against the north and their nuclear rackets against it. It is needless to say that there is no need for us to be bound to the declaration.

As long as the south Korean puppet group of traitors persistently pursues a hostile policy toward the DPRK, we will never negotiate with anyone. The historical lesson shows that there is nothing to be solved when meeting with those who pursue confrontation with the DPRK and this will only bedevil the inter-Korean relations. The group should not think about any dialogue with us as long as it sticks to the policy of confrontation with fellow countrymen.

If the puppet group of traitors takes a direct part in the UN ‘sanctions,’ the DPRK will take strong physical counter-measures against it.

‘Sanctions’ mean a war and a declaration of war against us. We have already declared that ‘we would react to provocation with immediate retaliatory blows and a war of aggression with a great war of justice for national reunification.’

The group would be well advised to stop acting rashly, bearing in mind this warning served by us. All our service personnel and people will never allow the reckless confrontation moves of the group. Those who dare stand in the way of our just cause will never be able to escape deadly retaliatory blows.” (KCNA, “S. Korean Authorities Accused of Fabricating ‘Resolution’ with Foreign Forces,” January 25, 2013)
Global Times: “China has a dilemma: We are further away from the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and there’s no possible way for us to search for a diplomatic balance between North Korea and South Korea, Japan and the US. China should be more relaxed and reduce our expectations on the effect of our strategies toward the peninsula. We should have a pragmatic attitude to deal with the problems and pursue the optimal ratio between our investment of resources and strategic gains. China can neither take one side of the peninsula conflict like the US and Japan nor dream of staying aloof. We should readily accept that China is involved and may offend one side or both sides. China’s role and position are clear when discussing North Korea issue in the UN Security Council. If North Korea engages in further nuclear tests, China will not hesitate to reduce its assistance to North Korea. If the US, Japan and South Korea promote extreme UN sanctions on North Korea, China will resolutely stop them and force them to amend these draft resolutions. Just let North Korea be ‘angry.’ We can’t sit by and do nothing just because we are worried it might impact the Sino-North Korean relationship. Just let the US, Japan and South Korea grumble about China. We have no obligation to soothe their feelings. Due to China’s strength, as long as our attitude is resolute, the situation will be gradually influenced by our principles and our insistence. China is a power adjacent to the Korean Peninsula. This means that our strategic interests are complex and diverse. China should maintain our national interest to the full extent instead of any other side’s interests.” (Global Times, “Not All Peninsula Issues China’s Problem,” January 25, 2013)

North Korea’s sole major ally China will decrease aid to Pyongyang if it goes ahead with a planned nuclear test, state-run media said in an unusually frank warning. “If North Korea engages in further nuclear tests, China will not hesitate to reduce its assistance to North Korea,” the Global Times said in an editorial. “Just let North Korea be ‘angry’. We can’t sit by and do nothing just because we are worried it might impact the Sino-North Korean relationship. Just let the US, Japan and South Korea grumble about China. We have no obligation to soothe their feelings. Due to China’s strength, as long as our attitude is resolute, the situation will be gradually influenced by our principles and our insistence. China is a power adjacent to the Korean Peninsula. This means that our strategic interests are complex and diverse. China should maintain our national interest to the full extent instead of any other side’s interests.” (Global Times, “Not All Peninsula Issues China’s Problem,” January 25, 2013)
relationship of mutual benefit with Japan from broad perspectives," according to Yamaguchi. (Hirano Ko, “China Leader Xi Vows to Improve Ties with Japan despite Senkaku Row,” Kyodo, January 25, 2013)

Pyongyang will likely experiment with a fusion-boosted fission bomb in a "high-level" nuclear test it said would target the United States, according to the sources. A fusion-boosted fission bomb induces nuclear fusion with slight nuclear fission, enabling more efficient nuclear fission. A fusion-boosted fission bomb can therefore be made about one-fourth the size of an ordinary nuclear bomb. The Japanese government has concluded that North Korea is ready to test a fusion-boosted fission bomb, and sources said Pyongyang will be able to put it to practical use after a single test. Japan has been monitoring North Korea’s nuclear development program with the United States and other countries. It has analyzed nuclear-related materials North Korea has imported and nuclear-related facilities it has constructed or developed. While North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 resulted in an explosion equivalent to less than 1 kiloton of trinitrotoluene (TNT), the second test in 2009 generated an explosion of several kilotons. In May 2010, North Korea also announced it had succeeded in achieving nuclear fusion. According to Akihiro Kuroki, a managing director at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, a fusion-boosted fission bomb uses substantially smaller amounts of explosives and buffer materials than an ordinary nuclear bomb. North Korea is believed to possess an atomic bomb similar to the one dropped on Nagasaki on Aug. 9, 1945, which weighed about five tons. A successful test of a fusion-boosted fission bomb is expected to enable the reclusive communist country to reduce it to a little more than 1 ton. (Makino Yoshihiro, “N. Korea Likely to Test Fusion-Boosted Fission Bomb able to Reach the U.S.,” Asahi Shimbun, January 25, 2013)

Assessing North Korea’s real intentions is always difficult, and it may prove that the statement, issued by the country’s highest military body, was another outburst by an insecure, starving country seeking to shake down the West for more aid, a cycle President Obama had vowed to break. Pyongyang’s public declarations often heat up at times when the United States is focusing its attention elsewhere. American intelligence officials have also become concerned that the latest rocket test indicated that the country’s new leader might have decided that confrontation with the West could prove a more successful strategy to retaining power than a new attempt at difficult economic reforms. There had been hopes that Kim Jong-un – who is reported to have made modest economic changes and is portrayed as more affable than his father – might be willing to compromise with the West for economic aid. The threat was the latest suggestion that he was more likely to follow the pattern that his father, Kim Jong-il, established when he ran the country: a cycle of a rocket launching, United Nations condemnation and nuclear testing. “It’s a major test for Kim Jong-un,” said Koh Yu-hwan, a North Korea specialist at Dongguk University in Seoul. “Unlike the rocket launching in December, which the North has said was conducted because it was his father’s dying wish, a nuclear test will be Kim Jong-un’s decision, one for which he will be held responsible.” The White House responded to the North Korean declaration Thursday by declaring it “needlessly provocative.” Jay Carney, the White House press secretary, told reporters that “further provocations would only increase Pyongyang’s isolation,” a variant of the line the White House has used every time the North has
issued a threat, launched a missile or revealed a new nuclear facility. But deeper isolation does not appear to be the young Mr. Kim’s greatest fear. So far, China, which supplies the North’s energy and some of its food, has not cut off aid in response to North Korean actions even though its leaders have urged Mr. Kim and his father to refrain from provocations. Chinese officials have made clear in meetings with their American counterparts that they fear instability in North Korea more than they worry about the country advancing its longstanding nuclear and missile capabilities. “If you look back over the past four years,” a former administration official said recently, “we haven’t moved the Chinese at all.” (David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Threatens to ‘Target’ U.S. and Conduct a ‘Higher-Level’ Nuclear Test,” New York Times, January 25, 2013, p. A-8) Some strategic weapons policy analysts suggested that North Korea’s defiant tone, and the relatively muted American response, had set an example for Iran by demonstrating what can be achieved when an American adversary is armed with nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders, like North Korea’s Kim family, view America as a nuclear-armed bully that respects only the threat of force. Jeffrey Lewis, a nonproliferation expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, Calif., said he feared that North Korea was now intent on demonstrating the ability to produce a far more powerful nuclear weapon than the two relatively small nuclear devices it had tested so far. “If you think international politics is basically about power and that power is basically about armaments, then having a small number of fission devices is not good enough,” he said. “You want big nuclear devices.” (American intelligence officials believe North Korea has enough plutonium for roughly 6 to 10 weapons.) Others dismissed the idea that Iran is taking any political cues from North Korea. They noted that Iran remained a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that Iranian leaders had repeatedly asserted that they had no interest in nuclear weapons. “They see North Korea is starving and isolated with no resources whatsoever,” said Gary G. Sick, an American academic and Iran expert who served on the National Security Council under the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations. He called the connectivity on the nuclear issue between Iran and North Korea “a Western argument – I’ve never seen anybody in Iran make that argument.” (Choe Sang-hun and Rick Gladstone, “North Korea Warns of Retaliation if South Helps Enforce Tightened Sanctions,” New York Times, January 26, 2013, p. A-5)

KCNA: “A consultative meeting of officials in the fields of state security and foreign affairs took place as regards the grave situation prevailing in the DPRK. Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), first chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), convened the meeting and guided it. Present at the meeting were Choe Ryong Hae, director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA; Hyon Yong Chol, chief of the General Staff of the KPA; Kim Won Hong, minister of State Security; Pak To Chun and Kim Yong Il, secretaries of the Central Committee of the WPK; Hong Sung Mu, vice department director of the C.C., the WPK; and Kim Kye Gwan, first vice-minister of Foreign Affairs [Jang Song-thaek?]. Kim Jong Un received a report on the new situation and circumstances prevailing on the Korean Peninsula and in its vicinity. The successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 was an exercise of a legitimate right of a sovereign state and it was recognized by even leading special organs of the U.S. However, a grave situation was created on the Korean Peninsula and in its vicinity.
due to the unprecedented anti-DPRK moves of the hostile forces which arbitrarily and provocatively fabricated the “resolution” of the UN Security Council on tightening sanctions against the DPRK. Since April last year the DPRK has made every possible effort to prove the peaceful nature of the satellite launch; it ensured transparency, going beyond international practice, and chose the time when the situation was relatively peaceful for satellite launch, etc. However, the hostile forces deliberately denied the DPRK’s right to satellite launch in a bid to use it as a pretext for stifling it. The U.S. and its allies took this high-handed hostile action in wanton violation of the sovereign state’s independent right to develop space publicly recognized by international law. This indicates that the U.S. has reached its height in its anti-DPRK strategy to stand in confrontation with it to the last out of inveterate repugnancy and enmity towards the ideology and social system chosen by the people in the DPRK. This has thrown a grave obstacle to the efforts to be focused by the DPRK on economic construction so that the people may not tighten their belts any longer on the basis of the war deterrence for self-defense provided by leader Kim Jong Il all his life. Different countries concerned made efforts to fairly solve the problem and prevent the deterioration of the situation. But, it became clear that there was limit to their ability, as they admitted. This fact proved once again that the DPRK should defend its sovereignty by itself. It also became clear that there can be no denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula before the world has been denuclearized. At the consultative meeting Kim Jong Un expressed the firm resolution to take substantial and high-profile important state measures [nuclear test!] in view of the prevailing situation as the stand had already been clarified by the National Defense Commission and the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK through their statements that powerful physical countermeasures would be taken to defend the dignity of the nation and the sovereignty of the country. He advanced specific tasks to the officials concerned."


Kim Jong-un has vowed to take “substantial and high-profile important state measures” and ordered his top military and party officials of what to do to retaliate against American-led United Nations sanctions on the country, the North’s official media reported. North Korea did not clarify what those measures might be, but it referred to a series of earlier statements in which Kim’s government has threatened to launch more long-range rockets and conduct a third nuclear test to build an ability to “target” the United States. By calling such a meeting and having it reported in state news media, Kim seemed to assert his leadership in what his country called an “all-out action” against the United States, as opposed to his father, who tended to remain reclusive during similar confrontations. “At the consultative meeting, Kim Jong-un expressed the firm resolution to take substantial and high-profile important state measures in view of the prevailing situation,” said KCNA. “He advanced specific tasks to the officials concerned.” The dispatch, which was distributed today, was dated yesterday, indicating that the meeting in Pyongyang took place then. That was the same day on which the North’s main party newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, said that the United Nations Security Council’s resolution last Tuesday calling for tightening sanctions against the North left it with “no other option” but a nuclear test. “A nuclear test is what the people demand,” it said in a commentary. (Choe Sang-hun, “North
Kim Jong-un issued a secret order to “complete preparations for a nuclear weapons test between Tuesday and yesterday” and carry it out sometime soon, a source told *JoongAng Ilbo*. Kim also reportedly said, “The country will be under martial law starting from midnight January 29 and all the frontline and central units should be ready for a war,” the source said. The North’s state media reported January 27 that Kim convened an emergency meeting with top defense and security officials on Saturday. It said Kim made a stern command to take “effective, high-profile state measures” and “assigned specific tasks” to officials. The source told *JoongAng Ilbo* January 29 that Kim made six orders at the meeting including preparing a third nuclear test. South Korean government officials confirmed that based on sources in Beijing. The source also said that a nuclear test would come earlier than predicted. Other analysts anticipate it would be held on February 16, the birthday of former leader Kim Jong-il, the late father of the current leader, or February 25, the inauguration day of South Korean President-elect Park Geun-hye. The idea of putting the country under martial law echoes the situation in March 1993, when North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the time, Pyongyang also ordered the military to be in a quasi-state of war. The source said Kim Jong-un is worried about China’s reaction to a nuclear test. China is the regime’s closest ally and has warned the North not to go ahead with a third nuclear test. At the meeting, Kim allegedly said, “China is still useful to us. We need to be careful of the relationship with China.” Kim also asked his officials to be careful of criticizing Beijing. “The recent criticism of China was too tough,” he said, according to the source. “We need to make this correct.” This appears to refer to a statement made on January 25 by the National Defense Commission, the North’s top military body, which said China “abandoned its principle” by approving the new UN resolution which includes tougher sanctions against Pyongyang. “North Korean media directly quoted Kim mentioning ‘high-profile measures’ at the meeting,” said Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University. “So he will definitely come through with some actions.” As of the 29th, the South Korean military didn’t detect any unusual movements in North Korea’s frontline units. Seoul is assuming a delay in the nuclear test because of a meeting of lower-level members of the ruling Workers’ Party that started on the 28th. The meeting was the first since October 2007. “Kim Ki-nam, a party secretary, ordered the party members to be ready for combat,” a South Korean government official said. “That jibed with the Kim Jong-un orders.” The official speculated Kim Jong-un will issue an “Order from the Supreme Commander” through state media to ask the military and people to prepare for war. Amidst escalating tension, a South Korean government official told reporters January 30 there have been increased activities and movement of equipment near a test site in Punggye-ri in the northwest part of North Korea. “Activities of vehicles, equipment and work forces near the entrance of a mine have recently increased,” the official said. “We assume that the North is maintaining the conditions for a nuclear test at any time. But we still can’t say the test is imminent.” (Lee Young-jong and Kim Hee-jin, “Jong-un Issues Martial Law Order,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, January 31, 2013)
South Korea’s humanitarian aid to North Korea dropped 28 percent to a record 16-year low last year, the unification ministry said. Seoul’s humanitarian aid to the impoverished North totaled 14.1 billion won (US$13.1 million), compared with 19.6 billion won a year earlier. Last year’s amount is the lowest since 1996 when only 3.6 billion won was provided to the North in humanitarian aid. The total amount of assistance the South provided the North during the five years of President Lee was 257.5 billion won, including 155.1 billion won of civilian aid. The total amount is only 20 percent of the aid sent during the presidency of Lee’s predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun. 

(Yonhap, “S. Korea’s Humanitarian Aid to N. Korea Drops to 16-Year Low Last Year,” January 27, 2013)

KCNA: “A consultative meeting of officials in the fields of state security and foreign affairs in view of the grave situation prevailing in the DPRK took place under the guidance of Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, first chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army. At the meeting Kim Jong Un expressed the firm resolution to take substantial and high-profile important state measures in view of the prevailing situation and advanced specific tasks to the officials concerned. His firm resolution is just one to defend the dignity of the nation and the sovereignty of the country in view of the new situation and circumstances created on the Korean Peninsula and in its vicinity after the successful launch of the DPRK’s satellite. It is important for us to put a satellite into orbit, but it is more important to defend the legitimate right to the use of space for peaceful purposes. If the DPRK steps back from this, it will allow its right to existence to be infringed upon, to say nothing of development toward a thriving nation. To defend the right to use space for peaceful purposes is not just the issue of the right to develop space but the issue of defending the sovereignty and achieving the prosperity of the country and the nation. The hostile forces including the U.S. imperialists regard the DPRK advancing along the road of independence, Songun and socialism as a thorn in their flesh. The U.S. considers the DPRK emerging a thriving nation in the strategic center of the 21st century as a blatant challenge to its strategy for dominating the Asia-Pacific region. That is why the U.S. uses the successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 as the best pretext for bringing down the social system in the DPRK. The U.S. groundlessly denied the DPRK’s right to satellite launch, taking issue with it, and fabricated “a resolution on sanctions” at the UN Security Council this time. This is an unpardonable hostile action as it disclosed the U.S. inveterate repugnancy and enmity towards the ideology and social system chosen by the people in the DPRK. The DPRK has already warned the U.S. and those countries concerned on historic December 12 when it succeeded in the satellite launch. Hostility does no good to anyone and with confrontation it is impossible to settle any problem. We hoped to see all countries concerned take a reasonable and calm attitude so that the situation might not develop in the direction contrary to their will and desire. However, the U.S. disregarded it and took an extremely arrogant attitude of hurting the dignity of the Korean nation. Finally, it cooked up the “resolution on sanctions” against the DPRK and vociferated about “crucial measures,” deliberately straining the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in its vicinity. Now that the U.S. hostile strategy to stifle the DPRK by force of arms has reached its height and it has become clear that the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula and the world is nothing but an empty talk, the DPRK is left with no option but to take strong physical counter-measures to defend its sovereignty. The DPRK’s cause of defending independence and justice is right and its victory is sure to come. The U.S. will come to know what dear price it will have to pay for insulting and mocking the Koreans. Satellites and long-range rockets to be launched by the DPRK without let-up and the nuclear test of higher level to be conducted by it in the all-out action, a new stage of the anti-U.S. struggle, will be targeted against the U.S. imperialists, the sworn enemy of the Korean people. The world will clearly know what tremendous might the servicepersons and people of the DPRK will display and what great history of a thriving nation they will make, aware of the justice of their cause and single-mindedly united behind their leader.” (KCNA, “U.S. Mistook Koreans: KCNA Commentary,” January 28, 2013)

Glyn Davies: “Today has been a busy day. We began with a call on Ambassador John Roos and the staff at the U.S. Embassy here in Tokyo. We moved on to a meeting with the executive members of the Association of the Family of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea, Chairman Iizuka, Mr. and Mrs. Yokota. This was for us an opportunity to express our solidarity with them and to reassure them of our commitment to their cause, to express to them as we have before that they are not alone in their suffering. And we will never, we can never forget the abductees or the suffering of their families. We then moved on to the Cabinet Office, for a meeting with Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanehara. We expressed to him our commitment to coordinating closely with the new Japanese government, the Abe administration, on North Korea. From there, we went on to a luncheon meeting with the Secretary General for the Abduction Issue Mr. Mitani Hideshi. Next, after a stop back at the Embassy, we came here to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to meet with my good friend and colleague Director General Sugiyama Shinsuke. I reported to him on the results of our meetings in Seoul and in Beijing. We discussed the importance of fully implementing the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2087, maintaining trilateral coordination with the Republic of Korea, and staying closely aligned with our Chinese and Russian partners. Following that session, we called on Deputy Foreign Minister Saiki here in this building, which brings us to the present point. Tomorrow very quickly we’ll pay a call on Representative Nukaga Fukushiro, Secretary General of the Japan-ROK Parliamentary League, and Minister in Charge of the Abductions Issue, Mr. Furuya, before returning to Washington. We began our trip last week intending to explore a way forward with our partners to a credible and authentic diplomatic process. But we found ourselves dealing instead with a North Korea bent on bluster and intimidation, a North Korea uninterested in finding a diplomatic way forward. A North Korea declaring itself at odds with its neighbors, and indeed at odds with the entire international system. Faced with this challenge, United Nations member states must make clear to North Korea that it has a clear and distinct choice: either it can continue its defiance of the United Nations Security Council, a path which can lead only to further isolation and to censure, or the path of peace, living up to its promises, meeting its obligations, living in harmony with its neighbors and the world. … Q: Do you see any signs that North Korea is moving towards a third nuclear test? DAVIES: Well they’ve said that they intend to conduct a nuclear test, so we’ll see what they end up doing. We have called upon them, as have other countries, not to proceed with a nuclear test. It would be a
mistake, it would be a miscalculation, it would set back the cause of resolving issues that relate to the Korean Peninsula diplomatically, most importantly the issue of denuclearization. **Q:** Mr. Davies, it seems that North Korea is determined to become a defacto nuclear weapons state. I was wondering how realistic the goal is of denuclearization. How specifically are you going to achieve that goal? **DAVIES:** Well, I think what's important is to get back to the process that for many years had been underway, which is following up on the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Parties, in which North Korea made commitments and undertakings. It's also very important that North Korea take seriously its commitments as a member of the international system, which is to say following up on the strictures of repeated United Nations Security Council resolutions. I think the international community should continue to make clear to North Korea that it does face a choice. It does not have to continue to go down the road of isolation and continued impoverishment of its people. It can instead choose to meet its obligations and rejoin the international system. If so, one can imagine a diplomatic process going forward. What I hope to do, what we had hoped to do in coming to North Asia was to begin this process of exploring a credible and authentic diplomatic process going forward. But very soon after we arrived in Seoul, South Korea, North Korea began to make these threatening statements, which of course makes it very difficult to imagine how we could go forward diplomatically. So right now, the emphasis, the accent of our efforts is on seeking to convince North Korea not to go down this path, not to test a nuclear weapon, but rather to come back to its obligations and commitments. **Q:** Did you discuss sanctions with the Japanese side? **DAVIES:** Of course, we discussed sanctions in South Korea, we discussed sanctions in Beijing, and we discussed sanctions here. And we agreed in all three capitols that it's very important that we fulfill the sanctions commitments contained in the recently passed United Nations Security Council resolution. **Only by doing that can we prevent North Korea from obtaining the materials it needs to carry forward its weapons of mass destruction program, and prevent North Korea from proliferating technologies** that are dangerous to the entire world. **Q:** Ambassador Davies, I think President Obama said he wants to break the pattern that North Korea has been rewarded for its provocations. But it seems that North Korea still wants that pattern again, it seems that want a direct talk with you. They’ve been sending a message to you, they want a direct talk with you as a nuclear state. So what is your response? **DAVIES:** Again, I think what's important is to take this one step at a time. I don't know what North Korea's next step is going to be. If they go in the direction of testing a nuclear device, they are going to set back the prospect of any diplomatic process going forward. So that kind of a provocative approach in dealing with the outside world will not serve their interests ultimately. But the strength of our position really depends on the solidarity of our allies, first and foremost, of the Five Parties in the Six-Party process, and I’d like to re-emphasize this to all members of the international system. So that’s the message that we’re putting out there. We came out to the region [hoping to find a way forward diplomatically] but instead we find a North Korea that seems bent on playing a game of risk. This is very dangerous. We’d like them to step away, step back from this kind of provocative stance and enable us to get back to a diplomatic process. But I have to be honest with you, as a diplomat I don’t see any prospect for a diplomatic process in the immediate future, as long as North Korea continues this belligerent and provocative behavior and language.” (DoS,
Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies, “Remarks to the Media at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 28, 2013)

China also expressed alarm about a nuclear test. "China is highly concerned about the relevant developments. China is opposed to any acts that might escalate tension or undermine the denuclearization of the peninsula. We hope the relevant sides can remain calm and restrained and earnestly maintain the peace and stability of Northeast Asia," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a daily briefing in Beijing. Hong repeated China's appeal for dialogue. He made a side-swiped criticism of China's neighbor and ally over its continued funding for defense programs despite a languishing economy, urging it to "develop its economy and improve people's living conditions." (Associated Press, “U.S. Envoy Urges North Korea to Scrap Nuke Test Plan,” January 28, 2013)

A U.S. citizen detained in North Korea that former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson sought to bring home during his recent visit is accused of plotting to topple the regime and assassinating the leadership, a member of his delegation told the Korea Herald. Kun “Tony” Namkung, a North Korea expert known for longstanding ties with Pyongyang, arranged and took part in the trip by Richardson and Google Inc. executive chairman Eric Schmidt from January 7-10. The much-trumpeted mission was partly aimed at negotiating the release of Kenneth Bae, the Korean-American tourist operator who was arrested in November in the Rason economic zone. “My understanding is that he has been accused of serious crimes including plotting to overthrow the regime and assassinating the leadership,” Namkung said in an email interview. "Richardson’s hope was to see the detainee, Kenneth Bae, and if possible, bring him home. However, North Korea was not cooperative in this regard." During the latest four-day stay, the nine-member group toured a computer lab at Kim Il-sung University and the Korea Computer Center in the capital, among other places. They also met with North Korean officials from the Foreign Ministry and the military. “The primary purpose was to achieve an overview of North Korea’s information technology industry and to explore the prospects for cooperation in the future, which was fully achieved,” Namkung said. “The trip demonstrated that North Korea is prepared to expand access to the Internet, develop its digital technology to higher standards and increase the use of mobile phones,” Namkung added. The communist regime's uranium enrichment program and overall nuclear “deterrent” is “improving by the day,” Namkung said. “It will be very difficult to forestall another nuclear test, which will this time be a thermonuclear test, unless the U.S. and North Korean governments reach out to one another to revive the ‘Leap Day’ deal of last year.” Namkung added that Pyongyang’s atmosphere has “brightened” with more cars on the road and restaurants compared with his last visit in June. Other changes include “more disposable income with which to buy goods in improved stores, even more bustling private markets, improved attire, and last but not least, higher heels for women,” he said. “As always, North Korea’s opening and reform is contingent on its relations with the three countries with which it has adversarial relations -- South Korea, the U.S., and Japan,” he added. (Shin Hyon-hee, “U.S. Detainee Accused of Plotting to Kill N.K. Leadership: Namkung,” Korea Herald, January 28, 2013)
As tensions on the Korean Peninsula soar amid the North’s military threats, U.S. experts are calling for full-fledged consultations between Washington and Beijing on ways to deal with Pyongyang. They emphasize that major dialogue between the superpowers, also involving South Korea, is necessary not only to prevent another conflict on the peninsula but also to prepare for possible emergencies in the North. "If Washington and Beijing fail to coordinate and communicate, we could face the possibility of a U.S.-China confrontation almost unimaginable in its consequences," said Jonathan Pollack, senior fellow at Brookings Institution. "This will require discussions on military deployments and operations unprecedented in their scope and candor. South Korea must also be part of this conversation," he added. Pollack was offering Korea policy recommendations for the second Obama administration, called a “Memorandum to the President.” "This threat now encompasses the potential use of nuclear weapons," Pollack said. Pollack said the U.S. and China should disclose information on the location, operation and capabilities of each other’s military forces that could rapidly intervene in North Korea. The two sides will have to "share intelligence on the known or suspected locations of North Korea’s weapons of massive destruction (WMD) assets," he said. Scott Snyder, senior researcher at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), also urged Washington and Beijing to redouble efforts to narrow perception gaps on Pyongyang. "China’s focus on peninsular stability was a function of a geostategic view of the peninsula as a zero-sum competition for influence between China and the United States, while Washington talked denuclearization without sufficient attention to China’s geostategic concerns," he said in a recent writing on what Obama needs to do in his second term with regard to Korea. He said establishing a South Korea-U.S.-China dialogue on North Korea, as proposed by the incoming South Korean leader Park Geun-hye, would "provide an improved basis for forging trilateral cooperation measures." Snyder said over the last four years Obama played "small ball" with North Korea, which resulted in limited accomplishments for Washington. Although North Korea’s military ties with Libya and Myanmar have shrunken thanks to political transitions there, Pyongyang forged an agreement with Iran last year on scientific and technical cooperation, he said. “Given steady North Korean progress in developing its missile and nuclear programs, your administration should pursue a more active strategy designed to shape North Korea’s environment," Snyder said. (Yonhap, “U.S., China Need Candid Consultations over N. Korea: Experts,” January 28, 2013)

South Korea was third time lucky in its aspirations to join the Asian space race after successfully launching a two-stage rocket from its Naro Space Center on the country’s southwestern coast. Korea is the 11th country joining an elite group of nations capable of sending rockets into space to launch satellites. Such an achievement comes nearly 10 years after Asia’s fourth largest economy began seeking its own capability to place a satellite into orbit. Engineers at the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) said the rocket, the Korea Space Launch Vehicle-1 (KSLV-1), succeeded in putting its satellite payload into orbit. Whether the satellite is functioning properly will be confirmed through radio communication. “Thanks to the successful launch of Naro, we are now one step closer to becoming a space power,” said Lee Ju-ho, minister of education, science and technology, in a press conference after the launch. “I want to thank everyone involved for their support and efforts.” “I think failure is the essence of
Jeffrey Lewis: “North Korea's announcement of an impending nuclear test refers to a “nuclear test of higher level which will be carried out by it in the upcoming all-out action...” Most people seem to be focusing on the possibility of a device using highly enriched uranium – which is probably right but maybe not the whole story. DPRK officials have been dropping some interesting hints lately. In August, the DPRK indicated that it would be “modernizing and expanding its nuclear deterrent capability beyond the U.S. imagination.” That would seem to suggest we should broaden our realm of possibilities. I've been thinking about the possibility of a North Korean thermonuclear weapons test since 2010, after North Korea started talking about Korean style thermo-nuclear reaction devices. (Not quite as catchy as Gangnam Style, eh?) Apparently, I am no longer the only crank. The Asahi Shimbun recently published an article entitled, “DPRK Likely To Use ‘Fusion-Boosted Fission Bomb’ in Third Nuclear Test.” Tony Namkung, who took Google's Eric Schmidt to North Korea, has said that it “will this time be a thermonuclear test.” He must have had some interesting conversations in Pyongyang. Sounds crazy, I know. But I think we have to at least consider an early DPRK effort at a thermonuclear weapon of one sort or another. (I am still inclined to think a boosted design like the Alarm Clock is more likely than a staged device.) We've systematically underestimated both North Korea's capabilities and, even when those capabilities are found wanting, the leadership's resolve to try anyway.

I've been thinking about this possibility again for at least three reasons: First, in 2002, Kang Sok-ju told Jim Kelly responded to evidence that North Korea was pursuing uranium enrichment by stating that North Korea was "entitled to possess our own HEU, and we are bound to produce more powerful weapons than that." Kang may have committed the canonical diplomatic gaffe – saying what he really thought. (Tong Kim certainly thought, in context, he was talking about thermonuclear weapons.) Also, if Kim Jong Il wanted to bequeath his son some technical accomplishments to make his first year or so in power an eventful one, putting a satellite in orbit, testing an ICBM and detonating a thermonuclear weapon seem like pretty solid ideas. We may wonder about North Korea's technical capability, but I don't think the North Korean leadership will simply settle for a small number of relatively crude fission-type devices. Second, consider North Korea's statement following its 2009 nuclear test: “The current nuclear test was safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control and the results of the test helped satisfactorily settle the scientific and technological problems arising in further increasing the power of nuclear weapons and steadily developing nuclear technology.” “Higher level" explicitly refers to both yield and technology. What is really interesting, though, is the statement of
purpose: “the results of the test helped satisfactorily settle the scientific and technological problems arising in further increasing the power of nuclear weapons and steadily developing nuclear technology.” KCNA could not have been more clear that these tests were leading to something larger. ...Third, the North Koreans themselves have been talking more about thermonuclear weapons, and thermonuclear war, in recent months. In addition to the August statement, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Kil-yon said in October that: “Today, due to the continued U.S. hostile policy towards DPRK, the vicious cycle of confrontation and aggravation of tensions is an ongoing phenomenon on the Korean peninsula, which has become the world’s most dangerous hot spot where a spark of fire could set off a thermonuclear war.” I don’t think Pak is describing a war in which the DPRK are the only thermonuclear victims. I’ve gone back and forth over whether to mention that Kim Myong Chol, an “unofficial spokesman” for the DPRK, has been saying that the DPRK is developing thermonuclear weapons for years. Kim isn’t privy to such details and uncritically repeats any claim he reads in Western media that suit his particular bromide of the moment. (His source on North Korea’s thermonuclear weapons seems to be John Pike.) I am going to stick with state media and DPRK officials, while adding that KCNA repeated Kim’s assertion that “Unlike the past Korean War which was limited to the Korean Peninsula, the second Korean War will turn into a thermonuclear war and naturally spill over into the U.S. mainland.” Whether or not Kim is right about the particulars, the party line seems to be that North Korea won’t be the only victims in a thermonuclear war. Given all this, we should at least consider the possibility that, in addition to testing an HEU-based device, the North Koreans may burn a fusion fuel like Lithium 6. If the US intelligence community thinks this is even a possibility, the Obama Administration should be managing expectations with allies now as Bob Gates did with the KN-08. It would help to emphasize that bigger nuclear weapons wouldn’t really change our commitment to the defense of Japan and South Korea and that it would be suicide for North Korea to use a nuclear weapons of any kind. I don’t want to be alarmist. North Korea might simply test an HEU device or maybe a more efficient missile warhead. If they do try something fancier, it may not work – which means we might never know what it was. But it is important to understand that the range of North Korean possibilities may be much larger than we normally describe. …” (Jeffrey Lewis, “Setting Expectations for a DPRK Test,” Arms Control Wonk, January 29, 2013)

Seoul is considering pushing for tougher sanctions against Pyongyang in tandem with the U.S., China and Japan, officials said, warning of “grave consequences” for its possible third nuclear test. A senior Seoul official said “all possible options will be on the table,” but remained reluctant to touch on a military option, stressing that consultation with the concerned countries was under way. President Lee Myung-bak instructed Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin to ensure the top readiness posture, noting that the North was ratcheting up military tension on the peninsula at a time of a power transition in Seoul. Lee and senior officials in charge of security and foreign affairs met earlier in the day to explore punitive sanctions in the event of an atomic test and ways to address public anxiety over it. “The (Seoul) government urges North Korea to stop all provocative speeches and abide by international obligations, including those stipulated in U.N. Security Council resolutions,” said Cheong Wa Dae in a statement issued after the top security meeting. “We warn that should the North make another
provocation based on its misjudgment of the situation, it will face grave consequences.” The defense chief inspected an army unit near the tense inter-Korean border, ordering the military to keep high vigilance. “It is crucial to let the enemy know our strong posture and principle that we automatically strike back sufficiently and accurately at the origin of the provocation,” Defense Minister Kim said during the inspection. (Song Sang-ho, “Seoul Warns N. Ko of ‘Grave Consequences,” Korea Herald, January 31, 2013)

South Korea’s defense minister ordered an early development and deployment of long-range ballistic missiles that can hit all parts of North Korea. Minister Kim Kwan-jin visited a front-line unit to urge the military to stay vigilant against any provocations from the North after it threatened a third nuclear test in response to the U.N. Security Council sanction for December 12 rocket launch. “Many of North Korea’s missile bases are located in the rear (northern region),” Kim told soldiers in Yeoncheon, north of Seoul.

“When we are able to destroy the origin of provocations, ballistic missiles with an 800-kilometer range should be promptly put in place.” (Yonhap, “Defense Chief Calls for Early Deployment of 800-km Missiles,” Korea Herald, January 31, 2013)

The world is warning North Korea against going ahead with its third nuclear test, but inside the American intelligence community, some officials are quietly hoping it happens. A test could give them their first real view in years into whether the North has made significant progress toward a weapon that could threaten the United States or its allies. Since the North’s last test, in 2009, during President Obama’s first months in office, the United States has lost much of its visibility into what a former senior intelligence official says is on the cusp of becoming a “runaway program.” Inspectors have been ejected from the country, and new facilities to make nuclear fuel have appeared. And after the North warned last week that it would now conduct a “higher level” test “targeted” at the United States, Kurt M. Campbell, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia, conceded that “we don’t know the kind of test that is anticipated.” Now the hope is that an underground blast will answer several mysteries. Can the North Koreans produce a bomb out of uranium – a program they invited a visiting American nuclear scientist to glimpse two years ago – as well as the plutonium bombs that they exploded in 2006 and 2009? Can they make a warhead small enough to fit atop one of the long-range missiles they successfully tested last month? In short, is it possible that the country that gained a reputation as the Keystone Kops of nuclear nations, setting off nuclear explosions that sputtered and missiles that crashed into the sea, has actually gotten its act together to the point that it now may pose a significant threat? “It’s clear that there is now an expectation that this test could cross a threshold and yield data we haven’t had,” said Michael Green, a senior director for Asian affairs in the National Security Council under President George W. Bush. “We know a lot about their programs, but not the most important part: how far along are they? And we won’t know that until they test.” The test could show, he said, “whether they can build a bomb that can approach Hiroshima or Nagasaki levels, and that would tell us a lot about how far they have proceeded on weaponization.” The United States has already deployed equipment to measure the future test, including sensitive sniffing devices mounted on reconnaissance planes that may be able to answer the question of
whether the North has moved to a new generation of homemade uranium weapons. But the Americans are not the only ones who are focused on the North’s progress. So is Iran, which has been struggling with the same uranium technology for years, but has stopped short of conducting a test. “They will certainly be watching,” said Joseph R. DeTrani, who was the intelligence community’s top North Korea watcher for many years and went on to run the intelligence group created to fight weapons proliferation. “They want to see how it works, and they want to see how North Korea is treated by the rest of the world if they do another test.” The White House has played down the threat from the North and has repeated the mantra that a test would further “isolate” the country, a term that both the Obama and Bush administrations have used, to little effect. But senior American military commanders have noted that the missile that the North tested in December, which went as far as the Philippines and launched a small, light satellite, was a success—a notable change after several missiles fell quickly into the sea. Similarly, many nuclear experts viewed the North’s first two nuclear explosions as laughable flops, if not complete failures. The North set off its first bomb on October 9, 2006. Surprised analysts judged its strength to be less than one kiloton, or equal to less than 1,000 tons of high explosive. By contrast, the first nuclear blast by the United States was more than 20 times as powerful. Last year, James R. Clapper, the director of national intelligence, told Congress that federal analysts had judged the first explosion to be “a partial failure.” He added that the North’s second blast, on May 25, 2009, “appeared to be more technically successful,” with an estimated yield of about two kilotons. That was more impressive, but China’s second bomb test, nearly a half-century ago, was about 20 times as powerful. Now, some revisionism has set in. Top American scientists have questioned the accuracy of the intelligence community’s assessments of the tests, and its portrayal of the North’s nuclear engineers as bumbling amateurs. The split indicates just how difficult it can be to understand what is happening deep underground in the famously reclusive state. Siegfried S. Hecker, a Stanford professor who previously directed the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and Frank V. Pabian, a senior adviser on nuclear nonproliferation at Los Alamos, reanalyzed the global measurements of the distant rumbles in North Korea and concluded that Western observers had underestimated the power of the blasts. Their findings, published recently in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [8/6/12], said the first test could have yielded an explosion of up to one kiloton, and the second of up to seven kilotons. In an interview, Dr. Hecker said the higher figure suggested that the North Koreans were much closer to being able to produce a true weapon than first thought. “If they can do four,” Dr. Hecker said of the North Koreans, “they can do 20,” roughly the size of the weapon that leveled Hiroshima, Japan. As he acknowledges, the measurements are still in dispute. Nuclear experts at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California did their own reassessments and kept to the view that the first tests were small. The intelligence divisions of those two laboratories provide the government’s scientific estimates of foreign nuclear threats. “We haven’t been able to resolve the issue,” Dr. Hecker said. (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Nuclear Test Could Open Window on North Korea, New York Times, January 31, 2013, p. A-8)

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said he would shelve his long-held plan to review the 1993 government statement that expressed remorse for the suffering of “comfort women” before and during World War II. “The matter should not be turned into a political and
diplomatic issue,” Abe said in the Lower House in response to a question by Shii Kazuo, leader of the Japanese Communist Party. “I, as prime minister, will refrain from making further remarks.” Abe had previously said he wanted to review the statement released in the name of Kono Yohei, chief Cabinet secretary at the time. The statement apologized to the comfort women, who were forced to provide sex to Japanese soldiers, and also acknowledged the Japanese military’s involvement in establishing and managing “comfort” stations and transferring the women. Abe said in the Diet that he will abide by the official stances of his predecessors on the issue. “There have been many wars throughout history, involving infringement on the human rights of women,” Abe said. “When it comes to the issue of comfort women, my heart aches acutely when I think about those who had to go through painful experiences beyond description. I am no different from successive prime ministers on that point.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Abe: No Review of Kono Statement Apologizing to ‘Comfort Women,’” February 1, 2013)

A diplomatic source in Beijing told JoongAng Ilbo that “the Chinese authorities are viewing North Korea’s nuclear test as a serious concern and reviewing a variety of measures to be taken after the test.” “The most likely measure by China would be probably trimming the amount of aid provided for North Korea, which will cause Kim Jong-un’s regime difficulties in pushing forward with his economic reform plans,” the source said. The Chinese government decided to freeze the assets of a North Korean bank’s Beijing branch in protest of Pyongyang’s warning to stage a third nuclear test, Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported, citing its sources in Beijing. Since the defiant long-range rocket launch of Unha-3 in December 2012, China tightened up customs on travelers and cargo entering North Korea. (Kim Hee-jin and Lee Young-jong, “World Braces for North’s Imminent Nuclear Test,” Joongang Ilbo, February 2, 2013)

The sudden announcement that the US and South Korea are planning to hold a joint anti-submarine training exercise in the East Sea next week, and that a 6900-ton US nuclear submarine arrived at Masan’s Jinhae naval port on February 1, is being seen as a show of force directed at North Korea. The US is about to dispatch an aircraft carrier attached to the Seventh Fleet to Korea as well. “Even though this is being described as an exercise that had already been planned, there is little doubt that it will send North Korea a message that we will not simply look on if they do anything wrong,” a senior military official said. The US has from time to time used its nuclear capability as a means of pressuring North Korea to refrain from provocative action. In Nov. 2010, just after the North bombarded Yeonpyeong Island, the US sent the nuclear carrier USS George Washington to the region and conducted joint drills with South Korea. More than 19 years have passed since the nuclear submarine USS San Francisco entered Korean waters. The previous visit was in 1994, at a time of increased tensions following the first North Korean nuclear crisis and the death of North Korean founder Kim Il-sung. The USS San Francisco, which just arrived at Jinhae, belongs to US Naval Submarine Squadron 11, which is based in California. The vessel is 110.3 meters long and 10.1 meters wide and is equipped with torpedoes and Tomahawk cruise missiles. Currently moored in Busan and also meant to take part in the drill is the cruiser USS Shiloh (CZ-67), which has a displacement of 9800 tons. This Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser is armed with the latest SM-3 ship-based missile system, Tomahawk cruise missiles used for attacking ground-based targets, and torpedoes, in addition to
the anti-submarine helicopter MH-60R Seahawk. *Choson Shinbo*, published by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, which speaks for North Korea, today once again called for a reopening of peace talks. “As past attempts reveal, increasing sanctions will not change North Korea’s mind; all it does is aggravate the situation even further,” the newspaper said. “Returning to the peace talks is the only sure way of preventing war.” (Park Byong-su, “large South-U.S. Military Exercises to Involve Nuclear Submarine,” *Hankyore*, February 2, 2013)

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DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S., which masterminded the UN Security Council’s "resolution" against the DPRK’s launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2, supported and defended south Korea’s launch of satellite Naro, drawing worldwide censure and derision. A spokesman for the U.S. State Department made sophism that south Korea’s approach is, therefore, quite different from north Korea’s. The U.S. denied the DPRK’s right to launch satellite for no justifiable reason but blindly connived at the satellite launch by its stooge south Korea. This is the height of double standards and impudence. The successful launch of Kwangmyongsong 3-2 by the DPRK was the exercise of the legitimate right of a sovereignty state consistent with universally recognized international law. Even professional institutions in the U.S., to say nothing of the international community, admitted that the DPRK’s satellite goes around its orbit. This being a hard fact, the U.S. perpetrated the highhanded hostile act of deliberately negating the DPRK’s independent and legitimate right to satellite launch. This goes to prove that from the outset it intended to use the satellite launch as a new occasion of stifling the DPRK. The U.S. was wrong in seeking the adoption of UNSC "resolutions" which it cites whenever an opportunity presents itself to use as a pretext for denying the DPRK’s right to satellite launch. It forced the UNSC to enforce the hostile policy in a bid to block the DPRK’s scientific research into space and its economic development, trampling upon the universally accepted international law reflecting the general will of the international community in violation of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter which calls for respecting each country’s sovereignty and ensuring impartiality. Last year when it left no means untried to stifle the DPRK the U.S. allowed the south Korean puppets to drastically extend the range of missiles in violation of the missile non-proliferation regime cooked up by itself, straining the regional situation. Still overlooked is the brigandish logic that its stooges are allowed to do whatever they like and those countries hostile to it are not allowed to do anything and the law governing existence based on jungle law prevails. It is the situation of the present world. The American way of thinking, American standard may work on other countries but never on the DPRK. The army and people of the DPRK have launched an all-out struggle to defend the dignity and sovereignty of the country. The U.S. brazen-faced double standards and highhanded hostile act are bound to face the DPRK’s toughest retaliation.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts U.S. Double Standard over Satellite Launch Issue,” February 2, 2013)

CPRK Information Bulletin: “The puppet group of south Korea, much upset by the strong statement of the DPRK in reaction to the hostile measures taken at the UN, is working hard to take part in the "sanctions" in league with the U.S. just like a thief
crying “Stop the thief!” At an emergency meeting of ministers for diplomacy and security on January 31, traitor Lee, speaking loudly of the “north’s nuclear test and additional provocation and threats”, made provocative remarks calling for “tighter sanctions” and “counteraction”. Puppet Defense Minister Kim Kwan Jin, Chief of the Intelligence Service Won Se Hun and others fully backed him. Chon Yong U, chief of Diplomacy and Security in Chongwadae, Ryu U Ik, puppet minister of Unification, and other confrontation maniacs of south Korea said that “the north should choose one, either survival or nuclear weapons” and “stronger sanctions unbearable by the north have to be imposed.” The U.S. and the south Korean regime do not hesitate to make such outbursts as calling for not ruling out even military "sanctions". In the meantime, the U.S. ultra-modern war means are being amassed in south Korea and in the areas around the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. nuclear submarine and Aegis cruiser entered south Korea to hold combined marine exercises and to show off "military muscle" while the puppet army was put on “an alert to stand guard against the north.” Warmongers are inciting war fever while touring units in the forefront areas. The south Korean puppet group of traitors, which took an active part in the adoption of the unwarranted UN "resolution" against the Koreans, are now working hard to escalate confrontation with the DPRK and provoke a war against it while calling the DPRK’s counteraction for defending its inviolable sovereignty an “additional provocation”. This shows that the south Korean group consists of hooligans and matchless villains to exterminate the nation in collusion with outsiders. The Lee group’s anti-DPRK confrontation racket is a last-ditch effort of a man more dead than alive. The intention of the group is to make a bluff with the help of the American master and save its tarnished image even a bit. It also seeks to drive the situation to the extremes by brandishing the ball of fire, plunge the north-south ties into an irretrievable phase and hand over the baton of “sanctions” and “confrontation” to the next regime. The ever-more intensified confrontation racket on the part of the U.S., the Lee group and other hostile forces goes to prove that the UN "resolution on sanctions" against the DPRK is a product of the deliberate and planned intrigues to escalate the hostile steps against it to bar it from building an economic giant, and to isolate and stifle it. But they are seriously mistaken. The "sanctions" of the enemies further hardened the will and strength of all service personnel and people of the DPRK to defend their just cause and build the most powerful nation, a highly-civilized socialist nation under the banner of justice. The Lee group talks about “sanctions” in league with the U.S. and Japan. This reminds one of a puppy knowing no fear of the tiger as it is a suicidal act of jumping into fire with fagot. The DPRK already declared its toughest stand to cope with the hostile steps of the ferocious enemies, and its army and people are fully ready and waiting for only the time for final battle. The DPRK is fully ready for both economic and military "sanctions", and anyone who encroaches upon its dignity and sovereignty even a bit with any form of "sanctions" will not be able to avoid deadly retaliation. The Lee group should bear in mind that its participation in the "sanctions" against the DPRK will lead to a historical grand war for national reunification. Invincible is our just cause and no force on earth can arrest it. The Lee group should stop a foolish act, understanding the fierce nature of the history of stand-off between the DPRK and the U.S." (KCNA, “DPRK Will Retaliate against Provokers: CPRK Secretariat,” February 2, 2013)
KCNA: “An enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held under the guidance of Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the WPK, chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK, first chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army. Present there were members of the WPK Central Military Commission, staff members of the KPA Supreme Command and commanding officers of the large combined units including the navy, air force and anti-air force and strategic rocket force. The enlarge meeting of the WPK Central Military Commission discussed the issue of bringing about a great turn in bolstering up the military capability, true to the Songun revolutionary leadership of the WPK, and an organizational issue. Kim Jong Un made an important concluding speech which serves as guidelines for further strengthening the KPA into a matchless revolutionary army of Mt. Paektu and defending the security and sovereignty of the country as required by the WPK and the developing revolution. After listening to the historic speech made by Kim Jong Un with great excitement, the participants in the meeting extended highest glory and deepest thanks to Kim Jong Un, who is ushering in the greatest heyday of increasing the military capability with his extraordinary wisdom and stratagem, matchless grit and pluck and noble virtues and evinced their firm determination to unconditionally and thoroughly implement the militant tasks set forth by him in his speech. The enlarged meeting of the WPK Central Military Commission held at an important time when a turning phase is being opened in building a thriving socialist nation and achieving the cause of national reunification will mark an important occasion in powerfully encouraging the army and people of the DPRK all out in the general advance of the new year full of conviction of certain victory and optimism and bolstering up the defence capability of the country in every way.” (KCNA, “Enlarged Meeting of Central Military Commission of WPK Held under Guidance of Kim Jong-un,” February 3, 2013)
is being opened in building a thriving socialist nation and achieving the cause of national reunification will mark an important occasion in powerfully encouraging the army and people of the DPRK all out in the general advance of the new year full of conviction of certain victory and optimism and bolstering up the defense capability of the country in every way.” (KCNA, “DPRK’s Choice Will Be beyond Imagination of Hostile Forces: KCNA Commentary,” February 5, 2013)

South Korea will push for a stronger joint nuclear deterrence strategy with Washington should Pyongyang conduct a third nuclear test, a senior government official said. The two allies agreed last year to forge a “tailored deterrence strategy” by 2014 to cope with increasing threats from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. “We may have to talk about sure, strong measures when we negotiate with the U.S. (over the deterrence strategy) in the future. We should map out sure responses should our people be put under the threat of the North’s nuclear weapons,” he told reporters. “After a third nuclear test, the threat would become more real. For that, we should map out a stronger, more concrete one that could have a substantive (impact) on the North.” The official stressed that what is discussed at the South Korea-U.S. Extended Deterrence Policy Committee is how to cope with the threat from the possible use of nuclear arms while sanctions are what can be adopted in the diplomatic and economic realms with regard to nuclear experiments. The allies will continue to have working-level talks over the strategy at the EDPC in the first half of this year, he said. They will flesh out their vision over the strategy and have a more concrete form reported at the annual Security Consultative Meeting Slated for October. (Song Sang-ho, “Seoul, Washington Seek Strong Deterrence against N.K. Nukes,” Korea Herald, February 4, 2013)

The UN Security Council will take “very firm and strong” action against any nuclear test by North Korea, the council president said. Kim Sook, South Korea’s UN envoy, said the test appeared “imminent” and any blast would be ”a dangerous attempt to undermine the authority and credibility of the Security Council.” The 15-member council is “unified and they are very firm and resolute. I would expect very firm and strong measures to be taken,” Kim told reporters at the UN headquarters as his country assumed the council’s presidency for February. “We cannot sit idly by and do nothing vis-a-vis some devastating provocative action done by North Korea,” the envoy added. (AFP, “U.N. Council Vows ‘Strong’ Action on N. Korea Nuclear Test,” February 4, 2013)

South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak believes North Korea could detonate multiple devices when it goes ahead with a nuclear test expected in the coming weeks or even days. In an interview in Chosun Ilbo, Lee said “higher-level” suggested Pyongyang might attempt to detonate several devices. “North Korea is likely to carry out multiple nuclear tests at two places or more simultaneously” in order to maximise scientific gains from an event that will be globally condemned, Lee said. “If the North produces miniaturised weapons that can be used as warheads on missiles, it would really pose a threat,” Lee said. “That’s why the whole world is watching it so intensively.” In his interview, he suggested that diplomatic efforts would make little headway in bringing about a significant policy shift in Pyongyang. “I think it is difficult to persuade the North
regime to give up the nuclear path,” he said. (AFP, “N. Korea ’May Stage Multiple Nuclear Tests,’” February 4, 2013)

President Lee Myung-bak recalled that he warned North Korea via China following the North’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November of 2010 that Seoul will not tolerate any further provocations. “I conveyed my decision to China after North Korea’s provocation against Yeonpyeong Island that Seoul will retaliate not just targeting the source of the attack but supporting bases behind too, by mobilizing the Army, Navy and Air Force,” Lee told Chosun Ilbo. “I told China to convey this message to North Korea, and State Councilor Dai Bingguo went to Pyongyang to tell the North and informed me personally that the message had been conveyed.” Lee said he took those steps because North Korea’s provocations are based on the regime’s belief that South Korea and the U.S. will never retaliate. The outgoing president said he also urged the Air Force to strike the North after the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, but a high-ranking military officer stopped him by saying such a move must be discussed with the U.S. and that an aerial attack had to be avoided according to the rules of engagement. “After that, I revised the rules of engagement so that frontline commanders can first take aggressive action in response and then report it up the chain of command,” Lee said. (Chosun Ilbo, “Lee Recalls Getting Tough with N. Korea,” February 5, 2013)

Even if North Korea follows through with its threat to conduct a third nuclear test, Washington and its allies will have difficulty determining whether the device detonated is made of plutonium or uranium, a prominent American nuclear scientist and South Korean officials said. To find out which type of bomb is used, “you have to be very lucky,” said Siegfried S. Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and now a professor at Stanford University in California. He was speaking on the sidelines of a forum organized by Yonhap and Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. While scientists can determine the size of the explosion from its seismic signals, differentiating between a plutonium bomb and a highly enriched uranium bomb requires the quick detection and analysis of the different types of xenon gases produced in an atomic explosion. “The problem with xenon gases is that 10 to 20 hours after the detonation, it gets extremely difficult to tell their ratio difference between a plutonium and atomic bomb,” said a nuclear scientist affiliated with the South Korean military, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not allowed to talk to reporters on the record. “Since North Korea conducts its nuclear tests underground, it takes two to four days for the gases to get out, if they do at all. By then, it would be too late to tell the difference.” Dr. Hecker shared the concern. “If a next test is well contained, then we may learn nothing about the device detonated,” he said in an article posted on the Web site of Foreign Policy magazine on Tuesday. “However, one of the risks Pyongyang takes in trying to demonstrate a test at a higher level is that they may produce fissures that allow radioactive seepage, or possibly cause a major blowout from the tunnel.” (Choe Sang-hun, “U.S. May Have Trouble Gauging Nuclear Test,” New York Times, February 5, 2013)

Diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear ambition have been a failure, and South Korea, the U.S. and other nations must pay attention to the reality of
the North’s nuclear capability, a former U.S. defense chief and other experts said at a security forum in Seoul hosted by Yonhap and the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) of Stanford University. "When I consider where we are with North Korea today, compared with 13 years ago, I am compelled to conclude that diplomacy with North Korea in the past 13 years may well go down as the greatest diplomatic failure in our history," former U.S. defense chief William Perry told the forum. "They have built at least two uranium enrichment facilities, probably using one of these to build highly enriched uranium to increase their nuclear arsenal," Perry said. "One lesson we must learn from that is we should not continue the same losing diplomatic strategy," Perry said. Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear scientist at Stanford, called for South Korea and the U.S. to lay out a new policy aimed at limiting the North’s nuclear threat before the North’s nuclear ambitions become "an increasingly menacing and permanent fixture." "American and South Korean policies since 2002 designed to denuclearize North Korea have failed to halt the North’s relentless march to enhance its nuclear programs - from nuclear reactors, to uranium enrichment, to nuclear tests and its long-range missile capabilities," Hecker said. "Yet, in spite of the North’s threatening rhetoric, the nuclear threat is still in its infancy -- the worst is yet to come, unless the new administrations formulate policies that focus on limiting the threat," he said. Numerous analysts have raised doubts over Washington’s so-called "strategic patience" approach toward North Korea, a policy of shunning direct talks with the North until it agrees to abide by past nuclear commitments. "North Korea has now categorically stated its nuclear weapons are not negotiable," Hecker said. "South Korean and American actions must focus on those weapons being a temporary hedge rather than an increasingly menacing and permanent fixture." Hecker said North Korea will likely conduct its third nuclear test with a highly enriched uranium (HEU) explosion because there is "no plutonium in the pipeline." “The North’s Yongbyon nuclear facility has a potential for 2 tons of low-enriched uranium fuel per year or 40 kilograms of HEU per year," Hecker said. If North Korea follows through on its threats of a nuclear test with HEU, it will “potentially greatly expand size of their nuclear arsenal because we don’t know when and where they enrich uranium because it is so easy to hide.” During the forum, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Sung Kim called on North Korea to avoid any "provocative" moves. "We continue to call on the DPRK (North Korea) to avoid any provocative behavior, become a responsible neighbor, and return to an authentic and credible diplomatic process toward our shared goal of denuclearization," Kim said. "The process will not happen overnight. It will not be easy," Kim said. "But we will continue to press forward, in cooperation with our friends and allies in the region, to help build a Northeast Asia full of peace and prosperity." (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Confront Failure of Diplomacy with N. Korea,” February 5, 2013) One of the US’s best known experts on North Korea’s nuclear program says Washington and Seoul’s policies on containing the threat need to focus on a broader range of issues. Siegfried Hecker said that the policies to combat the nuclear threat need to focus on the economy, education, resources, culture, and exchange in order to be effective. He advocated a broader approach in response to North Korea’s imminent third nuclear test, rather than the hard line currently coming from the United Nations Security Council, with its emphasis on military actions such as preemptive strikes and a stronger naval blockade. Hecker, who first glimpsed North Korea’s large-scale, modernized uranium enrichment facilities during a visit in November 2010, made the remarks at an
international symposium in Seoul on the future of Northeast Asia. Describing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities as still at a beginning level, he also warned of a possible worst-case scenario if the administrations of Barack Obama and Park Geun-hye did not develop policies geared to contain the threat the country’s nuclear program poses. (Kang Tae-ho, “Expert Says Seoul and Washington’s Emphasis on N.K. Denuclearization Has Failed,” *Hankyore*, February 6, 2013)

A U.N. special investigator is urging the world body to open an inquiry into North Korea for possible crimes against humanity. U.N. special rapporteur Marzuki Darusman is recommending that the Geneva-based Human Rights Council investigate North Korea’s “grave, widespread and systematic violations of human rights.” Darusman’s report says a review of the isolated country’s record since 2004 shows the need for a probe to fully document the responsibility of government and individuals for alleged abuses “in particular where they amount to crimes against humanity.” The report cites nine patterns of violations such as prison camps and using food to control people. In a lengthy response, North Korea’s U.N. mission in Geneva calls the new U.N. report “politically motivated.” (Associated Press, “U.N. Report Urges Human Rights Probe of North Korea for Possible Crimes against Humanity,” February 5, 2013)

North Korea is not known for its subtlety, famous instead for its soaring patriotic rhetoric and threats to turn the capital of its rival, South Korea, into a “sea of fire.” But even by those standards, the latest volley of North Korea propaganda is noteworthy. Posted recently on YouTube, a video by one of the North’s propaganda agencies shows an animated version of Manhattan in flames – part of a dream in which a young Korean man envisions a glorious future of rocket launchings and the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The background music to the scenes of launchings and destruction: an instrumental version of “We Are the World.” “I see black smoke billowing somewhere in America,” the text that scrolls across the screen says in what are, in essence, subtitles of the man’s dream. “It appears that the headquarters of evil, which has had a habit of using force and unilateralism and committing wars of aggression, is going up in flames it itself has ignited.” By this afternoon, the video had been removed from YouTube after a copyright complaint from Activision, the maker of the video game “Call of Duty,” from which the fiery New York scene was lifted. Copies, however, were up elsewhere on the Web, including on Live Leak. The three-and-a-half-minute clip – titled “On Board Unha-9” and posted on YouTube on February 2 by Uriminzokkiri, a North Korean government Web site – is the latest evidence of the propaganda mileage Pyongyang is extracting from its December 12 launching of its Unha-3 rocket, which the West considers North Korea’s first successful test of long-range-missile technology. This is not the first time North Korea has portrayed attacks on the United States. Propaganda posters have shown a missile striking what looks like Capitol Hill. There is no evidence that the North has the ability to strike the United States mainland with missiles. (Choe Sang-hun, “In Propaganda Video, Only Pyongyang Sleeps Easy,” *New York Times*, February 6, 2013, p. A-4)

With rising expectations that North Korea will test a nuclear device, a special envoy of leader Kim Jong-un reportedly paid a secret visit to Beijing. “As far as I know, a high-ranking envoy from North Korea arrived in Beijing yesterday [this] morning by
airplane,” a source in Beijing told JoongAng Ilbo. “Although we haven’t confirmed specific identification of the envoy, we were told he is an official of the ruling Workers’ Party’s international affairs department.” South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense said a preemptive strike is also a possible option for the military in case Pyongyang attempts a nuclear attack on the South. “If the enemy [North Korea] is actually about to use a nuclear weapon, a pre-emptive strike is also one of our possible reactions,” Jung Seung-jo, chairman of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a briefing of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee. (Lee Young-jong and Kim Hee-jin, “North Sends a Top Envoy to Beijing, Says Source,” JoongAng Ilbo, February 6, 2013)

The South Korean military is pushing to deploy spy satellites to strengthen its surveillance of North Korea, a senior military official said, in light of growing missile and nuclear threats from the communist country. South Korea currently operates Arirang-3, a multipurpose satellite, which provides geographical information on the Korean Peninsula, including on North Korea’s missile and nuclear test sites. However, it still relies on the United States for much of its intelligence due to the commercial satellite’s limited vision and longer rotation period. “Although the South Korean military can mobilize various intelligence assets to monitor the North Korean military’s activities, its capability is limited in observing the control command and supporting facilities in the North,” a senior military official said. “To be able to independently monitor the enemy’s activities, the military will include the deployment of military spy satellites in the mid and long-term plan.” The official did not provide further details on the envisioned plan, which would cost time and lots of money to implement. (Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea Pushes for Development of Military Spy Satellites,” Yonhap, February 6, 2013)

South Korea faces a tough task in bolstering its deterrence capabilities against a North Korea feared to emerge as a genuine nuclear power if an impending third test is successful. Experts said Seoul and Washington should map out a comprehensive deterrence strategy, stressing that North Korean technology to miniaturize nuclear warheads, along with its ballistic missile capability, would pose a grave threat to security on the peninsula and beyond. Some emphasize a military approach to neutralize the nuclear threat while others stress more cautious, diplomatic methods such as strengthening the security alliance with the U.S. and deferring the transfer of wartime operational control slated for December 2015. “What is clear as evidenced by its preparation for another nuclear test is that the North has no intention of renouncing its nuclear program,” said Chun In-young, professor emeritus at Seoul National University.

“Whether we recognize its nuclear power status or not, whatever the rhetoric Seoul and Washington may use to describe the North’s nuclear programs, Pyongyang will have crossed the threshold through the next test. Then, Seoul needs to craft a new deterrence strategy,” Some military strategists argued that the South could consider “balancing nuclear power” against the North by developing its own nuclear arms or persuading the U.S. to redeploy its tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. Nuclear theorists claim that nuclear weapons are for political, deterrence purposes, as witnessed during the Cold War, which did not escalate into an all-out war between the U.S. and the then-Soviet Union due to the balance of terror stemming from “mutually
assured destruction.” “Theoretically, the only thing that can deter or block nuclear weapons is nuclear weapons,” said Lee Choon-kun, security expert at the Korea Economic Research Institute. “Although the U.S. ‘Barack Obama administration champions the vision of a nuclear-free world, South Korea has a different security environment exposed to a constant nuclear threat from the North. Seoul can ask for the redeployment of tactical nukes on the grounds that it would not build its own nuclear arsenal.” Some said that Seoul should seek to bring in tactical weapons and could propose to the North mutual nuclear arms reductions given that international diplomatic methods have borne little fruit. But others argue the disadvantages of bringing nuclear weapons to the South would outweigh the advantages. They cautioned that Seoul could face strong resistance not only from its ally the U.S. but also from the international community upholding the non-proliferation principle, and that its soft power accumulated through its active participation in global issues such as green growth and anti-piracy efforts would be undermined. Some also pointed out that neighboring states such as China and Japan would not accept a nuclear peninsula due to the possible fallout in case of a nuclear disaster. “Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear arms is driven by political motivations to raise its bargaining power. It is a last-resort political weapon. Thus, I am skeptical about the attempt to resolve a political issue through a military approach such as a preemptive strike,” said Kim Ho-sup, international politics professor at Chung-Ang University. “Seoul has long committed itself to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has played a pivotal role to keep world peace. Backing out of it would shake the country’s primary diplomatic policy line as well as the roots of the Korea-U.S. alliance.” He added that Seoul could propose the delay of the OPCON transfer should security conditions seriously deteriorate after another atomic test in the North. Another security expert echoed Kim’s view, stressing the importance of maintaining a robust alliance with the U.S. “The U.S. is confident about its security commitment to the South. In case of a pending nuclear threat, it could launch a nuclear strike from its submarine stationed near Okinawa, Japan. The Obama administration would not do things that would undermine its non-proliferation initiatives,” he said, declining to be named. “On top of that, it is, in some sense, meaningless for Seoul to seek nuclear arms. It can hardly catch up with others in terms of balancing regional nuclear power. The North is thought to have around 10 warheads while Japan can make many nukes quickly if it determined to do so.” At the bilateral Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, Seoul and Washington have discussed “tailored deterrence strategy.” The allies are expected to craft a concrete deterrence plan by the end of this year, Seoul officials said. The possible third nuclear test is expected to affect the allies’ discussion over the strategy. “After a third nuclear test, the threat would become more real. For that, we should map out a stronger, more concrete one that could have a substantive (impact) on the North,” a senior Seoul official told reporters earlier this week. If nuclear weapons are not an appropriate option for Seoul, it needs to develop asymmetrical capabilities and more sophisticated conventional weapons to fend off the North’s nuclear threats, experts said. The South can bolster its special operations forces that can be preeminently deployed to the North to eliminate or neutralize the enemy’s strategic arms such as weapons of mass destruction and key command structures. Seoul can also introduce strategic weapons such as unmanned drones or guided cruise missiles and bunker-busters to destroy key military bases including underground sites where the North’s leadership could hide in
Nam Chang-hee, security expert at Inha University, stressed the need to construct a three-way security cooperation mechanism with the U.S. and Japan; secure capabilities for stealth infiltration; and bolster intelligence-gathering and missile defense capabilities. “We need to build an intelligence-sharing mechanism for an early detection of North Korean missile launches while at the same time, exerting ‘coercive diplomacy’ to pressure Beijing, which wants to shun the deepening trilateral cooperation, to more actively exert its leverage to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions,” he said. “Through procuring stealth combat aircraft, we can also develop an operation plan to decapitate the North Korean leadership, so as to present to the North that we have non-nuclear retaliatory capabilities.” Nam also underscored that to bolster the alliance with the U.S. to help deter the North, Seoul should support the U.S. Forces Korea’s expanding role beyond the peninsula and seek ways to increase South Korea’s strategic security value for Washington. South Korea has been cautious about obviously supporting the U.S. policy of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific for fear of straining ties with China, its largest trade partner. (Song Sang-ho, “Seoul Faces Tough Choices to Contain N.K. Nuke Threat,” Korea Herald, February 6, 2013)

North Korea could conduct a nuclear test soon with either plutonium-based devices or highly enriched uranium, or with both, “a destabilizing event” that would prevent the United States from returning to negotiations but would not threaten the country, a former U.S. secretary of defense said. “I think they are technically ready or will be ready in a few weeks (for the nuclear test),” William Perry said in an interview with Yonhap. “It all depends on its political decision. The former defense secretary, however, dismissed the notion that the North’s long-range rockets or nuclear weapons will be a serious threat to the U.S. “Suppose North Korea has 10 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), but how can they threaten the U.S. that has more than a thousand ICBMs? I don’t think the North Korean government is suicidal,” he said. He also said any military options for the U.S. against Pyongyang are not practical, citing different circumstances now. In 1994, Washington prepared for an attack on the North when the communist country was beginning to produce plutonium at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, and Perry himself was involved in the plan. “In those days, all the North Korean nuclear facilities were in one place so that we can attack them with one strike. But now, facilities are spreading all over the country, and bombs could be moved around from place to place. So it’s not possible today to eliminate all the nuclear capability,” he said. Just as the U.S. did back then, the military option is “always the last possible alternative,” he said, advocating the launch of “an official dialogue.” “We need an official dialogue between senior officials of the U.S. and North Korea. Any unofficial dialogues can only be the stepping stone to the official one,” he said. “If North Korea goes ahead with the third nuclear test, that’s going to be a very destabilizing event, and it’s going to make it very difficult for the U.S. ever to get back into the negotiation position. It is going to make it almost impossible to start the Perry Process again,” he said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Not ‘Suicidal’ Enough to Attack U.S.: Perry,” Korea Herald, February 6, 2013)

In a familiar tactic of coupling saber-rattling and peace overtures, North Korea called for the incoming Seoul government’s efforts to put cross-border relations back on track amid signs of its impending nuclear test. Tokyo-based Choson Sinbo said that
resumption of inter-Korean dialogue hinged on Seoul’s attitude under President-elect Park Geun-hye. “In the wake of the United Nations Security Council sanctions, the new government’s behavior will be the touchstone for the ‘trust-building process’ for the normalization of the North-South relations,” the newspaper said. North Korea “has concluded that the U.S.’ hostile policy had reached its peak through the UNSC resolution and declared the end of denuclearization talks,” it said. “But there is enough possibility for the opening of the window of dialogue if the South attempts to resolve the standoff for the people’s common interests.” It has also lashed out at a South Korea and U.S. joint naval exercise and a smaller drill by the South Korean military early this week, accusing them of preparing for war. “If anyone touches the Gaeseong district at all, we will consider it to be an atrocious sanction against us and take stern measures such as withdrawing all incentives associated with the complex and recreating the area as our military zone,” the North’s National Economic Cooperation Committee said in a statement carried by KCNA. With the unruly state seen as technically ready for another detonation, neighboring countries have been ramping up warnings and last-ditch diplomacy to facilitate policy coordination.

In Washington, State Department Victoria Nuland reiterated that the U.S. “remains firmly committed to the undertakings in UNSC Resolution 2087, and if provocations continue, there will be continued consequences.” (Shin Hyon-hee, “N.K. Sends Mixed Signals,” Korea Herald, February 7, 2013)

The South Korean government is under the impression that if North Korea goes ahead with its third nuclear test, it would likely use a small and lightweight nuclear warhead that could be mounted on a missile. It also appears likely that it will use highly enriched uranium instead of plutonium, which it is difficult to produce more of. Speaking before the National Assembly’s national defense committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Jung Seung-jo said the military was “not ruling out the possibility that North Korea will test a boosted weapon as the next stage before, a hydrogen bomb using nuclear fusion.” Even if it does come with a light enough warhead, another question is whether it is capable of linking it to its rocket launch technology. In principle, a country that is capable of launching a satellite can also develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). But Siegfried Hecker was skeptical, saying it would take several launch attempts, and about five years, to develop a functioning ICBM because of the necessary reentry technology. (Kim Kyu-won, “North Korea Could Be Developing Hydrogen Bomb,” Hankyore, February 7, 2013)

DPRK National Economic Cooperation Committee spokesman’s statement: “The puppet Ministry of Unification of south Korea in a business report to “the National Assembly” on February 4 said inspection would be intensified of the things carried into the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ), crying out for an “effective implementation” of the UN “resolution on sanctions against the north” and “corresponding payment be imposed upon the banned goods.” In this regard the spokesman for the ministry blustered this step would mean that south Korea would remain true to the UN “resolution on sanctions”, asserting that the items banned by the UN are possible to find their ways to the north via the KIZ. This step is another reckless action to escalate the confrontation with the DPRK and a criminal act of putting the inter-Korean relations into an inescapable collapse. As known to everybody, the KIZ, a product of the historic June 15 era of reunification, is a symbol of national reconciliation, unity and
cooperation as it was built after the north provided the militarily most sensitive forefront area to the south. That is why the KIZ drew great attention of all Koreans and the world and evoked positive response internally and externally since its proclamation. The Lee Myung Bak group, however, has made persistent efforts to remove the KIZ, resorting to vicious moves to deny and violate the north-south joint declarations soon after its seizure of power. … The group is sadly mistaken if it thinks its "sanctions" against the KIZ will be pressure on the north. We hope the KIZ will continue operating in the spirit of the June 15 era of reunification but if someone makes any form of provocation to the KIZ, we will consider it as vicious "sanctions" against us and take such resolute counter-actions as withdrawing all privileges for the KIZ and restoring the area as a military zone. In this case the Lee Myung Bak group will be held wholly accountable for the ensuing grave consequences. It had better behave itself, keenly aware of the dear price it will have to pay for its reckless "sanctions" against the KIZ.” (KCNA, “S. Korea Will Have to Pay Dearly for ‘Sanctions’ against KIZ,” February 7, 2013)

An editorial in the Global Times, a sister tabloid to the People’s Daily, stated that relations between Beijing and Pyongyang “now face a new challenge” with an imminent third nuclear test from North Korea. “If North Korea insists on a third nuclear test despite attempts to dissuade it, it must pay a heavy price,” it continued. As a potential consequence, the editorial stated, “The assistance it will be able to receive from China should be reduced.” “Pyongyang’s diplomacy is characterized with [sic] toughness,” it continued. “But if Pyongyang gets tough with China, China should strike back hard, even at the cost of deteriorating bilateral relations.” “There is a general principle: China is never afraid of Pyongyang,” the editorial affirmed. It went to say that Pyongyang was “important to China, but not important enough to make China give up its diplomatic principles.” “China is willing to maintain the Sino-North Korean friendship, but Pyongyang should do the same,” it added. It also said the Chinese government should make it clear that aid will be reduced “to shatter any illusions Pyongyang may have,” advising North Korea not to misread China’s signals. It went on to address claims about the issue being used as a diplomatic weapon. “Some believe the US, Japan and South Korea are attempting to foment discord between China and North Korea . . . but China shouldn’t be taken hostage by North Korea’s extreme actions in order to avoid such a trap,” it said. The Global Times added, “We are not advocating giving up the Sino-North Korean friendship. Instead, we believe the strategic significance of a friendly relationship is special. But Pyongyang shouldn’t misread China. China won’t put its relations with Pyongyang above other strategic interests.” A diplomatic source in Beijing said, “The Chinese government is trying to prevent North Korea’s nuclear test because of the leadership transition to Xi Jinping becoming president next month. But if North Korea goes ahead with the nuclear, China will likely work to reduce the level of the international sanctions.” (Hankyore, “Chinese Newspaper Says Pyongyang Should Pay a Heavy Price for Nuke Test,” February 6, 2013)
response. I’m just wondering what makes you think this – the most recent UN resolution or the next one will have any effect. **MS. NULAND:** Well, again, what we can do here is ensure that the Six Parties are unified in their response, as we did in crafting UN Security Council Resolution 2087. We can ensure that that’s not just a piece of paper, that those sanctions are implemented around the international community and in all of our member countries, which we are very much doing. And we can continue to make clear, all of us, publicly and privately, as we are, to the North – to the government of the DPRK that if they continue down this provocative path, there will be more, as it says in 2087. **Q:** -- As I mentioned yesterday, South Korea and the United States is considering preemptive strikes to North Korea. And how is the United States position of these preemptive strikes against North Korea? Could the U.S. cooperate to South Korea or -- **MS. NULAND:** Well, obviously we don’t take anything off the table. We never do. But we are focused on the path laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 2087, which is to continue to exert economic pressure if, in fact, the North Koreans don’t change their course.” (DoS, Daily Briefing, February 7, 2013)

DPRK National Economic Cooperation Committee spokesman: “The puppet Ministry of Unification of south Korea in a business report to “the National Assembly” on Feb. 4 said inspection would be intensified of the things carried into the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ), crying out for an “effective implementation” of the UN "resolution on sanctions against the north" and "corresponding payment be imposed upon the banned goods." In this regard the spokesman for the ministry blustered this step would mean that south Korea would remain true to the UN "resolution on sanctions", asserting that the items banned by the UN are possible to find their ways to the north via the KIZ. This step is another reckless action to escalate the confrontation with the DPRK and a criminal act of putting the inter-Korean relations into an inescapable collapse. As known to everybody, the KIZ, a product of the historic June 15 era of reunification, is a symbol of national reconciliation, unity and cooperation as it was built after the north provided the militarily most sensitive forefront area to the south. That is why the KIZ drew great attention of all Koreans and the world and evoked positive response internally and externally since its proclamation. The Lee Myung Bak group, however, has made persistent efforts to remove the KIZ, resorting to vicious moves to deny and violate the north-south joint declarations soon after its seizure of power. It worked with bloodshot eyes to stifle the KIZ by limiting or interrupting the entry of south Koreans and the shipment of items particularly whenever the situation got strained. The group hamstrung our sincere efforts to revitalize the KIZ, seriously mocking at them and persistently disregarding them. It claims that the north greatly benefited from the operations in the KIZ, but it is nothing but a sheer paradox. The north offered the KIZ to the south entirely for the sake of national reconciliation, unity and reunification and out of its compatriotic feeling for the minor enterprises and poor people in south Korea. It was a resolute step that we provided the whole KIZ of great military importance. Is it possible to properly calculate the action? It is something shocking that the ministry looking after “the policy towards the north” and its boss took the lead in kicking up the “sanctions” row. The present catastrophic phase is entirely attributable to those elements who stand in the way of inter-Korean relations to escalate the confrontation with compatriots. Their trumpeting about “sanctions” against the KIZ is as foolish an act as pricking its own
eyes. Its consequences would be unimaginable. The group is sadly mistaken if it thinks its "sanctions" against the KIZ will be pressure on the north. We hope the KIZ will continue operating in the spirit of the June 15 era of reunification but if someone makes any form of provocation to the KIZ, we will consider it as vicious "sanctions" against us and take such resolute counter-actions as withdrawing all privileges for the KIZ and restoring the area as a military zone. In this case the Lee Myung Bak group will be held wholly accountable for the ensuing grave consequences. It had better behave itself, keenly aware of the dear price it will have to pay for its reckless "sanctions" against the KIZ."

(KCNA, “S. Korea Will Have to Pay Dearly for "Sanctions" against KIZ,” February 7, 2013)

2/8/13

"The U.S. and hostile forces jumped to conclusions that the republic is planning the third nuclear test, citing their hypothesis and argument," the propaganda weekly Tongil Sinbo said Friday in an article posted on a Web site operated by the North. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Says World Mistakenly Interprets Its ‘Important Measures’ as Nuclear Test,” February 10, 2013)

2/9/13

Despite rising cross-border tension, the trade between South and North Korea reached a record high last year. The volume of trade between the two Koreas reached US$1.97 billion in 2012, inching up from the previous record of $1.91 billion in 2010, according to the data by the Korea Customs Service. South Korean products worth $896.26 million were shipped to North Korea, up 13.4 percent from the previous year. The amount of exports from the North jumped 19.3 percent on-year to $1.07 billion. A total of 99 percent of the volume was shipped through a land route linked to the inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong. (Yonhap, “Inter-Korean Trade Hits Record High in 2012,” February 9, 2013)

2/10/13

In an interview with Hankyore, Tony Namkung said the outcome depended on the response from Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo, but added that the most important factor would be the North Korea policy of South Korean President-elect Park Geun-hye, who is set to take office on Feb. 25. According to Namkung, Pyongyang is watching closely right now to see what Park will do - and could call its test off if she shows a willingness to work proactively on improving relations.

“Hani: What kind of gesture can Park Geun-hye make to improve relations? Namkung: Maybe something like a personnel exchange. It could be helpful, the kind of exchange where the government is sanctioning it indirectly without actively pushing it. For instance, you have things like the Pyongyang performance by the New York Philharmonic orchestra a few years back. It might also help to have unofficial meetings between officials. Hani: How does North Korea see Park Geun-hye? Namkung: If you listen to the things they say off the record, there seems to be a lot of interest in what kinds of policies she has in store. It may be because she said some positive things during her 2002 visit to North Korea. So I think they’re taking a wait-and-see approach. Hani: What kinds of policies do you think Park Geun-hye needs to proceed with? Namkung: I’m sure the people in North Korea would like to see her being like liberal former Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. She’s going to have to find the middle ground between the Sunshine Policy and the policies of the Lee Myung-bak administration. She needs to stress for the resumption of dialogue more than they’re
doing now. Hani: Park Geun-hye has talked about the “Korean Peninsula trust-building process.” Do you think that’s feasible? Namkung: I think it’s vital for the North and South Korean foreign ministries to communicate through the official diplomatic channels. There’s a lot of symbolic value to that, because it’s a meeting between diplomatic authorities who represent two sovereign states. At a meeting like that, they might be able to discuss security issues. But it’s important that the two foreign ministries initiate this bilateral dialogue rather than making it part of the six-party talks. It can serve as a sign of mutual respect. Also, the South Korean Ministry of Unification and North Korea’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea could discuss other issues like separated families, travel, and investment.” (Park Hyun, “Park Guen-hye’s Response to North Korea’s Provocations Will Be Crucial,” Hankyore, February 12, 2013)

KCNA: “A meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) took place here on Monday [February 11]. Present there were members of the Presidium, members and alternate members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK. The meeting adopted a decision “On marking the 65th anniversary of the DPRK and the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War as grand festivals of victors.” The decision emphasized the need to further deepen and accomplish the sacred cause of holding in high esteem the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il as eternal leaders of the WPK and the revolution. The decision called for splendidly and significantly organizing political events marking the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War and the 65th anniversary of the DPRK. According to it, various political events will be held with splendor to mark the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War. They will include a parade of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), mass demonstration of Pyongyang citizens, grand mass gymnastic and artistic performance “Arirang” and army-people joint meeting with war veterans. The decision stressed the need to successfully rebuild the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum and spruce up the revolutionary battle sites, revolutionary sites and revolutionary museums including the revolutionary museum at Kim Il Sung University, the Museum of the Fatherland Liberation War and the Jonsung Revolutionary Museum. It called for newly building a martyrs cemetery of the KPA in Pyongyang and sprucing up KPA martyrs cemeteries and monuments to the fallen fighters of the KPA in various parts of the country. It underlined the need to resolutely foil all the hostile forces’ moves to isolate and stifle the DPRK by achieving proud victory in building an economic power and improving the people’s living standard. It also underscored the need for all fields and units to do a lot of good works for the prosperity of the country and its people’s happiness on the occasion of the 65th birthday of the Republic. It called for staging an all-out action of high intensity for reliably protecting the security and sovereignty of the country in view of the prevailing grave situation and marking the 65th anniversary of the DPRK and the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War with fresh achievements in bolstering up capability for self-defense. It stressed the need to continue launching satellites of Kwangmyongsong series and powerful long-range rockets. It called on the KPA to keep itself fully ready for combat and put maximum spurs to rounding off its combat preparedness in order to bolster up one-beats-a hundred combat capability.
stressed that once an order is issued, the KPA should blow up the stronghold of aggression at a strike and wipe out the brigandish U.S. imperialists and south Korean puppet army to the last man and thus accomplish the historic cause of national reunification. The decision called for sincerely helping the army and significantly conducting the work for putting forward and preferentially treating the war veterans and wartime merited persons as a social movement on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the war victory. It underscored the need to give further spurs to building a highly civilized socialist nation. It referred to the tasks for completing the preparations for the universal 12-year compulsory education within this year, establishing a medical information service network and telemedicine system, building a children’s hospital, a dental hospital and a recovery center and winding up the first phase project for updating the Hungnam Pharmaceutical Factory. It also underscored the need to build a modern combined center for sports trainings and different kinds of mass sporting facilities and raise hot wind of sports throughout the country. It called for face-lifting the central part of Pyongyang and building more modern cultural facilities including pleasure grounds and Munsu Wading Pool. The decision stressed the need to arouse all compatriots to the struggle for resolutely foiling the anti-DPRK moves and "sanctions" racket of the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet group of traitors and thoroughly implementing the June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration so as to open up a new phase for national reunification. It called for conducting external activities to grandly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War as a common event for the anti-imperialist independent forces and the world progressive people.” (KCNA, “Political Bureau of WPK Central Committee Meets,” February 12, 2013)

North Korea tested an engine for its new long-range missiles, government sources here said February 17. Pyongyang carried out a function test of the engine for its long-range “KN-08” missiles on the Dongchang-ri launch site in North Pyongan Province, according to multiple government sources. “It appears that North Korea conducted the engine test aimed at extending the range of the KN-08 missile to over 5,000 kilometers,” said a source. “If the North decides the test successful, it is expected to operationally deploy the new long-range rocket,” he added. “What deserves attention is that the North carried out the engine test despite being aware of the fact that the U.S. surveillance satellite would detect the move,” said another source. “The engine test right before its third nuclear test would be intended to intensify its threat to the U.S. and its allies,” he added. (Korea Herald, “N. Korea Tested Long-Range Missile Engine before Nuke Blast,” February 17, 2013)

North Korea claimed that it successfully conducted its third underground nuclear test at its northeastern site, drawing strong condemnation from the international community, including the governments of South Korea and the United States. Hours after an unusual seismic tremor was detected at the North’s Punggye-ri nuclear test complex, KCNA said that the detonation was of a “high level” using a smaller device compared to its previous two nuclear tests. “The test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power,” the KCNA said in the English dispatch, adding that the test did not have any adverse effects on the surrounding environment.
“The specific features of the function and explosive power of the A-bomb and all other measurements fully tallied with the values of the design, physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK’s (North Korea) nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.” Confirming a third nuclear test, South Korea’s government issued a statement, saying the nuclear test “is an unacceptable threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the region and a head-on challenge to the international community,” and “North Korea won’t be able to avoid grave responsibility,” it said, noting South Korea will try to take every possible measure to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs, including taking matter in the UNSC. The UN body is expected to convene an emergency meeting to discuss the latest provocation at 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday (New York time). U.S. President Barack Obama also said Tuesday that North Korea’s announcement of another nuclear test is a “highly provocative act” and pledged all necessary actions to defend his country and its allies.South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan called U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and pledged “swift and unified” action at the U.N. over North Korea’s third nuclear test. Seoul’s Korea Meteorological Administration detected a magnitude 4.9 tremor at 11:57:50 a.m. with its epicenter located in Kilju County. The area, located in North Hamgyeong Province in the northeastern part of the communist country, is home to the North’s Punggye-ri nuclear test complex that was used in the 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests. Other seismic detection agencies in other countries also picked up the artificial quake. South Korea’s defense ministry said the latest detonation resulted in a 6-7 kiloton atomic explosion that fell shy of a yield from a “boosted fission weapon” that some experts speculated the North wanted to test this time around. A kiloton is equal to 1,000 tons of conventional TNT explosive. It said while the detonation resulted in a blast larger than the 1 kiloton device that Pyongyang used for its first test and the 2-6 kiloton weapon used in the second experiment, it was not as powerful as the 13 kiloton bomb dropped on Hiroshima by the United States at the end of World War II. An official said that judging by the overall yield as checked by seismic readings, the explosion was not “normal.” (Yonhap, “N. Korea Claims Successful Nuclear Test,” February 12, 2013) Outside watchers say that the North’s high-stake nuclear test is aimed at building a smaller weapon because it’s the key ICBM technology, though it was not immediately clear whether the reclusive state used uranium or plutonium to build its latest atomic bomb. “If the third test produced stronger explosive yield with smaller amount of plutonium, it is believed to have made progress in making a smaller nuclear warhead,” said Jung Yong-hoon, a nuclear science professor at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology. South Korea's defense ministry said seismic data suggested the nuclear test had a yield of 6-7 kilotons. South Korea’s intelligence agency chief said Pyongyang is making progress towards building a smaller and lighter bomb, but doubted whether the North detonated a bomb with “great explosive power,” calling the North’s announcement an “exaggerated advertisement.” “We don’t need to worry about North Korea’s nuclear capacity with overly exaggerated assessment, though we shouldn’t ease down defense posture,” Won Sei-hoon, the chief of the National Intelligence Service, was quoted as saying during a parliamentary meeting. “We don’t see the North has succeeded in mastering miniaturization technology,” another senior intelligence official said during a closed parliamentary meeting convened after the test. (Yonhap, “N. Korea’s Nuclear Test Aimed at Making Nuclear-Tipped ICBM: Experts,” February 12, 2013) President Lee Myung-bak and President-elect Park Geun-
hye held an emergency meeting at Cheong Wa Dae, and condemned the North’s action. “We will stress all steps, including taking it to the United Nations, to make the North give up its nuclear weapons,” said senior presidential secretary Chun Young-woo after a National Security Council meeting presided over by Lee. “We will push for the early deployment of missiles, which are under development, that can cover the North in its entirety.” Park also issued a strong condemnation through her spokeswoman. “We won’t tolerate North Korea’s nuclear weapons,” she said. “The North should realize it has nothing to gain from this provocation.” Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin said during a meeting of the National Assembly National Defense Committee, “We were notified of the North’s planned test in advance on Monday by the United States.” The North had conveyed its test schedule to Washington through its New York channel, he said. Regarding the matter, the defense ministry said that it couldn’t definitely say what material was used. “Some say a boosted fission weapon could have been used but considering the strength of the bomb it couldn’t belong in that category,” said an Army officer. In a meeting with lawmakers of the National Assembly Intelligence Committee, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) said that it was too early to say the North had succeeded in weaponizing its nuclear technology. “North Korea has yet to complete the technology for shrinking and lightening a nuclear device to build a missile warhead,” the NIS said. The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command raised its Watch Condition, or Watchcon, to level 2 from 3, to effectively cope with a possible military threat by the North. (Chung Min-uck, “N.K. Presses on with Nuke Test,” Korea Times, February 12, 2013) A global nuclear test monitoring agency said in April it had detected radioactive xenon gases that could have come from the February 12 underground explosion. But the measurement gave no indication of which material was used. “We would very much like to know whether it is plutonium or highly enriched uranium,” U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker, who has visited North Korea, told a news conference. “But in the end - unless the xenon people get very lucky, very soon - we just don’t know. There is no other way to tell,” he said, referring to the analysts of such radioactive traces. Large amounts of xenon gases are produced in fission, an atomic reaction occurring both in nuclear arms and reactors. To distinguish between plutonium and uranium, it helps if the detection is made soon after the test and the amount of gases released is large, experts say. “The sooner, the better,” said Mika Nikkinen of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), the Vienna-based monitoring body which registered the February blast virtually instantaneously via seismic signals around the world. Speaking at the same event, he suggested the fissile source in the device detonated by the North would not be known “until somebody is able to get” to the test site and see what is there. Anders Ringbom, deputy research director at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, said it was not possible to determine the material on the basis of the gases picked up two months ago. “If we look at the (isotope) ratios you cannot distinguish in this case because the release was so late,” he said. (Fredrik Dahl, “North Korea Nuclear Test Still Shrouded in Mystery,” Reuters, June 18, 2013)

KCNA: “The scientific field for national defense of the DPRK succeeded in the third underground nuclear test at the site for underground nuclear test in the northern part of the DPRK on Tuesday. The test was carried out as part of practical measures of counteraction to defend the country’s security and sovereignty in the face of the
ferocious hostile act of the U.S. which wantonly violated the DPRK’s legitimate right to launch satellite for peaceful purposes. The test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power. It was confirmed that the test did not give any adverse effect to the surrounding ecological environment. The specific features of the function and explosive power of the A-bomb and all other measurements fully tallied with the values of the design, physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence that has become diversified. The nuclear test will greatly encourage the army and people of the DPRK in their efforts to build a thriving nation with the same spirit and mettle as displayed in conquering space, and offer an important occasion in ensuring peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and the region.” (KCNA, “KCNA Report on Successful 3rd Underground Nuclear Test,” February 12, 2013)

DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement: “The DPRK’s third nuclear test is a resolute step for self-defense taken by it to cope with the U.S. hostile act against it.

Its successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 in December last year was a peaceful one from A to Z which was conducted according to its plan for scientific and technological development for economic construction and the improvement of the standard of people’s living. The world including hostile countries recognized its application satellite’s entry into orbit and greatly admired its development of space technology.

The U.S., however, again prodded the UN Security Council into cooking up a new “resolution on sanctions” against the DPRK, terming its satellite launch a violation of the UNSC’s “resolution”.

Encroaching upon the right to satellite launch is an unpardonable grave hostile act as it is an infringement on the DPRK’s sovereignty.

By origin, the DPRK had neither need nor plan to conduct a nuclear test. The DPRK’s nuclear deterrence has already acquired the trustworthy capability strong enough to make a precision strike at bases for aggression and blow them up at a single blow no matter where they are on the earth.

It was the DPRK’s goal to focus efforts on economic construction and the improvement of the standard of people’s living by dint of nuclear deterrence for self-defense provided by the great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il all their lives.

The DPRK exercised its maximum self-restraint when the U.S. fabricated the “presidential statement” over its satellite launch for peaceful purposes by abusing the UNSC in April last year.

But the DPRK’s patience reached its limit as the U.S. intensified such hostile act as implementing before anyone else the UNSC’s “resolution on sanctions”, far from apologizing for its renewed wanton violation of the DPRK’s right to satellite launch.

The main objective of the current nuclear test is to express the surging resentment of the army and people of the DPRK at the U.S. brigandish hostile act and demonstrate the will and capability of Songun Korea to defend the sovereignty of the country to the last.

The DPRK’s nuclear test is a just step for self-defense not contradictory to any international law.
The U.S. has long put the DPRK on the list of preemptive nuclear strike. It is quite natural just measure for self-defense to react to the U.S. ever-increasing nuclear threat with nuclear deterrence.

The DPRK withdrew from the NPT after going through legitimate procedures and chose the way of having access to nuclear deterrence for self-defense to protect the supreme interests of the country.

There have been on the earth more than 2,000 nuclear tests and at least 9,000 satellite launches in the UN history spanning over 60 years but there has never been a UNSC resolution on banning any nuclear test or satellite launch.

It is the U.S. that has conducted more nuclear tests and launched more satellites than any others. It, however, cooked up the UNSC’s "resolution" banning only the DPRK’s nuclear test and satellite launch. This is the breach of international law and the height of double standards.

Had the UNSC been impartial even a bit, it would not have taken issue with a sovereign state’s exercise of the right to self-defense and its scientific and technological activities for peaceful purposes but with the U.S. policy for preemptive nuclear strike, a threat to global peace and security, to begin with. The current nuclear test is the primary countermeasure taken by the DPRK in which it exercised its maximum self-restraint.

If the U.S. takes a hostile approach toward the DPRK to the last, rendering the situation complicated, it will be left with no option but to take the second and third stronger steps in succession.

The inspection of ships and maritime blockade touted by the hostile forces will be regarded as war actions and will invite the DPRK’s merciless retaliatory strikes at their strongholds.

The U.S., though belatedly, should choose between the two options: To respect the DPRK’s right to satellite launch and open a phase of detente and stability or to keep to its wrong road leading to the explosive situation by persistently pursuing its hostile policy toward the DPRK.

In case the U.S. chooses the road of conflict finally, the world will clearly see the army and people of the DPRK defend its dignity and sovereignty to the end through a do-or-die battle between justice and injustice, greet a great revolutionary event for national reunification and win a final victory.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Urges U.S. to Choose between Two Options,” February 12, 2013)

KCNA: “The scientific field for national defense of the DPRK succeeded in the third underground nuclear test at the site for underground nuclear test in the northern part of the DPRK [today]. The test was carried out as part of practical measures of counteraction to defend the country’s security and sovereignty in the face of the ferocious hostile act of the U.S. which wantonly violated the DPRK’s legitimate right to launch satellite for peaceful purposes. The test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power. It was confirmed that the test did not give any adverse effect to the surrounding ecological environment. The specific features of the function and explosive power of the A-bomb and all other measurements fully tallied with the values of the design, physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence that has become diversified. The nuclear test will greatly
encourage the army and people of the DPRK in their efforts to build a thriving nation with the same spirit and mettle as displayed in conquering space, and offer an important occasion in ensuring peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and the region." (KCNA, “KCNA Report on Successful 3rd Underground Nuclear Test,” February 12, 2013)

White House statement: “North Korea announced today that it conducted a third nuclear test. This is a highly provocative act that, following its December 12 ballistic missile launch, undermines regional stability, violates North Korea’s obligations under numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions, contravenes its commitments under the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and increases the risk of proliferation. North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs constitute a threat to U.S. national security and to international peace and security. The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korean provocations and steadfast in its defense commitments to allies in the region. These provocations do not make North Korea more secure. Far from achieving its stated goal of becoming a strong and prosperous nation, North Korea has instead increasingly isolated and impoverished its people through its ill-advised pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The danger posed by North Korea’s threatening activities warrants further swift and credible action by the international community. The United States will also continue to take steps necessary to defend ourselves and our allies. We will strengthen close coordination with allies and partners and work with our Six-Party partners, the United Nations Security Council, and other UN member states to pursue firm action.” (White House, Statement by the President on North Korean Announcement of a Nuclear Test,” February 12, 2013)

In a phone conversation, President Barack Obama and his South Korean counterpart, President Lee Myung-bak, pledged unswerving unity in coping with North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile threats. “They agreed to work closely together, including at the United Nations Security Council, to seek a range of measures aimed at impeding North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and reducing the risk of proliferation,” the White House said in a press release.

“President Obama unequivocally reaffirmed that the United States remains steadfast in its defense commitments to the Republic of Korea, including the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella,” it added. The phone talks between Obama and Lee came as the U.N. Security Council had an one-hour emergency session in New York, in which its members strongly condemned Pyongyang’s behavior. “To address the persistent danger posed by North Korea’s threatening activities, the U.N. Security Council must and will deliver a swift, credible, and strong response by way of a Security Council resolution that further impedes the growth of DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its ability to engage in proliferation activities,” U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice told reporters after the meeting. (Korea Times, “Obama Vows Nuclear Deterrence for S. Korea,” February 13, 2013) “Nonproliferation may seem to be a doable option to break the current deadlock with North Korea. But it must take substantial risks for political leaders not just to abandon the denuclearization concept but also to talk your own allies and partners into following suit, given saber-rattling and provocations we’ve seen all the while,” a senior Foreign Ministry official
said on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the subject. "It’s like you admit the failure of diplomacy, which the international community has prioritized for so long in resolving any confrontation, and end up acceding to demands of a rogue state. I don’t think either Seoul or Washington is ready for that." (Shin Hyon-hee, “Security Dynamics Take on New Aspect,” Korea Herald, February 13, 2013)

Obama State of the Union: “The regime in North Korea must know that they will only achieve security and prosperity by meeting their international obligations. Provocations of the sort we saw last night will only isolate them further, as we stand by our allies, strengthen our own missile defense, and lead the world in taking firm action in response to these threats. Likewise, the leaders of Iran must recognize that now is the time for a diplomatic solution, because a coalition stands united in demanding that they meet their obligations, and we will do what is necessary to prevent them from getting a nuclear weapon. At the same time, we will engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals, and continue leading the global effort to secure nuclear materials that could fall into the wrong hands – because our ability to influence others depends on our willingness to lead.” (President Obama, State of the Union Address, February 12, 2013)

President-elect Park Geun-hye named her long-time foreign policy brain Yun Byung-se as foreign minister and former Army general Kim Byung-kwan, who served as deputy commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, as her defense minister. (Chang Jae-soon, “Park Names Long-Time Foreign Policy Brain Yun as Foreign Minister,” Yonhap, February 13, 2013)

The Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) will convene on February 21 in Washington, its first meeting since the North’s recent nuclear test, to discuss ways to share intelligence to detect early signs of a nuclear attack as well as set the doctrine for pre-emptive measures in case of North Korean provocations, military officials said. ROK Deputy Defense Minister Lim Kwan-bin and Mark Lippert, U.S. assistant defense secretary for Asian and Pacific security affairs, will attend the bilateral meeting. “There will be discussions about how to use intelligence assets of South Korea and the U.S. to detect signs of a North Korean nuclear attack and under what condition the joint force will launch a pre-emptive strike," a senior ministry official said. (Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea, U.S. to Discuss N. Korea Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,” Yonhap, February 13, 2013)

South Korea does not have any plans to use the Kaesong industrial complex as a tool to sanction North Korea for detonating its third nuclear device, Seoul’s unification minister Yu Woo-ik said in a meeting with lawmakers on the Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee. (Yonhap, “Kaesong Industrial Complex Not a Sanction Tool for N.K.: Minister,” February 13, 2013)

In her harshest criticism yet of North Korea, the incoming president of South Korea, Park Geun-hye, warned, “No matter how many nuclear tests North Korea conducts to bolster its nuclear capabilities, it will eventually bring itself self-destruction by wasting its resources.” She was quoted by her office as telling a meeting of her national security
and foreign affairs advisers, “Nuclear weapons did not prevent the old Soviet Union from collapsing.” During her campaign for her December election, she opposed unconditional aid and economic investments of the sort championed by her liberal rivals, insisting that North Korea must first win the South’s “trust” by easing its hostilities. But she also criticized Lee Myung-bak’s hard-line policy as failing to change North Korea’s behavior. Park shifted to a firmer stance after the nuclear test. She said that a central principle of her North Korea policy has been to “make sure that North Korea pays for its provocations while assuring opportunities and assistance if it chooses to become a responsible member of the international community.” “But if the North pours cold water, it will affect our approach,” she added. “Even if it conducts fourth and fifth nuclear tests, they will do nothing to boost its bargaining position.” The North’s detonation also added urgency to the “Korea Air and Missile Defense” system, which South Korea plans to build to guard itself from North Korea’s short-range ballistic missiles, said Kim Min-seok, a ministry spokesman, during a media briefing. Kim said South Korea had “doubts” about the North’s claim to have successfully tested a “miniaturized and lighter” atomic bomb that could theoretically be used atop missiles. North Korea still needed more time to reach that goal, he said. Ships, airborne sensors and ground-based monitors from North Korea’s neighbors tried to collect air samples that may give them answers to questions surrounding the North Korean blast. Kim said no telltale air samples had been collected as of Wednesday. Experts say it takes two to four days for radioactive gases to leak out from an underground nuclear test. By then, they are harder to detect. In its 2009 test, North Korea plugged its underground testing tunnel so tightly that no radioactive gas escaped. (Choe Sang-hun, “New Leader in South Criticizes North Korea,” New York Times, February 14, 2013, p. A-12)

China is likely to acknowledge North Korea as a de facto nuclear power as the recalcitrant regime now seems to have completed the final stages of developing its own nuclear weapons with its “advanced” test Tuesday, analysts said. “Essentially, now North Korea’s nuclear warheads can reach the United States,” said a Chinese state-controlled CCTV anchorwoman in a live analysis of the event, characterizing it as “an importance milestone” in North Korea’s leverage against Washington. “North Korea has already gone too far now with it nuclear weapons programs. Now, achieving the goal of denuclearization is very difficult,” said Cai Jian, a professor of Korean studies at Shanghai’s Fudan University. “So, now there is a debate in China that we should be realistic with the changed situation and focus our attention on how to manage Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons, instead of preventing it from developing them, which is already a lost cause,” Cai said. Another Chinese analyst with a state-run think tank in Beijing echoed the view. “Look. How many of China’s neighboring countries have nuclear weapons? India has them. Pakistan has them. Russia has them too. So, China doesn’t give too much attention to whether North Korea is a nuclear state or not,” he said on condition of anonymity. “China can accept another neighbor who has nuclear weapons,” he added. The primary reason China strongly opposed the North developing nuclear weapons was because it was concerned about a nuclear domino effect in East Asia. Once North Korea has nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea may also want to have them. That’s not something China wants to see. Kotani Tetsuo, a security expert with the Japan Institute of International Affairs, thinks the changed
environment will spark Japan to think in that direction. “If North Korea successfully miniaturized a nuclear warhead to fit intermediate range missiles, it would pose a direct threat to Japan. Meanwhile, Japan is worried about the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella.” South Korea also will be more eager to consider joining the US-led missile defense system too, and that’s something, in turn, that worries China. “This kind of new US military deployment to the Asia-Pacific will then become a threat to China’s security,” said Shi Yinhong, an international relations expert at Renmin University in Beijing. To prevent the situation getting worse, some North Korea experts in China, who were greatly enraged by the nuclear test, have reportedly been calling for “teaching a big lesson to North Korea’s new leader Kim Jong-un,” according to a Chinese scholar. These scholars are trying to influence the Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping so that when he official takes power in March, he will implement a tougher policy to contain North Korea’s behavior. But Cai in Shanghai thinks there won’t likely be a drastic shift in China’s dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea. “I don’t think Xi Jinping’s North Korean policy will be much different from the past. It’s because, for Beijing, the stability of Pyongyang is a priority. And China also needs the North to counter the US in the region.” (Sunny Lee, “China to Acknowledge N. Korea as a Nuclear State,” Korea Times, February 13, 2013)

According to reports in Foreign Policy magazine and accounts from diplomatic sources, Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN, made a proposal early in the meeting for a UNSC resolution on a "swift, credible, and strong" response to prevent North Korea from making further progress with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The draft text submitted at the meeting described the nuclear test as a “clear threat to international peace and security” and included a recommendation that the resolution be based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This chapter would have to be invoked for the resolution to have any real binding force on a member nation. Chapter VII includes Article 41 on non-military action and Article 42 on military action. A resolution referring to Chapter VII is rare due to these two articles, which are binding for member states. The move prompted immediate objections from Chinese deputy ambassador Wang Min, who was attending in lieu of Ambassador Li Baodong, who is traveling on official business. Prefacing his remarks by saying that China was sternly opposed to North Korea’s actions, Wang stressed the importance of North Korea’s denuclearization. However, he also argued in favor of resolving the matter through dialogue, saying the nuclear test did not pose a threat to international or regional peace and stability. This has been China’s go-to argument when defending North Korea before the UN. If it accepted the idea of the test as a threat to peace and stability, it would have to accept the calls for firmer sanctions. Rice responded by reading out a portion of a statement in which North Korea announced its plans to conduct a nuclear test, noting that it described the test as targeting the US. She went on to ask whether China did not construe this as being a threat to international peace. The two countries finally reached a compromise leaving the phrase “clear threat to international peace and security” in the draft but removing the reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (Park Hyun and Park Min-hee, “U.S. and China Butting Heads over North Korea,” Hankyore, February 15, 2013)
An increasing number of pundits say that the nuclear issue should be seen from the perspective of weighing up the North’s needs and creating incentives to stop the Stalinist nation resorting to nuclear weapons. “The North spent billions of dollars for the third test so it risks losing food and fuel aids from international society, a lifeline for the impoverished country. These are significant costs,” said Chang Yong-seok, a researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification affiliated with Seoul National University. “In comparison, it believes that its nuclear capability will provide leverage during talks with the United States as well as protect the country from outside threats. Plus, it helps Kim strengthen his grip on his kingdom. These are the benefits.” “Sanctions including exerting a financial squeeze or maritime interdictions are all about increasing the costs of the nuclear program. But these will have limited effects without the proactive participation of China,” Chang said. “And China is unlikely to drastically cut its aid to the North in consideration of the country’s strategic and geographic significance. Well aware of China’s dilemma, North Korea is betting China will not miss its buffer against the U.S.” Some even say that North Korea is already ready for the worst-case scenario under which China could withdraw all its assistance. “In the wake of the Banco of Delta Asia (BDA) case, the North appears to have prepared for the possibility of China turning its back,” said Prof. Yang Moo-jin at the University of North Korean Studies. “The North would face a big blow in the event of China stopping all assistance. But the shockwave would not be strong enough to shake the stability of the regime. It would be a hard pill to swallow but the North does not live in fear of it.” In a nutshell, many watchers think that the “carrot” is better than the “stick” when dealing with the nuclear issue as amply demonstrated by the fact that past UNSC sanctions failed to deter the North from accelerating its development of missiles or nuclear weapons. “South Korea and the United States maintain the overwhelming dominance in conventional weapons. Fears about this imbalance are a key reason that prompts Pyongyang to stick to its nuclear project,” Yang said. “Curtailment of conventional weapons in any form would be a good example of shrinking any benefits gained by the North testing a nuclear bomb or conducting a rocket test.” He added that the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula would undercut the position of hawkish military elites, thus eliminating incentives to continue weapons development. The worst tactic would be that both the international community and the North would adopt tit-for-tat strategies so that the two sides end up playing a game of chicken,” he said. “Eventually, Seoul would have to engage with Pyongyang in talks.” Others contend that the South can reduce the attractiveness of nuclear warheads for the North by making the latter engage on economic issues so that its Swiss-educated new leader becomes willing to focus on economic reform rather than take a path similar to those pursued by his grandfather and father. In a conference late last month, Prof. Kim Byung-yeon of Seoul National University branded such efforts as “globalizing the North Korean economy,” an initiative that the current government failed to achieve. Lee depended on the “stick” rather than the “carrot,” which observers say proved not to be very successful. President-elect Park Geun-hye is expected to take a more proactive approach. Although she has yet to disclose details of her administration’s North Korea policies, she promised to resume humanitarian aid and establish trust on the Korean Peninsula. In the wake of the nuclear test, however, she raised concerns whether such an approach is viable. Paik Hak-soon at Sejong Institute said that Park should not repeat the mistakes of her predecessor. “The Park administration will have to join the
Shen Dengli: "Over the last two months, Beijing has conveyed its concerns to North Korea about conducting a nuclear test. Yet on Feb. 12, China’s neighbor detonated its third nuclear weapon -- smaller and more powerful than the two that preceded it. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said China was "strongly dissatisfied and resolutely opposed" to the test, but, as with North Korea’s bad behavior in the past, will likely not follow with tougher action. ... And what thanks does China get in return? Lies, insults, and provocations. On Jan. 22, after the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2087 as a response to Pyongyang’s December "satellite" launch, North Korea responded by announcing that the six-party talks over its nuclear program have ceased to exist. Since 2003, China has worked hard to bring North Korea to those talks, asking for it to commit to nuclear abandonment while assuring it with development and security aid. China tried to water down the sanctions; instead of being grateful, Pyongyang hinted that some major powers had been manipulated by the United States. North Korea’s threatening behavior, meanwhile, has made the region less stable. By firing artillery at South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, killing four people, North Korea has pushed the envelope too far, undermining China’s interests in keeping Northeast Asia stable. And now, this third nuclear test not only discredits Chinese diplomacy, but also provides a ready excuse for the United States to expand its military presence in the region. In his State of the Union address Tuesday, U.S. President Barack Obama vowed to boost America’s missile-defense efforts in Asia -- U.S. technology that China doesn’t welcome. Let’s face it: China has reached a point where it needs to cut its losses and cut North Korea loose. But how? China can’t force North Korea to change its behavior simply by political means. North Korea is one of the most isolated states in the world, and its independence is a point of pride. While the regime survives due to its extraordinary resilience, China’s economic help is an extremely important external source of sustenance. China’s trade with North Korea rose to $3.1 billion in the first half of 2012, a rise of 24.7 percent; the 2011 trade figures of $5.7 billion represent a 62.4-percent gain over 2010. Beijing has also provided Pyongyang with aid in the form of energy, fertilizer, and other assistance. So, what is to be done? Through the Security Council, China should vote for tougher sanctions, while at the same time reducing aid and trade with its erstwhile ally. By acting multilaterally to curb North Korea, China could also strengthen its nonproliferation partnership with the United States and other countries in the region, fostering a more balanced U.S. Asian policy. China is dedicated to peace in East Asia. By pursuing its own national interest, China has also provided regional public goods, and has prevented a humanitarian disaster in North Korea. But Pyongyang’s search for an independent deterrent indicates that it doesn’t wish to put its security in Beijing’s hands. So why should China continue to prop up this embarrassing maverick? The loss of this “ally” would be little felt in Beijing. China’s view of its security interests has been much broadened over the last few decades, and with relations with Taiwan fast improving, North Korea’s value as a security buffer has much diminished. And in an
Nuclear armament has been a taboo issue in South Korea but North Korea’s third nuclear test is prodding a debate among politicians. For now, calls for going head-to-head with Pyongyang have yet to reach the national narrative but the government may soon find itself having to respond to doubts about its ability to protect South Koreans against the North’s nuclear weapons and delivery systems. “At a time when the North is moving toward nuclear armament, we cannot sit idle against the mounting threat,” Rep. Won Yoo-chul of the governing Saenuri Party said in a telephone interview with The Korea Times, Thursday. “Under the condition that we will immediately scrap them if the North gives up its nuclear program, we need to develop our own nuclear weapons. It is not desirable to cause political tension but we must have the power to defend ourselves.” Rep. Chung Mong-joon, also of the conservative party, was more emphatic about the need to acquire nuclear arms. “A gangster in the neighborhood snaps up a brand-new machine gun and it is absurd for us to try and defend our home with a pebble,” the seven-term lawmaker, who once headed the ruling party, said. “We are required to persuade the United States with such a rationale.” Saenuri Party Chairman Hwang Woo-yea and Rep. Shim Jae-chul, a member of the party’s Supreme Council, also agreed. Park Jie-won, a former floor leader of the main opposition Democratic United Party (DUP), made his objections clear. “It is absurd,” Park said during a radio talk show about the idea of nuclear armament. “It would be the first step to turning the region into a warehouse for nuclear weapons.” (Kim Tae-gyu, “An Itch to Go Nuclear,” Korea Times, February 14, 2013)

The Defense Ministry responded to North Korea’s recent nuclear test by unveiling ship-to-shore and submarine-to-ground cruise missiles that have already been deployed warfare-ready. Dubbed the Haeseong-2 and Haeseong-3, respectively, the missiles have been developed with South Korea’s own technology. They are both modified versions of a surface-to-surface cruise missile unveiled last year but are designed to be launched from a ship or a submarine. Their maximum range of 1,000 km covers all of North Korea. The Haeseong-3 is a strategic weapon capable of being launched from a submarine that can stealthily approach the North Korean coast. The missiles are said to be so accurate that they can hit a window-size target of 1-3 square miles, and powerful enough to pulverize a soccer field-size area to rubble. The Haeseong-3 will be carried by a new Type 214 submarine, and the Haeseong-2 on a 4,500 ton-class Korean Destroyer (KD) vessel or a 7,600 ton-class Aegis destroyer. The Haeseong-3 is subsonic and takes about 20 minutes to fly up to 1,000 km. It would be launched from the torpedo tube of a submarine in a waterproof capsule. The Haeseong-2 would be fired from a vertical launch tube. The King Sejong the Great Aegis destroyer carries 32 Haeseong-2s. (Chosun Ilbo, “S. Korea Unveils Homegrown Cruise Missiles,” February 15, 2013)

South Korea staged large military drills and disclosed a new cruise missile capable of hitting any target in North Korea, just days after the North said it detonated its third nuclear device and as Pyongyang became increasingly candid about its intentions to
build intercontinental ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. “We no longer hide but publicly declare: If the imperialists have nuclear weapons, we must have them, and if they have intercontinental ballistic missiles, we must have them, too,” *Rodong Sinmun* said in a commentary published today. “Anger seeks weapons.” Although blustering is a common propaganda tactic for North Korea, its increasingly public boasting comes amid growing concerns that the country is moving closer to building workable long-range nuclear missiles. If unchecked, American officials fear, the North’s drive will embolden Iran to pursue its own nuclear ambitions despite stiff sanctions. “It’s important for the world to have credibility with respect to our nonproliferation efforts,” Secretary of State John Kerry said on yesterday in urging the world to make a “swift, clear, strong and credible response” to the North’s third nuclear test. “What our response is with respect to this will have an impact on all other nonproliferation efforts.” South Korea’s reaction has been a rapid attempt to show North Korea its own military strength. The South’s political parties put aside their bickering over domestic politics and passed nearly unanimously a parliamentary resolution condemning the North’s nuclear test. Its navy deployed destroyers and submarines off its eastern coast to test their combat readiness. South Korea started a similar naval drill off the western coast yesterday and planned tomorrow to begin live-fire drills involving rockets and artillery near the land border with North Korea. The American military, which keeps 28,500 troops in South Korea, was staging an air drill mobilizing jet fighters of the two allies. Also today, the South’s Defense Ministry offered a rare glimpse of its military abilities by releasing a 50-second video clip that showed two cruise missiles blasting targets after they were launched by a South Korean submarine and destroyer. It was the first time the South Korean military had publicly disclosed the recently deployed missiles, believed to have a range of 620 miles, and it did so with a bravado that reflected the tension on the divided peninsula after the North Korean test. “Our cruise missile shown today is a precision-guided weapon so accurate that it can be directed to smash through the window of a North Korean command post from anywhere on the Korean Peninsula,” Kim Min-seok, a ministry spokesman, said during a news briefing. On the same day, Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin of South Korea visited his military’s rocket command, as well as its Agency for Defense Development, which is in charge of developing ballistic missiles able to reach any target in the North. “North Korea as a whole is a hopeless rogue state, and it will continue to launch provocations,” Kim was quoted as saying by Yonhap during his visit to the rocket command. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Shows Military Muscle in Sparring with the North,” *New York Times*, February 15, 2013, p. A-)

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and President Barack Obama agreed to seek the early adoption of a new U.N. Security Council resolution to impose tougher sanctions over a nuclear test North Korea conducted earlier this week, government officials said. The two leaders talked over the phone for about 20 minutes in their first conversation since Abe launched his second Cabinet in December. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, “Abe, Obama Share Stance on N. Korea; 2 Leaders Seek Tough UNSC Resolution,” February 15, 2013)

“Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. CORKER, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. RUBIO, Mrs.
FEINSTEIN, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. INHOFE, and Mr. DONNELLY) introduced the following bill ...It is the sense of Congress that (1) the test of a nuclear device by the Government of North Korea on February 12, 2013, and the missile launch of December 12, 2012, represent flagrant violations of the sanctions regime created by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), and 1874 (2009), the test of the nuclear device on February 12, 2013, is a clear, deliberate, and provocative violation of United Nations Security Resolution 2087 (2013), and the Government of North Korea continues to defy the United Nations, its Six-Party partners, and the international community; (2) all Member States of the United Nations should immediately implement and enforce sanctions imposed by these resolutions and censure North Korea; (3) the Government of North Korea should abandon and dismantle its provocative ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs, cease its proliferation activities, and come into immediate compliance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions and its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks; (4) restrictions against the Government of North Korea, including sanctions that ban the importation into the United States of unlicensed North Korean products and goods, should remain in effect until the Government of North Korea no longer engages in activities that threaten the United States, our allies and partners, and global peace and stability; (5) the United States Government should seek a new round of United Nations Security Council sanctions, including the public identification of all North Korean and foreign banks, business, and government agencies suspected of conduct that violates United Nations Security Council resolutions, and implementing necessary measures to ensure enforcement of such sanctions; (6) all United Nations Member States should (A) further strengthen efforts to prevent the transfer of military and dual-use technologies to North Korea, including an expansion of the list of sanctioned materials identified by the United Nations Panel of Experts on North Korea sanctions and the items on the Nuclear Suppliers Group lists; (B) exercise enhanced vigilance including monitoring the activities of their nationals, persons in their territories, financial institutions, and other entities with or on behalf of financial institutions in North Korea, or of those that act on behalf or at the direction of financial institutions in North Korea, including their branches, representatives, agents, and subsidiaries abroad; and (C) prevent transshipments that relate to North Korean military, missile, and nuclear programs and proliferation activities; (7) the United States Government should explore all appropriate measures for enhanced military operations by the United States Armed Forces appropriate measures by the United States Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific region, including in partnership with the armed forces of others countries in the region, to safeguard the national interests, security, and livelihood of the United States and its people, as well as those of United States allies and partners in the region; and (8) the United States Government, acting through its appropriate diplomatic representatives, should secure the agreement of the United Nations Human Rights Council and General Assembly to adopt the recommendations made in the February 1, 2013, report of Marzuki Darusman, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that an inquiry mechanism should be established to investigate North Korea's "grave, widespread and systematic violations of human rights," as well as to analyze whether crimes against humanity are being perpetrated in North Korea. **SEC. 4. REPORT.** Not later than May 15, 2013, the Secretary of State shall conduct, coordinate, and submit to
Congress a comprehensive report on United States policy towards North Korea based on a full and complete interagency review of current policy and possible alternatives, including North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and human rights atrocities. The report shall include recommendations for such legislative or administrative action as the Secretary considers appropriate in light of the results of the review.” (S.Res. introduced February 14, 2013)

North Korea warned it can acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles to counter hostile forces and bolster its self-defense capabilities. The political review carried by Rodong Sinmun, said if “imperialists” have a nuclear arsenal, ICBMs and other types of space-bound weapons, North Korea should have them as well. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Threatens to Acquire ICBMs to Bolster Self-Defense,” North Korea Newsletter, No. 250, February 21, 2013)

David Albright: “So far, North Korea has not overtly deployed Nodong missiles with nuclear warheads. There appears to be no public evidence of covert deployments of such missiles. However, the lack of any deployment of nuclear-tipped Nodong missiles does not mean North Korea cannot do so. At ISIS, we have assessed for some time that North Korea likely has the capability to mount a plutonium-based nuclear warhead on the shorter range Nodong missile, which has a range of about 800 miles, and that Pyongyang still lacks the ability to deploy a warhead on an ICBM, although it shows progress at this effort. North Korea would need to conduct missile flight tests with a re-entry vehicle and mock warhead, increase the explosive yield of the warhead (possibly requiring its further miniaturization), and improve the operational reliability of the warhead and missile. Accurately assessing North Korea’s progress in building deliverable nuclear weapons is never easy since it is intensely secretive and U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities are limited. The North often publicly exaggerates its capabilities to boost its perceived nuclear deterrent. Analysts are left to try to draw conclusions based on partial information, and as a result, there are notable differences on most nuclear weapons issues. The miniaturization debate is no different. Analysts of all opinions are unable to know the true situation and can assess only the estimated state of North Korea’s progress. The U.S. intelligence community has also not been of one opinion on the issue of North Korea’s ability to miniaturize and deploy a warhead on a missile. According to a U.S. official, key members of the U.S. intelligence community have for many years given North Korea credit for being able to produce missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. However, the official said that this conclusion is based on an assessment and not concrete evidence of such a capability. … One reason that North Korea can likely miniaturize its warheads by now has to do with the sheer duration of its nuclear weapons program. North Korea’s weaponization work can be traced back to the 1980s. In those early years, China may have provided assistance in terms of nuclear weapons data and designs. Until the mid-to-late 1980s, China was not opposed to nuclear proliferation. In the early 1980s, it provided Pakistan with 50 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium and a nuclear warhead design. An early indication of North Korea’s work on nuclear weapons was the existence of a high explosive test site abutting the north end of the Yongbyon site suspected to be related to the development of nuclear weapons. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the North was known to have conducted high explosives tests at this site. …Media reports, based
on other countries’ overhead imagery, stated North Korea had conducted about 70 high explosive tests. In 1992, soon after North Korea signed its safeguards agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sought to take samples at this site to determine whether uranium had been used in any of the high explosive tests, an indicator of nuclear weapons-related development. North Korea allowed a visit to the site but denied the inspectors’ request to take samples. The issue was left unresolved. After the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework was signed in 1994, the media reported that, based on information from U.S. officials, the North continued testing high explosives at another site, apparently as part of on-going nuclear weapons development. After the demise of the Agreed Framework in late 2002, North Korean statements and actions indicated it was working on developing and possibly building nuclear weapons. In the early 1990s, the CIA estimated that North Korea had a first-generation implosion design based on plutonium that was likely to be deployed on the Nodong missile, which North Korea was developing at the time and first flight tested in 1993. ... The experiences of Pakistan and Iran provide another indication that North Korea likely has achieved the necessary miniaturization for the Nodong. The warhead design China gave Pakistan in the early 1980s had a diameter of about 0.8 meters, according to nuclear weapons experts who examined the design. The warhead was reportedly a solid core design containing about 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium. Starting from the Chinese supplied nuclear weapons design, Pakistani scientists miniaturized the design further in the 1980s. By 1990, Pakistan had developed “levitated” designs that compress the nuclear core more efficiently than a crude core design. This innovation allowed for a significantly smaller, lighter weapon. Pakistan’s ultimate design fit on its Ghauri missile, which Pakistan initially acquired from North Korea and then modified and produced itself. This warhead reportedly had a diameter of about 0.6 meters. By 1998, when Pakistan conducted its first underground nuclear tests, it had reportedly already developed a miniaturized warhead for the Ghauri missile. In the early 2000s, according to an IAEA internal report: “Iran may have developed an effective high explosive implosion system, which could be contained within a payload container believed to be small enough to fit into the re-entry body chamber of the Shahab 3 missile. Overall the [IAEA] does not believe that Iran has yet achieved the means of integrating a nuclear payload into the Shahab 3 missile with any confidence that it would work. Nonetheless, with further effort it is likely that Iran will overcome problems and confidence will be built up.” Based on information assembled and assessed by the IAEA, Iran was working on a warhead in the early 2000s that had a diameter of 0.55 meters, small enough for the Shahab 3 missile. North Korea and Iran have had extensive missile cooperation; the Shahab 3 is also based on the Nodong missile. Pakistan achieved miniaturization for the Ghauri missile within ten years; Iran reportedly focused on developing a warhead small enough for the Shahab 3 missile early in its nuclear weaponization program. The Ghauri and Shahab 3 were close copies of the Nodong missile. North Korea could reasonably be expected to have made the same priority of building a warhead to fit its Nodong missile and made progress in a comparable time frame to Pakistan. Given that North Korea started at least 20 years ago working on a warhead for the Nodong missile, it is likely that it finished developing one able to fit on the Nodong in the early to mid-2000s. Following North Korea providing Pakistan with the Ghauri missile, A.Q. Khan and his colleagues at the Khan Research Laboratories transferred centrifuges and centrifuge-related
equipment and materials to North Korea. Each side gained considerable knowledge of the other’s secret nuclear programs. In his 2004 confession to the Pakistani government, following the busting of his network, Khan stated that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program was more advanced than Pakistan’s. He wrote in his confession that North Korea showed him and his colleague Dr. Mizra the “perfect nuclear weapons, technologically more advanced than ours.” Khan also stated that North Korea taught Pakistan how to make krytrons, or fast switches, used in initiating the detonation of a nuclear weapon. Krytrons can be difficult to either make or procure abroad. So, this transfer would have been valuable to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons effort. Khan’s description of North Korea’s nuclear weapons prowess may have been intended to head off accusations of sharing nuclear weapons information with Pyongyang, a charge many believe to be true. Nonetheless, his statement confirms that North Korea had an active nuclear weapons program in the 1990s, and it supports that Pakistan and North Korea shared information about their nuclear weapons programs, although the extent of sharing cannot be determined conclusively. They likely shared the priority of developing nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles.” (David Albright, “North Korean Miniaturization,” 38North, February 13, 2013)

Nick Hansen: “Commercial satellite imagery through January 2013 confirms activity at the old launch pad, possibly to modify it in preparation for an upcoming test of a liquid-fueled rocket. While it would be premature to reach that conclusion without more recent imagery, press reports have speculated that the DPRK is planning to conduct the first launch of the Musudan intermediate-range or the KN-08 long-range rocket, both mobile missiles. An additional possibility is another launch of an Unha rocket.” (Nick Hansen, “New Developments at the Tonghae Rocket Test Site,” 38North, February 14, 2013)

2/15/13 North Korea has told its key ally, China, that it is prepared to stage one or even two more nuclear tests this year in an effort to force the United States into diplomatic talks with Pyongyang, said a source with direct knowledge of the message. Further tests could also be accompanied this year by another rocket launch, said the source who has direct access to the top levels of government in both Beijing and Pyongyang. “It’s all ready. A fourth and fifth nuclear test and a rocket launch could be conducted soon, possibly this year,” the source said, adding that the fourth nuclear test would be much larger than the third at an equivalent of 10 kilotons of TNT. The tests will be undertaken, the source said, unless Washington holds talks with North Korea and abandons its policy of what Pyongyang sees as attempts at regime change. (Benjamin Kang Lim, “North Korea Tells China of Preparations for Fresh Nuclear Test,” Reuters, February 15, 2013)

South Korea is trying to convince the U.N. Security Council to punish North Korea for conducting its third nuclear test with a new resolution that would include a clause for enforcement of sanctions by military means, a senior Seoul diplomat said. Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter allow all U.N. members to enforce sanctions by military means, theoretically enabling their navy ships to intercept and board North Korean vessels suspected of carrying illicit weapons or nuclear or missile components. “Our basic target is to persuade the Security Council members to adopt a resolution
including Chapter 7 against North Korea," said the diplomat, who has direct knowledge with the ongoing U.N. debate over the North’s nuclear test. “The reason is that any sanctions against North Korea would be effective only if Chapter 7 is included in a resolution," the diplomat said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Seeks U.N. Resolution with Military Means against N. Korea,” February 15, 2013)

In response to calls for bringing back tactical nuclear weapons to the nation, defense ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said such an option is not on the table. "The most important task is to make North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons. The ministry does not review whether or not to deploy (U.S.) strategic nuclear weapons at this moment," Kim said in a briefing. "We still maintain denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula." (Yonhap, “Defense Ministry Dismisses Hawkish Calls for Nuclear Armament,” February 15, 2013)

Senior U.S. administration officials held secret talks in North Korea on at least three occasions in 2011 and 2012, Asahi Shimbun has learned. Although the visits had potential implications for Japan, Washington did not inform its security partner at the time and only informally confirmed one of them when the Japanese side pressed, government and other sources in Japan, South Korea and the United States said. The State Department even warned the Foreign Ministry against making further inquiries, saying they would harm bilateral relations, the sources said. U.S. military planes flew from an air base in Guam to Pyongyang and back on April 7, 2012, and again on a longer visit lasting from Aug. 18-20, the sources said. It is believed that those aboard included Sydney Seiler, director for Korea at the U.S. National Security Council, and Joseph DeTrani, who headed the North Korea desk at the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. DeTrani left the post in May. They met with North Korean officials and discussed policies following the death of leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011. The North Korean delegation included Jang Song Thaek, vice chairman of the National Defense Commission and husband of Kim Jong Il’s sister. The Japanese government only learned about the flights after receiving reports from hobbyists monitoring activity at military bases and also analyzing air traffic flight plans. When the Japanese side submitted an official inquiry, U.S. officials expressed frustration that the request had been made, citing the subject’s confidential nature. The third visit that The Asahi Shimbun has confirmed is one that took place in November 2011. Sources said at least one military aircraft from the Guam air base loaded heavy equipment, including bulldozers, at Yokota Air Base in western Tokyo and flew to Pyongyang. It is believed that the delegation included officials from the U.S. Pacific Command. They met with North Korean officials and discussed efforts to recover the remains of U.S. soldiers killed during the 1950-53 Korean War, the sources said. When Japan inquired about this visit, U.S. officials unofficially confirmed that it had taken place, the sources said. (Makino Yoshihiro, “Left in the Dark: Secret U.S. Military Flights Carried Officials, Equipment to N. Korea,” Asahi Shimbun, February 15, 2013)

Kim Kwang-jin says that when he worked for North Korea’s state insurance company in Singapore in 2003, he stuffed $20 million into two suitcases one day and sent it to Pyongyang as a special gift for then leader Kim Jong-il. He received a medal for that, Kim Kwang-jin said. Kim Kwang-jin, now living as a defector in South Korea, said the
$20 million sent to Kim Jong-il in 2003 came from insurance scams by Pyongyang’s Korea National Insurance Corp (KNIC), which exaggerated claims from re-insurers and underwriters for events such as weather damage, ship and aircraft losses. When contacted by Reuters by telephone and email, KNIC was not immediately available for comment. Kim Kwang-jin said the money from the scams he participated in was funneled into what he termed North Korea’s "royal court fund" - money for Kim Jong-il and his inner circle. "Kim Jong-il sent a letter of thanks to the people in my company (KNIC). And some of us received presents like DVD players and blankets. I later got a medal too," said the 46-year-old. North Korea, sanctioned by the United States since the 1950s and later by the United Nations after its nuclear tests, has been shuffling money for decades from illicit drugs, arms and financial scams and is now more expert at hiding it to fund its weapons programs and its leaders' opulent lifestyles. "There is tremendous difficulty identifying bank accounts," said a South Korean government source who is directly involved in yet another sanctions push in the U.N. Security Council after the North conducted a third nuclear test this week. A source who has access to the top levels of government in both North Korea and China, its only major ally, told Reuters that Pyongyang was not afraid of sanctions and was considering two more nuclear tests and a rocket launch this year. "It is confident agricultural and economic reforms will boost grain harvests this year, reducing its food reliance on China," said the source. In 2005, $25 million of the regime’s cash was frozen at Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, which was designated a “primary money laundering concern” by the U.S. Treasury. Pyongyang has learned from that episode and buried its funds even deeper, said the South Korean official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The bank accounts are split up a lot,” the official said, meaning the money is divided into small amounts so that a freeze on one account would not greatly affect the total. The official has tried to identify North Korean funds for years and was involved in previous sanctions pushes, although he said that identifying accounts and transactions was near impossible because of the use of fake names. North Korea often uses its diplomats and other officials to ferry cash, according to Kim and other defectors and diplomats. This method, called “bulk cash”, is largely untraceable. U.S. diplomats said new sanctions against North Korea that the Security Council might consider could be to add more names to a U.N. blacklist and measures similar to those in place for Iran, which include a U.N. arms embargo, a variety of asset freezes and a ban on some banking relations. In addition, "you can strengthen the provisions to do with enforcing embargoes, inspecting ships", said a senior U.N. diplomat. Another area where U.N. sanctions could be strengthened is enforcement, especially in China, diplomats say. U.N. experts who monitor sanctions violations have said Pyongyang regularly flouts the sanctions, sometimes by shipping banned goods such as weapons via China. "If the Chinese would be willing to inspect half of what goes through Dalian harbor, that would be big," said George Lopez, a former U.N. North Korea sanctions monitor, now at the University of Notre Dame. In January, the Security Council added a raft of companies to a list of sanctioned entities in response to North Korea’s long-range rocket launch late last year, which violated a ban on Pyongyang from developing missile or nuclear technology. These included a company called Leader (Hong Kong) International, listed with a Hong Kong address that was named as a subsidiary of Korea Mining Development Corp., the country’s main arms dealer and exporter of ballistic missile technology, according to the U.S. Treasury. Checks by Reuters journalists at
multiple addresses associated with the company in China and Hong Kong turned up no direct trace of the company or its managers. Corporate records show the Hong Kong address for a similarly named company, Leader (Hong Kong) International Trading Ltd, as the same as that listed in the U.N. report, although the office moved in 2007. A Chinese public security branch office is situated at an address listed for that company’s director in Dalian, about 300 km (185 miles) from the North Korean border. “Companies and individuals are using different names. China may know, but wink at it,” Kim, the defector, said. (Jack Kim and Louis Charbonneau, “North Korea Uses Cash Couriers, False Names to Outwit Sanctions,” Reuters, February 15, 2013)

2/16/13 A “source close to the Asia team in the first term” provides authoritative guidance on how the Administration sees it: “The Obama Administration has never had an ideological problem with talking to the North Koreans - directly or multilaterally - and has been pushing without success since early 2009 for authentic and credible negotiations. The problem has been North Korea’s unwillingness to negotiate over its nuclear program, let alone to provide anyone with reason to believe that it will abide by any commitment it makes. The purpose of the Feb 29 understanding last year was to put in place a moratorium that would open the door to negotiations - but the North immediately blew that up. So: The North refuses to press the pause button on its nuclear and missile development during talks; The North refuses to discuss its nuclear or missile programs, let alone negotiate steps to roll back and eliminate them; The North sets as its predicate that denuclearization and its prior commitments are moot and that the only issue for discussion is actions by the US to make amends for UNSC resolutions, hostile policy, sanctions, etc. The record of its approach to 6PT with Chris Hill shows that Pyongyang was running a clandestine uranium enrichment program while it sold the cooling tower of its obsolete plutonium program for a profit - no one wants to get diddled that way again. It doesn’t sound like ‘diplomatic talks’ are penicillin here. We are and should be pushing for real negotiations. Here’s what you should remember: One: WMD are only useful to North Korea as leverage to extort resources, not as weapons. (The deterrence angle doesn’t really mean much - after all, there’s a reason no one used military force to destroy the DPRK in the decades since the Armistice). Two: North Korea requires significant inputs of food, fuel, fertilizer, foreign currency, and other things, merely to survive. Right now, due to sanctions and tight US-ROK-Japan policy coordination, NK is on a Chinese IV drip that doesn’t have much sucrose in it anymore. Therefore, three: If their current escalation play is unsuccessful and the world doesn’t capitulate to North Korea’s terms (like the Onion described), regime survival increasingly points to the one way out - to negotiate terms for stopping, rolling back, and relinquishing its nuclear and missile programs. Obama will be ready.” (The Nelson Report, February 16, 2013)

2/17/13 President-elect Park Guen-hye nominated University of North Korean Studies professor Ryoo Kihl-jae to be Minister of Unification. Before joining the University of North Korean Studies, Ryoo was dean of Kyungnam University’s Graduate School of North Korean Studies. He studied political science at Korea University. Ryoo, a 53-year-old from Seoul, had been considered as an academic to be involved in Park’s Blue House or government as he had played a role in planning the president-elect’s policies on North Korea along with others, including Foreign Ministry nominee Yun Byung-se,
head of the transition team’s foreign affairs, security and unification subcommittee. “He is an expert who has been researching North Korean issues for nearly 30 years,” Kim, head of the transition team, told reporters yesterday in a press briefing. “He has approached North Korean policy issues from a rational and balanced point of view.” (Lee Eun-joo “Park Completes Cabinet Nominations,” Korea Herald, February 17, 2013)

Beds shook and teacups clattered in this town bordering North Korea, less than 100 miles from the site where the North said it detonated a nuclear test that exploded midmorning in the midst of Chinese New Year festivities. “I’m worried about radiation,” said a 26-year-old woman as she served customers in a bookstore here. “My family lives in the mountains close to the border. They felt the bed shake on the day of the test. I have no idea whether it is safe or not, though the government says it is.” The fact that North Korea detonated the device on a special Chinese holiday did not sit well, either. Among Chinese officials, the mood toward the young North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, has also darkened. The Chinese government is reported by analysts to be wrestling with what to do about a man who, in power for a little more than a year, thumbed his nose at China by ignoring its appeals not to conduct the country’s third nuclear test, and who shows no gratitude for China’s largess as the main supplier of oil and food. “The public does not want China to be the only friend of an evil regime, and we’re not even recognized by North Korea as a friend,” said Jin Qiangyi, director of the Center for North and South Korea Studies at Yanbian University in Yanji City. “For the first time, the Chinese government has felt the pressure of public opinion not to be too friendly with North Korea.” In the aftermath of the test, a prominent Chinese political scientist with a penchant for provocative ideas, Shen Dingli at Fudan University in Shanghai, wrote in Foreign Policy that it was time for China “to cut its losses and cut North Korea loose.” If China decides to go along with the United States’ calls for much more stringent sanctions than exist now, there are fears among China’s policy makers that the North’s government would collapse, possibly setting the stage for mayhem on the border and a reunification of Korea as an American ally. But if China maintains the status quo, it could face mounting criticism among its own citizens. If it decided to take a harder stance, China could punish North Korea by curtailing its oil shipments, by far the major source of fuel in the energy-starved North, Jin said. The oil is piped from Dandong, southwest of here. China charges North Korea the highest price of any country to which it exports oil, said Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute, a San Francisco-based policy group that specializes in North Korea. Despite the cost, those fuel shipments are considered essential to the government’s survival, even as they possibly create resentment in the North against its patron. Another option for China would be to cut the trade of its own businessmen, many of whom have become disillusioned by the tough deals that North Korea imposes, including demanding that Chinese enterprises in the North build their own roads and supply their own electricity. Despite the lull in activity, cross-border legal and illegal trade amounts to about $10 billion a year, said Jin, the policy expert on the North at the university here. The National Bureau of Statistics estimated that in the overall Chinese economy, the cross-border trade with North Korea was so small it was not a factor, he said. The trade’s importance is based, instead, on its contribution to the stability of the North’s leadership, which not only relies on Chinese investment, but also often turns a
blind eye to unauthorized shipments of food and other goods to help keep its suffering people from considering revolt. “China’s options have reached an impasse,” said Jin. “For now China chooses to maintain the situation in North Korea, not because it wants to prop up an evil regime but because it doesn’t see another choice.” (Jane Perlez, “Some Chinese Are Souring on Being North Korea’s Best Friend,” New York Times, February 17, 2013, p. 8)

2/18/13 The European Union imposed trade and economic sanctions on North Korea while condemning “in the strongest terms” the nation’s latest nuclear test. The 27 EU finance ministers’ action brings the number of North Koreans subject to a travel ban and an asset freeze to 26, and the number of sanctioned companies to 33. The ministers also banned the export of components for ballistic missiles, such as certain types of aluminum, and prohibited trade in new public bonds from North Korea. (Associated Press, “European Union Sanctions North Korea,” February 18, 2013)

2/19/13 North Korea followed up its nuclear test last week with threats aimed at its southern enemy during a UN conference on disarmament in Geneva. “As the saying goes a new born puppy knows no fear of a tiger,” said North Korean diplomat Jon Yong Ryong to the meeting. “South Korea’s erratic behavior would only herald its final destruction.” He avoided specifically mentioning the nuclear test, instead referring to a “resolute step for self-defense.” “If the US takes a hostile approach toward the DPRK to the last, rendering the situation complicated, it [North Korea] will be left with no option but to take the second and third stronger steps in succession,” he said. Ambassador Laura Kennedy, the U.S. permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament, strongly condemned North Korea’s statement. “I also was particularly struck by the phrase ‘heralding the destruction of the Republic of Korea’ and find that language incredibly inconsistent with the goals and objectives that this body is intended to pursue,” she said. (Gabrielle Levy, “N. Korea Threatens ‘Final Destruction’ of South Korea,” UPI, February 19, 2013)

President-elect Park Geun-hye named her long-time right-hand man Lee Jung-hyun as senior presidential secretary for political affairs and former career diplomat Ju Chul-ki as senior secretary for foreign affairs and national security, a spokesman said. Ju, 67, is a former veteran diplomat with more than three decades of experience that includes ambassador to France, UNESCO and Morocco, and deputy ambassador at South Korea’s mission to the U.N. office in Geneva. (Yonhap, “Park Names Ex-Career Diplomat as Senior Foreign Affairs Secretary,” February 19, 2013)

President-elect Park Geun-hye has completed her foreign and security policy lineup led by moderate conservatives who emphasize a realistic balance between dialogue and pressure in dealing with North Korea. The team led by top presidential security aide Kim Jang-soo has pressed for a major policy shift to normalize inter-Korean ties after five years of chill under incumbent President Lee Myung-bak. The Park team’s new approach promises more flexibility calling for openness and accommodation with the North while maintaining robust deterrence. But Pyongyang’s renewed nuclear brinkmanship is already narrowing their policy options and threatening to derail the reengagement policy. Experts widely expect lingering tensions to strengthen hard-line
elements in her government, thus throwing cross-border relations deeper into crisis. “One good thing is almost all of them are prepared to get down to business right away without having to be briefed on every single thing that’s going on,” a government official said on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. “They probably know what they’re dealing with and what the problems are, though the answers may not be that easy.” But the security crisis following Pyongyang’s atomic blast is threatening to leave her two-track strategy between a rock and a hard place even before its official takeoff. Amid increasing hawkish voices in government and parliament, the president-in-waiting herself appears to be leaning toward a hard-line stance, putting aside her pledge to resume dialogue with her northern counterpart Kim Jong-un. “The Korean Peninsula trust-building process’ is based on strong deterrence,” she said at a meeting on February 13. “As the old saying goes, it takes two to tango. We can carry it out together only if North Korea shows sincerity and an earnest attitude.” The next day she told former Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei that “under the current situation it is difficult to proceed” with the initiative. Kim Jang-soo said after seismic activity was detected on February 12, “If a nuclear test is confirmed, things will not be the same as the past.” Yun told JoongAng Ilbo last week that “the trust process is not a one-sided appeasement or get-tough policy toward North Korea but a countermeasure tailored for the leadership’s behavior. “It applies principles that we sternly respond to the nuclear issue and make them rightly pay for their provocations.” Some analysts have said that the much-touted policy could easily drift toward President Lee Myung-bak’s stringently reciprocal, conditions-loaded approach Park blamed for the freeze in cross-border ties. After his nomination on Sunday, Ryoo vowed utmost efforts to follow through on the initiative and also bolster security. “I well recognize the grave situation of the Korean Peninsula and many citizens’ concern about it,” he said in a statement. “I will strive to build trust on the peninsula as suggested by the president-elect’s ‘trust-building process’ policy while firmly ensuring national security.” (Shin Hyon-hee, “Moderate Conservatives to Steer Park’s Foreign Policy,” Korea Herald, February 19, 2013)

South Korea and the United States will have working-level defense talks February 21-22 to explore all possible measures to deter growing nuclear threats from North Korea in light of its third atomic test, Seoul’s defense ministry said. The Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue, the first such meeting since the North’s recent nuclear test, will be held from Thursday to Friday in Washington to discuss ways to step up intelligence efforts and prepare measures to deter North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and further provocations, the ministry said. South Korea’s Deputy Defense Minister Lim Kwan-bin and his American counterparts, including James Miller, the deputy assistant defense secretary; David Helvey, the acting deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia; and Bradley Roberts, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense, will attend the bilateral meeting, it said. "The two sides will evaluate the North Korean situation following its nuclear test and discuss ways how to cooperate in drafting policies on the North," the ministry said in a release. "The meeting will also discuss the S. Korea-U.S. alliance issues and events to mark the 60th anniversary of the armistice and military alliance." The Combined Forces Command (CFC) said South Korea and U.S. forces jointly carried out a one-day drill in early February to rehearse key tasks in planning and execution of combined ballistic missile defense. "We
highlighted the successful integration of our combined theater missile defense force,” Gen. James Thurman, CFC Command commander, said in a statement. “These drills show the ROK-U.S. Alliance’s commitment to provide an enduring and capable defense of the Republic of Korea.” (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. to Discuss N. Korea Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,” February 20, 2013)

North Korea’s third nuclear test represents a challenge to all countries interested in the future of the pariah state. For South Korea, it is a final rebuke against the hard-line policies of outgoing president Lee Myung-bak and a reminder to incoming president Park Geun-hye ahead of her inauguration next week that engagement with Pyongyang poses severe risks. For Japan, it dashes latent hopes for a breakthrough in the unresolved kidnapping cases of its citizens who were snatched off its beaches by North Korean agents. And for the US, the test is a vivid testament that the young, unpredictable and secretive leader Kim Jong-un is pursuing a long-range nuclear capability - a growing risk to American security. Yet North Korea’s big bang is primarily directed at and most keenly felt in Beijing, where a new generation of leaders is choosing its foreign policy underlings and policies for the years ahead. China’s relationship with North Korea is a complex mix of supposed ideological solidarity and deep mutual distrust. …At the UN in December, Chinese diplomats, in tandem with the US, proceeded with a Security Council resolution that criticized North Korea for its provocative missile launch late last year. This modest step surprised and enraged Pyongyang and set the stage for a nuclear test meant as a warning to China that North Korea will not play the traditional role of a vassal state. As China takes stock of the situation in northeast Asia, it must confront several trends. The lack of North Korean reform, Kim’s increasingly risky gambits, the ineffectiveness of its ‘soft’ approach, its own deepening ties with South Korea, and the risks of a wider Asian conflict underscore a growing unease. This has caused influential insiders around the new leadership in Beijing to ask: what good is this so-called buffer? (Kurt Campbell, “China’s Indulgence of North Korea Will Stop Soon,” Financial Times, February 20, 2013, p.6)

The United Nations’ human rights chief declared recently that the time had come for a “long overdue” investigation into what she called unparalleled rights abuses in North Korea. The probe, unprecedented in scope, could help establish whether the North’s leaders are committing crimes against humanity. Navi Pillay’s January proposal has already drawn support from the United States. But the decision has proved sensitive in South Korea, where leaders remain divided over whether to confront the North or try to somehow reduce tensions with it, even after Pyongyang last week detonated an underground nuclear device. South Korea’s support for the human rights investigation is critical, because farther-removed countries view Seoul as the leader on North Korea policy issues. But the decision on the Commission of Inquiry, or COI, comes at a particularly delicate time for South Korea, where a conservative new president, Park Geun-hye, takes office this month, having vowed to both re-engage with the North and “improve living conditions” for its 24 million citizens. The looming decision on the investigation highlights a fundamental South Korean quandary: Engaging North Korea and pushing it on human rights, though both reasonable goals, are often at odds. Other countries “should understand the sensitivities faced by South Korea” when
speaking out about human rights, said Song Min-soon, who was South Korea’s foreign minister from 2006 until 2008 under liberal president Roh Moo-hyun. “Those countries, they don’t have a real need to sit down with North Korea. We do. The new South Korean government has a plan to talk with the North Koreans about denuclearization, economic issues. But if we lead efforts on the COI, that won’t happen.” Park has blasted the North for conducting the much-anticipated nuclear test. But her incoming administration, according to analysts, is uneasy about scrapping any hope of civil ties with the North even before Park takes office. U.N. officials and human rights advocates, as well as one Park adviser, said they are cautiously optimistic that South Korea will ultimately back the inquiry. “I think we will quietly support it,” said Ha Tae-keung, a National Assembly member with an interest in North Korea issues who advises Park’s transition team. But if Park opposes it, she will heighten frustration among activists and thousands of defectors in her country, including the several hundred survivors of political prison camps, who often accuse the South of being more concerned about the North’s weapons than about its people. More than half a dozen human rights groups in Seoul have spent weeks trying to sway their incoming government. One advocate, An Myeong-chul, secretary general of the Free the NK Gulag group, said he is compiling documents about a few individuals in the North’s prison camps, based on information from relatives who have escaped to the South. The documents detail the names of those in the camps, when they were taken and by whom. An filled out one document of his own, giving information about his mother and two siblings, who were sent to a gulag in 1994, he said, paying for the crimes of his father, who had been stealing rice and then committed suicide. An believes that his family members are still in a camp, but he isn’t sure. He calls the commission of inquiry a “necessity.” “If Park Geun-hye wants to open dialogue with North Korea, accepting the COI might give the North an excuse to get upset,” he said. “But South Korea should be aware: There are prisoners in there, and there are survivors here.” (Chico Harlan, “Rights Probe of North Korea Puts South in a Quandary,” *Washington Post*, February 21, 2013, p. A-1)

2/22/13  South Korea’s incoming President Park Geun-hye said it is important to hand out strong punishment to North Korea in case of reckless provocations as she met with top military commanders just three days before taking office. The visit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command was aimed at underscoring her commitment to national security amid concern that the communist North could attempt provocations at a time of power transition in South Korea. “I think it is important that there should be stern punishment for reckless provocations so as to break the vicious cycle that has been repeating,” Park said during the visit, according to her spokesman Park Sun-kyoo. “I hope you will remember for sure that strong security is the basis of everything the new government pursues.” She also held video conference calls with top Army, Navy and Air Force commanders working in the field, expressing gratitude for their service and asking them to ensure strong defense so that the people can lead normal lives without any security concerns. “North Korea continues nuclear development and provocations against the South,” Park said. “I and South Korea’s government will never tolerate North Korea possessing nuclear weapons and will establish a perfect deterrence against the North based on the strong Korea-U.S. alliance.” (Yonhap, “Park Calls for ‘Stern Punishment’ for N. Korean Provocations,” February 22, 2013)
Evidence arose that last July North Korea was preparing its long-range missile launch and nuclear tests, and that the US government had been informed of the preparations. Joel Wit, an expert on North Korean issues, said during an interview with the Hankyoreh on Feb. 16, “In July, it was very clear from talking to the North Korean foreign ministers that they were moving toward further development of their nuclear deterrent and missile forces. It was already clear at the time that we were headed for a difficult time after the elections in the US and South Korea”. Wit and another US civilian expert met at a ‘Track-II’ meeting in Singapore with Choi Sun-hee, deputy director of North Korea’s foreign ministry and Han Sung-ryul, North Korean deputy ambassador to the UN. Wit said, “The North Korean officials firmly stated they were dropping the principle of ‘action for action’ contained in the 2005 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They wanted the US to take the first step to show that they were sincere”. He also said, “It was clear they were escalating their efforts to develop their nuclear deterrent”. In a situation where the US is demanding the North Koreans give up their nuclear weapons, asking the US to first open diplomatic relations is a sign that North Korea is willing to risk escalating the situation. Wit also said, “The North Korean officials didn’t specify what steps would be taken, but what they could do was pretty much common knowledge. Things North Korea could do to escalate this situation include a missile launch and a nuclear weapons test, mounting a nuclear warhead on top of a missile, producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), ditching denuclearization, and saying they no longer abide by the September 19 agreement.” He added, “Privately, at the track-II meeting the North Koreans basically said that they can mount nuclear warheads on missiles but have been debating among whether or not to say so publicly.” It has been found that the North Korean officials requested their warning message be known to the press. Wit said, “Normally, these meetings are confidential. And the request from the North Koreans was a first. I refused to talk to the press because my job is not to be North Korea’s press agent. That’s not my role. However, the messages were relayed very clearly to the US government, the White House, the State Department, and the intelligence community. The government officials knew at least from us what North Korea was saying”. Although there have been leaks on news about North Korea abrogating the September 19 agreement on Foreign Policy’s website, it is a first for a conference attendee to speak directly with the press. When it comes to US’s North Korea policy, Wit said, “For the past four years, we’ve [the Obama administration] been conducting a policy in cooperation with President Lee that is really a total failure”. He characterized this administration’s four-year approach as made up of ‘weak sanctions’ and ‘weak diplomacy’. Wit also pointed out, “We thought we could somehow alter North Korea’s behavior by not talking to them. Trying to teach them lessons by when they do bad things we react with sanctions and other measures. Not talking to them will teach them to behave better. In fact however, it only empowered the North Koreans and their behavior got worse and worse”. He added, “The Obama administration had worked closely with President Lee, whose approach toward North Korea, I believe, was driven by conservative ideology and not by national interests.” With regard to the recent nuclear test by North Korea, Wit said, “I tend to believe North Korea can build nuclear weapons that can be loaded on the Nodong missile and they are working to do more. Beyond that I can’t give fine-tuned analysis. We have to start to think about where this
is heading in the future. There have been some estimates that by 2016 North Korea could have 50 nuclear weapons. North Korea is becoming a small nuclear power like Pakistan, India, and Israel. That’s where they are heading.” Wit believes the way to deal with the current situation is through a combination of strong sanctions and strong diplomacy. He says sanctions alone cannot handle the situation and that above all, direct talks with North Korea are needed. He said, “We need to be thinking about a strong diplomacy initiative aimed at North Korea. By that I mean not just offering food aid or fuel oil. That’s not going to work anymore. We have to address the needs for core security for both sides. Their concern I guess is a peace treaty, while our concern is that we don’t like the weapons of mass destruction program. So strong diplomacy has to take both sides into account seriously. That is what North Korea expects.” (Park Hyun, “Last July, N. Korea Warned of Missile Launch and Nuclear Test,” Hankyore, February 22, 2013)

President Barack Obama pledged with Japan’s new leader to take a firm line on a defiant North Korea but the two sides also tried to calm rising tensions between Tokyo and China. PM Abe Shinzo carefully avoided disagreements with Obama after previous Japanese governments’ rifts and declared: “The alliance between Japan and the United States is back now. It’s completely back.” Obama promised to work closely with the conservative leader, whose Liberal Democratic Party swept back into power in December on a platform that includes boosting defense spending and aggressively stimulating a long-flaccid economy. “You can rest assured that you will have a strong partner in the United States throughout your tenure,” Obama told Abe in the Oval Office, calling the alliance with Japan “the central foundation” for US policy in Asia. Obama said the two leaders discussed “our concerns about the provocative actions that have been taken by North Korea and our determination to take strong actions in response.” North Korea carried out its third nuclear test on February 12, ignoring warnings even from its ally China. Abe, who first rose to political prominence as an advocate for a tough line on North Korea, said he agreed with Obama’s position of not offering “rewards” to Pyongyang and on the need for a new UN Security Council resolution. But the White House appeared to want to lower the temperature between Japan and China, which has increasingly sent vessels near Japanese-controlled islands known as the Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese. Obama did not mention the issue but Secretary of State John Kerry, in a separate meeting with Japan’s Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio, said he wanted to “compliment Japan on the restraint it has shown.” The meetings came hours after Beijing lashed out at Abe over a newspaper interview in which he charged that China would eventually hurt its investment climate through assertive actions in the region. Abe said the US-Japan alliance was “a stabilizing factor” and -- in remarks he nudged his translator to read out -- added: “We have always been dealing with the Senkaku issue in a calm manner and we will continue to do so.” The Japanese leader later spoke in stronger terms in an address at a think tank. While saying he wanted to cooperate with China’s incoming leader Xi Jinping, Abe insisted that the islands belonged to Japan. “We simply cannot tolerate any challenge now and in the future. No nation should make any miscalculation about the firmness of our resolve,” Abe said at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Shaun Tandon, “Obama, Japan PM Firm on N. Korea, Measured on China,” AFP, February 22, 2013)
He is a scientist and ultra-wealthy, a low-key Navy veteran who could pass unnoticed at a Wizards or Caps game but who happens to be a part owner of both teams. Now Jeong H. Kim, 52, may be about to add another line to his glittering résumé: Cabinet secretary in South Korea, where incoming president Park Geun-hye has tapped him to run the ministry of science and technology. But there is a hitch. Kim’s diverse background also happens to include time working with the Central Intelligence Agency. Now this unassuming Potomac resident is not only becoming a household name half a world away, but he is also setting off a political firestorm there. His connection to the CIA has stoked fears among some South Koreans that Kim would act as a spy for the U.S. government. Political opponents of the new president have publicly criticized Kim’s nomination, which could be decided by February 26. Korean news reports predict that his nomination is likely to be approved. Kim reportedly has gone as far as offering to forfeit his U.S. citizenship to appease critics. Korean news reports say he is seeking to regain his South Korean citizenship. He also resigned from his position as president of New Jersey-based Bell Labs this week. The concern centers on Kim’s service as a director of the External Advisory Board at the CIA from 2007 to 2011, while he was president of Bell Labs. He also served as a director at In-Q-Tel, an Arlington venture capital firm set up in 1999 with CIA funding. “No country in the world would appoint someone to a government post who formerly served as an adviser to a foreign intelligence agency,” said Park Jung-soo of Ewha Woman’s University, according to Chosun Ilbo. He could not be reached for comment, but his wife, Cindy Kim, said that the appointment by South Korea’s first woman president took the family by surprise. “Nobody expected it,” she said in an interview. “She just appointed him.” (Thomas Heath, “American’s C.I.A. Ties Snarl Bid for S. Korean Cabinet,” Washington Post, February 23, 2013 p. A-1)

North Korea will finally allow Internet searches on mobile devices. But if you’re a North Korean, you’re out of luck – only foreigners will get this privilege. Cracking the door open slightly to wider Internet use, the government will allow a company called Koryolink to give foreigners access to 3G mobile Internet service by next Friday, according to The Associated Press, which has a bureau in the North. (Gerry Mullany, “In a Slight Shift, North Korea Widens Internet Access, But Just for Visitors,” New York Times, February 24, 2013, p. A-6)

2/25/13

Park inaugural address: “I pledge to you today that I will not tolerate any action that threatens the lives of our people and the security of our nation. North Korea’s recent nuclear test is a challenge to the survival and future of the Korean people, and there should be no mistake that the biggest victim will be none other than North Korea itself. I urge North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions without delay and embark on the path to peace and shared development. It is my sincere hope that North Korea can progress together as a responsible member of the international community instead of wasting its resources on nuclear and missile development and continuing to turn its back to the world in self-imposed isolation. There is no doubt that we are faced today with an extremely serious security environment but neither can we afford to remain where we are. Through a trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula I intend to lay the groundwork for an era of harmonious unification where all Koreans can lead more prosperous and freer lives and where their dreams can come true. I will move forward
step-by-step on the basis of credible deterrence to build trust between the South and the North. **Trust can be built through dialogue and by honoring promises that have already been made.** It is my hope that North Korea will abide by international norms and make the right choice so that the trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula can move forward. The era of happiness that I envision is one that simultaneously unlocks an era of happiness on the Korean Peninsula while also contributing to ushering in an era of happiness throughout the global community. To ease tensions and conflicts and further spread peace and cooperation in Asia, I will work to strengthen trust with countries in the region including the United States, China, Japan, Russia and other Asian and Oceanic countries.” (President Park Guen-hye, Inaugural Address, *Korea Herald*, February 25, 2013)

2/26/13

President Park Geun-hye held back-to-back meetings with 19 foreign delegations including U.S. national security adviser Tom Donilon on her second day in office. In the meeting with the U.S. delegation, Park and Donilon reportedly shared concerns and views on North Korea’s defiant Feb. 12 nuclear test and agreed on enhanced cooperation to deal with the heightened security tensions. (Lee Joo-hee, “N.K. Tops Park’s Foreign Policy Agenda,” *Korea Herald*, February 26, 2013)

The National Assembly confirmed Jung Hong-won as prime minister, making him the first formally appointed cabinet member of the Park Geun-hye administration. The legislature held a plenary session yesterday and approved Jung’s appointment. Of the 272 lawmakers who attended the voting, 197 supported the appointment, while 67 opposed it. Eight votes were counted invalid. He was her second choice after her attempt to name Kim Yong-joon, former constitutional court chief and her transition team head, as prime minister failed. (Ser Myo-ja, “Jung Appointed Prime Minister,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, February 27, 2013)

Former NBA star Dennis Rodman brought his basketball skills and flamboyant style — tattoos, nose studs and all — to a country with possibly the world’s strictest dress code: North Korea. Arriving in Pyongyang, the American athlete and showman known as “The Worm” became an unlikely ambassador for sports diplomacy at a time of heightened tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. Or maybe not so unlikely: Young leader Kim Jong Un is said to have been a fan of the Chicago Bulls in the 1990s, when Rodman won three championships with the club. Rodman is joining three members of the Harlem Globetrotters basketball team and a VICE correspondent for a news show on North Korea that will air on HBO later this year, VICE producers told the Associated Press in an exclusive interview before they landed. “It’s my first time, I think it’s most of these guys’ first time here, so hopefully everything’s going to be OK, and hoping the kids have a good time for the game,” Rodman told reporters after arriving in Pyongyang. (Jean Lee, “Piercings and All, Rodman Heads to N. Korea,” *Associated Press*, February 26, 2013)

2/26/13

Japan and the United States called for the main U.N. human rights forum to launch an inquiry into allegations of violations including the torture and execution of political prisoners in North Korea. The reclusive country’s network of political prison camps are believed to contain at least 200,000 people and have been the scene of rapes, torture,
executions and slave labor, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay said last month. She called for an international investigation into what "may amount to crimes against humanity" in "one of the worst - but least understood and reported - human rights situations in the world." North Korea dismissed the allegations. Japan and the European Union will submit a joint resolution seeking a inquiry, Japan’s Abe Toshiko said in a speech to the Human Rights Council, which began a four-week session on Monday. "Broad support of this resolution by the international community would send a stronger message to the DPRK," the parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs said. Pyongyang has also failed to resolve the fate of many Japanese nationals abducted by North Korean agents, Abe said. Esther Brimmer, U.S. assistant secretary of state, backed the call for action by the 47-member state Geneva forum. "The council’s work remains unfinished so long as millions of North Koreans face untold human rights abuses amidst a daily struggle for survival," she said. The resolution is likely to pass easily and it would be up to the council president to name a team of investigators. (Stephanie Nebehay, “Japan, U.S. Seek U.N. Inquiry into North Korea Abuses,” Reuters, February 26, 2013)

The international expressions of anger and dismay that followed North Korea’s announcement of a nuclear test a few weeks ago, punctuated by a United Nations Security Council pledge to immediately work on “appropriate measures” in a new resolution, appear to have given way to slow-motion diplomacy and some frustration that not even a draft has been circulated among the Council’s 15 members. United Nations diplomats privately said the process had become bogged down mainly over bridging differences between China and the United States about how forcefully to respond, in some ways replicating a pattern that has prevailed in deliberations taken previously in dealing with North Korea’s defiant tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear devices. The frustration level, diplomats say, has been most prominent in South Korea, which has just sworn in a new leader, President Park Geun-hye. There had been hope in South Korea that a forceful Security Council resolution, expanding the economic penalties already in place against North Korea, would be completed and presented for a vote before South Korea relinquishes the presidential gavel at the end of Thursday to Russia, the Council president for March. But given the lack of progress, that prospect appears unlikely, diplomats said. And Russia, like China, appears in no hurry to take action that, in its view, would only further antagonize North Korea and destabilize the Korean Peninsula. "The South Koreans would like to see a resolution during their tenure," one diplomat said. Members of the South Korean Mission to the United Nations did not respond to telephone messages or e-mails regarding the status of a North Korean resolution. North Korea has said it would regard any new Security Council resolution as a provocation. China has shown increasing impatience with North Korea, a destitute nation that depends on China for vital economic aid and trade. But on Tuesday China signaled its cautious approach on a Security Council resolution. A Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, was quoted by the official Xinhua News Agency as saying the Council’s discussions “should be conducive to the denuclearization of the peninsula as well as peace and stability in northeast Asia.” Xinhua said the spokeswoman was responding to comments made earlier by Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, who was quoted as saying in Moscow that any Security Council resolution “must confirm that negotiations are the only choice for the
parties involved.” There has been no public indication that China would be willing to expand the sanctions against North Korea, which cover military and dual-use goods, as well as luxury items for the elite. Nor has China given any indication that it would be willing to stop trade that helps keep its longtime ally afloat. (Rick Gladstone, “No Move Yet by U.N. Body after Test by Koreans,” *New York Times*, February 27, 2013, p. A-6)

President Park Geun-hye said she is very much concerned that her main national security aide is unable to take office at a time of high tensions with North Korea due to the parliamentary impasse over her government reorganization proposal. Park made the remark in her first meeting with senior secretaries, referring to the absence of former Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo, who has been named to head the presidential national security office. The security office, a centerpiece of the reorganization plan, is supposed to play the role of a “control tower” on national security issues. Its importance has grown higher in the wake of North Korea’s third underground nuclear test earlier this month. But Kim could not attend the meeting as his appointment could not be officially approved because the government rearrangement proposal is still pending in parliament amid a deadlock in negotiations between the rival parties. “In a situation where North Korea conducted a nuclear test and our security is threatened, it is truly worrisome and regrettable that the one who is supposed to play the role of a control tower in the security area could not attend the first meeting of senior secretaries,” she said. “Yonhap, “Park Voices Concern over Stalled Gov’t Reorganization Plan amid N.K. Nuclear Tensions,” February 27, 2013)

Following its recent rocket launch and nuclear test, North Korea’s winter military drills have become more aggressive with its firing drills directly targeting South Korea’s capital city of Seoul, military sources said. “An analysis of the North Korean military’s winter training showed that live-fire artillery drills and airborne infiltrations increased (compared to the past),” the source said, asking for anonymity as he is not allowed to talk about military information. “Overall, its winter training has increased aggression.” In the last couple months, North Korea’s military has conducted several airborne infiltration exercises with fighter jets and cargo aircrafts as well as increased special forces training compared to the previous year, the source said. North Korea’s artillery drills simulated bombarding Seoul with shells loaded with concrete, instead of live ammunition, the source said. Yesterday, the North’s state media said its leader Kim Jong-un oversaw a live-fire artillery drill simulating an “actual war,” during which he emphasized the artillerymen should always be ready to open fire to deal a “merciless blow” to the enemy. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea Conducts Artillery Drills Targeting Seoul: Source,” Yonhap, February 27, 2013)

Kim Yong-chol, the man who was responsible for the sinking of the Navy corvette *Cheonan*, has been rehabilitated after a surprise demotion. *Rodong Sinmun* yesterday ran a photo of Kim Yong-chol applauding at a musical performance that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un also attended. It shows him with his former insignia of a four-star general after he was demoted to lieutenant general three months ago. An intelligence source here said 10 top North Korean military officials had either been demoted or sacked in October and November of last year, but only two were rehabilitated. They are new army chief Choe Ryong-hae and Kim Yong-chol. “This clearly shows who Kim
Jong-un trusts in the North Korean military," the source said. Kim heads the General Reconnaissance Bureau, which spearheads spying and infiltration in South Korea. It was created in February 2009, when Kim Jong-un was fingered as the successor to his father. Kim Yong-chol, the first head of the bureau, is believed to have orchestrated cyber attacks on South Korean firms and institutions in July 2009; a naval confrontation with South Korea in November that year; an assassination attempt on Hwang Jang-yop, the highest-ranking North Korean defector, in February 2010; the sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010; the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November of 2010; a hacking attempt on Nonghyup Bank; and the jamming of South Korean GPS signals between 2010 and 2012. Kim is no stranger to South Korean officials since he appeared regularly in talks with the South since 1989, when he was a major general. He became an experienced hand in negotiations and gained former leader Kim Jong-il’s trust. One Unification Ministry official who negotiated with him said he "always appeared when it was time to reach a decision. He has nerves of steel." (Chosun Ilbo, “N. Korean General behind Cheonan Sinking Rehabilitated,” February 27, 2013)

DoS: “The United States is deploying missile defenses around the world to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies from ballistic missile threats. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is focused on defending U.S. forces as well as our allies against the threat from North Korea. Additionally, we have deployed a number of missile defense assets in the region. For example, we have deployed a missile defense radar in Japan, and we have several U.S. ships operating in the Sea of Japan, with the missile defense mission. We are also discussing with Japan the possibility of deploying a second radar in Japan, which will assist with the defense of the United States, Japan against threats from North Korea. U.S.-Japan cooperation is very close and substantial. In addition to the U.S. capability in the region, Japan has also developed and deployed its own missile defense assets. For example, Japan has several Aegis class ships that have a missile defense capability and they have also deployed the Patriot air missile defense system.” (DoS, Press Statement, Missile Defense,” February 27, 2013)

South Korea’s decision to support a United Nations investigation into human rights abuses by North Korea signals that Seoul’s new conservative administration is willing to pressure its neighbor on such issues – even if it hurts the chances for engagement. South Korea’s pledge to give “active” support to the investigation comes just two days after the inauguration of President Park Geun-hye and will likely infuriate the North, which views discussion of its human rights as a “grave violation.” Seoul struggled with the decision, which forced a choice between two key goals: Restoring civil relations with Pyongyang, and pressing its government to improve treatment of its 24 million people. (Chico Harlan, “South Korea Vows Active Support of U.N. Probe into North Korean Rights Abuses,” Washington Post, February 28, 2013)

In a written answer to Saenuri Party lawmaker Won Yoo-chul, FM nominee Yun Byung-se picked the U.S. as the “top priority diplomatic partner” followed by China. “The South Korea-U.S. alliance has played a core role in the maturity of our democracy, economic development and national security for the past 60 years,” he said. “I see China as the next diplomatic partner after the U.S., given China’s economic importance as our biggest trade partner and investment destination, and its role in the peninsula’s
peace and prosperity.” The ministry said in a later statement that Yun’s remarks were not to “number the significance of diplomatic partners but to emphasize the importance of the country’s relationship with China as well as traditional ally the U.S.” (Shin Hyon-hee and Lee Song-hoon, “F.M. Nominee Rules out Military Action against N.K.,” Korea Herald, February 28, 2013)

3/3/13

Signs of large-scale North Korea military exercises have been detected in the East Sea, coinciding with the US and South Korea’s regular combined Foal Eagle field-training exercises, which enter full swing this week. Rodong Sinmun also warned again of the possibility of additional nuclear testing. A source with the South Korean military said on March 3 that the North Korean armed forces had been detected preparing for joint exercises of their army, navy, and air force. “They’re preparing for the exercises all over North Korea, and it looks like they’re planning joint army, navy, and air force firepower training in the East Sea early this month,” the source said. One possibility mentioned was that the exercises might include a launch of the KN-08 missile, which appears to have been developed as a new intercontinental ballistic missile, or the Musudan, which has a 4,000-kilometer range and was placed into combat position without ever being test launched. The source went on to say that the North Korean army, navy, and air force had conducted joint firing drills in Nampo, South Pyongan province in March 2012, while the army and air force participated in live-fire exercises at the village of Taewon south of Pyongyang the following month. “But these latest exercises seem to be much bigger than past ones in the East Sea, and they have a nuclear testing site there,” the source added. (Kang tae-ho, “North Korea Planning Joint Military Exercises to Counter US-SK Combined Exercises,” Hankyore, March 4, 2013)

3/5/13

KPA Supreme Command statement: “On December 12 last year the DPRK legitimately and successfully launched a satellite for peaceful purposes, ensuring international transparency, going beyond practice, and choosing a comparatively mild situation for it.

Seizing the DPRK’s satellite launch as an occasion for stifling it from the outset, the U.S. and its allies deliberately negated the DPRK’s sovereignty over its satellite launch. They finally prodded the UN Security Council into adopting a “resolution on sanctions” before opting for high-handed hostile acts against the DPRK. These hostile acts are still going on. Under this situation the DPRK was compelled to take practical counteractions to defend the security and sovereignty of the country. On February 12 it admirably and successfully conducted the third underground nuclear test for self-defense at the highest level as part of those counteractions. However, the U.S. imperialists and their allied forces including south Korea are making more persistent and desperate efforts to slap new tougher “sanctions” against the DPRK, far from drawing a due lesson. Not content with this, they kicked off again the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises to stifle the DPRK by force of arms by mobilizing huge armed forces of aggression. They will reportedly last for two months from March 1. Unlike last year the current joint military exercises will be participated in by super-large nuclear-powered carrier task force carrying at least 100 nuclear warheads, B-52H strategic bombers and other means of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces for making ground, sea and air nuclear strikes and its allied forces including south Korea, U.K. and Australia. From this point of view,
the exercises cannot be construed otherwise than the most dangerous nuclear war maneuvers targeted against the DPRK and the most undisguised military provocation to be made by a group of all hues of hostile forces. This serious situation clearly indicates that the actions of the U.S., south Korea and other hostile forces to infringe upon the sovereignty of the DPRK are now leading to a military offensive for aggression, going beyond the level of outrageous economic "sanctions."

In view of the prevailing situation, the Supreme Command of the KPA which is responsible for the national defense and security of the country and the destiny of the nation sent a meaningful warning message to the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces through the KPA Panmunjom mission on February 23. It warned them that if they ignite a war of aggression in the end, from that moment their fate will be hung by a thread with every hour. But, the joint military exercises have persisted and the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces have become all the more undisguised in their base moves to kick up their "sanctions." Looking back on history, the Korean people have neither shot even a single arrow nor thrown a single stone at the land of the U.S. The U.S. is, however, working with bloodshot eyes to swallow up the DPRK, not content with having incurred the pent-up grudge of the Korean people which can never be settled. What matters is that the south Korean puppet forces steeped in worship and sycophancy toward the U.S. are dancing to its tune. Of late Kim Kwan Jin, puppet minister of Defense, and Jong Sung Jo, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, inspected frontline army corps, fleet command and guided missile units where they blustered that a sort of military provocation is expected from the north and cried out for making "deadly strikes" and "preemptive strikes" at the "bases for provocations." As far as these guys are concerned, they are a group of traitors who pushed the inter-Korean relations to a collapse together with traitor Lee Myung Bak who knows nothing about politics and military affairs. They are military gangsters who go reckless, unaware of what their master U.S. has in mind, what is the intention of the neighbouring countries and what all fellow countrymen and nation desire.

The puppet authorities, too, are crying out for the dismantlement of nukes and halt to provocation as dictated by their master, without knowing what is precious wealth for the nation. They move like a robot and repeat anything like a parrot. The sovereignty and dignity of the nation are violated and the supreme interests of the country are seriously threatened by the U.S., the sworn enemy of the Korean people, and maniacs of confrontation with fellow countrymen grouping worst traitors. The army and people of the DPRK can never remain a passive onlooker to this fact. The spokesman for the KPA Supreme Command is authorized to declare the following important measures:

First, it will take the second and third strong practical counteractions in succession to cope with the high-handed war acts of the U.S. and all other hostile forces as it had already declared. The army and people of the DPRK never make an empty talk. It is the mettle of Songun Korea to do what it is determined to do. It won victories in the two wars and has advanced along the road of victory despite manifold difficulties. The army groups on the front, ground forces, the navy, air and anti-air units, strategic rocket units of the KPA, the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards have launched an all-out action according to the operational plan finally signed by the dear respected Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un. Now that the U.S.
imperialists seek to attack the DPRK even with nuclear weapons, it will counter
them with diversified precision nuclear strike means of Korean style. Those
means are bound to be launched once their buttons are pressed, and the
enemies' strongholds be turned into a sea in flames. This land is neither the
Balkans nor Iraq and Libya. The army and people of the DPRK have everything
including lighter and smaller nukes unlike what they had in the past.

Second, the KPA Supreme Command will make the Korean Armistice Agreement
totally nullified. The war maneuvers being staged by the U.S. imperialists and the south
Korean puppet forces are a vivid expression of their systematic violation of the
AA. Accordingly, the Supreme Command of the KPA will completely declare
invalid the AA, which has existed for form's sake from March 11, the day when
the war maneuvers will enter into a full-dress stage. The DPRK will make a strike of
justice at any target anytime as it pleases without limit, not bound to the AA, and
achieve the great cause of the country's reunification, the cherished desire of the
nation.

Third, the KPA Supreme Command will totally stop the activities of the
Panmunjom mission of the KPA which was tentatively established and operated
by it as a negotiating body for establishing a peace-keeping mechanism on the
Korean Peninsula. In this regard it will simultaneously make a decision to cut off
the Panmunjom DPRK-U.S. military telephone.

Our choice has become clear now that the moves of all hostile forces to encroach
upon the sovereignty and dignity of the DPRK are reaching a dangerous phase. It is the
unshakable stand of the army and people of the DPRK and the mode of counteraction
of Mt. Paektu style to counter enemies coming in attack with a dagger with a sword, a
rifle with an artillery piece and nukes with precision nuclear strike means of Korean
style more powerful than them. The U.S. imperialists and their allies should not forget
even a moment that they are standing at the crossroads of their life and death. A final
victory is in store for the army and people of the DPRK who are all out to protect its
sovereignty.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for Supreme Command of KPA Clarifies Important
Measures to Be Taken by It,” March 5, 2013)

The United Nations Security Council moved closer on Tuesday to expanding sanctions
on North Korea for its nuclear and ballistic missile activities. The United States and
China introduced a resolution that would target North Korean bankers and overseas
cash couriers, tighten inspections of suspect ship and air cargo, and subject the
country’s diplomats to invasive scrutiny and increased risk of expulsion. Passage of the
measure, drafted in response to the third North Korean underground nuclear test
three weeks ago, seemed all but assured, in part because China – North Korea’s major
benefactor – participated in drafting the language. It would be the fourth Security
Council sanctions resolution on North Korea, which has defied the previous measures
with increasing belligerence. A vote was expected on March 8. The Americans did not
publicly release the resolution text. But a Security Council diplomat familiar with the
measure, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the language may still be
subject to revision, said it broke new ground with restrictions and prohibitions on
North Korean banking transactions, new travel restrictions and increased monitoring of
North Korean ship and air cargo. The diplomat also said that the resolution added a
special lubricant and valve, needed for uranium enrichment, to items that North Korea
cannot import. The resolution would also place greater scrutiny on North Korean diplomatic personnel who are suspected of carrying proscribed goods and cash under the guise of official business, exposing them to possible deportation. “We know there are diplomats out there cooking up deals and moving funds around,” the Security Council diplomat said. Among the other provisions, the diplomat said the resolution also included new language aimed at enforcement that had been absent from the earlier resolutions. It requires, for example, that if a North Korean cargo vessel crew refuses a host country’s request for inspection, the host is under a legal obligation to deny the vessel port access. If a cargo plane is suspected of carrying prohibited goods to or from North Korea, the resolution would urge, but not require, that it be denied permission to fly over any other country—a new provision that could affect China, which routinely permits North Korean flights over its territory. Previous rounds of sanctions have blacklisted trading and financial firms believed to be directly involved with nuclear and missile work. The sanctions have also restricted the importation of luxury goods, an effort directed at the country’s ruling elite. American officials said privately that the latest resolution did not go as far as they would have liked, reflecting China’s insistence that the punitive measures remain focused on discouraging North Korea’s nuclear and missile behavior and avoid actions that could destabilize the country and lead to an economic collapse. But the text was stronger than what some North Korean experts had anticipated, particularly the measures that could slow or frustrate the country’s banking activities and extensive dependence on cash payments in its trade with other countries. “Going after the banking system in a broad brush way is arguably the strongest thing on this list,” said Evans J. R. Revere, a former State Department specialist in East Asian and Pacific affairs, and now senior director at the Albright Stonebridge Group, a Washington-based consulting company. “It does begin to eat into the ability of North Korea to finance many things.” (Rick Gladstone, “U.N. Resolution to Aim at North Korean Banks,” New York Times, March 6, 2013, p. A-12)

In the North’s first reported response to Park’s inauguration address, Choson Sinbo, North Korea’s mouthpiece published in Japan, said, “(We) cannot hide indignation over the unilateral call on North Korea to ‘discard nuclear arms first’ (before seeking fence-mending) as well as the pressure for change,” said referring to Park’s inauguration speech on February 25. Calling the speech “a one-way inauguration address,” the newspaper said the Park administration is “disappointing” from the start. North Korea had shown signs of hopes for fence-mending under the new Park administration, which is expected to be more lenient than the former administration of Lee Myung-bak. “The new administration is not correctly assessing the nature of the acute political conditions on today’s Korean Peninsula,” the newspaper said, accusing the South of holding joint military exercises with the U.S. in March for offensive purposes. The newspaper commentary also urged the Park administration to end hostile policies toward the North, saying “a departure from (previous) failed polices, that is where the new administration should start.” (Yonhap, “N. Korea Denounces Park’s Inauguration Address as Disappointing,” March 4, 2013)

North Korea may have reduced the number of political prisoners and closed one of its notorious political prison camps. A report by the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul said, “A minimum of 80,000 to a maximum of 120,000 political prisoners are
estimated to be detained in five political prisons.” The report said last year’s closure of
the political prison camp in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province, may have brought
the total number of political concentration camps to five. The figures compare with the
government’s estimation of around 154,000 political prisoners in the North, submitted
to the National Assembly in October 2009. Deaths stemming from severe forced labor
and dire prison conditions may have led to the cuts, the report said, adding those
detained in the Hoeryong camp have been moved to other areas, according to the
report which cited remarks by North Korean defectors in South Korea and satellite
images. "It’s difficult to say that the reduction in the number of prison camps was the
result of any changes in the North Korean authorities’ stance or policy toward political
prisons," the report said. “Even after Kim Jong-un took power, the North still maintains
political prison camps in order to isolate those that pose threats to the regime and
other potentially risky forces.” The Washington-based U.S. Committee for Human
Rights in North Korea, however, refuted similar allegations in October last year that
were previously raised by other media outlets, saying the Hoeryong camp, also known
as Camp No. 22, is still in operation. (Yonhap, “Political Prisoners in N. Korea Reduced
to Maximum 120,000: Report,” March 4, 2013)

Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center: “During a four-year leadership transition,
North Korea’s approach toward the international community has become even more
aggressive. The new Swiss-educated leader, Kim Jong Un, dashed initial hopes that he
might take the regime in a more positive direction than his father, the late Kim Jong Il.
In 2010 Pyongyang killed fifty South Koreans in two attacks, and it has warned of
further strikes. With its third nuclear test in February and another rocket test last
December, North Korea seems determined to develop a deliverable nuclear warhead
to threaten the United States. The international community has reached a critical
juncture in dealing with North Korea. If the regime continues on its current path, more
serious provocations may occur, increasing the risk of instability in the region and the
danger of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Two decades of American-led policy have
not succeeded in changing this trajectory. Moreover, with Washington judging that
North Korea is not prepared to give up its nuclear weapons program, there appears to
be no political basis for further U.S. negotiations with North Korea. The chief hope for
the resumption of North Korea diplomacy now rests with the new South Korean
president, Park Geun-hye. She campaigned on a platform of a “trustpolitik” to build
mutual confidence and improve North-South relations. Her conservative credentials
provide her with considerable political leeway at home for such an effort. Moreover,
Park heads a country that has become a global leading middle power, giving her
substantial influence with the international community, including key players such as
China. President Park should appoint a very senior presidential envoy to advise her on
North Korea policy, initiate contact with Pyongyang, and engage in high-level talks
with the regime, analogous to the role that former U.S. Secretary of Defense William
Perry played in the Clinton administration. The United States can be expected to
support such efforts as long as it is confident that its ultimate objective—the complete
elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons—is not compromised. South Korea
should aim to take the lead in dealing not only with inter-Korean relations but also the
nuclear issue. It should seek an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing by
persuading Pyongyang to freeze its nuclear program while negotiations are underway
and back away from its insistence that it will not abandon nuclear weapons. To revitalize the Six-Party Talks, four countries—South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China—should constitute a subcommittee within the Talks to negotiate the key issues. The goal should be to verify North Korea’s complete denuclearization and to simultaneously sign a peace mechanism no later than the end of the Obama administration. This will sharpen the focus of the Talks and put pressure on all four participants, but especially on North Korea and the PRC, to make the hard choices necessary to reach a successful conclusion.” (Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Policy Report, “The North Korea Problem and the Necessity for South Korean Leadership,” March 4, 2013, Executive Summary, Gi-wook Shin, Karl Eikenberry, Thomas Fingar, Daniel Sneider, David Straub, co-authors)

North Korea is drastically expanding a missile launch site in Musudan-ri, North Hamgyong Province, and has changed the shape of warheads to improve missile accuracy. “The North is building a new launch site designed for massive rockets in Musudan-ri,” a South Korean missile expert said. “They’re expanding the assembly facility there by 28 m so that they can assemble two long-range missiles simultaneously.” (Chosun Ilbo, “N. Korea Expands Missile Launch Site,” March 5, 2013)

The South Korean military notched up its defense posture and vowed stern punishment against North Korea’s provocations after Pyongyang warned of retaliation for imminent U.N. Security Council sanctions and Seoul-Washington joint military drills. North Korea’s military leadership late yesterday threatened to launch “nuclear strikes,” annul the inter-Korean truce, close its office in the border village of Panmunjom, and cut off its military hotline with the U.N. Command. “The drills are, as the North was informed, annual South Korea-U.S. joint exercises for the defense of the Korean Peninsula,” said Maj. Gen. Kim Yong-hyun, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s head of operations, at a news conference at the Defense Ministry in Seoul. “If North Korea nonetheless pushes ahead with provocations that would threaten the lives and safety of our citizens, our military will strongly and sternly punish the provocations’ starting point, its supporting forces and command. We are making it clear that all preparations are completed.” Concerns are rising over President Park Geun-hye’s ability to handle the high-stake issue with the much-touted national security office still not in place amid festering partisan disputes over her overall government reshuffle plans and an ensuing administrative vacuum. Yesterday’s meeting took place without Kim Jang-soo, a former defense minister who was named to steer the organization. He is being separately briefed on the situation and related developments, government sources said. “We are under abnormal conditions in which Kim is unable to attend the senior secretary meeting because of delays in passing the government reform bill,” presidential spokesperson Yoon Chang-jung told reporters early in the day. “But the National Security Office is substantively examining and responding to the situation in close cooperation with the administration including the Defense Ministry and military.” (Shin Hyon-hee, “Seoul Vows to Strike Origin, Command Posts of N.K. Attacks,” Korea Herald, March 6, 2013)

The U.S. government is known to have installed within its forces in South Korea an organization in charge of taking control of nuclear facilities in North Korea in the event
of a sudden contingency, including the collapse of the communist regime. Judging that the Chinese military will likely occupy nuclear facilities around the North’s border with China and acquire nuclear weapons and materials, the Pentagon is also taking steps to prepare for such a situation. According to high-level sources of the South Korean and U.S. governments Wednesday, the U.S. Defense Department late last year created within the 8th U.S. Army Command an organization exclusively in charge of penetrating 105 nuclear facilities across North Korea and taking control of them in the event of a sudden contingency there. This is the first confirmation of the number of North Korea’s nuclear facilities to be targeted by a U.S. military operation in the event of a crisis in the North. Such facilities are known to include the Yongbyon nuclear complex and a multiple number of nuclear material plants, including small-scale uranium enrichment facilities that North Korea is secretly operating. A South Korean military source said “I understand that the U.S. organization comprises not only U.S. military officials but also those from U.S. intelligence agencies and anti-terrorism organizations who have missions there.” Another informed source on North Korean affairs said, “The organization’s major missions include safely securing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials in the North, and taking control of nuclear-related facilities and technology institutes, arrests of key figures, and acquisition of confidential data.” “With the North’s third nuclear test (Feb. 12) as turning point, we understand that a plan to remove weapons of mass destruction in North Korea in the event of emergency is taking shape in earnest.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “U.S. Organ to Take over N.K. Nuke Facilities in Case of Crisis,” March 7, 2013)

North Korea’s trade with China barely grew in 2012 compared to a year earlier as growth in the world’s second-biggest economy slowed, according to South Korean calculations. Trade between the two countries rose an annual 5.4 percent in 2012 to a total of $5.93 billion, compared with 62.4 percent growth in 2011, according to a report released on Thursday by the Korea International Trade Association (KITA). The trade body said the fall was due lower global prices for coal and steel -- the of the two main resources China imports from North Korea -- and due to weaker demand as China’s economy grew just 7.8 percent in 2012, its weakest level since 1999, the report said. North Korean exports to China stood at $2.48 billion in 2012, up just 0.8 percent from a year earlier, the South Korean data showed. Imports from China rose 8.9 percent in 2012 year-on-year to $3.45 billion, compared to a 38.9 percent rise in the previous year. China had a $960 million trade surplus as a result in 2012. (Christine Kim, “North Korea’s Trade Growth with China Slows Sharply in 2012,” Reuters, March 6, 2013)

DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement: “The U.S. is now working hard to ignite a nuclear war to stifle the DPRK. Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises kicked off by the U.S., putting the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war, are maneuvers for a nuclear war aimed to mount a preemptive strike on the DPRK from A to Z. The U.S. is massively deploying armed forces for aggression, including nuclear carrier task force and strategic bombers, enough to fight a nuclear war under the smokescreen of “annual drills.” What should not be overlooked is that the war maneuvers are timed to coincide with the moves to fabricate a new “resolution” of the UN Security Council against the DPRK, pursuant to a war scenario of the U.S. to ignite a
nuclear war under the pretext of "nuclear nonproliferation." It is a trite war method of the U.S. to cook up "a resolution" at the UNSC to justify its war of aggression and then unleash it under the berets of "UN forces." That is why the U.S. is hurling into the war maneuvers even armed forces of its satellite countries which participated in the past Korean War as "UN forces." After directing the strategic pivot for world hegemony to the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. regards it as its primary goal to put the whole of the Korean Peninsula under its control in a bid to secure a bridgehead for landing in the Eurasian continent. It also seeks a way out of a serious economic crisis at home in unleashing the second Korean war. The U.S. is, indeed, the very criminal threatening global peace and security as it is staging dangerous war drills in this region, the biggest hotspot in the world and a nuclear arsenal where nuclear weapons and facilities are densely deployed. The DPRK has so far made every possible effort while exercising maximum self-restraint in order to defend the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. The U.S. is, however, responding to the DPRK’s good will and self-restraint with large-scale nuclear war maneuvers and the “annual” war drills are developing into a real war. Under this situation the opportunity of diplomatic solution has disappeared and there remains only military counteraction.

The spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry states as follows upon authorization as regards the grim situation that was created on the Korean Peninsula seriously threatening the sovereignty of the country and its right to existence: First, now that the U.S. is set to light a fuse for a nuclear war, the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will exercise the right to a preemptive nuclear attack to destroy the strongholds of the aggressors and to defend the supreme interests of the country. The Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army declared that it would totally nullify the Korean Armistice Agreement (AA) from March 11 when the U.S. nuclear war rehearsal gets into full swing. This meant that from that moment the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will take military actions for self-defense against any target any moment, not restrained by AA. Second, the farce for the adoption of "resolution on sanctions" against the DPRK being backed by the U.S. at the UN Security Council will compel the DPRK to take at an earlier date more powerful second and third countermeasures as it had declared. If the UN Security Council gives the green light to the U.S. in its moves for a war of aggression against the DPRK by adopting a new "resolution on sanctions," it will fully display the might of Songun it built up decades after decades and put an end to the evil cycle of tension. Third, given that it has become difficult to avert the second Korean war, the DPRK strongly warns the UN Security Council not to make another big blunder like the one in the past when it earned inveterate grudge of the Korean nation by acting as a war servant for the U.S. in 1950. The UNSC should immediately call into question the U.S. DPRK-targeted nuclear war rehearsals that pose a serious threat to the global peace and security, immediately disband the "UN Command" which is a tool for executing the U.S. war of aggression and take measures for ending the state of technical war. Justice can be defended only when strength is reacted with strength and nuke with nuke. Should the U.S. ignite a war in the end, it will cause flames of justice to flare up like an erupting volcano in which the aggressors will perish and the cursed Military Demarcation Line disappear for good.” (KCNA, “Second Korean War Is Unavoidable: DPRK FM Spokesman,” March 7, 2013)
The United Nations Security Council approved a new regimen of sanctions against North Korea for its underground nuclear test last month, imposing penalties on North Korean banking, travel and trade in a unanimous vote that reflected the country’s increased international isolation. The resolution, which was drafted by the United States and China, was passed in a speedy vote hours after North Korea threatened for the first time to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea. “The strength, breadth and severity of these sanctions will raise the cost to North Korea of its illicit nuclear program,” the United States ambassador to the United Nations, Susan E. Rice, told reporters after the vote. “Taken together, these sanctions will bite and bite hard.” Li Baodong, the ambassador from China, which lent its support to the new sanctions to the anger of the North Korean government, told reporters the resolution was aimed at the long-term goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. “This resolution is a very important step,” he told reporters. Calling such sanctions “an act of war,” the North has sharply escalated its threats against the United States and its allies in the last few days, declaring the 1953 armistice that stopped the Korean War null and void and threatening to turn Washington and Seoul into “a sea in flames” with “lighter and smaller nukes.” The combative country had often warned that it had the right to launch pre-emptive military strikes against the United States, which it claimed was preparing to start a war on the Korean Peninsula. It ratcheted up its hostile language by talking about pre-emptive nuclear strikes for the first time, citing the continuing joint American-South Korean military exercises as a proof that the United States and its allies were preparing for “a nuclear war aimed to mount a pre-emptive strike” on North Korea. “Now that the U.S. is set to light a fuse for a nuclear war, the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will exercise the right to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to destroy the strongholds of the aggressors and to defend the supreme interests of the country,” a spokesman of the North Korean Foreign Ministry said in a Korean-language statement carried by the North’s official Korean Central News Agency. He used the acronym for his country’s official name, Democratic People’s republic of Korea. The spokesman said that North Korea was no longer bound by the 1953 armistice ending the Korean War – and its military was free to “take military actions for self-defense against any target any moment” – starting from Monday, when it declared the cease-fire was terminated. The resolution the United Nations adopted to impose more sanctions against the North “will compel the DPRK to take at an earlier date more powerful second and third countermeasures as it had declared,” the spokesman added, without elaborating. Photos filed by news agencies from the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, and carried in South Korean media on Thursday showed buses covered with military camouflage and university students rushing out of their classroom building in military uniforms in a military exercise. Few analysts believed that North Korea would launch a military attack at the United States, a decision that would be suicidal for the regime. But officials in Seoul feared that North Korea might attempt an armed skirmish to test the military resolve of Park Geun-hye, South Korea’s first female president, who took office less than two weeks ago. In North Korea, where pronouncements are carefully choreographed and timed, the threat on Tuesday to use “lighter and smaller nukes” was read on North Korean television by Gen. Kim Yong-chol. General Kim, the head of the North’s military intelligence, is one of the hard-liners that South Korean officials suspected was deeply involved in the 2010 attacks. (Rick Gladstone and Choe Sang-hun, “New Sanctions Imposed on North Korea As It Warns
The U.N. Security Council is set to add three North Korean weapons dealers and two entities to its new resolution to punish the North for conducting its third nuclear test last month, according to a copy of a draft resolution obtained by Yonhap. The three North Korean arms dealers are: Yon Chong-nam, the chief representative for the Korea Mining Developing Trading Corp (KOMID); Ko Chol-chae, the deputy chief representative for the KOMID; and Mun Chong-chol, an official at Tanchon Central Bank, the resolution showed. KOMID is described by the resolution as North Korea's "primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons," while the North Korean bank is the "main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacturing of such weapons." The two North Korean entities are the Second Academy of Natural Sciences, which is responsible for research and development of the North's advanced weapons systems, including "missiles and probably nuclear weapons," and the Korea Complex Equipment Import Corp. linked to the North's "military-related sales," according to the draft. The Security Council "decides that all states shall inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK," the draft said. It also "calls upon states to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items" banned by previous U.N. resolutions, the document said.


According to KCNA, Kim Jong Un inspected coastal defense units on the North’s southernmost islets in the Yellow Sea early this morning. The islets are close to South Korea’s frontline island of Yeonpyeong, which North Korea shelled in 2010. After being briefed on targets on Yeonpyeong, the report said, Kim ordered troops on the islet of Jangjae to “deal a deadly blow to the enemy and blow up their positions if they fire even a single shell at their territorial waters or land.” In a visit to the nearby islet of Mu, he urged “reinforced means of firepower strikes and targets” on five South Korean islets in the Yellow Sea, including Yeonpyeong, and “defined the order of precision strikes.” Expressing satisfaction over the combat readiness postures on the islets, Kim also ordered his soldiers to “promptly deal a deadly counterblow to the enemy if a single shell is fired on their waters and land, where their sovereignty is exercised, and make the first gunfire and shoot a signal flare for a great war of national reunification.” He was also quoted as saying the North’s 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong was “the most satisfying” engagement since the 1953 armistice agreement that ended the Korean War was signed. He claimed that no North Korean soldier was killed or injured in the incident, but this is not true. North Korea’s military sustained significant damage from the South’s return fire. North Korean media outlets also continued their provocative rhetoric. Rodong Shinmun urged its people to “settle scores with the U.S. imperialists” and achieve national reunification while reporting on a mass rally in Pyongyang to support a statement by the supreme command of the North Korean military. (Dong-A Ilbo, “N.K. Escalates Saber-Rattling, Threats against S. Korea,” March 8, 2013)
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Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009) and resolution 2087 (2013), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

Expressing the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and resolution 2087 (2013), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Concerned that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,

Welcoming the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) new Recommendation 7 on targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation, and urging Member States to apply FATF’s Interpretative Note to Recommendation 7 and related guidance papers for effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation of the Council’s relevant resolutions;
2. Decides that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests or any other provocation;
3. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;
4. Demands further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;
5. Condemns all the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment, notes that all such activities are in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities and shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403);
6. Reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

7. Reaffirms that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) apply to items prohibited by paragraphs 8 (a) (i), 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009), decides that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) also apply to paragraphs 20 and 22 of this resolution, and notes that these measures apply also to brokering or other intermediary services, including when arranging for the provision, maintenance or use of prohibited items in other States or the supply, sale or transfer to or exports from other States;

8. Decides further that measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in annexes I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and decides further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to any individuals or entities acting on the behalf or at the direction of the individuals and entities that have already been designated, to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means;

9. Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

10. Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and the exemptions set forth in paragraph 10 of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any individual whom a State determines is working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or individuals assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and further decides that, if such an individual is a DPRK national, then States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of an individual is required for fulfillment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede he transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters to conduct United Nations business;

11. Decides that Member States shall, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such
programs or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

12. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks, and also calls upon States to prohibit DPRK banks from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

13. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, and other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution;

14. Expresses concern that transfers to the DPRK of bulk cash may be used to evade the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and clarifies that all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of this resolution to the transfers of cash, including through cash couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK so as to ensure such transfers of bulk cash do not contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

15. Decides that all Member States shall not provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

16. Decides that all States shall inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, if the State concerned has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

17. Decides that, if any vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s flag State, or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009), all States shall deny such a vessel entry to their ports, unless entry is required for the purpose of an inspection, in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, and decides further that any State that has been refused by a vessel to allow an inspection shall promptly report the incident to the Committee;
18. Calls upon States to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, except in the case of an emergency landing;
19. Requests all States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers of DPRK aircraft or vessels to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;
20. Decides that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in annex III of this resolution;
21. Directs the Committee to review and update the items contained in the lists specified in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013) no later than twelve months from the adoption of this resolution and on an annual basis thereafter, and decides that, if the Committee has not acted to update this information by then, the Security Council will complete action to update within an additional thirty days;
22. Calls upon and allows all States to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories of any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, and directs the Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding the proper implementation of this provision;
23. Reaffirms the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and clarifies that the term “luxury goods” includes, but is not limited to, the items specified in annex IV of this resolution;
24. Calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;
25. Calls upon all States to report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, and requests the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;
26. Calls upon all States to supply information at their disposal regarding non-compliance with the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;
27. Directs the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, directs the
Committee to designate additional individuals and entities to be subject to the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and decides that the Committee may designate any individuals for measures under paragraphs 8 (d) and 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and entities for measures under paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) that have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

28. Decides that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 1874 (2009) and this resolution;

29. Recalls the creation, pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), of a Panel of Experts, under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the tasks provided for by that paragraph, decides to extend until 7 April 2014 the Panel’s mandate, as renewed by resolution 2050 (2012), decides further that this mandate shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution, expresses its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than twelve months from the adoption of this resolution, requests the Secretary-General to create a group of up to eight experts and to take the necessary administrative measures to this effect, and requests the Committee, in consultation with the Panel, to adjust the Panel’s schedule of reporting;

30. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

31. Underlines that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK;

32. Emphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

33. Expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;

34. Reaffirms its support to the Six-Party Talks, calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;
35. Reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large;
36. Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test;
37. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I Travel ban/asset freeze
1. YO’N CHO’NG NAM (a) Description: Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). The KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
2. KO CH’OL-CHAE (a) Description: Deputy Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). The KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
3. MUN CHO’NG-CH’OL (a) Description: Mun Cho’ng-Ch’ol is a TCB official. In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB. Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.

Annex II Asset freeze
1. SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES (a) Description: The Second Academy of Natural Sciences is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of the DPRK’s advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences uses a number of subordinate organizations to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas, including Tangun Trading Corporation, for use in the DPRK’s missile and probably nuclear weapons programs. Tangun Trading Corporation was designated by the Committee in July 2009 and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support DPRK’s defence research and development programs, including, but not limited to, weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programs and procurement, including materials that are controlled or prohibited under relevant multilateral control regimes. (b) AKA: 2ND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; CHE 2 CHAYON KWAHAKWON; ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; CHAYON KWAHAK-WON; NATIONAL DEFENSE ACADEMY; KUKPANG KWAHAK-WON; SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE; SANSRI (c) Location: Pyongyang, DPRK
2. KOREA COMPLEX EQUIPMENT IMPORT CORPORATION (a) Description: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to that country’s military-related sales. (b) Location: Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Annex III Items, materials, equipment, goods and technology
Nuclear items
1. Perfluorinated Lubricants: They can be used for lubricating vacuum pump and compressor bearings. They have a low vapor pressure, are resistant to uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the gaseous uranium compound used in the gas centrifuge process, and are used for pumping fluorine.

2. UF6 Corrosion Resistant Bellow-sealed Valves: They can be used in uranium enrichment facilities (such as gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion plants), in facilities that produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the gaseous uranium compound used in the gas centrifuge process, in fuel fabrication facilities and in facilities handling tritium.

Missile items
1. Special corrosion resistant steels – limited to steels resistant to Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) or nitric acid, such as nitrogen stabilized duplex stainless steel (N-DSS).
2. Ultra high-temperature ceramic composite materials in solid form (i.e. blocks, cylinders, tubes or ingots) in any of the following form factors: (a) Cylinders having a diameter of 120 mm or greater and a length of 50 mm or greater; (b) Tubes having an inner diameter of 65 mm or greater and a wall thickness of 25 mm or greater and a length of 50 mm or greater; or (c) Blocks having a size of 120 mm x 120 mm x 50 mm or greater.
3. Pyrotechnically Actuated Valves.
5. Sodium Perchlorate.

Chemical weapons list
Vacuum pumps with a manufacturer's specified maximum flow-rate greater than 1 m3/h (under standard temperature and pressure conditions), casings (pump bodies), preformed casing-liners, impellers, rotors, and jet pump nozzles designed for such pumps, in which all surfaces that come into direct contact with the chemicals being processed are made from controlled materials."

Annex IV Luxury goods
1. Jewelry: (a) Jewelry with pearls; (b) Gems; (c) Precious and semi-precious stones (including diamonds, sapphires, rubies, and emeralds); (d) Jewelry of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal.
2. Transportation items, as follows: (a) Yachts; (b) Luxury automobiles (and motor vehicles): automobiles and other motor vehicles to transport people (other than public transport), including station wagons; (c) Racing cars. (U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013) adopted at its 6932nd meeting on 7 March 2013)

Fresh U.N. sanctions are unlikely to halt North Korea’s nuclear program given that seven years of previous measures from the world body and more than 50 years of U.S. penalties have failed to dissuade North Korea from trying to develop banned weapons. "They will never give up their (nuclear) intercontinental ballistic missile plans. Their stance on this is very firm," said Kim Yeon-su, professor of the department of security policy studies at the National Defense University in Seoul. China backed the U.S.-led push for the new round of sanctions in the United Nations. It has also supported previous efforts and stood behind condemnations of the North Korean long-range rocket launch in December which breached U.N. rules. Kim from the National Defense University said recent ties between North Korea and China had been
fragile. He noted there had been a lack of visits to North Korea from senior Chinese officials since the missile launch in December - a contrast to the usual interaction seen during the days of Kim Jong-il. A Chinese politburo member was also snubbed by Kim Jong-un on a trip to Pyongyang ahead of the December rocket launch and Beijing summoned the North Korean envoy after the nuclear test to express its "strong dissatisfaction" over the test. Despite the warning from Beijing, North Korea has told China it is ready to push ahead with a fourth and even a fifth test, a top official with direct access to both capitals told Reuters in February. "Compared to his father ... Kim Jong-un seems to be charting his own path when it comes to China," said Kim at Seoul's National Defense University. (Christine Kim, “North Korea’s Kim Jong-un to Ride out Sanctions in Nuclear Push,” Reuters, March 7, 2013)

Davies testimony: “The world is increasingly taking note of the grave, widespread, and systematic human rights violations in the DPRK and demanding action. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay has called for an in-depth international inquiry to document abuses. We support this call, and next week, my colleague Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert King will travel to Geneva to attend the UN Human Rights Council’s 22nd session, where he will call attention to North Korea’s human rights record and urge the adoption of an enhanced mechanism of inquiry into the regime’s abuses against the North Korean people. We continue, meanwhile, to engage countries across the globe to raise awareness about North Korea and enlist their help in pushing for action. We are also working with international and non-governmental organizations to improve the situation on the ground for the North Korean people, including by supporting the flow of independent information into the DPRK. Working with the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and independent broadcasters in the ROK, we aim to provide information to the North Korean people and—over the longer term—plant the seeds for the development of civil society. The Obama Administration’s dual-track policy of engagement and pressure toward the DPRK reflects a bipartisan recognition that only a policy of openness to dialogue when possible, combined with sustained, robust pressure through sanctions when necessary, can maximize prospects for progress in denuclearizing North Korea.” (Glyn Davies, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Policy toward North Korea, March 7, 2013)

Ignoring threats of retaliation, the United Nations Security Council ordered new economic sanctions against North Korea for its third nuclear test last month, unanimously approving a resolution that the United States negotiated with China, the North’s greatest protector. In an angry response, North Korea said on March 8 that it was nullifying all agreements of nonaggression and denuclearization with South Korea and was cutting off the North-South hot line. But beyond those steps, it was unclear how, if at all, North Korea’s young and untested leader, Kim Jong-un, would react to the rebuke. His government has threatened to terminate the 60-year-old armistice that brought a halt to the Korean War and that has kept a cold peace on the peninsula since, and South Korean officials said they were on the alert for any possible attack by the North. Any military action, or response, could end up involving the American forces that have remained in South Korea as it has turned from war-ravaged ruin into one of the most advanced industrialized powerhouses. The 15-to-0 Security Council vote
places potentially painful new constraints on North Korean banking, trade and travel, pressures countries to search suspect North Korean cargo and includes new enforcement language absent from previous measures. But the provisions are in some ways less important than China's participation in writing them, suggesting that the country has lost patience with the neighbor it supported in the Korean War. While China's enforcement of sanctions on North Korea remains to be seen, it may now be more assertive. “This is not about the words, it is about the music,” said Christopher R. Hill, the former American diplomat who negotiated a deal with the North during the Bush administration to dismantle its nuclear facilities – an accord that quickly collapsed. China’s co-sponsorship of the resolution “suggests that after many years, the screws are beginning to turn,” said Hill, now the dean of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. The United Nations vote came hours after North Korea, infuriated by the combination of the proposed resolution and annual joint military exercises by South Korea and the United States, threatened for the first time to carry out “a pre-emptive nuclear strike” on its enemies. Military experts regarded that threat as bluster: While the North has conducted three underground nuclear tests, it is far from clear it knows how to deploy a nuclear weapon or make one small enough to fit atop a missile. But the threat still prompted the White House spokesman, Jay Carney, to respond that the United States was “fully capable” of defending itself. Another nuclear test is possible, as is another ballistic missile launching or perhaps an armed provocation aimed at South Korea. Some regarded the North’s dire warnings as a signal that some military response was looming. “The higher decibel of invective is a bit worrisome,” said Bill Richardson, the former governor of New Mexico and presidential candidate, who has traveled to North Korea eight times, most recently in January. “It’s the highest negative level I’ve ever seen, and it probably means that the hard-line elements, particularly the military and not the Foreign Ministry, are in control.” On the other hand, Richardson said, “China is part of a significant sanctions effort, and this may cool the North Koreans down, may temper their response.” It is also possible that the new and isolated North Korean government may have misjudged the reaction to talk of a pre-emptive nuclear attack, wording rarely heard since the cold war ended. It could be another way in which the North is demanding talks with President Obama – only last week Kim told Dennis Rodman, the visiting former basketball star, that he wanted Obama to call him. But it could also be a way of saying that North Korea now expected to be treated the way Pakistan is: as an established, if formally unrecognized, nuclear power. “This is a tactic they have employed when they don’t get their way, when the international community brings more sanctions to bear,” said Suzanne DiMaggio, vice president of global policy programs at the Asia Society in New York. “Whether that will happen this time is unclear, given the level of hostile rhetoric,” she said. “I'm not sure Pyongyang recognizes that fact.” The United Nations vote and North Korea’s threat come at a time when, internally, the Obama administration is debating the wisdom of its policy of essentially ignoring the North for the past four years, and responding to any provocations with new sanctions. According to current and former administration officials, there is a growing discussion within the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon over whether Kim is using each new test of rockets and nuclear devices to solidify his position with the military, his most important single constituency. “Under that theory,” one official who has dealt with North Korea often said recently,
“even a firefight with the South Koreans might help him, as long as it doesn’t escalate into something that threatens the regime.” In testimony today before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Glyn T. Davies, the administration’s special representative for North Korea policy, argued that the best course was to continue with Mr. Obama’s current policy of using tests and provocations to tighten sanctions, and try to starve development of the North’s long-range missiles and its effort to design nuclear weapons small enough for those missiles. Davies insisted that “it is still the goal of U.S. policy to achieve a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons.” Davies’s prescription was challenged by Robert Joseph, who dealt with North Korea issues for the Bush administration, and left the State Department partly in protest over a North Korean deal approved by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. “North Korea will only agree to abandon its missile and nuclear programs if it is judged essential for regime survival,” he told the committee. The North, he said, considers these programs a deterrent against attack. The new resolution instructs North Korea to cease all nuclear and missile testing and contains restrictions that will block financial transactions, impound cash, further empower countries to inspect suspicious North Korean cargo, and expand a blacklist of items that the North is prohibited from importing. The sanctions also place new constraints on North Korean diplomats, raising their risk of expulsion. But they do not allow countries to stop and inspect North Korean shipments on the high seas or force down aircraft suspected of moving contraband, acts that could set off a violent confrontation. “The strength, breadth and severity of these sanctions will raise the cost to North Korea of its illicit nuclear program and further constrain its ability to finance and source materials and technology for its ballistic missile, conventional and nuclear weapons programs,” the United States ambassador to the United Nations, Susan E. Rice, told reporters after the vote. Li Baodong, the Chinese envoy, appeared to signal China’s frustration with North Korea, which ignored its entreaties not to carry out the test last month. “China is a country of principle,” he told reporters. “We are formally committed to safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” (Rick Gladstone and David E. Sanger, “U.N. Council Puts More Sanctions on North Korea,” New York Times, March 8, 2013, p. A-1)

White House daily briefing: “Q. Does the United States believe that North Korea is capable of carrying out this threat? Officials there are claiming that they now have the missiles on standby that can “leave Washington engulfed in a sea of fire.” What can you tell Americans who might be concerned when they see that about whether they have the capability to carry that out? CARNEY: I can tell you that the United States is fully capable of defending against any North Korean ballistic missile attack. And our recent success in returning to testing of the upgraded version of the so-called GBI, or the CE2 missile, will keep us on a good trajectory to improve our defense capability against limited ballistic missile threats such as those from North Korea. But let’s be clear, we are fully capable of dealing with that threat...” (White House Daily Briefing, Spokesman Jay Carney, March 7, 2013)

DoS daily briefing: Q: I guess the most serious thing we could ever talk about is nuclear war, so why don’t we start with North Korea? How serious do you take the threats from Pyongyang? And what contacts have people in this building had, besides New York, with either the Chinese or your P-5 - your Six-Party partners? NULAND: Well,
let’s just start by saying that this kind of bellicose rhetoric from the DPRK is not surprising. It’s not new. This regime has regularly missed the opportunity to improve its relationship with the outside world. Let me just take this opportunity to say that the United States is fully capable of defending against a DPRK ballistic missile attack. Furthermore, we are continuing to upgrade our ballistic missile defense capabilities. We remain firmly committed to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan and the maintenance of regional peace and security. With regard to consultations, as you know, and as announced by Ambassador Rice just a little while ago, we were very pleased to see the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2094 and the tough new sanctions that that imposes, and the fact that the international community was able to speak with one voice about these things. Q: Just - when you say that it’s not surprising, does that mean you take it to be more bluster than actual warning of any imminent plans from North Korea of military action? NULAND: Well, obviously, one has to take what any government says seriously. It's for that reason that I repeat here that we are fully capable of defending the United States. But I would also say that this kind of extreme rhetoric has not been unusual for this regime, unfortunately. Q: But when you say, like, you're fully capable of defending against a ballistic missile attack, that you're boosting up your ballistic missile - it sounds as if you’re taking these threats seriously. NULAND: Well, you have to take a government at its word when it makes these kinds of threats, which is why we are making clear that we have not only full defensive capability for the United States, but that we’re prepared to defend our allies. But what’s really disappointing and unfortunate here is that this is a regime that’s been offered multiple opportunities, repeated opportunities, particularly in recent years, to come clean with the international community, to work with us, to come out of its isolation, and instead it remains committed to this kind of pattern.” (DoS Daily Briefing, Spokesman Victoria Nuland, March 7, 2013)

Pyongyang has also extended the range of one of its short-range missiles to enable it to strike U.S. forces in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, a high-ranking government official told the JoongAng Ilbo. “Based on our analysis of the KN-02 missile that Pyongyang launched during live-fire exercises last month, we found its range reaches up to 150 or 160 kilometers [99 miles],” the official said. “We assume they boosted the force of the missile’s engine to extend the range.” On February 10, the North Korean military fired four KN-02 missiles toward the East Sea. With the extended range, if North Korea launches it from a pad near the border, such as the city of Kaesong, the missile could reach Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul, as well as Daejeon. Currently Camp Humphreys is in Pyeongtaek, but the U.S. garrison in Yongsan, central Seoul, will move there in 2019. The KN-02 missile can also be mounted with a payload, the South’s military said. “The KN-02 missile uses solid fuel and it can blast off within five or ten minutes if carried on a mobile rocket launcher,” the official said. “It is a threatening weapon because of its striking accuracy.” The North Korean military showed the KN-02 missiles for the first time at a military parade on April 25, 2007, the anniversary of the birth of its military. According to South Korea’s military, the KN-02 is manufactured by the North Korean military based on Russia’s SS-21 Scarab missiles. “Since Pyongyang showed the missile in 2007, it has frequently test-fired it near Wonsan, an eastern coastal city, or Hwajin, on the Yellow Sea,” the official said. “Up until recently, it has reportedly tested the missile’s engine at an institute in Samum-dong, Pyongyang.” North Korea allegedly
invited military officials from Iran and Syria to witness live-fire tests of about 10 KN-02 missiles in 2012. Several officials in the South’s military said they were tipped off that the North has a plan to conduct live-fire exercises between Feb. 10 and 11. (Kim Hee-jin and Jeong Yong-soo, “Pre-Emptive Nuclear Strike Threat from Pyongyang,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, March 8, 2013)

DoS Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation: “The United States welcomes the unanimous passage today of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2094. North Korea’s nuclear and missile proliferation activities violate the UN Security Council sanctions regime comprised of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), destabilize the region, and undermine the global nonproliferation regime. The international community has condemned North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation activity and its continued efforts to advance its nuclear and missile programs, including its announced February 12 nuclear test and its April and December 2012 launches using ballistic missile technology. These provocative acts continue to threaten international peace and security and will only result in North Korea becoming further isolated from the international community. On Thursday, March 7, 2013 the U.S. Department of the Treasury implemented the asset freeze provisions of UNSCR 2094 (2013) by designating Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l, a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) representative who served in Beijing, China; and Yo’n Cho’ng-Nam and Ko Ch’o’l-Chae, both based in Dalian, China, and representatives of Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of WMD and their supporters. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences and Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation, listed in UNSCR 2094 today, were previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in August 2010 and October 2005 respectively. “These individuals are important actors within North Korea’s proliferation network who have been working to gain access to international markets,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “We will continue to work with our partners around the world to expose these operations and hold North Korea accountable for its provocative and destabilizing acts.” TCB was identified in the annex of E.O. 13382 in June 2005 because it acts as the financial arm of KOMID, Pyongyang’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. KOMID was also listed in the annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 for its role in North Korea’s proliferation of WMD. KOMID has offices in multiple countries around the world and facilitates weapons sales for the North Korean government. TCB plays a role in financing KOMID’s sales of ballistic missiles and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), the U.S. and UN-sanctioned Iranian organization responsible for developing liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. In addition to their listings under E.O. 13382, both TCB and KOMID were designated by the UNSCR 1718 Committee in April 2009. Today’s designations under E.O. 13382 generally result in the prohibition of transactions between these individuals and any U.S. person, and the freezing of any assets they may have under U.S. jurisdiction.” (Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Fact Sheet, United States Sanctions Individuals Linked to North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, March 7, 2013)
Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) statement: "The Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army on Tuesday [March 5] solemnly declared the important measures to defend the sovereignty and dignity of the nation and the supreme interests of the country in view of the fact that the U.S. and south Korean puppet forces' hostile acts and their nuclear war moves against the DPRK have reached a dangerous phase. The measures were very just as they reflected the resolute disposition and iron will of the army and people of the DPRK to counter enemies coming in attack with a dagger with a sword, a rifle with an artillery piece and nukes with precision nuclear strike means of Korean style more powerful than them. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces should have pondered over our warning. However, they, hell bent on confrontation and war fever, illegally cooked up additional "resolution on sanctions" against the DPRK by using the hand-raising machine at the UN, while working hard to ignite a large-scale nuclear war against it. What should not be overlooked is that the south Korean puppet forces are taking the lead in the moves for invading the DPRK, unaware of the disasters they will suffer like a tiger moth. Even the puppet military warmongers unhesitatingly cried out for "resolutely destroying not only the bases of provocations and forces supporting them but their commanding forces" by brandishing the U.S.-provided nuclear stick against the DPRK over its just measures to defend the sovereignty of the nation. They were so foolish as to let loose sheer sophism that the DPRK's important measures were a ploy to create "uneasiness" in south Korea and lead the situation to "dialogue." This is aimed to play down the DPRK's toughest stance. Due to such evermore undisguised moves of the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces to escalate the confrontation with the DPRK and ignite a war against it, the frozen north-south relations have gone beyond such the danger line that they are no longer repairable and an extremely dangerous situation is prevailing on the Korean Peninsula where a nuclear war may break out right now. It is the steadfast determination and unshakable faith of the army and people of the DPRK led by the illustrious commander of Mt. Paektu not to allow the hostile forces to infringe upon the sovereignty and dignity of the country but decisively and mercilessly wipe them out. Upon authorization, the CPRK clarifies the following countermeasures as regards the prevailing grave situation: First, the DPRK abrogates all agreements on nonaggression reached between the north and the south. The frantic Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises being staged by the south Korean warmongers together with the U.S. in the land, air and seas of south Korea with huge armed forces, nuclear-powered carrier flotilla, strategic bombers and other nuclear strike hardware involved are open acts of aggression against the DPRK and a vivid expression of wanton violation of all the agreements on nonaggression reached between the north and the south. The south Korean puppet forces are working with bloodshot eyes to invade the DPRK in collusion with the U.S. This situation reduced to dead papers the north-south agreements on nonaggression which calls for nonuse of force against the other party, prevention of accidental military clashes, peaceful settlement of disputes and the issue of nonaggression demarcation line. Therefore, the DPRK officially declares that from the moment the Korean Armistice Agreement is made totally invalid on March 11 all the said agreements will be completely nullified. The DPRK will mercilessly punish the enemies through prompt crushing retaliatory strikes, not bound to the above-said agreements, if they intrude into its land and territorial air and waters even an inch and fire even a single shell at them. Second,
the DPRK totally nullifies the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is the arch criminal who introduced nuclear weapons to south Korea more than 60 years ago and has threatened the DPRK with nukes, spawning the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The south Korean puppet forces are the accomplices who shielded and encouraged the U.S. shipment of nuclear weapons into south Korea and have danced to the tune of the U.S. in its moves for a nuclear war against the DPRK. The U.S. and the puppet forces’ nuclear war moves against the DPRK virtually put an end to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula long ago and rendered the joint declaration on its denuclearization totally meaningless. Hence, the DPRK re-clarifies that the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become totally invalid. From now on, no one is allowed to utter such words as the DPRK’s "dismantlement of nukes" and "no-use of nuclear weapons." Moreover, the puppet forces have neither qualifications nor reason to urge the DPRK to dismantle nukes as they allowed the shipment of nukes into south Korea and have zealously participated in the moves for a nuclear war against it. Third, the DPRK will close the Panmunjom liaison channel between the north and the south. There is nothing to talk to the puppet group of traitors hell-bent on the moves for a war of aggression against the north, blinded with confrontation and hostility towards compatriots. What remains to be done is to settle accounts with them by physical force only. It is a mockery and insult to the noble Red Cross spirit to discuss compatriotism and humanitarian issues with those who consider confrontation with compatriots as a means for their existence. Moves for war and confidence-building cannot go together and showdown is incompatible with dialogue. It is illogical and nothing but hypocrisy to talk about "trust" and "dialogue" while pursuing confrontation and war. The DPRK declares the above-said channel closed from the view that this channel can no longer perform its mission due to the prevailing grave situation. It notifies the south side that, accordingly, it will immediately cut off the north-south hotline. The hostile forces should clearly know that our just option is by no means a mere threat but is an expression of the fixed will of our army and people to annihilate the enemy. All the service personnel and people of the DPRK will turn out as one and mercilessly wipe out the aggressors and provocateurs with the tremendous might of Songun they have consolidated, and build a reunified, prosperous and best powerful country on the land of three thousand-ri without fail. We will never miss the golden chance to wage a great war for national reunification.” (KCNA, “Important Measures o Defend the Nation’s Sovereignty, Dignity and Country’s Supreme Interests: CPRK,” March 8, 2013)

CPRK Secretariat Information Bulletin 1021: “The army and people of the DPRK are poised for a final do-or-die battle in the spirit of annihilating enemies after the statement was made public by a spokesman for the Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army. The south Korean puppet military hooligans engrossed in confrontation and provocation are running reckless, unaware of the gravity of the situation and the ensuing catastrophic consequences. On March 6, the puppet Joint Chiefs of Staff let the chief of the operational department clarify south Korea’s stand with regard to the statement of the Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army. The military hooligans described the Key Resolve and Foal eagle war drills as "annual exercises for defense" and called the DPRK’s crucial measures a "provocation". They
even blustered that they would “severely punish even the commanding forces” of the north, adding that “they are bracing for putting it into practice.” They even bluffed that they would target the supreme headquarters of the Korean revolution, openly touting “punishing the commanding forces,” a serious act of provoking an all-out war. In April last year, they openly aired the footage of missile attack, calling for “striking the window of office in Pyongyang.” It is tragedy of the nation that the group of cursed traitors like Lee Myung Bak is still at large even though they deserve divine punishment for the heinous crimes they already committed against the nation. The enemies of the nation who dare point their finger at the sky can never go scot-free. It is the fixed determination of the army and people of the DPRK to certainly deal sledge-hammer blows at the group of traitors who seek to harm the headquarters of the revolution, which represents the supreme dignity of the DPRK. The puppet military group dares make rhetoric, unaware that the stronghold of confrontation and treachery Chongwadae, and Seoul will be blown up at a time when they attempt “punishing the commanding forces of the north.” The DPRK solemnly stated to the world that from the moment when the Korean Armistice Agreement is nullified due to the moves for provoking a war of aggression by the U.S. imperialists and the puppet warmongers, the DPRK will mount Korean style strike of justice at the provocateurs without hesitation. The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK, already put on a high alert, are waiting for an order for great advance for national reunification, determined to blast the strongholds of aggression with prompt and fatal retaliation, should the provocateurs make even the slightest move. The reckless moves of the puppet warmongers for confrontation with the DPRK will accelerate their most miserable end. Neither the U.S. nuclear umbrella which the puppet forces trust in as the savior nor international cooperation will be able to save the group of traitors to the nation. The aggressors, provokers will meet a final ruin for provoking the DPRK for no reason.” (KCNA, “Aggressors Will Meet Destruction: CPRK Secretariat,” March 8, 2013)

In a speech to a mass rally in Pyongyang yesterday, Col. Gen. Kang Pyo-yong, deputy chief of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, was quoted by Rodong Sinmun, “Soldiers are ready for a battle and only awaiting an order, while various missiles including an intercontinental ballistic missile are on standby preset for targets, equipped with lightened, miniaturized and varied nuclear warheads.” Kang said the missiles will turn Washington and its allies into a “sea of fire.” In a speech at a joint commissioning ceremony for graduating military cadets at the Gyeryongdae military headquarters, President Park Guen-hye urged Pyongyang to stop raising tension “Our current security situation is extremely grave. North Korea pushed ahead with a nuclear test and long-range missile development and is threatening to annul the Armistice Agreement,” the president said. “I will deal strongly with North Korea’s provocations. But if North Korea takes a path of change I will actively undertake the Korean Peninsula Trust Process to build a foundation for the South and North to live peacefully and pave the way for national unification,” she said, referring to her signature policy aimed at building trust for inter-Korean reconciliation. Earlier in the day, Cheong Wa Dae also held a meeting of senior secretaries to discuss the situation and countermeasures. (Shin Hyon-hee, “N. Korea Ramps up Tension; Parks Vows Stern Retaliation,” Korea Herald, March 9, 2013)
The governments of North and South Korea escalated their hostile warnings to the highest level in years, with each threatening to annihilate the other a day after the United Nations Security Council unanimously imposed tightened sanctions on the North for its nuclear test last month. North Korea said it was nullifying all nonaggression agreements with South Korea, and one of its top generals claimed his country had nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles ready to blast off. South Korea said that if North Korea attacked the South with a nuclear weapon, the government of the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, would be “erased from the earth.” While experts say North Korea does not have the technical ability to use nuclear-tipped missiles, that did not stop it from threatening to deploy them. “If we push the button, they will blast off and their barrage will turn Washington, the stronghold of American imperialists and the nest of evil, and its followers, into a sea of fire,” said Kang Pyo-yong, the North Korean vice defense minister. His speech yesterday in Pyongyang was carried today by Rodong Sinmun. In the last few days, North Korea’s state-run news media have carried a slew of official remarks threatening to launch “pre-emptive nuclear strikes” at the United States and South Korea with “lighter and smaller nukes,” hinting that the country has built nuclear warheads small enough to mount on long-range missiles. But American and South Korean officials strongly doubt that the North has mastered that technology. South Korean military officials called the remarks bluster, designed not so much to threaten Washington as to infuse the North with a sense of crisis and empowerment as Kim consolidates his grip on power and uses his country’s growing confrontation with the outside world to enhance his status at home. The North’s state media has shown tearful soldiers running into his arms or shaking their rifles overhead in jubilation during Kim’s visits to their units. North Korean television reports have also shown soldiers rushing waist-deep into the ocean to see Kim off after a recent visit to a front-line island. Such scenes are not unusual in North Korea, where the state media depicts the nation’s leader as a fatherlike protector and calls for unconditional adoration and obedience. Park, however, warned that with its behavior, North Korea was only hurting itself. North Korea “will collapse in self-destruction if it continues to waste its resources on nuclear weapons development while its people are going hungry,” she said Friday at a commission ceremony for young military officers. (Choe Sang-hun, “Two Koreas in Doomsday Threats after Vote at U.N.,” New York Times, March 9, 2013, p. A-3)

A belligerent mood is also forming inside North Korea, with several large-scale military and civilian rallies over the past few days. The military reportedly increased its firing exercises with a mock attack on the Seoul area. Meanwhile, leader Kim Jong-un rallied the troops with a visit to front line units on the West Sea coast on March 7, declaring that the “front line units and all the soldiers of our army, navy, air force, anti-air force, and strategic rocket units are prepared in every way to launch our version of total warfare.” The Blue House responded on March 8 with its first foreign policy and national security policy coordination meeting since the Park Geun-hye administration took office. With delays holding up the appointment of the relevant Cabinet ministers, vice ministers were present from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Unification, and National Defense, as well as deputy heads from the National Intelligence Service and the Office of the Prime Minister. The administration also released a statement through Ministry of Unification spokesman Kim Hyung-suk expressing its dismay at the
“heightening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula” from North Korea backing out of the non-aggression agreements. “North Korea’s authorities bear all responsibility for anything that occurs from not abiding by the inter-Korean agreements,” Kim said. The Ministry of National Defense fired back with even more aggressive rhetoric. Speaking at a briefing, spokesman Kim Min-seok said, “We will respond forcefully if North Korea provokes us. If North Korea attacks South Korea with a nuclear weapon, then by the will of the Republic of Korea and humanity, the Kim Jong-un regime will perish from the Earth.” The rising tensions are also fanning concerns about a military clash breaking out. Many are pointing to the Northern Limit Line area in the West Sea, where armed clash-es have occurred in the past, as a particularly tense area. “If military tensions rise, there’s a strong possibility that even a small, accidental clash will get out of control and spiral into a large-scale military conflict,” said Kim Yeon-chul, a professor at Inje University. “Managing any unintended clashes is of paramount importance.” (Park Byong-su and Seok Jin-hwan, “North and South Korea Exchanging Most Heated Rhetoric Yet,” Hankyore, March 9, 2013)

China’s foreign minister said that Beijing would not abandon North Korea, reiterating China’s longstanding position that dialogue, not sanctions, is the best way to persuade the North to abandon its nuclear weapons. At a news conference during the National People’s Congress, Yang Jiechi, suggested that Chinese support for tougher United Nations sanctions against North Korea should not be interpreted as a basic change in China’s attitude. “We always believe that sanctions are not the end of the Security Council actions, nor are sanctions the fundamental way to resolve the relevant issues,” said Yang, who addressed foreign policy questions from Chinese and foreign reporters. But the careful remarks masked the unparalleled plain-spoken discussions among China’s officials and analysts about the value of supporting North Korea even as it continues to develop nuclear weapons and unleashes new threats to attack the United States and South Korea. Although it remained to be seen whether China would actually enforce the sanctions, its decision to support them also raised the possibility that it might take even bolder steps. The clearest sign of China’s exasperation with North Korea came March 7 at a side session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, an advisory group to the government that was open to the news media. Delegates to the conference, according to a senior Communist Party official, Qiu Yuanping, talked about whether to “keep or dump” North Korea and debated whether China, as a major power, should “fight or talk” with the North. In the annals of Communist Party decorum, Ms. Qiu’s description of the spirited debate was quite extraordinary. She made the remarks in the presence of reporters at a session titled “Friendship with Foreign Countries” that was attended by several Chinese ambassadors who were visiting Beijing from their posts abroad. As deputy director of the Communist Party’s Central Foreign Affairs Office, a secretive body that gives foreign policy advice to top leaders, Ms. Qiu usually opts for discretion. The admission by a senior Communist Party official that North Korea is a nettlesome neighbor is especially striking because China conducts its relations with North Korea chiefly through the comradely auspices of the party, rather than the Foreign Ministry. Just days before Ms. Qiu’s remarks, a prominent Communist Party analyst, Deng Yuwen, a deputy editor of Study Times, the journal of the Central Party School of the Communist Party, wrote an op-ed in Financial Times that China should “give up” on North Korea.
Deng asked what would happen if the United States launched a pre-emptive attack on North Korea: “Would China not be obliged to help North Korea based on our ‘alliance.’ Would that not be drawing fire upon ourselves?” Moreover, Deng wrote, there was no hope that North Korea would overhaul its economy and become a normal country, a path urged in the past several years by the Chinese government. Even if the North’s new ruler, Kim Jong-un, wanted reform, the entrenched ruling elite “would absolutely not allow him to do so,” because they know change would result in the overthrow of the government, Deng said. Deng’s analysis was widely read, in part, because he has a habit of expressing provocative views that meld into the mainstream. Last year, he wrote an article that appeared in the online version of Caijing, a business magazine that said failures had outweighed achievements in the decade-long rule of President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. After the article appeared, the era of Hu and Wen was often referred to as the “lost decade.” For all the concern about North Korea since the nuclear test in mid-February, there have been no concrete signs that China plans to take any action against the North beyond the United Nations sanctions. Traders in Jilin Province, which abuts North Korea in northeastern China, said there was not a noticeable slowdown of goods passing across the border. It is possible that there will be a crackdown on smugglers, but that has not happened yet, said an official in the Yanbian Prefecture in Jilin Province, where much of the smuggling takes place. It is doubtful that China will reinforce the United Nations sanctions by imposing penalties of its own, said Cai Jian, the deputy director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. The biggest element of China’s trade with North Korea is the export of oil that keeps the North Korean military going and its creaky industrial base more or less functioning. “Oil will not be cut,” Cai said. Chinese companies buy North Korean coal and iron ore, a trade that the Chinese government has encouraged and that helps North Korea by generating hard currency. Those imports are unlikely to be curbed. The extent to which China will enforce the new United Nations sanctions remains unclear, an expert on the North Korean economy, Marcus Noland of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, wrote in a blog post. There are plenty of loopholes for China to exploit if it wanted to, he noted. The new restrictions against the North, including efforts to block the opening of North Korean banks abroad if they support weapons purchases, are limited by a “credible information” clause, Noland wrote, which allows a government to say that it lacks the information needed to assess the situation or apply the sanctions. The support of the sanctions at the United Nations are a fine balancing act by China, said Jia Qingguo, the associate dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University. China backed the new sanctions in the hope that they would be sufficient to encourage North Korea to return to the negotiating table to discuss denuclearization, but not so harsh that they would cause the North’s collapse. If that were to occur, American troops stationed in South Korea could move north and help unite the Korean Peninsula under an American umbrella, the last thing China would want, Jia said. For now, China’s position on North Korea will remain the same. “If China’s policy changes, it would be because of a North Korean provocative act,” he said, “like another nuclear test, closer to China’s borders.” (Jane Perlez, “China Says It Won’t Forsake North Korea, Despite Support for U.N. Sanctions,” New York Times, March 10, 2013, p. 19)
North Korea’s army has not carried out routine communications checks with U.S. forces for the past three days. The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea declared that the armistice would be “totally invalid” and the Panmunjom telephone link would be closed from the moment the U.S.-South Korea joint exercise begins March 11, but a USFK spokeswoman said the link may already have been out of action for several days. “We have no way of knowing if the KPA has actually disconnected the phone lines or are just not answering the phone,” she said. Exercises began March 7 but a two-week exercise of 13,500 troops will begin March 11. (Simon Mundy, “Tension Builds as N. Korea Army Breaks Contact,” Financial Times, March 9, 2013, p. 4)

Seven years of U.N. sanctions against North Korea have done nothing to derail Pyongyang’s drive for a nuclear weapon capable of hitting the United States. They may have even bolstered the ruling Kim family by giving their propaganda maestros ammunition to whip up anti-U.S. sentiment and direct attention away from government failures. In the wake of fresh U.N. sanctions leveled at North Korea for its latest nuclear test, the question is: Will this time be different? A problem with the approach, analysts say, is that outsiders routinely underestimate North Korea’s knack for survival. The sanctions are intended to make life more difficult for a country that has crushing poverty, once suffered through a devastating famine and lost its Soviet backers long ago, but Pyongyang often manages to find some advantage. While state media have not officially announced the new measures, North Korean citizens have been both defiant and dismissive about past sanctions. “The sanctions are a trigger, a confrontation,” said Kim Myong Sim, a 36-year-old who works at Pyongyang Shoe Factory. “History has shown that Korea has never even thrown a stone at America, but the U.S. still continues to have a hostile policy toward my country.” If North Koreans have “the respected general’s order, we will wipe Washington from the Earth,” she said, referring to leader Kim Jong Un. She said North Koreans have “already suffered sanctions in the past, but we have found our own way and have become self-reliant.” Sanctions “may be doing more to strengthen the regime than hasten its demise,” according to a 2011 essay by John Delury and Moon Chung In, North Korea specialists at Yonsei University. “They have generally been counterproductive by playing into Pyongyang hardliners’ argument that U.S. hostility is the root cause of North Korea’s predicament, providing an external enemy to blame for all woes and undercutting initiatives by more moderate forces in the North Korean elite who want to shift the focus more toward economic development,” Delury said in an interview yesterday. “These sanctions will bite, and bite hard,” U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice said. But they may also play into Jong Un’s hands. With the outside world clamoring to punish North Korea, Kim can build the same image his late father, Kim Jong Il, looked to create — that of a strong leader developing nuclear weapons despite outrage from the U.S. superpower, said Ahn Chan Il, a political scientist who heads the World Institute for North Korea Studies in Seoul. The latest sanctions will squeeze North Korea’s already meager exports and imports, which will in turn cause pain for citizens, said Cho Bong Hyun, a research fellow at the IBK Economic Research Institute in Seoul. “North Korea’s economy faces so many difficulties already, and it can get even worse (because of the sanctions),” Cho said. A glimpse of North Korean thinking on sanctions can be seen in a wave of recent warlike threats from North Korea. Fierce language associated with the specter of yet more sanctions leveled at the North by Washington and its allies feeds
into an us-against-the-world mentality. It is meant to “solidify Kim Jong Un’s leadership by creating a state of quasi-war and tension,” said Koh Yu Hwan, a North Korea expert at Seoul’s Dongguk University. Pyongyang’s dependency on Beijing has grown as sanctions have piled up. Chinese products made up only about 43 percent of North Korean imports in 2006, compared to more than 95 percent in 2012, according to data from the International Trade Center. The group, a joint agency of the U.N. and the World Trade Organization, said more than $3.5 billion in Chinese exports reached North Korea last year. Beijing’s backing for the new measures signals its growing frustration with its neighbor and ally. “In the past, we opened our eyes and closed our eyes as need be. Now we’re not closing our eyes anymore,” said Cui Yingjiu, a retired professor from Peking University in China and a former classmate of Kim Jong Il. (Associated Press, “U.N. Sanctions May Play into N. Korean Propaganda,” Japan Times, March 9, 2013)

3/10/13

Fewer North Korean defectors entered South Korea in the first two months of this year, compared with a year earlier, Seoul’s unification ministry said. “The number of North Korean defectors who entered the country is 206 as of the end of February,” a ministry official said. The number for the first two months of this year represents 84.6 percent of the total 238 North Korean defectors who entered South Korea during the same period last year, according to data. The fall came after the country had last year the lowest number of North Korean defectors coming to South Korea in seven years. A total of 1,508 North Koreans defected from their communist country and entered South Korea for resettlement in 2012. The annual number of North Korean defectors first exceeded the 1,000-level in 2001 and stayed above the 2,000-level during the 2006-2011 period. The number had jumped to 2,929 in 2009. “The number of North Korean defectors coming to South Korea is generally lower in January and February than other months,” the ministry official said, adding the ministry may take time to determine whether the downward trend in inbound North Korean defectors that stared in early 2012 will continue into this year. Previously, the government said the downward trend is attributable to tightened security on the border with China, the main defection route, under the Kim Jong-un regime which took power after the death of late leader Kim Jong-il in December 2011. (Yonhap, “Fewer N. Korean Defectors Enter S. Korea This Year,” March 10, 2013)

South Korea imposed additional sanctions against North Korea following the United Nations Security Council’s toughened regulations to punish the North’s Feb. 12 nuclear test, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance said. South Korea put three additional North Korean officials and two entities on the blacklist, including officials from a North-based trade firm and a banker. South Korean citizens and companies making financial transactions with people and firms listed on the list must win prior approval from the Bank of Korea, the country’s central bank. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Imposes Additional Sanctions on North,” Korea Herald, March 10, 2013)

3/11/13

North Korea severed the inter-Korean communication hotline that runs through the truce village of Panmunjom following its threat to do so last week, South Korea’s unification ministry said Monday. The ministry said the North seems to have disconnected the emergency link set up to ensure prompt two-way communication to
deal with any sudden developments along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separates the two Koreas. It said attempts to contact the North by telephone at 9 a.m. failed. Despite Pyongyang following through on its pledge to sever the hotline, the unification ministry said the North is using a separate South-North military communication line to process South Korean nationals arriving and leaving the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The complex is home to 123 South Korean companies. Construction of the complex began in June 2003 with first goods being produced in late 2004. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Severs Communication Hotline with S. Korea,” Reuters, March 11, 2013)

After two Korea-U.S. joint military drills end, American vessels equipped with nuclear weapons will stay in South Korean waters to fully guarantee the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” in case North Korea attacks. A high-ranking South Korean government official told JoongAng Ilbo, “If North Korea makes a nuclear attack, retaliation can come from U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Okinawa or Guam. But considering the time that might take, we need to have a nuclear weapon near the Korean Peninsula. “By not withdrawing U.S. weapons participating in the Korea-U.S. military exercises, we decided to let them stay a while and see what happens in North Korea,” he said. (Jeong Yong-soo and Kim Hee-jin, “U.S. Nukes to Remain in the South,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 12, 2013)

President Park Geun-hye in the first Cabinet meeting ordered solid security against North Korea’s provocation but also urged for efforts to start the trust-building process with the defiant regime. “One of the core directions for the new government is to build the foundation for peace and unification of the Korean Peninsula. While we should strongly counter any provocation by the North, we must also not stop our efforts to activate the trust-building process,” Park said in the meeting held after more than two weeks of state affairs vacuum. With regard to the reports that some military officials played golf over the weekend at a time of heightened tensions, Park insisted the Defense Ministry prevent such incident from reoccurring. Sources said Park is likely to formally appoint her defense minister-nominee Kim Byung-kwan tomorrow despite vehement opposition over his alleged ethical lapses. (Lee Joo-hee, “Park Calls for Robust Defense, Trust-Building with N. Korea,” Korea Herald, March 11, 2013)

South Korea’s new Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se said, “The security situation on the Korean Peninsula for now is very grave as the unpredictability surrounding North Korea is rising following its third nuclear test.” In his inauguration speech as he officially took up the post, Yun added, “However, my aim is to turn this era of confrontation and mistrust into an era of trust and cooperation with North Korea.” (Yonhap, “Security Situation on Korean Peninsula Becomes ‘Very Grave’: FM,” March 11, 2013) South Korea seeks dialogue with the North despite rising tensions following the communist country’s third nuclear test and repeated war threats, Seoul’s new unification minister said. In an inaugural address, Ryoo Kihl-jae stressed inter-Korean talks are needed down the line even if current developments are very grave. “Holding talks is critical, and it is vitally important that both Koreas respect and adhere to past agreements such as the July 4th North-South Joint Statement signed in 1972, the June 15 Joint Declaration reached in 2000, and the Oct. 4 joint declaration agreed to in 2007,” he said. The policymaker then said that depending on future developments South Korea
can examine ways to offer humanitarian support to the North, although for the time being, emphasis must be placed on strengthening the country’s defense against possible provocations. “It is hard to discuss other matters when the North is making military threats,” he pointed out, although elaborating that support for babies and socially disadvantaged people in the North can be moved forward independent of political developments. He did not elaborate on when such support would be offered.

(Yonhap, “S. Korea Seeks Dialogue with N. Korea despite Tensions: Minister,” March 11, 2013)

Breakthroughs in the North’s missile and nuclear programs and fiery threats of war have heightened fears in the South that even small miscalculations by the new and untested leaders of each country could have disastrous consequences. Now this new sense of vulnerability is causing some influential South Koreans to break a decades-old taboo by openly calling for the South to develop its own nuclear arsenal, a move that would raise the stakes in what is already one of the world’s most militarized regions. While few here think this will happen anytime soon, two recent opinion polls show that two-thirds of South Koreans support the idea posed by a small but growing number of politicians and columnists – a reflection, analysts say, of hardening attitudes since North Korea’s Feb. 12 underground nuclear test, its third since 2006. “The third nuclear test was for South Korea what the Cuban missile crisis was for the U.S.,” said Han Yong-sup, a professor of security policy at the Korea National Defense University in Seoul. “It has made the North Korean threat seem very close and very real.” In recent weeks, the North has approached a crucial threshold with its weapons programs, with the successful launching of a long-range rocket, followed by the test detonation of a nuclear device that could be small enough to fit on top of a rocket. Those advances were followed by a barrage of apocalyptic threats to rain “pre-emptive nuclear strikes” and “final destruction” on Seoul, the South’s neon-drenched capital. The intensification of North Korea’s typically bellicose language shocked many South Koreans, who had thought the main target of the North’s nuclear program was the United States. Adding to South Koreans’ worries, the North and its nuclear arsenal are in the hands of a young new leader, Kim Jong-un, whose brinkmanship appears to be an effort to ensure the support of his nation’s powerful military. The South also has a new president, Park Geun-hye, the daughter of a military strongman who stood firm against North Korea, who herself also faces pressure to stand fast against the North. Just two weeks after her inauguration, Ms. Park faces a crisis as the North makes vague threats interpreted by many South Koreans as the precursor to some sort of limited, conventional military provocation. Ms. Park has promised to retaliate if her nation is attacked, aware of the public anger directed at her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, when he showed restraint after the North shelled a South Korean island in 2010, killing four people. That kind of limited skirmish is more likely than a nuclear attack, but such an episode could quickly inflame tensions and escalate out of control. But beyond the immediate fear of a military provocation, analysts say deeper anxieties are also at work in the South. One of the biggest is the creeping resurgence of old fears about the reliability of this nation’s longtime protector, the United States. Experts say the talk of South Korea’s acquiring nuclear weapons is an oblique way to voice the concerns of a small but growing number of South Koreans that the United States, either because of budget cuts or a lack of will, may one day no longer act as the South’s ultimate insurance policy. “The
Americans don’t feel the North Korean nuclear weapons as a direct threat,” said Chung Mong-joon, a son of the founder of the Hyundai industrial group and the former leader of the governing party, who has been the leading proponent of South Korea’s development of a nuclear weapons program. “At a time of crisis, we are not 100 percent sure whether the Americans will cover us with its nuclear umbrella.” The United States, which still has 28,500 troops based in South Korea, has sought to assure its ally that it remains committed to the region as part of the Obama administration’s strategic “pivot” to Asia. But analysts say the fact that senior leaders like Chung and a handful of influential newspaper columnists now call for the need for “nuclear deterrence,” or at least hint at it, reflects widespread frustrations over the inability of the United States and other nations to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Until recently the idea was too radical for most mainstream leaders and opinion makers, including both deeply pro-American conservatives and nationalistic yet antinuclear liberals. Advocacy for a nuclear-armed South Korea has been virtually taboo since the early 1970s, when the country’s military dictator, Park Chung-hee, made a serious bid to develop a nuclear weapon, fearing that the United States might pull out of Asia after its defeat in Vietnam. After catching wind of the program, Washington forced Park, the new president’s father, to stop, persuading him instead to rely on the United States, an agreement that has held ever since. Chung and others say that if the United States does not allow South Korea to develop its own nuclear arms, it should at least restore the nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula by reintroducing American atomic weapons, which were removed from bases in the South in 1991 in a post-cold-war effort to reduce tensions. Many in the South are now convinced that the North may never give up its nuclear weapons. The North’s new level of anxiety is also apparent in the widespread speculation here about when and where the North might carry out another, non-nuclear military provocation. North Korea has stoked those fears by saying that it will drop out of the 60-year-old armistice that ended the Korean War, in a show of anger at new United Nations sanctions for its nuclear test. North Korea has threatened to terminate the armistice in the past, but the greater worry now is that it might take actions to contravene it. There have been cryptic warnings in North Korea’s state-run news media of coming “counteractions,” which have led South Korean officials to warn of an episode like the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. On March 8, North Korea’s state-run television showed Kim addressing the same artillery units that hit Yeonpyeong. On the same day, South Korean television stations showed President Park with heavily decorated generals, and later descending into the bunker at the Blue House to confer with her national security advisers. The opposition parties had blocked the confirmation of her cabinet, raising concerns about her ability to respond to a crisis, but she reached a deal allowing her to fill crucial posts today. Even many on the left said that the country would quickly pull together if shots were fired. “The third test was a wake-up call for the left, too,” said Lee Kang-yun, a television commentator. Two opinion polls conducted after the third test, one by Gallup Korea and the other by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, found that 64 to 66.5 percent of the respondents supported South Korea’s developing its own nuclear weapons, similar to polls after the Yeonpyeong attack in 2010. “Having a nuclear North Korea is like facing a person holding a gun with just your bare hands,” said Kwon Gi-yoon, 38, an engineer. South Koreans should have “our own nuclear capabilities, in case the U.S.
A UN human rights monitor on Monday accused North Korea of committing a string of crimes against humanity, laying out a litany of abuses before the world body’s top rights forum. “The violations in the DPRK have reached a critical mass,” Marzuki Darusman told the UN Human Rights Council. Darusman said that he had identified nine areas of key concern, among them depriving the population of food, torture, arbitrary detention and the secretive regime’s denial of freedom of expression. “I believe that many, if not all, of the nine patterns of violation, identified in my present report, may amount to crimes against humanity, committed as part of systematic and or widespread attacks against civilian population,” Darusman, who hails from Indonesia, told the Council as he presented a report on the situation in North Korea. He also highlighted concerns about a network of political prison camps believed to hold at least 200,000 people, including detainees who were born in captivity because entire families are thought to have been sent there. “I also believe that grave human rights violations in the prison camps or even the mere existence of such camps, with slave-like conditions for political prisoners, may qualify as crimes against humanity,” Darusman said. Barred from actually visiting the remote nation, Darusman reports on the situation in part by speaking to North Koreans who have managed to flee, though Pyongyang’s power to silence extends beyond its closely-guarded border. “Concerns about reprisals, including against family members who are left behind in the country, make it difficult for individual victims to come forward with certain details of the abuses that they had to endure,” the UN monitor said. He called for an international commission of inquiry into the human rights record of North Korea, which repeatedly has refused to cooperate with Darusman and past UN investigators. “There’s been a change in style in North Korea,” said the US special envoy for North Korean human rights, Robert King. “But what we’re interested in seeing is whether there has been a change in substance,” he told reporters in Geneva. North Korean delegate Kim Jo-song claimed Darusman was in league with “hostile forces”, citing Japan, the EU and the US. “We make it clear again. The human rights violations identified in this report do no exist,” Kim told the Council. “The government of the DPRK will continue to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people.” North Korea won support at the Council from China, whose delegate warned that creating a commission of inquiry could “escalate tensions” on the Korean Peninsula. Other nations including Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Vietnam and Syria also criticized the plan, calling for dialogue and accusing the West of double standards. (Jonathan Fowler, “U.N. Monitor Accuses N. Korea of Crimes against Humanity,” AFP, March 11, 2013)

NSA Donilon: “For sixty years, the United States has been committed to ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This means deterring North Korean aggression and protecting our allies. And it means the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The United States will not accept North Korea as a nuclear state; nor will we stand by while it seeks to develop a nuclear-armed missile that can target the United States. The international community has made clear that there will be consequences for North Korea’s flagrant violation of its international obligations, as the UN Security Council did again unanimously just last week in approving new sanctions.
in response to the North’s recent provocative nuclear test. U.S. policy toward North Korea rests on four key principles: First, close and expanded cooperation with Japan and South Korea. The unity that our three countries have forged in the face of North Korea’s provocations—unity reaffirmed by President Park and Prime Minister Abe—is as crucial to the search for a diplomatic solution as it is to deterrence. The days when North Korea could exploit any seams between our three governments are over. And let me add that the prospects for a peaceful resolution also will require close U.S. coordination with China’s new government. We believe that no country, including China, should conduct “business as usual” with a North Korea that threatens its neighbors. China’s interest in stability on the Korean Peninsula argues for a clear path to ending North Korea’s nuclear program. We welcome China’s support at the UN Security Council and its continued insistence that North Korea completely, verifiably and irreversibly abandon its WMD and ballistic missile programs. Second, the United States refuses to reward bad North Korean behavior. The United States will not play the game of accepting empty promises or yielding to threats. As former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has said, we won’t buy the same horse twice. We have made clear our openness to authentic negotiations with North Korea. In return, however, we’ve only seen provocations and extreme rhetoric. To get the assistance it desperately needs and the respect it claims it wants, North Korea will have to change course.

Otherwise, the United States will continue to work with allies and partners to tighten national and international sanctions to impede North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Today, the Treasury Department is announcing the imposition of U.S. sanctions against the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea, the country’s primary foreign exchange bank, for its role in supporting North Korea’s WMD program. By now it is clear that the provocations, escalations and poor choices of North Korea’s leaders are not only making their country less secure—they are condemning their people to a level of poverty that stands in stark contrast not only to South Korea, but every other country in East Asia. Third, we unequivocally reaffirm that the United States is committed to the defense of our homeland and our allies. Recently, North Korean officials have made some highly provocative statements. North Korea’s claims may be hyperbolic—but as to the policy of the United States, there should be no doubt: we will draw upon the full range of our capabilities to protect against, and to respond to, the threat posed to us and to our allies by North Korea. This includes not only any North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction—but also, as the President made clear, their transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to other states or non-state entities. Such actions would be considered a grave threat to the United States and our allies and we will hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences. Finally, the United States will continue to encourage North Korea to choose a better path. As he has said many times, President Obama came to office willing to offer his hand to those who would unclench their fists. The United States is prepared to help North Korea develop its economy and feed its people—but it must change its current course. The United States is prepared to sit down with North Korea to negotiate and to implement the commitments that they and the United States have made. We ask only that Pyongyang prove its seriousness by taking meaningful steps to show it will abide by its commitments, honor its words, and respect international law. Anyone who doubts the President’s commitment needs look no further than Burma, where new leaders have begun a process of reform. President Obama’s historic visit to Rangoon is proof of our
readiness to start transforming a relationship marked by hostility into one of greater cooperation. Burma has already received billions in debt forgiveness, large-scale development assistance, and an influx of new investment. While the work of reform is ongoing, Burma has already broken out of isolation and opened the door to a far better future for its people in partnership with its neighbors and with the United States. And, as President Obama said in his speech to the people of Burma, we will continue to stand with those who continue to support rights, democracy and reform. So I urge North Korea’s leaders to reflect on Burma’s experience.” (National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon, Remarks to the Asia Society, March 11, 2013)

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The U.S. does not want to deploy a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier for joint military exercises with South Korea that began on March 1 as Seoul had hoped, despite escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula. Washington apparently feels that a cautious, level-headed response to increasingly belligerent threats from North Korea is the best strategy.

Just after the North’s latest nuclear test, Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin said he would ask the U.S. to deploy a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to the drills. Seoul and Washington are also apparently at odds over a joint military response to any North Korean provocation. The two countries were originally scheduled to sign off in January on the deal, but it has been delayed for months now. “We aim to strike not only the source of North Korean provocations, but also supporting forces and command, but the U.S. wants to focus on preventing an escalation,” said a researcher at a state-run think tank here. (Chosun Ilbo, “U.S., China Resist Tough Response to N. Korean Threats,” March 12, 2013)

North Korea’s daily threats of war are part of its psychological tactics to pressure South Korea and the United States to change their policy on Pyongyang and unite its own people, Seoul’s defense ministry said. “North Korea has consistently and blatantly issued a series of bellicose warnings of provocations, which are seen as an attempt to put psychological pressure on South Korea,” ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said in a briefing. The North has made some residents near border areas live in underground shelters and prepare emergency food rations, and covered buses in the capital city of Pyongyang with camouflage nets to create a “war-like atmosphere,” Kim said. Recent coverage of Kim Jong-un’s front-line military inspections near the western sea border and the military chief’s visit to the border village of Panmunjom in the past days are also part of the psychological tactics, Kim said. “Currently, signs of provocations have not been detected. I’m saying this so people don’t get swayed by North Korea’s psychological tactics,” Kim said, adding additional nuclear tests or a long-range missile launch are not likely to happen for the time being. “It is believed that North Korea tries to unite its people through a series of military and political activities, while pressuring South Korea and the U.S. to change their policy on the North in light of the U.N. sanctions,” Kim said.

North Korea’s military is preparing a large scale drill involving all three services later this month, which is expected to be attended by Kim Jong-un, Kim said. “As these drills could lead to provocations, we are closely monitoring North Korea’s military,” Kim said. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea’s War Threats Are Psychological Tactics: Seoul,” Yonhap, March 12, 2013)
DCI Threat Briefing: “North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to the security environment in East Asia, a region with some of the world’s largest populations, militaries, and economies. North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities. Despite the Six-Party Joint Statements issued in 2005 and 2007, in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, we remain alert to the possibility that North Korea might again export nuclear technology. North Korea announced on 12 February that it conducted its third nuclear test. It has also displayed what appears to be a road-mobile ICBM and in December 2012 placed a satellite in orbit using its Taepo Dong 2 launch vehicle. These programs demonstrate North Korea’s commitment to develop long-range missile technology that could pose a direct threat to the United States, and its efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security concerns. Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, North Korean leaders are focused on deterrence and defense. The Intelligence Community has long assessed that, in Pyongyang’s view, its nuclear capabilities are intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. We do not know Pyongyang’s nuclear doctrine or employment concepts. Although we assess with low confidence that the North would only attempt to use nuclear weapons against US forces or allies to preserve the Kim regime, we do not know what would constitute, from the North’s perspective, crossing that threshold. … Kim Jong Un has quickly consolidated power since taking over as leader of North Korea when his father, Kim Jong Il, died in December 2011. Kim has publicly focused on improving the country’s troubled economy and the livelihood of the North Korean people, but we have yet to see any signs of serious economic reform. North Korea maintains a large, conventional military force held in check by the more powerful South Korean-US military alliance. Nevertheless, the North Korean military is well postured to conduct limited attacks with little or no warning, such as the 2010 sinking of a South Korean warship and the artillery bombardment of a South Korean island along the Northern Limit Line.” (DCI James R. Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013)

“The rhetoric, while it is propaganda laced, is also an indicator of their attitude and perhaps their intent,” Clapper said during one exchange with a lawmaker, adding that he was concerned that North Korea “could initiate a provocative action against the South.” (Mark Mazetti and David E. Sanger, “Security Chief Says Cyberattacks Will Meet with Retaliation,” New York Times, March 13, 2013, p. A-4)

North Korea’s air force has sharply increased jet fighter training flights in the past few days, with the number of sorties reaching as many as 700 on the day South Korea and the United States launched a joint war game earlier this week, a military source in Seoul said Wednesday. The North’s move is seen as part of efforts to beef up combat readiness and to closely monitor joint drills in the South that began on Monday. The drill, called Key Resolve, involves about 10,000 Korean troops and 3,000 American personnel as well as military weapons and equipment, including F-22 stealth jets and
B-52 bombers deployed from overseas U.S. bases. “Flights of the North Korean air force’s fighter jets and helicopters reached about 700 sorties on March 11,” the source said on the condition of anonymity. “It is seen as unprecedented in scale.” The recent sortie is nearly six times more than the maximum number of flights in a day during last year’s summer training, the source said. The impoverished nation is known to have restricted flying time to save hard currency as its fighter jets depend on imported fuel. North Korea is believed to have accumulated about 1.5 tons of fuel for wartime use, according to military officials. The latest move comes as the communist nation is preparing a mass military drill along its eastern coast, and activities of submarines and warships have also increased along its east and west coasts. Recent satellite imagery shows no sign North Korea is readying another long-range rocket launch within the next month or another nuclear test, a U.S. research institute said Tuesday. North Korea has previously announced it would conduct more rocket launches and has also hinted at a follow-up to its Feb. 12 atomic test. Very little is going on at the Sohae site on the west coast from where a satellite was launched in December, according to an analysis written for 38 North, the website of the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. There has been recent activity at the older Tonghae launch site on its northeast coast, although it’s unclear to what end. Joel Wit, the 38 North editor and a former State Department official, said that as of end February, aerial photos also showed no indications of another nuclear test — although preparations for such an underground blast are more tricky to detect. “While inter-Korean rhetoric is heating up,” Wit said, “Pyongyang is unlikely to do anything provocative in the near-term” at least in terms of testing its weapons of mass destruction. (*Korea Herald,* “N.K. Sharply Ups Jet Fighter Activity,” March 13, 2013)

South Korea’s foreign ministry said that an Armistice Agreement that ended the 1950-53 Korean War remains valid, despite the North’s threats to scrap the cease-fire deal. “The terms of the Armistice Agreement cannot be unilaterally invalid or terminated,” foreign ministry spokesman Cho Tai-young said, demanding North Korea withdraw the threats. (*Yonhap,* “S. Korea Warns N. Korea Not to Scrap Korean War Armistice,” March 12, 2013)

South Korea’s unification ministry said Tuesday that it wants to ensure the safety of its citizens working at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea and has set up a contingency plan to deal with sudden developments. “In light of grave developments, top priority has been placed on ensuring the safety of South Korean nationals at the industrial park,” said a ministry official. “The representative office has been told to immediately contact Seoul in case of strange behavior by North Koreans,” he said. Despite the concerns, the North has so far kept open the military communication link with the South that is used to permit movement of people and vehicles over the demilitarized zone (DMZ). This is in contrast to the severing of the communication links at the truce village of Panmunjom. “All movements across the DMZ are moving without a hitch,” he said. The ministry source, meanwhile, said that Seoul is currently in the process of working with other countries to implement the UNSC sanctions and not thinking of carrying out independent actions of its own. “Slapping more sanctions will depend on what actions are taken by the North down the line,” he said. He pointed out that Seoul already has one of the most rigorous sanctions slapped on the North, which
was given for the sinking of a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea in March 2010. Seoul currently bans all contact and exchange with the North with the exception of the Kaesong complex. He added that Seoul remains open to offering humanitarian assistance to the North that could push forward trust building, between the two countries, but made clear no specific plans have been laid down because Pyongyang is currently taking steps to fuel tensions by unilaterally nullifying the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War (1950-53), and all past non-aggression pacts signed between South and North Korea. (Yonhap, “Gov’t Wants to Ensure Safety of S. Korean Nationals in Kaesong,” March 12, 2013)

3/13/13 Obama interview: “STEPHANOPOULOS: Let me ask you about North Korea. Seen a lotta belligerent behavior from the- OBAMA: Yeah. Yeah. -regime in recent days. Canceled the 1953 armistice. And your director of national intelligence James Clapper told Capitol Hill today for the first time did North Korea and nuclear weapons and missiles pose a serious threat to the United States. STEPHANOPOULOS: So, can North Korea now make good on its threat to hit the United States? OBAMA: They- they probably can’t, but we don’t like margin of error, right, when it comes to- STEPHANOPOULOS: It’s that close? OBAMA: Well, and I don’t th. it’s not that close. But what is true is, is they’ve had nuclear weapons since well before I came into office. What’s also true is missile technology improves and their missile technology has improved. Now, what we’ve done is we’ve made sure that we’ve got defensive measures to prevent- any attacks on the homeland. And we’re not anticipating any of that. But we’ve seen outta the North Koreans is they go through these periodic spasms of- of provocative behavior. STEPHANOPOULOS: Is this one more serious? OBAMA: Well- I don’t necessarily think it’s different in kind. They’ve all been serious. Because when you’re talking about a regime that- is oppressive towards its people, is belligerent- has shown itself to sometimes miscalculate and do things that are very dangerous- that’s always a problem. And, so, we’ve s- what we’ve done is organized the world community to strengthen sanctions, to sink- strengthen unilateral sanctions on- North Korea. I think what’s most promising is we’re startin’ to see the Chinese, who historically have- tolerated misbehavior on the part of the North Koreans because they’re worried about- regime collapse and how that could spill over to them. You’re startin’ to see them recalculate and say, “You know what? This is startin’ to get outta hand.” And, so, we may slowly be in a position where we’re able to force- a recalculation on the part of North Koreans about what’s gonna be- STEPHANOPOULOS: Is there anything more you- OBAMA: -good for them and not - STEPHANOPOULOS: -can be doing directly? The last American to see Kim Jong Un, Dennis Rodman. I had (LAUGH) the pleasure of talking to him a couple weeks ago- OBAMA: Yeah, I noticed that STEPHANOPOULOS: -a little crazy. But he did say that Kim Jong Un said, "Boy, I want the president to call me." Back in 2007, you were for a direct- BARACK OBAMA: Right. STEPHANOPOULOS: -talk, you said you were for with the North Koreans. Would it make any sense now, one? If not, why not? OBAMA: You- you know, I think that- you always wanna create the conditions where if you have a conversation, it’s actually useful. And, you know, we’re not the only players in this. Obviously, the South Koreans- the Chinese- all the six-party talk players- need to be involved in how you resolve this. And, you know, we communicate with the North Koreans. They know- what our bottom lines are. What we’ve said is we want a
denuclearized peninsula. You know, we've gotta stop with these kinds of provocative threats. And we're prepared to work with them where they could break their isolation and rejoin the international community. Well, I mean, I think there are a lot of things. But they could start by ending nuclear testing. They could start by ending some of this missile testing. There are a whole s- battery of confidence-building measures that they could engage in. And I think all the countries involved have said, "We would reciprocate if we saw the any kind of responsible behavior from the North Koreans. We have not seen it yet." That doesn't mean that- they may not change their calculations. One thing we've tried to do is to make sure that we're not gonna reward bad behavior. There previously have been patterns where, you know, they bang the spoon on the table and then suddenly they get food aid. Or they get other concessions. And then they come back to the table and negotiate a little bit, and then if they get bored they start provocative actions again. We've broken that pattern. Now, what we need to see is whether they're willin' to come in a serious way to negotiate these issues. (ABC News, Transcript: President Obama's Exclusive Interview with George Stephanopoulos, March 13, 2013)
Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces of the DPRK National Defense Commission spokesman’s statement: “The Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army on March 5 stated to the world the resolute determination of the army and people of the DPRK in the face of the anti-DPRK hostile acts that have become all the more undisguised on the part of the U.S. and other hostile forces. The south Korean military warmongers have not yet come to their senses and are still going reckless. On March 6, the puppet Joint Chiefs of Staff let the chief of its operation headquarters call for “punishing” even “commanding forces”, to say nothing of “bases” and “reinforcements” by mobilizing military means if the DPRK commences actions. On March 8, the puppet Ministry of Defense also got its spokesman to dare hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership of the north and bluster that “it would remove the north’s regime from the the earth in reflection of the will of mankind” if the nuclear-armed north launches an all-out action. Defense Minister nominee Kim Pyong Gwan, who will replace military hooligan Kim Kwan Jin, also said that they will counter the north’s all-out action with “regime change or toppling of its regime including psychological warfare.” This frenzy kicked up by the south Korean warmongers is no way irrelevant with the swish of skirt made by the owner of Chongwadae. Ill-boding voices are being heard from the inner room of Chongwadae. They call for maintaining a high alert posture for “security,” saying that “a country can not be protected only with weapons” and “a country concentrating on beefing up military muscle only including nuclear weapons will bring about its own destruction.” Matter is that all these developments are timed to coincide with the U.S.-south Korea Key Resolve and Foal Eagle nuclear war rehearsals that have got into full swing. The DPRK cannot interpret those moves otherwise than a repetition of the long bankrupt confrontation stance of the Lee Myung Bak regime and an expression of utter ignorance of the precious asset of the nation. An army of the nation and people possessed of nuclear weapons can always win a victory in the struggle against formidable enemies and reliably guarantee the grandeur and security of the country. This is a stark reality unfolded by the world where the law of the jungle governs and a bitter lesson drawn by the DPRK in the decades-long arduous confrontation with the U.S. They, however, cried out for “abandoning nuclear weapons,” the asset of which the nation can be proud before the world, and “giving up Songun” aimed at preserving peace on this land from outside forces’ aggression and war moves in disregard of this stark reality. These are little short of jargons made by the idiots who lack any ability to judge the reality. The DPRK launched an all-out action to foil the war moves of the robbers attacking in groups in order to violate the sovereignty of the nation, but the south Korean trigger-happy forces painted it as “provocation”. Not content with this, they are working hard to deprive the DPRK of its nukes built to defend the country and the nation. This amounts to a thrice-cursed act of treachery. The people and servicepersons of south Korea must turn their rifles on the warmongers in response to the just all-out action of the DPRK, well aware that the sovereignty of the country and the destiny of the nation can never be left to such traitors to the nation. What they are doing is an anachronistic act of treachery as they are blindly following the brigandish assertion of their U.S. master keen to put the whole country and the nation under its control, unable to discern what is justice, what is injustice and what is hypocrisy. Whatever the U.S. and other big powers decide, resorting to high-handed and arbitrary practices, can by no means be justice.
Whatever resolutions the UN Security Council adopts cannot be truth as it is a mere voting machine bereft of impartiality and equity. Injustice and lies can never become justice and truth and their hypocrisy is bound to be revealed in face of the times and history. The DPRK army and people’s unyielding struggle to protect the sovereignty of the nation and the right to existence and defend its supreme interests is the just one as proved by history and the truth indicated by the times. They have had access to precision nuclear deterrence that has become diversified, tightening their belts, and chosen the arduous road of Songun out of many other alternatives. It is because herein lie justice and truth. The south Korean military warmongers can not understand the reality because they are traitors engrossed in sycophancy toward the U.S. A man who takes to flunkeyism is bound to become an idiot and a nation that turns to flunkeyism is bound to ruin. This is the law proven by long human history. The DPRK’s army and people will not remain an onlooker to the south Korean warmongers’ disgraceful act of transferring the wartime operation control, life and soul of the army, to the U.S. and offering the soldiers as canon fodder to their master. That’s why the DPRK chose the U.S. and the south Korean military warmongers following it as the major target of the all-out action for defending the sovereignty and the first target of merciless strike. The warmongers would be well advised to keep in mind that the Armistice Agreement is no longer valid and the DPRK is not restrained by the north-south declaration on non-aggression. What is left to be done now is an action of justice and merciless retaliation of the army and people of the DPRK. The south Korean puppet forces should come to their senses.” (KCNA, “Armed Forces Ministry Blasts S. Korean Warmongers,” March 13, 2013)

Rodong Sinmun: The DPRK’s step to completely halt the activities of the Panmunjom mission of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is a decisive option to mercilessly foil the moves of the hostile forces, says Rodong Sinmun in a bylined article. It goes on: “The mission is a negotiating mechanism which the army of the DPRK tentatively established and operated in order to establish a peace-keeping mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. The moves of the U.S. and its south Korean puppet regime for a war of aggression have virtually reduced the Korean Armistice Agreement to a dead paper. It is natural to cut the DPRK-U.S. military hotline in Panmunjom as there is no need for the former to be bound to the agreement and talking does not work on the war maniacs. The DPRK’s option has become clear now that the bellicose forces have entered a full-scale phase of implementation in their moves to realize their scenario for invading it, in violation of its sovereignty and dignity. It is necessary to eliminate everything lying in the way of starting a just war, revolutionary war to counter a war of aggression. It is the firm stand of the DPRK to deal limitless blows of justice at any target as it pleases at any place any time, free from any restriction, and accomplish the great cause for national reunification, the cherished desire of the nation. The second and third strong countermeasures to be taken by the DPRK will strikingly demonstrate its tremendous military power and they will be steps to be taken in advance to root out the source of confrontation and war on the Korean Peninsula and victoriously conclude the great war for national reunification. It is very just for the DPRK to bolster up its nuclear deterrent both in quality and quantity for lasting peace and stability on the peninsula.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun on Halt to Activities of Panmunjom Mission of KPA,” March 13, 2013)
Crisis Group: “North Korea has taken a number of recent steps that raise the risks of miscalculation, inadvertent escalation and deadly conflict on the Korean peninsula. On 12 December, it launched a small satellite into orbit in defiance of UN Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718 and 1874. The Council condemned this in Resolution 2087 (22 January). Three weeks later, Pyongyang conducted its third underground nuclear explosion. In response, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2094 (7 March) condemning the test and expanding economic sanctions. This was preceded by multiple vitriolic threats from the North. While none of this is unprecedented, the danger of unintended consequences has increased considerably. All sides need to issue more reassuring statements, exercise caution during planned military exercises and, especially, the North must avoid further blatant disregard of its international obligations. The North’s threats had slight nuances and different audiences. The military’s main target was the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the UN Command (UNC) as they begin large combined exercises in the South. It declared the Security Council actions hostile and the annual U.S.-South Korean combined military exercises “the most dangerous nuclear war maneuvers targeted against the [North]”. The North’s army said it would take practical (but undefined) counter-actions, no longer recognize the 1953 Korean War Armistice as of 11 March, shut down operations at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom and cut off the telephone line to the UNC. The televised statement also declared that all armed forces, including reserves and the Strategic Rocket Forces, were prepared to act according to an “operational plan signed by Kim Jong-un” and that the army was ready to counter even a nuclear attack with a “diversified precision nuclear strike of Korean style.” The foreign ministry's statement was aimed at the Security Council and particularly the U.S. and South Korea, currently a Council member. While mostly repetitive, confusion was caused by the headline accompanying the official news agency’s English version: “Second Korean War Is Unavoidable: DPRK FM Spokesman.” The Korean could be better (if a little tortuously) translated: “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman’s Clarification of the Extreme Hardline Position Related to the Current Situation whereby a Second Korean War is Difficult to Avoid.’ The statement declared that “if the Americans light the fuse of a nuclear war, the revolutionary forces will exercise the right to execute a pre-emptive nuclear attack against the headquarters of the invaders”. World media reported this as threatening a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the U.S., but it should be interpreted to mean the North is prepared to retaliate with nuclear weapons against a conventional military attack from the UNC in Seoul. The foreign ministry’s message was that sanctions will not work, pressure is counterproductive, and the world should recognize the North as a nuclear weapons state. Pyongyang was displeased with China’s support of 2094 and is also trying to signal that the regional security important to Beijing’s development goals will suffer if it implements the sanctions. Meanwhile, the North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea issued a statement renouncing all inter-Korean non-aggression agreements, including the 1992 “Basic Agreement” and the Korean War Armistice, and declaring that the inter-Korean Red Cross liaison office at Panmunjom would be closed. The target audience was South Korea, aiming to challenge new President Park Geun-hye and undermine domestic support for the U.S. alliance. The rhetoric was matched in the South. On 6 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesman said, more assertively than ever before, that Seoul would respond strongly
to provocation, not only directly but also at the command leadership. The defense minister nominee said the South was prepared for every military contingency, including all-out war to topple the Pyongyang regime. The North’s measures are partly timed to coincide with annual major military exercises in South Korea. Foal Eagle, a joint and combined U.S.-South Korea field exercise (1 March-30 April) includes about 10,000 U.S. troops, mostly from outside the peninsula. Key Resolve (11-21 March) includes some 3,000 from the U.S. and South Korea and a few from the UK, Australia, Canada, Colombia and Denmark. Swedish and Swiss representatives from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are monitoring armistice compliance. The UNC notified the North on 21 February, but Pyongyang always declines invitations to observe. These coincide with large joint exercises in the North. Pyongyang has declared sea/air exclusion zones on both coasts expected to last until the end of March. These zones and reports of mobile missile deployments indicate a possible live-fire missile test. This is the seventh North Korean renunciation of the 1953 armistice. If it is no longer in force, it means a formal return to wartime conditions but not that an attack is imminent. However, it raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation of incidents. There would be no written agreement constraining either side from new military operations, such as the North’s three statements threatened. Pyongyang is signaling willingness to accept high risks apparently in belief it has greater resolve than South Korea, the U.S. and the international community. It is trying to respond to condemnation with its own pressure in the hope Seoul, Washington, Beijing and others will tire of heightened tensions, especially if the situation begins to undermine the international economy. The leadership, since it does not face the same accountability as the democratic South, might possibly feel it has an advantage in a game of brinkmanship. There are also two trip wires that would warn it of going too far or that an attack against the North was in preparation: roughly 700 South Koreans at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) just north of the Military Demarcation Line; and tens of thousand U.S. civilians in South Korea. If major military action were considered imminent, both governments would remove their citizens from harm’s way. Whatever brinkmanship advantage Pyongyang believes it has is balanced by risks. Military action, even heightened tensions, could damage the North’s already parlous economy, producing unintended consequences for the regime. Following the North’s artillery attack against the South in November 2010, war fears among North Koreans leading to food hoarding and financial upset were reported. The economy is not immune to confidence shocks, especially entering a season of depleted food stocks. Food insecurity is worsened by a steep decline in food aid since the December satellite launch. After its disastrous 2009 currency reform, there were reports of dissent and unprecedented official apologies. Tightening sanctions, worsening food insecurity, and bellicose state behavior could have negative economic effects that could just possibly impact regime stability and predictability. Mutual deterrence remains robust, but the threat of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation has risen considerably. In a worst-case scenario, retaliatory responses to an accident during either side’s military exercises or a deliberate military provocation could lead rapidly to war with potential first-day casualties in the hundreds of thousands. Even if further escalation is averted, the North’s actions likely will have negative effects on its economy and worsening food insecurity.” (Crisis Group, “The Korean Peninsula: Flirting with Conflict,” March 13, 2013)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army announced that the AA will be totally nullified from March 11 when the U.S. nuclear war exercises aimed to stifle the DPRK get into full swing. Accordingly the army and people of the DPRK turned out in an all-out action for foiling the U.S. moves aimed at a nuclear war and reunifying the country at an early date, completely unrestrained by AA. But the U.S. and its allies are asserting that AA was adopted with mutual agreement and can not be dissolved unilaterally. This shows a sleight of hand they have employed to use the threadbare AA for escaping the DPRK’s toughest counteraction. Unlike other agreements, AA is not one that requires bilateral agreement to be rendered invalid from its peculiar nature and it will be naturally nullified if one side does not abide by it. AA has long been invalid due to the systematic scrapping of it by the U.S. and the unreasonable behavior of the UN Security Council that backed the U.S. moves for the last six decades. Armistice could remain though in name only because the DPRK exercised utmost self-restraint and patience. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces are now holding Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military drills to light a fuse for a nuclear war with the involvement of huge aggression troops, the biggest violation of AA and an act of scrapping it. Under the prevailing situation which is little different from a war in fact, the DPRK can no longer be bound to AA. This is a stark reality in which AA is no longer valid. The U.S. will have to hold full responsibility for scrapping and finally nullifying AA, in case the situation entails a catastrophic consequence on the Korean Peninsula.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman Hits out at U.S. for Contending AA Can’t Be Dissolved Unilaterally,” March 14, 2013)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un supervised a live artillery drill close to a disputed sea border with South Korea, KCNA reported, in the latest sign of increased tensions between the two Koreas. KCNA did not specify when the drill took place. Kim praised the artillery units on two islands after watching them hit targets, in what KCNA described as the “biggest hotspots in the southwestern sector of the front”, in practice for striking at two South Korean islands. (David Chance, “North Korea’s Leader Oversees Artillery Fire near Disputed Islands,” Reuters, March 14, 2013)

The North Koreans, masters of outrageous propaganda, no doubt picked their phrase carefully for the South’s first female president. “Swish of skirt” was long an insult in Korean culture, directed at women deemed too aggressive, far from the traditional ideal of docile and coy. “North Korea is taunting and testing her,” said Choi Jin, head of the Institute of Presidential Leadership in Seoul. “It’s an important test for her at home, too. People supported her for being a strong leader, but they also have a lingering doubt about whether their first female president will be as good in national security as she sounds.” The North Korean news media also reported today that its leader, Kim Jong-un, supervised a live artillery drill near the disputed western sea border, the site of recent skirmishes. Several analysts said that the North Koreans – who have held on to their patriarchal traditions even as the South has rapidly become more egalitarian – are aware of Park’s reputation. The North got a direct glimpse of her in 2002, when she traveled to meet Kim Jong-il. “I don’t think her gender is a disadvantage,” said Yoo Ho-yel, a North Korea specialist at Korea University. “The North Koreans know that she is not an easy woman, or an easy female leader, to deal
with." But Andrei Lankov, a North Korea scholar at Kookmin University in Seoul, is less convinced. He called the North “a deeply patriarchal culture where women are believed to be generally unsuitable for any position of power and influence.” “Hence,” he said, “they might assume that President Park is weak and irrational.” Her top national security adviser, the former Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo, is remembered for skipping the Korean custom of bowing when he met Kim Jong-il, then North Korea’s leader, in 2007. “She seems to surround herself with former generals to cover herself from any doubt that she might be weak in national security,” said Kim Yong-hyun, a North Korean expert at Dongguk University in Seoul. The test of her resolve would come if the North Koreans, vexed by tough new international sanctions, launch some limited strike on border islands or South Korean naval ships, as many analysts suspect might happen. But few believe she will hold back from a strong but limited response, because she knows her history. Her predecessor was criticized for what many considered a weak response to the artillery barrage of a South Korean island in 2010 that killed four people. (Choe Sang-hun, “Sexist Taunt from North Korea Raises Gender Issue for the South’s New Leader,” New York Times, March 15, 2013, p. A-12)

Expectations of a significant change in China’s approach toward North Korea are growing among U.S. officials and experts, especially with the election of Beijing’s new president, Xi Jinping. “You’re starting to see them recalibrate and say, ‘You know what? this is starting to get out of hand,'” President Barack Obama said in an interview with ABC News earlier this week. “And, so, we may slowly be in a position where we’re able to force a recalibration on the part of North Koreans,” he added without elaborating. Obama’s comments came amid persistent criticism of his North Korea strategy featuring the so-called "strategic patience." Some analysts say the U.S. has "run out of ideas" about how to denuclearize North Korea and the only option is to let China rein in its ally. In an op-ed piece in the Washington Post today, Fareed Zakaria quoted a senior Obama administration official as saying, "We are clearly hearing increasing levels of frustration and concern" from China about North Korea. Zakaria, known for his expertise on international affairs, also noted that in a recent key government meeting, a top Communist Party official, Qiu Yuanping, publicly questioned whether to "keep" or "dump" North Korea. Zakaria pointed out it’s still premature to conclude that Beijing is actually going to change its policy on Pyongyang, saying talk is easier than action. In drafting the two latest resolutions against Pyongyang, Beijing remained opposed to the inclusion of any possibility of using military force and to pushing Pyongyang too hard. Kevin Rudd, former Australian prime minister and foreign minister, agreed with a view that China is increasingly taking its international role into account. He said he would regard the move not as a "break" with China’s past on North Korea but as "continued movement along a continuum." “At one end China backing North Korea, my country right or wrong approach; at the other end of the spectrum, China joining the mainstream of international public opinion in trying to rein the North Koreans in,” he said in a media call arranged by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). “I think it’s fair to say over the last several years the Chinese have been moving along that continuum but increasingly in the direction of greater acceptance of their role of global political and security responsibility,” Rudd said. Under the leadership of Xi, who was formally elected China’s president earlier this week, there is a more positive sign. he said. “This will, of
course, lead to considerable angst in Pyongyang," he added. David Ignatius, another Washington Post columnist, said the new Chinese leadership may be also stepping up efforts to revive the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. Wang Yi, reportedly set to become Beijing’s new foreign minister, is believed to favor more emphatic negotiations with Pyongyang, he said. Involving the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan, the six-party format was once hailed as an effective tool for denuclearization talks with North Korea. But negotiations have been stalled since 2009. It remains uncertain whether or when the multilateral talks will get under way again as Pyongyang has been erratic in negotiations and actions. "The North Koreans may be interested in moving forward with the United States and/or Japan while not addressing inter-Korean tensions," Scott Snyder, a senior researcher at the CFR said. (Yonhap, “U.S. Pins Hopes on Signs of Change in China’s N.K. Policy,” Korea Herald, March 15, 2013)

Elleman: “Although international anger over Pyongyang’s launch using the Unha-3 rocket is understandable, efforts to condemn and punish North Korea for it might not be properly placed. Policymakers around the world face an important choice. They can impose further demands on an already heavily sanctioned country for exploring outer space, albeit using missile technologies. Alternatively, they can scale back their collective reaction to North Korean provocations that do not pose an immediate or significant threat and instead preserve their punitive responses for those activities that are most threatening, such as the February 12 nuclear test or future flight tests of long-range ballistic missiles. The history of ballistic missile development in other countries, which shows that space launches do not and cannot play a decisive role in the creation of long-range missiles, suggests the latter. …First, ballistic missile payloads must survive the rigors of re-entry into the atmosphere. Protecting a long-range missile’s payload from the extreme heat and structural loads experienced during re-entry requires the development and production of special materials, which must be tested and validated under real conditions. A second, less obvious difference lies with the operational requirements. Before their flight, space launchers, unlike their ballistic missile counterparts, are prepared over a period of many days, if not weeks. Components and subsystems can be checked and verified prior to launch, and the mission commander can wait for ideal weather before initiating the countdown. If an anomaly emerges during the countdown, engineers can delay the launch, identify and fix the problem, and restart the process. In contrast, ballistic missiles, like all other military systems, must perform reliably under a variety of operational conditions, with little or no warning. These operational requirements impose a more rigorous validation scheme, which includes an extensive test program. Only after successfully completing validation testing is a missile deemed to be combat ready. Although space launch activities offer an opportunity to accumulate experience and generate data that could aid efforts to develop long-range ballistic missiles, the results have limited application to ballistic missiles. Only a fraction of the overall missile development issues can be addressed when testing the system as a satellite launcher. Other requirements, most notably re-entry technologies and operational flexibility requirements, cannot be adequately addressed by satellite launches. A proven satellite launch vehicle would still need to be flight-tested as a ballistic missile a half-dozen or more times before it would be combat ready. For these reasons and others, the universal trend has been to
convert ballistic missiles into space launchers, not the opposite, as evidenced by the Soviet, U.S., and Chinese experiences. The Soviets, for instance, began development of the R-7 (Semyorka, or SS-6) intercontinental missile in 1954 and initiated flight trials in May 1957. Two dozen R-7s were tested as ballistic missiles before the weapon became operational. During the R-7 flight trials, a handful of prototypes were diverted from the military program and transformed into satellite launchers or lunar probes. The reconfigured and renamed launcher, dubbed Soyuz, boosted the first earth-orbiting satellite, Sputnik, on October 4, 1957. The R-7 was an impractical ballistic missile. It was deployed in limited numbers, no more than six, and was soon replaced by the R-16 (SS-7), R-36 (SS-9), and UR-100 (SS-11) missiles, which offered greater deployment flexibility.\[15\] The R-7, however, provided the foundation for the world’s most diverse and widely used family of satellite launchers. Derivatives of the R-7 have flown more than 1,800 manned and unmanned space missions since 1957.

The U.S. experience was similar but broader. During the latter half of the 1950s, the United States ambitiously pursued a handful of ballistic missile development efforts, each of which would also establish the foundation for satellite launch vehicles. The short-range Redstone missile, itself derived from the German V-2, was the basis for the Jupiter-A and -C experimental rockets and space launchers, as well as the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missile. The Jupiter-C, also known as Juno-1, placed the first U.S. satellite, Explorer-1, into orbit on January 31, 1958. The first U.S. manned missions to space were powered by Redstone rockets. The Thor intermediate-range missile, propelled by a modified Jupiter engine, was eventually used as a satellite launcher and is the progenitor of today’s Delta family of heavy-lift systems. Similarly, the Atlas and Titan ballistic missiles were transformed into satellite launchers, providing the building blocks for a family of launch vehicles operated under the same names. Interestingly, the four-stage Vanguard rocket, designed specifically for launching satellites, was never used as a ballistic missile. It did, however, place the world’s fourth satellite into orbit on March 17, 1958. Thus, space launch activities apparently played only a minor role, if any, in the development of U.S. and Soviet long-range ballistic missiles. In China, however, satellite launches might have significantly aided the military’s missile development efforts. The DF-3 and DF-4 intermediate-range missiles, as well as the CZ-1 satellite launcher, for instance, shared the same first-stage booster. Development of the single-stage DF-3 began in the early 1960s. It was first flight-tested in December 1966 and deployed in 1971. The two-stage DF-4 was flight-tested three times from December 1969 to November 1970. During this period, the CZ-1 satellite launcher, which was derived from the DF-4, was launched three times; and on April 24, 1970, it successfully lofted China’s first satellite into orbit. Before the DF-4 was inducted into military service, however, it had to undergo two batches of additional flight trials. The first stretched from May 1976 to November 1977, and the second took place in 1980. The missile achieved combat readiness in late 1980, 10 years after China’s first successful satellite launch. Similarly, China’s first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-5, and its workhorse satellite launcher, the CZ-2, appear to have been developed in tandem. The first flight of the DF-5 came in late 1971; the second flight was in 1973. The missile was not launched again until June 1979, when it underwent operational flight trials before being deployed in August 1981. However, the CZ-2, which employed DF-5 booster rockets not used during the initial flight trials in the early 1970s, was launched four times during the six years spanning the second and third DF-
5 test firings. It seems reasonable to conclude that technical issues related to the stalled DF-5 development effort were at least partially addressed by the CZ-2 space missions. History strongly suggests that satellite launch activities have assisted long-range missile development to varying degrees, but civilian space efforts have never played a decisive role in the creation of a long-range missile. In each of the cases reviewed above, regardless of the number of satellite launches conducted during new missile development, extensive flight trials in the military mode were needed to confirm combat readiness. The same principles apply to North Korea. Unha launches, although troubling and politically provocative, are not a substitute for ballistic missile testing. After weeks of North Korean preparations and repeated international appeals to cancel the test, Pyongyang launched the Unha-2 on April 5, 2009. Breaking with the pattern of its previous missile tests or satellite launches, the North Korean government released a video recording of the Unha-2 firing, revealing for the first time information about the system’s configuration and its approximate performance characteristics. Nevertheless, it remains unclear if the Unha-2 is a replica of the 2006 Taepo Dong-2 or a new system altogether. Flight data gathered by the Japanese Ministry of Defense and published in the Japanese press indicated that the first two stages of the Unha-2 performed as North Korean engineers had projected. The first stage splashed down in the East Sea approximately 540 kilometers from the launch site, within the hazard zone designated by North Korean officials before the flight, albeit at the edge of the zone closest to the Korean coastline. The second stage landed in the Pacific Ocean, roughly 3,200 kilometers from Musudan-ri, within the hazard zone, but at the forward edge. It is unclear if the third stage separated from the second stage. If it did successfully separate, it might not have ignited properly. The third stage and satellite tumbled out of control and fell into the ocean very near the second-stage impact location. The Unha-3 was launched on April 12, 2012, but not in the presence of the foreign observers. As the rocket headed south from the launch site, as expected, it reportedly failed after approximately 100 seconds of flight. Sections of the rocket and satellite were strewn across a swath of sea west of South Korea. The timing of the failure and the impact locations of the debris indicate that a malfunction occurred during first-stage operation, but the precise cause cannot be determined from available data. Pyongyang did not release any video of the launch. Prelaunch photographs of the Unha-3 show it to be a near copy of the Unha-2 fired in 2009 although the third stage appears to have been stretched by 30 to 50 centimeters, presumably to carry additional propellant. High-resolution photographs indicate that the second stage was neither a modified R-27—a retired Soviet submarine-launched missile, known in the West as the SS-N-6—nor a stage that employs the higher-energy propellants associated with the R-27, as some analysts had concluded after the 2009 launch. Indeed, the relative size of the oxidizer and fuel tanks found on the second stage is consistent with the propellant combination used by the Nodong engine. The Unha-3 consists of three stages. The first is powered by a cluster of four Nodong engines and steered using four small vernier engines. The available evidence suggests that the second stage is a modified Nodong missile, with a larger-diameter fuselage to accommodate additional propellant. The configuration of the third stage is not known with certainty, but is most likely similar to that of the second stage of Iran’s Safir launch vehicle, which is suitable for satellite launches but not powerful enough to propel a moderately sized military payload. If
North Korea built a ballistic missile using the first two stages of an Unha-3, the notional missile might achieve a maximum range of 5,000 to 6,000 kilometers. To reach the continental United States, a powerful third stage would have to be developed and added to the first two stages of the Unha-3. The Soviet Union considered an analogous upgrade in 1957, when Soviet designers suggested combining the main boosters of the R-12 and R-14 missiles to create the R-16 ICBM. The R-16 was successfully developed, but only after substantial redesign, including the development of new engines using more-powerful propellants. This Soviet experience suggests that North Korea would find it difficult to build an operational ICBM founded on the Unha-3 technology. Nevertheless, North Korea could contemplate using the Unha-3 as the basis for an ICBM. The missile would weigh more than 90 tons, making it too large and cumbersome to be viably deployed on a mobile launch platform. Silo deployment might be possible, but North Korea is a relatively small country and would find it difficult to conceal the location of its silos. Further, all of North Korea’s silos would be fewer than 200 kilometers from the coastline and thus vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes by advanced military powers, such as the United States. A new missile design seems more likely. In April 2012, North Korea unveiled mock-ups of a mobile, long-range missile during a military parade in Pyongyang. The missile has never been tested, and its origins are not known. If propellants more energetic than those used by the Unha-3, Nodong, or Scud missiles were employed, the new missile might be capable of intercontinental range. Until it is flight-tested, however, such possibilities remain speculative. Satellite launch activities provide Pyongyang with a platform for exploring and demonstrating new technologies relevant to the creation of an ICBM. The international community should discourage such activities through diplomatic and other means. Satellite launches, however, are not a substitute for ballistic missile flight trials. North Korea cannot develop an operationally sound ICBM without first conducting a series of test flights in the ballistic missile mode. The international community therefore should refrain from overreacting to North Korean satellite launches. Condemnations of space-related activities that utilize ballistic missile technologies are warranted and necessary. However, the threat of coercive measures such as economic and trade sanctions or enforced embargoes should be reserved for dissuading North Korea from testing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.”

(Michael Elleman, “Prelude to an ICBM? North Korea’s Unha-3 Launch into Context,” Arms Control Today, 43, 2 (March 2013), 8-13)

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The Pentagon will spend $1 billion to deploy additional ballistic missile interceptors along the Pacific Coast to counter the growing reach of North Korea’s weapons, a decision accelerated by Pyongyang’s recent belligerence and indications that Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, is resisting China’s efforts to restrain him. The new deployments, announced by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, will increase the number of ground-based interceptors in California and Alaska to 44 from 30 by 2017. The missiles have a mixed record in testing, hitting dummy targets just 50 percent of the time, but officials said today’s announcement was intended not merely to present a credible deterrence to the North’s limited intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal. They said it is also meant to show South Korea and Japan that the United States is willing to commit resources to deterring the North and, at the same time, warn Beijing that it must restrain its ally or face an expanding American military focus on Asia.
“There’s been a quickening pace of provocations,” said one senior administration official, describing actions and words from North Korea and its new leader. “But the real accelerant was the fact that the North Koreans seemed more unmoored from their Chinese handlers than even we had feared.” Although American and South Korean intelligence officials doubt the North is close to being able to follow through on a nuclear strike, or that it would even try, given its almost certain destruction, analysts say the country’s aggressive behavior is an important and worrying sign of changing calculations in the North. In interviews over recent days, Obama administration officials described internal debates at the White House and the Pentagon about how strongly to react to the recent provocations. It is a delicate balance, they said, of defending against real potential threats while avoiding giving the North Koreans what one official called “the satisfaction of seeming to make the rest of the world jumpy.” At a Pentagon news conference, Hagel cited North Korea’s third test of nuclear weapons technology last month, the successful test of a long-range missile that sent a satellite into space, and the discovery that a new generation of mobile missiles appeared closer to development. “We will strengthen our homeland defense, maintain our commitments to our allies and partners, and make clear to the world that the United States stands firm against aggression,” Hagel said. All 14 of the new interceptors will be placed in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, where 26 interceptors are already deployed. Four others are at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Adm. James A. Winnefeld Jr., the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also spoke at the Pentagon and described how the United States was deliberately building a two-tiered system of deterrence against North Korea. The United States will “put the mechanics in place to deny any potential North Korean objectives to launch a missile to the United States, but also to impose costs upon them if they do,” Admiral Winnefeld said. In an unusually pointed warning to the new North Korean leader, Admiral Winnefeld added, “We believe that this young lad ought to be deterred by that – and if he’s not, we’ll be ready.” The arguments for bolstering the limited missile defense were symbolic of the larger problem. The antimissile systems are considered less than reliable, and some administration officials were reluctant to pour additional resources into deploying more of the existing technology. But in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. C. Robert Kehler, the commander of the United States Strategic Command, made clear they serve a larger purpose. “Deterring North Korea from acting irrationally is our No. 1 priority,” he said. He acknowledged that there were doubts that the 30 existing antimissile systems would be sufficient, and added that an additional site in the United States, on the East Coast, may be needed to deter Iran. But the new deployment is also intended to send a signal to China, which tried but failed to block the more recent nuclear test, to rein in the North. “We want to make it clear that there’s a price to be paid for letting the North Koreans stay on the current path,” a senior official said. The North’s new leader, some analysts say, is intensifying the threats because he has failed to get the Obama administration and its South Korean allies to return to an established pattern in which the North provoked and the allies followed with much-needed economic aid in return for Pyongyang’s promises to finally halt its nuclear weapons program. But a growing number of experts believe North Korea also views its recent advances in missile and nuclear technology as game changers that will allow it to build the nuclear arsenal it desperately wants, both as a deterrent against better-armed enemies and a cudgel to extract more concessions and
possibly even international recognition. “Developing nuclear weapons gives North Korea a chance to turn the tables in one stroke,” said Cheong Seong-chang, an expert on North Korea at the Sejong Institute. “They can get around the weakness of their economy and their outdated conventional weapons.” *Rodong Sinmun* recently gave the North’s own explanation for its actions. “Let the American imperialists and their followers know!” the paper said. “We are not a pushover like Iraq or Libya.” Some missile-defense experts express deep skepticism about the capability of the ground-based interceptors deployed in California and Alaska. “It remains unclear whether these ground-based interceptors can work effectively, and they should be subjected to much more rigorous field testing before taxpayer resources are spent on a system that is ineffective,” said Tom Z. Collina, research director at the Arms Control Association. James N. Miller, the Pentagon’s under secretary for policy, said the new missiles would have to show success before they would be deployed. “We will continue to stick with our ‘fly before we buy’ approach,” Miller said, citing a successful test as recently as Jan. 26. George Lewis, an antimissile missile expert at Cornell University, said 15 flight tests of the defensive system have tried to hit targets, and only eight have succeeded. The United States also deploys Patriot Advanced Capability batteries in South Korea for defense of targets there, and the South fields an older model of the Patriot. Japan is developing its own layered missile-defense system, which includes Aegis warships and Patriot systems as well. The United States deploys one advanced TPY-2 missile-defense tracking radar in Japan to enhance early warning across the region and toward the West Coast, and it has reached agreement to deploy a second. And the Navy also recently bolstered its deployment of ballistic missile defense warships in waters off the Korean Peninsula, although the vessels were sent as part of an exercise even before the increase in caustic language from the North. As part of the Foal Eagle military exercise with South Korea, the Navy has four Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers in the region. (Thom Shanker, David E. Sanger and Martin Fac...)

KCNA said in a commentary that Internet servers operated by the state have come under intensive and persistent cyber attacks. It added that the cyber attacks are of significance because they are taking place while the United States and South Korea are conducting massive military exercises. “These attacks cannot be construed otherwise than despicable and base acts of the hostile forces consternated by the toughest measures taken by the DPRK (against the joint exercises),” the report said in an English dispatch. Independent reports indicated that the attacks began Wednesday morning and lasted until Thursday afternoon, and affected sites run by the media organization such as the KCNA and *Rodong Sinmun*, as well as other state-run Internet servers. South Korea’s unification ministry said it has no knowledge of the attacks mentioned by the North and pointed out it will probably take time to determine the details of the incident. In the past, North Korea has been accused on several occasions of carrying out cyber attacks against various Web sites in South Korea and the United States, with many observers in Seoul speculating the country operates a government organization that specializes in disrupting foreign Internet connectivity and services. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Blames U.S., S. Korea for Cyber Attack,” March 15, 2013)
The United Nations says that more than a fourth of all North Korean children are stunted from chronic malnutrition and fully two-thirds of the country's 24 million people don't know where their next meal is coming from. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs found that 2.8 million North Koreans “are in need of regular food assistance amidst worrying levels of chronic malnutrition and food insecurity.” The OCHA report read out by U.N. spokesman Eduardo del Buey said food aid should be neutral and impartial “and must not be contingent on political developments. (Reuters, “North Korea: U.N. Team Finds High Level of Malnutrition,” New York Times, March 16, 2013, p. A-9)

DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement: “U.S. high-ranking officials vied with each other to talk such nonsense as misinterpreting the present situation on the Korean Peninsula, claiming that the situation was aggravated due to the DPRK’s access to nuclear weapons. Their ulterior aim is to cover up their responsibility for having compelled the DPRK to have access to nukes. This is little short of a foolish poor artifice to justify the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK which escalated the situation on the Korean Peninsula to an extreme phase and stifle the DPRK by creating an international atmosphere of sanctions and pressure upon it. This only fully revealed that the U.S. remains unchanged in its hostile policy toward the DPRK and it has become more pronounced. The DPRK would like to re-clarify its unshakable principled stand on its nuclear deterrence for self-defense now that the U.S. persistently sticks to its hostile policy toward the DPRK, taking issue with its access to nukes with such sophism making profound confusion of right and wrong. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons serve as an all-powerful treasured sword for protecting the sovereignty and security of the country. Therefore, they cannot be disputed even in the least as long as the U.S. nuclear threat and hostile policy persist. The DPRK did not have access to nuclear weapons for the purpose of getting a recognition from someone. It will never reach out to anyone to get it recognized as a nuclear weapons state in the future. The only objective of its access to nukes is to put an end to the U.S. persistent nuclear threat and blackmail that have lasted for over half a century and mercilessly blow up strongholds for aggression wherever they are on the earth. The U.S. is seriously mistaken if it thinks that the DPRK had access to nukes as a bargaining chip to barter them for what it called economic reward. Nothing is more valuable than the sovereignty of the country and national dignity in the world-this remains an invariable faith of the DPRK. The U.S. poor temptation that it would help the DPRK if the latter makes other choice may work on other countries, but it sounds nonsensical to the DPRK. The DPRK has no idea of negotiating with the U.S. unless it rolls back its hostile policy towards the former and it will advance straight along the road of Songun of its own choice no matter what others may say.” (KCNA, “DPRK Has No Idea of Negotiating with U.S. Unless It Rolls back Its Hostile Policy towards It,” March 16, 2013)

North Korea test-fired a pair of short-range missiles into its eastern waters this past week in a likely response to ongoing routine U.S.-South Korean military drills, a South Korean official said. The North launched what appeared to be KN-02 (Toksa) missiles during its own drills, the military official said. He would not say on which day the missiles were fired or give other details, and declined to be named, citing policy. North
Korea routinely launches short-range missiles in an effort to improve its arsenal, but the latest test comes at a time of rising tensions. (Associated Press, “North Korea Reportedly Test-Fires Short-Range Missiles,” March 16, 2013)

China’s parliament on Saturday approved Wang Yi, a former envoy to North Korean nuclear talks and ambassador to Japan, as the country’s new foreign minister as tensions run high in Northeast Asia. Wang, 59, was involved from 2003 in the early stages of so-called six-party talks. A Japanese speaker, Wang was ambassador to Japan from 2004 to 2007 after previously serving as a diplomat in China’s embassy in Tokyo from 1989 to 1994. Since 2008 he has been in charge of Taiwan affairs. Chang Wanquan, 64, a People’s Liberation Army general who in recent years has been involved with China’s space programme, was approved as the new defense minister. As expected, Zhou Xiaochuan was retained as governor of the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central bank, but changes were made in other posts related to the economy. Lou Jiwei, chairman of sovereign wealth fund manager China Investment Corp., was named finance minister, while Gao Hucheng takes over as minister of commerce. (AFP, “China Names N. Korea, Japan Expert as Foreign Minister,” March 16, 2013)

Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said his government’s budget cuts won’t affect military readiness in South Korea, as deterrence against North Korea remains a top priority despite fiscal woes. "The commitment to the alliance is part of the Asia-Pacific rebalance, and we will ensure all the pieces of our defense relationship will continue to move forward, and this will occur despite the budgetary pressures in the U.S.,” Carter said in a press conference at the American Center Korea in Seoul. Carter stressed that ongoing military drills between the two nations are aimed at improving military readiness against North Korea, particularly mentioning flight training involving B-52s, which is slated for Tuesday. "I should note the presences of strategic bombers taking place in flight training in the Korean peninsula area in particular, for example, but this is routine. But there will be B-52 flights tomorrow," Carter told reporters. The Key Resolve exercise, which is held from March 11-21, involves about 10,000 Korean troops and 3,500 American personnel, along with military equipment and weapons, including F-22 stealth fighter jets deployed from overseas U.S. bases. But U.S. military officials rarely disclose what kind of military equipment is used in drills. “Together we’re taking important steps to advance allies’ military capabilities,” Carter said. "In particular, we remain steadfast to our commitment to **extended deterrence** offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. We’ll ensure all of our resources will be available to our alliance.” (Kim Eun-jung, “Pentagon Official Says U.S. Budget Cut Won’t Affect Readiness in S. Korea,” March 18, 2013)

Pentagon spokesman George Little said a B-52 from Andersen Air Force base in Guam, flew over South Korea on March 8 as part of a military exercise "Foal Eagle." “The B-52 Stratofortress can perform a variety of missions including **carrying precision-guided conventional or nuclear ordnance**,” he said. B-52s have taken part in annual exercises before, but Little said the Pentagon wanted to underline their use this time given the current, heightened tensions. "**We’re drawing attention to the fact that we have extended deterrence capabilities that we believe are important**
to demonstrate in the wake of recent North Korean rhetoric," he said. On the first day of negotiations for a conventional weapons treaty at UN headquarters on Monday, the North’s deputy UN ambassador Ri Tong-II proclaimed the North’s "very proud and powerful" position as the latest nuclear weapons state. Ri also denounced what he termed a U.S. policy of "nuclear blackmail" that he insisted would "in the long run give birth to more nuclear weapons states." (AFP, “U.S. Flies B-52s over S. Korea,” March 19, 2013)

China has criticized a US plan to strengthen its missile defences in response to North Korea’s growing military capabilities. The move would "intensify antagonism," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said, urging the US to "act prudently." Russia has also expressed opposition to the plan. "The anti-missile issue has a direct bearing on global and regional balance and stability," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said at a daily news briefing. "Actions such as strengthening anti-missile [defenses] will intensify antagonism and will not be beneficial to finding a solution for the problem," Hong said. (BBC, “China Criticizes U.S. Missile Defense Plans,” March 18, 2013)

KCNA: “Kim Jong Un set forth main tasks and ways to be held fast to by the field of light industry at present. He said: It is necessary to make the most effective use of the existing production potential to radically increase the production of consumer goods and push forward the modernization and scientification of light industry and thus put it on the world’s advanced level. … The whole state should attach importance to light industry and channel great efforts into its development. Various sectors and units of national economy should render positive help to the field of light industry, bearing in mind the Party’s intention to effect a turn in the people’s living in the shortest possible span of time.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at National Meeting of Light Industrial Workers,” March 19, 2013)

In a speech to a national meeting of light industrial workers in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-un called for concentrated efforts to build up the country’s light industrial sector that has direct bearing on the lives of everyday people, KCNA reported. Kim stressed the importance of the sector. “Kim Jong-un in his speech said that the light industrial front along with the agricultural front are the main fronts on which efforts should be focused in the drive for building an economic power and improving the people’s living standards,” KCNA reported. It also said that Kim pointed out that light industry is the main target for the concentration of the country’s resources, even under heightened tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the report said. “It is necessary to make the most effective use of existing production potential to radically increase the production of consumer goods and push forward with the modernization of light industry, and make it the world’s standard,” the leader told people gathered at the meeting. Chang Yong-seok, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University, said the emphasis on light industry at a time when Pyongyang has placed the country in battle mode is a sign that the North does not want to ignore the economy or its impact on the people. Others such as Yang Moo-jin, political science professor at the University of North Korean Studies, claimed that the KCNA report and the sudden holding of the meeting may be a sign that Pyongyang wants to end the current confrontational stance with the outside world and focus on its
North Korea’s nuclear test last month wasn’t just a show of defiance and national pride; it also serves as advertising. The target audience, analysts say, is anyone in the world looking to buy nuclear material. Though Pyongyang has threatened to launch nuclear strikes on the U.S., the most immediate threat posed by its nuclear technology may be North Korea’s willingness to sell it to nations that Washington sees as sponsors of terrorism. The fear of such sales was highlighted this week, when Japan confirmed that cargo seized last year and believed to be from North Korea contained material that could be used to make nuclear centrifuges, which are crucial to enriching uranium into bomb fuel. The dangerous message North Korea is sending, according to Graham Allison, a nuclear expert at the Harvard Kennedy School: “Nukes are for sale.” Outside nuclear specialists believe North Korea has enough nuclear material for several crude bombs, but they have yet to see proof that Pyongyang can build a warhead small enough to mount on a missile. The North, however, may be able to help other countries develop nuclear expertise right now, as it is believed to have done in the past. “There’s a growing technical capability and confidence to sell weapons and technology abroad, without fear of reprisal, and that lack of fear comes from (their) growing nuclear capabilities,” Joel Wit, a former U.S. State Department official, said at a recent nuclear conference in Seoul. A nuclear test using highly enriched uranium would announce to the world – including potential buyers – that North Korea is now operating a new, undiscovered production line for weapons-usable material,” Allison, wrote in a New York Times op-ed after the North’s test. Japan’s chief government spokesman, Suga Yoshihide, said officials searched the ship because they believed it carried North Korean cargo. News reports said the United States tipped off Japan. Suga said officials had determined in subsequent analyses that the rods were made of an alloy that suggests they were intended for use in a nuclear centrifuge. Suga said the seizure was the first to be conducted under a law Japan passed in 2010 to clamp down on the movement of materials that could be used for nuclear weapons development being brought into, or exported from, North Korea. The murkiness of the clandestine nuclear trade is a major worry. It’s difficult to know how a buyer would use atomic material or know-how, or where material could end up after being sold. “The terrorist threat of an improvised nuclear device delivered anonymously and unconventionally by a boat or a truck across our long and unprotected borders is one against which we have no certain deterrent or defensive response,” Robert Gallucci, former U.S. diplomat who negotiated a U.S.-North Korea nuclear deal used in the 1990s, said late last month in Seoul. “For Americans, this threat is far greater than the unlikely threat that may someday be posed by North Korean nuclear weapons delivered by a ballistic missile,” he said. (Foster Klug, “Renewed Nuke Sale Fear after Recent N. Korea Test,” Associated Press, March 19, 2013)
Public opinion polling in South Korea over the last decade has consistently demonstrated majority support both for an indigenous nuclear weapons effort and the return of US tactical nuclear weapons, which Washington withdrew in 1991. In two recent polls conducted in the wake of the North Korean test, 64 percent and 66 percent of those surveyed agreed that South Korea should possess its own nuclear weapons. This is not surprising as a simple matter of equality with North Korea, ignoring for a moment the thorny technical and policy issues that developing nuclear weapons would pose to South Korea. Public opinion seems to reflect a general sense of insecurity among South Koreans more than a real desire that their government build nuclear weapons. Elite opinion until now has largely discounted nuclear weapons. The issue resonated only at the political fringe, where a few conservative politicians and commentators periodically voiced support for nuclear weapons. In a 2011 Chosun Ilbo column, for instance, Kim Dae Jung, the conservative commentator and political analyst, argued: “Only when Seoul develops a nuclear bomb will the way for substantive negotiations between the two Koreas open. We can no longer entrust our lives and territorial security to the incompetence of world powers that have failed to settle the North Korean nuclear issue for over two decades.” The North’s February test broke the taboo and brought the nuclear issue into mainstream political discourse; more commentators and politicians have joined the debate. Anti-nuclear arguments still seem to dominate, but more people are now willing to argue in favor of nuclear weapons in South Korea. Because the debate is new, the various strands of argument are not yet fully formed. The boundaries between these strands are still squishy, with many protagonists present multiple arguments that are not mutually exclusive. Our review of publicly available Korean and English-language reporting to date suggests the following four (and maybe more) separate arguments in favor of South Korean or US nuclear weapons. 1) Return US tactical nuclear weapons to improve bargaining leverage with North Korea. By this logic, redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons would force North Korea back to negotiations culminating in the dismantling of its nuclear weapons program. One proponent of this view, Jeon Sung Hun, senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, has argued that US tactical nuclear weapons could be used in a strategy of “bilateral denuclearization” with North Korea. Echoing this view, Won Yoo Chul, former chairman of the National Defense Committee, asserted two days after North Korea’s third nuclear test, “It is time to consider the necessity of redeploying US nuclear weapons, based on the premise that we would abandon these weapons immediately once the North Korean nuclear issue is solved.” 2) Redeploy US tactical nuclear weapons to enhance deterrence against North Korea. The latest North Korean test played on Korean fears about the durability of the ROK-US alliance and the reliability of US extended deterrence commitments. Some Koreans worry that without its own nuclear weapons on the Peninsula the United States might give in to nuclear coercion by Pyongyang at South Korea’s expense. The return of US tactical weapons would thus “fix the torn [nuclear] umbrella,” according to Chung Mong Joon,* member of the Korean National Assembly and former chairman of the ruling Saenuri party. “At a time of crisis, we are not 100 percent sure whether the Americans will cover us with its nuclear umbrella,” he argues. Suggesting a similar logic, albeit without physically stationing tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean soil, Kim Young Hee of Joongang Ilbo posited that “The only remaining way to solve the North Korean nuclear problem is to enforce nuclear deterrence. The best way is to
deploy US nuclear-armed submarines regularly under the East Sea and observe North Korea’s behavior.” 3) Develop South Korean nuclear weapons to alter calculus in North Korea nuclear negotiations. Those convinced that the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons is insufficient leverage against North Korea argue that indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons could achieve a better result in negotiations. An ROK nuclear weapons program would pressure China and the United States to bring North Korea to the table to achieve denuclearization. This view was espoused by Lee Chun Geun of the Korea Economic Research Institute: “When we solidify our resolution to develop our own nuclear weapons, the US, China, and Russia cannot help but look for a practical way to hold back North Korea’s nuclear weapons.” Chosun Ilbo reporter Jung Kwon Hyun similarly stipulated that only the fear of other East Asian “nuclear dominos” like Japan and Taiwan would convince China of the need to rein in North Korea’s nuclear behavior. 4) Develop South Korean nuclear weapons as a security guarantee. “If North Korea possesses long-range missiles that can attack the state of the US, one might consider the US nuclear umbrella to be torn. Will the US be prepared to sacrifice Los Angeles to save Seoul?” queried Lee Chun Geun. For those who worry that the answer to this question is “no,” then South Korea can only rely on its own capabilities. Nuclear weapons would provide South Korea with a means of self-defense independent of the United States. One proponent of this view, the conservative commentator Jeon Won Chaek, argued that “we have to be nuclear armed ourselves to survive. The fact that this debate has emerged from the shadows does not make a South Korean decision to pursue nuclear weapons any more likely. There are just as many, if not more, arguments against nuclear weapons, ranging from the economic and reputational penalties that would result from violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Indeed, the ROK government has taken pains to distance itself from pro-nuclear weapon views. Chun Young Woo, presidential secretary for foreign affairs and national security, stated on February 2013, that “The government has never considered such an [indigenous nuclear weapon] option, nor is it something to be considered.” Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min Seok similarly stated on February that Korea “is not considering bringing in tactical nuclear weapons right now because the priority is to make North Korea give up its nuclear armament.” (Toby Dalton and Yoon Ho-jin, “Reading into South Korea’s Nuclear Debate,” PacNet No. 20, March 18, 2013)
own to enforce sanctions on the North, but rather that it is treating North Korea-related transactions by the book.” Another source said just cracking down on fake accounts used by North Korean banks will cause havoc for the North Korean regime. Until recently China has turned a blind eye to such violations. Beijing has also banned North Korean restaurants from selling North Korean agricultural produce including ginseng, and is cracking down on illegal migrant workers from the North. A North Korean source in Dandong said Beijing is trying to clamp down on North Koreans who come to China on student or tourist visas or simple entry permits and then work there illegally. To work legally in China, North Koreans need a six-month “industrial trainee” visa, which can be extended for up to a year. (Chosun Ilbo, “China Moves on N. Korean Money-Laundering,” March 20, 2013)

After decades in the red, North Korea may be running a trade surplus, according to two economists who warn the breakthrough makes Pyongyang less vulnerable to pressure on its nuclear program. Marcus Noland and Stephen Haggard, both North Korea experts at the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics, say their research suggests the North’s current account went into surplus in 2011. In a posting on the institute’s website, they said the improvement had come “largely on the back of expanding trade with China” and added that preliminary research also pointed to a 2012 surplus. The findings will surprise many, given the North’s reputation as an economic basket case wrecked by decades of mismanagement and ruinous spending on military hardware.

While acknowledging “significant uncertainty” in calculating the North’s balance of payments, Noland and Haggard said their conclusion was “bad news” – both for North Koreans and the rest of the world. “It is bad news for North Korea because as a relatively poor country, they should be running a current account deficit, importing capital and expanding productive capacity for future growth,” Noland said. Instead, they are exporting capital, with money flowing abroad presumably, Noland suggests, to fund the up-market consumption habits of the ruling elite. “It is also bad news for us. If North Korea is running current account surpluses, then they are less vulnerable to foreign pressure,” he added. Nolan and Haggard stress that constructing a balance of payments for North Korea is inevitably speculative, given that its actual trade figures are state secrets and can only be extrapolated using “mirror statistics” reported by a trade partner. Their calculations included illicit activities, such as counterfeiting to build a high- and low-range estimate for the current account – the broadest measure of trade with the rest of the world. “In all likelihood, North Korea has run current account deficits for most of its history. That meant that the country was consuming more than it was producing, and the difference had to be financed from abroad,” Noland said. (AFP, Jiji, “North Korea Might Turn Tables with trade Surplus,” Japan Times, March 20, 2013)

Chinese President Xi Jinping told President Park Geun-Hye that Beijing is willing to help reconciliation between South and North Korea, the foreign ministry said. “China is willing to provide the necessary assistance to advance South-North reconciliation and cooperation,” Xi told Park in a phone call, according to a statement on the ministry website. “The South and North are compatriots and South-North relations are important to the situation on the peninsula,” the newly elevated Chinese leader said. (AFP, “China Willing to Help Korea ‘Reconciliation’: Xi,” March 20, 2013)
20-minute talk, Park congratulated Xi on his inauguration as China’s president and talked about plans to improve ties between the two countries and the North Korea issues, Kim said.

“Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula not only serves the national interests of South Korea but also China,” Xi was quoted as telling Park. “To realize the Korean Peninsula’s peace, stability and denuclearization, China will work together with South Korea and strengthen communication with Seoul.” According to Kim, Park explained her North Korea policy to the Chinese leader. “The South will sternly counter the North’s additional provocations,” Park was quoted as saying. “But if the North makes the right choice, we will improve inter-Korean relations through the Korean Peninsula process.” (Ser Myo-ja, “Xi Offers His Support for Park’s Policy on the North,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 21, 2013)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. is reportedly letting its B-52 deployed on Guam make sortie to the Korean Peninsula on March 19 in the wake of its sortie made on March 8. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence Carter made a junket to south Korea on March 18, where he was closeted with south Korean puppet Minister of Defence Kim Kwan Jin over “south Korea-U.S. joint reaction” to the DPRK’s threat. There Carter blustered that B-52 would be involved in the U.S.-south Korea joint military drills on March 19 to demonstrate the U.S. will to defend south Korea and such sorties would continue in the future, too. It is an unpardonable provocation against the DPRK to sound out its strongest will that the U.S. is introducing a strategic nuclear strike means to the Korean Peninsula at a time when its situation is inching close to the brink of war. The DPRK is now closely watching the move of B-52 and the hostile forces will never escape its strong military counteraction, should the strategic bomber make such sortie to the peninsula again.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman Accuses U.S. of Letting Strategic Bomber Make Sortie to Korea Peninsula,” March 20, 2013)

South Korea said that it was investigating the possibility of a North Korean cyberattack after the computer networks of three broadcasters and three banks were paralyzed. The government and military raised their vigilance against more possible disruptions. But they cautioned that it was still too early to point the finger at Pyongyang, which has been threatening “pre-emptive nuclear attacks” and other, unspecified actions against its southern neighbor for conducting military exercises with the United States this month and for supporting new American-led United Nations sanctions against the North. The attacks, which left many South Koreans unable to withdraw money from A.T.M.’s and news broadcasting crews staring at blank computer screens, came as KCNA quoted the country’s leader, Kim Jong-un, as threatening to destroy government installations in the South, along with American bases in the Pacific. Though American officials dismissed those threats, they also noted that the broadcasters hit by the virus had been cited by the North before as potential targets. The Korea Communications Commission said that the disruption originated at an Internet provider address in China but that it was still not known who was responsible. Many analysts in Seoul suspect that North Korean hackers honed their skills in China and were operating there. At a hacking conference here last year, Michael Sutton, the head of threat research at Zscaler, a security company, said a handful of hackers from China “were clearly very skilled, knowledgeable and were in touch with their
counterparts and familiar with the scene in North Korea.” But there has never been any evidence to back up some analysts’ speculation that they were collaborating with their Chinese counterparts. “I’ve never seen any real evidence that points to any exchanges between China and North Korea,” said Adam Segal, a senior fellow who specializes in China and cyberconflict at the Council on Foreign Relations. The attacks, which occurred as American and South Korean military forces were conducting major exercises, were not as sophisticated as some from China that have struck United States computers, and certainly less sophisticated than the American and Israeli cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But it was far more complex than a “denial of service” attack that simply overwhelms a computer system with a flood of data. The malware is called “DarkSeoul” in the computer world and was first identified about a year ago. It is intended to evade some of South Korea’s most popular antivirus products and to render computers unusable. In Wednesday’s strikes, the attackers made no effort to disguise the malware, leading some to question whether it came from a state sponsor – which tend to be more stealthy – or whether officials or hackers in North Korea were sending a specific, clear message: that they can reach into Seoul’s economic heart without blowing up South Korean warships or shelling South Korean islands. South Korea’s two leading television stations, KBS and MBC, maintained normal broadcasts but said their computers were frozen. The cable channel YTN reported a similar problem. The KBS Web site was shut down. Shinhan Bank, the country’s fourth-largest lender, reported that its Internet banking servers had been blocked temporarily. Technicians restored operations, the government’s Financial Services Commission said in a statement. Two other banks, NongHyup and Jeju, reported that operations at some of their branches had been paralyzed after computers were “affected with virus and their files erased,” the commission said. After two hours, the banks’ operations returned to normal, they said. A fourth bank, Woori, reported a hacking attack, but said it had suffered no damage. South Korea’s government, military and nuclear power plants reported no disruptions. But scenes of customers complaining at bank windows about their inability to use A.T.M.’s and live national broadcasts with experts who raised the possibility of North Korean cyberattacks reflected a simmering anxiety over North Korea, which recently declared that the 1953 armistice that halted the Korean War was not valid. The Web site of the Washington-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea was hacked by an entity calling itself “Hitman 007-Kingdom of Morocco,” which stole the committee’s publications and other documents, said its executive director, Greg Scarlatoiu. He said he did not know whether the attack was linked to the disruptions in South Korea, but noted that it came a day before the United Nations Human Rights Council was to vote on the resolution calling for the establishment of an independent investigation of North Korean human rights abuses, including its running of prison gulags. The committee has been an active supporter of such an inquiry. “This type of mishap is not to be unexpected, given the nature of our work,” Scarlatoiu said. In testimony to Congress last year, Gen. James D. Thurman, the American commander in South Korea, described what he called North Korea’s “growing cyberwarfare capability.” “North Korea employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyberinfiltration and cyberattacks” against South Korea and the United States, General Thurman said. “Such attacks are ideal for North Korea,” he added, “providing the regime a means to attack” South Korean and American businesses “without attribution.” But security researchers and foreign policy experts
say that North Korea faces significant hurdles. “They simply don’t have access to the same technology due to sanctions,” said Sutton, of Zscaler. “And a large portion of their population does not have ready access to the Internet, so they don’t have that natural pool of talent to recruit from.” Lee Seong-won, an official at the communications commission, told reporters on Wednesday that the malicious code, once activated, disrupted the booting of computers. “It will take time for us to find out the identity and motive of those who were behind this attack,” he said. After an initial investigation, government experts found that a virus had penetrated the networks of the agencies, Lee Seong-won, an official at the Korea Communications Commission, said during a media briefing. Once activated, the malicious code disrupted the booting of computers. “It will take time for us to find out the identity and motive of those who were behind this attack,” Lee said. The government investigators were also checking whether skulls that reportedly popped up on some computer screens had anything to do with the virus attack. Kim Min-seok, a spokesman of the Defense Ministry, said, “We cannot rule out the possibility of North Korean involvement, but we don’t want to jump to a conclusion.” The military raised its alert against cyberattacks by one level, Kim said. The Korea Communications Commission also upgraded the country’s defense against cyberattacks, asking government agencies and businesses to triple the number of monitors for possible hacking attacks. President Park Geun-hye instructed a civilian-government task force to investigate the disruptions. The simultaneous shutdowns came five days after North Korea blamed South Korea and the United States for cyberattacks that temporarily shut down Web sites in Pyongyang last week. In recent years, North Korea had also vowed to attack South Korean television stations and newspapers for carrying articles critical of its government, even citing the map coordinates of their headquarters. North Korea said it suspected that South Korea and the United States had hacked its Web sites as part of the joint military exercises they have been conducting since early this month. North Korea “will never remain a passive onlooker to the enemies’ cyberattacks that have reached a very grave phase as part of their moves to stifle it,” KCNA said March 15. Experts said it could take months to determine what happened. In January, after a six-month investigation, the South Korean police said North Korea had been behind a hacking attack that disrupted the computer network of JoongAng Ilbo. (Choe Sang-hun, “Computer Networks in South Korea Are Paralyzed in Cyberattacks,” New York Times, March 20, 2013, p. A-5) The source of a massive cyber attack that caused three South Korean broadcasters and two banks to go offline for most of Wednesday afternoon (KST) was domestic, the Korean Communications Commission (KCC) said today. The internet watchdog had previously announced that a Chinese IP address was behind the attack, leading many to speculate that North Korea had conducted a sophisticated and coordinated hacking operation against the South Korean capital. A website operated by LG was also targeted, in what some analysts now argue appears to have been entirely coincidental. (NK News, “South Korea Was Source of Wednesday’s Cyber Attack,” March 22, 2013)
The one-hour air-raid drill today came amid heightened tensions on the Korean. Nuclear-capable B-52 bombers, taking off from Guam, had previously flown missions over South Korea as part of joint military exercises. But this month, the Pentagon took the rare action of publicly announcing those missions to reaffirm the United States’ “nuclear umbrella” for South Korea and Japan at a time of rising anxiety over the North’s nuclear threats. South Korean news media also carried photos of an American nuclear-powered attack submarine making a port call at a South Korean naval base. “The U.S. should not forget that the Anderson Air Force Base on Guam, where B-52s take off, and naval bases in Japan proper and Okinawa, where nuclear-powered submarines are launched, are within the striking range of the DPRK’s precision strike means,” a spokesman of the Supreme Command of the North Korean People’s Army told KCNA. He added, without elaborating, “Now that the U.S. started open nuclear blackmail and threat, the DPRK, too, will move to take corresponding military actions.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Threatens U.S. Military Bases in the Pacific,” New York Times, March 21, 2013)

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KPA Supreme Command spokesman answer to question put by KCNA: “As the KPA Supreme Command already clarified, the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises are evidently dangerous nuclear war drills now under way as part of the most outrageous hostile acts to encroach upon the sovereignty and supreme interests of the DPRK. This is a vivid expression of the crudest violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement (AA) and all the north-south agreements. This was precisely the reason why the DPRK took an important decision to totally nullify the AA and declare the north-south declaration on nonaggression and the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula invalid. The decision reflected the strong will and steadfast determination of the DPRK army and the people to foil the U.S. nuclear war racket with their own nuclear weapons, free from any binding, and wipe out all hostile forces toeing the U.S. policy now that it has become impossible to pin any hope on the validity of the above-said agreements and declarations. The U.S. is now introducing B-52, nuclear-powered submarines and other nuclear strike means into south Korea and its vicinity in a bid to test the DPRK’s will and break its resolute determination. The flying corps of strategic bombers equipped with nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered submarines serve as “the three major nuclear mainstays” and “the three major nuclear strike means” along with intercontinental ballistic missiles that the U.S. brandishes as means of blackmail as it pleases. What should not be overlooked is that the U.S. picked up B-52 and nuclear-powered submarines out of these nuclear strike means to send them to the sky above south Korea and its waters for a nuclear strike drill under the simulated conditions of an actual war against the DPRK. The U.S. is openly calling it a strong warning message to the DPRK and is claiming in public that it would continue such threat and blackmail against the DPRK in the future. But the army and people of the DPRK will never be frightened at such a warning message, threat and blackmail. The U.S. should not forget that the Anderson Air Force Base on Guam where B-52 takes off and naval bases in Japan proper and Okinawa where nuclear-powered submarines are launched are within the striking range of the DPRK’s precision strike means. Now that the U.S. started open nuclear blackmail and threat, the DPRK, too, will move to take
North Korea threatened to attack American military bases in Japan and on the Pacific island of Guam in retaliation for recent training missions by American B-52 bombers over South Korea. While the North has threatened American forces in Guam before, the latest warning comes amid heightened tension on the peninsula after a North Korean nuclear test last month and the imposition of United Nations sanctions that have infuriated Pyongyang. Those tensions might rise again because of another United Nations action today: Its Human Rights Council created a commission to look into allegations of human rights violations in North Korea, including the incarceration of political prisoners at labor camps and torture. Navi Pillay, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, has been calling for such an investigation for months, fearful that the world’s preoccupation with the North’s growing nuclear arsenal overshadowed discussions of a human rights situation she called “the worst in the whole world” in an interview with Reuters. The commission will be somewhat limited in what it can do. It is unlikely to get access to North Korea, a police state, and it remains unclear what court would take up its findings. But Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, told Radio Australia that “collecting the evidence is the first step toward putting pressure on the international community, and whoever North Korea’s defenders are, to ultimately acquiesce in prosecution” of what he called “the terrible atrocities that are routinely committed in North Korea.” An estimated 1 in 120 North Koreans are imprisoned in gulags, where defectors from the country say starvation, forced labor and torture are endemic. Roth acknowledged the difficulties facing investigators. “There is no international tribunal that has jurisdiction over North Korea,” he told Radio Australia. “Theoretically, the International Criminal Court could be brought in with a resolution from the U.N. Security Council, yet China would probably veto that at this stage.” Nuclear-capable B-52 bombers that upset the North have flown missions over South Korea in the past as part of joint military exercises. But this month, the Pentagon took the rare action of announcing those missions to reaffirm the United States’ “nuclear umbrella” for South Korea and Japan at a time of rising anxiety over the North’s nuclear threats. A spokesman for the Supreme Command of the North Korean People’s Army told KCNA that “the U.S. should not forget that the Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, where B-52s take off, and naval bases in Japan proper and Okinawa, where nuclear-powered submarines are launched, are within the striking range of the D.P.R.K.’s precision strike means.” He added, without elaborating, “Now that the U.S. started open nuclear blackmail and threat, the D.P.R.K., too, will move to take corresponding military actions,” referring to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the North’s official name. State radio also blared air-raid warnings in North Korea. The North Koreans have also been angry about what they expected to be an unfavorable outcome in the Human Rights Council. On March 11, Rodong Sinmun said the council’s expected move to adopt the resolution, coupled with the United Nations sanctions, would “raise tensions and ignite a war to invade the North.” It vowed to
deliver “a merciless mace-blow” on “traitors” in South Korea. North Korea’s ambassador, So Se Pyong, rejected the resolution today as “an instrument that serves the political purposes of the hostile forces in their attempt to discredit the image” of his country. He denied human rights abuses existed there. Cho Tae-young, a South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman, said, “We hope that the establishment of the commission of inquiry through this resolution will contribute to the improvement of human rights in North Korea.” The commission will include the Indonesian lawyer Marzuki Darusman, who wrote a report for the council citing the kidnapping of foreigners and the system of labor camps. He said the situation had worsened since the North’s new young leader, Kim Jong-un, took over after his father’s death in December 2011. The European Union and Japan sponsored the resolution calling for the commission, and the United States backed it. With no Chinese or Russian vote on the 47-member council, North Korea had no country willing to oppose the inquiry.


The 47-member state Geneva-based Human Rights Council (HRC), a subsidiary organ of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted a resolution that establishes a Commission of Inquiry (CoI) to investigate more fully the severe human rights violations in North Korea, and to determine whether those violations amount to crimes against humanity. Commissions of Inquiry are a venerable diplomatic mechanism dating back at least to the Concert of Europe, through which a delegation of eminent persons, almost always legal experts or experienced diplomats from a cross-section of the Concert powers, investigated egregious human rights violations (often massacres) usually with the particular aim of assessing accountability for large-scale atrocities. In recent years, investigative bodies known as mechanisms of inquiry, expert panels or group of experts, as well as commissions of inquiry, created by the UN Security Council, General Assembly or Human Rights Council, have been used to make prima facie determinations of grave breaches of international criminal law prior to the creation of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, such as those for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or prior to a referral to the International Criminal Court. Presently, another CoI is documenting atrocities in Syria. For North Korea, the Col will consist of three “eminent persons,” one of whom will be the present “Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK,” Marzuki Darusman, the former Attorney General of Indonesia. The other two commissioners will be selected from the regions of Africa, Latin America or Europe. The selection will be made by the revolving President of the Human Rights Council from a list of potential candidates proposed by the member states and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. One commissioner will almost certainly be an expert in international humanitarian and criminal law, perhaps a former judge or prosecutor from one of the existing international tribunals. Some member states favor the appointment of a high level political figure such as a former foreign minister or head of state. This new resolution calls for an “adequately resourced” inquiry, meaning that in addition to the three commissioners, the High Commissioner for Human Rights will appoint three or more full time staff and probably additional investigators. The CoI will also be provided the budget necessary to conduct investigations. Once appointed, the commissioners and staff will operate independently of the Council and the High Commissioners Office. The CoI will make interim reports to the September session of
the HRC and to the General Assembly later this year. The full report is scheduled to be presented to the HRC in March of 2014. The HRC resolution tasks the CoI to investigate systematic, widespread and grave violations in nine specified areas: 1) violations of the right to food; 2) violations associated with prison camps; 3) torture and inhuman treatment; 4) arbitrary detention; 5) discrimination; 6) violations of freedom of expression; 7) violations of the right to life; 8) violations of the right to movement; and 9) enforced disappearances, including the abductions of nationals of other states. Moreover, these areas or patterns of violations are to be investigated “with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular where these violations may amount to crimes against humanity” (emphasis added). If so determined, the commissioners have the additional task of making recommendations to both the DPRK and the international community for further action. Almost certainly, as a part of the investigation, the commissioners will seek entry to Pyongyang. But even more certainly, the DPRK will refuse, as it has with the present and past Special Rapporteurs on human rights in the DPRK. However, given the huge amount of information potentially available in South Korea and Japan, Pyongyang’s non-cooperation won’t stymie the investigation. Other targeted states have also refused to cooperate with comparable UN investigations. 

Once up and running, the inquiry into the DPRK violations will face a number of challenges. Such UN investigations are usually mandated to deal with a recent large-scale massacre or a recent series of inter-related severe violations. For North Korea, the CoI is mandated to establish the factual record on a wide-ranging number of violations, all of which are ongoing, but which date back decades to the 1970s for the abducted Japanese and South Korean citizens, and even to the Korean War for several thousand South Koreans who were chained and forced to march to the North during the North Korean army’s retreat from Seoul in the face of MacArthur’s’ advance. To illustrate the fact-finding challenges facing the CoI, taking one of the nine patterns of severe violations that I am most familiar with—the slave labor political prison camps—these prison camps are moving targets. North Korean refugees recently arrived in Seoul (termed “defectors” in South Korea) from the areas of Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province and Bukchang, South Pyongan Province, claim that Camp 22 has been closed and the political prisoners transferred to other camps, and that Camp 18, has been substantially dismantled. But there is no first hand testimony on this from former prisoners or guards at these camps. Satellite imagery of other prison camps show new construction and seeming expansion. But there are not yet North Korean eyewitnesses accessible to investigators in South Korea who can confirm, verify or detail the new construction or suspected expansion seen in the most recent satellite photographs. The oft-cited round number of estimated political prisoners in the slave labor camps—200,000—was originally provided by defecting North Korean prison and state security officials ten to fifteen years ago. But by all former prisoner accounts, the camps have staggeringly high rates of deaths-in-detention. The total number of prisoners has almost certainly declined, as, in the absence of large-scale purges of the party, the army or the government ministries (that we would almost certainly find out about), it is unlikely that the number of new deportations to the camps matches the extraordinary rates of death-in-detention over the last decade or so. Similarly, while we know that very large numbers of prisoners in the camps are there by virtue of “guilt-by-association” for the real or imagined political misdemeanors of their relatives, we don’t know to what extent current deportations to the camps are by virtue of “guilt-by-
Similarly, two of the camps—Camps 15 and 18—had “re-revolutionizing” or “re-re-education” zones from which prisoners were eligible for release, often after three to ten years of forced labor. Much of our information about the camps comes from former prisoners released from these zones who subsequently fled North Korea to China and South Korea. But there are no known releases from the camps since 2008. Thus, we don’t know if releases are ongoing, or if the former “re-revolutionizing zones” have been converted to “total control zones” where the prisoners are consigned to forced labor until death. The CoI will have to sort out the recent information on these matters. The HRC resolution also highlights violations of the right to food. This is the first of the nine subject areas mandated for the CoI. There is much less jurisprudence and scholarly literature on policy-induced or policy-driven famine as a crime against humanity compared with violations such as extra-judicial and summary executions, or rape as an instrument of repression. Notwithstanding, the current miasma in both North Korean agricultural policy and international food policies toward North Korea, the CoI has a considerable opportunity challenge here as it is tasked with making recommendations to both the DPRK and the international community. Both North Korean food production policy and the international response to the DPRK’s chronic food shortages are in considerable disarray and fully merit forthcoming examination. It may turn out to be not very difficult for the CoI to determine that some of the severe violations in North Korea constitute crimes against humanity. (David Hawk, “A United Nations Commission of Inquiry for North Korea,” 38North, April 1, 2103)
Despite escalated tension with Pyongyang, the Park Geun-hye administration granted permission to a private organization to provide a humanitarian aid package to North Korea for the first time since her inauguration in keeping with her two-track policy regarding the North. The Ministry of Unification announced yesterday that it gave governmental permission for the Eugene Bell Foundation, a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington which provides humanitarian services to the North, to provide 678 million won ($605,708) worth of medical aid to Pyongyang. According to the ministry, the medical package will namely be medicine to treat some 500 patients in North Korea suffering from multidrug-resistant tuberculosis. The shipment is expected to reach the North sometime next month and the aid will be transferred to eight TB Care Centers in North and South Pyongan provinces, Pyongyang and Nampo. Kim Hyeong-sik, the spokesman of the ministry, said that the aid was approved “taking into consideration that medicine to treat tuberculosis patients in North Korea has to be distributed urgently, especially for vulnerable social groups [such as the pregnant and young].” “We look forward to this measure to help build trust between the North and South,” he added. The ministry said that the government is in the process of reviewing up to four other civilian organizations besides Eugene Bell to grant humanitarian aid to the North. The last aid request to North Korea was granted in November last year in the Lee Myung-bak administration, before Pyongyang’s rocket launch in December. (Sarah Kim, “First Aid to North Allowed under park,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 23, 2013)

Seeking to remove a longstanding irritant in Japan’s ties with the United States, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said that his government would ask local officials on the island of Okinawa for a key permit to begin construction to relocate an unpopular American air base to another part of the island. The decision to request the permit is an effort by Abe’s government to restart a plan to move the American base, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, to a less crowded area. Abe and President Obama agreed last month to proceed with the relocation plan, which was originally approved in 1996 but has been blocked because of opposition in Okinawa, where many people prefer the base be moved off the island. That opposition appears to be as stiff as ever, making it uncertain that the island’s prefectoral government will approve the permit. While the island’s governor, Nakaima Hirokazu, is a member of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, he is under intense public pressure to oppose the relocation. “I cannot understand it; this is impossible” to approve, Nakaima said of the government’s decision to seek the construction permit. For many Okinawans, the Futenma base has become a symbol of an onerous American military presence on an island that is home to more than half of the 50,000 United States military employees in Japan. Abe said on Friday, allowing the base to remain in its current location is “impermissible.” That is also the official position of the United States government, which wants to move Futenma and its aircraft from their current location in the center of the crowded city of Ginowan, in southern Okinawa, to Camp Schwab, an existing Marine base on the island’s jungle-covered northern end. “I don’t think it will be easy,” Abe said of getting permission to start new construction. “We need to proceed while rebuilding a relationship of trust” with
Okinawans. The land-reclamation permit is needed before work can begin on filling in parts of the coral-filled sea off Camp Schwab for the new air base’s twin runways. The landfill plans are also fiercely opposed by many Okinawans, who say they would damage the island’s fragile ecosystem, and particularly the feeding grounds of the dugong, a large, manatee-like marine mammal. (Martin Fackler, “Japan Leader Backs Move of U.S. Base on Okinawa,” New York Times, March 23, 2013, p. A-4)

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The Chinese Navy will participate in the U.S.-organized RIMPAC multinational maritime exercise off Hawaii for the first time in 2014, informed sources have said. The Rim of the Pacific Exercise is the world’s largest joint naval exercise, held once every two years. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta called on the Chinese Navy to participate when he visited China in September. The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama intends to stabilize Asia-Pacific security through the establishment of mutual trust with China on the military level, the sources said Thursday. It would like to expand military exchanges with Beijing, which has been increasingly seeking to expand its interests in the Pacific, they said. This year the U.S. Navy officially invited its Chinese counterpart to the exercise and the Chinese side expressed its intention to participate, according to the sources. China had never been invited to RIMPAC before and had called it a “China containment” policy by the United States and other nations. The exercise mainly consists of tactical training programs including ship-to-ship battle drills, antisubmarine warfare, sea-to-air drills and missile launches. Twenty-two countries sent 46 vessels, about 200 aircraft and about 25,000 personnel to RIMPAC 2012, including those from the U.S. Navy and the Maritime Self-Defense Force. Eleven countries including the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea and Canada sent vessels and aircraft, while another 11 countries sent only personnel. At this stage it has not been decided whether China will send vessels and aircraft to RIMPAC 2014, the sources said. Against China, which has been strengthening its naval power, the U.S. government has been taking both “soft” and “hard” approaches. On the hard side, it has tried to keep China in check by reinforcing alliances with Japan and other countries. In contrast, its invitation to RIMPAC, which is part of military exchanges by the United States, is a soft approach. The Chinese Navy has acted in ways that indicate the country does not understand international rules, a defense source said. Such actions include applying a fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer near the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture in January. The invitation to the RIMPAC joint military exercise is aimed at prompting China to recognize global standards that would increase the transparency of its military activities. (Nakajima Kentaro, “China to Join RIMPAC Drills in 2014; First-Ever Invite Seeks to Build Trust,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 23, 2013)

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The militaries of South Korea and the United States said they have worked out a new joint operational plan that details how they should cooperate to deal with North Korean provocations. The Combined Counter-Provocation Plan, signed between South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Gen. Jung Seung-jo and Gen. James Thurman, the commander of the U.S. Forces in South Korea, went into effect immediately. “By completing this plan, we improved our combined readiness posture to allow us to immediately and decisively respond to any North Korean provocation,” the Combined Forces Command (CFC) of the two allies said in a statement. “The
completed plan includes procedures for consultation and action to allow for a strong and decisive combined Republic of Korea-U.S. response to North Korean provocations and threats." The allies have been working on the plan since 2010 when North Korea torpedoed the South Korean warship Cheonan and bombarded the South’s border island of Yeonpyeong in the Yellow Sea. Gen. Jung said the North’s military threats are for real. "We are ready to sternly retaliate North Korea’s provocations as this plan was completed," he said. "This plan allows South Korean and U.S. forces to respond more strongly than when they had separate plans." According to the new plan, South Korea’s military is set to play a more active role in taking any counteractions against "the origin of North Korean provocation and surrounding forces in the first stage." If North Korean provocations escalate, the U.S. will provide reinforcements from within and outside of South Korea, including Japan and elsewhere in the region under the control of the U.S. Pacific Command, South Korean military officials said. Previously, South Korean forces were solely in charge of any actions against North Korean provocations, while the U.S. military would come to the aid of South Korea only when a full-scale war erupts, they said. "The South Korean military’s operational plan now calls for striking the origin of the enemy’s provocation and supporting and command forces," a senior South Korean defense ministry official said. "Depending on the type of provocations and operational circumstance, the U.S. with its weapons can strike North Korean territories." (Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea, U.S. Sign Combined Operational Plan against N. Korea,” Yonhap, March 24, 2013)

The United States military said that it had signed an agreement with South Korea on how to counter provocations from North Korea. The two allies described the new contingency plans as “South Korean-led, U.S.-supported.” They lay out various types of provocations and a joint South Korean-American response for each type, South Korean officials said. Putting those commitments down on paper will help deter provocations, they said. The two allies refused to disclose specifics about how far the United States would go in its supporting role, especially at what point American troops would directly join a South Korean counterattack against a North Korean provocation. In recent weeks, South Korea has said that if provoked, it would attack not only the origin of the North Korean provocation but also “its supporting forces and its commanding post.” “By completing this plan, we improved our combined readiness posture to allow us to immediately and decisively respond to any North Korean provocation,” a joint statement from the two allies said. The plan was signed by Gen. James D. Thurman, the top American commander in South Korea, and Gen. Jung Seung-jo, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the South Korean military. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea: U.S. Signs Defense Deal,” New York Times, March 26, 2013, p. A-8)

The Park Geun-hye administration will actively engage with North Korea with more support and exchange projects if the communist neighbor strives to follow international norms, a senior official at Seoul’s presidential office said. “Support for North Korea and diverse inter-Korean exchange programs will be expanded as long as the North cooperates with peace efforts on the Korean Peninsula by refraining from provocations and joining the international community,” said a high-ranking official at Seoul’s presidential office Cheong Wa Dae. His remarks echo Park’s “Korean Peninsula trust process” vision that calls for greater exchanges and dialogue between the two sides so as to build trust and reduce tensions across their heavily fortified
Seoul is working on a program to help North Korea address years of deforestation and environmental degradation, as part of a “green détente” aimed at reducing simmering tensions on the peninsula. Last year’s severe floods in North Korea, which killed more than 150 people and displaced tens of thousands, reflected the environmental damage caused by the extensive clearing of woodland in recent decades. The country now has the third most severe level of deforestation in the world, according to the UK consultancy Maplecroft. Tensions rose to their highest point for two years this month as South Korea and the US carried out a large military exercise, drawing North Korean warnings of imminent war. But South Korea’s new government has identified environmental projects as a possible testing ground for co-operation with Pyongyang, in line with President Park Geun-hye’s promise to pursue “trust-based diplomacy with the North”. The early-stage plan, which may allow for the involvement of other nations and organizations, is being drafted by Seoul’s ministry of foreign affairs and will be presented to Park later this week. The plan is effectively a revival of an idea first conceived more than a decade ago, but has languished amid volatile relations between Seoul and Pyongyang. Reforestation, the first stage, would help to address the fragile state of North Korean agriculture, which has undermined the state food distribution system and left about a third of children stunted due to malnutrition. The economic collapse of the 1990s prompted Pyongyang to order the clearing of forest to make way for farmland. The country’s forested areas fell from 8.2m ha in 1990 to 6.19m ha in 2005, according to the UN. But instead of helping to boost agricultural production, deforestation has further undermined it. Fertile topsoil has been washed away from fields no longer protected from heavy rainfall by surrounding forests, while such farmland is also now more vulnerable to drought in dry periods. Kwon Tae-jin, a senior researcher at the Korea Rural Economic Institute in Seoul, said that the “green détente” plan could be appealing to Pyongyang, which will need large amounts of money to improve its farmland. “North Korea’s deforestation situation is very serious, and crop yields are falling due to land degradation,” he said, noting that the situation had been further exacerbated by a failure to rotate crops. But North Korea might be unwilling to accept bilateral assistance from the South in the near future, and would be more likely to agree to a multinational program, said Phillip Park, a professor at Seoul’s University of North Korean Studies. Pyongyang had already been investing in efforts to repair the damage to its farmland, he said. According to South Korea’s central bank, North Korea’s agricultural sector grew by 5.3 per cent in 2011, helping the economy to record its first year of growth since 2008. This was largely a result of mass mobilization of labor and increased use of tractors, Kwon said. (Simon Mundy, “Seoul Plans ‘Green Détente’ with Pyongyang,” Financial Times, March 25, 2013)
It took 56 days for the U.S. to flow two divisions’ worth of soldiers into the failed nuclear-armed state of “North Brownland” and as many as 90,000 troops to deal with the country’s nuclear stockpiles, a major U.S. Army war game concluded this winter. The Unified Quest war game conducted this year by Army planners posited the collapse of a nuclear-armed, xenophobic, criminal family regime that had lorded over a closed society and inconvenienced lost control over its nukes as it fell. Army leaders stayed mum about the model for the game, but all indications – and maps seen during the game at the Army War College – point to North Korea. While American forces who staged in a neighboring friendly country to the south eventually made it over the border into North Brownland, they encountered several problems for which they struggled to find solutions. One of the first was that a large number of nuclear sites were in populated areas, so they had to try to perform humanitarian assistance operations while conducting combined arms maneuver and operations. One way of doing this was to “use humanitarian assistance as a form of maneuver,” Maj. Gen. Bill Hix, director of the Army’s Concept Development and Learning Directorate, told reporters. The Army dropped humanitarian supplies a short distance from populated areas, drawing the population away from the objective sites, he explained. Many of the problems encountered were hashed out with Army leaders at a Senior Leader Seminar on March 19 at Fort McNair in Washington. The event—which included the Army chief of staff, Gen. Ray Odierno, and the vice chief, Gen. John Campbell, along with a collection of three- and four-star generals – was off the record, but under terms of the agreement that allowed a handful of reporters to cover the event, unattributed quotes can be reported. One of the major complications was that “technical ISR was not capable of closing the gap” caused by not having human intelligence assets in the country for years before the fight, one participant said. Also, “our ability to get north was hindered by our operational inflexibility,” particularly when it comes to dropping troops into austere, contested areas. To move soldiers quickly, Marine Corps V-22 Ospreys quickly inserted Army units deep behind enemy lines, but leaders found that inserting troops far in front of the main force so quickly often caused them to be surrounded, after which they had to be withdrawn. Overall, the friendly force ultimately “failed to achieve the operational agility” it needed to succeed, another participant complained, “largely due to the rigidity” of current deployment models. What’s more, the joint force was “able to get the force there quickly, but it was the technical force” that proved more difficult to deploy. Another participant agreed, adding “the key challenge was timely access to joint enablers” such as ISR and counter-weapons of mass destruction units, which were desperately needed by the general-purpose ground units. “We’ve had the luxury in the last several wars of a place called Kuwait” from which to launch troops and stage equipment, one officer said. “I think our skills have atrophied in the call you get in the middle of the night,” and in forcible-entry operations from the air and sea. Skills haven’t been kept fresh in doing things such as loading trains full of equipment, and in setting up new command posts, he said. Another leader agreed. “We have been spoiled by a command-and-control network that has been established for a decade” in Afghanistan and Iraq, he said, adding that the Army has to get back to training to operate in an austere environment. One lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan, reinforced by the Unified Quest game, was that “we’re not going to fight a pure military war again,” one four-star general opined. Instead, being successful in conflict will require a variety of solutions requiring cultural knowledge,
political acumen and other intelligence activities. The problem is, according to another officer, that the service needs to better understand the cultures in which it will fight, since “we tend to focus on the clash, when we need to focus on the will” of the local population. Gen. Robert Cone, director of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, said the difficulties the Army faces in moving troops and materiel around the battlefield again reinforced that “we have significant inter-service dependencies on our ability to move” and that any future fight will be a joint fight. When asked about the potential for conflict in North Korea specifically, Cone said that while he thinks the forces the U.S. has today in South Korea “are adequate … the question is what forces are adequate for the problem of loose nukes?” (Paul McLeary, “U.S. Army Learns Hard Lesson in N. Korea-Like War Game,” Defense News, March 26, 2013)

KPA Supreme Command statement: “The U.S. nuclear war racket has gone beyond the danger line and entered the phase of an actual war, defying the repeated warnings from the army and people of the DPRK. The U.S. let B-52 formation deployed in Anderson air force base on Guam fly into the sky above south Korea at around 08:00 on March 25. The formation staged a nuclear striking drill with simulated targets in the depth of the DPRK from around 11:50 and revealed it to the public. The U.S. even let the conservative media of south Korea reveal the process of the 2010 operation against Osama bin Laden. It openly said the operational plan of “south Korea-U.S. combined forces” includes targeting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK with the use of lethal striking means and methods of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces and the south Korean puppet army. They blustered that the operation targeting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK has no problem in terms of military technique, adding that they are closely monitoring all the relevant moves of the DPRK. They even made such bluff that now is the time to unfold “active north Korea policy,” “not passive one.” The present south Korean puppet authorities tried to link the Cheonan sinking case with the DPRK and shift the blame for the Yonphyong Island shelling on to the DPRK just as traitor Lee Myung Bak did. They said they plan mounting precision missile attacks on the statues of great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in different parts of the DPRK including those in Pyongyang if “local provocation” of similar nature reoccurs. They, unafraid of divine punishment, even said that they drafted the “list of targets” based on detailed analysis of the locations, sizes and specific features of those statues. All these moves clearly prove that the anti-DPRK hostile acts now under way by the U.S., south Korean puppet forces and all other followers under the pretext of the DPRK’s satellite launch and the underground nuclear test have entered a reckless phase of practical implementation after going beyond the phase of threatening and blackmailing. The gravity of the situation lies in that such reckless moves are timed to coincide with the U.S.-masterminded resolutions on sanctions against the DPRK being carried into practice intensively through conspiracy and nexus with all hues of hostile forces. The KPA Supreme Command declares at home and abroad the final decision of the army and people of the DPRK as follows as regards the present prevailing situation: 1. We will **demonstrate** with the practical military action the firm will of the army and people of the DPRK to take **counteraction** to defend the sovereignty and dignity of the supreme leadership of the country. There is a limit to patience. It is the clear conclusion drawn by us that we can never tolerate the serious situation in which the sovereignty and
dignity of the supreme leadership of the country are ruthlessly trampled down and the U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail are turning into a real war. From this moment the KPA Supreme Command will put on the highest alert all the field artillery units including strategic rocket units and long-range artillery units which are assigned to strike bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor troops in the U.S. mainland and on Hawaii and Guam and other operational zone in the Pacific as well as all the enemy targets in south Korea and its vicinity. 2. We will show the present puppet authorities of south Korea, which are dancing to the tune of their master, kowtowing to his hostile policy toward the DPRK, the strongest will of the DPRK army with physical action. The enemies are seriously mistaken if they think they can find an opportunity for striking "basic bases" and attacking "support forces" and "commanding forces." They should be mindful that everything will be reduced to ashes and flames the moment the first attack is unleashed. It is the unshakable stand of the army and people of the DPRK that they can never allow the treacherous acts, the preceding ruler committed by pushing the inter-Korean relations to a catastrophe and blocking the way for peace and prosperity for five years, to be taken over by the present south Korean chief executive. 3. We call upon progressive people of the world opposing war and loving peace to turn out as one in the struggle against the brigandish U.S. highhanded and arbitrary practices. Injustice can never become justice though it is practiced by big countries with advantageous military muscles. Even the resolution of the UN Security Council will become unjust one and become an international crime going against the trend of the times if it is devoid of impartiality. Injustice is temporary one and will die in end. But justice is like a flame that flares up forever. The KPA Supreme Command calls upon the conscience of the world to actively join the army and people of the DPRK in defending independence and justice, not blindly following the U.S. high-handed and arbitrary practices and the UNSC's "resolutions" bereft of impartiality. Victory is in store for the army and people of the DPRK rising up to defend the sovereignty, and progressive people of the world loving justice and peace.” (KCNA, “DPRK Will Show Its Will for Counteraction with Military Action: KPA Supreme Command,” March 26, 2013)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. anti-DPRK hostile acts being intensified over its satellite launch for peaceful purposes have reached the eve of nuclear war. On Monday [March 25] U.S. B-52 strategic bombers flew to the sky above south Korea by stealth again to stage a nuclear bomb dropping drill aimed at a surprise preemptive nuclear attack on the DPRK. Their flight defying our repeated warnings clearly proves that the U.S. plan for a nuclear war has entered an uncontrollable phase of practice. The U.S. is making desperate efforts to seek a way out from igniting a nuclear war against the DPRK, afraid that if the DPRK with nuclear weapons achieves economic prosperity through the building of a thriving nation, its hostile policy toward the DPRK will end in failure. The U.S. has already cooked up two "resolutions on sanctions" through the UN Security Council in less than two months, creating a vicious cycle of escalated tension to provide an international pretext for unleashing a nuclear war under the signboard of "nuclear non-proliferation." Now the U.S. is mobilizing all their "three nuclear attack means" in the preparation for a nuclear war against the DPRK. Strategic nuclear missiles in the U.S. mainland are aiming at the DPRK and submarines with nuclear warheads are swarming to the waters off south Korea and its vicinity in the Pacific region. Meanwhile, the U.S. deputy secretary of Defense, who
visited south Korea to finally examine the preparations for a nuclear war against the DPRK, openly said that the U.S. military attaches top priority to the second Korean war, giving green light to a nuclear war. Accordingly, the commander of the U.S. forces in south Korea and the south Korean military chief drafted a "joint plan to cope with local provocation". The main point of it is to start a total nuclear war involving the U.S. forces in the U.S. mainland and the Pacific region after the south Korean puppet army touches off a conflict. The south Korean warmongers, elated with the backing of the U.S. master, are threatening punishment to "provocation" of the DPRK and even seeking a nefarious purpose of hurting statues of great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong II, symbol of our supreme dignity. The prevailing grave situation goes to prove that the U.S. is seeking a nuclear war against the DPRK, its first target of attack, after moving the strategic centre for world domination to the Asian-Pacific region. A nuclear war in the Korean Peninsula is no longer a presentative meaning but realistic one. **Now the U.S. is making false show of the numerical advantage in nuclear weapons but it is doomed to perish in the flames kindled by itself.** The DPRK has its own powerful precision means for nuclear attack and nuclear war methods. The south Korean puppets who are behaving recklessly under their master's nuclear umbrella will experience a sound by-blow of a nuclear attack when a war breaks out between the DPRK and the U.S. To cope with the prevailing grave situation the KPA Supreme Command made a final decision to demonstrate with a practical military action the strong will of the DPRK army and people to take a resolute counteraction and gave an order to the strike forces of justice to keep themselves on the highest alert. **Upon authorization the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK openly informs the UN Security Council that the Korean Peninsula is now in a touch-and-go situation due to the nuclear war provocation moves of the U.S. and south Korean puppets.** The DPRK army and people that have become one with the Supreme Command are entering the final stage of the all-out showdown with the U.S. to defend the country’s sovereignty and the nation’s dignity by dint of the power of Songun they have long bolstered up.” (KCNA, “DPRK Informs UNSC of Impending Danger of Nuclear War on Korean Peninsula,” March 26, 2013)

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KCNA: “The south Korean puppet forces have kicked up the racket for confrontation with the fellow countrymen by taking the advantages of the U.S. intensified nuclear threats to the DPRK and the racket for sanctions on it. They have now entered the phase of hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK. The Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army solemnly declared that it would demonstrate the firm will for counteraction of the army and people with substantial military actions to defend the sovereignty and the supreme dignity of the country under the prevailing situation where the U.S., the south Korean puppet forces and all other followers have entered an adventurous phase in their hostile acts against the DPRK after going beyond the phase of threatening and blackmailing. **Due to the reckless acts of the enemies, the north-south military communications which were set up for dialogue and cooperation between the north and the south has already lost its significance. In this regard, the head of the DPRK side’s delegation to the north-south general-level military talks sent the south Korean puppet military authorities the following telephone message at 11:20 on Wednesday [March 27]: The situation is becoming grim as the south side staged the Key Resolve and Foal**
Eagle nuclear war exercises pursuant to the U.S. moves to encroach upon the sovereignty of the DPRK. Under the situation where a war may break out any moment, there is no need to keep north-south military communications which were laid between the militaries of both sides. War and confrontation can never go together with dialogue and reconciliation under any circumstances. I, upon authorization, inform the south side that the north-south military communications will be cut off and the members of the north side at the military communications liaison office in the zone under the control of the north and the south in the west coastal area will stop their activities from this moment. This step will be thoroughly implemented as long as the south side’s anachronistic hostile acts against the DPRK go on. There do not exist any dialogue channel and communications means between the DPRK and the U.S. and between the north and the south. Not words but only arms will work on the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces. The will of the army and people of the DPRK to safeguard the sovereignty and the supreme dignity of the country will be displayed through practical physical counteraction.” (KCNA, “Telephone Message Sent to S. Korean Military Authorities,” March 27, 2013)

North Korea had already shut down Red Cross hot lines with South Korea and a communication line with the American military command in South Korea. But the North’s decision to cut off military hot lines with South Korea on Wednesday was taken more seriously in Seoul because the two Koreas have used those four telephone lines to control daily cross-border traffic of workers and cargo traveling to the North Korean border town of Kaesong. “There do not exist any dialogue channel and communications means between the D.P.R.K. and the U.S. and between the North and the South,” said a North Korean statement sent to the South Korean military by telephone and later carried by KCNA. “Not words but only arms will work on the U.S. and the South Korean puppet forces.” The two Koreas continue to maintain hot lines between their civil aviation authorities. “Under the situation where a war may break out any moment, there is no need to keep North-South military communications,” the North said. “If North Korea provokes or does things that harm peace, we must make sure that it gets nothing but will pay the price, while if it keeps its promises, the South should do the same,” President Park Guen-hye said during a briefing with her government’s top diplomats and North Korea policy makers. “Without rushing, and in the same way we would lay one brick after another, we must develop South-North relations step by step, based on trust, and create sustainable peace.” Her new unification minister, Ryoo Kihl-jae, South Korea’s point man on North Korea, later told reporters that his government was willing to consider lifting trade embargoes imposed on the North after the deadly sinking of a South Korean Navy ship in 2010, but not before North Korea takes responsibility for the sinking, which killed 46 South Korean sailors. “We keep our door open for dialogue,” Ryoo said. But today, the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, counterpart to Ryoo’s ministry, berated Park for warning a day earlier that the Pyongyang government could ensure its survival only when it stops building nuclear weapons while its people go hungry. “This time her remarks have gone beyond the line,” the committee said. It said Park’s recent comments were “utterly shocking” compared with her earlier indications that she would not maintain the hard-line policy of her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak. “If she keeps to the road of confrontation like traitor Lee, defying the warnings of the D.P.R.K.,
she will meet a miserable ruin,” the committee said. *Rodong Sinmun*, said the North planned “substantial military actions,” including “pre-emptive nuclear strikes” against the United States and South Korea. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Cuts off the Remaining Military Hotlines with South Korea,” *New York Times*, March 28, 2013, p. A-12)

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea spokesman: “The chief of Chongwadae made a "memorial address" at a "service" held at Taejon Memorial Monument Tuesday [March 26] amid the anti-DPRK confrontation racket that has been stepped up in south Korea on the occasion of the third anniversary of Cheonan warship sinking case. In the address she let loose a string of confrontational rhetoric that "nuclear weapons can not protect the social system", "nuclear weapons should be dismantled" and called for "change" and "stop to provocation." She even said invectives slandering the social system in the DPRK, talking about "hunger", "isolation" and "option of road for peace and prosperity." This is an unpardonable provocation against the DPRK and a blatant challenge to it. As for the sinking case, it was a hideous farce orchestrated by the group of Lee Myung Bak as part of its moves for confrontation and a war against the DPRK. The truth of the case has already been brought to light, inviting derision of the public at home and abroad. No other country is wicked and degenerated more than the group of traitors of south Korea who hurled innocent young people of the puppet army into miserable death and is using it for escalating confrontation with fellow countrymen. Matter is that the owner of the inner room of Chongwadae is repeating the confrontation racket of the preceding regime. What’s more, she said "it is impossible to live with nukes", just echoing what her precedent said. This is utterly shocking when recalling "distinction" and "switchover in north policy" much touted by her. This clearly shows that the present regime is confrontation-minded regime little different from the Lee Myung Bak regime. Is it the north’s nukes or the U.S. nukes which threaten the security and peace? Who is keen on provocation and who should be changed? The owner of Chongwadae had better know this and watch her tongue. She did not hesitate to make venomous remarks at the “presidential inaugural speech” and "speech for commemorating March first uprising." This time her remarks have gone beyond the line. "Process for building trust" and "dialogue" are just hypocrisy and deception as she now incites confrontation with fellow countrymen. We have already seriously warned against the venomous swish of skirt of Chongwadae. We are now again forced to warn south Korea that the ever-more undisguised confrontation frenzy is pushing the DPRK’s patience and self-restraint to the limit. She should behave with discretion, clearly mindful that a wrong word may entail horrible disaster at a time when the north-south relations are being pushed to the lowest ebb and the danger of an all-out war is increasing on the Korean Peninsula. If she keeps to the road of confrontation like traitor Lee, defying the warnings of the DPRK, she will meet a miserable ruin.” (KCNA, “S. Korean Chief Executive’s Invectives against DPRK Slammed: CPRK Spokesman,” March 27, 2013) North Korea said that it will cut a military hotline with South Korea, the latest in a string of provocations that include the North’s unilateral severance of an inter-Korean Red Cross hotline on March 11. “The Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army solemnly declared that... Due to the reckless acts of the enemies, the north-south military communications which were set up for
dialogue and cooperation between the north and the south has already lost its significance," KCNA reported, citing hostility from the United States and South Korea.

The report said that the North sent a message to the South at 11:20 a.m., quoting the head of the North Korean side’s delegation to the north-south general-level military talks as saying, "I, upon authorization, inform the south side that the north-south military communications will be cut off and the members of the north side at the military communications liaison office in the zone under the control of the north and the south in the west coastal area will stop their activities from this moment." The military hotline established in 2006 has been used to notify the North of any planned movement of people and vehicles to the Kaesong complex located just north of the demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas. South Korea’s Ministry of Unification confirmed that the North is no longer answering calls made on the hotline. “The North must take immediate steps to reconsider its actions,” a ministry official said. The official, however, said that despite the North shutting off contact, movement of people and vehicle traffic took place without problems during the day. He pointed out that notification processes over the demilitarized zone have all been exchanged three days in advance. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Cuts Inter-Korean Military Hotline,” March 27, 2013)

“The announcement of cutting the final hotline at the border village of Panmunjom is as part of the North’s recent move to ratchet up tension,” a military official said. Pyongyang watchers say the North is seeking diplomatic ways out of the current situation. “Recent moves by the North to stress the dangerous situation on the Korean Peninsula may be a plan to overcome the present unfavorable circumstances,” said Chang Yong-seok, a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. “By referring to growing risks, Pyongyang may be seeking dialogue with the outside world.” (Kang Seung-woo, “North Cuts All S-N Hotlines,” Korea Times, March 27, 2013)

President Park Geun-hye called for a steady development of inter-Korean relations in a way that will lead to lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. “The new government’s foreign and North Korea policy is designed to establish peace and a foundation for reunification by building and restoring trust between the South and the North upon firm (national) security,” Park said during a joint policy briefing by the foreign and unification ministries at the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae. “Without rushing and in the same way that we would lay one brick after another, based on trust, (we) will have to develop South-North relations step by step and create sustainable peace.” (Yonhap, “Park Calls for Steady Development of Inter-Korean Relations,” March 27, 2013)

South Korea will seek to hold talks with North Korea this year to help arrange reunions of separated families and try to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the Ministry of Unification said. In its 2013 policy plan reported to President Park Geun-hye, the ministry said it will propose meetings between the two countries’ Red Cross groups to hold reunions of families separated by the Korean War (1950-53) “at an appropriate time.” About 81,800 South Koreans have registered with the government as having been parted from their families in the North during the three-year-long conflict. Seoul will also seek official government-to-government talks with North Korea to discuss ways to curb provocative rhetoric and actions by Pyongyang, according to the policy plan. “I cannot say now in detail when the reunion project will take place,” Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said in a news briefing after he reported to the chief
executive. “Responsible measures should first be taken by North Korea” in order for the South to lift the punitive measures, Ryoo said. The unification ministry also plans to continue its humanitarian aid to the underprivileged in the North through international organizations, including the World Health Organization, as well as local private aid groups, the report said. “I hope the Unification Ministry will solve the current dire situation. I will put forth efforts to make that happen,” Ryoo said. “The ministry will take step-by-step actions to show the Park administration’s North Korean policy stance to the North and the policy, if properly conveyed to the North, would expectedly induce changes in the North’s attitude.” (Yonhap, “Seoul to Seek Family Reunions with Pyongyang This Year,” March 27, 2013) Unification Minister Ryoo said that the ministry will basically take a two-track strategy in dealing with North Korea - boost inter-Korean relations but pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions. “I know there are public demands calling for the government’s unification policies to evolve, going beyond the former administrations’ policies,” Ryoo said. But he said the situation is too grave for it to be improved, referring to the recent military provocations of the regime. “In the midst of this situation, the Unification Ministry will view this challenge as a new opportunity for the future,” he said. “Taking two top agendas - the trust-building process and preparations for unification - we selected nine main assignments and three cooperative tasks.” “If the two Koreas develop a variety of talks, and if we judge that both have built mutual trust with each other, we can probably talk about North Korea’s nuclear program as one of the agendas,” Ryoo said. He said the ministry will approve civilian-level aid for the North. “President Park already has said she will resume humanitarian assistance for the underprivileged classes and children,” the minister said. “If the inter-Korean relations are improved, we can also add more items to the list.” When it comes to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, he said he will expand its international market. “When there is a further negotiation of free trade agreement [between the South and U.S. or China or the European Union], I will persuade them to approve products from the complex.” The flexible approach came after criticism over the Lee Myung-bak administration’s so-called “Denuclearization, Openness and 3,000” initiative - the former administration’s policy in dealing with North Korea. The rigid, conditional assistance came under fire by analysts and soured relations between the two Koreas. “That condition - ‘No denuclearization, then no dialogue’ - doesn’t exist anymore now,” a senior Blue House official told JoongAng Ilbo by phone. “But it also doesn’t mean ‘Dialogue before denuclearization.’ “A six-party talk can be launched anytime if prepared, and the pressure for denuclearization can also occur [separately],” he said. (Kim Hee-jin, “More Flexible Stance on North,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 28, 2013)
long-duration, round-trip training mission from Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., to Korea,” the CFC said in a statement. The warplanes dropped bombs on the Jik-do Range in coastal waters off Gunsan, North Jeolla Province and then returned to their base, the CFC added. “As the B-2 has a radar-evading stealth function, it can penetrate anti-aircraft defenses to drop conventional and nuclear weapons,” a senior military official said. “It is the strategic weapon most feared by North Korea.” Additional to the stealth aircraft, B-52 bombers, another nuclear-capable warplane, and a nuclear-powered attack submarine the USS Cheyenne were also involved in the military drill, amounting to a strong show of U.S. determination regarding North Korea amid escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The training run of the B-2s took place hours after the South Korean and U.S. defense chiefs discussed military commitments and strategies in a phone call. According to the Ministry of National Defense (MND), Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin agreed with his U.S. counterpart Chuck Hagel “not to tolerate the North’s dedication to expanding programs for nuclear missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD),” making it clear that North Korea would be held responsible for any aggressive action. The Department of Defense described the alliance as instrumental in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. “The secretary highlighted the steadfast U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea, including extended deterrence capabilities, and pointed to the recently signed ROK-U.S. counter provocation plan as a mechanism to enhance consultation and coordination of alliance responses to North Korean aggression,” said Pentagon Press Secretary George Little. The ministers also discussed a recently announced U.S. plan to increase U.S. ground-based interceptors and early warning and tracking radar in response to the North Korean threat. (Kang Seung-woo, “B-2 Bobers Fly over in Show of Force against NK,” Korea Times, March 28, 2013)

OSD Briefing: “Q: Mr. Secretary, regarding North Korea, would you say that -- is North Korea more dangerous now than you think it was six months or a year ago? And could you talk both about the decision to send the B-2s to South Korea for this exercise? Was that not more of a provocative move by the United States? Does that risk provoking North Korea to do something more so than they might have already been? HAGEL: Well, first, we, the United States and South Korea, have not been involved in provoking anything. We, over the years, have been engaged with South Korea on joint exercises. The B-2 flight was part of that. I made an announcement a couple of weeks ago regarding new missile defense capabilities, which cuts to your question about, is North Korea more dangerous today? I think their very provocative actions and belligerent tone, it has ratcheted up the danger, and we have to understand that reality. We -- the United States, South Koreans, all of the nations in -- in that region of the world -- are committed to a pathway to peace. And the North Koreans seem to be headed in a different direction here. So we will unequivocally defend and we are unequivocally committed to that alliance with South Korea, as well as our other allies in that region of the world. And we will be prepared -- we have to be prepared to deal with any eventuality there. Q: Mr. Secretary, along those lines, last week General Thurman, the commander, U.S. commander there, signed with his South Korean counterpart something called a combined counter-provocation plan. It talks about consultations with the South in light any of, you know, North Korean provocations. We’ve been told this is an effort to kind of put a brake on things, to prevent things from
escalating, to have a calming effect. Would you agree with that? And if not, what's the point of having this plan? GEN. DEMPSEY: I can actually help you with that, sir, because this has been about a two-year process. And I wouldn't describe it as all as trying to put a brake on our very close South Korean allies. ... General Thurman wears three hats. One of them is a U.N. hat. And he's responsible for sustaining the armistice, and then he has his combined forces command hat and his U.S. Forces Korea hat. So he has to have not only visibility and transparency, but -- but he has to have influence in the process of managing the potential for conflict on the peninsula. So this is just essentially allowing him and my South Korean counterpart, General Jeong, to come to agreement about how that influence will be -- will be handled. Q: So why now? ... GEN. DEMPSEY: Sure. I think the answer to that question is -- is that this has been an ongoing effort to have a counter-provocation plan over the last two years in recognition of the stated position of the South Korean government that they no longer are willing to be provoked. And so we wanted to make sure we understood what that meant. ... Q: Mr. Secretary, beyond the heightened rhetoric, have you seen any moves that suggest any kind of military steps by the North Koreans that we should be concerned about? ... GEN. DEMPSEY: Yeah, as you know, we're -- we're in our annual exercise cycle. So are they. And so there have been moves in the maritime domain on each coast, as well as some of the artillery units that are across the demilitarized zone from Seoul. So, yeah, there have been movements. We haven't seen anything that would cause us to believe there are movements other than consistent with historic patterns and training exercises. Q: And no reaction, then, to the B-2s that you’re aware of? GEN. DEMPSEY: Well, the reaction to the B-2 that we're most concerned about is not necessarily the reaction it might elicit in North Korea, but rather among our Japanese and Korean allies. You know, those exercises are mostly to assure our allies that they can count on us to be prepared and to help them deter conflict. Q: Mr. Secretary (inaudible) sequestration question - - and for General Dempsey, too. Since January, the public has been hearing the military warn of a potential readiness crisis from sequestration. Sequestration is here now. You have to live with it. Are we entering a -- a period of readiness crisis? Or is it more a period of adjustment, where you have to live within your means, basically? HAGEL: Well, you're always adjusting. And when you are dealing with $41 billion less than what was projected in a budget, you’re going to adjust. And to maintain readiness is a key part of our responsibility. And I think, as General Dempsey has said, as I've said, all our leaders have said, we will work around that. I mean, we will make things work for that readiness. That's a priority. You have to have that. It is a balancing and a rebalancing, just as we noted in some of our comments here and in others. So we've got no choice. It is -- it is what it is. But make no mistake, this capability of this Department of Defense to defend the interest of our country and our allies will be there. GEN. DEMPSEY: If I could add, the answer is yes, actually. It's both. And it's both for this reason. This is not -- you know, some of you are students of history and the expansion and contraction of defense budgets over time. This is not the deepest, but it is the steepest decline in our budget ever. And so what we’ve got is an FY '13 problem that will affect readiness and it will affect it into ‘14. But what the secretary has challenged us to do is, first of all, lead our way through that. We’ve got to get through ‘13 and ‘14. And then as we look to the ‘15-‘19 budget, he’s asked us to do this review to look for the kind of opportunities you’re talking about. Q: So it
wouldn’t be inaccurate to say the United States faces a major readiness crisis because of sequestration? Well, have you got enough relief right now from the budget to somewhat mitigate a full-blown readiness crisis? GEN. DEMPSEY: Yeah, give us about two weeks to answer that question. We’re in the midst of trying to figure that out.” (News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin E. Dempsey, DoD transcript, March 28, 2013)

The global effort to regulate the sale of conventional weapons suffered a significant but not fatal setback after Iran, Syria and North Korea opposed the draft Arms Trade Treaty, blocking the consensus needed for passage after years of arduous negotiations. The three countries, often isolated as pariahs for their arms and human rights records, used their rejection of the treaty to lash out at what they see as their unfair treatment. The treaty would require states exporting conventional weapons to develop criteria that would link exports to avoiding human rights abuses, terrorism and organized crime. It would also ban shipments if they were deemed harmful to women and children. After Iran and North Korea voted against the draft treaty, Peter Woolcott, the Australian ambassador who was the president of the treaty conference, suspended the meeting. When it resumed, Syria voted against the treaty as well. In the absence of consensus, it was expected that the treaty would be sent to the General Assembly as early as next week for approval. That is considered a weaker, but no less binding, manner of getting it passed. After General Assembly passage, the treaty would still require ratification by 50 member states before it could take effect. “We are certainly disappointed, because we could not achieve the expected result tonight,” said Juan M. Gómez-Robledo, vice minister of multilateral affairs and the head of the Mexican delegation, “but it is only a matter of days, because this conference has shown that the overwhelming majority wish to adopt this text.” He rejected the three countries’ objections that not enough time or attention had been given to address their concerns, noting that the talks had been going on for seven years. Most countries who spoke after the treaty stalled said they fully supported it, although some major ones, including India and Russia, voiced strong reservations about some provisions. India said the draft treaty favored exporters. Russia said it should be more specific about banning conventional weapons sales to non-state actors. Thomas M. Countryman, the assistant secretary of state who led the American delegation, said that the United States would support the treaty in the General Assembly based on the fact, he said, that the pact would promote global security, advance humanitarian objectives and curb illegal arms sales, all without affecting the constitutional right to bear arms. Although opposition from Iran, North Korea and Syria had been expected, diplomats and outside proponents of the treaty had hoped the three countries would not block an accord that so many sought. All three belong to the roughly 120-member Nonaligned Movement – Iran is its current president – and the bulk of its members in Africa and Latin America strongly backed the treaty. But in the end, the three went with their domestic concerns. They are each subject to arms embargoes already, and were concerned that the treaty would add muscle to such blockades. (Neil MacFarquhar, “U.N. Treaty to Control Arms Sales Hits Snag,” New York Times, March 29, 2013, p. A-4)
KCNA: “The moves of the U.S. imperialists to violate the sovereignty of the DPRK and encroach upon its supreme interests have entered a grave phase. Not content with letting B-52 make sorties over south Korea in succession despite the repeated warnings, they made B-2A stealth strategic bomber and other strategic strike means fly from Whiteman air force base in Missouri State, the U.S. over south Korea on March 28 for the first time in history to commit such dangerous provocation as openly staging a drill for striking ground targets of the DPRK. This fully proves that the brigandish ambition of the U.S. imperialists for aggression to stand in confrontation with the DPRK has reached an extreme phase defying the meaningful warning made by its revolutionary armed forces in the March 26 statement of the Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army. In view of the prevailing grim situation, Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army Marshal Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK, convened an urgent operation meeting on the KPA Strategic Rocket Force’s performance of duty for firepower strike at the Supreme Command at 00:30 Friday. Present there were Hyon Yong Chol, chief of the KPA General Staff, Ri Yong Gil, director of the Operation Bureau, Kim Yong Chol, director of the General Reconnaissance Bureau, and Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the Strategic Rocket Force. At the meeting he first received a report from General Kim Yong Chol, who is also vice chief of the General Staff of the KPA, on the information about the nature of action of the nuclear strike means of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces. After receiving a report from Lieut. General Kim Rak Gyom on the technical conditions of the strategic strike means of the KPA, he made an important decision. He said he has judged the time has come to settle accounts with the U.S. imperialists in view of the prevailing situation. If they make a reckless provocation with huge strategic forces, the KPA should mercilessly strike the U.S. mainland, their stronghold, their military bases in the operational theaters in the Pacific, including Hawaii and Guam, and those in south Korea, he said. He examined and finally ratified the plan of the Strategic Rocket Force for firepower strike. The U.S. imperialists let B-2A make sorties over south Korea in succession, indicating once again that their hostile acts against the DPRK have entered a reckless phase, going beyond the phase of threat and blackmail, he said. B-2A’s flight to the sky above south Korea is not a simple demonstration of forces in reaction to the tough stand of the DPRK but an ultimatum that they will ignite a nuclear war at any cost on the Korean Peninsula, he noted, underlining the need to put a definite end to the times when they could threaten and blackmail the DPRK with nukes. He declared the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK would react to the U.S. nuclear blackmail with a merciless nuclear attack, and war of aggression with an all-out war of justice. He finally signed the plan on technical preparations of strategic rockets of the KPA, ordering them to be standby for fire so that they may strike any time the U.S. mainland, its military bases in the operational theaters in the Pacific, including Hawaii and Guam, and those in south Korea. He said the enemies are bringing dark clouds of a nuclear war testing the DPRK’s self-restraint, adding the DPRK can no longer tolerate this. He ordered the KPA to blow up and reduce everything to ashes at a single strike, if an order is issued. He said the heroic service personnel of the KPA and all other people, their hearts burning with irrepressible resentment at the reckless war provocation moves of the U.S. imperialists, are now waiting for a final order of the
WPK Central Committee, hardening their will to turn out in a do-or-die battle with the enemies. The KPA will never remain a passive onlooker to the U.S. imperialists' frantic moves for aggression but do its best to defend the destiny of the country and nation, he said. It is the truth confirmed by history that no force on earth can hold in check the people all out for the just cause, he noted, stressing if an undesired war breaks out on this land again due to the consequences of the unpardonable action of the U.S. imperialists, it will bring them a shameful ruin and the Korean nation will greet the bright day of national reunification. The important decision made by him under the grave situation where the Korean Peninsula has been pushed to the brink of a nuclear war by the U.S. imperialists will mark a turning point in putting an end to the history of the long-standing showdown with the U.S. and opening a new phase of history."


Kim’s order, which North Korea said was given during an emergency meeting early today, was similar to the one issued March 26 when the North’s top military command told all its missile and artillery units to be on the “highest alert” and ready to strike the United States and South Korea in retaliation against their joint military exercises. But by attributing such an order to its top leader, North Korea tried to add weight to its threat. “We believe they are taking follow-up steps,” said Kim Min-seok, spokesman of the South Korean Defense Ministry, referring to increased activities of the North Korean military units. “South Korean and American intelligence authorities are closely watching whether North Korea is preparing its short, medium, and long-range missiles, including its Scud, Rodong and Musudan.” He did not elaborate. But government officials and South Korean media said that there had been a surge in vehicle and troop movements at North Korean missile units in recent days as the United States and South Korea has been conducting joint military drills. Yonhap quoted an anonymous military source as saying that North Korean vehicles had been moving to Tongchang-ri near the North’s western border with China, where its Unha-3 rocket blasted off in December. North Korea might be preparing for an engine test ahead of a long-range rocket test, the source was quoted as saying. Scud and Rodong are the North’s mainstay short- and medium-range missiles. The Musudan, deployed around 2007 and displayed for the first time during a military parade in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, in 2010, is a road-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile with a range of more than 1,900 miles, according to the South Korean Defense Ministry. A photo released by KCNA showed Kim conferring with his top generals on what the agency called “plans to strike the mainland U.S.” A military chart behind them showed what appeared to be trajectories of North Korean missiles hitting major cities in the United States. North Korea also said its leader, Kim, “finally signed the plan on technical preparations of strategic rockets of the KPA, ordering them to be standby for fire so that they may strike any time the U.S. mainland, its military bases in the operational theaters in the Pacific, including Hawaii and Guam, and those in South Korea.” Kim Min-seok, the South Korean spokesman, said the North’s “unusual” public announcement of such plans was partly “psychological.” Many experts and South Korean officials doubted that North Korea has such long-range missiles, much less the know-how to make a nuclear warhead small enough to mount on such rockets. But other analysts believed that the North’s new KN-08 missiles, which were put on public
display last April, were indeed intercontinental ballistic missiles, although they and Musudan have never been test-launched before. They wondered whether North Korea might use the current tensions as an excuse to launch them. Hours after Kim’s call to arms, thousands of North Koreans turned out for a 90-minute mass rally at the main square in Pyongyang, chanting “Death to the U.S. imperialists” and “Sweep away the U.S. aggressors,” according to Associated Press, which has a bureau in Pyongyang. Soldiers and students marched through downtown Pyongyang. Yesterday, the American military carried out a rare long-range practice bombing run over the Korean Peninsula, sending two nuclear-capable B-2 stealth bombers on a practice sortie over South Korea, underscoring Washington’s commitment to defend its ally amid rising tensions with North Korea. “The reaction to the B-2 that we’re most concerned about is not necessarily the reaction it might elicit in North Korea, but rather among our Japanese and Korean allies,” Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during a news conference at the Pentagon. “Those exercises are mostly to assure our allies that they can count on us to be prepared and to help them deter conflict.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Orders Missile Readiness, State Media Says,” New York Times, March 29, 2013)

The latest round of threats exchanged by North Korea and the United States is dragging on longer and taking on a more virulent tone than in the past, provoking deep concerns among American officials and their allies. Following blustery warnings by Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s 30-year-old leader, and videos depicting North Korean attacks on the United States, the Obama administration took the unprecedented step this week of sending two stealth bombers to South Korea as part of an ongoing military training exercise. But despite the escalating tensions, U.S. officials said they have focused more closely on what North Korea is doing than on what it is saying. “Putting on a show is not the same as taking action,” said a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the volatile situation. “Describing the situation as akin to war is not to be remotely confused with wanting a war, let alone going to war.” The senior official and others said that U.S. military commanders are closely watching the situation, which has escalated since North Korea conducted a nuclear weapons test in December. In addition, officials cited new levels of cooperation and mutual confidence between the United States and allies in South Korea and Japan. While a direct attack on U.S. forces on the mainland or in the Pacific seems unlikely, nongovernment analysts said the rising tensions increase the risk of some form of limited armed conflict. North Korea recently cut off its military phone line with the South, which is used to coordinate logistics along the demilitarized border buffer. In a new escalation of rhetoric early Saturday, North Korea’s official KCNA news agency reported that the country was entering a “state of war” with South Korea and that “all issues raised between the North and the South will be handled accordingly.” Some experts noted that South Korea also has adopted a more aggressive rhetorical posture. Senior officials quoted anonymously in the media have suggested that plans have been drawn up for “surgical strikes” against North Korea. “The level and scope of the rhetoric [in North Korea] is stronger than in the past,” said Scott A. Snyder, a Korea expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “This time we’ve seen a higher level of threat, delivered at a higher level.” He added, “There’s room for miscalculation right now.” Christopher R. Hill, a former U.S. diplomat who served as ambassador in Seoul in
2004 and later led a negotiating team that sought to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat, said the current standoff appears “more serious” than past ones. It also comes as the North appears to be attempting to bolster Kim’s military credentials.


The government, political parties and organizations of the DPRK special statement:

“The moves of the U.S. imperialists to violate the sovereignty of the DPRK and encroach upon its supreme interests have entered an extremely grave phase. Under this situation, the dear respected Marshal Kim Jong Un, brilliant commander of Mt. Paektu, convened an urgent operation meeting on the performance of duty of the Strategic Rocket Force of the Korean People's Army for firepower strike and finally examined and ratified a plan for firepower strike.

The important decision made by him is the declaration of a do-or-die battle to provide an epochal occasion for putting an end to the history of the longstanding showdown with the U.S. and opening a new era. It is also a last warning of justice served to the U.S., south Korean puppet group and other anti-reunification hostile forces. The decision reflects the strong will of the army and people of the DPRK to annihilate the enemies.

Now the heroic service personnel and all other people of the DPRK are full of surging anger at the U.S. imperialists' reckless war provocation moves, and the strong will to turn out as one in the death-defying battle with the enemies and achieve a final victory of the great war for national reunification, true to the important decision made by Kim Jong Un.

The Supreme Command of the KPA in its recent statement solemnly declared at home and abroad the will of the army and people of the DPRK to take decisive military counteraction to defend the sovereignty of the country and the dignity of its supreme leadership, as regards the war moves of the U.S. and south Korean puppets that have reached the most extreme phase.

Not content with letting B-52 make sorties into the sky over south Korea in succession despite the repeated warnings of the DPRK, the U.S. made B-2A stealth strategic bomber and other ultra-modern strategic strike means fly from the U.S. mainland to south Korea to stage a bombing drill targeting the DPRK. This is an unpardonable and heinous provocation and an open challenge.

By taking advantage of the U.S. reckless campaign for a nuclear war against the DPRK, the south Korean puppets vociferated about “preemptive attack” and “strong counteraction” and even "strike at the commanding forces", openly revealing the attempt to destroy monuments symbolic of the dignity of the DPRK’s supreme leadership.

This clearly shows that the U.S. brigandish ambition for aggression and the puppets’ attempt to invade the DPRK have gone beyond the limit and their threats have entered the reckless phase of an actual war from the phase of threat and blackmail.

The prevailing grim situation more clearly proves that the Supreme Command of the KPA was just when it made the judgment and decision to decisively settle accounts with the U.S. imperialists and south Korean puppets by dint of the arms of Songun, because time when words could work has passed.

Now they are openly claiming that the B-2A stealth strategic bombers' drill of
dropping nuclear bombs was "not to irritate the north" but for "defense". The U.S. also says the drill is "to defend the interests of its ally." However, it is nothing but a lame pretext to cover up its aggressive nature, evade the denunciation at home and abroad and escape from the DPRK's retaliatory blows. The era when the U.S. resorted to the policy of strength by brandishing nuclear weapons has gone.

It is the resolute answer of the DPRK and its steadfast stand to counter the nuclear blackmail of the U.S. imperialists with merciless nuclear attack and their war of aggression with just all-out war. They should clearly know that in the era of Marshal Kim Jong Un, the greatest-ever commander, all things are different from what they used to be in the past.

The hostile forces will clearly realize the iron will, matchless grit and extraordinary mettle of the brilliant commander of Mt. Paektu to the effect that the earth cannot exist without Songun Korea. Time has come to stage a do-or-die final battle.

The government, political parties and organizations of the DPRK solemnly declare as follows reflecting the final decision made by Kim Jong Un at the operation meeting of the KPA Supreme Command and the unanimous will of all service personnel and people of the DPRK who are waiting for a final order from him.

1. **From this moment, the north-south relations will be put at the state of war and all the issues arousing between the north and the south will be dealt with according to the wartime regulations.**

   The state of neither peace nor war has ended on the Korean Peninsula.

   Now that the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK have entered into an actual military action, the inter-Korean relations have naturally entered the state of war. Accordingly, the DPRK will immediately punish any slightest provocation hurting its dignity and sovereignty with resolute and merciless physical actions without any prior notice.

2. **If the U.S. and the south Korean puppet group perpetrate a military provocation for igniting a war against the DPRK in any area including the five islands in the West Sea of Korea or in the area along the Military Demarcation Line, it will not be limited to a local war, but develop into an all-out war, a nuclear war.** It is evident that any military conflict on the Korean Peninsula is bound to lead to an all-out war, a nuclear war now that even U.S. nuclear strategic bombers in its military bases in the Pacific including Hawaii and Guam and in its mainland are flying into the sky above south Korea to participate in the madcap DPRK-targeted nuclear war moves. The first strike of the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will blow up the U.S. mainland and its bases for aggression in the Pacific operational theatres including Hawaii and Guam and reduce not only its military bases in south Korea but the puppets' ruling institutions including Chongwadae and military bases to ashes at once, to say nothing of the aggressors and the provokers.

3. The DPRK will never miss the golden chance to win a final victory in a great war for national reunification. **This war will not be a three-day-war but it will be a blitz war through which the KPA will occupy all areas of south Korea including Jeju Island at one strike**, not giving the U.S. and the south Korean warmongers time to come to their senses, and a three-dimensional war to be fought in the air, land and seas and on the front line and in the rear. This sacred war of justice will be a nation-wide, all-people resistance involving all Koreans in the north and the south and overseas in which the traitors to the nation including heinous confrontation maniacs, warmongers and
human scum will be mercilessly swept away. No force on earth can break the will of the service personnel and people of the DPRK all out in the just great war for national reunification and of all other Koreans and overpower their might. Holding in high esteem the peerlessly great men of Mt. Paektu, the Korean people will give vent to the pent-up grudge and realize their cherished desire and thus bring a bright day of national reunification and build the best power on this land without fail.” (KCNA, “North-South Relations Have Have Been Put at State of War: Special Statement of DPRK,” March 30, 2013)

General Bureau for Central Guidance to the Development of the Special Zone statement: “The north-south military hotline was cut off as the Korean Armistice Agreement has been completely nullified, creating a warlike situation. There exists neither a channel for dialogue nor any communications means between the north and the south. The entry into the Kaesong Industrial Zone by the south side's personnel has been put in jeopardy. No one can see an inch ahead as regards the destiny of the Kaesong Industrial Zone. But the puppet group of south Korea, its dutiful media and hack writers are saying that “the north does not take up the issue of the zone because it is a source for its foreign currency income” and talking about “two faces of the north”. They are even insulting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK. It is an extremely unusual thing that the Kaesong Industrial Zone is still in existence under the grave situation in which the north-south relations have plunged into a deadlock and the Korean Peninsula is on the verge of a war due to the U.S. and the south Korean warmongers' vicious moves for igniting a nuclear war against the DPRK. Under the situation, the south Korean puppet forces are left with no face to make complaint even though we ban the south side's personnel's entry into the zone and close it. But we have exercised self-restraint, taking into consideration that the closure of the zone on which the livelihood of small and medium businesses of south Korea hinge can leave those businesses bankrupt and lots of people jobless. In fact, it is the puppet group and small and medium businesses of south Korea, not the DPRK, which benefit from the zone. But the paid media and media men of south Korea have gone thoughtless to become vocal about the zone just like imbeciles bereft of elementary ability for assessing the situation. If the puppet group seeks to tarnish the image of the DPRK even a bit, while speaking of the zone whose operation has been barely maintained, we will shut down the zone without mercy. The south Korean group should clearly know that its short tongue may bring it an irretrievable misfortune. The DPRK does whatever it says it will and the future of the zone entirely depends on the attitude of the south Korean puppet group. The south side's businessmen operational in the zone should clearly face up to the situation and reject the rhetoric of the group and its paid media who act just like a “thief crying stop the thief.” We will closely follow the movement of the puppet group and the reactionary media. We warn that we will take a resolute measure, should rhetoric insulting the dignity of the DPRK continues.” (KCNA, “DPRK Warns of Future of Kaesong Industrial Zone Depends on S. Korean Attitude,” March 30, 2013)
KCNA: “The historic March, 2013 plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea took place at the building of the WPK Central Committee, supreme staff of the Korean revolution, on Sunday. First Secretary of the WPK Kim Jong Un guided the meeting. Present at the meeting were members and alternate members of the WPK Central Committee and members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK. Present there as observers were senior officials of ministries, national institutions, provincial, city and county committees of the WPK, complexes, major munitions factories and enterprises. The participants paid silent tribute to President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il. Taken up for discussion at the meeting were the following agenda items “1. On tasks of our Party on bringing about a decisive turn in accomplishing revolutionary cause of Juche as required by the present situation and the developing revolution”, "2. On personnel affairs issue to be submitted to the 7th Session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly” and "3. On organizational matter.”

Kim Jong Un made a report and concluding speech on the first agenda item. The plenary meeting set forth a new strategic line on carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously under the prevailing situation and to meet the legitimate requirement of the developing revolution. This line is a brilliant succession and development onto a new higher stage of the original line of simultaneously developing economy and national defense that was set forth and had been fully embodied by the great Generalissimos. It was stressed at the meeting that the party’s new line is not a temporary countermeasure for coping with the rapidly changing situation but a strategic line to be always held fast to, in the supreme interests of the Korean revolution. The nuclear weapons of Songun Korea are not goods for getting U.S. dollars and they are neither a political bargaining chip nor a thing for economic dealings to be presented to the place of dialogue or be put on the table of negotiations aimed at forcing the DPRK to disarm itself. The DPRK’s nuclear armed forces represent the nation’s life which can never be abandoned as long as the imperialists and nuclear threats exist on earth. They are a treasure of a reunified country which can never be traded with billions of dollars. Only when the nuclear shield for self-defense is held fast, will it be possible to shatter the U.S. imperialists’ ambition for annexing the Korean Peninsula by force and making the Korean people modern slaves, firmly defend our ideology, social system and all other socialist treasures won at the cost of blood and safeguard the nation’s right to existence and its time-honored history and brilliant culture. When the party’s new line is thoroughly carried out, the DPRK will emerge as a great political, military and socialist economic power and a highly-civilized country which steers the era of independence.

The meeting set forth tasks for carrying out the new line and ways for doing so. All the officials, party members and other people should wage bold offensive and all-people decisive battle with faith in sure victory and strong determination and thus make the flame of miracle and innovation sweep all fields of national economy. The pilot fields of the national economy, the basic industrial fields should be drastically developed and production be increased to the maximum. Forces should be directed to agriculture and light industry, key fields in building an economic power to improve and put on a stable basis the people’s living standard at the earliest possible date. The
self-reliant nuclear power industry should be developed and the work for developing light water reactor be dynamically promoted to actively contribute to easing the strain on the electricity problem of the country. Spurs should be given to the development of space science and technology and more advanced satellites including communications satellites be developed and launched. The country’s economy should be shifted into knowledge-based economy and the foreign trade be made multilateral and diversified and investment be widely introduced. The economic guidance shall be fundamentally improved as required by the new situation and Korean-style advantageous economic management methods be completed by embodying the Juche idea. The DPRK’s possession of nukes should be fixed by law and the nuclear armed forces should be expanded and beefed up qualitatively and quantitatively until the denuclearization of the world is realized. The People’s Army should perfect the war method and operation in the direction of raising the pivotal role of the nuclear armed forces in all aspects concerning the war deterrence and the war strategy, and the nuclear armed forces should always round off the combat posture. As a responsible nuclear weapons state, the DPRK will make positive efforts to prevent the nuclear proliferation, ensure peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world and realize the denuclearization of the world. Institutions in charge of security and safeguard, judicial and prosecution and people’s security and the Korean People’s Internal Security Forces should resolutely foil the vicious moves of the imperialist reactionaries and class enemies, devotedly defend the party, social system and people and surely guarantee the new line of the party with arms and by law. The party and working people’s organizations and power bodies should increase their militant function and role in every way in the struggle for implementing the party’s line. The meeting entrusted the Presidium of the SPA and the Cabinet with the matters of taking legal, administrative and technical measures for implementing the tasks. At the meeting a decision on the first agenda item “On carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously and thus bringing earlier the final victory in the cause of building a thriving socialist nation” was adopted with unanimous approval. The second agenda item, personal affairs issue to be submitted to the 7th Session of the 12th SPA, was discussed and decided at the meeting. The meeting also dealt with an organizational matter, its third agenda item. Members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee, members and alternate members of the Political Bureau were recalled and new ones were elected to fill vacancies. Pak Pong Ju was elected to fill a vacancy of a member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee. Hyon Yong Chol, Kim Kyok Sik and Choe Pu Il were elected to fill vacancies of alternate members of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee. Members and alternate members of the WPK Central Committee were recalled and new ones were elected to fill vacancies. Upon authorization of Kim Jong Un, Paek Kye Ryong was appointed as director of the Light Industrial Department of the WPK Central Committee and Yun U Chol as editor-in-chief of Rodong Sinmun, organ of the WPK Central Committee. Members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK were also recalled and new ones were elected to fill vacancies.” (KCNA, “Report on Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee,” March 31, 2013)
Pak Pong Ju, a former Prime Minister and rumored proponent of Chinese-style economic reforms, has been re-appointed to the position by North Korea’s parliament after being forced to step down in 2007. Pak was first appointed as premier in 2003, taking over from Hong Song Nam, after North Korea passed modest economic reforms. It was believed at the time that he favored Chinese-style reforms, but what he ultimately passed was eventually rolled-back by 2005. His appointment is likely to renew talk that North Korea will try and reform its economy. “He is a very friendly and competent person. I met him in Pyongyang and, from my conversations with him, I’m convinced he will be good for the North Korean economy,” Felix Abt, author of A Capitalist in North Korea told NK News. Pak was removed from the position in 2007 for alleged misappropriation of funds, but returned to the public eye in August 2010 whereby he accompanied Kim Jong Il on a trip to China. He is said to be close to Jang Sung Taek and Kim Kyong Hui – Kim Jong Un’s aunt and uncle. Pak will leave his current position as director of the Korean Worker’s Party Light Industry Department - he replaces regime stalwart Choe Yong Rim as premier. There were a few other notable leadership moves at both the Central Committee plenum and Supreme People’s Assembly meeting. Choe Pu Il replaced Ri Myong Su as Minister of People’s Security and was named an alternate member of the Politburo. Paek Kye Ryong, formerly chief secretary of Kangwon province, replaced Pak as head of the Light Industry department. And both Hyon Yong Chol, the Chief of the KPA General Staff and Kim Kyok Sik, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, were also named alternate members of the Politburo. Interestingly, both Hyon and Kim appeared to receive demotions. Based on name order at official party events, they both appeared to be full members of the Politburo. Ri Myong Su, who was replaced as Minister of People’s Security, was also a full member of the Politburo, meaning Choe, his replacement, will have a lower spot as well. This may be a further indication of the party reasserting its power at the expense of the military and security apparatuses. The Central Committee plenum was also notable for the return of Jang Song Thaek, who had not been seen in public since March 8th, and rumors emerged that Jang had been purged. His disappearance may have simply been related to the rise in recent tensions. (NK Daily, “North Korea Names New Prime Minister,” April 1, 2013)

Kim Jong-un announced a “new strategic line” that defied warnings from Washington, saying that his country was determined to rebuild its economy in the face of international sanctions while simultaneously expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal, which the ruling party called “the nation’s life.” The North’s nuclear weapons “are neither a political bargaining chip nor a thing for economic dealings,” KCNA reported, citing remarks from the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party, which adopted new guidelines for the country. The North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, presided over the meeting, which South Korean news media said was convened for the first time since 1993. The rare event came a day before the planned gathering of the North’s rubber-stamp Parliament, the Supreme People’s Assembly, which was expected to follow up on the new guidelines adopted by the party. American and South Korean officials still hope they can persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons through sanctions and diplomacy, especially if China agrees to use its economic leverage with the North. Many regional analysts and officials have suggested that the North’s recent strident language, including threats to
North Korea’s nuclear threats are intended not only to solidify Kim’s military credentials at home but also to draw the United States back to the negotiating table. But a growing number of analysts also say that North Korea seems to have no intention of giving up its nuclear arms. “The enemies are using both blackmail, telling us that we cannot achieve economic development unless we give up nuclear weapons, and appeasement, saying that they will help us live well if we choose a different path,” Kim was quoted as saying during the meeting. But he said his country must expand its nuclear arsenal both “in quality and quantity, as long as the United States’s nuclear threat continues.” On March 17, the North’s Foreign Ministry said the country’s nuclear weapons were not a bargaining chip. Officials at the plenary meeting made that stance formal, adopting a statement calling the North’s nuclear weapons a “treasure” that will not be traded for “billions of dollars,” because they “represent the nation’s life, which can never be abandoned as long as imperialists and nuclear threats exist on earth.” Both President Obama and his national security adviser, Thomas E. Donilon, have recently urged Kim to learn from Myanmar, where changes initiated by new leaders have resulted in billions in debt forgiveness, large-scale development assistance and an influx of foreign investment. It North Korea continues on its current path, they said, it will face more sanctions and deeper isolation. President Park Geun-hye of South Korea has also warned that the only way for Kim’s government to ensure its survival is to give up its nuclear weapons. She has often said that nuclear weapons did not save the Soviet Union from collapsing. North Korea said economic development and an expansion of the nuclear program could take place “simultaneously” because a growing nuclear deterrent could allow the North to limit military spending and put more resources into the agricultural sector and light industries to improve people’s lives. In what appeared to be related move, officials at the party meeting appointed Pak Pong-ju, a minister in charge of light industries who has supported economic policy changes in the past, to the Politburo. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Vows to Keep Nuclear Arms and Fix Economy,” New York Times, April 1, 2013, p. A-6)

As tension percolates on the Korean Peninsula following Pyongyang’s chain of escalated threats, the United States deployed its most advanced fighter jets, the F-22 Raptors, to join military drills in Korea Sunday as a new demonstration of military might. A fleet of the radar-evading stealth fighters were deployed to Osan Air Base from the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa today to join the ongoing, two-month Foal Eagle joint U.S.-Korea exercises, which run until the end of the month, the U.S. military command revealed yesterday. It did not specify the number of planes sent to Korea. (Sarah Kim and Chang Se-jeong, “F-22 Stealth Fighters Sent as Signal to North,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 2, 2013)

The White House said it was treating seriously North Korea’s warning over the weekend that it has entered a “state of war” with South Korea, although U.S. officials noted the regime’s history of blustery rhetoric. “We take these threats seriously and remain in close contact with our South Korean allies. But we would also note that North Korea has a long history of bellicose rhetoric and threats and today’s announcement follows that familiar pattern,” a White House spokesperson said. Peter King, (R-NY) who sits on the House intelligence and homeland security committees, said he did not
regard the North Korean statement as an “empty threat.”” Kim Jong-eun is trying to establish himself. He’s trying to be the tough guy. He is 28, 29 years old, and he keeps going further and further out, and I don’t know if he can get himself back in,” Mr King said. “So my concern would be that he may feel to save face he has to launch some sort of attack on South Korea, or some base in the Pacific.” In a statement, the U.S. military said that the radar-avoiding F22 Raptors were deployed to the main US air force base in South Korea from Japan to join the military exercises, which run until the end of April. “[North Korea] will achieve nothing by threats or provocations, which will only further isolate North Korea and undermine international efforts to ensure peace and stability in Northeast Asia,” the U.S. military added. Despite the aggressive North Korean rhetoric yesterday, Pyongyang’s threat was couched in conditional language. The statement carried by KCNA said: “If the US and the South Korean puppet group perpetrate a military provocation for igniting a war, [it will] develop into an all-out war, a nuclear war.” The consensus among analysts is that North Korea would be unlikely to initiate a war, given the technological inferiority of its military resources to those of the U.S. For decades, anti-U.S. propaganda has been a staple theme of North Korean efforts to boost patriotic feeling. “I think it’s in the context of deterrence, with a lot of it directed at the domestic audience,” said Daniel Pinkston, a North Korea expert at the International Crisis Group. “With the ongoing exercises, the leadership needs to look strong in the face of external threats - real or perceived - or else run the risk of looking weak internally.” “I’m getting a bit more concerned about something going on in the West Sea,” said Bruce Klingner, an analyst at the Heritage Foundation. (Simon Mundy, Song Jung-a, and James Politi, “U.S. Stays Calm over N. Korea ‘State of War,’” Financial Times, April 1, 2013, p. 4)
state in its invasion and attack on the DPRK. 6. The DPRK shall strictly observe the rules on safekeeping and management of nukes and ensuring the stability of nuclear tests. 7. The DPRK shall establish a mechanism and order for their safekeeping and management so that nukes and their technology, weapon-grade nuclear substance may not leak out illegally. 8. The DPRK shall cooperate in the international efforts for nuclear non-proliferation and safe management of nuclear substance on the principle of mutual respect and equality, depending on the improvement of relations with hostile nuclear weapons states. 9. The DPRK shall strive hard to defuse the danger of a nuclear war and finally build a world without nukes and fully support the international efforts for nuclear disarmament against nuclear arms race. 10. The related institutions shall take thorough practical steps for implementing this ordinance.” (KCNA, “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted,” April 1, 2013)

President Park Geun-hye instructed South Korea’s military to set aside any political considerations and respond powerfully in the event of North Korean provocations, as Pyongyang has churned out near-daily threats of war on the divided peninsula. Park made the unusually tough remark during a policy briefing at the defense ministry, saying she takes “very seriously” a recent string of North Korean moves and threats, such as the scrapping of a nonaggression treaty, the cutoff of a military hotline and the weekend declaration that inter-Korean ties have entered a "state of war." “The reason for the military’s existence is to protect the country and the people from threats. If any provocations happen against our people and our country, it should respond powerfully in the early stage without having any political considerations,” Park said. "As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, I will trust the military’s judgment on abrupt and surprise provocations by North Korea as it is the one that directly faces off against the North,” she said. "Please carry out your duty of guarding the safety of the people without getting distracted even a bit." During the briefing, Park had a video call with the commander of the Navy's Second Fleet responsible for defense of the western sea border with North Korea and called for strong preparedness, according to presidential spokesman Yoon Chang-jung. "The West Sea is where North Korean provocations have concentrated, and I remember that more provocations happened in the crab-catching season,” Park said during the call. "On the shoulders of the Second Fleet is the heavy responsibility of not only guaranteeing the safety of fishermen and their livelihoods, but also (safeguarding) security and peace” of the country. Park had a similar video call with an Army division commander. She also called for rooting out draft dodging, saying it gives the people a sense of unfairness, which she said could ultimately lead to shaking the country’s security, according to the spokesman. (Yonhap, “Park Calls for Powerful Response to N. Korean Provocations,” April 1, 2013) "I view the threats by North Korea at present very seriously,” Park told the members of the Defense Ministry, which delivered its policy briefing. "If any provocation occurs against our citizens and the Republic of Korea, a strong response should be taken without any other political consideration at an early stage,” Park said. (Lee Joo-hee and Song Sang-ho, “Park Vows Swift Reprisal to Provocation,” Korea Herald, April 1, 2013) Park said. "In the case of a surprise provocation by North Korea, I, as commander in chief, will trust the judgment of the military which encounters the North directly.” The remarks hint at Park's permission for the military to fire first and report later in the case
of an attack by the North. The ministry reported to Park that it will create specific deterrence measures for different scenarios of a nuclear crisis. “The reconnaissance capabilities of the military will be strengthened,” Defense Minister Kim was quoted as saying in the ministry’s press statement. “We will establish a proactive deterrence strategy and strike system to incapacitate the North’s nuclear and missile threats at an early stage.” A proactive deterrence strategy is more aggressive than the “active deterrence strategy” currently in place. Under the new scheme, the South Korean military would **react proactively to a contingency without consulting U.S. forces by exercising its right to self-defense**. With the new strategy, the South intends to launch preemptive strikes within 30 minutes of detecting signs of an imminent attack by the North using weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons. The backbone of the strategy will be the establishment of a so-called “Kill Chain” and the completion of the Korean Air and Missile Defense regime. A kill chain refers to the deployment of various intelligence assets, missiles, fighter jets and vessels to detect, identify and intercept the North’s missiles. The military plans to deploy ballistic missiles with a range longer than 500 kilometers (310.68 miles) and improved reconnaissance capabilities to form the kill chain. (Ser Myo-ja, “Park Tells Military to Strike Back If Attacked,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, April 2, 2013)

South Korea’s defense ministry unveiled a new contingency plan of "active deterrence" that allows its military to launch a preemptive strike against North Korea if the North shows signs of an imminent nuclear or missile attack on the South. In an annual policy briefing to President Park Geun-hye, Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin said the military is mapping out “an active deterrence and will build an attack system to swiftly neutralize North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, while significantly improving our military’s capability of surveillance and reconnaissance.” To achieve the goal, the ministry will speed up the deployment of a “kill chain” system capable of detecting, targeting and destroying North Korean nuclear and missile targets, ministry officials said. South Korea had originally planned to deploy the “kill chain” system by 2015, but ministry officials said it will be deployed ahead of the planned schedule. The new contingency plan will be formalized in October this year, when defense chiefs of South Korea and the U.S. hold annual security talks, ministry officials said. The ministry will also speed up building and deploying South Korea’s own missile defense system, named “Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD),” at an earlier date than scheduled. The Korean missile defense system, tailored for Korean terrain, is designed to intercept hostile missiles or combat aircrafts at an altitude of 10-30 kilometers. To enhance its reconnaissance capability, South Korea will make efforts for a speedy deployment of U.S.-made Global Hawk spy drones and put at least two military spy satellites into orbit by 2021, according to the ministry. Last December, the U.S. government informed Congress of a plan to sell four Global Hawk surveillance drones to South Korea. The deal under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program would be worth up to US$1.2 billion. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Sets out ‘Active Deterrence’ against N. Korea’s Nuke Threats,” April 1, 2013)

South Korea’s U.S.-oriented foreign policy appears to be evolving to place China as its second nucleus. According to experts, Seoul sees the trend as inevitable since China is its biggest trading partner with the additional clout of possibly being able to exert pressure on North Korea. President Park Geun-hye chose former ruling Saenuri Party
lawmaker Kwon Young-se as the new ambassador to China, while tapping former vice Foreign Minister Ahn Ho-young, a career diplomat and trade expert, as the new top diplomat to the U.S. Watchers interpreted the move as a demonstration of a focus on China since Kwon is not only a close confidant of Park but is a rising political heavyweight who has substantial influence on the domestic political scene. Kwon, a former prosecutor and three-term lawmaker, helped Park win the presidential election last year as a senior campaign strategist. The decision is in line with President Park’s series of friendly gestures made to China lately. Last month, she had a 20-minute phone conversation with President Xi Jinping to further deepen the two nation’s “strategic cooperative partnership.” Park also invited Xi to visit South Korea whenever was convenient for him. In response, Xi asked Park to visit China in the near future and said Beijing will work and communicate more closely with Seoul to ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula. Park also selected China as the first destination to dispatch a team of special envoys right after elected as the nation’s chief. During last week’s luncheon with reporters, Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se disclosed an episode regarding the envoys’ visit to Beijing. President Xi, according to Yun, after reading the diplomatic letter sent by Park described the contents of the letter as “really moving.” This kind of reaction made by the Chinese President, Yun said, was unprecedented in their 21-year-long bilateral relationship. “It is the right stance taken by the new government to get closer to China,” said Prof. Won Dong-wook of Dong-A University in Busan. “In the ongoing rivalry between U.S. and China, South Korea should carry out aggressive diplomatic policies of engaging with both powers. Washington and Beijing have a common regional interest on the Korean Peninsula, especially, regarding the North Korea nuclear issue. Both nations don’t want to see Pyongyang going nuclear. Seoul should capitalize on the situation by inducing the two into a peaceful framework and order set by Seoul.” (Chung Min-uck, “China Emerges as Second Pivot in Foreign Policy,” Korea Times, April 1, 2013)

White House briefing: “Q. Are you concerned about the escalating tensions with North Korea? And does the White House believe that the U.S. actions on this are contributing to those tensions in any way? CARNEY: Well, not at all. The United States is committed to maintaining peace and security in the region, as you know. North Korea should stop its provocative threats and instead concentrate on abiding by its international obligations. And pursuit of nuclear and missile programs -- its pursuit, rather, of those programs, does not make it more secure but only increases its isolation and seriously undermines its ability to pursue economic development. I would note that despite the harsh rhetoric we’re hearing from Pyongyang, we are not seeing changes to the North Korean military posture, such as large-scale mobilizations and positioning of forces. Now, we take this seriously. I’ve said in the past. And we are vigilant and we are monitoring the Korean situation very diligently. And as you know, we’re in close, regular contact with our team in Korea; that would be both General Thurman and Ambassador Kim, both of whom are exceptionally well-qualified for the positions they hold. And they are coordinating closely with our South Korean counterparts. The actions we’ve taken are prudent, and they include, on missile defense, to enhance both the homeland and allied security, and others actions like the B-2 and B-52 flights, have been important steps to reassure our allies, demonstrate our resolve to the North, and reduce pressure on Seoul to take unilateral action. And we
believe this has reduced the chance of miscalculation and provocation. I would also note -- and I’ve said this consistently, as have other officials -- **that this pattern of bellicose rhetoric is not new, it is familiar. And we take it very seriously.** We take prudent measures in response to it. But it is consistent with past behavior. Q. So just to follow on that -- the fact that this has been going on for quite some time, this kind of rhetoric from North Korea, and that no assets have been moved around that you can tell, is there then the sense that this is more of Kim Jong-un trying to establish his reputation than it is anything else behind the threat? CARNEY: Well, I would reiterate that we haven’t seen action to back up the rhetoric in the sense that we haven’t seen significant changes, as I said, in the North in terms of mobilizations or repositioning of forces, and that is important to note. And what that disconnect between the rhetoric and action means, I’ll leave to the analysts to judge. We simply evaluate it and take necessary precautionary measures, and make clear to North Korea, together with our allies that this provocation behavior, provocative rhetoric only isolates them further; brings them no closer to rejoining the international community of nations -- in fact, moves them farther away from that potential and possibility. So we take steps necessary to make sure that we can protect ourselves and our allies, and we judge both -- we assess the rhetoric and we look very closely at what is happening on the ground.” (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, April 1, 2013)

South Korea and the United States are poised to resume sensitive negotiations soon aimed at revising a bilateral civilian nuclear accord, a diplomatic source said, as Seoul seeks to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel. The allies are likely to reopen the talks as early as this week in Washington, when Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se visits there for a bilateral meeting tomorrow with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, the source said. "Korea and the U.S. will soon resume the formal negotiations," the source said. If resumed, it will mark the sixth round of talks. Revising the civilian nuclear agreement, which expires next year, is a key pending bilateral agenda for President Park and the second-term administration of U.S. President Barack Obama. Little progress has been made in bilateral talks since 2010 to revise the 1974 accord that bans South Korea from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. For a revised accord to be approved by the U.S. Congress, both sides must conclude negotiations by June of this year, ministry officials said. Last week, Park asked for U.S. congressional support for South Korea to expand its "peaceful use" of atomic energy. Park made the remark when she met with U.S. Sen. Bob Corker, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, saying she hopes the expiring nuclear accord between the two countries will be revised in an advanced way, according to spokeswoman Kim Haing. South Korea, a major nuclear energy developer, wants the U.S. to allow it to adopt proliferation-resistant technology for enriching uranium and reprocessing spent atomic fuel from its 22 nuclear power plants, but Washington has been reluctant to do so. (Korea Times, “S. Korea, U.S. to resume Talks Soon on Revision of Nuclear Accord,” April 1, 2013)

The United States has positioned USS Fitzgerald near North Korea, a destroyer capable of shooting down missiles in the latest military move amid a showdown with the communist state, an official said. The vessel, which had sailed to South Korea as
part of recent exercises, has been sent off the southwestern coast of the Korean peninsula instead of returning to its home port in Japan, a US defense official said. The official, speaking to AFP, said that the shifting of the USS Fitzgerald was "a prudent move" meant to offer "greater missile defense options should that become necessary." (AFP, “U.S. Sends Destroyer off Korea Coast: Official,” April 1, 2013)

A well-known editor of an influential Communist Party journal said that he had been suspended after writing an article for a British newspaper saying that China should abandon its ally North Korea. The editor, Deng Yuwen, told the South Korean paper Chosun Ilbo that the Foreign Ministry had called the Communist Party’s Central Party School in Beijing to complain about his February 27 article in the Financial Times. It argued that China’s strategic alliance with North Korea was “outdated” and that the wayward ally was no longer useful as a buffer against United States influence. Deng also wrote in the article, that the government in Pyongyang could use nuclear weapons against China. Because of Deng’s stature – he is deputy editor of Study Times, a weekly journal of the Central Party School, which trains rising officials – the article garnered attention in Washington and Europe. Some took it as a sign that perhaps the new Chinese government led by President Xi Jinping was fed up with North Korea after its third nuclear test in February and that it would modify its support. Chosun Ilbo quoted Deng as saying in a telephone interview: “I was relieved of the position because of that article, and I’m suspended indefinitely. Although I’m still being paid by the company, I don’t know when I will be given another position.” Deng declined to comment. Three senior United States officials have come to Beijing in the past two weeks to request enforcement of the United Nations sanctions and to ask that China stop doing business with the North Korean Trade Bank. The American officials left Beijing without announcing any specific agreement with China on enforcement. Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew, who met with Mr. Xi, said after two days of talks in March, “The U.S. views the provocative actions of North Korea as very serious, and we will continue to pursue methods available to change the policy perspective in Pyongyang.” He added, “We share a common objective of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, and we will continue to discuss it.” Shortly after Lew’s visit, the United States under secretary of the Treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, David S. Cohen, and the State Department coordinator for sanctions policy, Daniel Fried, went to Beijing to discuss sanctions enforcement in more detail. They left without any announcements. In a response to the Chinese policy of urging North Korea to overhaul its economy, Deng wrote: “Once the door of reform opened, the regime could be overthrown. Why should China maintain relations with a regime and a country that will face failure sooner or later?” While working at Study Times, Deng also developed a reputation as a combative commentator for other news publications less bound to official orthodoxy. He wrote an article last year on the failures of President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who both recently retired, saying that during their decade in power they squandered chances to make much-needed changes. (Jane Perlez, “Chinese Editor Suspended for Article on North Korea,” New York Times, April 2, 2013, p. A-9)
Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear armed force to cope with the prevailing situation so as to meet the law-governing requirements of the development of the Korean revolution: The field of atomic energy is faced with heavy tasks for making a positive contribution to solving the acute shortage of electricity by developing the self-reliant nuclear power industry and for bolstering up the nuclear armed force both in quality and quantity till the world is denuclearized, pursuant to the strategic line on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of the nuclear armed force. The General Department of Atomic Energy of the DRPK decided to adjust and alter the uses of the existing nuclear facilities, to begin with, in accordance with the line. This will include the measure for readjusting and restarting all the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon including uranium enrichment plant and 5MW graphite moderated reactor which had been mothballed and disabled under an agreement reached at the six-party talks in October, 2007. This work will be put into practice without delay. (KCNA, “DPRK to Adjust Uses of Existing Nuclear Facilities,” April 2, 2013)

North Korea can probably restart a mothballed plutonium-producing reactor in six months if it is determined to do so and the site has suffered no major structural damage, but it may take years to produce significant new atom bomb material. Siegfried Hecker - a Stanford University nuclear scientist who is believed to have been the last Westerner to visit the Yongbyon nuclear complex - said the Yongbyon research reactor has been on standby since July 2007. “If they restart the reactor, which I estimate will take them at least six months, they can produce about six kilograms of plutonium (roughly one bomb’s worth) per year,” Hecker said in an interview published on Tuesday on a Stanford website. He said that it would take the North approximately three to four years before it could get another 12 kg (26 lbs) of plutonium, which would suffice for two more weapons. Hecker added that when he last visited North Korea in 2010, he estimated that the country had a stockpile of 24 to 42 kg (53 to 93 lbs) of plutonium, roughly four to eight bombs worth. If the country’s February nuclear test used plutonium - which is not clear - the stocks would be about five to six kg lower, he said. Satellite images published by 38North showed new construction activity at the reactor site from early February until the end of March. It said the imagery indicated that construction had begun along a roadway and toward the back of the reactor building. Olli Heinonen, former head of the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards department, told Reuters he had a similar prediction, though he said it was possible North Korea could have the research reactor running in less than six months. "We don’t know how much preparatory work they’ve done," said Heinonen, who is currently at Harvard University and has visited North Korea and met with North Korean scientists. Both Hecker and Heinonen said North Korea could most likely restart the reactor without any foreign assistance, despite U.N., U.S. and other sanctions aimed at curtailing its ability to purchase nuclear and missile technology. A U.S. official concurred with Hecker and Heinonen. "North Korea’s assertion that it intends to bring Yongbyon back on line can’t be easily written off as an insurmountable hurdle," the official said. Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, however, said there was a possibility that the Yongbyon reactor has been rendered inoperable for unknown reasons. "It's been a
mystery to me why they haven’t started it up before this,” he said. “The most logical answer is that they couldn’t ... But there’s no certainty here.” If the reactor is functional, Fitzpatrick said, the half-year timeline for restarting it made sense. Certain technical challenges await the North Koreans. In 2008 they destroyed the Yongbyon reactor’s cooling tower as a confidence-building step in U.S.-led multilateral negotiations aimed at reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. Heinonen said that either North Korea must build a new cooling tower or create an underground cooling plant, like one that was under construction at a site in Syria that Israel bombed in 2007. Western intelligence sources have said North Korea helped build the Syrian reactor, which the government of President Bashar al-Assad has said was not a nuclear site. David Albright, a former weapons inspector and head of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security think tank, said it was important not to underestimate the nuclear capabilities of the North Koreans or their determination to live up to their word. “North Korea huffs and puffs a lot, but underneath that they pretty much do as they say,” said Albright, who met with North Korean nuclear scientists in Pyongyang in 2011. “They have been saying they want to improve the quality of their nuclear weapons and they may very well do that.” Hecker, who visited the enrichment plant in 2010, said North Korea has a good safety record for its five-megawatt research reactor, but he voiced concerns about the new plant it intends to construct. “I am much more concerned about the safety of the new light-water reactor they are building,” he told Reuters without elaborating. (Louis Charbonneau, “North Korea Can Likely Revive Reactor in Six Months, Needs Years for More Bombs,” Reuters, April 3, 2013)

SecState Kerry, FM Yun: “KERRY: Good afternoon. It’s a great pleasure for me to welcome Foreign Minister Yun here today to Washington. This is his first visit as the Foreign Minister, and it’s my first visit with him as Secretary of State. And we’re both delighted to start off this way, two very close friends, countries that have traveled a very interesting journey together for 60 years now. We celebrate 60 years of this alliance. …Today, we discussed all of the issues that you would obviously imagine we would and even more. We covered a great deal, but I will start with North Korea. We’ve heard an extraordinary amount of unacceptable rhetoric from the North Korean Government in the last days. So let me be perfectly clear here today: The United States will defend and protect ourselves and our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. The Foreign Minister and I also think it’s important to stay absolutely focused on our shared goal of a peaceful Korean Peninsula, free of nuclear weapons. And we agree that improved relations between North and South would ultimately help to move us towards that goal. That is a stated goal of the new President of the Republic of Korea, and we look forward to working with her to achieve that goal. We also discussed our collaboration on global security issues. South Korea has done great work on the UN Security Council helping to curb civilian casualties in combat zones. And they have done that work not just in the Far East, but around the world. We’re also grateful for South Korea’s continued commitment to reducing Iranian oil imports. This has not been easy. It’s at a cost to their economy. It’s difficult. But they have played their role and taken their part in helping to have an impact on trying to change the behavior of Iran. Iran knows exactly what it needs to do in order to address international concerns about its nuclear program, and it can start doing so next weekend in Almaty at the P-5+1 talks. We also discussed ways to work more closely on the humanitarian crisis in Syria, and I thanked the Republic of Korea for their support
on the humanitarian concerns in that area. We also have shared initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa, and we thank them for that. In terms of bilateral issues, the Foreign Minister and I both want to promote the smooth implementation of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. This agreement is good for both countries, and it will strengthen our broad economic ties, it will spur growth, it will help create jobs in both countries and in both regions. We also had a good discussion on the bilateral civilian nuclear agreement. We have a long record of close cooperation on this issue, and we are committed to finding a workable, expeditious way forward. And finally, we also are both deeply concerned about addressing the problem of climate change. We discussed that. We will have further discussions when I go to Seoul next week. We both support clean energy development, and we will be looking for ways to work closely on these issues as we enter a period of new negotiations on climate change over the course of the next few years. So this was a very productive meeting, I hope the first of many in the years ahead. And Mr. Foreign Minister, I look forward to seeing you again in a very short period of time. And I thank you for your commitment to this important partnership, and I thank you for taking time to come and visit here today to prepare for the important meetings of our leaders in early May. YUN: …More than anything else, I discussed with Secretary Kerry the serious nature of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea’s (inaudible) nuclear testing as well as the series of threats from the North. We agreed to further strengthen credible and robust deterrence vis-a-vis North Korea’s nuclear and conventional provocations. In particular, the Secretary and I expressed satisfaction over the progress made in the tailored extended deterrence and the counter-provocation plan. I reaffirmed my government’s strong commitment to work closely with the United States on North Korea policy. Both Secretary Kerry and I agreed that North Korea should abandon its nuclear ambitions and bellicose rhetoric. We also agreed to collaborate to ensure full implementation of the UN’s Security Council Resolution 2094. I also updated Secretary Kerry on my government’s policy of building trust between Seoul and Pyongyang as North Korea makes the right choice. I also emphasized that President Park’s new policy to promote peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia is in line with the United States policy toward Asia and that they mutually reinforce each other. As we celebrate the first anniversary of the KORUS FTA, both Secretary Kerry and I were pleased with the smooth implementation of the agreement. I also took the opportunity to reaffirm my government’s strong commitment to open economy and free trade. Moreover, I stressed the importance of further strengthening our cooperation in the field of science and technology, renewable energy, space, and climate change. Finally, I stressed to Secretary Kerry the importance of revising the Korea-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement in a mutually beneficial, timely, and forward-looking manner. Both sides will continue consultations in this regard. … NULAND: Good. We’ll take four questions today. We’ll start with CNN. Elise Labott, please. Q: I’d like to ask you about what you think North Korea’s intentions are. Do you think that these threats are just bluster, specifically, the recent threat to restart its nuclear facility? And is there a danger of not taking these threats too seriously that that might provoke them into actually doing something? Or is there a chance, do you think, that they could pull back and be ready for diplomacy at some point? Mr. Foreign Minister, the Six-Party talks and the whole process has always really relied on China to rein in the North, if you will. Lately, it doesn’t really seem that the North is listening to China in any meaningful way. And I’m wondering if you think that this is a safeguard that the parties cannot rely on anymore. Has the
influence China had kind of been used up? YUN: Regarding (inaudible), basically as we saw in the latest adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2094, China is now very cooperative, and they made very clear that they will fully implement the resolution of the UN Security Council Resolution 2094. Regarding the Six-Party talks, actually in this resolution now, Six-Party members and members of the Council also made it clear the Six-Party Talks is still a very useful tool to implement - to actually make efforts towards denuclearization of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Even though this is a very difficult task, we believe that with China and with members of the Six-Party talks, we should continue these efforts with patience. KERRY: I’m not going to speculate on what the intent is or whether there’s a strategy or not a strategy. The bottom line is very simply that what Kim Jong-un has been choosing to do is provocative, it is dangerous, reckless, and the United States will not accept the DPRK as a nuclear state. And I reiterate again the United States will do what is necessary to defend ourselves and defend our allies, Korea and Japan. We are fully prepared and capable of doing so, and I think the DPRK understands that. Now, that said, no one takes lightly, least of all the President of the United States, what has been happening, which is precisely why the President made the decision to redeploy missile defense with respect to the United States itself as well as to take other preparations in the region and to send a very clear signal to our allies and the North alike that the United States will defend our allies and that we will not be subject to irrational or reckless provocation. But – and here’s an important but - we make it clear, as we have consistently, that the United States believes there is a very simple way for North Korea to rejoin the community of nations and make it clear that they want to pursue a peaceful path. And they can come back to the table and join all of those other countries, including their nearest neighbor and partner, China, obviously shared nearest neighbor with the Republic of Korea, but China which has such an important role to play and which has always maintained a closer relationship to the North than any other country. So they have an option, and that option is to enter into negotiations for the denuclearization, which is China’s policy also, and to begin to focus on the needs of their people, which we also have made it clear we are prepared to help them with if they will bring their behavior in line with the United Nations and global community requirements. So it’s very simple: We are going to proceed thoughtfully and carefully, as the President has indicated, but we take nothing for granted. And we also are not indifferent to the meaning of the risks that are involved. Q: Do you believe they’ll restart their nuclear facility, as they threatened to do? KERRY: Well, first of all, if they restart their nuclear facility at Yongbyon, that is in direct violation of their international obligations, so that in itself would be a breach of international standard and requirement, it would be a provocative act and completely contrary to the road that we have traveled all of these years from the Agreed Framework forward. So we’ll have to wait and see what happens with respect to that, but it is a direct violation of their international obligations and would be a very serious step. NULAND: Next one, Im Min-hyuk from Chosun Ilbo, please. Q: (Via interpreter) The first question goes out to Secretary Kerry. Right now a lot of Korean people are deeply interested in the negotiation of the U.S.-Korea civil nuclear agreement. Mr. Secretary, some people are concerned that if Korea’s request to low enrichment for peaceful purposes is not accepted, then this may harm U.S.-Korea relationship. And Mr. Secretary, do you have any intention of proactively accepting Korea’s request and before the visit of President Park do you see some tangible progress happening in this area? KERRY: Well, we
welcome - President Obama and the United States welcomes South Korea’s emergence as a nuclear energy leader, peaceful nuclear energy leader. And we are working together on a civil nuclear agreement that will build on a very strong nuclear energy cooperation that we’ve enjoyed for literally over 50-plus years. We see no reason that that will not continue in an agreed-upon fashion. And the Foreign Minister and I had a very good discussion about that agreement. We’ve exchanged some ideas, and I will follow up on those when I visit Seoul in about a week. And I am very hopeful, and I think the Foreign Minister shares this hope, that this can be resolved before the visit of President Park. But we’re quite confident that is a relationship that can and will continue in its proper form. … NULAND: Last one today, Lee Woo-tak of Yonhap News, please. Q: (Via interpreter) (Inaudible) Korea Peninsula with its Korea Peninsula peace process. My question is: Do you have any plans on suggesting a dialogue with the North Koreans first - for instance, reopening the Mount Kumgang tourist visit? And my question going out to Secretary Kerry: Ever since you were a member of the Senate, I know that you’ve always emphasized the importance of diplomacy and dialogue. I know that this was one of your standing principles, and I know you also spoke about that kind of principle when dealing with the North Koreans. And Mr. Secretary, under what circumstances or what situation would the United States be prepared to resume dialogue with the North Koreans? Do you have any specific conditions in mind in order to resume dialogue with the North Koreans, and if so, Mr. Secretary, do you have any plans on sending a special envoy to North Korea in order to resume talks with the North Koreans? YUN: (Via interpreter) First of all, situation on the Korean Peninsula or tension is getting higher on the Korean Peninsula, and is critically important for the U.S. and South Korea to enhance its defense capabilities. And as we said repeatedly, we will always be - we will address, in case of North Korean provocation, but if North Korea decides to give up its nuclear ambitions and to become a member of the international community, we are prepared to resume our talks in terms of putting in place a peace process on the Korean Peninsula. KERRY: North Korea needs to make it clear that they are prepared to have a serious discussion about denuclearization. And they know exactly what the goal is; they know exactly what the terms are. And we are prepared. President Obama has said repeatedly we are prepared to enter into a dialogue negotiation if they are serious, if they will stop the provocations and engage in a serious discussion. We have always said that we would like to try to resolve the problems of the entire peninsula. That means making peace. But making peace does not involve having a nuclear north and a disadvantaged Republic of Korea to the south. So they know very well what the terms are here. And with the respect to the question of an envoy, we have an envoy. Ambassador Glyn Davies is appointed already. He’s there - I mean, he’s there - he’s here, but if the circumstances are correct, when North Korea meets or it issues an indication that it is serious about trying to resolve this issue. And I would just say this and I think it’s important. We face this danger not just to the Republic of Korea but a danger to the entire region and the world of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And we face it with respect to Iran. President Obama could not have been more clear with respect to both. His policy is the denuclearization of North Korea - the DPRK - because that is the only way to begin to end the conflict and create safety in the region. The last thing the world needs is more nuclear nations at the very time that the nuclear nations are trying to reduce their current numbers of nuclear weapons and control this danger. Secondly, we face the question of Iran. And Iran knows very well it has an opportunity this weekend.
The Iranian people are a great people. They have a long, long history, many times longer than the United States of America, thousands of years. They have an ability to rejoin the community of nations, to get out from under this isolation, if they will choose the simple ways of proving, as other nations proved, that they have peaceful nuclear energy. It’s that simple. It’s not complicated. And our hope is that that initiative can begin in earnest this weekend in Almaty, where we will have a team prepared to negotiate, and that in the days ahead we can reach an understanding that will also move as we are trying, with respect to the Korea Peninsula, to make the world safer. That’s what this is about. It’s not about - we have no ambitions there, and I think they know that. We want to see a peaceful community of nations trading with each other, working to improve the lives of their citizens; and that is in direct contrast to the North, which maintains gulags, has thousands of political prisoners, treats people in the most inhumane way, and now starves their people in order to build nuclear weapons. That couldn’t be a bigger choice. And that’s the choice that we are standing here presenting to the community of nations that have made a different choice.” (Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks With Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea Yun Byung-se after Their Meeting, April 3, 2013)

There is a saying that, when cornered, a rat can turn around and bite a cat. Finding a sense of wisdom in this, some North Korea experts say it is about time to moderate the recent show of force by the United States in joint drills with South Korea and see how Pyongyang will react. It is obvious this show of force by the world’s largest military superpower is acting as a deterrent against the North, which has been spewing belligerent vitriol to jack up tension. “As the North was ramping up its rhetoric and military show of force, the South and the United States needed to display their deterrence capability against its threats,” said Chang Yong-seok, a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. “But an excessive demonstration of U.S. military might unnecessarily spike the tension. We need to be cautious and control the level of show of force. We do not have to slap a crying child in the face.” The situation is so precarious that President Park Geun-hye ordered a meeting of national security-related ministers Monday night. Park presided over the meeting to go over the situation in detail. The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) was scheduled to show its F-22 Raptors to the Korean media today, but cancelled the plan a day earlier, simply saying circumstances had changed. There were reports the cancellation was part of a decision not to further provoke the North, although the USFK declined to comment. “The cancellation is not a bad decision,” Chang said. “I think it looks like a government- or Cheong Wa Dae-level decision to defuse the current situation. It is a positive sign.” Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, agreed. “Mindful of more provocation of the North with the continuous U.S. show of force, it is seen as part of efforts to calm down the situation on the Korean Peninsula.” A string of demonstrations of U.S. advanced military capabilities started with a flyover by a nuclear-capable B-52 bomber and two B-2 stealth bombers. The USS Cheyenne, a nuclear attack submarine, also participated in the Foal Eagle exercise — an annual joint maneuver that is scheduled to continue until April 30 — before two F-22 stealth fighter jets highlighted the demonstration of U.S. military might, yesterday. (Kang Seung-woo, “Do Allies Need to Keep the Pressure on?” Korea Times, April 2, 2013)
The Japanese soldiers in camouflage face paint and full combat gear were dropped by American helicopters onto this treeless, hilly island, and moved quickly to recapture it from an imaginary invader. To secure their victory, they called on a nearby U.S. warship to pound the “enemy” with gunfire that exploded in deafening thunderclaps. Perhaps the most notable feature of the war games in February, called Iron Fist, was the baldness of their unspoken warning. There is only one country that Japan fears would stage an assault on one of its islands: China. Iron Fist is one of the latest signs that Japan’s anxiety about China’s insistent claims over disputed islands as well as North Korea’s escalating nuclear threats are pushing Japanese leaders to shift further away from the nation’s postwar pacifism. The new assertiveness has been particularly apparent under the new prime minister, Abe Shinzo, a conservative who has increased military spending for the first time in 11 years. With China’s maritime forces staging regular demonstrations of their determination to control disputed islands in the East China Sea and North Korea’s new leader issuing daily proclamations against the United States and its allies, Abe’s calls for a bolder, stronger military are getting a warmer welcome in Japan than similar efforts in the past. “This is a very serious rethink of Japan’s security,” said Morimoto Satoshi, defense minister in the last administration, who was an architect of changes in Japan’s defense policy. Until recently, a simulated battle against Chinese forces would have been unthinkable for Japan, which renounced the right to wage war — or even to possess a military — after its march across Asia in World War II resulted in crushing defeat. The purely defensive forces created in 1954 are still constrained from acting in too offensive a manner: last year, a smaller mock assault by Japanese and American forces on an island near Okinawa was canceled because of local opposition. That recalculation — a large step in what analysts see as a creeping over the years toward a more robust Japanese military — could have broad implications for the power balance in the region, angering China and likely giving the United States a more involved partner in its pivot to Asia to offset China’s extended reach. At the same time, the Japanese public has more fully embraced the once-discredited Self-Defense Forces. That is in part because of anxiety over China and North Korea, but also because of the military’s prominent humanitarian presence after the 2011 tsunami. Although Japanese liberals and critics elsewhere in Asia fear that Mr. Abe is using regional tensions as an excuse to ram through a hawkish agenda, opinion polls show he has broad public support for his overall policies. The mock invasion was part of the joint training exercises that are held annually with the Marines. But this one broke new ground. Not only were the soldiers calling in American naval fire and airstrikes themselves, the leaders of their elite unit for the first time helped plan the war game, taking on a role closer to equals than to junior partners. And in a reversal of historical roles, wartime aggressor Japan now finds itself on the defensive against a powerful China that feels its moment has arrived. “China is in their face, giving them the first militarized challenge that Japan has seen since the war,” said Richard J. Samuels, an M.I.T. political scientist who has written about Japanese security. “The mood has shifted toward giving more legitimacy to the guys in uniform.” With small but significant steps, Japan has been moving for several years toward refashioning itself and its 240,000-strong Self-Defense Forces into something closer to a true partner of the United States military. In recent years, the two countries have jointly developed a ship-borne missile system capable of shooting down ballistic missiles. Abe is calling for a broader interpretation of the postwar Constitution, which restricts Japan to
acting only in “self-defense,” to include acting in defense of allies. Abe says this would allow Japanese forces to shoot down a North Korean missile heading toward the United States, something they cannot now legally do. While the military spending increase passed by Abe and his governing party is small (0.8 percent compared with China’s double-digit gains in recent years), it is intended to bolster the defense of Japan’s southwestern islands, including the disputed ones, known as the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. The new military budget also adds weapons that just a decade or two ago would have seemed overly offensive for Japan’s defensive forces, including financing for two F-35 stealth fighter jets. The larger budget will also add another attack submarine to strengthen the Japanese Navy’s ability to hunt the new Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning as well as money to develop a new anti-ship missile. “This is a signal that we are still a player,” said Michishita Narushige, a specialist in security studies at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. Abe has also called for rewriting the postwar Constitution to scrap restrictions on the military altogether, but polls show the idea remains unpopular with the majority of Japanese. Still, in a country that for years would not acknowledge it had armed forces, the changes in budgets and tactics are significant. The move toward a more normalized military also benefited from misfortune, the triple disaster in 2011, when an earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis crippled northeastern Japan. During the grim first days of the crisis, the Self-Defense Forces were the face of the government amid scenes of devastation, and a lifeline for shocked survivors. Now, after years when they were barely seen in public, the troops are spoken of with a new warmth and have even become fixtures on television programs lauding the heroes of the rescue efforts. The military’s own shift to a somewhat more assertive force was on display last month at Camp Pendleton, a Marine base near San Diego and San Clemente Island. This year, 280 Japanese soldiers participated in the war games, 100 more than last year’s Iron Fist, which started eight years ago with just a dozen Japanese soldiers. The soldiers were part of the Western Army Infantry Regiment, a centerpiece of Japan’s efforts to build its own military capabilities. With American help, the 1,000-man unit is being fashioned into a Marine-style force capable of making helicopter and amphibious landings to defend Japan’s southwestern islands. This year’s military budget includes $25 million for four American-made amphibious troop carriers used by the Marines. (Martin Fackler, “Japan Shifts from Pacifism as Anxiety in the Region Rises,” New York Times, April 2, 2013, p. A-4)
the measure for readjusting and restarting all the nuclear facilities in Nyongbyon
including uranium enrichment plant and 5MW graphite moderated reactor which had
been mothballed and disabled under an agreement reached at the six-party talks in
October, 2007. This work will be put into practice without delay.” (KCNA, “DPRK to
Adjust Uses of Existing Nuclear Facilities,” April 2, 2013)

North Korea announced plans to restart a mothballed nuclear reactor, the latest in a
series of provocations by its leader, Kim Jong-un, to elicit a muted response from
American officials, who believe they can wait out Kim’s threats until he realizes his
belligerent behavior will not force South Korea or the United States into making any
concessions. “Right now, they’re testing the proposition that we’ll choose peace and
quiet, and put it on our MasterCard,” said a senior American official, who spoke on the
condition of anonymity to discuss the administration’s internal calculations. “When they
get through this cycle, they will have gotten no return on their investment.” Secretary
of State John Kerry, using time-tested diplomatic language, said North Korea’s plan to
restart the reactor would be a “provocative act” and “a direct violation of their
international obligations.” Speaking in Washington after his first meeting with South
Korea’s foreign minister, Yun Byung-se, Kerry reaffirmed the determination of the United
States to defend its ally. American officials still worry about the consequences of any
miscalculation, given the hair-trigger tensions on the Korean Peninsula and Kim’s
inexperience at this type of brinkmanship. The top American commander in South
Korea, Gen. James D. Thurman, called the situation “tense” and “volatile” in an interview
with ABC News. But the senior official predicted that North Korea would eventually back
down, as Mr. Kim’s need for food aid and hard currency outweighed the domestic
political gains from his threats to shoot missiles at American cities. “The North Koreans
want the international community to feed their people, fuel their factories and fill their
bank accounts,” the official said. “If North Korea were a self-sufficient enterprise, we
would have a much bigger problem on our hands.” Still, the announcements by the
North’s General Department of Atomic Energy were troubling on a couple of levels: The
plan to restart the reactor at the main nuclear complex in Yongbyon reverses gains from
a short-lived 2007 nuclear disarmament deal with the United States. And its plan to use a
uranium-enrichment plant on the site for the weapons program gives it two ways of
producing fuel for bombs, since the reactor produces plutonium. The announcements
came two days after Kim said his nuclear weapons were not a bargaining chip and called
for expanding the arsenal in “quality and quantity” during a meeting of the Central
Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea. It was the first time North Korea had
said it would use the uranium plant to make nuclear weapons. Since unveiling it to a
visiting American scholar in 2010, North Korea had insisted it was running the plant to
make reactor fuel to generate electricity, though Washington suggested that its purpose
was bombs. The five-megawatt, graphite-moderated reactor, which experts say would
require significant effort to bring back on line, had been the main source of plutonium
bomb fuel until it was shut down under the deal with the United States. North Korean
engineers are believed to have extracted enough plutonium for six to eight bombs from
the spent fuel unloaded from the reactor. It is unknown whether North Korea’s third
nuclear test in February used some of its limited stockpile of plutonium or fuel from its
uranium-enrichment program, whose scale and history remain a mystery. Mr. Kim has
recently raised tensions with a torrent of threats to attack the United States and South Korea with pre-emptive nuclear strikes. But this week, he appeared to shift his tone slightly by reiterating that his nuclear weapons were a deterrent that helped his country focus on more pressing domestic economic issues. The White House said it was reaching out to China and Russia to encourage them to use their influence to urge restraint on Pyongyang. The senior American official said the new Chinese leadership, led by President Xi Jinping, was frustrated by Kim’s belligerence, which it viewed as a threat to China’s own security. And Yun of South Korea said the Chinese had been cooperative since the passage of the latest United Nations sanctions. Xinhua issued comments from Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui that did not expressly single out North Korea but nonetheless signaled deepening worry about its actions and the response from the United States and its allies. “We do not want to see war or turmoil break out on the peninsula, and we oppose provocative words and actions by any side,” Zhang said, using more urgent language than his government has tended to use until now. North Korea blocked traffic across the heavily armed border to an industrial park it has run with South Korea for eight years. It was unclear whether the action resulted from a communications problem or represented the end of one of the last symbols of North-South cooperation. (Choe Sang-hun and Mark Landler, “North Korea Says It Will Restart Mothballed Nuclear Reactor,” New York Times, April 3, 2013, p. A-4)

The U.S.’s recent show of force around the Korean Peninsula was designed to send a warning to North Korea and “reduce pressure on Seoul to take unilateral action,” White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters. Carney was explaining why Washington recently announced the deployment in joint exercises with South Korea of hard-hitting weaponry such as B-52 bombers, B-2 stealth bombers, and F-22 fighter jets. Carney appeared to hint that Washington does not want South Korea to respond in kind to any North Korean provocation. “Of course, Washington is worried about provocations from Pyongyang. But it is also very worried about the possibility of South Korea taking unilateral action in response and of the situation escalating to the point that the U.S. can’t control it,” a diplomatic source in Washington said. “The actions we have taken... have been important steps to reassure our allies, demonstrate our resolve to the North,” Carney said. (Chosun Ilbo, “U.S. Seeks to Prevent Unilateral S. Korean Action,” April 3, 2013)

President Park Geun-hye hosted her first ministerial meeting of foreign affairs and security officials at the Blue House to discuss escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. “It is indispensable for us to strongly retaliate against a North Korean attack,” Park was quoted as saying by her spokesman, Yoon Chang-joong. “But it is also important to stop North Korea from even thinking about a provocation.” The meeting lasted for about one hour and 30 minutes. Its participants included the defense minister, unification minister, chief of the National Intelligence Service, presidential chief of staff, Blue House chief of national security and senior presidential secretary for foreign affairs and national security. The vice foreign minister attended on behalf of the foreign minister, who was in the United States. The meeting was decided abruptly by Park Monday evening, a Blue House official said, and the participants were not informed until yesterday morning, prompting speculation
Kurt Campbell, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, revealed in an interview that North Korea's Kim Jong Un regime repeatedly refused calls from the U.S. government seeking dialogue. "I don't think we've received, since Kim Jong Un has come to power, any real indication of his determination at the highest levels to have the sincere, forward-looking dialogue with the U.S.,” Campbell told Yomiuri Shimbun. “We have tested their willingness for dialogue in a number of ways--I'm not going to get into that--and we have been unsuccessful in those efforts. To those who say, ‘The U.S. has not tried talking with North Korea,’ that's wrong. We've tried.”

Regarding North Korea's announcement Tuesday that it would restart a graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, Campbell said he feels a diplomatic solution to the issue of North Korea's nuclear ambitions has become very difficult. "[I] think even the most optimistic observer, of which there are very few left, cannot help but acknowledge that this is a substantial setback [in denuclearization negotiations]. It's just going to be very difficult to recover in a way that will allow any form of truly productive diplomacy to go forward," Campbell said. Concerning North Korea's recent provocative remarks, Campbell said they are not for preparation for war, but part of a propaganda campaign. "We have seen no change in the disposition of North Korean military forces on the ground...all the things that we look for in terms of military preparedness--forces out in the field, deployments of aircraft, missiles out of their storage areas--none of that has happened...One has to come to some conclusions that part of this is about a propaganda campaign, not a preparation for war," he said. Campbell praised the diplomacy of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration, saying, "[He’s] been very careful, particularly on some nationalist hot button issues...I know that Abe-san wants very much to have a very good relationship with [South Korean President] Madame Park [Geun Hye] and her senior team. I think the China-Japan relationship has improved marginally. (Yamaguchi Kyoke, “United States: N. Korea Refused Dialogue Calls,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 4, 2013)
North Korea will ban South Koreans from the industrial park in Kaesong, only allowing South Koreans currently staying at the border town to return home. The abrupt entry ban came after Pyongyang threatened to shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex and launch a pre-emptive nuclear war on Seoul and Washington over South Korea-U.S. joint military drills and U.N. sanctions for its latest nuclear test. Seoul's Ministry of Unification said that it received an official notification from the North earlier in the day stating the restrictions. "South Korea's government deeply regrets the entry ban and urges it to be lifted immediately," ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk said in a press conference. The official pointed out that the latest action by the communist country will impede normal operations at the site. He stressed Seoul will make every effort to ensure the safety of South Korean nationals at the industrial site. "The government will talk with companies that have factories at Kaesong to determine what course of action should be taken," he said. Kim pointed out that because the North has not barred South Korean workers from leaving Kaesong, people expected to cross the demilitarized zone (DMZ) into South Korea should be able to do so. There were 861 South Koreans at the Kaesong complex before the North announced the ban, with three having returned across the demarcation line around noon, six at 2 p.m. and eight at 3 p.m. Originally, 484 South Koreans and 371 vehicles were scheduled to go to Kaesong during the day. Because of the ban, only 33 have returned, a much smaller number than previously planned, which will leave 828 people at the complex. The drop in returnees from 466 is mainly due to less people going North during the day, and to a lesser extent the 123 labor-intensive firms in the border town asking their workers to stay on so they can run their factories despite the entry ban. In an official statement released by the unification ministry, Seoul pointed out that in order for the North to attract investments from abroad, there must be trust not only between the two Koreas, but with the rest of the world. Such trust-building requires the North to be predictable in its actions, it said. "If the North, despite such clear fallouts,
persists in its current path, it must be aware of the negative repercussion its actions will have on inter-Korean relations and be willing to face the criticism and isolation from the international community," the statement said, calling on the North to lift its latest restrictions immediately. South Korea’s response comes as officials at the Customs, Immigration and Quarantine Office (CIQ) in Paju, about 50 kilometers northwest of Seoul, said the North had not issued permits authorizing the daily trip of South Korean managers and cargo over the DMZ. Officials at CIQ said many workers who planned to cross over turned back after waiting 3-4 hours and confirmed the North’s decision to ban entry into Kaesong. Meanwhile, the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee (KIDMAC) in the border town informed Seoul that South Korean plants at the complex were operating normally. KIDMAC maintains round-the-clock contact with the ministry. South Korean workers who returned over the demarcation line confirmed work at the factories was unimpeded by the ban. "There seemed to be nothing different at Kaesong, although customs officers at the border wore uniforms and more soldiers were seen," a worker for a textile company said. The worker, identified only by his surname of Roh, said that while the region could hold out for a short period, problems may occur if there is a shortage of food and industrial materials. The ministry in charge of dialogue with the North and formulating long-term unification policies added that the North had halted movement to and from Kaesong on three occasions in March 2009 when Seoul and Washington were conducting the Key Resolve command post and field exercise. "Although the action taken is serious, it is not without precedence," an official, who declined to be identified, said. In 2009, the North blocked and opened movement over the DMZ although they allowed moved after the end of the military exercise. An year earlier the country implemented the so-called Dec. 1 measure that reduced the number of South Korea who could remain at Kaesong from 1,070-1,500 to around 800, and moved to exercise more control over the movement of people. President Park Geun-hye was briefed on the situation, a senior aide said. "It was immediately reported" to the president by National Security Office chief Kim Jang-soo, the official said without elaborating, including how Park reacted. "We are closely taking care of the situation around the national security office." The defense ministry is preparing to take military action in the event that the safety of South Koreans at the factory park comes under threat, Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin was quoted as saying by Rep. Won Yoo-chul of the ruling Saenuri Party. The minister made the remark during a meeting of the party’s special committee on North Korea’s nuclear issue, the lawmaker, who chairs the committee, said at a press briefing. The military is also prepared to destroy 70 percent of the North’s front-line units within five days in the event that the communist nation provokes the South, the minister was also quoted as saying by the lawmaker. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Slaps Entry Ban on S. Korean’s Kaesong Workers," April 3, 2013)

U.S. officials tell NBC News they believe North Korea does have the capability to put a nuclear weapon on a missile and that they have missile deliverable nukes. Those missiles, however, cannot go more than 1000 miles. [?] (Richard Engel, NBC “Nightlyy News, April 3, 2013)

The United States announced that it was speeding the deployment of an advanced missile defense system to Guam in the next few weeks, two years ahead of schedule in what the Pentagon said was “a precautionary move” to protect American naval and air
forces from the threat of a North Korean missile attack. The system – called Thaad, for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense – was scheduled for deployment around 2015. The decision to deploy it now was the latest in a series of steps intended to deter the North from either military action or new missile tests and came only hours after the latest North Korean provocation, with officials blocking South Koreans from crossing the border to enter a jointly operated industrial park. In recent weeks, the North has repeatedly threatened that, if provoked, it could target United States forces in Guam and Hawaii as well as the mainland United States – a threat it repeated today. Earlier this week, the Defense Department announced that two of the Navy’s Aegis-class missile defense warships were positioned in the Pacific to watch North Korea. Installing the land-based missile system in Guam will free up the ships, which have radar and interceptor missiles, to be repositioned closer to the North Korean coast. That would give President Obama a wider range of options if the North Koreans fire their missiles in a test or at a target. “We haven’t made any decisions,” a senior administration official said. “But we want as many options as possible.” The last time the United States seriously prepared to shoot down North Korean missiles was the summer of 2006, when the defense secretary at the time, Donald H. Rumsfeld, ordered the Army to prepare to intercept a long-range Taepodong missile from its antiballistic missile base in Alaska during a North Korean test. But the North Korean missile broke up in flight. Last month, as the North escalated its threats, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced that the United States would bolster long-range ballistic missile defenses in Alaska and California. But that process will take several years; the Thaad is intended to deter a threat to Guam, which is considered to be on the outer edge of the North’s missile range. The system includes a truck-mounted launcher, interceptor missiles, an integrated fire control system and advanced tracking radar.

Hagel, speaking at the National Defense University in Washington, referred to North Korea’s increased nuclear ability in response to a question from the audience. “They have a nuclear capacity now,” he said. “They have a missile delivery capacity now. And so, as they have ratcheted up their bellicose, dangerous rhetoric, and some of the actions they have taken over the last few weeks present a real and clear danger.” Hagel’s carefully worded comment about the North’s “nuclear capacity” was significant; on April 2, Secretary of State John Kerry insisted that the United States would never recognize the North “as a nuclear state.” The difference pointed to the administration’s dilemma: after three nuclear tests, there is no doubt the country can trigger a nuclear explosion, but the United States is adamant that it will not reward the North by accepting its arsenal as a permanent reality. Photographs published yesterday on the Web site 38 North, which follows North Korean developments, show new construction at the aging reactor, dating back several weeks. The United States and South Korea are entering the final stretch of long-stalled negotiations over another highly delicate nuclear issue: South Korea’s own request for American permission to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel. Allowing South Korea to develop either the enrichment or reprocessing technologies would be a rare exception, one that nonproliferation advocates said would set a bad precedent. They said it would undermine not only Washington’s global efforts to curb the spread of such activities, but also American efforts to persuade North Korea and Iran to give up their nuclear programs. In South Korea, where people remember their recent history of war and foreign occupation, popular support has often surged for arming the country with nuclear weapons – especially when people doubt the American commitment to defend their country or when the North’s threats intensify. “When the
thug in the neighborhood has gotten himself a brand new machine gun, we can’t defend our home with a stone,” Chung Mong-joon, a ruling party leader and vocal champion of “nuclear sovereignty” for South Korea, recently said, referring to the North Korean nuclear threat. “At a time of crisis, we are not 100 percent sure whether the Americans will cover us with its nuclear umbrella.” But such a call, even if reflective of popular sentiments, has always been tamped down by unequivocal rebuttals from government policy makers. And the United States flew nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers in recent training sorties over the Korean Peninsula, demonstrating its commitment to a nuclear umbrella for the South Korean ally. Choe Sang-hun and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Speeds Missile Defense to Guam after North Korea Bars South’s Workers,” New York Times, April 4, 2013, p. A-10)

After a high-visibility display of military power aimed at deterring North Korean provocations, the White House is dialing back the aggressive posture amid fears that it could inadvertently trigger an even deeper crisis, according to U.S. officials. The U.S. is putting a pause to what several officials described as a step-by-step plan the Obama administration approved earlier this year, dubbed “the playbook,” that laid out the sequence and publicity plans for U.S. shows of force during annual war games with South Korea. The playbook included well-publicized flights in recent weeks near North Korea by nuclear-capable B-52 and stealth B-2 bombers, as well as advanced F-22 warplanes. The U.S. stepped back from the plans this week, as U.S. officials began to worry that the North, which has a small nuclear arsenal and an unpredictable new leader, may be more provoked than the U.S. had intended, the officials said. “The concern was that we were heightening the prospect of misperceptions on the part of the North Koreans, and that that could lead to miscalculations,” a senior administration official said. Officials said the U.S. didn’t believe North Korea had any imminent plans to take military action in response to the exercises. Rather, the shift reflects concerns within the administration that the North, caught off guard, could do something rash, contrary to intelligence assessments showing that it is unlikely to respond militarily to the U.S. show of force. The shift also came after the Navy confirmed reports on Monday that the U.S. had sent two guided-missile destroyers to the waters off South Korea—a deployment that the White House and Pentagon hadn’t intended to publicize and wasn’t part of the playbook, officials said. Yesterday Pentagon Press Secretary George Little said the U.S. wanted to lower the "temperature" on the peninsula. Today, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel—one of the playbook’s chief backers—said during an address that the U.S. and other powers in the region don’t want to make a "complicated, combustible situation" even worse. He urged the North to tone down its rhetoric, holding out the prospect of a “path to peace.” (Adam Entous and Julian Barnes, “U.S. Dials back on Korean Show of Force,” Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2013)

Joel Wit: “Given the torrent of threats and insults hurtling out of Pyongyang these days, North Korea’s announcement Tuesday that it intends to restart facilities at its Yongbyon nuclear installation should come as no surprise. One of those facilities, a plutonium production reactor partially disabled under an agreement with the George W. Bush administration, should eventually be able to produce at least eight more nuclear weapons, adding significantly to Pyongyang’s existing small inventory. What will come as a surprise is that, until recently, the North had been willing to agree to steps that
could have prevented that outcome but was ignored by the United States and South Korea. ...The future of the 5 MWe reactor became an important subject for unofficial contacts between the North Koreans, myself and other Americans. For example, during a Track II meeting in Pyongyang in November 2010, senior North Korean Foreign Ministry officials made it very clear that they were willing to relinquish thousands of fuel rods in their possession that could have been used by the reactor, rods that could help produce as many as eight nuclear bombs. That would have been a first step toward permanently disabling the facility, making sure the reactor would never again be a threat. Of course, the North Koreans wanted compensation -- standard practice in the international nuclear fuel industry -- and they wanted more than the rods were worth. But that was clearly their opening position. The offer was repeated during meetings in March 2011 in Berlin and once again in Pyongyang at the end of that year. Each time, the North Korean proposal was dutifully reported to the Obama administration in briefings for the White House, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community. The Lee Myung-bak administration was familiar with the offer, as they would have been intimately involved in any effort to shut Yongbyon down because Lee’s predecessor had been willing to pay for the rods to take them off North Korea’s hands. The North Korean initiative was duly noted, but the United States and South Korea failed to take advantage of the opportunity to ensure that North Korea wasn’t able to restart the reactor and turn the rods into new nuclear bombs. Some U.S. officials felt it wasn’t worth the effort since the reactor was old and probably useless. Others believed that Washington should focus entirely on stopping Pyongyang’s much more threatening program to enrich uranium, unveiled in late 2010, rather than putting the final nail in the coffin of the plutonium production program. Still others, infected by the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience,” did not want to do much of anything before the North demonstrated its willingness to reform and end its bad behavior. By August 2012, when another unofficial meeting was held in Singapore, the North Koreans’ position had shifted. It was clear that Washington and Seoul were going to be in for tough times after their respective presidential elections at the end of the year. According to an estimate by Siegfried Hecker, the former head of the Los Alamos Weapons lab now at Stanford University, the North Koreans may need as little as six months to restart the reactor. Unless they are willing to operate at very low power levels, reducing the output of plutonium, they will need to rebuild the cooling tower or put in place some sort of alternative cooling system. That might take six months. Another important job will be to modify some of the thousands of fuel rods either meant for another reactor or complete unfinished rods so that they can be used by the 5 MWe system. That task also may take six months from start to finish. Both of these tasks can be done concurrently. The missed opportunity to stop the restart of the 5 MWe reactor and make sure Pyongyang has eight fewer nuclear weapons is now water under the bridge. More importantly, if the North Koreans make good on their threat, it’s one more sign, if we need it, that Pyongyang is moving full-steam ahead with becoming a small nuclear power. How many nuclear weapons they will eventually produce is anyone’s guess. But one thing should be clear by now: The Obama administration’s policy toward North Korea has failed.” (Joel Wit, “The North Korea Deal That Wasn’t,” Foreign Policy, April 3, 2013)
President Park Geun-hye’s North Korea policy — dubbed the “trustpolitik” doctrine — is drawing criticism for lacking clear focus or detailed plans of action. “I suggest that the Park administration come up with more detailed policies on North Korea,” said Yoon Yeo-sang, a researcher at the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights. “Trust-building between the two Koreas can only be achieved through interaction. The relationship cannot move forward while sticking to a past-oriented concept of ‘trust.’” “The Park government’s willingness to engage is essential to improve inter-Korean ties,” said Prof. Kim Hyun-wook of the state-run Korea National Diplomatic Academy. “But the administration needs to push forward with the trust-building process more aggressively.” Asked when the trust-building process might begin, foreign and unification ministry officials said now is clearly not the time due to increased tension after the North’s February 12 nuclear test and continued military threats. In their 2013 policy plan reported to the president last week, the ministries reported providing humanitarian aid to the North would not be conditional to Pyongyang abandoning its nuclear program. Following this, the government allowed a private charity group to send tuberculosis medicine to North Korea, raising hopes of further positive engagement. “Responsible measures must first be taken by North Korea in order for the South to lift all punitive measures and push forward with the trust-building process,” said Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae at a recent news briefing. Foreign Minister Yun Byeong-se also said in a recent meeting with reporters that the doctrine “forms the basis” of Park’s North Korean policy and that its execution is not constrained to any time span. “Implementation of specific policies can change depending on the situation on and beyond the Korean Peninsula,” Yun said. “Park’s North Korean policy is unfocused because she sought to depart from Lee’s policy of laying out conditions,” said an insider on North Korean issues who requested anonymity. “Her policy in turn has no essence to it.” (Chung Min-uck, “Action Plans Missing in ‘Trust Process,” Korea Times, April 3, 2013)

China has demanded that a trilateral summit it was slated to attend in late May in Seoul with Japan and South Korea be postponed because of its ongoing dispute over the Japan-held Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, sources said. South Korea, which is scheduled to chair the annual meeting of the three countries’ leaders this year, has urged China to drop the demand, but Beijing has refused, the sources said, giving rise to speculation that the summit will not be held until June or later. Beijing’s demand comes despite signs of improved Sino-Japanese ties, which have soured over the Senkaku row, with former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda arranging to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in China later this month. But the move suggests Beijing believes it is too soon for the leaders of China and Japan to meet face to face as a way to repair ties, amid continuing tensions over the Japan-controlled islets, which China also claims and calls Diaoyu. The Chinese stance was conveyed to Japan via South Korea, according to the sources. South Korea sounded out Japan and China about holding the trilateral summit in Seoul on May 25 and 26. But a Chinese official demanded that it be postponed, the sources said. At a news conference in Tokyo late last month, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua took a cautious stance on a summit with Japan. “It would not be good for the top leaders to get into a fight as soon as they meet,” he said. (Kyodo, “Senkaku Row Prompts China to Demand Postponement of Summit with Japan, South Korea: Sources,” April 4, 2013)
A North Korean defector boomeranged back to his homeland by crossing the inter-Korean maritime border, evading a South Korean military that is on high alert after daily threats from Pyongyang. South Korea’s Defense Ministry told reporters April 4 that the 28-year-old defector, Lee Hyeok-cheol, crossed the Northern Limit Line, de facto maritime border between the two Koreas in the Yellow Sea, in a stolen fishing boat. According to the South’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lee stole a 9.7-ton fishing boat from Yeonpyeong Island, a frontline island only 0.8 nautical miles (1.5 kilometers) south of North Korean territory, at around 10:30 p.m. on April 3 and sailed away. The owner of the stolen boat said he left the key in its ignition. South Korean marines detected the boat on two radar devices on Yeonpyeong Island at 10:46 p.m. when it was about 0.6 nautical miles south of the NLL, the military said. The boat crossed the border at 10:49 p.m. At 10:51 p.m., the marines ordered a high-speed boat to chase the defector. At 10:54 p.m., the speed boat departed from Yeonpyeong. It failed to find the defector’s boat. The military said it has only two radar units on Yeonpyeong, but they monitor the northern regions of the island, not the southern region, which was where the boat was stolen. They couldn’t detect Lee until he had almost reached the border. The military and police launched a joint investigation into whether Lee was a double agent all along sent to the South to spy. According to the Unification Ministry, Lee defected to the South on March 21, 2007 via China. He worked as a fisherman in Pohang, a coastal city in North Gyeongsang, until he came to Yeonpyeong Island on February 27 to look for a job as a fisherman. The ministry said Lee told one of his friends in Pohang on February 24 that he would “attend a wedding ceremony” and went to Seoul. At the time, tensions were rising in the aftermath of North Korea’s third nuclear test. But the Unification Ministry said it is not illegal for a North Korean defector to travel anywhere in the country, including a frontline island. “After they finished their mandatory education in the Hanawon resettlement center, there is no legal problem for them to go anywhere,” a Unification Ministry official said. “Still, they should report their travel to the government and Lee apparently violated this rule. (Chang Se-jeong and Kim Hee-jin, “Defector Sails Home across the NLL,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 5, 2013)
stark fact, even plans ‘military operation for rescuing hostages,’ not content with insulting the dignity of the DPRK. This clearly proves that the group is trying to use the Kaesong Industrial Zone as a **fuse for provoking a war of aggression** against the DPRK. It is none other than the group which holds south Korean personnel in the Zone as hostages for a war of aggression against the DPRK. With no rhetoric can the group evade the responsibility for having created such a grim situation as today. The group should know that there is limit to the magnanimity of the DPRK. It had better control its mouth, mindful that the Zone is less than 40 km from Seoul. It has not yet come to its senses and is still asserting that the DPRK’s measure of prohibition will not last long. But this is foolish ambition. As the puppet forces are abusing the Zone as leverage for escalating confrontation with fellow countrymen, the **shutdown of the Zone has become imminent**. If the south Korean puppet group and conservative media keep vociferating about the Zone, we will take a resolute measure of withdrawing all our personnel from the Zone. The group should clearly understand that the fate of the Kaesong Industrial Zone is on the verge of bankruptcy.” (KCNA, “CPRK Spokesman Slams S. Korean Group for Vociferating about Kaesong Industrial Complex,” April 4, 2013)

North Korea threatened to close a joint industrial park in Kaesong one day after it barred South Koreans’ entry, fueling concerns about their possible detention. Pyongyang’s official media said its Wednesday decision resulted from Seoul’s conservative politicians and news outlets “speaking nonsense that we would not be able to do anything with the Gaeseong Industrial Complex.” “Military provocations against the complex mean a self-destruction of the traitor forces,” a spokesman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea said in a report from KCNA. “The industrial district’s closure is nearing reality under the current condition with the puppet forces abusing it as a venue for fratricidal confrontation.” Propaganda website Uriminzokkiri TV claimed that the regime has refrained from shutting down the complex so that South Korean businesses and employees would not lose their livelihoods. “It is not us but the South Korean puppet forces and petty firms who benefit from the joint factory zone,” it said. “If the puppet forces continue to churn out remarks hurting our dignity, the grave step of a lockout will be taken immediately.” The reports are apparently aimed at dismissing a widespread view in the South that the communist regime would not permanently close the Kaesong complex, which is a major source of hard currency. With some 800 countrymen remaining in the North, the government is striving to ensure their safety, activating its emergency round-the-clock contact system and some 1,300 civilian communication lines. Even in the 2009 incident, a Hyundai Asan Corp. employee was detained for 136 days. Cheong Wa Dae’s national security office convenes a meeting every morning to discuss the situation with presidential secretaries on foreign affairs and security, unification and crisis management, spokeswoman Kim Haing said. Earlier in the day, more than 520 officials and workers gathered in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, hoping to cross the border but were turned back again. Around 220 people are expected to come home throughout the day for the weekend. Pyongyang has requested some firms at Gaeseong to submit their lists of remaining workers who plan to return to the South by April 10, the Unification Ministry said. Concerned about any manufacturing delays and subsequent revenue shortfalls, many executives and workers are postponing their
departure and asking for more time. “People inside are anxious because the situation is more serious than usual,” a 37-year-old female surnamed Kwon told reporters as she arrived at the Gyeongui Highway Transit Office in the border city. “It’s been all right so far because all companies have food materials good for one week. But there will be a huge problem if this situation drags on.” Industry organizations issued a statement and urged the North to lift the entry ban, saying the complex “must maintain normal production activities in all circumstances.” “A couple of factories have suspended operations because of a lack of gas supplies,” said Kim Ki-mun, chairman of the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Businesses, at a news conference in Paju. “We’re extending our stay to work as long as we can while monitoring the situation, and hoping the problem will be positively resolved.” (Shin Hyon-hee, “N.K. Threatens to Shut down Kaesong Complex,” Korea Herald, April 4, 2013)

Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin said that North Korea has moved an intermediate-range missile to its east coast for an imminent test firing or military drill, but it does not seem to be aimed at striking the U.S. mainland. In a parliamentary defense committee meeting, Kim refuted media reports that Pyongyang has moved a KN-08 missile, which is believed to have a range of 10,000 kilometers, into position to strike the U.S. Without specifying the type of missile, Kim said it is believed to be able to reach a “considerable distance,” though it is not able to strike the U.S. mainland. “The missile does not seem to be aimed at the U.S. mainland,” Kim told lawmakers. “It could be aimed at test firing or military drills.” According to intelligence analysis by South Korean and U.S. forces, it is believed to be a Musudan missile, which is estimated to have a range of 3,000-4,000 km, putting the U.S. base in Guam within striking. (Kim Eun-jung, “Defense Chief Says North’s Missile Movement Not Aimed at U.S. Mainland,” Yonhap, April 4, 2013) North Korea has loaded two intermediate-range missiles onto mobile launchers and hidden them in an unidentified facility near the east coast, Seoul military sources said Friday, triggering speculation that the North is ready for an abrupt missile launch. “Early this week, the North has moved two Musudan missiles on the train and placed them on mobile launchers,” a senior military official familiar with the knowledge of the matter said. The North’s concealing the missiles atop the mobile launcher platform is seen as an attempt to launch missiles in a surprise move, the official said, noting it was not clear whether the move is for a test firing or military drills. The isolated communist nation has not yet conducted a test firing of the Musudan missile, which was first revealed to the international community in October 2010 during a military parade in Pyongyang. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea Loads Two Medium-Range Missiles on Mobile Launchers,” Yonhap, April 5, 2013)

The tense situation on the Korean Peninsula is drawing major attention from the international media, with some raising the possibility of a military clash between North and South. The situation now could be enough to push Washington into taking steps toward dialogue with Pyongyang. But it has not shown any signs of doing so yet. The US government certainly is acutely aware of the need for dialogue to make a breakthrough in relieving the tensions. A senior diplomatic source said there was “growing concern” in Washington about the possibility of a clash erupting. So why has Washington be so reluctant to take action? Part of this is due to the awkwardness of
taking action amid an ongoing offensive from Pyongyang, but analysts also attributed it to a kind of aftereffect of failed negotiations with North Korea in the past. “You don’t see anyone [in Washington] willing to take the initiative in dialogue with Pyongyang,” said a diplomatic source. “I think that after the February 29 agreement [in 2012] fell through after just 16 days, there’s more of a sense that you’ll only get hurt by leading the push for negotiations.” Indeed, some have seen the 2009 departure of Christopher Hill, a leading proponent of negotiations who spearheaded the six-party talks as Assistant Secretary of State during the George W. Bush administration, as a “resignation in disgrace” after failing at dialogue with North Korea. Also adding to Washington’s reluctance is its increased emphasis on China’s role since last year. The idea is that Beijing should cooperate in using its considerable diplomatic and economic influence over North Korea to induce changes there. The problem is that China has different strategic objectives. While there have been signs of change since late last year, there is little possibility of Beijing significantly reorienting its North Korea policy over a short time. A diplomatic source noted that China was angry enough about North Korea rejecting its calls not to launch a long-range rocket last December that it agreed on a UN Security Council resolution sanctioning the country, but added, “We have no way of knowing how rigorously China plans to enforce the sanctions.” This provides some explanation for Kerry’s recent call for South Korea to take action in improving inter-Korean relations. A senior diplomatic source called it “actually very significant” that Kerry said improved relations would be “helpful” in achieving the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, without mentioning a role for the US in improving relations with North Korea. “I think his idea is that it would also benefit the US if things improved between North and South Korea first,” the source said. (Park Hyun, “The Chances of Dialogue between N. Korea and the U.S.,” Hankyore, April 4, 2013)

After years of largely ignoring threats from North Korea, some residents say they are becoming a bit jittery, with the ascension of an unpredictable young leader in Pyongyang and levels of hostile rhetoric not seen since the early 1990s. Coffee shops here are still packed, and pop music pulses from storefronts, but South Koreans’ concerns are palpable in quieter moments. Their phones buzz with news updates on the North’s latest moves – its declaration of war; its announcement of plans to restart key nuclear facilities; its barricade of a joint industrial complex near the border. Children ask their parents what would happen if fighting broke out and where they would go for safety. Today, the fear spread to South Korea’s stock market, which suffered its biggest daily fall of the year. Rather than play down the possibility of an attack, South Korean officials in recent days have emphasized their ability to strike back promptly. They have also welcomed recent U.S. shows of force in the region. South Koreans differ in their views of their increasingly belligerent northern neighbor. Some speak with confidence, saying the North’s near-daily threats are part of a coherent plan to force negotiations, not spark war. But others fear that the North’s new leader, Kim Jong Un, might push things too far, perhaps because he thinks he needs a major conflict to coalesce domestic support. That divergence is reflected in public opinion polls. Over the past two months, the percentage of South Koreans who say the North is their top concern has more than tripled. Still, that represents just 26 percent of respondents; more South Koreans care about job creation than about Pyongyang.
Even the segment that is concerned about the North is far from panicking. During a crisis 20 years ago sparked by North Korea’s announced intent to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, some in South Korea rushed to stock up on canned goods and water. This time, grocery-store shelves remain full. Over the past several decades, Park said, South Koreans have been “gradually immunized” against the North’s threats. And for all the North’s recent bluster, nothing it has done lately compares with the galling attacks of the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s, which included hacking to death two U.S. troops in the demilitarized zone, numerous assassination attempts against South Korean presidents and the midair sabotage of a South Korean passenger plane. After a fatal attack by the North in November 2010, South Koreans were at least as angry with their own government as they were with Pyongyang. When the North shelled a front-line island, killing two soldiers and two civilians, the South responded by lobbing 80 shells toward the North. Then-President Lee Myung-bak was criticized for not taking more serious action, leading to his pledge – reiterated by the current president, Park Geun-hye – to counter with greater force if provoked again.

One lingering concern, voiced by a minority of South Koreans, is whether the United States can act as a sufficient deterrent to the North at a time of defense budget cuts in Washington and major crises in the Middle East. The United States has tried to assuage those worries, and deter the North, by flying the stealth bombers over the peninsula and speeding up the deployment of a missile-defense system to Guam. South Korean analysts say they are most concerned about how either side can step back from the possibility of a confrontation over the next few months. The Obama administration has shown little interest in talking directly with the North, and the North is seen as having little interest in toning down its rhetoric – unless it can win some kind of concession. “If the U.S. doesn’t want to engage, that pushes North Korea even further” to provoke, said Kim Dong-sik, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul. “I don’t know how that scenario ends.” (Chico Harlan, “As N. Korean Threats Intensify, First Signs of Jitters in the South,” Washington Post, April 5, 2013, p. A-1)

North Korea has asked all embassies in Pyongyang to move out staff for their security amid sharp military tensions, but the United States said Friday it has no plans yet to take extraordinary steps with regard to Americans in the communist nation. The Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang serves as interim protecting power for the U.S. and provides basic consular services to American citizens. “We have been in touch with the Swedes, our protecting power in the DPRK, because obviously if they were to change their status, we would have to inform American citizens in the DPRK,” State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said, briefing reporters. “At this point, we have no reason to believe that they will make any changes.” She said she has no exact number of U.S. people staying in the North, adding the majority of Americans there are nongovernmental organization workers and occasional tourists. (Yonhap, “N.Korea Asks Foreign Officials to Leave Pyongyang,” Korea Herald, April 6, 2013)

North Korea’s torrent of threats – and the matching show of military power and political resolve from the United States and South Korea – began showing signs of unsettling foreign investors’ confidence. The development magnified the challenges Seoul and Washington face. The two powers are trying to show the North’s novice leader, Kim Jong-un, that they will not be blackmailed by his bluff and bluster. But at
the same time, they do not want to escalate the tensions to an extent that they hurt the South Korean economy, the pride of the local population, or President Park Geun-hye's political standing at home. “In the past, North Korea-related events had little impact or the markets recovered quickly,” the South’s vice finance minister, Choo Kyung-ho, told a meeting of top finance officials today. “But recent threats from North Korea are stronger and the impact may therefore not disappear quickly.” His comment came hours after the chief executive of General Motors, Dan Akerson, underscored the increased concern by saying that his company was making contingency plans for employee safety at its South Korean plants and that further increases in tensions would prompt G.M. to look at moving production elsewhere. In an interview with CNBC television, he said, “If there were something to happen in Korea, it’s going to affect our entire industry, not just General Motors.” South Korean stocks slumped 1.64 percent Friday in a selling spree among foreign investors that analysts attributed to jitters over North Korea. The South Korean won also sank against the U.S. dollar. “The North Koreans are now using the propaganda in an extreme form to try to damage foreign direct investments into South Korea,” said Tom Coyner, a member of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea and author of “Doing Business in Korea.” “They are, in a sense at this point, winning in an asymmetrical psychological warfare, attacking the economic strength of South Korea.” War cries from North Korea have been factored into the stock market for decades. Still, its threats have grown in their intensity and frequency since the country upheld Kim as its top leader in late 2011, and especially after the United Nations imposed sanctions against the North following its nuclear test in February. The sanctions took direct aim at North Korea’s Achilles’ heel by focusing on cash transfers and luxury items, which the Kim regime uses to buy the loyalty of the elite. Also making this situation different was the way Washington and Seoul responded. South Korea matched the tone by declaring that if provoked, it would target the North Korean military leadership and by revising the rules of engagement to let its military respond more swiftly, forcefully and “without political consideration.” Meanwhile, the United States flew nuclear-capable bombers over the peninsula on training sorties and signed an agreement with Seoul to respond jointly to any North Korean provocation. “The relentless show of force on a daily basis by not just North Korea, but also the U.S. and South Korea as part of their annual military exercises, has captured the attention of the world, and made the Korean Peninsula a place associated not with ‘Gangnam Style’ but with nuclear weapons and stealth bombers,” said John Delury, an American scholar who teaches at Yonsei University in Seoul. “Markets hate risk, even if it is the perception, rather than reality of risk,” he added. “This poses a serious challenge to President Park, who was elected on the basis of promises to keep growing the South Korean economy and improve relations with the North.” Officials said that the military tensions had so far had only limited effects on the markets. But for the South Korean economy, the North Korean imbroglio is an additional drag at an inopportune time. In the face of the weakening Japanese yen, which hurts South Korean exporters, South Korea recently announced a sharp cut in growth forecasts. Officials vowed to ensure stability if the situation got worse. An important test is whether North Korea will go so far as to close down a joint industrial park in the North Korean town of Kaesong. The complex, where South Korean factories use low-cost North Korean labor, is a major source of hard currency for Pyongyang and stands as the last major symbol of inter-Korean cooperation. Seoul officials have cited the project
when they wanted to show foreign investors that North Korean harsh rhetoric is not always matched by action. In a “Global Political Insights” report Friday, Citi Research said that “barring an outbreak of wide-scale military conflict, we think North Korean brinksmanship will not impact the South Korean economic fundamentals.” In a report earlier this week, Thomas J. Byrne and Steffen Dyck at Moody’s Investors Service expressed similar views but also mentioned “a heightened risk of military adventurism or miscalculation by the 30-something Kim Jong-un.” Lee Beom-ho, an analyst at Shinhan Investment Corp., said that markets had traditionally tended to dismiss North Korean brinkmanship. But this time, “the targets of North Korean threat have expanded and the international community has become more sensitive,” he said, referring to the North’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities and American plans to deploy more interceptor missiles to the region. “At the same time, there is doubt over the abilities of those who are supposed to deter North Korea, especially China.” In a sign of how accustomed South Korea has grown to the security provided by the military alliance with the United States, people in South Korea have shown few signs of agitation in recent weeks, even as North Korea has been bombarding their country almost daily with apocalyptic threats of “final destruction.” South Koreans remain more sensitive about foreign investors’ moves. During a previous North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, the market proved resilient when a videotaped threat by a North Korean official to turn Seoul into “a sea of fire” was leaked to the media. But later that year, when Washington drew up plans to evacuate Americans from South Korea before a planned surgical strike at the North Korean nuclear facilities, South Koreans rushed to supermarkets, hoarding goods, and the stock market took a dive. Officials and analysts in South Korea suspect that North Korea, no longer able to fight a conventional war or even start a major skirmish with the South without suffering a humiliating strike-back, was increasingly resorting to other forms of warfare, like hacking South Korean banks and broadcasters. “Most people say they are used to a lot of blustering and posturing by North Korea and we should not take it too seriously,” Mr. Coyner said. “But it needs to be taken seriously in the sense that it is already proving to be effective where foreign multinationals are looking at political risk contingency option.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Tensions with North Unsettle South Korean Economy,” New York Times, April 5, 2013)

Tokyo and Washington agreed on a roadmap for the reversion of five U.S. military sites in Okinawa, pledging to accelerate the handover of Camp Zukeran, the Makiminato Service Area, Camp Kuwae, the army port in Naha and Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1. The two sides also assented to transfer the operations, in fiscal 2022 or later, of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in the heavily populated city of Ginowan to an airstrip to be built in the Henoko coastal area in the city of Nago, farther north on Okinawa Island, once the replacement site is operational. By showing Okinawans concrete schedules and plans for the return and redevelopment of the five sites, all situated south of U.S. Kadena Air Base, the central government apparently hopes to resurrect the plan to replace the Futenma base within the prefecture, a move already stymied for 17 years by local opposition. “We were able to reach an agreement on plans to return (facilities and land now used by the U.S. military) south of the Kadena Air Base. It was (an) extremely meaningful (agreement) to lessen the burden on Okinawa,” Prime Minister Abe told reporters, adding the accord demonstrates to the world that the mutual trust between Japan and the U.S. is on solid ground amid an
“increasingly severe national security environment.” According to the plan, however, four of the five complexes will be returned only after alternative sites are secured within existing U.S. military facilities in Okinawa or a large number of the U.S. Marines in the prefecture are redeployed overseas. The new plan divides the five military sites south of Kadena into 13 smaller areas, each with different reversion timetables. In the earliest return, part of the Makiminato Service Area will be handed over to Japan this fiscal year or later. Seven of the sites, including Kuwae Tank Farm No.1, will be closed and their operations re-established elsewhere in Okinawa as early as fiscal 2022. Two areas will be returned in fiscal 2024 or later after marine contingents redeploy overseas. The U.S. and Japan will review how the plan progresses every three years. The timelines may change depending on the progress, a Defense Ministry official said. The plan’s future is thus cloaked in uncertainty, given the fervent antimilitary sentiment of Okinawa residents, who oppose construction of any new U.S. forces installations. The prefecture has meanwhile demanded the early reversion of all five sites, saying redevelopment of these areas would greatly benefit the local economy. Abe and U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos signed the new agreement. Japan and the United States in 2006 agreed to replace the Futenma air station by 2014, but due to persistent local opposition they were forced to abandon this deadline in 2011 and amend the wording of the pact to read: “at the earliest possible date.” The two countries had agreed on the return of the five sites south of Kadena as well, but since that deal was packaged with the contentious Futenma replacement, it meant they would revert to Japan’s control only after the new airstrip was built at Henoko. Last April, Tokyo and Washington agreed to delink Futenma’s replacement and the reversion of the five other sites. (Aoki Mizuho and Yoshida Reiji, “Okinawa U.S. Land Return Plan Linked,” Japan Times, April 5, 2013) Protest banners, raised fists and angry shouts greeted Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera after he landed in Okinawa Prefecture on April 6. Residents made sure Japan’s defense chief knew how they felt about a Japan-U.S. agreement announced the previous day on the return of land now used by six U.S. military facilities to the south of Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture. They said the agreement does not specify any time frame for the return of the land and appears intended to keep the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma within the prefecture. "Listen to the voice of the Okinawa people," the protesters shouted ahead of Onodera’s meeting with Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima in Naha. The 120 protesters included Diet members, citizens and prefectural assembly members angry and frustrated over the lack of progress in removing U.S. military bases from the prefecture. The demonstrators called for the unconditional return of land used by the Futenma air station and argued against the planned relocation of the base to the Henoko area of Nago, also in Okinawa. (Asahi Shimbun, “Okinawans Blast Vague Plan to Return Land Used by U.S. Military,” April 6, 2013)

Hecker: “Q. How concerned should we be about North Korea’s announcement that it will restart all its nuclear facilities? Does this fundamentally change the threat imposed by Pyongyang? Hecker: It does not immediately change the threat, but it really complicates the long-term picture. This announcement indicates that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is severely limited by a lack of fissile materials -- plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) -- to fuel its bombs. Despite its recent threats, North Korea does not yet have much of a nuclear arsenal because it lacks fissile materials and has
limited nuclear testing experience. In the long term, it's important to keep it that way; otherwise North Korea will pose a much more serious threat. So, it is important that they don't produce more fissile materials and don't conduct more nuclear tests. The Kim Jong-un regime has already threatened to conduct more tests, and with this announcement they are telling the world that they are going to make more bomb fuel. I should add that they also need more bomb fuel to conduct more nuclear tests. … Q. What do you make of the previous threats to launch an all-out nuclear war against the United States and South Korea? Does North Korea have the technical means to do so? Hecker: I don’t believe North Korea has the capacity to attack the United States with nuclear weapons mounted on missiles and won’t for many years. Its ability to target and strike South Korea is also very limited. And even if Pyongyang had the technical means, why would the regime want to launch a nuclear attack when it fully knows that any use of nuclear weapons would result in a devastating military response and would spell the end of the regime? Nevertheless, this is an uneasy situation with a potential for miscalculations from a young and untested leader. Q. Could you explain what you see as North Korea’s capabilities in regard to putting nuclear warheads on short-, medium-, and long-range missiles? Hecker: North Korea has conducted only three nuclear tests. The 2006 test was partially successful; the 2009 and 2013 tests likely were fully successful. With so few tests, the North Korean ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads to fit on its missiles is severely limited. After the first two tests, I did not believe North Korea had sufficient test experience to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to fit on any of its missiles. I believed the nuclear devices tested were likely primitive -- on the order of the Nagasaki device, which weighed roughly 5,000 kilograms. Official North Korea news outlets implied they were more advanced, and some Western analysts agreed. I stated that they needed additional nuclear tests to miniaturize. Q. After the test on February 13, Pyongyang announced that it had successfully tested a smaller and lighter nuclear device. North Korean news media also specifically stated that this was unlike the first two, confirming that the earlier tests involved primitive devices. The Kim Jong-un regime followed the claim of having smaller and lighter warheads with threats of launching nuclear-tipped missiles against the United States and South Korea. Hecker: My colleague Nick Hansen and I do not believe that the North Koreans have the capability to miniaturize a warhead to fit on a long-range missile that can reach the United States because the weight and size limits are prohibitive for them. They have insufficient nuclear test experience. Although last December they were able to launch a satellite into space, it is much more difficult to develop a warhead, fit it into a reentry body, and have it survive the enormous mechanical and thermal stresses of reentry on its way to a target. In April 2012, Pyongyang paraded a road-mobile long-range missile we call the KN-08. It may have been designed to reach as far as Alaska and the US West Coast, but to our knowledge it has never been test fired. There is some evidence that the first-stage engine may have been tested last year and early this year at the Sohae (Tongchang) launch site on North Korea’s West Coast. North Korea would need a lot more missile tests as well as more nuclear tests to present a serious long-range threat. Q. What about what medium-range and short-range missiles -- ones that could reach South Korea or Japan? Hecker: A road-mobile, intermediate-range ballistic missile we call the Musudan was apparently paraded in Pyongyang in 2007 and again in October 2010, when photos were actually released by official North Korean news media. The
Musudan is believed to have a range of about 3,000 kilometers, meaning it could reach all of South Korea and Japan and come close to reaching Guam. As far as we know, this missile has also never been test fired. Western and South Korean news media reported that some of these missiles have apparently recently been moved to the Tonghae (Musudan) launch site on the East Coast and that North Korea may be preparing for test launches. However, overhead imagery from April 4 shows very little activity at the launch site, and we consider it unlikely that any kind of launch was planned for at least the next week. It is possible that North Korea may instead move these road-mobile missiles to the training base at Kittaeryong, several hundred kilometers to the south. This base has been used to launch most of the Scud and Nodong tactical missiles. In any case, for now the threat from medium-range missiles is also low. The situation is not so clear for the short-range missiles that can reach South Korea and parts of Japan. The North Koreans are believed to have close to 1,000 short-range missiles, such as the KN-02, a version of the Soviet SS-21; various versions of the Soviet Scud; and the Nodong. These can reach distances from 70 to 1,000 kilometers with payloads ranging from 500 to 1,000 kilograms. But we know little about the sophistication of North Korea’s warheads. They likely made some progress toward miniaturization with the third test, but we don’t even know whether or not they switched from plutonium, which we believe they used for the first two tests, to a highly enriched uranium (HEU) device for the third test. However, thanks to Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan, the North Koreans almost certainly have HEU designs for such a device that could fit on some of their short-range missiles. The reliability and accuracy of all but North Korea’s shortest-range missiles is questionable. Without a serious testing program with instrumented dummy warheads and a more extensive nuclear testing program, it does not make much sense to consider launching a nuclear-tipped missile that could blow up in your own backyard. Q. So, in your opinion, is the US placement of additional missile-defense systems in the region a reasonable response, or an overreaction? Hecker: In spite of the fact that we consider North Korea’s capability to field any nuclear-tipped missile low, we simply don’t know for sure. We also consider the likelihood that Pyongyang would decide to launch such a missile very low, because the launch would bring a devastating military response from the combined US and South Korean forces and spell an end to the Kim regime. Nevertheless, we have been surprised before by North Korea’s capabilities, and we simply cannot rule out a miscalculation on the part of the new, inexperienced leader. Therefore, we consider it prudent to prepare missile-defense capabilities, both for Northeast Asia and for the United States. It is also important to try to head off North Korea’s drive toward more and better bombs and better delivery capabilities. If we don’t, the risk will increase. Q. If North Korea launches a missile from its East Coast in the general direction of Japan, will US radar and tracking systems be able to tell quickly whether the missile is a test aimed into the ocean or an attack on (say) Japan? In other words, would the prudent response to such a launch be to try to shoot down the missile, regardless? Hecker: The radars on shore in Japan and on US and Japanese ships could quickly determine if a missile is headed to targets in Japan or South Korea, or to the open sea. In the recent past, Pyongyang has given notice when it was about to launch a missile that is expected to leave its territory. Hansen and I would expect the North Korean government to do the same this time. If it does, we don’t think it would be prudent to intercept it, because tensions in the area are so high. However, if the North Koreans
don’t give notice, we favor shooting it down. Q. The Kim Jong-un regime has reiterated and apparently put into law that North Korea will not give up its nuclear arsenal. Does the current announcement really make things that much worse? Hecker: I have previously stated that North Korea has the bomb, but not yet much of an arsenal. It has been clear for some time that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons, so what we should have focused on is to make sure things don’t get worse. I have stated it as the three noes: no more bombs, no better bombs, and no export. We don’t know much about North Korea’s nuclear exports, but that potential is a serious concern. Pyongyang took a step toward better bombs with its successful February 12 nuclear test, although it still has little test experience. The current announcement demonstrates that [the North Koreans] will now redouble efforts to get more bombs by increasing their capacity to make plutonium and HEU. It won’t happen quickly because these are time-consuming efforts -- but it bodes ill for the future. Q. Let’s look at the technical issues of the latest announcement. What do you think Pyongyang means by “readjusting and restarting all the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon?” Hecker: The restarting is easy to decipher: They plan to take the 5-megawatt-electric (MWe), gas-graphite plutonium production reactor out of mothballs and bring the plutonium reprocessing facility back into operation. The “readjusting” comment is less clear. It may mean that they will reconfigure the uranium enrichment facility they showed to John Lewis, Bob Carlin, and me in 2010 from making low-enriched uranium (LEU at 3 to 5 percent for reactor fuel) to making highly enriched uranium (HEU at 90 percent for bomb fuel). Q. Was the new centrifuge facility you saw in 2010 making LEU? Hecker: Actually, we could not confirm that uranium enrichment centrifuge facility was operating, or that it was making LEU reactor fuel. However, that is what they told us -- and in my opinion, they likely have produced, if any fuel, only LEU for their experimental light water reactor (LWR) at that facility since then. So, this announcement may mean that they will now redirect that facility to making HEU. Q. How difficult would it be for North Korea to adjust its centrifuge facility to make HEU? And how much HEU could they make? Hecker: Not very difficult. It just requires reconfiguration of the various centrifuge cascades and adjusting operational procedures. That could be done very rapidly. They most likely had everything prepared in case they ever wanted to make this move. If they reconfigure, then based on our estimates, they could make roughly 40 kilograms of HEU annually in that facility -- that’s enough for one or two HEU bombs per year. Q. The announcement by North Korea’s state news agency said the North Koreans would develop a self-reliant nuclear power industry as well. Don’t they need the centrifuge facility to make LEU to do that? Hecker: Yes, they need LEU for the experimental LWR reactor fuel. However, based on what they told us in 2010, they had the capacity to make about 2 tons of LEU annually in the centrifuge facility. If they have operated it full-time since we were there, they may have enough fuel to operate the experimental LWR for several years. If that is the case, then they could afford to reconfigure the centrifuge plant now for HEU. The North Koreans will eventually need a much bigger centrifuge facility than the 2,000 centrifuges we saw, if they follow through with larger LWRs that can make sufficient electricity to help alleviate their power shortages. In any case, such reactors are still more than a decade away. Q. Didn’t you previously claim that they likely have another centrifuge facility? Hecker: On the basis of what I saw in November 2010, I concluded they must have a covert centrifuge facility (or facilities) and that it had likely been operational for years.
That experience allowed them to build the Yongbyon facility as rapidly as they did, which was in a little more than one year. I also concluded they likely had previously produced HEU at a clandestine facility. **Q.** If they have already produced HEU at an alternate facility, then why would they need to "readjust" the Yongbyon facility? **Hecker:** That’s not clear. I believed that the covert facilities were likely limited in enrichment capacity because they still need to import key materials and components. So, they may simply have decided that they need increased capacity to make HEU quickly, and the simplest way to get that was to reconfigure the Yongbyon facility from LEU to HEU. **Q.** Is there any indication that they actually have an HEU bomb? **Hecker:** We really don’t know. To the best of our knowledge, the first two nuclear tests, in 2006 and 2009, used plutonium for the bomb fuel. We do not know what was used in the most recent test on February 12. It could have been either HEU or plutonium. It would not surprise me if they have been pursuing both paths to the bomb; that’s what the United States did during the Manhattan Project. **Q.** What did you learn about the 5-MWe reactor during your November 2010 visit to Yongbyon? Will they really be able to restart it? **Hecker:** Lewis, Carlin, and I were shown the beginning of the construction of the small experimental light water reactor. The containment structure was just going up. I pointed to the 5-MWe reactor right next door and asked the chief engineer of the reactor, "What about the 5-MWe gas-graphite reactor?" He replied: "We have it in standby mode." I told him that people in the West claim it is beyond hope to restart. He chuckled and said, "Yes, I know, that’s what they also said in 2003, and they were wrong then as well." The reactor had been mothballed since 1994 as part of the Agreed Framework. The North Koreans restarted it in 2003 without much of a problem and ran two more campaigns to make plutonium. **Q.** Will we know when they restart the reactor? **Hecker:** Yes, using satellite imagery we should be able to see the steam plume from the cooling tower as soon as they rebuild and restart it.” *(Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Interview with Siegfried Hecker: North Korea Complicates the Long-Term Picture,” April 5, 2103)*

The Obama administration, detecting what it sees as a shift in decades of Chinese support for North Korea, is pressuring China’s new president, Xi Jinping, to crack down on the regime in Pyongyang or face a heightened American military presence in its region. In a flurry of exchanges that included a recent phone call from President Obama to Xi, administration officials said, they have briefed the Chinese in detail about American plans to upgrade missile defenses and other steps to deter the increasingly belligerent threats made by North Korea’s young leader, Kim Jong-un. China, which has been deeply suspicious of the American desire to reassert itself in Asia, has not protested publicly or privately as the United States has deployed ships and warplanes to the Korean Peninsula. That silence, American officials say, attests to both Beijing’s mounting frustration with the North and the recognition that its reflexive support for Pyongyang could strain its ties with Washington. “The timing of this is important,” Tom Donilon, Obama’s national security adviser, said in an interview. “It will be an important early exercise between the United States and China, early in the term of Xi Jinping and early in the second term of President Obama.” The White House said it was encouraged by how swiftly China had supported the sanctions, which followed a North Korean nuclear test and a missile launch. But some diplomats and analysts say China has dragged its feet in enforcing them. In a meeting with two senior American
officials who traveled to Beijing two weeks ago to try to persuade China to enforce new banking restrictions on North Korea, Chinese banking leaders showed little sign of compliance, said Marcus Noland, an expert on North Korea at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “But I wouldn’t expect them publicize it,” even if they did move ahead, Noland added. Many analysts say the sanctions cannot succeed without China’s cooperation, since it has close trade ties with North Korea and has in the past chosen to keep its government afloat by providing fuel and significant aid. China continues to say economic sanctions will not work. A Chinese diplomat who is involved in policy on North Korea said recently that he thought China would enforce the new United Nations sanctions to a point but would not go as far as the Obama administration wanted. Last month, Xi spoke by phone with the new president of South Korea, Park Geun-hye, telling Park how much China prized its ties with South Korea and offering China’s assistance in the “reconciliation and cooperation” of the two Koreas. Such sentiments, analysts said, would have been inconceivable from President Hu. By contrast, there has been little high-level contact between Kim and Chinese officials, which American officials cited as evidence of growing irritation on the part of the Chinese. “What we have seen is a subtle change in Chinese thinking,” Kurt M. Campbell, a former assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, said in a speech Thursday at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. The Chinese now believe North Korea’s actions are “antithetical” to their national security interests, he said. That thinking has also surfaced in recent articles by Chinese scholars that have called into question China’s policy. Deng Yuwen, influential deputy editor of a Communist Party journal, wrote in the Financial Times, “Beijing should give up on Pyongyang and press for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.” And yet Deng has since been suspended from his job, which underscores how little China’s attitude has changed. (Mark Landler, “U.S. Sees China as Lever to Press North Korea,” New York Times, April 6, 2013, p. A-1)

Responding to regional worries over North Korea’s bellicose threats, China expressed concern and what appeared to be veiled criticism of its long-time ally. “No one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains,” said President Xi Jinping at an economic forum in Hainan Province. Avoiding a mention of North Korea by name, Xi said, “While pursuing its own interests, a country should accommodate the legitimate interests of others.” Xi said that the international community and its collective scrutiny should act as a platform for common development rather than an “arena where gladiators fight each other.” China’s foreign ministry also issued a statement saying it was “seriously concerned” about the “continuously escalating tensions.” In even stronger language, China’s foreign minister called U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon last night about the problem, according to China’s foreign ministry. Wang repeated China’s oft-stated position that issues with North Korea can only be solved through dialogue, but he also said China is opposed to “any provocative words and actions from any party in the region and does not allow troublemaking at the doorsteps of China.” (William Wan, “China Expresses Concern over North Korea’s Rhetoric,” Washington Post, April 7, 2013)

The US has delayed an intercontinental ballistic missile test to avoid stoking tensions with North Korea, as fears escalated that weeks of angry rhetoric could erupt into
conflict on the Korean peninsula. A US defence official said Defense Secretary Chuck
Hagel postponed the Minuteman 3 test at Vandenberg Air Force Base until next month
due to concerns it "might be misconstrued by some as suggesting that we were
intending to exacerbate the current crisis with North Korea." "We wanted to avoid that
misperception or manipulation," the US official told AFP. "We are committed to testing
our ICBMs to ensure a safe, secure, effective nuclear arsenal." British Foreign Secretary
William Hague said Sunday he saw no immediate need to withdraw his country’s
diplomats. Hague also told the BBC the North is showing no sign of gearing up for "all-
out conflict" by repositioning its armed forces, and called for calm. The top national
security adviser to South Korea’s President Park Geun-Hye said Sunday the warning
was another ploy to force the South and the United States to reach out with face-saving
concessions. "We believe the North is trying to turn the situation around by making the
US send a special envoy, the South to offer dialogue and China or Russia to act as a
mediator," Kim Jang-Soo said. After non-stop escalation including the public
deployment of US warships and planes to the region, the Pentagon move was a
welcome measure to cool tensions, said Yang Moo-Jin from Seoul’s University of North
Korean Studies. "The US military may have felt that now was the time to pace itself after
weeks of hectic military confrontation," he told AFP. "If the North really launches
intermediate-range missiles as widely feared, the US may be partially blamed for
having pushed it to take such drastic action by deploying extremely threatening
weaponry near the Korean peninsula." (Jung Ha-won, “U.S. Delays Missile Test to Cool
N. Korea Tensions,” AFP, April 7, 2013)

As North Korea hints at new military provocations in the coming days, the United States
and South Korea have drawn up plans to respond more forcefully than in the recent
past, but in a limited way intended to prevent an escalation to broader war. A senior
adviser to President Obama, Dan Pfeiffer, appearing on the ABC program “This Week,”
played down the situation as “a pattern of behavior we’ve seen from the North Koreans
many times.” Still, the escalating tensions were underscored today when the
commander of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula, Gen. James D. Thurman, abruptly
canceled a trip to Washington for Congressional testimony and consultations. So did
South Korea’s top commander. U.S. officials described the new “counterprovocation”
plan as calling for an immediate but proportional “response in kind” – hitting the
source of any North Korean attack with similar weapons. For example, if the North
Koreans were to shell a South Korean island that had military installations, as has
occurred in the past, the plan calls for the South to retaliate quickly with a barrage of
artillery of similar intensity. South Korea’s national security director said today that the
North this week might launch one of its new missiles. If so, Pentagon officials said they
would be ready to calculate its trajectory within seconds and try to shoot it down if it
appeared headed toward impact in South Korea, Japan or Guam, an American
territory. But they planned to do nothing if it were headed toward open water, even if it
went over Japan, as one previous North Korean test did. The officials doubted that the
North’s new leader, Kim Jong-un, would risk aiming the missile at the United States or
its allies. Obama, officials say, has ruled out striking at the missiles while they are on
their launchers – when they are easiest to destroy – unless there is evidence they are
being fitted with nuclear warheads, which intelligence officials doubt North Korea yet
possesses. The key, then, is how to respond to anticipated North Korean hostilities
while preventing the crisis from escalating. “How we carry out a proportional retaliation without triggering a general conflict, or an assault on Seoul, is the hardest part of the problem,” said Gary Samore, who served until recently as Obama’s top nuclear adviser and is now executive director of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Everyone is aware there are not big margins for error here.” Some of the public language from the South Korean government suggests that Seoul and Washington may not agree on how far any retaliation should go, although the agreement between the two countries guarantees consultation. “Overreaction by South Korea is a real risk – and we’re working on that problem,” a senior administration official said. South Korea’s new president, Park Geun-hye, a daughter of a famed South Korean dictator from the cold war, has indicated that she might also go after the North’s command-and-control centers responsible for the provocation. In the past, classified addendums to the war plan for the Korean Peninsula have not been publicized. So it is notable that agreement on a new plan was publicly disclosed – both to deter the North and to reassure the population of the South. The nature of the response is critical. Ordering hostilities short of war in an effort to stage-manage the agenda with Seoul and Washington has been a major part of the playbook used by the past two generations of leaders in the North: rapid escalation of a crisis until the United States and South Korea buy temporary peace with aid or investments. But some American intelligence officials believe that Kim may have more to gain from striking out at his enemies – within reason – to bolster his credentials with his military, still deeply suspicious of his youth and inexperience. The absence of a clear understanding about when and how to use force on the peninsula reflects, in part, the rapid shifts over the past 20 years between hard-line South Korean governments and those advocating a “sunshine policy” of reaching out to the North. Park would be under extraordinary pressure to take action if the North acted out again. When the Cheonan, a South Korean warship, was sunk in March 2010, her predecessor decided not to strike back – and it took months to complete a study that concluded the explosion aboard the ship had been caused by a torpedo shot from a minisubmarine based just over the border in North Korea. Months later, the North shelled a lightly inhabited island in the South – and was met by delayed and ineffective return fire. “The new agreement defines action down to the tactical level and locks in alliance political consultations at the highest level,” an American official said. The official stressed that the South Korean military would take the lead in any response to hostilities from the North short of war. “North Korea has gotten away with murder – literally – for decades, and the South Korean and American forces have rarely responded with decisive military action,” said David S. Maxwell, a retired Army colonel who served five tours in South Korea. “It’s very important to break the cycle of provocation,” said Maxwell, now the associate director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University. “These responses have to be proportional. They have to be delivered decisively, at the time and at the point of provocation.” As part of prescheduled military exercises with South Korea, and to prove America’s commitment to regional security, the United States mounted an unusual, highly publicized show of force. It included the decision to use nuclear-capable B-2 bombers, which have a stealthy design to avoid detection, to conduct a mock bombing run in South Korea. At the same time, the Navy moved two missile defense ships into the area, both of which carry advanced radar and interceptor missiles. A ground-based system with a similar missile defense capability was ordered
moved to Guam, two years ahead of schedule, to protect that territory and allow the two ships to patrol waters closer to the Korean Peninsula. A Pentagon official said today that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel had postponed tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile that had been planned for this week, concerned that they might “exacerbate the crisis with North Korea.” The tests will be rescheduled. The additional American military presence is believed to be highly worrisome to Beijing, and it is intended to be. It is an effort to demonstrate to the Chinese that unless they get their ward under control, they will invite exactly the kind of American military presence in northeast Asia that they are hoping will go away. “There are some who question our long-term staying power in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in a time of spending constraints,” one American official said. “So it is important to show our allies that we can still project power in a very meaningful and rapid way.” But seen from a North Korean perspective, the Americans do not stand quite as tall as they once did. After three successive American presidents have said they could not tolerate a nuclear North Korea, they are tolerating it. Moreover, the South has made North Korean retaliation even easier. New housing developments sprawl north of Seoul, in areas the South Koreans had once planned to keep as a buffer zone—and well within range of more than 10,000 short-range artillery and rocket launchers deployed by the North. So far, the Obama administration has not tried to interfere with a North Korean long-range missile test, even though the North is prohibited from fielding these weapons by United Nations Security Council resolutions. But in the days leading up to a 2006 test launching of a North Korean missile, two prominent Democrats, William Perry, a former defense secretary, and Ashton B. Carter, a Harvard professor who is currently the deputy secretary of defense, wrote in The Washington Post that the Bush administration should destroy the missile on the North Korean launching pad. “Should the United States allow a country openly hostile to it and armed with nuclear weapons to perfect an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of delivering nuclear weapons to U.S. soil?” they wrote. “We believe not.” In any event, that missile blew up by itself, about 40 seconds after it was launched. (David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Designs a Korea Response Proportional to the Provocation,” New York Times, April 8, 2013, A-1)

North Korea said that it would pull out all of its workers from the inter-Korean industrial complex in its border city of Kaesong, jeopardizing the last remaining symbol of bilateral economic cooperation. Kim Yang-gon, the Workers’ Party’s secretary in charge of South Korean affairs, said the communist state would tentatively put operation at the complex on hold and consider whether or not to scrap it. “How the situation will develop in the future will entirely depend on the South Korean government’s attitude,” he said in a statement carried by KCNA. Kim made the comments after he inspected the complex and assigned its officials there “concrete tasks for being fully prepared to deal with any incident,” according to KCNA. During a parliamentary session, Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said there was no need for negotiations with regard to the complex, claiming that if the North allowed the reentry of South Korean workers to the complex, the situation would simply “return to normalcy.” “The complex has been in existence for a decade as a symbol of inter-Korean coexistence and peace,” he said. “We should not let it be broken up due to unclear reasons.” Fourteen factories have suspended production so far due to a lack of
food and production materials, and power and fuel supplies, according to the ministry. Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said another five plants are expected to follow suit within the day. “I just can’t understand why (North Korea) is pushing a project maintained by former leader Kim Jong-il into an abnormal condition,” Ryoo said at the National Assembly. “If the situation comes to this project being halted or all our workers completely pulling out, inter-Korean relations will greatly regress.” Ok Sung-suk, president of clothing firm Nine Mode and vice president of an association of companies running plants in the district, said nearly all remaining factories will be forced to freeze operations until Wednesday. “Workers bring with them a week’s worth of foodstuffs and other necessities when they go back up to Gaeseong after the weekend. The fact that they failed to enter today means their weeklong food load has run out,” Ok told reporters at the Dorasan Customs, Immigration and Quarantine office in Paju, Gyeonggi Province. “Though they have been rationing food and sharing with others since last Wednesday, this can hold up for only so long.” In addition to food, most factories are running short of raw materials and other industrial parts, as well as gas supplies that account for about 15 percent of the district’s energy sources. The North Korean workers are also having difficulty turning up at work because of a shortage of fuel for buses carrying them to and from Kaesong. A number of firms have already reported a reduction or cancellation of orders from their buyers in favor of a more stable contractor, Ok said.

Thirty-nine employees returned throughout the day, bringing down the number of South Koreans there to 475. Most of the remaining workers are executives and plant managers, he added. “We stopped operation because we ran out of raw materials. Production workers did not come to work, just managers and office workers,” said a 45-year-old employee of Doosung Tech Co., a chemical firm, upon his arrival at the CIQ office. “Before I left, North Korean employees and I told each other that we hoped the entry ban would be lifted soon.” (Song Sang-ho, Shin Hyon-hee and Lee Sang-ju, “N.K. Halts Kaesong Operations, Says It Will Withdraw Its Workers,” Korea Herald, April 8, 2013)

The Defense Ministry and Self-Defense Forces will permanently deploy surface-to-air Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile units in Okinawa Prefecture for the first time later this month to defend against a possible North Korean missile launch. The units will be deployed to the Air Self-Defense Force’s Naha Air Base and the Chinen Sub Base in Nanjo, government sources said. In April and December last year, the ministry and SDF deployed PAC-3 units to the two bases, as well as Ishigakijima and Miyakojima islands in the prefecture, to intercept a North Korean missile should it fall on Japanese land or in its territorial waters. At the time, Pyongyang claimed it had intended to put a satellite into orbit. The ministry and the SDF then began studying deploying PAC-3 units permanently in the prefecture to enhance reaction capability as a considerable preparation period is needed to transport the units by sea from the mainland. The units are expected to be deployed from existing units stationed at Hamamatsu Air Base in Hamamatsu, where training and education for air-defense units are conducted. A senior SDF official said the planned deployment is not a direct response to recent moves by North Korea. “Still, deploying [the PAC-3 units] permanently is expected to improve defense capabilities to intercept a missile in areas
near the Nansei Islands [in Okinawa Prefecture]," the official said. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “PAC-3 Units to Be Based Permanently in Okinawa,” April 9, 2013)

Kim Yang Gon, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, statement: “The Korean Peninsula has been put in the state of war due to the serious anti-DPRK moves of the U.S. and south Korean authorities and their moves for a nuclear war. Not content with escalating military tension together with the U.S., the south Korean conservatives, in particular, are running the whole gamut of intrigues to find a pretext for igniting a war against the DPRK after reducing the Kaesong Industrial Zone to a theatre of confrontation. Defying the repeated warnings of the DPRK, the south Korean confrontation maniacs are letting loose a string of invectives hurting the dignity of the DPRK, talking about "source of money", "detention" and "hostages." South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan Jin revealed his sinister intention to introduce a special unit of the U.S. forces into the zone, vociferating about an operation for “rescuing hostages.” This goes to prove that the south Korean warmongers seek to turn the zone into a hotbed of war against the DPRK. By origin, the zone was built as a symbol of reconciliation, cooperation and reunification after the DPRK granted a privilege to Jong Ju Yong, honorary chairman of Hyundai Group of south Korea, valuing his patriotic will for reunification. The DPRK’s offer to south Korean enterprises a vast area near the Military Demarcation Line where armed forces of the north and the south are standing in acute confrontation was a bold decision based on ardent love for the nation and compatriotism and a manifestation of the firm will for independent reunification, peace and prosperity based on the spirit of “By our nation itself” clarified in the historic June 15 North-South Joint Declaration. When traitor Lee Myung Bak did serious harm to the inter-Korean relations in all aspects, getting hell-bent on confrontation after coming to power, the zone remained unaffected by it thanks to the desire and will of all Koreans in the north and the south for reunification and kept its operations for common prosperity. But the zone is now in the grip of a serious crisis. The zone, a product of the June 15 joint declaration, has been reduced to a theater of confrontation with fellow countrymen and military provocation, quite contrary to its original nature and mission due to such hideous confrontation maniacs as Kim Kwan Jin. This situation can no longer be tolerated. The south Korean conservative forces claim that the DPRK will never give up the zone as it benefits from the industrial zone, but it gets few economic benefits from the zone while the south side largely benefits from it. The DPRK provided an area of military strategic importance to the south side, in particular. This meant a big concession. It is a tragedy that the industrial zone which should serve purposes of national reconciliation, unity, peace and reunification has been reduced to a theatre of confrontation between compatriots and war against the north. The existence of such zone is no better than nothing. The DPRK is compelled to make an important decision related to the issue of the industrial zone now that the south Korean authorities abuse the generosity and compatriotism of the DPRK for their hostile purpose. Upon authorization, I declare the following important steps as regards the crisis in the Kaesong Industrial Zone:

1. The DPRK will withdraw all its employees from the zone.
2. It will temporarily suspend the operations in the zone and examine the issue of whether it will allow its existence or close it as the south Korean authorities and military
warmongers seek to turn it into a hotbed of confrontation between compatriots and war against the DPRK, hurting its dignity. The General Bureau for Central Guidance to the Development of the Special Zone will be responsible for the working matters related to the important steps including the withdrawal of the employees and the temporary suspension of the operations in the zone. How the situation will develop in the days ahead will entirely depend on the attitude of the south Korean authorities.” (KCNA, “Important Steps Declared as Regards Kaesong Industrial Zone, April 8, 2013)

Han Song Ryol, the North Korean diplomat who serves as the principal liaison between Washington and Pyongyang, has spent the better part of the past two decades exploring the prospects for a normalized relationship between his country and the United States. From his perch at the North Korean mission to the United Nations on Manhattan’s East Side, Han oversees Pyongyang’s end of the New York channel, a diplomatic conduit that was established in the early 1990s and that, in a more hopeful era, paved the way for the first visit by a high-ranking North Korean official to Washington. But the importance of the New York channel has been noticeably diminished over the years, according to diplomats. The shift, diplomats and others say, underscores the radicalization of North Korea’s foreign policy and a growing pessimism that relations can be improved. “These people in New York are not authorized to say anything or do anything – they don’t have the authority to deviate from specific instructions,” said Han Park, a professor at the University of Georgia with long-standing ties to the North Korean government. The diminished status of the New York channel also speaks to the waning influence of the North Korean Foreign Ministry, which oversees the conduit, in shaping the country’s relationship with the United States. For its part, the Obama administration has shown little interest in cultivating the channel more assiduously, on the grounds that Han Song Ryol and his colleagues have little influence back home and little authority to advance relations, according to diplomats and former U.S. officials. Some North Korea watchers say the New York channel remains important, particularly at a time when the North, which recently severed its few lines of communication with the South, has moved to further isolate itself. “It serves only as a communications channel, although messages can be and have been sent between the highest levels of the two governments,” said Kun A. “Tony” Namkung, who maintains close contacts with the mission and who helped arrange recent visits to Pyongyang by former New Mexico governor Bill Richardson and Google chief executive Eric Schmidt. “It remains wide open and is in good shape. Given the recent cutting off of the military hotline at the DMZ, its importance has actually increased,” he added, referring to the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas. Han, who did not respond to requests for an interview, first arrived in New York in the early 1990s and served nearly five years as a young counselor, initially as an aide to the North Korean mission’s top ambassador. During the Clinton era, the New York channel served various functions, according to Evans Revere, who was a senior State Department official at the time and functioned as the Washington end of the New York channel. It was, Revere said, a “sounding board and exploratory vehicle” for resolving differences between North Korea and the United States; the “eyes and ears” of Pyongyang in the United States; and “the voice of the regime” for American audiences. In 2002, after a hiatus from the mission, Han returned to New York, where he served two stints as the envoy responsible for U.S. relations, the first of which ended after
North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, in 2006. Over the past few years, the New York channel’s role, however, has been limited. “One has to wonder whether and to what degree the channel is able to report back fully and frankly on developments in the United States, and also the extent to which the leadership in Pyongyang is actually listening to what the channel is reporting,” Revere said. Some North Korea watchers say the New York channel remains important, particularly at a time when the North, which recently severed its few lines of communication with the South, has moved to further isolate itself. “It serves only as a communications channel, although messages can be and have been sent between the highest levels of the two governments,” said Kun A. “Tony” Namkung, who maintains close contacts with the mission and who helped arrange recent visits to Pyongyang by former New Mexico governor Bill Richardson and Google chief executive Eric Schmidt. “It remains wide open and is in good shape. Given the recent cutting off of the military hotline at the DMZ, its importance has actually increased,” he added, referring to the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas. Han, who did not respond to requests for an interview, first arrived in New York in the early 1990s and served nearly five years as a young counselor, initially as an aide to the North Korean mission’s top ambassador. During the Clinton era, the New York channel served various functions, according to Evans Revere, who was a senior State Department official at the time and functioned as the Washington end of the New York channel. It was, Revere said, a “sounding board and exploratory vehicle” for resolving differences between North Korea and the United States; the “eyes and ears” of Pyongyang in the United States; and “the voice of the regime” for American audiences. In 2002, after a hiatus from the mission, Han returned to New York, where he served two stints as the envoy responsible for U.S. relations, the first of which ended after North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, in 2006. Over the past few years, the New York channel’s role, however, has been limited. “One has to wonder whether and to what degree the channel is able to report back fully and frankly on developments in the United States, and also the extent to which the leadership in Pyongyang is actually listening to what the channel is reporting,” Revere said. (Colum Lynch, “North Korea Diplomatic Channel Loses Its Luster,” Washington Post, April 9, 2013)

If North Korea fires off a missile in the coming days, the United States should use its missile defenses to shoot it down, even if it’s not headed for a real target, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) told The Cable. The Obama administration has been moving missile defense related assets closer to North Korea recently and has plans to shoot down a North Korean missile headed for Japan, South Korea, or Guam, according to the New York Times, but not if the missile is just going to fall into the water. McCain begs to differ. “If they launched a missile, we should take it out. It’s best to show them what some of our capabilities are,” he said. “Their missile would most likely miss, but the fact that they have the ability to launch one with that range is very escalatory at least.” Asked if a failure of U.S. missile defenses in such a scenario would be harmful to the credibility of U.S. weapons systems, McCain said, “That’s true, but I would hope that would be a minimal risk.” South Korean officials have been predicting that North Korea could launch a medium-range ballistic missile on or about April 10, just ahead of the April 15 birthday of North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung. North Korea’s missile-launch preparations are ongoing. Secretary of State John Kerry will visit China, South Korea,
and Japan later this week. A senior administration told CNN that Kerry will try to present a diplomatic path out of the crisis during his trip. “Secretary Kerry agrees that we have to have a robust deterrent because we really don’t know what these guys will do,” the official said. “But he also knows that the North Koreans need a diplomatic off-ramp and that they have to be able to see it.” Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey will visit Beijing next week and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon is scheduled to travel to China in May. McCain said the key to solving the North Korean crisis in the short term is held by the Chinese, who although they have made increasingly sharp statements and have been conducting military exercises near their border with North Korea, have yet to use whatever leverage they have on Pyongyang. “The Chinese are the only ones who have real influence over the North Koreans and they could take action that would ratchet down this crisis dramatically and they are not doing that,” McCain said. “China could shut down their whole economy in a short period of time... It’s symptomatic of Chinese behavior... They are not behaving appropriate to a world power.” (Josh Rogin, “McCain: Shoot down the North Korea Missile,” The Cable/Foreign Policy, April 9, 2013)

The United States warned the government not to purchase the Senkaku Islands last fall, former U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said in an interview Monday. The Japanese government consulted with the State Department prior to the purchase, Campbell revealed, and was given “very strong advice not to go in this direction.” The U.S. government, in urging Japan not to follow through with the purchase, stressed the action could “trigger a crisis” with China, which claims the islands for itself. “Even though we warned Japan, Japan decided to go in a different direction, and they thought they had gained the support of China, or some did, which we were certain that they had not,” Campbell said. The central government purchased three of the five islets from their private owner in September to bring them under its control. The action enraged the government in Beijing and sparked a wave of anti-Japanese protests across China. Campbell, while reiterating that the United States takes no position on the disputed territory, stressed that Washington wants “effective, positive diplomacy” between China and Japan. The U.S. wants circumstances in which “both countries appreciate... the cockpit of the global economy is in Northeast Asia, and they must get along better,” he added. (Kyodo, “U.S. Warned Government against Buying Senkaku Islands: Campbell,” Japan Times, April 10, 2013)

Sigal: “The crescendo of shrill war cries from North Korea is obscuring the real threat it poses—its unbounded nuclear and missile potential. Its February 12 nuclear test showed it is well on the way to perfecting a compact weapons design capable of being mounted on a missile. It now says it will restart its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon to generate plutonium and will continue enriching uranium for weapons. And it may be moving to test-launch a new missile capable of reaching Japan or possibly Guam. After the nuclear test set off renewed talk in South Korea and Japan about their own nuclear arms, Washington moved to reassure its allies by strengthening deterrence. Yet doing so did little to make Korea or the region more secure. The surreal spate of threats from Pyongyang came in response to military moves by Washington and Seoul. The threats all seem intended to underscore North Korea’s own posture of deterrence—and are
explicitly predicated on prior action by the United States or South Korea. Unlike Washington and Seoul, which have far superior forces, Pyongyang for now has escalation dominance only in the realm of rhetoric. The danger is that as the armed forces on both sides conduct exercises, the rhetoric can have unintended consequences along Korea’s ceasefire line if it leads those forces to shoot first and ask questions later. Consider what North Korea has said and done since its nuclear test.

Rhetorical Deterrence After China cooperated with the United States to draft a U.N. Security Council resolution tightening sanctions, the North did what it always does whenever Washington and Beijing work in concert—raise tensions to provoke their discordant reaction. It worked. When Beijing moves to calm Pyongyang down, many in Washington mistake its unwillingness to abandon the North as evidence of Beijing’s duplicity. Yet antagonizing Beijing will only deepen insecurity in Northeast Asia, not put more pressure on Pyongyang. When Washington and Seoul announced that their annual joint exercise would involve the dispatch of B-52 bombers, unlike those in the recent past, highlighting the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the Supreme Command of the North Korean Army announced “strong practical counteractions”: it would declare the Korean War armistice agreement “invalid,” suspend talks at Panmunjom, cut off the hotline to the U.S. commander there as it has in the past, and threaten “precision nuclear strike means” of its own, which it did not yet possess. Kim Jong-un, on an inspection tour of his country’s coastal defenses, was said to have ordered that troops there “promptly deal a deadly counterblow to the enemy if a single shell is fired on their waters and land.” When the joint exercise kicked off, the North stepped up the tempo of its own air sorties, held a mass rally and announced that its armed forces, “already put on a high alert, are waiting for an order … to blast the strongholds of aggression with prompt and fatal retaliation, should the provocateurs make even the slightest move.” South Korea’s defense ministry responded in kind, “We will respond forcefully if North Korea provokes us. If North Korea attacks South Korea with a nuclear weapon, then by the will of the Republic of Korea and humanity, the Kim Jong-un regime will perish from the Earth.” Two days after Washington sent a B-52 on a practice bombing run in Korea on March 19, Pyongyang warned that U.S. bases in Japan and Guam “were within range of North Korea’s precision strike means.” The Foreign Ministry spokesman qualified the warning the next day: “The DPRK is now closely watching the move of B-52 and the hostile forces will never escape its strong military counteraction, should the strategic bomber make such sortie to the peninsula again.” Yet the threat seemed real enough to alert missile defenses in Japan and aboard Aegis cruisers in waters off Korea. When Washington dispatched two B-2 stealth bombers on a similar mission, Pyongyang declared it was in a “state of war.” What did that mean? First, it said, “all the issues arousing between the north and the south will be dealt with according to the wartime regulations,” the first sign that it would bar entry to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Second, “If the U.S. and the south Korean puppet group perpetrated a military provocation for igniting a war against the DPRK in any area including the five islands in the West Sea of Korea or in the area along the Military Demarcation Line, it will not be limited to a local war, but develop into an all-out war, a nuclear war.” The North’s news agency reported that Kim Jong-un at a meeting on Strategic Rocket Forces operations had “examined and ratified a plan for firepower strike.” Potentially Real Threats In the midst of these rhetorical volleys, the Foreign Ministry spokesman on March 16 reiterated the North’s longstanding negotiating
position: first, it “will never reach out to anyone to get it recognized as a nuclear weapons state in the future.” Second, “The U.S. is seriously mistaken if it thinks that the DPRK had access to nukes as a bargaining chip to barter them for what it called economic reward.” Third, its nuclear weapons “serve as an all-powerful treasured sword for protecting the sovereignty and security of the country” and are not negotiable “at least as long as the U.S. nuclear threat and hostile policy persist.” The nuclear threat could end with an end to the “hostile policy.” In short, its nuclear diplomacy is not about money but about reconciliation. On March 31, however, Pyongyang announced a “new strategic line” laid down by Kim Jong-un on “carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously” and said it would restart its shuttered reactor at Yongbyon to generate more plutonium as well as producing weapons-grade uranium at its nearby enrichment plant. It said that “the nuclear armed forces should be expanded and beefed up qualitatively and quantitatively until the denuclearization of the world is realized.” Was this Kim’s version of Ike’s “bigger bang for a buck,” allowing some military-industrial resources to be reallocated from military to civilian production? Last week’s White House decision to ratchet down tensions was perhaps belated recognition that Washington’s deterrent moves had not chastened Pyongyang. Far from it. A Way Out? Strategic patience may have given way to strategic impatience in Washington, but not yet to strategic rethinking. That rethinking begins by acknowledging that the very steps that each side in Korea takes to bolster deterrence increase the risk of deadly clashes. This is shown by incidents such as the sinking of the South’s ROKS Cheonan in March 2010 in retaliation for the November 2009 shooting up of a North Korean navy vessel and a November 2010 artillery exchange in the contested waters off Korea’s west coast. In short, deterrence alone will not assure calm on the peninsula. The way to reduce the risk of further clashes is a peace process in Korea in parallel with renewed negotiations to rein in the North’s nuclear and missile programs. Pyongyang has long said it wants a peace treaty ending the Korean War. Probing whether it means what it says is in South Korean and U.S. security interests, especially now that North Korea is nuclear-armed. Whether the new strategic line of March 31 has ruled out negotiated limits on its nuclear and missile programs needs to be explored as well. The second problem is that the steps taken to reassure U.S. allies also antagonize China—joint exercises that include flights of B-52 and B-2 bombers or the dispatch of aircraft carriers to Korea, expanding missile defenses, and helping South Korea to develop longer-range ballistic missiles (to add to the long-range cruise missiles it recently deployed). It is utterly unrealistic to expect China to abandon North Korea as the United States moves to shore up its alliances. No chorus of disclaimers from Washington will persuade Beijing that the U.S. military rebalancing to Asia is not aimed at containing it. Washington needs to accompany it with a political and diplomatic rebalancing toward China, and encourage its allies to do the same. Cooperation has to be a two-way street. A sustained effort at rapprochement could include bilateral discussion of urgent security issues, including exploring a naval no-go zone along China’s coast in return for China’s acceptance of a comparable buffer zone in the waters off Japan, greater U.S. restraint in arming Taiwan in return for greater Chinese transparency about its military plans and programs and tension-easing in the South China Sea. Revived accommodation could also involve sustained military-to-military talks to address the two states’ mutual vulnerability through mutual restraint in the domains of cyberspace,
nuclear weaponry and space. That might include commitments to forgo cyber attacks on each other’s critical infrastructure, acknowledgement of mutual deterrence (U.S. acceptance of China’s retaliatory capability as legitimate or a pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons against each other), and a ban on attacks on or interference with one another’s satellites. Such an approach would benefit South Korea, which does not want to be entrapped in a revived cold war between the United States and China. It could also ease pressure on President Park Guen-hye from her party’s right wing to shy away from engagement with North Korea, even though it is in South Korea’s interest to nurture much-needed change in the North and counter rising Chinese economic influence there. Easing of U.S. tensions with China could also counter the rise of rightists in Japan’s Diet who believe in a Japan that can “say no” to the United States and who are pressing Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to confront China in order to expose U.S. unreliability. Realists in Tokyo still support both the U.S. alliance and engagement with China, as do most Japanese and the business community, which depends on China trade. The only way to head off looming instability in Asia is to try to move toward peace in Korea and rapprochement with China. Sustained diplomacy and political rebalancing may not succeed, but unlike more stringent sanctions, more muscular deterrence, diplomatic disengagement and military rebalancing, they just might work.” (Leon V. Sigal, Deterrence Will Not Bring Korean Peace,” The National Interest, April 8, 2013)

International Crisis Group: “The dispute over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea claimed by the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China), Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan) has brought China-Japan relations to a new low. The island chain has significant strategic, historical and potentially economic value. Chinese naval analysts see control of the islands as critical to accessing the Pacific Ocean beyond the first island chain linking South Korea, Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture, Taiwan and the Philippines. Japan has been administering the islands and from its perspective, losing them would mean providing China a platform to monitor Japanese and U.S. military activities in Okinawa, about 400km in the east, and potentially curtail freedom of navigation. With regard to economic value, a 1969 UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East report mentioned possible large hydrocarbon deposits in the seabed, but very limited exploration activities have been carried out because of the dispute. Adding sensitivity to the issue, both countries face additional maritime and sovereignty disputes and sense a general deterioration in overall maritime security. China is engaged in heated quarrels with several countries in the South China Sea and Japan has unresolved maritime disputes with Russia and South Korea. Both feel compelled to demonstrate resolve to defend their claims over the Diaoyu/Senkaku for fear that other rival claimants would take advantage of any perceived weakness. The two countries claim the islands under different elements of international law. Japan’s case rests on the principle of “occupation of terra nullius,” or land without owner; it asserts that when it formally incorporated the islands through a January 1895 Cabinet decision, it had confirmed that they were uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of China. China claims historical title, stating it has evidence that it exercised sovereignty over the islands as they were discovered, named and used during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and administered as a part of Taiwan by the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). It argues that the islands were
ceded to Japan as part of the April 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the First Sino-Japanese War, and therefore should be returned to China under the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations (1943 and 1945), which stated that Japan must return all territories seized through war. The key question under international law appears to be whether China established historical title before 1895. Taiwan also claims the islands based on the same historical title as China. After the Second World War, the islands were occupied, along with Ryukyu Islands, by the U.S. under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco and were reverted to Japanese administration in 1972. The U.S. plays an important role in the dispute as it asserts that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Both sides also disagree over the delineation of their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the East China Sea. With this level of complexity, a judicial or arbitration settlement would be the most logical solution. Yet, there is little chance that an international tribunal will be able to examine the issue. Japan does not formally acknowledge that a dispute exists and believes it would therefore be up to China – which it says is seeking to challenge Japan’s “valid control” of the island chain – to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Japanese officials also point out that, unlike Japan, China does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. Chinese analysts say that Beijing has no faith in the ICJ’s fairness, as it is a “Western” system that will only produce results “biased against China.” Since the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, the two countries had followed a strategy of consigning any settlement to the distant future, preserving “the absence of escalation as well as the absence of compromise.” They were able to prevent small incidents from spiraling out of control and damaging diplomatic relations through refraining from provocation and engaging in effective and often discreet diplomacy when problems arose. China claims this was due to an agreement between leaders, but Japan denies such an understanding existed. Strong economic ties have also acted as a stabilizing factor. In recent years, in the context of an ascendant China, many Chinese analysts increasingly thought Japan had the better end of this “gentlemen’s agreement” since it had been administering the islands alone while taking steps to reinforce its claim. They also saw a balance of power shifting in China’s favor vis-à-vis Japan and felt more confident in asserting Chinese claims in the East China Sea. An incident in September 2010 – when a Chinese fishing boat rammed two Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessels near the islands – brought these issues to the forefront. Japanese analysts believe the fallout from this led to Japan’s purchase of three of the disputed islands from a private owner in September 2012, which gave China the opportunity to alter the status quo. By the beginning of 2013, the two countries were locked in a volatile standoff with Chinese and Japanese law enforcement vessels in close proximity, creating the risk for a dangerous clash. Despite expressions by both governments that they wish to avoid a military conflict, the potential for escalation has increased. … Shintaro Ishihara, then-governor of Tokyo, announced on 16 April 2012 a plan for the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from the Kurihara family and build on them, citing the need to counter China’s challenge of Japanese control. The government of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda felt compelled to act pre-emptively for fear that if Ishihara purchased the islands and built structures on them, a far larger crisis would result and send tensions with China spiraling. The Noda government felt that it lacked the legal means to stop Ishihara, and due to the significant public support for
the Tokyo governor’s plan to purchase the islands, it decided in May to open its own bid to purchase them. Noda was also reportedly driven by “a sense of responsibility” to defend the country’s territory. Tokyo had expected a negative reaction from China, but was trying not to “lose bigger” should Ishihara purchase and develop them. Japan viewed the island purchase as an internal transfer of property from a private owner to the central government; “from the left hand to the right.” While such an act altered the status of the islands under Japanese domestic laws, Tokyo believed that it was unrelated to issues of sovereignty and could not be considered a change to the bilateral status quo. A former Japanese diplomat explained in further detail, “there are two types of ownership with regard to territories. There are property rights and there are sovereignty rights.” He said the state already had sovereignty rights to the islands, and was only acquiring the property rights through the purchase. China’s interpretation was twofold. It felt that the islands’ ownership transfer aggravated an already unacceptable situation, Japan’s control over the islands and denial that they are disputed. According to a Chinese analyst, Beijing never agreed that the private owner possessed the islands in the first place. While a military analyst conceded that although China could understand that “legally there was no change to the status quo”, nevertheless “politically the action ... violated the basic agreement that both countries shelve the dispute and kick it into the long grass.” In his October press conference, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun termed “absurd logic” the notion that “it is better for the government to ‘purchase’ the islands than the right-wing forces,” saying it amounts to “asking China to choose between two kinds of poison.” Beijing considered the purchase a deliberate unilateral change to the status quo. Many Chinese analysts adopted the narrative of a “good cop, bad cop” conspiracy by Japan to solidify its claim. Policy groupthink - where lower-level analysts and bureaucrats assess the leadership’s position and provide information and analysis accordingly - reinforced the theory that Noda engineered the drama with Ishihara to deal a blow to China. This version was easily adopted by the Chinese policy apparatus given the very different political and legal systems in the two countries. In contrast with Japan, Chinese regional officials who oversee provinces are appointed and rotated by the central government, and “respond to signals set by the centralized party leadership.” While they enjoy significant autonomy on economic issues, they are expected to heed the government line on important political and security issues. Furthermore, in China it would be impossible for a private individual to purchase an island, let alone one that is disputed. Japan had several more months to complete the purchase or even explore other options, but expedited the process in part to complete it before China’s once-in-a-decade leadership transition in November 2012. Japanese analysts said the timing was meant to avoid “punch[ing] the new [Chinese] leaders in the face”. Tokyo also calculated that a new leadership in Beijing might offer opportunities for reconciliation. Unknown to Japan, then-incoming Chinese leader Xi Jinping had already been put in charge of the “Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests.” Many in Beijing, however, suspected Japan had deliberately timed the purchase before its power transfer because it thought the leadership would be weak or distracted. According to an account, Chinese leaders were focused on ensuring a smooth handover and did not wish to be forced to deal with Japan. Adding to Chinese sensitivity, the run-up to the leadership transition saw ample signs of fierce factional struggles. A government official responsible for security noted in September that the
date of the eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which would formalize the handover, had not yet been set - a sign of uncertainty. He asked, “does Japan want to exacerbate the dispute to disrupt the ... Congress?” There was also a sense that if China were perceived as being too soft in its reaction, its rival claimants “will reach out for a yard after taking an inch” in the belief that Beijing might want to avoid external troubles during the transition. Another analyst said that Japan had to be made into an example to prevent rival claimants from “exploiting usevery time [there is a party congress].” Signals from both sides were misinterpreted. Prime Minister Noda had sent a secret envoy in early September to Beijing, which according to a Chinese source gave President Hu Jintao the impression that Japan could be persuaded to abandon the purchase plan. This reportedly prompted Hu to agree to a meeting with Noda at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Vladivostok (8-9 September). Japanese officials had been surprised by the Chinese side’s acceptance of the request for the meeting and interpreted it as a good sign. They had assumed that President Hu had been made fully aware of Japan’s intentions to finalize the purchase the following day. The Chinese side, however, had agreed to the encounter on the belief that Noda could still be convinced to back away from the move. During the meeting, Hu stressed to Noda that nationalizing the islands was illegal. When Japan went ahead with the purchase, this was seen as a loss of face for Chinese leaders. Shortly thereafter, Xi Jinping was put in charge of the issue. The purchase reignited the disagreement over the basis on which China and Japan had refrained for decades from trying to resolve the sovereignty issues. According to Beijing, there was a “gentlemen’s agreement” between earlier high-level leaders to “shelve the dispute.” Japanese politicians at times have alluded to earlier Chinese leaders’ statements that the dispute should be resolved by future generations, but Tokyo has explicitly denied the existence of an agreement with China to shelve the dispute. Tokyo maintained that Japan followed a unilateral policy of “ensuring a peaceful and stable maintenance and management of the Senkaku Islands.” The denial has always been taken by China as a political affront. Japan’s island purchase was seen in Beijing as final proof that Japan had disrespected the tacit understanding and, in the minds of Chinese analysts, freed Beijing from adhering to the status quo. … Immediately following the purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, China implemented a string of measures, termed "combination punches," that bore the hallmarks of a well-planned campaign with multi-agency coordination and high-level decision-making. Top leaders delivered harsh rebukes of Japan, with then-Premier Wen Jiabao vowing to “never yield an inch” and then-Vice President Xi Jinping calling the island purchase “a farce.” The foreign ministry stated that the purchase was “illegal and invalid, and changed nothing about the historical fact that Japan had invaded and occupied Chinese territories.” Defense Minister Liang Guanglie said China’s military reserves the right to take further actions.” The commerce ministry warned that Japan’s action “will inevitably affect and damage the normal development of Sino-Japanese economic and trade relations.” Chinese provincial- and central-level officials were also ordered to cancel visits to Japan and meetings with Japanese counterparts. Other punitive measures were taken in which the Chinese government denied any official coordination. Tourist agencies, some state-owned, cancelled trips to Japan. Consumers boycotted Japanese products while goods from Japan faced delays at several Chinese ports due to longer customs inspections. Violent anti-Japan protests erupted in dozens of cities, damaging
some Japanese shops and factories. State media trumpeted photos and video footage of military drills, including island-landing exercises in the Yellow Sea. But a quieter move may have had more serious repercussions. On 10 September, the day Tokyo formally declared it was purchasing the islands, Beijing announced territorial sea baselines around the islands. According to Chinese law, the move placed the disputed islands under Chinese administration and was therefore a direct challenge to Japan’s control of the islands. This was the first time that China announced baselines for territories that it did not already control. Chinese experts explained that from then on, entrance by Japanese public service or Self-Defense Force (SDF) vessels into the area would be considered intrusions into China’s territory and a violation of its sovereignty. Such an unprecedented move to formalize its claim obliged China under its own laws – and in the court of domestic public opinion – to assert jurisdiction over the waters surrounding the islands. Its two largest maritime law enforcement agencies – the China Marine Surveillance (Marine Surveillance) and the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (Fisheries) – which already competed with each other in the South China Sea for budget and clout, were further empowered to assert sovereignty in the East China Sea. They immediately increased their patrols in waters previously dominated by the JCG. For Chinese experts, the immediate aim is to establish “overlapping control” in the disputed waters. Some have stated that in this way, Japan would at least have to admit that a dispute exits. Beijing’s responses to Japan’s is land purchase reflect a tactic that it has used in other maritime disputes, which can be termed “reactive assertiveness”: Beijing uses an action by another party as justification to push back hard and change the facts on the ground in its favor. In April 2012, the Philippines maladroitly sent a warship to arrest Chinese fishermen operating near the disputed Scarborough Shoal, prompting China to send two civilian maritime patrol ships. Manila soon replaced the navy ship with a civilian coast guard vessel, and a standoff ensued between the two countries’ law enforcement vessels. By mid-June, both sides withdrew on the pretext of rough weather, but Chinese Marine Surveillance and Fisheries vessels soon returned, roped off the mouth of the lagoon to keep Filipino fishermen from entering, and established routine patrols of the area. Previously, neither China nor the Philippines maintained a permanent presence in the area and fishermen from the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and China operated untroubled in and around the large reef. Taking advantage of the Philippines’s action of sending a warship to arrest Chinese fishermen, China established effective control of the shoal, thus changing the status quo in its favor. All the while, the blame was laid on the Philippines for having responded to a fishing dispute by sending in a naval vessel. Similarly, on 21 June 2012, Vietnam passed a maritime law with new navigation regulations covering the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands. China reacted by establishing Sansha City to encompass the islands and 2 million sq km of the South China Sea, complete with a military garrison. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation, a state-owned enterprise, then proceeded to offer oil exploration leases in nine blocks located within the disputed area in the South China Sea. Chinese analysts have said that Beijing was made aware many months ahead of the impending law by Vietnam, giving it ample opportunity to craft its response. Vietnamese officials said that communications with China began six months in advance of the law’s passage, but that nothing in their conversations warned them that the response would be so drastic. China’s dispute with Japan in the East China Sea showed a use of the same “reactive assertiveness” tactic. Chinese analysts
confirmed that territorial baselines had been drawn long before but had been withheld from public release as Beijing had been concerned about appearing expansionist. The Japanese purchase announcement then provided an opportunity to implement the plan. A scholar joked that he refers to Ishihara and Noda as “comrades” for giving China the chance to change the situation around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in its favor. Another feature of reactive assertiveness is that the measures taken by China were designed to be irreversible. Scarborough Shoal remains inaccessible to Filipino fishermen and the development of Sansha City continues apace. With regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Chinese officials and analysts have made it clear that there is no going back to the previous status quo of Japan administering the area alone. The Chinese foreign ministry has urged Japan to “face the reality that the situation around the Diaoyu Islands has fundamentally changed.” The director of the State Oceanic Administration, which oversees the Marine Surveillance, stated in November 2012 that “there is no time limit” to Chinese patrols around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

According to an analyst, after months of regular patrols in the disputed waters, Beijing’s goal became to wear down Japan into “accept[ing] the new situation” and making overlapping control “the new status quo.” In each case, Beijing saw its actions as justified not only as responses to other parties’ provocations, but also to rectify situations that it believed to be unacceptable. Many Chinese analysts describe a pattern in these situations as one of “small countries bullying a big country.” With regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku, many Chinese analysts believed that Beijing had been too soft by allowing Japan to solely administer the disputed islands and solidify control over them for so long. According to an analyst, China’s strategy was motivated by a sense that time was running out and that regular patrolling would be necessary “or else China’s sovereignty claim would become weaker and weaker.” This view reflects a widely held belief in China that Japan could cement its claim if its de facto control could run fifty years unchallenged, through the international legal doctrine of “acquisition prescription.” Additionally, China’s sense of a shifting balance of power has given it confidence to correct what it considered a disadvantage. The shift in the two countries’ comparative economic strength left many in China with the belief that it no longer needs to appease Japan by treading carefully on the island dispute. Analysts and policymakers in China have increasingly spoken of Japan as a second-class power while China is on its way to becoming a first-class power. Some held the view that for many years China had been too conservative in shelving the dispute and had allowed Japan to solidify its control of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. According to a newspaper affiliated with the Communist Party of China, “the time that the Chinese nation could be bullied by anyone is gone forever and China now absolutely has the capabilities to safeguard its territorial sovereignty.” Such factors could have motivated Chinese actions starting in 2008 to send occasional civilian law enforcement vessels to the disputed waters, and was cited as a reason for continued patrols far before Japan’s island purchase. A Marine Surveillance East China Sea fleet commander stated in March 2012 that China had to “demonstrate presence, show administration and declare sovereignty” by patrolling near the islands in order to “foil Japan’s attempt to cement its claim through establishing the so called ‘acquisition prescription.’” The Japanese purchase announcement offered China the opportunity to officially normalize such patrols and conduct them with regularity. China’s reactively assertive approach likely reflects its desire to take firm actions to defend its maritime claims.
while maintaining a policy of peaceful development. Beijing repeatedly stated that Japan was “fully responsible for all consequences.” As a Chinese maritime researcher put it, “the series of measures that China has taken to defend its rights has been mostly reactive and responsive and was necessary to respond to violation of our maritime interests.” China’s firm approach reflects a larger strategy of shifting from a land-focused power in both economic development and defense terms to a maritime power, a key component of which is strengthening defense of maritime rights. The change of focus from landward to seaward security has led maritime security interests to become the most important part of China’s strategic rationale. Former President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao both stressed the importance of China becoming a maritime power in their final speeches, in November 2012 and March 2013 respectively. New leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have also reinforced the “maritime power” concept. Maritime agencies, coastal provinces and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have all considered the leadership’s initiative a license to step up their own activities for ocean exploration, development and the defense of maritime rights and claims. Alongside these developments, Beijing has expanded both Marine Surveillance and Fisheries agencies in order to strengthen routine patrols in disputed areas. In March 2013, it began restructuring and consolidating its maritime agencies in order to focus its resources and enhance coordination. Beijing has also established the National Oceanic Commission “to formulate oceanic development strategies.” Although never officially stated by the government, Chinese commentators and state media in recent years have started to refer to maritime rights as part of China’s “core interests, namely those strategic interests on which China will not compromise and which it would possibly be ready to protect by force. The phrase, broadly defined to include state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and domestic stability, had traditionally only been applied to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. In his first foreign policy speech after becoming head of the communist party, Xi Jinping stated that China “will remain on a path of peaceful development,” but warned that “no country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests.” A Chinese analyst interpreted this as a warning to countries that are challenging China’s maritime rights and interests. A few days later, a top-level PLA general warned that China’s “main security threat comes from the sea,” pledging “not the slightest harm can come to the core national interests.” In recent years, foreign diplomats have said Chinese officials repeatedly referred to the South China Sea as part of China’s core interests, although Chinese researchers insist that Beijing has not made a policy decision to do so. The government has avoided directly labeling the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute an issue that involves its core interests, but the linkage is apparent. Such a connection was made for the first time by a January 2012 editorial in the government’s mouthpiece, The People’s Daily. In October that year, when asked whether core interests apply to Diaoyu/Senkaku, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun did not deny or confirm, and instead recited the definition of the phrase, repeated that those islands are Chinese territories and warned Japan “not to doubt, let alone to test” China’s resolve to defend them. Nationalism makes sovereignty in the East China Sea a highly explosive issue, as sentiments over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands run deeper in the Chinese psyche than any other territorial dispute in modern Chinese history, with the exception of Taiwan. Anti-Japanese sentiment in China is a legacy of the Japanese invasion during the Second World War and has been reinforced by decades of
government-driven patriotic education and mass media recounting Japan’s brutal occupation and China’s heroic triumph under the CCP’s leadership. Beijing further weaves the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue into the historical narrative of Japan’s refusal to repent for its past aggression. This has ensured that more than 60 years after the war, the enmity of the past remains alive in today’s younger generations. A “feedback loop” has ensued whereby history education has stimulated the growth of nationalism, which in turn provides a larger market for nationalistic messages. According to a Chinese scholar, “the main theme of Chinese nationalism is anti-Japan.” Meanwhile, the rapid rise of Internet use and social media over the past decade has eroded Beijing’s control over popular sentiments and begun to influence policymaking. Internet users now track Chinese law enforcement vessels via satellite photos, mocking and criticizing the government when they stop short of disputed waters, holding Beijing accountable to act in line with statements made during times of high public pressure. The baseline announcement, for example, created expectations that China would take steps to assert sovereignty over the islands while pushing Japan out. After the announcement and before Marine Surveillance ships arrived near the islands, netizens questioned the government’s resolve and mocked the Marine Surveillance for acting cowardly. A netizen summed it up: Beijing “can’t just verbally draw [the territorial sea baselines], then neglect them. That’s humiliating.” This in turn emboldens belligerent voices and constricts the space for diplomacy. Some current and former PLA officers regularly give vent to hardline rhetoric that borders on warmongering. Internet users have gone so far as to ask for military intervention. Online posts refer to the foreign ministry as “Mai Guo Bu,” “the ministry of traitors” – for calling for Japan to return to negotiations. Chinese analysts said such statements do not represent the leadership’s thinking, but are nevertheless allowed as “they are motivated by patriotism and not in violation of national principles.” But the government takes measures to quickly curtail such expression as soon as it turns into criticism of its domestic policy. During the anti-Japan demonstrations that erupted across China in mid-September 2012, protesters held signs denouncing the government’s record on food safety and land-grabbing by officials and calling for “corrupt officials” to be sent to defend the islands. A Chinese analyst explained that the government had been under criticism for being “too hard on its own people and too soft facing outside,” and therefore “wouldn’t be able to answer to the public” had it not responded firmly to “Japan’s provocation.” The New Left – a loose collection of officials, activists and intellectuals that broadly advocate a return to Maoism and a stronger role for the state in the economy – utilized the protests to rally support for their cause and fuel opposition to the government. The government rapidly shut down the protests and restored order within a day. If the central leadership were to adopt a clear and moderate policy, it could certainly take measures to sensitize the public to the need for such an approach and help dampen nationalist sentiment. The fact that it has done the opposite suggests it prefers to fan nationalism to justify assertive actions and convince its adversary that it cannot back down. It took until March 2013 for Beijing to make an effort to tone down harsh rhetoric against Japan. Understanding Japan’s perspective on the current crisis requires examination of the diplomatic row following the 7 September 2010 incident, also referred to as the “Senkaku shock” in Japan, when a Chinese trawler captain rammed two JCG vessels in disputed waters. The captain was subsequently detained and charged under Japanese domestic law. According to a Japanese analyst, this led to “a combination of
unfortunate elements” causing the largest crisis in bilateral relations since the 2005 anti-Japan protests across China. Beijing’s demand for the immediate release of the boat captain, his crew and the trawler went unmet. After releasing the crew and the boat on 13 September, Japan kept the captain and then prolonged his detention by nine days on 20 September. The episode appeared to be a departure from the way Japan had handled Chinese civilians who travelled to the disputed islands. In those cases, such as the March 2004 landing incident, Japan arrested the individuals and deported them without charge, allowing tensions to dissipate more quickly. In those previous incidents, Chinese activists who tried to force their way onto the islands were processed under the immigration law. The 2010 boat collision involved a higher-level violation under Japan’s criminal code for “obstruction of public duties of an officer of the law.” Some Japanese analysts said it was a mistake for the three-month-old Naoto Kan government to allow legal procedures to play out a long course rather than treat the boat collision as a diplomatic incident and step in to manage it. They said such a blunder permitted a wider crisis, with one of them saying that the inexperienced government should have flashed a “new driver on board” sign. According to a prominent Japanese expert, “the poor handling of this situation contributed to the DPJ’s image of ineptness on foreign policy, particularly with regard to China.” Beijing interpreted Japan’s reaction as a breach of the precedent of “capture and release” that had helped limit the impact of individual activist activity on bilateral relations, and struck back with a string of punitive measures. These included the suspension of bilateral exchanges at the provincial and ministerial level, mass cancellations of trips to Japan by Chinese tourists and allowing protests in front of Japanese diplomatic missions and schools. On 21 September, China reportedly suspended shipments of rare earth metals essential for Japanese high-tech industries. The embargo lasted approximately two months. Beijing denied official involvement, but many Japanese analysts remain convinced that the Chinese government had tailored the export restriction to punish Japan. Many Japanese were extremely shocked by the rare earths ban, particularly given previous practice of insulating the bilateral economic relationship from political tensions, a situation both sides referred to as “hot economics, cold politics.” On 23 September, China arrested four Japanese for entering a military zone without authorization. The next day, Japanese officials announced that the government had decided to release the Chinese skipper. Even after this, China demanded apologies and monetary compensation, which became an additional sore point in a Japan already reeling from having yielded under Chinese pressure. This incident came on the heels of the announcement in August 2010 that China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy, leading some in Japan to refer to 2010 as the year of the “China shock.” Beijing’s tough response to the incident caused a spike in antipathy among the Japanese public towards China. Several surveys in Japan in the following years confirmed this trend, with half of those who expressed an unfavorable view in June 2012 citing the island dispute as the main cause. The release of the captain also left many Japanese feeling humiliated and deepened their disappointment with the leadership. According to a Japanese scholar, “we lost face in a big way.” A Yomiuri Shimbun survey in October 2012 found nearly half of respondents thought the decision gave “the impression Japan will back down if pressure is applied.” The souring public sentiment left a deep impression on the DPJ government, which subsequently was on the defensive from attacks by right-wingers.
especially Tokyo Governor Ishihara. Public demand in Japan grew for the government to strengthen control and defense of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. A Japanese analyst said the public feared that the next incident could involve “100 [Chinese] fishermen and we can’t stop them, so we have to solidify our claim.” Another said the Japanese were worried that “if China takes over Senkaku, the next would be Okinawa.” Such sentiment was shared in some corners of the diplomatic community in Japan, who felt that “as China rose, we couldn’t just be nice.” Amid such domestic pressure, the Japanese government in January 2012 named some of the disputed islands, which resulted in protests from Beijing and The People’s Daily labelling the islands one of China’s “core interests.” Growing public appetite for the government to better safeguard the islands provided a receptive audience for Ishihara. The U.S. has consistently asserted that the 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty covers the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. But both Japan and China project their own fears and hopes onto whether and how the U.S. would fulfill its treaty obligation. China’s incremental escalation of the island dispute sowed fear in Tokyo that Beijing was aiming to test and expose the limits of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japanese officials and strategists expressed overall confidence in the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. But some voiced unease over a perceived delay by the Obama administration to reiterate that the treaty covered the islands, as well as an understanding that the U.S. would only come to Japan’s defense “after the Self-Defense Force was bloodied.” They also expressed a desire for the U.S. to explicitly endorse Japan’s sovereignty claim over the islands. As the dispute wore on, some in both Tokyo and Washington became concerned about the possibility that China’s game plan was to “provoke Japan to overreact; make the U.S. nervous about Japan’s overreaction; to generate insecurity within Japan regarding the U.S.; thus weakening U.S.-Japan solidarity.” Many Chinese strategists believe that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is the largest obstacle to taking over the islands by force. However, some of them have been searching for signs of strain in the alliance as well as ambiguity that China could exploit in Article V of the treaty, which states that the security alliance applies to “territories under the administration of Japan.” Some analysts questioned whether the treaty would apply if China successfully established overlapping administration, since they would no longer unquestionably be under Japanese control – a notion which the U.S. has taken steps to dispel. Some analysts also wondered if the U.S. would only nominally fulfill its treaty obligation in the event of a conflict by providing Japan weapons rather than soldiers and fleets. After Abe’s visit to Washington – during which he declared, “no one should ever doubt the robustness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance”, Chinese state media and commentators asserted that Obama had given Abe a “cold shoulder,” as he did not specifically mention the island issue. Harder-line analysts in China assert that Washington has encouraged Japan to stir up trouble in order to facilitate the U.S. rebalancing to Asia, which many Chinese are convinced is aimed at containing China. Even moderates hold the view that the growing presence of the U.S. in the region has at least emboldened Japan. Due to the belief that Japan is being used in a broader geopolitical strategy by the U.S. to encircle China, many in Beijing were less willing to give importance to internal Japanese politics as the reason that led the government to purchase the islands. The tendency by Chinese policymakers and the state media to see foreign policy issues through the lens of a U.S.-China strategic struggle inhibits accurate analysis of underlying issues.
and irritates countries that do not feel treated as an equal player by China. Forty years of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations have been dotted with disputes. While managing frequent, inevitable frictions, the two sides had developed a “ritualized” system that had prevented minor crises from spinning out of control. Top leaders were setting the overall tone for peace and friendship, with dedicated high-level officials negotiating behind the scenes and diplomats providing expertise and logistical support. In recent years, however, this personality-driven system started to disintegrate, beginning from the very top. Attempts to forge more stable institutional linkages have largely failed. China’s increased naval presence in the East China Sea and the contest for administration of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have expanded risks for frictions into new frontlines that involve more hardline actors, making future crisis management even more challenging. These factors have taken place in the context of the shifting balance of power between China and Japan. Due to the countries’ fraught history, advocating for improved ties with Japan in China has always carried political risk. Strong leaders have had the most success. The normalization of diplomatic ties in 1972 was led by Mao Zedong, who enjoyed a status akin to a deity. It was implemented under the close supervision of the People’s Republic of China’s first Premier Zhou Enlai. This decision followed the deterioration of ties with Moscow and China’s need for financial and economic assistance from Japan. Top Chinese leaders carefully prepared propaganda guidelines, arguing, for example, that strengthening relations with Japan was “a beneficial move to contain U.S. imperialism and to strike against the Soviet Union.” Deng Xiaoping, another revolutionary leader who ruled the country from 1978 to 1989, presided over the negotiations leading to, and the signing of, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan in 1978, ushering in an era of booming trade, economic and cultural exchanges. Deng knew well that China needed Japan’s intellectual capital and investment for his opening and reform policy to succeed. During his visit to Japan in 1978, he said that China and Japan should set aside the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue and leave it to a future and smarter generation to solve. “Shelving the dispute” thus became the guiding principle for managing maritime sovereignty issues for generations of Chinese leaders and diplomats until recent years. Deng’s successors had less success in maintaining good Sino-Japanese relations. When Hu Yaobang tried to enhance ties between the two countries, he came under severe criticism from conservatives, particularly for inviting 3,000 Japanese youths to visit China and entertaining Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone and his family in his home when they visited China. Hu lost power in a factional struggle, and his attempts to improve relations with Japan were used among other alleged misdeeds to justify his removal from office. While his downfall was primarily due to a conservative backlash against his efforts toward political reform, Chinese leaders and diplomats also read it as a cautionary tale on reaching out to Japan. Relations with Japan began to seriously deteriorate in the 1990s during the rule of Jiang Zemin. He launched a patriotic propaganda campaign centered on China’s suffering under and eventual triumph over Japan during the Second World War. In a speech in front of the Japanese emperor in November 1998, Jiang brought up Japanese militarism and “reemphasize[d] historical issues” between the two sides, only aggravating bilateral tensions. Many Chinese scholars think that Jiang’s childhood memory of family suffering and sacrifice during the Japanese invasion motivated this campaign. Japanese and Western scholars, however, believe that the real driver was his desire to
cement his power in the ideological void left after the 1989 Tian’anmen events, when the CCP’s legitimacy was under severe strain. Following Jiang, President Hu Jintao had a mixed record in attempting to enhance relations with Japan. He was able to overcome internal disagreement to reach a deal with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who privately promised not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in exchange for a resumption of high-level summits. Abe ed an “ice-breaking” trip to Beijing in 2006, ending a five-year freeze of summit exchanges. Subsequently, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao led an “ice-melting trip” to Tokyo in 2007, followed by a “warm-spring trip” by Hu Jintao to Japan in 2008. But one of Hu’s and Wen’s signature endeavors – to begin jointly developing oil and gas resources with Japan in the East China Sea – was halted after two years of negotiation due to domestic opposition. By the time Hu and Wen left power, Sino-Japanese tensions had entered another downturn due to the 2010 and 2012 crises. The challenges Hu encountered in sustaining good relations with Japan partly had to do with the transition of the Chinese governance model from the strong individual to a collective leadership, with major decisions made through consensus by members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). Within the PBSC, rival factions compete for power and influence. Hu Jintao was considered one of the PBSC’s most Japan-friendly members by both Chinese and Japanese analysts. But he had a slow start in consolidating his power. Unlike Hu Jintao, current leader Xi Jinping was immediately put in charge of the PLA as chairman of the Central Military Commission. By all accounts, he has been central to China’s current Japan strategy. Before he took over as head of the CCP in November 2012, he was put in charge of a maritime security group in mid-2012, and then of the “Office to Respond to the Diaoyu Crisis” in September. The first several months of Xi’s leadership gave few signs that he was ready to spend political capital to de-escalate the tensions in the East China Sea. Rather, one of his early speeches was to urge the military to be combat-ready. However, in March 2013, PLA general Liu Yuan, a close ally of Xi, on several occasions warned against talks of war and said the island dispute “can be deferred, discussed and coordinated. It is not worth resorting to humanity’s most extreme and violent methods to resolve it.” Several factors could have contributed to Beijing’s desire to tone down the rhetoric. Although Xi took control of the CCP and the military in November 2012, it was not until the March 2013 National People’s Congress (NPC) that he became head of the state and major government posts, including the cabinet, were filled. The NPC allowed Xi to further consolidate power and place his allies in key positions. According to an analyst, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula since the third nuclear test in February 2013 encouraged Beijing to cool tensions somewhat with Japan, as the system is under strain with multiple foreign policy crises. China also likely has an interest in reducing the heat over the dispute to attempt to regularize and legitimize its concept of overlapping control. By shifting international attention elsewhere, it could be easier for Beijing to cement the new status quo. But although the rhetoric has been moderated, China’s actions on the ground have not changed and it has set in motion a series of expectations and institutional changes to assert its claims. Japanese leaders have had difficulty making inroads in improving ties with China partly due to the rapid succession of prime ministers in the past two decades (with the exception of Junichiro Koizumi), with seven prime ministers from 2006-2013. Koizumi presided over a period that witnessed a deep freeze of political exchanges with China (2001-2006), due to his several visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. The short reign
of each prime minister after him made it challenging to forge stable personal ties and trust with Chinese counterparts. When the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was defeated by the DPJ in August 2009, Japan also lost many vital party-to-party ties and other political connections built up during nearly 40 years of unbroken LDP rule. A Chinese scholar explained that because Chinese officials were “practical,” they were unwilling to waste too much time on “lame-duck or retired” foreign counterparts. The dramatic change in direction of the DPJ’s foreign policy affected China-Japan relations. When Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and DPJ Secretary-General Ozawa Ichiro took power in August 2009, they unveiled a vision for creating an “equal alliance” with the U.S. and a more “autonomous foreign policy” that emphasized improving relations with Asia, especially China. Hatoyama, while meeting with President Hu Jintao at the UN in September 2009, declared a wish to turn the East China Sea into a “sea of fraternity instead of a sea of disputes.” The new ruling party promised to establish party-to-party ties with China, and Ozawa led a delegation of 600 to Beijing in December 2009. Ultimately, Hatoyama’s campaign promise to relocate the Futenma U.S. Marine Corps Air Station in Okinawa proved untenable. His desire for a more even relationship with both the U.S. and China strained ties with the former, whose security alliance with Japan is traditionally seen as a main tenant of regional security. China did not take advantage of this period in which Japan reached out its hand. It reportedly began drilling in the Chunxiao oil field in January 2010. Htoyama and Ozawa were forced to resign in June 2010 due to the failure to relocate the Futenma base and financial scandals. Foreign policy reverted to a more pro-U.S. stance after Kan Naoto became prime minister, bringing pro-U.S. DPJ member Maehara Seiji into the foreign policy decision-making circle. Some Chinese analysts interpreted the change as confirmation that the Japanese government was beholden to the U.S. and suggested that this made it difficult for Chinese leaders to trust their Japanese counterparts. The DPJ also started its tenure by curbing the influence of the bureaucracy and transferring power into the hands of politicians, to deliver on its campaign promise to correct political inertia. Some Japanese analysts said the reform went too far in sidelining experienced bureaucrats. This was compounded by the tumult around the Japanese leadership at the time of the September 2010 incident, which included a change of foreign minister. Each DPJ government experienced a sharp decline in popularity. Public support for then-Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio eroded rapidly after his attempt to realign Japanese foreign policy failed, reaching 17 per cent at the end of May 2010, a near 50-point decline in eight months. When Kan Naoto took over in June, support for his cabinet was at 60 per cent. His statements supporting an increase in consumption tax upset voters, and the DPJ was defeated in the July 2010 upper house elections. After the March 2011 Tohoko earthquake and tsunami and subsequent Fukushima nuclear crisis, public support for Kan dropped to 21 per cent. The Noda government took over in August. By the time Ishihara announced his island purchase plan, public support for Noda had slumped to around 25 per cent and never recovered. The unpopularity of the DPJ left a leadership vacuum that was exploited by populist and nationalist politicians. Disappointment with traditional politics and frustration with the failure to restore Japan to a prosperous path made many long for stronger leadership. This environment gave rise to populist and nationalist politicians who were seen as credible alternatives to ineffectual and ambiguous leaders. These movements have been driven, in part, by former Tokyo
Governor Ishihara and Osaka Mayor Hashimoto Toru. A Japanese analyst wrote that the Japanese wanted to “stop floating like a ghost in the sea of perpetual apologies for the Asia-Pacific War of 70 years ago.” Ishihara captured popular opinion after the 2010 boat incident and forced the government’s hand over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island purchase. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who took power after the LDP’s victory in the December 2012 elections, publicly stated, “there is no room for negotiation.” But he has nevertheless shown a willingness to mend bilateral relations and sent a personal letter to Xi Jinping, delivered by the New Komeito Party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi in January 2013. Xi received Yamaguchi and the two spoke of their desire to overcome difficulties. Optimism inspired by the meeting, however, quickly dissipated after reports of dangerous military encounters in the East China Sea. Added to that, Abe resumed nationalist rhetoric and gestures after he was elected, arousing the suspicion that he wanted to backtrack on Japan’s Second World War apologies. These decisions did not help to convince the Chinese public or leadership that Japan was sincere about mending ties. There have been several attempts to enhance communications by reestablishing a hotline between the Japanese and Chinese prime ministers. It was first inaugurated in October 2000, during a visit by Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji to Tokyo, in order to “increase trust and dispel suspicion in the political area.” It was never used throughout the Koizumi government during which Sino-Japanese relations grew frosty. Subsequent Japanese prime ministers all attempted to reopen the hotline to then-Chinese Premier Wen, but left office after brief tenures. An analyst said that Beijing has low expectations that even Abe will remain in office for long. To date, the hotline has not been effectively used in a time of crisis or high tension. As a former Japanese diplomat explained, a hotline only works when the two countries have similar bureaucracies and strong mutual trust – both of which are lacking. Part of the problem is a mismatch in the two systems: while the prime minister in Japan heads the cabinet, the ruling party and the SDF, the Chinese premier does not head the communist party nor does he command the PLA. He would have to get his message approved before speaking in a crisis. Efforts to establish a military-to-military hotline have similarly stalled. A tradition of back-channel diplomacy between high-level officials dating back to Zhou Enlai’s time - and known as a “pipe” by analysts in both countries - had enabled China and Japan to reestablish diplomatic ties and mend relations in times of trouble. The interlocutors were individuals in each government’s decision-making center who were influential in their respective party. Their positions and communication allowed for the effective flow of information up the chain of command to facilitate moderate policymaking. Because of the channel’s informal nature, sensitive discussions could be shielded from public pressure and provide space for diplomatic maneuvers. The last stable and effective channel, between Hiromu Nonaka, former chief cabinet secretary in Japan, and Zeng Qinghong, a former PBSC member and vice president of China, ran from the late 1990s until 2008. Nonaka was a powerful figure in the LDP’s largest faction and then-Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo’s right-hand man. Zeng, similarly, was a trusted protégé of Jiang Zemin and continued to be an influential powerbroker between factions in the CCP after Jiang retired. The two men were known to meet “anytime there was trouble” to “extinguish it for the sake of bilateral relations. In one such episode, Zeng swiftly dispatched Chinese officials to investigate crimes reportedly committed by Chinese in Japan, after Nonaka made a complaint to him. The Zeng-Nonaka channel lost its pull in 2008 when Zeng retired
from public life. Subsequent efforts by the two countries to reestablish a high-level connection with similar influence have been interrupted. A connection first appeared to have been established between Hidenao Nakagawa, former LDP secretary-general, and Wang Jiarui, then-director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CCP. In an interview, Nakagawa stressed the importance of “pipes” between politicians in addition to regular diplomatic channels. But the channel unravelled in 2009, when the LDP was defeated by the DPJ. The absence of effective backchannels during the 2010 and 2012 crises deprived the two countries of a discreet means to avoid misunderstanding and foster trust. More important, personal interactions through backchannels had served to put human faces on events that otherwise would be solely considered cold political or geopolitical motivations. “If human beings meet, they can always find a way out, but the current situation is like a computer game with no human contact between the two parties,” said a former Japanese envoy to China. Veteran diplomats in both countries have tried to revive the tradition of backchannels in order to thaw the current standoff, but such efforts have been derailed by escalatory events. Back-channel diplomacy naturally had its limits. It depended heavily on individuals, thus was vulnerable to politics. It could only be effective when there was will from top leaders to place higher priority on preserving bilateral ties than on scoring points on a single dispute. Nonaka, for example, was unable to dissuade Koizumi from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, despite the expectations China placed on him. Neither can personal ties negate changes in national objectives. China’s view on the utility of “shelving the dispute” changed, and instead it tries to erode Japanese administration of the islands. In fact, the disappearance of back-channel diplomacy can be seen as one symptom of these changes. According to a Chinese analyst, “leaders of the two countries just don’t trust each other anymore.” Another factor that has complicated the relationship between China and Japan and prevented effective management of crises is the relative weakness of the Chinese foreign ministry, which is the official - and often the only - channel open to Tokyo. Although the ministry technically remains responsible for the formulation and execution of foreign policy, its leadership role, responsibility and authority on most strategic foreign policy issues have been diluted as China’s global role has grown and many formerly domestically oriented agencies have acquired foreign policy responsibilities. One example was the November 2012 issuing of new passports with a map including disputed territories in the South China Sea, which enraged other claimant states. The decision had been made by the Public Security Bureau and the passports went to print over the objection of the foreign ministry, which was told, “passports are an issue of immigration and not foreign policy.” As a government analyst said, “Chinese foreign policymaking has been fragmented.” In Japan, the foreign ministry holds a higher position. Therefore there has been a mismatch in the relative power of the diplomats who were tasked with discussing Japan’s plan to purchase the islands and the aftermath. In Japan, a foreign ministry division chief overseeing China policy directly briefs the prime minister. Conversely, in China, a state councilor in charge of foreign policy is responsible for liaising with the senior leadership. The state councilor is one rank above the foreign minister and one rank below the vice premier. Although she or he is the highest-ranking official in charge of foreign affairs, she or he is not even a member of the CCP’s 25-strong Politburo, the second-highest level decision-making organ in the party after the Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC). Japan began informing China of its intention to purchase the disputed islands in June through the Chinese foreign ministry. While the Chinese side expressed its general opposition to the move, Japanese diplomats said that there was no signaling of planned reactions to the purchase. It is plausible that the asymmetry of the two ministries’ influence in their respective government contributed somewhat to Tokyo’s inaccurate reading of Beijing’s understanding and intentions. Japanese officials and diplomats came away with the impression that their Chinese counterparts had understood – yet of course opposed to – Japan’s rationale for making the move. After the island purchase, communications between the two foreign ministries were reduced to very formulaic meetings. According to officials on both sides, diplomats spent entire meetings without any real dialogue, simply reciting their official stances. Démarches have also become formulaic. A Japanese envoy attempting to open up additional communication channels lamented that Chinese foreign ministry officials “may have lost almost all influence but we are only given access to them.” The foreign ministry’s job is made tougher by the fact that it is often outside of the information loop on incidents involving other agencies but which have foreign affairs implications. This happened with the USNS Impeccable incident in 2009. Similarly, the ministry was reportedly not consulted or even informed about Hainan province’s new maritime security regulations empowering provincial border police to board and search foreign vessels when they were first announced in November 2012. When diplomats from other countries sought clarification, the ministry was unaware and unprepared. It also apparently learned about the 30 January 2013 alleged radar-locking incident seven days later through the media, instead of the navy, and even then, it still lacked enough facts to comment. Therefore, the agency with arguably the greatest interest in de-escalating tensions has limited room for maneuver. One reason for the Chinese foreign ministry’s lack of authority is that domestic priorities, such as sustaining economic growth and political stability, still far outweigh foreign policy. According to a Chinese analyst, “the Diaoyu Islands may be the priority of Chinese foreign policy, but economic development is still the priority of overall Chinese policy.” The foreign ministry is also often made the scapegoat for any problems that arise in foreign policy, even if the issue is not a result of its error. For example, it was blamed for having abstained from the 2011 UN resolution authorizing the no-fly zone over Libya, allowing it to pass. A Chinese analyst said the ministry was criticised for “placing too much importance on diplomatic relations while losing sight of the entirety of national interests,” and was further stripped of decision-making power. A Chinese scholar remarked that the agency had been reduced to “a protocol department and is busying itself with administrative tasks.” Japan’s diplomacy with China has also suffered from the relative decline of a group within the foreign ministry known as the “China school.” Comprised of specialists equipped with extensive China-specific experience and language skills, they were known for their commitment to a good friendship with their neighbor. For many years, these diplomats headed the ministry’s China and Mongolia division as well as the Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau. These two departments, along with the vice foreign minister, formed the core of China policy within the ministry. China school officials for a long time also served as ambassadors to China and as heads of the Cabinet Councilors’ Office on External Affairs. These individuals were professionally committed to Sino-Japanese relations and had “a vested institutional interest in avoiding conflict under their watch.” The China school began to lose its
influence in the late 1990s due to a hardening of the public’s attitude toward China and the chill in relations during the Koizumi era. The foreign ministry came under severe criticism for its handling of several China-related incidents, especially the Chinese police’s seizure of North Koreans who sought asylum in the Japanese consulate in Shenyang in May 2002, resulting in significant erosion of the diplomats’ credibility. They were attacked by nationalists as “weaklings who would wag their tails when facing China.” A Japanese analyst close to the government noted, “China school diplomats are always vulnerable to right-wing attacks” and it has become politically risky to be seen as belonging to this faction. Beginning with Koizumi, China school diplomats were gradually phased out of key positions, marking, in the words of a Japanese official, “a conscious shift by the government.” Kunihiko Makita - the last China school diplomat who headed the Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau - told a newspaper in 2012 that since he left in 2001, his former post has been filled by “diplomats trained in America” who he worried “are not necessarily well-versed in China.” Similarly in 2006, the director of the China and Mongolia division was not a Chinese-speaker - a first for that position - but was a specialist on Japanese-U.S. relations. In 2010, Uichiro Niwa, a top business executive and the former chairman of ITOCHU corporation, one of the largest Japanese trading firms, was appointed ambassador to China, a break from the previous practice of filling the post with China school veterans. By the time Sino-Japanese relations entered their most challenging stretch in 2010, the traditional China school diplomats had lost influence, with their successors tending to be tougher on China. The result was that certain decisions were made without what a former China school diplomat termed “the ‘feel’ of China.” China’s maritime law enforcement agencies are its primary tool to strengthen its claims in recent disputes. Maritime law enforcement was historically divided among five agencies competing for funding, jurisdiction and political influence. The rivalry between them created overlaps in their responsibilities, inefficiency in resource deployment and poor coordination. The China Marine Surveillance (Marine Surveillance) and the China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (Fisheries) have played the most active roles in asserting maritime claims. Marine Surveillance is under the State Oceanic Administration of the land and resources ministry. The Fisheries was overseen by the Bureau of Fisheries Administration of the agriculture ministry before restructuring began in early 2013 to place it under the State Oceanic Administration. Marine Surveillance and Fisheries for many years have been tasked with occupying or patrolling disputed areas in the South China Sea. They are also at the forefront of the struggle with the JCG to administer waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The Marine Surveillance and Fisheries have traditionally been rivals, competing not only for a larger share of the State Council’s budget but also the leadership role among law enforcement agencies. They had been expanding rapidly as China cultivated its growing maritime ambitions. Both have institutional interests in demonstrating China’s sovereignty in disputed areas, as defending maritime rights against foreign countries is one of the most important political achievements of both agencies. They have also been compelled to justify the increase in quality and quantity of their fleets by showcasing their resolve and ability to patrol further and more frequently in disputed waters. The two agencies have profited directly from tensions in the East and South China Seas. In 2012, a dramatically increased budget allowed Fisheries to spend more on equipment procurement that year than the sum of the previous 60 years. The same
The number of Marine Surveillance vessels patrolling China-claimed waters increased from six to more than ten each day. The announcement of the territorial baselines around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands further empowered the agencies directly while constraining the foreign ministry's ability to rein them in. In November 2012, a new 3,000-ton boat Haijian 137 was added to the Marine Surveillance East Sea fleet and began patrolling waters around Diaoyu/Senkaku the next month. In December 2012, a new 5,000-ton boat Yuzheng 206, “one of the largest and most advanced fishery patrol vessels in China,” began its maiden voyage from Shanghai to patrol near the disputed islands. A new opportunity for funding arises each time there is an incident or a major development in Japan’s capability. Despite new capacity, regular patrols of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have strained China’s maritime law enforcement capacity. Vessels and personnel from the North Sea and South Sea fleets have been diverted to reinforce the East Sea fleet. Marine Surveillance officials have often cited the need to compete with the JCG to advocate for faster expansion of its fleet. The PLA and the civilian maritime agencies maintain close linkages. The State Oceanic Administration was administered by the PLA Navy in the first sixteen years following its establishment in 1964, providing technical support for the navy. Marine Surveillance personnel have received navy training. In 2009, the PLA and Marine Surveillance signed an agreement to cooperate on maritime law enforcement and safeguarding maritime rights, joint surveillance and research, equipment supply and maintenance, and personnel exchange, and have since held annual meetings. Retired naval vessels have been regularly re-outfitted to become law enforcement boats. In October 2012, the PLA Navy’s East Sea Fleet held a joint exercise with the Marine Surveillance and Fisheries – the third such drill aimed at safeguarding sovereign rights in disputed waters. Prior to the restructuring in March 2013, the Marine Surveillance emerged as the more powerful and influential of the two, seen as the “spearhead,” with more vessels patrolling in disputed waters more frequently. This is partly due to its considerably broader jurisdiction, while Fisheries’ duties were technically tied to fishing activities (although that has not necessarily been respected in practice). Marine Surveillance also had larger and better-equipped vessels and enjoyed more political clout, as its parent agency, the State Oceanic Administration, had more independence and flexibility compared with other agencies of the same level. The agency head, Liu Cigui, also has close ties to Xi Jinping. The State Oceanic Administration’s dominant status was solidified in March 2013 during the annual National People’s Congress, when it absorbed three additional law enforcement agencies including the Fisheries to create “the China Maritime Police Administration.” The consolidation, according to State Councillor Ma Kai, was aimed at correcting “diffusion of maritime law enforcement capabilities, overlapping [maritime] inspection, duplicative construction ... and insufficient ability to safeguard [maritime] rights.” Implementation of the reorganization has begun, including the drafting of new regulations defining jurisdiction, criminal law enforcement authority, and levels of fleet weaponization. It will take place over several months, likely accompanied by new laws and regulations defining the duties, jurisdiction and operating procedures of the new State Oceanic Administration. Another key element in the reorganization was the establishment of the National Oceanic Commission. Details of its configuration have yet to emerge, but it is likely to be under the direct supervision of the State Council and composed of high-level officials of agencies, such as the foreign ministry, the military, the State
Oceanic Administration and the public security ministry, whose responsibilities include maritime affairs. It is expected to formulate China’s first comprehensive maritime strategy, covering areas such as safeguarding maritime rights, developing maritime economy and projecting naval capabilities to protect the country’s ever-growing overseas interests. As a Chinese analyst put it, the commission will define strategies and coordinate like “a brain” so that the consolidated maritime law enforcement capacity will become “a tightly clenched fist” - in contrast to the “open palm” of its previous fragmented existence - in safeguarding the country’s maritime rights. The consolidation was clearly not designed to dampen the ardor of the agencies, but to ensure that they are more focused, better coordinated, better equipped and more effective in defending maritime claims. Japan’s post-war constitution bars the government from having a military force, but it has worked around this restriction by maintaining the Self-Defense Force (SDF) with legal restrictions on its tasks, operations and use of force. In the maritime domain, Japan has also built up the JCG and increased cooperation between military and civilian institutions. Some scholars thus believe it acts as a quasi-military force. The JCG, under the land, infrastructure, transportation and tourism ministry, has a traditional maritime law enforcement role, including policing and search and rescue missions. But it is also responsible for guarding Japanese territorial waters and EEZs, and is a first responder to incursions. The JCG has acquired the right to fire direct warning shots at foreign vessels in certain circumstances. Japan has increased coordination between the SDF and the JCG through regular mutual training, information exchange and joint exercises, in part for crisis management. This was apparent after Japanese radars failed to detect the Marine Surveillance plane that flew over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands on 13 December 2012. As the plane flew below Japanese radars, the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) was only alerted to its presence after a JCG vessel spotted it. After China stepped up regular patrols of waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands following the September 2012 purchase, Japan responded by increasing the number of JCG vessels patrolling the islands from three to 30. There has been growing agreement among Japanese politicians that the JCG needs to be “reinforced” for fear that its capability will be “overtaken by the Chinese.” The 26 October 2012 government economic stimulus plan gave the JCG the largest ever disbursement of special funds, and the first specifically for territorial water patrol. The agency again received a 37 per cent budget increase for the financial year 2013 from the previous year. A dedicated Senkaku Island team was created, with the aim of deploying ten new patrol boats to the area in the next three years. The JCG has also received increased legal jurisdiction due to the island dispute. This build-up must be seen in the context of the September 2010 collision, which caused the Japanese government “great embarrassment” and led to changes in the jurisdiction of the JCG. It was instructed by the government to be “more careful,” as it was responsible for preventing any further incident, and accordingly adjusted its engagement with Chinese vessels in order to minimize risks. The JCG has adopted a “defensive mode” when patrolling the waters near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands so as to prevent an activist landing on the islands or a deliberate or accidental collision with Chinese ships. It has enhanced manoeuvres including shadowing, which may give the JCG the capability to repel Chinese ships without having to use force. Unlike its Chinese counterparts, the JCG has not demonstrated any desire to shape or get ahead of national foreign policy. It was consulted only one week before the island purchase in
September 2012, after the government had already made its decision, and was not enthusiastic about the plan. It was also questioned in the Diet (parliament) following the 15 August 2012 activist landing incident to explain why it did not arrest the activists for obstruction. However, as a frontline actor, it has the ability to shape information flow and influence the course of events. This was illustrated after the 2010 incident when a JCG guardsman uploaded a video of the collision against the government’s decision, leading to a public uproar against the government for being too conciliatory toward China.” (International Crisis Group, Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks, April 8, 2013)

4/9/13

Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee statement: “The situation on the Korean Peninsula is inching close to a thermonuclear war due to the evermore undisguised hostile actions of the United States and the south Korean puppet warmongers and their moves for a war against the DPRK. The prevailing situation is seriously affecting peace and security not only on the peninsula but in the rest of the Asia-Pacific. The DPRK has already declared strong military counteractions to protect the dignity of the nation and the sovereignty of the country from the increasing threat of the aggressors. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet warmongers are now watching for a chance to start a war against the DPRK after massively introducing WMDs including nuclear war hardware into south Korea. Once a war is ignited on the peninsula, it will be an all-out war, ie a merciless sacred retaliatory war to be waged by the DPRK. It does not want to see foreigners in south Korea fall victim to the war. The committee informs all foreign institutions and enterprises and foreigners including tourists in Seoul and all other parts of south Korea that they are requested to take measures for shelter and evacuation in advance for their safety.” (KCNA, “KAPPC Urges Foreigners in S. Korea to Take Measures for Shelter and Evacuation,” April 9, 2013)

President Park Geun-hye expressed regret over temporary suspension of the inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong by North Korea, the first time that Park has directly expressed regret over the North’s specific threat. In a cabinet meeting, President Park said, “It is highly disappointing that North Korea decided to temporarily suspend the Kaesong Industrial Complex that had been operating well,” adding, “Until when (the North) will continue the vicious cycle wherein it creates a crisis before making compromise and receiving assistance?” She went on to say, “If normal operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex becomes difficult, the inter-Korean cooperation fund will be used to compensate South Korean firms for damage, and spending of the fund for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation will inevitably decline correspondingly,” hinting that her government is preparing measures to cope with possible closure of the industrial complex by the North. Park said, “If the North breaks international rules and promises this way, and thus suspend the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, no country or company in the world will want to invest in the North,” adding, “The North is urged to end wrong behaviors, and make righteous decision in a way that benefits the future of the entire Korean people.” About three hours after Park’s remarks were made public, the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee said in a spokesman’s statement, “All foreign organizations and companies, and foreigners including tourists in South Korea including Seoul, will have to prepare
A top US military commander said he favored shooting down a North Korean missile only if it threatened the United States or Washington’s allies in the region. When asked by lawmakers if he supported knocking out any missile fired by North Korea, Admiral Samuel Locklear, head of US Pacific Command, said: “I would not recommend that.” But the four-star admiral told the Senate Armed Services Committee he would “certainly recommend” intercepting an incoming North Korean missile “if it was in defense of our allies” or the United States. Amid widespread speculation North Korea could be preparing a missile launch, Locklear also said he was confident the US military would be able to detect quickly where any missile was headed. “It doesn’t take long for us to determine where it’s going and where it’s going to land,” said Locklear, who oversees American forces in the Asia-Pacific region. (AFP, “U.S. to Intercept N. Korea Missile If Allies at Risk: Admiral,” April 9, 2013)

As North Korea warned foreigners that they might want to leave South Korea because the peninsula was on the brink of nuclear war – a statement that analysts dismissed as hyperbole – the American commander in the Pacific expressed worries that the North’s young leader, Kim Jong-un, might not have left himself an easy exit to reduce tensions. “His father and his grandfather, as far as I can see, always figured into their provocation cycle an ‘off ramp,’ ” the commander, Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, said during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. “And it’s not clear to me that he has thought through how to get out of it. And so that’s what makes this scenario, I think, particularly challenging.” The administration has settled on a strategy of refusing to make concessions to the North and has adopted a new plan to deter any hostilities by promising a proportionate response. In doing so, it hopes to reverse what it considers a long-term pattern in which the West offers aid to calm tensions and then North Korea breaks its promises to halt its nuclear program. But Obama administration officials acknowledge that the new strategy will work only if Kim either backs down or satisfies himself with a token show of force, like a missile test into the open ocean. The South Koreans have warned such a test could happen as early as this week. At the core of the concern within the administration and the intelligence agencies is that they do not understand Kim’s motivations. His father and grandfather suggested, at times, that they might be willing to negotiate to end their nuclear program. But Kim arrived in power with a small nuclear arsenal – the fuel for about six to a dozen weapons, according to intelligence officials, and a pathway to make more – and he may be calculating that with those potential weapons in hand, he is less vulnerable to attack. “He may think he has more running room than the rest of the family did,” one administration official said this week, “and that can lead to miscalculation.” The United States’ harder line has also been adopted by the South’s conservative new president, Park Geun-hye, who parried the North’s latest threat on Tuesday by saying she remained determined not to succumb to what she said were efforts to escalate tensions. “How long are we going to repeat this vicious cycle where the North Koreans create tensions and we give them compromises and aid?” she said at a cabinet meeting. In an interview and a speech to the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, the lawmaker, Chung Mong-joon, a son of the Hyundai industrial group’s
founder, said South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and “match North Korea’s nuclear progress step by step while committing to stop if North Korea stops.” Chung said, “The only thing that kept the cold war cold was the mutual deterrence afforded by nuclear weapons.” His position is a fairly lonely one: President Park has not endorsed any effort to turn South Korea into a nuclear power. (Choe Sang-hun and David E. Sanger, “North Korea Warns of Imminent Nuclear War,” New York Times, April 10, 2013, p. A-8)

The South Korean government yesterday announced that the methods that paralyzed the computer networks of the country’s major broadcasters and banks on March 20 are identical to those used in cyberattacks of the JoongAng Ilbo (2012) and Nonghyup Bank (2011), leading them to conclude they were attacked by hackers from North Korea. It added that the other cyberattacks carried out after March 20: the indiscriminate malicious code that hit www.nalsee.com, a weather forecast Web site, (March 25); destruction of files saved in the servers of 14 anti-Pyongyang Web sites (March 26); and destruction of files contained in the servers of YTN’s affiliate company (March 26), were carried out by the North as well. “At least six PCs in the North accessed the servers of South Korean banks 1,590 times over eight months since June 28 last year to plant malicious code, so they can carry out attacks anytime they want from the North,” said Jeon Gil-soo, chief of the joint response team from the Korea Internet Security Agency in the briefing. “We found the servers were accessed 13 times and traced them to North Korean IP addresses.” It added that the North accessed the security patch servers connected with bank servers that were managed by private antivirus software companies, including AhnLab, and most of those servers were also attacked and digital history left there was also destroyed. “There are a total of 49 IP addresses [25 domestic and 24 overseas] that we suspect the North used in cyberattacking the South since 2009 and 22 [18 domestic and four overseas] of them were used in the March hacking,” Jeon said. “There are a total of 76 kinds of malicious code that the North used to attack the systems in Seoul and 30 of them were reused at this time.” “There are a total of 76 kinds of malicious code that the North used to attack the systems in Seoul and 30 of them were reused at this time. (Lee Jie-sang and Shim Seo-hyeon, “Cyberattacks Traced to Pyongyang,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 11, 2013)

Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se confirmed Wednesday that North Korea has moved a mid-range Musudan ballistic missile to its east coast and Pyongyang is prepared to launch the missile "at any time." “According to intelligence obtained by our side and the U.S., the possibility of a missile launch by North Korea is very high," Yun told a parliamentary hearing, adding that North Korea can launch the missile "at any time from now." Yun said, "The Musudan missile has a range of 3,500 kilometers and it’s up to North Korea how far it would fly." (Yonhap, “FM Confirms N. Korea Can Launch Mid-Range Missile ’at Any Time,’” April 10, 2013) The allied forces raised the Watch Condition, or Watchcon, by one notch to level 2, and bolstered their intelligence personnel. Intelligences indicated Pyongyang has finalized preparations to launch its Musudan intermediate-range missiles from its east coast. Seoul officials said. “North Korea can fire missiles at any time now, if it has the political determination to do so,” a military source said, declining to be named. Seoul officials believe Pyongyang could launch multiple missiles such as its Musudan, Scud and Rodong missiles on the same
day. "In addition to the two Musudan missiles spotted in the Wonsan area of (the North’s) Gangwon Province, we identified four to five transporter-erector-launchers (mobile launchers) around the Donghan bay spanning South Hamgyeong Province and Gangwon Province," a senior government official told reporters. During a parliamentary session, Seoul’s Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se confirmed the possibility of North Korea launching missiles was “considerably high.” “Based on our and U.S. intelligence, the missile could be the Musudan missile. Its range is around 3,500 km, but how far it will travel hinges on North Korea’s intentions,” he said. Stressing its nuclear and missile capabilities had reached a “considerable level,” Yun warned another missile launch would constitute a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban any missile tests by the provocative state. “Upon any additional launch, the UNSC would immediately convene. As we all need to thoroughly analyze the nature of the missile launch, it is yet difficult to predict what kinds of measures the UNSC would adopt for another launch,” he said. The minister also underscored that Washington would not hold talks with Pyongyang should it continue to set off provocations and refuse to show sincerity in the multilateral efforts to denuclearize it. “The U.S. stresses that inter-Korean talks should precede any talks between Washington and Pyongyang, (though be held) in close coordination with Washington,” he said. Another U.S. official said North Korea’s test missile launches could occur without Pyongyang issuing a standard warning to commercial aviation and maritime authorities. “We hope they issue a notification, but at this point we don’t expect it. We are working on the assumption they won’t;” the anonymous official was quoted by CNN as saying. (Song Sang-ho, “Allied Forces on High Alert amid N.K. Missile Threats,” Korea Herald, April 10, 2013) The U.S. and Japan are preparing to shoot down any medium-range missile North Korea is likely to launch. The Musudan missiles being readied on the east coast have a range of 3,000 to 4,000 km and could theoretically reach the U.S. territory of Guam. That means they would have to fly over Japan on their trajectory, prompting Tokyo to get ready to shoot them down. The SM-3 missiles aboard two Japanese Aegis-class ships dispatched to the East Sea can shoot down a projectile from 150 to 500 km away. "The SM-3s are capable of intercepting the Musudan before it reaches its maximum altitude of 300 to 400 km," said a military source here. But other experts believe that if a missile flies over Japan, it would fly so high above the island country’s air space of some 100 km as to give Tokyo little reason to intercept it. It is at any rate uncertain whether the SM-3 would succeed in intercepting the Musudan. Since 2001, the U.S. Defense Department conducted 30 tests gauging the SM-3’s intercept capability and succeeded only 24 times, an 80-percent success rate. But experts say the SM-3 needs further improvements since, for instance, it is not yet perfectly able to tell genuine missiles from decoys. If North Korea aims missiles at Guam, the U.S. may also shoot them down. Washington has said it would deploy missile defense systems on Guam within weeks that could intercept missiles at a height of 150 km, but they are not in place yet. Instead, it may also have to rely on SM-3 missiles on Aegis ships. "If North Korea fires a missile that lands close to Guam, this could be construed as an act of war, so we do not think that’s a likely scenario," said a government source here. (Chosun Ilbo, “U.S., Japan Get Ready to Shoot down N. Korean Missile,” April 10, 2013)
“DIA assesses with moderate confidence the North currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles. However, the reliability will be low.” A new assessment by the Pentagon’s intelligence arm has concluded for the first time, with “moderate confidence,” that North Korea has learned how to make a nuclear weapon small enough to be delivered by a ballistic missile. The assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has been distributed to senior administration officials and members of Congress, cautions that the weapon’s “reliability will be low,” apparently a reference to the North’s difficulty in developing accurate missiles or, perhaps, to the huge technical challenges of designing a warhead that can survive the rigors of flight and detonate on a specific target. The assessment’s existence was disclosed by Representative Doug Lamborn, Republican of Colorado, three hours into a budget hearing of the House Armed Services Committee with Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey. General Dempsey declined to comment on the assessment because of classification issues. But late in the day, the director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., released a statement saying that the assessment did not represent a consensus of the nation’s intelligence community and that “North Korea has not yet demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed missile.” In another sign of the administration’s deep concern over the release of the assessment, the Pentagon press secretary, George Little, issued a statement that sought to qualify the conclusion from the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has primary responsibility for monitoring the missile capabilities of adversary nations but which a decade ago was among those that argued most vociferously—and incorrectly—that Iraq had nuclear weapons. “It would be inaccurate to suggest that the North Korean regime has fully tested, developed or demonstrated the kinds of nuclear capabilities referenced in the passage,” Little said. A spokesman for the South Korean Defense Ministry, Kim Min-seok, said early Friday that despite various assessments, “we have doubt that North Korea has reached the stage of miniaturization.” Nonetheless, outside experts said that the report’s conclusions could explain why Hagel has announced in recent weeks that the Pentagon was bolstering long-range antimissile defenses in Alaska and California, intended to protect the West Coast, and rushing another antimissile system, originally not set for deployment until 2015, to Guam. (Thom Shanker, David E. Sanger, and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Finds Nuclear Strides by North Korea,” New York Times, April 12, 2013, p. A-1) Senior Obama administration officials said that the White House hasn’t seen evidence that the North can successfully put a nuclear weapon on a missile, despite progress over the years. "North Korea has launched missiles and successfully put a satellite in orbit in December, so we know that they have long-range missile technology. We know that they have a nuclear capability and have stated their intention to use it together with their missile capabilities. They've made progress over the past several years in developing both of those elements and that is concerning to us," a senior administration official said. "But we've not seen any evidence that they've actually been able to marry up their nuclear technology with their missile capabilities. They've certainly not successfully carried out these intentions," the official said. The administration, the official said, will "continue to monitor the situation and take prudent steps to protect ourselves and our allies." The DIA assessment was first divulged at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, by Rep. Doug Lamborn (R., Colo). By releasing the intelligence assessment, House Republicans injected more concern
about the North Korean threat into the public debate. Committee staff members said Rep. Lamborn had checked the assessment with the DIA before making the information public to ensure that the conclusion was accurate and unclassified. DIA officials wouldn’t comment. The Central Intelligence Agency also declined to comment. North Korea’s recent nuclear-weapons tests, missile launches and threats are fueling nationalistic calls in Seoul and Tokyo for those countries to respond and significantly enhance their own defenses. The drive is being fed by concerns over the U.S.’s financial position and Washington’s ability to defend its Asian allies long-term, these diplomats and analysts said. “Of all the issues I heard while in Asia, getting our fiscal house in order was No. 1,” said Sen. Bob Corker (R., Tenn.), who met with South Korean President Park Geun-hye recently in Seoul, and discussed the North Korea crisis. (Dion Nissenbaum and Jay Solomon, “Korean Nuclear Worries Raised,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2013) U.S. spy agencies believe the recent bellicose rhetoric from North Korea is mainly an effort by leader Kim Jong-un to demonstrate he is firmly in command, National Intelligence Director James Clapper told a hearing of the House Intelligence Committee. U.S. intelligence also believes China, North Korea’s neighbor and traditional protector, is becoming increasingly frustrated with Kim’s behavior, Clapper said. “I don’t think he really has much of an end game other than to somehow elicit recognition from the world, specifically the United States ... of North Korea’s arrival on the scene as a nuclear power,” Clapper said. “Much of the rhetoric - in fact all of the belligerent rhetoric of late - I think is designed for both an internal and an external audience. But I think first and foremost it’s to show that he is firmly in control in North Korea,” Clapper said. North Korea’s economy is in dire straits, he added, noting signs that some of its army has been diverted to work in agriculture. And he said there has been a "steady stream" of defectors lately, compared with prior years, when two a year would have been notable. Pyongyang recently has threatened a nuclear strike on the United States - something it does not have the capacity to carry out - and "war" with "puppet" South Korea. "If anyone has real leverage over the North Koreans, it is China. The indication that we have is that China itself is rather frustrated with the behavior and the belligerent rhetoric of Kim Jong-un," Clapper told the committee. (Patricia Zengere and Mark Hosenball, “U.S. Spy Chiefs See Domestic Influence in North Korean Rhetoric,” Reuters, April 11, 2013) The nation’s top intelligence official said April 18 that a one-paragraph assessment about North Korea’s ability to arm a nuclear missile was mistakenly declassified by the Pentagon’s intelligence agency, an inadvertent disclosure that revealed competing views on the country within the United States’ spy agencies. “The difference has to do with the confidence level in the actual ability of the North Koreans to make a weapon that will work in a missile,” Clapper, said, adding that since the North has yet to test such a weapon, “neither we nor the North Koreans know whether they have such capability.” Clapper continued: “D.I.A. has a higher confidence level than the rest of the community on that capability. That's the difference.” (Eric Schmitt, “New Details on Disclosure Regarding North Korea,” New York Times, April 19, 2013, p. A-6) On the hawkish end is the Pentagon’s intelligence arm, the Defense Intelligence Agency, which fears that North Korea could threaten American troops with a nuclear weapon on a crude missile. On the skeptical end is the State Department, which has more doubts about Pyongyang’s capabilities. And somewhere in the middle is the Central Intelligence Agency. Those contrasting views are vying with one another in the
intelligence community, and a hint of those differences came into rare public view when an assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency that it has “moderate confidence” that North Korea has the ability to shrink a nuclear weapon and fit it into a missile warhead surfaced at a Congressional hearing. That conclusion was disputed by James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence, who issued a statement later in the day saying that it did not reflect “the consensus” of the nation’s intelligence community. The contradictory statements and sudden round of finger-pointing seemed to underscore once again the difficulty of obtaining reliable information – and making educated guesses – about one of the world’s most closed societies. But it also highlighted the sensitivity surrounding intelligence estimates in the wake of the highly publicized intelligence failures leading up to the Iraq war, and some subsequent failures involving North Korea. “The situation is that there is so little direct evidence that I don’t think it’s possible to come to a firm conclusion on whether or not they currently have a nuclear warhead that can be delivered by missile,” said Gary Samore, who until early this year served as President Obama’s coordinator for weapons of mass destruction, “or how far away they are from getting there.” Samore, now at Harvard’s Belfer Center, added that when it comes to arming the North’s Nodong missiles – which can hit South Korea and American troops there, but not beyond – with a nuclear warhead, “the best you can say is that they might have.” There is no argument that the North can build a modest bomb – its most recent test is believed to have yielded an explosion of 6 to 10 kilotons, less than what the United States dropped on Hiroshima. But there does not appear to be clear evidence of its work on miniaturizing that bomb. An administration official said that including an unclassified passage in a largely classified seven-page assessment of North Korean capabilities by the Defense Intelligence Agency was “clearly a human error.” But he would not describe how it happened, nor would Defense Department officials say how that single conclusion ended up in the open, especially if it lacked the context of much more detailed reports. In his statement, the famously press-shy Clapper said, “North Korea has not yet demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed missile.” The next morning, a Republican member of Congress said “demonstrated” was the crucial phrase: North Korea has never conducted a test of a warhead, showing that it could be precisely targeted or that it could survive the heat and forces of re-entry into the atmosphere. But he said that there is “a consensus building” among rival intelligence agencies that “If they are not there, they are close to there.” Differences among the assessments, he added, “are not huge.” Republicans in Congress have led efforts to increase money for missile defense, and Mr. Lamborn said that he raised the issue largely because the Obama administration proposed this week in its annual budget submission to reduce financing for missile defenses by more than $500 million. Given the agency’s responsibility for protecting American forces, it is not surprising that the Defense Intelligence Agency has been the most aggressive in arguing that North Korea is on the verge of marrying the products of its nuclear and missile programs. Two years ago, Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess Jr., then the head of the agency, edged up to a similar conclusion, but with several caveats. In testimony to Congress, he said, “The North may now have several plutonium-based nuclear warheads that it can deliver by ballistic missiles, and aircraft, as well as by unconventional means.” The last two in his list were important: it would require no new technology to devise a weapon to fit on a plane or a donkey cart. The hardest task, experts say, would be for North
Korea to design a warhead for an intercontinental missile. That warhead would go through the huge heat and stress of leaving, then re-entering the atmosphere. The North would have to design a warhead durable enough to keep from burning up, or breaking up, on re-entry. That is why other agencies are more skeptical. (David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Contrasting Views on North Korea Underscore Sensitivities and Lack of Evidence,” *New York Times*, April 13, 2013, p. A-6)

Obama: “We had an opportunity to discuss North Korea, where the Secretary General obviously has an important political interest but also a personal interest as a native of the Republic of Korea. And we both agree that now is the time for North Korea to end the kind of belligerent approach that they’ve been taking, and to try to lower temperatures -- nobody wants to see a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. But it’s important for North Korea, like every other country in the world, to observe the basic rules and norms that are set forth, including a wide variety of U.N. resolutions that have passed. **And we will continue to try to work to resolve some of those issues diplomatically, even as I indicated to the Secretary General that the United States will take all necessary steps to protect its people and to meet our obligations under our alliances in the region.**” ... Ban: “On the situation in and around the Korean Peninsula, I am deeply concerned, and we share such a grave concern together on these continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. I urge the DPRK authorities to refrain from making any further provocative (inaudible) and rhetoric. This is not helpful. And I really highly commended President Obama’s firm, principled, but measured response in close consultation with the Republic of Korea government and with strong engagement with neighboring countries like China. We hope that more of the countries, including China, who may have influence over North Korea, can exercise their leadership and influence so that this situation will be resolved peacefully. First and foremost, tension levels must come down. North Korea should not confront the international community as they are now doing. I hope that concerned parties, including the United States, China, the Republic of Korea, and Russia, and Japan will continue to work together on this matter.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon after Their Meeting,” April 12, 2013)

South Korea appeared to ease its stance on North Korea by calling for dialogue to help defuse tensions, as its president moved to calm foreign investors whose confidence the North has tried to shake with increasingly belligerent maneuvers. “We hope the North Korean authorities come out to the dialogue table,” Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said in a nationally televised statement that deplored the North’s recent decision to suspend the operation of an industrial park the two Koreas have run together for eight years at the North Korean town of Kaesong. “We strongly urge North Korea not to stoke the crisis on the Korean Peninsula any further.” Ryoo stopped short of calling his statement an official proposal for dialogue. “Rather than being an offer for dialogue, this is a public declaration that the problem of the Kaesong industrial complex and the North’s escalating belligerent acts should be resolved through dialogue,” Ryoo said after reading his statement. But it marked a considerable softening in tone by President Park Geun-hye’s government. Until now, South Korea has categorically rejected any early dialogue with the North, believing that doing so
amid a torrent of North Korean threats to attack the South would amount to capitulation and would only embolden the North’s brinkmanship. On April 8, Ryoo said the South had no intention of talking with North Korea any time soon because it was unlikely to bring about “concrete results.” The next day, Park vowed to end a “vicious cycle” of South Korea answering North Korea’s hostilities with compromise. Earlier today, President Park invited a group of foreign investors, including members of the American Chamber of Commerce in South Korea, to a luncheon in her presidential Blue House, assuring them that it was safe to invest in her country. “Some of you may be worried because North Korea has been escalating tensions,” she said. “But South Korea has achieved a dramatic economic growth and democratization in the past 60 years despite the provocations and threats from North Korea.” South Koreans, while expecting their leaders to be firm against North Korean provocations, oppose reacting overly to North Korean rhetoric because they believe it would hurt their top priority, the economic stability, analysts said. That delicate challenge for Park was highlighted by signs that investor confidence in South Korea had been rattled by recent events. General Motors said last week that further increases in tensions would prompt it to consider eventually relocating its production out of South Korea. The country’s main stock index slipped to its lowest point since November last week. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Moves to Defuse Tensions with North,” New York Times, April 11, 2013)

North Korea is “skating very close to a dangerous line” after weeks of saber-rattling, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel warned as northeast Asia watched for an expected missile test. “Their actions and their words have not helped defuse a combustible situation,” Hagel told reporters at the Pentagon. He said the United States and its allies want to see North Korean rhetoric “ratcheted down,” but if that doesn’t happen, “our country is fully prepared to deal with any contingency.” “We have every capacity to deal with any action North Korea will take to protect this country and the interests of this country and our allies,” Hagel said. One official said the North Koreans are military “masters of deception,” and may have planned all along to focus the world’s attention on the Musudans while they plan multiple launches of other missiles. That’s a tactic they have used in the past, the official said. The United States is less troubled about the other missiles, a second Pentagon official told CNN. “We’ve been seeing some launchers moving around. These are smaller and don’t cause us as much concerns,” that official said. “We think these movements are within seasonal norms for their exercises.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told CNN that despite being an ally of North Korea, it stands with the United States. “On North Korea, we have no differences with the United States. One just shouldn’t scare anyone with military maneuvers and there’s a chance things might calm down,” he said. (Matt Smith and Jethro Mullen, “North Korea Nears ‘Dangerous Line’ Hagel Says,” CNN, April 10, 2013)

North Korea has been repeatedly moving multiple missiles around in an apparent bid to confuse outside intelligence gatherers ahead of an expected launch, Yonhap reported. According to intelligence analysis cited by the South Korean news agency, two midrange Musudan missiles have been repeatedly moved in and out of a warehouse facility in the eastern port city of Wonsan. At the same time, at least five mobile launch vehicles have also been spotted swapping positions in South Hamgyeong Province. They are believed to be launch platforms for short-range Scud
missiles, which have a range of 300 to 500 km, and medium-range Nodong missiles, which can travel 1,300 to 1,500 km. “There are signs the North could fire off Musudan missiles any time soon,” an intelligence source said. “But the North has been repeatedly moving its missiles in and out of a shed, which needs close monitoring.” Another source suggested Pyongyang was hoping to “fatigue” South Korean and U.S. intelligence gatherers who have been on a heightened state of surveillance alert since yesterday. Various Japanese news outlets on Thursday reported defense officials confirming that at least one of the North Korean mobile launchers had placed its pad in a launch-ready position. The reports also said that such moves could be deliberate attempts by North Korea to sow confusion and did not necessarily indicate a launch was imminent. Although Pyongyang has not announced any launch, many analysts believe it will take place during the buildup to the birthday anniversary of late founder Kim Il Sung on April 15. (AFP/JiJi, Kyodo, “North Korea Sows Confusion over Launch,” Japan Times, April 11, 2013)

Secretary of State John Kerry gave qualified U.S. blessing to peace overtures from South to North Korea, even as he slammed Pyongyang’s incendiary rhetoric and demanded it abandon an expected missile test. In particular, he said Washington chose to “honor” the vision of South Korea’s new President Park Geun-Hye, who was elected on a pledge of greater engagement with Pyongyang. “We’re prepared to work with conviction that relations between North and South can improve and they can improve very quickly,” Kerry said. “I think we have lowered our rhetoric significantly and we are attempting to find a way for reasonableness to prevail here,” he added. Yonhap quoted Park as telling ruling party officials Friday that the South should meet with the North and “listen to what North Korea thinks.” Kerry made clear that a US-North dialogue was not currently on the table and stressed that any talks by any parties would require a change of course and tone from Pyongyang. “The rhetoric that we are hearing from North Korea is simply unacceptable by any standards,” Kerry told a news conference in Seoul alongside South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-Se. (Jo Biddle, “Kerry Backs S. Korea Moves to Ease Tension with North,” AFP, April 12, 2013) At his confirmation hearing in January Kerry appeared to join the critics who believe the administration has placed too much emphasis on beefing up its military presence in the region, which was bound to alienate China. “We have a lot more forces there than any other nation in the world, including China,” he said. “And the Chinese look at that and say, ‘What’s the U.S. doing? Are they trying to circle us?’ I think we need to be thoughtful in how we go forward.” (Geoff Dyer, “Kerry Trip Sets Tone for Response to North Korea,” Financial Times, April 12, 2013, p. 2)

South Korean President Park Geun-hye said she wants to build trust with North Korea and work together for mutual development if Pyongyang ends its provocative behavior and comes forward for talks. The remark, made in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, is the latest in a series of indications that Park is seeking to open a dialogue with Pyongyang to cool heightened tensions in the midsts of a torrent of war threats from the communist nation. “President Park said (South Korea) is working to build up mutual trust and realize joint development if North Korea accepts change and comes forward to dialogue,” presidential spokeswoman Kim Haing said in a statement. Earlier today, Park also said dialogue is an essential first step toward defusing
heightened tensions with North Korea, and that determining the intentions of the counterpart is a matter of principle in resolving problems, according to ruling party officials. Park was quoted as saying that the South should meet with the belligerent nation and “listen to what North Korea thinks” as there are many issues to resolve, including Pyongyang’s suspension of operations at a jointly run industrial complex in the North’s border city of Kaesong. (Yonhap, “Park Holds out ‘Joint Development’ If N. Korea Comes forward to Dialogue,” April 12, 2013)

Kerry, Yun: **YUN:** “Secretary Kerry and I agreed that North Korea’s recent threatening remarks to the foreign missions based in Pyongyang and foreigners living in Korea, as well as its nuclear missile threats, constitute a grave provocation to the international community as a whole. Secretary Kerry and I shared the assessment that the international community is dealing calmly with North Korea’s threats and provocations and that the domestic situation in Korea is keeping stable without any unrest. This clearly shows that North Korea will gain nothing from its provocations and threats. … Moreover, we had useful and construction exchanges regarding the ROK-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreements. Our chief negotiators will resume their talks in the near future and comprehensively review and assess the progress made so far, including technical and other aspects of the negotiations. We will map out, based on the outcome, how to proceed with future negotiations. … **KERRY:** In the visit that we had in Washington last week and now today, we have covered a great deal of territory. And I want to reiterate perhaps the most important thing with respect to the immediate tensions that exist here in this region. Neither the United States nor the Republic of Korea nor the international community – we are all united in the fact that North Korea will not be accepted as a nuclear power. The rhetoric that we’re hearing from North Korea is simply unacceptable by any standard, and I am here to make it clear today, on behalf of President Obama and the citizens of the United States and our bilateral security agreement, that the United States will, if needed, defend our allies and defend ourselves. **I also want to emphasize, very much in keeping with the conversation that I had a little while ago with President Park, President Park was elected with a different vision for the possibilities of peace, and we honor that vision.** She has expressed an articulate view about trust-politik, and we hope that that vision is the one that actually will take hold here. We want to emphasize that the real goal should not be reinforcing the fact that we will defend our allies, which we will, but it should be emphasizing for everybody the possibilities of peace, the possibilities of reunification, the possibilities of a very different future for the people of the Republic of Korea and ultimately for the DPRK. The United States and the Republic of Korea both want to see a peaceful Korean Peninsula, and that means it must be free of nuclear weapons. We are committed to working with the Republic of Korea and the other Six-Party partners in order to get the North to live up to obligations that the North freely accepted and adopted. And we are prepared to work with the conviction that relations between the North and the South can improve – and they could improve very quickly, and the world would be much better off – if the leaders of the North, and one leader in particular, would make the right decisions. So I want to emphasize that that’s our vision and that’s the vision that we think the people of the world share. The Foreign Minister and I also continued our conversation from last week about a number of bilateral issues, including our civil nuclear cooperation,
further implementation of the Free Trade Agreement, and close coordination on climate change and on sustainable energy. … **Q:** (Via interpreter) My name is Kim Yun Don. First of all, I would like to address this question to Secretary Kerry. This attention on the Korean Peninsula is escalating, and there does not seem to be an exit strategy. Yesterday, President Park said that we have to talk with, dialogue with, North Korea. Secretary Kerry, what do you think of President Park’s proposal, first? And second, are there any plans for the U.S. to dialogue directly with North Korea? And if you do dialogue with North Korea, what will be your conditions for such dialogues? And if there is a missile launch, would you still be ready to dialogue with North Korea? I would also like to ask a question to Minister Yun. From the start of your inauguration, you have made a lot of multipronged efforts on the international stage, and I think that today’s meeting was also part of these efforts. But nevertheless, there don’t seem to be sufficient efforts being made. So President Park said that she’s ready to dialogue with North Korea, so what do you plan to do in the future? And if North Korea continues to act the way it does, what counterproposals do you have in mind? **KERRY:** Well, if North Korea decides to fire the Musudan missile, which they have threatened to, and which people have been following, it would really be one more unnecessary, unfortunate, unwanted contribution to an already volatile, potentially dangerous situation. And so it would indicate, really, who is being provocative with an exclamation point yet again. **Our preference would be to get to talks. Our preference would be, through these Six-Party or through bilateral means, get to a place where we are talking about the real future, which is the future of denuclearizing and ultimately, hopefully, depending on the choices that President Park and Republic of Korea make, ultimately, the reunification of the peninsula as a peaceful, nonnuclear entity.** So it’s up to Kim Jong-un what he decides to do. It’s not going to change our current position, which is very, very clear. We will defend our allies. We will stand with South Korea, Japan, and others against these threats. And we will defend ourselves. And Kim Jong-un needs to understand, as I think he probably does, what the outcome of the conflict would be. Our hope is that we can get back to talks. Now, you ask, what would the conditions of those talks be? Very simple: **They simply have to be prepared to live up to the international obligations and standards which they have accepted, and make it clear they will move to denuclearization as part of the talks, and those talks could begin.** But they have to be really serious. No one is going to talk for the sake of talking, and no one is going to continue to play this round-robin game that gets repeated every few years, which is both unnecessary and dangerous. I will be taking some of the comments from President Park that we had in our conversation to me with me to China tomorrow, and I will obviously raise this issue and these considerations with the Chinese leaders. And I think it’s clear to everybody in the world that no country in the world has as close a relationship or as significant an impact on the DPRK than China. **China has an enormous ability to help make a difference here, and I hope that in our conversations, when I get there tomorrow, we’ll be able to lay out a path ahead that can defuse this tension, that can allow the people of the North and the South and other people in the world to recognize that people are moving this in the right direction, which is towards negotiations and towards a reduction in the current level of tension.** And that’s our hope. But those are the conditions of talks. We are prepared, providing the North is prepared, to do what it knows it has to do, which is live up to international
obligations, and move towards a serious negotiation about denuclearizing the peninsula. YUN: (Via interpreter) Regarding Kim Yun Don’s question, in mid-March, I became the Foreign Minister, and regarding the North Korea nuclear issue, we have discussed this matter with the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia. And for example, we had a lot of telephone conversations and we had a lot of in-depth talks. And besides those four countries, we have talked with, for example, the EU, ASEAN countries, Germany, the Philippines, all of those concerned countries. And through telephone conversations, we had a lot of in-depth discussions. And last week, I met with Secretary Kerry, and we discussed how to strengthen security on the Korean Peninsula and also to have sustainable stability and peace in this region. Not only through these telephone conversations, but soon I will be meeting with a lot of senior officials from the neighboring countries in order to have further in-depth discussions. And I will be releasing the concrete plans in the future. Besides those plans, we also have a lot of different, multifaceted, diverse approaches, and so we are looking also at multilateral approaches. For example, between Korea, the U.S., and China, we have a special mechanism in order to discuss the North Korean situation. And the reaction has been quite good, and so in the near future, I believe that we will be able to have a more concrete mechanism. So we have these regional, multilateral, and diverse approaches in order to resolve this issue. In the case of provocation from North Korea, as you know, in the UN Security Council, we have a lot of - there are resolutions, and there will be proper reactions. And so besides those from the international community, I believe that any provocation from the North Korea will see a strong message from the international community, and there will be a reaction from not only Korea, but from the international community and neighboring countries as well. And so as the Minister of Unification said yesterday, North - we hope that North Korea will make the right choice and take part in the trust-politik. MODERATOR: Jill Dougherty, CNN. Q: This question is both to Secretary Kerry and to the Foreign Minister, please. At a hearing on Capitol Hill, a member of Congress read an unclassified section of a classified document, and in that, it says that the DIA assesses with moderate confidence that the North currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles. They also note, however, the reliability will be low. Is this the assessment of both the U.S. and of South Korea? And is this in any way altering your strategic calculations, especially in light of any particular or, let’s say, potential retaliation for a North Korean missile launch? KERRY: Well, I’m going to answer the second part of your question first, and then I’ll answer your first part declaratively. If Kim Jong-un decides to launch a missile, whether it’s across the Sea of Japan or some other direction, he will be choosing, willfully, to ignore the entire international community, his own obligations that he has accepted, and it will be a provocative and unwanted act that will raise people’s temperature with respect to this issue. It should - I would say ahead of time that it is a huge mistake for him to choose to do that, because it will further isolate this country and further isolate his people who, frankly, are desperate for food, not missile launches, for people who are desperate for opportunity, not for a leader who wants to flex his muscles in this manner, that takes everybody to a bad place. So that’s the choice, clearly, and we hope he will make the right choice. I could not make more clear - and I’ll reiterate it because I think it’s so important - President Park of the Republic of Korea articulated to me this afternoon a bright vision, a vision of big possibilities, a
vision of the potential of a nonnuclear peninsula in which the people’s needs are being met, and ultimately the aspirations of Koreans are met by the possibility of reunification. So you have a peaceful option here being proffered by the President of a country affected, to the South, and you have a very different option being offered in the North. That isolation, regrettably, is going to increasingly cost the people of North Korea. We hope that Kim Jong-un will choose otherwise. Now, with respect to the type of weapon or what they may have and the threats that he is making, let me make it clear - and this is the Pentagon’s assessment that I’m giving you - it is inaccurate to suggest that the DPRK has fully tested, developed, or demonstrated capabilities that are articulated in that report. So we do not operate under the presumption that they have that fully tested and available capacity. But obviously, they have conducted a nuclear test, so there’s some kind of device. But that is very different from miniaturization and delivery and from tested delivery and other things. Does it get you closer to a line that is more dangerous? Yes. And that is precisely why we are standing here together at this moment, talking about the need to move in a better and different direction. And our hope is that in the next days, in my conversations in China and conversations in Japan, that we will find the unity necessary to provide a very different set of alternatives for how we can proceed and ultimately defuse this situation. Final comment: I couldn’t make it more clear from our point of view. President Obama ordered a number of exercises not to be undertaken. I think we have lowered our rhetoric significantly, and we are attempting to find a way for reasonableness to prevail here. And we are seeking a partner to deal with in a rational and reasonable way. Our hope is that the vision expressed by President Park for negotiations and for a peaceful track is a vision that we can move too quickly. Because let’s face it, everybody here knows this: we’ve got enough problems to deal with around the world, and we don’t need some individual activities by one particular person threatening destruction and mayhem, chaos, in the ways that we’re seeing, no matter how based in reality it may be. The greatest danger here, we all agree, is for a mistake. The greatest danger is that something happens and there’s a response to that something, and then things somehow inadvertently were to get out of control. And so we call on Kim Jong-un to recognize that this is a moment for responsible leadership and it’s a moment to try to reach for the good possibilities, not try to guarantee the bad ones.

YUN: (Via interpreter) Regarding the DIA’s reports, I believe that there seem to be a lot of different views regarding the DIA’s report. As Secretary Kerry just mentioned, just talked about that, and so I don’t think that I need to make any additional comments. But we believe, regarding the nuclear capability of North Korea, it’s quite high. However, nevertheless, at the current time right now, their militarization, diversification, we believe that in that way they probably need to develop a little bit further. So they’re not that developed in those areas. So regarding nuclear capability of North Korea, whether it will have any impact on our reaction, I can make two points. Regarding security, Korea and the U.S. have already very concrete strategies being implemented. And so regarding the deterrence, I believe that it will be quite effective regarding North Korea’s WMDs. And we are moving in that direction. Secondly, besides the deterrent capability, we believe that within North Korea, we are trying to find ways to persuade North Korea. And so in early March, the UN Security Resolution 2094 we believe will be an effective tool to persuade
North Korea. And so we will continue to work with the interested parties as well as the UN Security Council member countries to persuade North Korea to make the right choice and we will continue to try to dialogue with North Korea. Q: (Via interpreter) Yonhap News, my name is Kang Eui-Young. I would like to ask a question to each of the ministers regarding the nuclear accord agreement between Korea and the U.S. You talked about a mutually beneficial agreement. So how - to what extent do the differences have to be narrowed in order to reach an agreement? And there’s also talk that enrichment is also an issue. So which part are you focusing more on? And to Secretary Kerry, I would like to also ask a question. You mentioned that before the May summit meeting, you see - you probably believe that an agreement could be concluded. So on the - are you still hopeful? Because Korea wants to have nuclear capability for peaceful purposes only. Also, another additional question regarding the meeting with President Park: Was there anything that surprised you during the meeting? YUN: (Via interpreter) Yes. I would like to answer first. Regarding the nuclear accord between Korea and the U.S., you asked to what extent we have to - the coverage, the scope should be for us to be satisfied, but we are currently under negotiations right now so it’s difficult to say what the extent or scope needs to be. However, when we start negotiations, we do have a few standards that we have in mind, and that is that we have a lot of spent fuel which is being accumulated, and so we have to use the spent fuel in an effective manner. And so that would be one point that would have to be considered, and also how to provide safe and nuclear power. That’s another point. And also, as you saw when - since we’re providing nuclear power to UAE, there are different ways that we can use nuclear energy. So that’s another point that we have in mind. So there are different standards that we are keeping in mind during holding negotiations. And also, since the alliance between our two countries is based on trust, I believe that we will be able to narrow our differences. KERRY: I very much agree with Foreign Minister Yun. The Republic of Korea has a peaceful civil program and it currently provides about 30 percent of the power to the country. And we have great respect for the way in which Korea has managed this program, how effective it’s been, and frankly, how they have really safeguarded the civil component of it. So we have great confidence in the Republic of Korea. As I explained, we are at a delicate moment with respect to the situation with the North, and we are also dealing with Iran and are very concerned at this time about not having any ingredients that could alter our approach with respect to either of those. I feel very confident, based on the discussions that we’ve had, there are a number of options on the table. I’m confident that one option or another will be able to come to fruition by the time that President Park comes to Washington. I’m not going to go into the details that you asked about what are we specifically discussing or what specific item might be an issue, because it may not be an issue and I don’t think anybody needs to negotiate publicly here. I think the Foreign Minister and I are both very confident that we’re on a track, that we understand the track we’re on, and that we will get where we’re going, and we will continue to cooperate and work on a civil nuclear program. So that’s important. And what - were there any surprises with respect to President Park? Probably just how gracious and patient she was with all my questions. (Laughter.) She was really very, very nice, and I found her to be incredibly strong and visionary with respect to her view of trust-politik and what she wants to try to do to change a mold that obviously has not worked very effectively over the last
years. So I think she expressed a terrific vision, and I think President Obama and she are going to have a very, very constructive and positive conversation, and I know the President is going to be delighted to spend time with her. MODERATOR: Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal. Q: A question for both: Minister Yun, I would like to get back to this issue of negotiations. Has the South Korean Government specifically communicated with North Korea in the recent days or weeks of a desire to hold direct talks to de-escalate these tensions? And is South Korea prepared to start sending humanitarian aid back to North Korea without any guarantees that they are going to take steps towards denuclearization? And if that’s the case, isn’t this kind of a sign of capitulating to the North? And for Secretary Kerry too, would the U.S. support direct talks between the South and the North and the resumption of aid without any guarantees or clear steps from Kim Jong-un that he’s prepared to start living up to these nuclear disarmament accords he’s signed to in the past? YUN: (Via interpreter) Yes, regarding talks with North Korea, we have reiterated several times, but in the current situation we will maintain strong deterrence against any North Korean provocation. That is our main stance. Nevertheless, our dialogue – the window for dialogue is always open. Yesterday, the Minister of Unification also made an announcement, and that was reiterated again. And regarding the Kaesong industrial complex, North Korea has rescinded its agreement with South Korea and it is causing quite a lot of damage for the Korean companies in the industrial complex. And so if there are any problems, then we are always ready to talk with North Korea. Regarding humanitarian aid, ever since the inauguration of the new administration, regardless of the political situation, we are always ready to provide humanitarian aid in principle. And so last week the Eugene Bell NGO has agreed to send TB medicine to North Korea, and this was accepted by the Korean Government. And so truly humanitarian aid and transparent aid, aid that can be verifiable, is accepted by the Korean Government. So that is totally acceptable. KERRY: From the point of view of the United States, we would never stand in the way nor argue against a sovereign and independent country, and particularly a partner in this case, from deciding to talk bilaterally if they thought that was important and saw fit to do so. We’ve also said we would engage in bilateral talks under the right circumstances, but it’s up to our friends to decide what they think those circumstances for them might be. We have agreed, however, to talk very closely about any steps that any of us will take, and there will be a complete and total process of cooperation and exchange of views before either of us take any steps that may come along. And that includes discussions with other countries and steps with other countries. No country more affected, obviously, in this than the Republic of Korea, and that’s really a central part of our partnership. With respect to the United States aid issue, we’ve been down that path before and we’ve been disappointed by the breach of those agreements previously. In principle, the United States - I’m not going to rule out a certain set of circumstances that might predicate that it was important in the context of other steps that might be taken, but in principle the answer is no, we would not provide it absent a move by the North to live up to the standards that have been laid out and to move towards the denuclearization or to embrace the denuclearization. And I think it’s critical that we have verifiable and real steps going forward, and that’s the way that we would approach it. But again, I say I’m not going to rule it out categorically if a whole set of circumstances predicated
that a bunch of good things could follow as a consequence. In principle, no.”
(DoS, Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se after Their Meeting,” Seoul, April 12, 2013)

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea spokesman’s answer to a question put by the KCNA as regards the recent proposal of dialogue made by the incumbent chief executive and the puppet minister of Unification of south Korea. “The chief executive at a dinner with parliamentary members from the “Saenuri Party” at Chongwadae on Thursday clarified her stand to resume dialogue with the north. Minister of Unification Ryu Kil Jae said on the same day in an exceptional "statement to the north" that he “hoped the north’s authorities will show up at a conference room for dialogue especially for the discussion of issues of the north side’s own concern", calling for settling the issue of normalizing the Kaesong Industrial Zone through dialogue. As regards this, the core member concerned of Chongwadae said Ryu’s statement was an official proposal of dialogue that reflected the will of the chief executive. But **to us, it is nothing but a crafty trick to cover up their crimes of driving the Kaesong Industrial Zone into a crisis and their nature of confrontation by misleading the public opinion**, the spokesman said, and went on: Those, keen on "sanctions" and "pressure", nuclear war maneuvers against the DPRPK and moves for confrontation with fellow countrymen in league with foreign forces, talked about dialogue, **not uttering a word of apologizing or claiming responsibility** in disregard of their crimes. This shameless act is an insult to and a mockery of the DPRK. The Foal Eagle war maneuvers are now being staged in south Korea and the U.S. and the puppet warmongers are deeply engaged in the moves for igniting a war against the DPRK under the pretext of its military countermeasures. As for the proposal for dialogue, it is an empty word without any content. Those, who fostered the present grave situation, showed no candid and sincere attitude toward the dialogue with the north but took the stand of listening to what the north thinks and wants. This is the height of arrogance. Worse still, the chief executive and the minister of Unification of south Korea let loose a spate of venomous outcries for "provocation", "dismantlement of nukes," "change" and "repetition of vicious cycle" toward the north to whom it proposed dialogue. This goes to fully prove that they still harbor hostility and intention for confrontation. **Do they think is it possible to have dialogue under such situation and have they ever thought of what results will such dialogue produce. The present chief executive of south Korea appears to follow the policy of transferring to the "confrontation with dialogue" from "confrontation without dialogue" touted by the "yushin regime" early in the 1970s.** If she really hopes it, she had better stop the farce of dialogue. The north-south dialogue is neither a game nor verbal spar. Such dialogue will be meaningless and useless. The south Korean authorities can never evade the blame for the present acute situation though they are resorting to crafty moves, misleading public opinion. Confrontation is incompatible with dialogue. **If they have true intent for dialogue, they should drop the attitude of confrontation, to begin with, not getting inveigled in wordplay. The possibility of dialogue entirely depends on their attitude.**” (KCNA, “CPRK Urges S. Korea to Drop Confrontational Stance,” July 14, 2013)
The U.S. government does not support the immediate closure of an embattled inter-Korean industrial complex, according to an official, despite claims that it is a failed effort at rapprochement that fuels the North Korean economy. North Korea has shut down, at least temporarily, the industrial park at Kaesong. Some say that’s good. Chun Yung-woo, a former South Korean national security adviser, has openly said Kaesong has served as an obstacle to efforts for the denuclearization of North Korea. “We don’t need to call for the close of the Kaesong industrial complex,” he said in a forum in Seoul earlier this week. “A good way is to shutter it when North Korea demands that.” The Wall Street Journal also said in an editorial that it’s time to say goodbye to Kaesong. But the State Department disagrees. “Closing Kaesong would not help the DPRK (North Korea) achieve its stated desire to improve its economy and better the lives of its people,” a department official told Yonhap News Agency on background Friday. “We are monitoring the situation closely and remain in close consultation with the South Korean government.” (Lee Chi-dong, “U.S. Views Kaesong Project Still Necessary despite Growing Criticism,” Yonhap, April 13, 2013)

White House spokesman Jay Carney: “Q. You’ve mentioned a couple of times prudent measures. I wonder -- because largely the context of that has been defensive things to protect allies or the United States. But I wonder if there’s also another aspect to prudent measures when you’ve got -- out of country today -- Secretary of State Kerry said, “President Obama has ordered a number of exercises not to be undertaken…for reasonableness to prevail here.” And I wonder if some of the prudent measures the President has undertaken in the most recent days have been to, in this case, cancel exercises that had been planned or delay them or do something else to take either theoretically provocative action or actions that might be misinterpreted out of the mix. CARNEY: What the Secretary was referring to was not the cancellation of exercises. He was referring, I believe, to what Secretary Hagel announced, which is that we postponed the April 9th Minuteman-III ICBM test, recognizing that it could be inaccurately construed by some as an attempt to exacerbate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The test was previously scheduled, and is no way -- was no way, prior to its postponement, connected to recent events on the Peninsula. But in keeping with what you’re suggesting, in order to -- that it would not be misinterpreted as something in response to the situation on the Peninsula or something that would potentially exacerbate tensions on the Peninsula, Secretary Hagel postponed it. But it will be rescheduled. Q. But that’s the only thing that has been canceled or postponed in this pursuit of bringing down -- CARNEY: I think that’s fair to say. I’m not familiar with all the different things that the Defense Department or others engage in with our South Korean allies, for example, or other measures that we take. But we did have recent, long-scheduled exercises that were undertaken with the ROK, and we obviously took other actions that are in specific response to what we have seen out of North Korea, including stepped-up missile defense actions and some of the over-flights that we had as well. ” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Daily Briefing, April 12, 2013)

North Korea seemed to stop moving vehicles suspected to be mobile launchers for its medium-range missiles over the past two days, a government source said, in a sign that Pyongyang’s missile launch may not be imminent. According to intelligence sources, the North had moved two Musudan intermediate missiles, which had been
concealed in a shed in the eastern port city of Wonsan, in and out of the facility earlier this week in an apparent bid to interfere with Seoul’s intelligence monitoring. Four or five vehicles, suspected of being so-called transporter erector launchers (TEL), were also previously moving around in South Hamgyeong Province. But a government source said that since Thursday the North has stopped moving the mobile launchers, whose timing comes on the heels of a dialogue proposal by South Korea and the U.S. “There are no signs that the TELs have been moved in and out of the facility since Thursday or that missile launches are imminent,” the government source said. "Situations surrounding the missile launch have not changed." "The North might be deliberating Seoul and Washington's dialogue offer," another source said. "We are closely monitoring whether there are any changes in North Korea's moves to launch missiles." However, Christopher Hill, a former chief U.S. nuclear envoy, said in an interview with Yonhap News Agency that it is not likely for the North to return to the negotiation table for the time being despite the dialogue proposal by Seoul and Washington. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Has Likely Not Moved Missile Launchers: Source,” April 13, 2013)

Secretary of State John Kerry flew to China and sought to elicit China’s help in dealing with an increasingly recalcitrant nuclear armed North Korea by saying that American missile defenses could be cut back if the North abandoned its nuclear program. In a news conference, Kerry suggested that the United States could remove some newly enhanced missile defenses in the region, though he did not specify which ones. Any eventual cutback would address Chinese concerns about the buildup of American weapons systems in the region. China’s cooperation is essential to the Obama administration’s strategy of holding a tough line on Pyongyang in an attempt to achieve the type of long-lasting solution on the nuclear program that has eluded a string of United States presidents. Previous administrations responded to North Korean provocations by eventually offering aid to tamp down tensions, only to see the North’s promises to relinquish its nuclear program evaporate once the aid had been delivered. Kerry said he explained to China why the United States felt it needed more missile defenses in the region. “Obviously if the threat disappears – i.e. North Korea denuclearizes – the same imperative does not exist at that point of time for us to have that kind of robust forward leaning posture of defense,” he said. “And it would be our hope in the long run, or better yet in short run, that we can address that.” Kerry’s remarks are likely to stir concern among staunch advocates of missile defense in the United States, who also see antimissile systems as a means of responding to China’s growing military might. His aides say any changes would require the input of the Pentagon. Even if China were to take a strong position with its longtime ally, possibly cutting back essential aid and fuel, North Korea might not fall into line. Under its new leader, Kim Jong-un, the North has snubbed China several times, including refusing Chinese entreaties to cancel the recent nuclear test that set off the war of words on the Peninsula. In Beijing, Mr. Kerry met with the new president, Xi Jinping, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Premier Li Keqiang and State Councilor Yang Jiechi. Yang said at a dinner with Kerry on tonight that China was committed to “the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula.” But the Chinese state councilor also stressed that the “issue should be handled and resolved peacefully through dialogue and consultation.” Bonnie S. Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington, said China was very frustrated with Kim and was taking some action, like cracking down on the flow of illicit North Korean funds through Chinese banks. At the same time, she noted, the Chinese fear the United States’ recent actions, including a test flight of B-2 bombers over South Korea, would further incite the North. The United States “keeps sending more fighter bombers and missile defense ships to the waters of East Asia and carrying out massive military drills with Asian allies in a dramatic display of pre-emptive power,” Xinhua said. (Michael R. Gordon, “Kerry in China to Seek Help in Korea Crisis,” New York Times, April 14, 2013, p. 1) He won a modest restatement of the shared goal of a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and a public call from China’s foreign policy chief, Yang Jiechi, for a way out of the tension “peacefully, through dialogue.” That was a clear warning to North Korea that its main economic and political protector does not want a new Asian war. “People in the region understand what the balance of the power is in the situation,” Kerry said during a news conference closing his day of meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping and other officials. “Everybody is hoping that reasonableness will prevail.” Kerry said he would not discuss specific promises or plans by China in dealing with its ally, saying China may or may not choose to reveal its program publicly. But he claimed a clear commitment between the United States and China to “bear down” together to reduce the risk of war or nuclear proliferation from North Korea. Chinese leaders whom Kerry met with earlier Saturday made oblique references to the tense North Korean standoff in brief public remarks. “I must say there are immense common interests between China and the United States,” Premier Li Keqiang told Kerry through an interpreter. “Our common interests far outweigh our differences.” Li said both are big countries and added, “We shoulder the responsibility for peace and stability in our region and the world.” Kerry told Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that he hoped to launch a broader cooperation “to define for both of us what the model relationship should be and how two great powers, China and the United States, can work effectively to solve problems.” (Anne Gearan, “U.S. China Agree to Cooperate on Korea Crisis,” Washington Post, April 14, 2013)

KERRY: “Let me try to give you a summary of what has been I think an extremely constructive and positive day – frankly, more agreement than disagreement in many - in most, in all respects - I think beyond what I anticipated in many regards. And I thank our host in China for the privilege to, as I think you know, to be able to meet with President Xi, with Premier Li, as well as with my counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang and also just to finish to both an energy cooperation program as well as a dinner with State Councilor Yang Jiechi. And we had a continued conversation on a number of topics tonight which were important, which is why we took a little longer. … Both President Xi and Premier Li and the new government have talked at great length about trying to build an even stronger relationship with the United States. And they have talked about the ways in which we can create a model partnership in our relationship. President Obama is excited about that prospect, and we are going to fully explore all of its possibilities. It is absolutely clear to everybody that when you have two of the most powerful – the two most powerful economies in the world and two of the most significant energy users in the world, as well as two members of the permanent Security Council of the United Nations, with interests that extend around the world, you have the possibility of being able to create synergy. And that’s what we
really talked about here today, how to deal with the cooperative relationship between us in order to contribute to global economic security and to global fiscal security. I look forward to strengthening many of the things that we began to discuss today, and I’ll be very precise with you about what they were. President Obama has said many times, and I repeat today that the United States welcomes a stable and prosperous China, a China that is a great power already, and that has the ability to be able to play a major role in world affairs. We have a stake in China’s success, and frankly, China has a stake in the success of the United States. That became clear in all of our conversations here today. A constructive partnership that is based on mutual interest benefits everybody in the world. And today we had the opportunity to talk about a large number of bilateral, regional, and global security issues, beginning, of course, with the issue of North Korea. China joined with the United States tonight through the statement that I made earlier, and the statement that Yang Jiechi made, State Councilor Yang Jiechi, that we both joined in stating that the United States and China remain fully committed to the September 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party Talks and to its core goal. And that core goal is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner. Together we talked about how we can give that a little more energy, a little more life over the course of these next days. And what we agreed to do is immediately bear down with further discussion at a very senior level in order to fill out exactly what steps we can take together to make sure that this is not rhetoric, but that it is real policy that is being implemented. To that end, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be traveling out here shortly, as will other members of our intel community, as well as Deputy Secretary Burns later this month. So there will be very focused, continued, high-level discussions about the ways to fill in any blanks that may exist as a consequence of the lack of time tonight. We also joined together in calling on North Korea to refrain from provocations and to abide by international obligations. We also discussed our shared interest in preventing Iran from securing a nuclear weapon and agreed on how valuable close cooperation between our countries is in the accomplishment of both of these goals. And these goals, we agreed, are not unrelated. What happens with respect to North Korea can affect Iran, and what happens with Iran can affect North Korea. And we are committed in both cases to not see the world move towards nuclearization, but to move in the opposite direction in a peaceful way. … We also had conversations about regional maritime security, including disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. And we talked about how important it is for all parties not to raise tensions that could undermine peace and security and economic growth in the region, not to engage in unilateral actions. And I spoke also with the Foreign Minister about the deteriorating situation in Syria. The State Councilor reminded me that he was present at the negotiations in Geneva, and that he agrees completely – China agrees completely – with the framework of the Geneva communiqué which mandates a dialogue coming through a transfer of authority to a transitional government by mutual consent from both sides. And he reemphasized China’s commitment to that approach, believing that the world will be better served by a political solution than by continued fighting. … Q: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you. Following the discussions today, could you tell us please what concrete commitments China has given, if any, to try to rein in tensions in the Korean peninsula, perhaps (inaudible) trade and investment into North Korea? And also secondly, I realize – or I noticed that you yourself and State
Councilor Yang mentioned the possibility of a missile launch from North Korea in the coming days. Do you now feel that you have no option but to (inaudible) this is going to take place? **KERRY:** Oh, on the contrary, on the contrary, I just said that we both call on North Korea to refrain from any provocative steps. And that obviously refers to any future missile shoot. I said it yesterday in Seoul. I addressed it and I called it both unwise and unnecessary and unwanted and provocative. So we’re very clear about what it is, but I think that more importantly, we really want to focus people on the better alternative. **And we don’t want to get into a threat-for-threat or some kind of confrontational language here.** There’s been enough of that. I think everybody in the world understands the balance of what is at stake in this issue. I think that people in the region understand what the balance of the power is in this situation. And everybody is hoping that reasonableness will prevail, as are we. China and the United States today, we committed ourselves to find a peaceful solution. And we say to Kim Jong-un and to the Government of Korea - of DPRK that they have an obvious choice here, which is to join us in an effort to try to find a negotiated resolution. Regardless of what they do, we will continue to fight for that and push for that. That’s our priority; that’s the best way to proceed. And we believe that there are ways to do that. Now with respect to specifics, **I’m not going to go into the specifics.** It is entirely within the purview of the Government of China to talk about what they would do or not do. But I can assure you we left no option off the table and we had a full discussion what the possibilities might be. And that will continue, as I said, in the days ahead. .... **MODERATOR:** Andrea Mitchell, NBC. **Q:** Mr. Secretary, from your conversations today at so many levels, top levels of the Chinese leadership, do you have an understanding of their communication with Kim Jong-un and their understanding of the decision making in Pyongyang, and whether they have communicated beyond their public statements the frustrations we are told they are beginning to feel about the (inaudible) behavior? Did you discuss with them also the possibility that some of the recent deployment of anti-missile defenses might be redeployed or stood down if Pyongyang were to change its behavior? And is it your assessment that Pyongyang could have achieved what it has in terms of its nuclear program without cross-border transactions from this side of the border and without China’s cooperation financially and technologically? How could North Korea under these sanction regimes have proceeded so well? **KERRY:** Well, Andrea, with respect to the last part of the question, I don’t want to get into any classified information here. But I will tell you that it **doesn’t have to be, nor is there an insinuation, that it is China.** There are plenty of places in the world where we know proliferation has taken place over the years. Obviously, the AQ Khan network of Pakistan; the Iranians themselves have engaged in a process external, and in exchange with other parties, and many people believe with North Korea. So there are lots of outside sources, regretfully, and that’s one of the principal concerns of counter-proliferation efforts and initiatives around the world. **Yes, I do believe that I have a better sense of what China’s intentions are here and how they can proceed.** But I think it’s inappropriate for me to speak for China. And I think the Chinese, over time, will speak as they deem it necessary and appropriate. I will say that they obviously communicate and they have communicated. It’s up to them to tell you what and when and how. But there’s no question in my mind that China is very serious, very serious, about denuclearizing. Today they made an unprecedented joint statement. They don’t usually do that. Today the State Councilor sat with me and
he joined in making a statement and sending the same message. They don’t usually do that. So I’d say that they have made it crystal clear that they want to abide by the international community’s standard of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. That is the Chinese policy. And they will speak to what steps they may or may not take in the days ahead. **Q:** Did you end on missile defense? **KERRY:** On missile defense, we’ve discussed, absolutely, why we have taken the steps that we have taken, in direct response to the fact that American interest and American territory in the following way: Guam and Hawaii, they brag, are threatened, and any president would be irresponsible not to heed warnings and at least take precautionary measures. And in addition to that, the - we discussed the fact that we have allies that it it’s important to reassure. South Korea, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, are important allies, both of them. We are committed to defend them; we’ve made it clear that we will, and we need to be in a position to do so. Now obviously, if the threat disappears, ie, North Korea denuclearizes, the same imperative does not exist at that point in time for us to have to have that kind of robust, forward-leading posture of defense. And it would be our hope in the long run that - or, better yet, in the short run - that we can address that.” (Secretary of State John Kerry, Solo Press Availability in Beijing, April 13, 2013)

The last known face-to-face contact between Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, and senior Chinese officials did not end well. A member of China’s Politburo, Li Jianguo, led a small delegation to Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, in November. He carried a letter from China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, which is said to have contained a simple message: Do not launch a ballistic missile. Twelve days later, Mr. Kim did just that. The relationship between North Korea and China, extolled in the past to be as close as "lips and teeth," has faltered ever since. How far the alliance between the powerhouse China and the impoverished North Korea has soured is now debated openly in the Chinese news media. Few call it a serious rift, though a spirited debate appears to be under way within the Chinese government over how to handle Kim. Some things are clear. The personal relationships among Kim and his Chinese counterparts appear to be less familiar than when his father, Kim Jong-il, was in charge. Analysts suggest that could be a result of the significant age differences between the inexperienced Kim and the much older Chinese leaders. There has been no publicized visit of Chinese leaders to North Korea since the embarrassing trip in November when Kim thumbed his nose at Xi’s request for restraint. As relations frayed after Kim carried out North Korea’s third nuclear test in February, China suggested sending several senior officials to Pyongyang, including Dai Bingguo, a state councilor and experienced North Korea hand who retired in March, Chinese analysts said. But Kim rebuffed the overture, the analysts said, a sign that the Chinese interpreted as the new leader wanting to show he is less dependent on Beijing than his father. It not clear whether Xi has ever met Kim. Xi last visited Pyongyang in June 2008 when he was vice president. He arrived before Kim Jong-il had a stroke, a period when the succession process that led to the appointment of Kim Jong-un as president had not yet begun. Speculation mounted in 2010 and 2011 that Kim would replace his ailing father after the son was reported to have participated in one or more of the four official North Korean delegations to China in those years, a period when the Chinese were encouraging North Korea to open up its economy. On at least one of those trips, Kim
Jong-il did meet with Xi, who at that time was vice president, said John Delury, associate professor of East Asian studies at Yonsei University in Seoul. “However, there was never evidence Kim Jong-un did in fact go with his dad,” Delury said. “I assume he did not, until there is positive evidence.” In August 2012, Kim’s uncle by marriage, Jang Song-thaek, a four-star general who is considered a close adviser to the new leader, visited Beijing and met with the Chinese leaders at the time, President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. It was assumed that Jang was setting the stage for a visit to China by the new, young leader, an idea that the Chinese appeared to be pushing as a way of showing what promise economic overhaul held for the repressed North Korea. Little came of the visit. (Jane Perlez, “North Korean Leader, Young and Defiant, Strains Ties with China,” New York Times, April 13, 2013, p. 10)

Her mother was shot by an assassin. Her father, a staunchly anti-Communist dictator, was similarly killed. And she survived a vicious razor attack to the face. Nobody doubts the toughness of South Korea’s new president, Park Geun-hye, whose upbringings has made her as steely a leader as they come. Now at the center of an escalating crisis with North Korea, Park, 61, is her country's first-ever female leader, a fact that her rivals in the North have raised to taunt her. Stories of her mental toughness are legend — on learning that her father had died, her first concern was whether North Korea was preparing to invade. Her first question after awakening from an operation after the razor attack in 2006, which left a scar across her jaw, was how her party’s campaign was going. Park is so tough-minded that even in South Korea, still one of Asia’s most patriarchal societies, her gender has mainly been a nonissue after some initial jitters. However, now that South Korea’s prized economy appears to be rattled by months of crisis, critics and supporters alike wonder if Ms. Park may have gone too far in presenting herself as an ultratough leader and what some now call the “neuter president.” Just as some critics accused Hillary Rodham Clinton of becoming more hawkish to win over skeptics, Park took office seemingly ready to do battle. She filled the top security posts in her cabinet and presidential staff with former generals and decided to offer no real concessions until the North backs down, a change from some past administrations. Even officials in the Obama administration, which has also taken a hard line against the North, have privately expressed fears that she might go too far if North Korea made a limited but deadly assault. To try to prevent an overreaction, the administration recently sent two stealth bombers to fly a practice run over South Korea to prove to the country’s leaders that they would not be left to face the North alone. (Choe Sang-hun, “Steely Leader of South Korea Is Battle-Ready,” New York Times, April 13, 2013, p. A-1) Making sense of the Kims has been more of an art than a science. A cadre of North Korea scholars has spent decades piecing together a portrait of the eccentric, secretive family by poring through mounds of propaganda, defector accounts and the limited, sporadic contact the regime has had with the West. While acknowledging that Kim Jong Un remains an enigma, experts in the intricacies of Pyongyang say a careful study suggests his recent bout of bellicose rhetoric probably represents a desperate cry for legitimacy rather than a genuine appetite for combat. As Kim Jong Un eases into the top job of a nation whose elite has long been presumed to be rife with intrigue and rivalries, he appears determined to assert a tight grip on the levers of power. “He has an inferiority complex,” said Kongdan Oh Hassig, a North Korea expert at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria. “He is trying to show
that he has a strategic mind, that the military stands behind him and that no one stands against him.” As a child, Kim was impetuous and competitive to a fault, according to a 2003 memoir by the family’s former sushi chef, writing under the pseudonym Kenji Fujimoto. “Perhaps in choosing the youngest of the three sons to succeed him, Kim Jong Il was looking for qualities that he did not have: an outgoing personality,” said Victor Cha, director of Asian studies at Georgetown University and a former senior official on the White House’s National Security Council. The ailing Kim Jong Il probably saw something more in his handpicked successor, said Ken E. Gause, a senior researcher at Alexandria-based CNA Strategic Studies who has cultivated an encyclopedic knowledge of the Kims. “Kim Jong Un showed a type of leadership and toughness that his older brothers didn’t have,” Gause said. “That leadership and toughness is required for leadership in North Korea, where, unless you have the personality to play the game, the politics can eat you up really quickly.”

After struggling two decades to get Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program and join the international community, Washington was cautiously optimistic about the young leader, wondering whether his time in Europe might have made him more prone to engagement with the West. “There was some hope out there,” said Joseph DeTrani, a former CIA and State Department official who negotiated with the North Koreans and has studied the Kim dynasty closely. “He inspired some hope.” Days after Kim Jong Il’s state funeral on Dec. 28, 2011, North Korea signaled a willingness to negotiate with the United States – but the conciliatory posture soon yielded to confusion. North Korea watchers wondered whether a power struggle was playing out behind the scenes of an outwardly smooth transition. “Kim Jong Un is a much better politician than his father,” said former New Mexico governor Bill Richardson, who has been invited to North Korea on official visits. “He gives better speeches and seems more naturally at ease with people in his greetings and his physical movements.” Richardson, who has not met Kim on his visits, speculated that the recent flare-up probably has one main audience. “He wants the approval of the North Korean military,” he said. “He’s trying to convince them that he is ready to govern. There may have been some doubts because of his youth and the fact that he never served in the military, so he’s trying to show them that he’s tough.” North Koreans should no longer have to “tighten their belts,” he proclaimed, and could look forward to enjoying “the wealth and prosperity of socialism as much as they like.” Soon after announcing that vision, Pyongyang offered hints that the country was experimenting with modest yet significant agricultural reforms that appeared designed to liberalize the economy a notch. “There may have been a major pushback from the military,” said Gause, the CNA researcher, noting that, in July, Ri Yong Ho, the chief military officer outside the Kim family, was publicly ousted. His dismissal was part of a broader purge of defense leaders that some analysts believe represents an effort by Kim to surround himself with loyalists. If Kim is in fact interested in reforms, he might be taking a calculated gamble that by raising the specter of bloodshed, a war-weary United States might be prodded to provide him with a pathway out of the strict sanctions that have helped turn North Korea into the world’s most isolated country. “Kim Jong Un is making an effort to have a better negotiating position with the U.S. and South Korea,” said Park Hyeong-jung, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute of National Unification in Seoul. “North Korea stands to lose or win.” Hassig, the defense analyst in Alexandria, said Kim is playing a dangerous game, comparing him to “a puppy” that is “not trained or groomed and
thus not afraid of anything.” The deepest insight into the young leader’s thinking, North Korea experts reluctantly note, may come from the account of the only American he is known to have met: Rodman, the colorful former basketball star who traveled to Pyongyang this year. “He wants [President] Obama to do one thing: call him,” Rodman said in an interview with ABC News about his late-February trip. “He told me, ‘If you can, Dennis – I don’t want to do war. I don’t want to do war.’” (Ernesto Londoño, “North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un Offers Many Faces, Many Threats,” Washington Post, April 14, 2013, p. A-1)

Arbatorv and Dvorkin: “In recent years, the United States has been shifting the emphasis of its nuclear strategy in the direction of the Pacific Ocean, primarily with China in mind (as noted above, eight of the fourteen Trident Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines are deployed in the Pacific). In focusing on this area, Washington has made developing its missile defense a much higher priority there than in the Euro-Atlantic area (90 percent of the BMD radars and interception assets are situated in the Asia-Pacific), and it is also concentrating on the deployment and development of high-precision conventional strategic systems, including Prompt Global Strike programs. At the same time, in contrast to its relations with Russia, the United States has never officially acknowledged a relationship with China based on mutual nuclear deterrence or accepted that China will eventually achieve parity with the United States. It would appear that Washington has no intention of offering such relations as a “gift” to China, the new superpower of the twenty-first century (similar to the way that the United States at one time had not wanted to recognize mutual deterrence with the Soviet Union, which then had to win parity for itself after first passing through three different cycles of the arms race and the very dangerous Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962). China, for its part, insists on its right to mutual deterrence with the United States, with an emphasis on “minimum nuclear deterrence,” and thus has been gradually increasing the number of its ICBMs and SLBMs. Along the way, China has been building precision-guided conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could potentially be used against Taiwan and the U.S. Navy and tactical ballistic missiles, and it is also conducting experiments with missile defense and antisatellite weapons. According to independent experts, China’s strategic forces (based on the New START Treaty’s classification) consist of 93 land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles. The land-based component of the Chinese nuclear forces consists of the Strategic Missile Force and missile systems of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ground force. China’s Strategic Missile Force is represented by the so-called Second Artillery of the PLA and includes eighteen obsolete silo-based liquid-fueled DongFeng5A (CSS-4) missiles as well as 30 new solid-fueled, road-mobile DongFeng31 and DongFeng31A (CSS-9) ICBMs. The sea-based component includes two types of ballistic missile submarines: one Xia-class (type 092) with twelve single-warhead Julang-1 (CSS-N-3) SLBMs and two Jin-class (type 094) submarines, each carrying twelve single-warhead Julang-2 missiles. Although the construction of Xia-class submarines and Julang-1 SLBMs was discontinued in the 1990s, construction of type 094 submarines began in 2001 with at least four planned to be built (other sources say at least five). The two type 094 submarines that are already serving with the Chinese Navy patrol the waters adjacent to China. Thus, the sea-based component of China’s nuclear forces consists of 36 single-warhead Julang-1 SLBMs, the combat loads of which consist of 45 nuclear
China has a significant number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) as well as tactical ballistic missiles. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated all Russian (Soviet) and U.S. weapons of this class. China has eleven obsolete DongFeng-4 (CSS-3) IRBMs and 88 new road-mobile intermediate-range DongFeng-21/21A (CSS-5) missiles, as well as 60 DongFeng-15/15A/15B (CSS-6) and DongFeng-11A (CSS-7) (the latter does not match the INF classification, having a range of 300 kilometers). Overall, China has 160 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Some IRBMs and tactical ballistic missiles, apparently, are conventionally armed. The air-based component of China’s nuclear forces consists of the strategic air force, which has 60 XianH-6 medium-range bombers, and the tactical air force, represented by 300 Jian-5 fighter-bombers and fighter aircraft derived from the Russian multirole Su-30 fighter. In addition, 120 strategic nuclear B-5 bombs and 320 B-4 nuclear bombs are allocated to them, for an overall total of 440. The PLA ground forces are armed with two types of road-mobile systems capable of launching either nuclear-armed or conventional-armed missiles. One system is based on use of the solid-fueled DongFeng-11 (CSS-7—about 100 units), the other on the DongHai-10 ground-launched cruise missiles (up to 500 units). Up to 150 nuclear warheads may be assigned to these missiles as nuclear payload. Thus, as many as about 360 nuclear reentry vehicles could come under the land-based component of the Chinese nuclear forces. During peacetime, most of these warheads would be stockpiled separately from the missiles. However, contrary to the opinion of many experts, the Second Artillery is now adopting a continuous duty cycle for the DongFeng-31/31A (CSS-9) ICBM missile brigades, clearly readying these systems for immediate use upon the authorization of the Chinese political leadership. This means that the missiles in their launch containers will have nuclear warheads permanently mounted on them. According to leading Russian experts, China has about 800 to 900 nuclear warheads in its current stockpile that are available for rapid deployment. In addition, approximately the same number could be held in storage as backup weapons and for spare parts or be earmarked for disposal. There is yet another aspect of utmost importance. Foreign news agencies and independent experts have periodically reported that the Chinese military has been building an extensive system of underground tunnels that could store large items of military hardware. These tunnels, which extend for several thousand kilometers, could be capable of accommodating significant numbers of backup launchers with ballistic and cruise missiles or of storing nuclear weapons. No other purpose has yet been identified for such extensive earthworks. Unofficial sources report that new versions of the XianH-6 medium-range bomber are being produced and that those already in service are undergoing modernization. They are equipped with new targeting and navigation equipment and will have an enlarged armament payload, including air-launched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The prototype for this missile is the DongHai ground-launched cruise missile. In an effort to modernize the land-based component of its nuclear forces, China has placed the emphasis on fitting ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads and with BMD penetration aids. In addition, two new ballistic missiles are under development: the DongFeng-25 IRBM and DongFeng-41 (CSS-10) ICBM. The DongFeng-25 is built using the first and second stages of the DongFeng-31, arming it with MIRVs (as many as three reentry vehicles). This system is intended to replace the outdated DongFeng-4 (CSS-3) IRBM. The DongFeng-41 ICBM was developed to be a versatile missile that could be
deployed on road-mobile and rail-based launchers. It is believed to be equipped with six to ten MIRVs. As far as the sea-based component is concerned, the main effort is being applied to increasing the speed and improving the quality of the type 094 class ballistic missile submarines. The JL-2 SLBM is undergoing modernization and being equipped with MIRV warheads. In addition, the necessary infrastructure for nuclear submarines is being built at a naval base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. A new type 096 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, which is to be equipped with 24 JL-2 MIRVed SLBMs, is being planned for the longer term. It is expected that the first such submarine will be launched in 2014-2015. Thus, the Chinese nuclear capability has clearly been underestimated by the international community. It appears in all likelihood that China, which is already the third-largest nuclear state after the United States and Russia, is in a class of its own. In terms of its nuclear force levels, China surpasses all of the other six nuclear states combined (excluding the two superpowers). In addition, China is the only state aside from Russia and the United States that has the technical and economic capability to build up its nuclear arsenal rapidly and manyfold. However, the balance is hugely asymmetrical in favor of the United States with respect to the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the strategic nuclear forces, as well as their command, control, and information management systems. As a consequence, there is no parity in the strategic balance of the two countries and also no state of mutually assured destruction (by retaliatory attack under all conditions of conflict), which is the basis of strategic stability. The United States has an excess of such capacity while, so far, China lacks it, based on the aforementioned description of its nuclear forces (in terms of their “operationally deployed capability”). In a hypothetical disarming (counterforce) strike against China’s identified strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces, the United States could destroy (in all probability within a single launch) more than 90 percent of these military targets. The missile defense system that is being deployed and enhanced in Asia and the Pacific by the United States (including the elements in Alaska and California) and its allies would be capable of intercepting the vast majority of the surviving Chinese nuclear missiles. For the foreseeable future, the strategic balance between the two powers will be defined by their strategic and theater offensive and defensive programs and by possible agreements in this area. As has been noted above, the United States has never acknowledged any degree of mutual nuclear deterrence or parity with China, nor has it ever admitted that such a situation could possibly emerge in the future. As applied to China, the American concept of strategic stability reduces to ensuring transparency for the strategic nuclear forces, rather than maintaining a mutual second-strike capability. Within the U.S.-China strategic balance, mutual nuclear deterrence is not only highly asymmetrical but is also further “diluted” by scenarios of regional conflict and by the weapons systems deployed in support of U.S. commitments to its allies and partners (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). The political ambiguity and strategic asymmetry discussed above will greatly complicate any potential negotiations between the two under the classic model. ... The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review report says that “The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies and partners. . . . The United States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” The role of nuclear weapons in
deterring an attack with the use of conventional, chemical, or biological weapons declines. The United States is ready to declare that it “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” However, this obligation does not apply to NPT nuclear powers or states that violate the NPT or are not party to the treaty. Apparently implying security commitments to Japan and South Korea, the United States reserves the right to deter attacks with conventional weapons or chemical or biological weapons (as noted within “a narrow range of contingencies”). In other words, nuclear weapons are seen as applicable not only globally (as the basis for deterring nuclear attack against the United States), but also for regional deterrence: to respond to a nuclear attack against U.S. allies or, in some cases, to respond to conventional attack or one using chemical or biological weapons. Given this reasoning, “the United States is . . . not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.” … The situation with China is much more complicated. Despite its seemingly cohesive and lapidary appearance, Beijing’s position and policies in the nuclear field are quite contradictory. On the one hand, China is the only one of the great powers that has officially undertaken an obligation, with no reservations, to not use nuclear weapons first. The section of the Chinese “White Book,” titled “Arms Control and Disarmament,” carries an appeal to all nuclear-weapon states to “abandon any nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons, make an unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will they use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones . . . nuclear-weapon states should negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other.” China’s approach to strategic stability differs from those of Russia and the United States in that it is not based on approximate missile/nuclear parity and the concept of mutually assured destruction (by a retaliatory strike). Concerning the size of the nuclear forces that China needs, it has been said that they will be kept to the minimum level “required for national security.” On the other hand, China is the only one of the five great powers—permanent members of the UN Security Council and the recognized five nuclear powers in the NPT—that does not provide any official factual information on its nuclear forces and their development programs. In the past, when the Chinese GDP, military expenditures, and nuclear forces had been rather modest, this situation was quietly accepted by other powers, but this attitude has changed over the past decade in view of China’s economic growth, its military budget (which has become second only to that of the United States), large-scale nuclear and conventional weapon modernization programs, impressive military parades in Tiananmen Square, and increasingly ambitious foreign and military policies. Now, provisions such as “no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances,” “purely defensive military doctrine,” and “will limit its nuclear capabilities to the minimum level” will not be taken for granted. Moreover, in the absence of any official information—even of the most general nature—on the Chinese nuclear forces and their development programs, such statements may produce the opposite effect: they will be seen as an indication of wanting to hide the truth and lull other states into lowering their vigilance. Millennia-old Chinese traditions seem to have been revived in many areas of China, perhaps
becoming more important than any euphonious provisions of current official policy of the People’s Republic. In this light, it would be useful to recall the thoughts of the great Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu in his treatise The Art of War. Two and a half thousand years ago, when the inhabitants of what today is Russia and the NATO states were still wearing animal hides and fighting with clubs, he wrote, “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away.” Reputable Russian experts have estimated that since the early 1960s China has generated 40 tons of enriched weapons-grade uranium and ten tons of plutonium, which would be enough to produce 3,600 nuclear warheads. However, it is most probable that half of this fissile material is being held in stocks and that half of the 1,500 to 1,800 warheads that have been produced are in storage. Thus, as indicated above, up to 800 to 900 warheads and bombs could be available for operational deployment on carriers of various types, all of which could reach Russia, and approximately 90 of which could reach the United States. In addition, China has been trying to improve the survivability and effectiveness of its land-based and space-based ballistic missile early warning system and command and control systems, and it has conducted research and development in the fields of missile defense and antisatellite weapons. There is also a great degree of uncertainty about the tunnel structures being built in China as their purpose has not yet been officially explained. This factor becomes especially important in view of the overall modernization of the PLA’s conventional forces and China’s superiority in these forces over its regional neighbors. India is greatly concerned about this situation. It may cast doubt on U.S. security commitments to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and encourage those states to adopt a policy of appeasement with regard to Beijing, or push them to seek military (including nuclear) independence (information about the growth of such sentiments in Japan has recently caused a sensation). China’s military buildup has also been a source of concern for the countries of Southeast Asia with which China faces disputes over the South China Sea oil shelf. Despite Russia’s ongoing plans of “strategic partnership” with China, the tendencies described above can have disturbing implications for Russia’s national security. The increasing Chinese capability of launching a nuclear strike on European Russian territory would diminish Russia’s advantage in intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons, which continue to compensate for China’s superiority in conventional forces close to the area of Russian Siberia and the Far East. China’s unambiguous pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons is also rather questionable. It is commonly believed that a nuclear power that makes a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first instead relies on the second-strike capability. However, according to information available to other countries, China’s deployed nuclear forces are generally estimated to be too vulnerable and not efficient enough to ensure a retaliatory capability after a hypothetical disarming attack by the United States or Russia. Moreover, Chinese strategic nuclear forces would be incapable of launching on a warning received from an early warning system due to the high vulnerability and inadequate effectiveness of the Chinese early warning system as well as its command and control system. The main paradox of China’s nuclear doctrine is that if its nuclear forces are indeed as limited as most foreign experts seem to think, they would be unable to deliver a retaliatory strike and would operationally most likely be oriented toward landing a preemptive attack. The Chinese second-strike
capability would be viable only if a large number of nuclear weapons are stored in the underground tunnels, which would be highly survivable and unknown to a potential adversary. This stockpile would not be available for immediate use but might be partially revealed to the world in a crisis in order to reinforce its deterrent effect and disrupt an opponent’s plans. In such a case, China could be considered the largest nuclear power after the United States and Russia. Moreover, China’s nuclear capability is apparently stronger than those of the next six nuclear states combined. It can be speculated that the real motives behind China’s complete secrecy about its nuclear forces lie not in their “weakness” and “small size” but in the much larger strength of China’s actual nuclear arsenal than can be construed from observing the weapons deployed on its surface. In addition, China’s economic and technical potential would allow it to build up its nuclear arms rapidly. The fact that China could build up its nuclear forces establishes a significant, though unspoken, incentive for the United States and its allies to develop a missile defense system in the Far East. Although the immediate justification of this system is to intercept North Korean missiles, Washington quite probably seeks to deploy a BMD system in the region to obstruct and delay China’s acquisition of a nuclear deterrent potential (not to mention strategic parity with Washington) based on the guaranteed capability for a retaliatory strike against the United States. For obvious reasons, China has been even more concerned about these developments than Russia has been concerned about NATO’s BMD system. China’s response will center on developing BMD penetration aids, an antisatellite system, and its own BMD. In addition to space-based global information systems, as of the beginning of 2012 the U.S. missile defense system included:

• Four early warning radars: the L-band radar in Shemya (Alaska) and UHF-band radars in Beale (California), Fylingdales (UK), and Thule (Greenland);
• Five transportable forward-based X-band AN/TPY-2 radars, three of which are on combat alert: Shariki (Honshū Island, Japan), Nevatim Desert (Israel), and Malatya Province (Turkey) (of the other two, the radar at Wake Island is used for BMD tests, while another radar is operated by the U.S. Central Command);
• The mobile sea-based X-band SBX radar mounted on a drilling rig in the Pacific Ocean near Adak Island (Alaska);
• Thirty ground-based interceptor missiles (GBIs), 26 of which are in Alaska at Fort Greely (deployed at six experimental sites and twenty combat sites), and four of which at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, with combat control centers at Fort Greely and Colorado Springs;
• Twenty-four ships (five cruisers and eighteen destroyers) of the Aegis BMD version 3 system, carrying a total of 158 interceptor missiles, of which 72 are the SM-2 Block IV and 86 are the SM-3 (three of these are the new SM-3 IB variant). Sixteen ships belong to the Pacific Fleet (five at Yokosuka, six at Pearl Harbor, and five at San Diego) and eight to the Atlantic Fleet (seven at Norfolk and one at Mayport);
• Two THAAD units equipped with two AN/TPY-2 radars, six launchers for eight missiles each currently equipped with eighteen interceptor missiles;
• Patriot missile systems: 56 launchers for sixteen missiles each, and 903 PAC-3 missiles.

These data show that two of four large-scale early warning radars and two of the five transportable radars are directed at the Asia-Pacific region; all 30 GBI strategic interceptors can reach missiles launched from the Asia-Pacific region; sixteen of 23
Aegis-equipped ships are deployed there. In addition, BMD radars and interceptors are deployed within the borders and on the fleets of local partners and allies of the United States. Joint research and development is conducted with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines (in the latter two cases it is planned). Specifically, there is a sea-based BMD layer in Yokosuka, Japan, consisting of Aegis-equipped ships with SM-3 1A (two cruisers) and SM-2 (seven destroyers), as well as a transportable AN/TPY-2 radar and a command, control, battle management, and communications unit (C2BMC). In addition to American warships, an Aegis combat system with SM-3 1A and SM-2 missiles is installed on four Japanese Kongo-class destroyers and two Atago-class destroyers. The second Japanese BMD layer consists of Patriot theater BMD systems of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, equipped with PAC-3 missiles. In addition, Japan plans to purchase THAAD systems. … The situation with regard to China is not as clear. The degree to which the U.S. ballistic missile defense and Russia’s Air-Space Defense system will put China’s nuclear deterrent capability into question will largely depend both on the effectiveness of these systems and the survivability of China’s nuclear forces. As noted above, the current survivability and combat readiness of the approximately 50 Chinese ICBMs and 100 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles leave little hope that there would be enough missiles to penetrate the U.S. BMD system in the aftermath of a hypothetical massive nuclear strike under any conflict scenario (if the Chinese tunnel storages have no missiles in reserve). Apparently aware of this situation, China has been heavily investing in creating a sea-based component for its nuclear triad. However, access to the open ocean from China’s naval bases is restricted by the Japanese, Ryukyu, Taiwanese, Philippine, Malaysian, and Indonesian island chains, which the United States and Japan, with their powerful antisubmarine capabilities, as well as the South Korean and Taiwanese navies, can use to their advantage. Still, China probably expects to ensure the combat survivability of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines at sea by using other naval assets and coastal systems designed for countering the U.S. Navy. According to available sources, during the first stage of its naval buildup (up until 2015) China plans to create naval capacity (including coastal missiles) to effectively counter the fleets of the United States, Japan, and other nations in the Chinese “near zone”—the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea (there is a nuclear submarine naval base on Hainan Island). During the second stage (2015–2020) China would establish complete military superiority in those waters, while enabling its Navy to effectively counter the U.S. Navy in the “middle zone,” that is, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, and the seas of the Indonesian Archipelago, as well as within the ocean space up to the Marianas, the Caroline Islands, and New Guinea. During the subsequent phase (after 2020) China would expect to acquire military dominance in the “middle zone,” while in the “far zone” (to the Hawaiian Islands) it would counter the U.S. Navy. China’s ambitious naval modernization plans also include the acquisition of naval bases and deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean in order to control the supply lines of energy resources from the Persian Gulf and Africa. The American-Japanese antisubmarine warfare systems are not the only threat to China’s strategic navy. China is also very concerned about the fact that U.S. BMD systems in Alaska and California (where GBIs are based) and Aegis-equipped U.S. warships, as well as Japanese military bases and ships (Aegis/SM-3), are able to counter Chinese SLBMs. A study conducted by Chinese experts, unique in its detail
and technical calculations, shows that such a multilayered BMD would be quite effective against Chinese SLBMs launched from shallow coastal waters, where the submarines would be under the protection of the Chinese fleet and where they would be more difficult for the antisubmarine warfare systems of the United States and Japan to detect. Although the Chinese nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines would be easier for an antisubmarine warfare force to counter if they should enter the open ocean, the BMD system described above would be incapable of intercepting SLBMs launched against U.S. territory from southern azimuths. For the system to gain such a capability, it would have to be significantly strengthened with new space- and sea-based detection and tracking systems, as well as upgraded land- and sea-based interceptors. However, if the United States should set its goal as continuing to impede the growth of the Chinese missile potential, the United States will be capable of creating such a BMD system. The United States has striven to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons to meet its commitments to its allies by developing not only defensive weapons, but also offensive conventional weapons. This is a source of major concern in China, especially with regard to the development by the United States of long-range, conventionally armed precision-guided weapons: sea- and air-based cruise missiles combined with space-based reconnaissance, targeting, and communication systems. The prospects that hypersonic precision conventional boost-glide systems could be created within the framework of the U.S. Prompt Global Strike concept cause no less concern for China. The Chinese are also worried about the U.S. experiments with the X-37B spacecraft that took place in April 2010 and the tests of various boost-glide systems. Eugene Miasnikov has provided a detailed description of current and prospective precision-guided conventional weapons. Under the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, all nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles are to be decommissioned. At the same time, long-range Tomahawk SLCMs will come to play an increasingly important role. They can be launched from the torpedo launchers and vertical launch systems on nearly all U.S. attack submarines. The greatest striking power is held by the four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines that have been converted to launch SLCMs. Each of the subs, two of which have been deployed to the Pacific, can carry up to 154 Tomahawk SLCMs. The U.S. Navy has 53 strategic submarines in service, of which 30 are deployed in the Pacific Ocean. The DDG-51 (Arleigh Burke-class) destroyers and CG-47 (Ticonderoga-class) cruisers are equipped with vertical launchers and can launch BMD, anti-aircraft, and antisubmarine warfare missiles. At the end of 2010, the U.S. Navy had 59 destroyers and 22 cruisers in service, of which 34 destroyers and twelve cruisers are deployed in the Pacific. CG-47 cruisers can carry a maximum of 122 SLCMs. DDG-51 and DDG-1000 destroyers can have up to 90 and 80 SLCMs, respectively, though the operational load of these missiles is usually a third to a half of their maximum size. By 2020, the number of deployed SLCMs could reach as high as 1,600 aboard U.S. Navy submarines and 4,700 aboard surface ships. At least 60 to 70 percent of these will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean. Conventional high-precision strikes against the territory of an adversary can also be carried out by U.S. Navy carrier-based aircraft. Eleven U.S. aircraft carriers are currently in service, which is expected to continue to 2020. The air wing of an aircraft carrier usually consists of 36 attack aircraft. The air-launched cruise missiles are deployed on heavy bombers. Conventionally armed bombers do not count in the New START Treaty’s allowed numbers of delivery vehicles and warheads, and the
transparency and verification measures that apply to such weapons are very limited. According to Eugene Miasnikov, the main disadvantage of the cruise missiles currently in service with the U.S. Air Force is their relatively low speed. In an effort to address this, the U.S. Navy has been developing hypersonic missiles under the RATTLRS program (Revolutionary Approach to Time-Critical Long Range Strike). These missiles, which travel at Mach 4.5, would be used to attack coastal targets at ranges of up to 1,000 km. The ArcLight project being carried out by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has the goal of creating a long-range, sea-based strike system based on the Standard SM-3 interceptor missile that could be equipped with a hypersonic glider with a warhead having an operational range exceeding 3,300 km. The missiles would be loaded into vertical launch systems aboard surface ships and submarines. The U.S. Air Force has joined with Boeing to develop the X-51A WaveRider hypersonic vehicle with a scramjet engine. This vehicle is expected to serve as the prototype for an air-launched missile that would have an operational range of up to 1,200 km and a speed of at least Mach 6. Systems capable of delivering a payload essentially anywhere in the world within one hour are being developed within the framework of the Prompt Global Strike program. For now, only ICBMs and SLBMs with nuclear warheads would be capable of meeting this requirement, and new systems of this kind will not enter operational service before 2020. The development of the Prompt Global Strike program has been conducted in three main areas, aimed at testing the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle (HTV-2), the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, and the Conventional Strategic Missile. These systems use ballistic launchers and highly maneuverable guided hypersonic gliding vehicles. The first two flight tests of the HTV-2 were carried out in April 2010 and August 2011. Both tests were conducted under similar scenarios. The launches took place at the Vandenberg Air Force Base space complex using the Minotaur IV Lite launch system (the four-stage “light” version, three stages of which came from the MX ICBM). Despite the failure of these tests, development of these systems continues. It is interesting to note that just as Russia does, China projects the threat of the use of such weapons on itself alone. The conflict scenario that is widely and seriously considered in China is that any attempt by China to solve the Taiwan problem by force would lead to armed conflict with the United States. Still, the matter does not stop there. Despite the vast financial and economic interdependence between the two powers, sharp disputes can be expected between them as they vie for dominance in the Western Pacific. A growing China will consider this region its natural area of vital strategic, military, and political interest, while the United States will not give up its current dominance in a region where it has made large-scale economic and political investments and has commitments to allies and partners. At the strategic level, Beijing’s great apprehension concerns the possibility of counterforce conventional strikes against its nuclear forces. It should be noted that Russia is also concerned about such a possibility as applied to itself, having 170 road-mobile ICBMs and 150 silo-based missiles on high alert in addition to other components of its nuclear triad and powerful tactical nuclear assets. Aside from that, Russian military doctrine has made it clear that any massive attack on Russian nuclear forces using precision-guided weapons would invite a nuclear strike in retaliation. Thus, it is understandable why Beijing would be so concerned, considering the fact that China has no more than 50 ICBMs that would be able to reach U.S. territory. The likelihood of a U.S. counterforce attack using precision-guided conventional weapons undercuts China’s sacramental
nuclear doctrine based on an unconditional commitment not to use nuclear weapons first. This obligation implies that China would not retaliate with nuclear arms if attacked by conventional precision-guided weapons. In any case, Beijing fears that the United States would expect China to hesitate in such circumstances, unless it adjusts its doctrine. Meanwhile, China attaches great political importance to its commitment on no first use of nuclear weapons. If Beijing makes an exception for the case of an attack against it with conventional weapons, then the Chinese nuclear doctrine would not in essence be different from that of Russia or a number of other states, and it would lose its unique nature. The military and political situation in the Western Pacific is further complicated by the intertwining of offensive and defensive conventional systems and potential scenarios of military combat. China probably believes that the U.S. precision-guided conventional weapons would be able to complete massive and multiple disarming strikes against its own conventional precision-guided missiles (and their command systems) designed to make strikes against the U.S. Navy, in particular against aircraft carriers and SLCM- and BMD-equipped warships. The advanced hypersonic boost-glide vehicles of the Prompt Global Strike program that are being developed by the United States could presumably penetrate the dense, multilayered air-defense system that shields China’s own coastal missile launchers. China puts great emphasis on such conventional systems in its military policy, first and foremost on medium-range ballistic missiles with precision-guided conventional warheads targeted at U.S. Navy ships (in particular, around Taiwan) and American bases on the territory of U.S. allies. These mainly include the DongFeng-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missiles with self-guided warheads and the DongFeng-15 (CSS-6) and DongFeng-11 (CSS-7) short-range ballistic missiles, as well as conventional DongFey-10 (CSS-X-10) ground-launched cruise missiles. According to various estimates, 300 to 500 Chinese tactical ballistic missiles are deployed at coastal areas and can make strikes on Taiwan. China has made significant achievements in developing these weapons: Chinese DongFeng-15 (CSS-6) missiles can reach American aircraft carriers at distances of 1,000 km from the coast, and the DongFeng-21D (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missiles can hit targets as far as 2,200 km from the coast. The new conventional DongFeng-25 medium-range missile, for instance, was designed to force the U.S. fleet to remain at a distance of 3,200 km from the coast, which is far beyond the operational range of carrier-based aircraft or even of the Tomahawk SLCMs based on cruisers and destroyers. These Chinese missiles are armed with hypersonic gliding guided warheads. To provide these missiles with targeting and guidance information, China has implemented large-scale programs aimed at developing orbital, stratospheric, and air-based reconnaissance and targeting systems. In this regard, the Chinese professional military literature emphasizes that in a crisis situation these offensive weapons should be used for a first strike once an adversary’s warships have entered the range of the Chinese missiles. If this tactic is applied in practice, any future crisis over Taiwan could spiral out of political control and develop into an armed conflict with subsequent unmanageable escalation. For their part, the United States and its allies have been deploying their sea- and land-based BMD systems, which among other things are assigned the mission of countering any Chinese attacks made by high-precision conventionally armed weapons against allied warships or land-based sites in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, or Taiwan. This interweaving of military technical and strategic factors and contradictions significantly complicates any possible efforts
to limit arms and agree on confidence-building measures in the region, and in some aspects globally. … Nevertheless, it would appear possible to gradually engage China in the nuclear arms limitation process, although this will not happen by merely announcing rhetorically that the number of participants in the process should be increased. It will not be possible to “teach” China the Russian-American lessons; Beijing will form its own position. China’s involvement would be realistic on only a strictly pragmatic basis, that is, once it has concluded that its concessions with regard to transparency and specific weapons systems will be paid off by the concessions made by the United States (and, indirectly, Russia) in matters of concern to Beijing. Beijing considers the New START Treaty to be an intermediate document that had been negotiated hastily in order to replace START I, which expired in 2009. It believes that the treaty, in a sense, is a pale imitation of real strategic arms reduction (minimal actual reductions, peculiar counting rules, reduction of warheads by stockpiling, and the like). To seriously approach at least a theoretical discussion of any limitations of its nuclear weapons, China is awaiting as a minimum a new U.S.-Russian treaty similar to START that would actually reduce the strategic forces of the two countries (for example, to 1,000 warheads). It is clear that prospects for the next strategic offensive arms reduction treaty are in doubt due to disagreements over such issues as missile defense, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and political matters. In addition, China insists that the United States (and, by default, Russia) abandon the first-use concept and recognize the existence of mutual nuclear deterrence based on mutual vulnerability. For the United States, to take such steps would be fraught with complications, in that its relations with its allies depend upon security guarantees (including nuclear ones) from Washington, while Russia would perceive such a transformation as being a threat to its own security in the west and the east. This would be especially true in light of China’s geostrategic advantages near Siberia and the Far East and also given China’s growing superiority in conventional forces. Therefore, to get China to participate in the nuclear disarmament process would not only be a matter of Beijing’s changing its position, but also the problem of introducing fundamental and perhaps painful changes in the military policies of the United States and Russia. If Washington and Moscow seriously wish to pursue transparency or limitation of the Chinese nuclear forces, rhetorical statements or appeals to Article VI of the NPT will remain as fruitless as before. The two leading powers must soberly assess what they would be prepared to sacrifice in terms of reducing and limiting their own weapons and modernization programs in exchange for corresponding concessions made by China. It appears that Beijing will not agree to anything short of this will continue to follow its “vicious circle” policy, demanding that the United States and Russia reduce their nuclear forces to levels closer to China’s, while not revealing what these levels are. It appears that the following conditions will need to be met before China “opens up” step-by-step and limits its strategic weapons (at least by committing itself not to increase them): The United States must commit not to further build up its sea- and land-based BMD assets in the Pacific Ocean (this condition depends on its ally Japan as well). The current multilayered BMD system in the Pacific is adequate to counter North Korean missile launches, and any further development will be increasingly seen as having an anti-Chinese purpose.

- The United States and Russia must make a commitment that China would be able to take part in any BMD cooperation efforts that the two powers agree to conduct under
the framework of specific projects (for example, on missile launch detection data exchange), in a manner it found acceptable.

• One such project might be the Asia-Pacific Joint Data Exchange Center, which would provide data on missile launches in a similar manner to the Russia-United States and Russia-NATO centers, which the countries had initiated and discussed in relation to Europe but which never became operational. Such a trilateral Russian-U.S.-Chinese facility in Asia could also be open to representatives of India, Japan, South Korea, and other states that comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime, which should officially admit both China and India.

• The United States and Russia must initiate negotiations on the next strategic offensive arms reduction treaty, which would include limitations on conventionally armed strategic weapon systems. This would fulfill the necessary precondition for China to also limit its high-precision missiles armed with conventional warheads, which are indistinguishable from the nuclear. Thus it would be possible to regulate the unfolding regional arms race involving advanced high-precision missiles.

• Progress must be made in limiting U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons (excluding their redeployment from Europe to Asia in spite of the NATO position). This would establish the necessary conditions for limiting the Chinese intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems. The first, second, and fourth points above would be indirect recognition by the two leading powers of mutual vulnerability and relations based on mutual nuclear deterrence with China. Both the U.S. commitments to its allies and the defense of Russia’s eastern frontiers will need to be provided by conventional forces, as well as through political or economic means. The most likely format for negotiations would be to conduct bilateral talks between the United States and China in parallel with START negotiations between the United States and Russia, with regular strategic consultations held between Russia and China. Although three- or four-party negotiations would be very complicated, such a format would nevertheless be possible, for example, for cooperating in the BMD field (missile launch data exchange). Over the longer term, trilateral agreements among the United States, Russia, and China could be possible for limiting strategic and nonstrategic weapons, for example, by imposing equal aggregate ceilings for land-based ICBMs plus medium-range and tactical missiles (with ranges over 500 km). As noted above, the aggregate levels of the three countries are approximately equal. Of course, weapons with corresponding characteristics that can presumably be stored in China’s tunnel systems would also need to be included. In the spirit of the New START Treaty, Additional ceilings could be set for these missiles, as for non-deployed launchers and missiles. The fact that the United States and Russia have dismantled their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles should be considered, while China would be able to remove its intermediate-range ballistic missiles and shorter-range missiles and replace them with intercontinental ballistic missiles. Russia and (even more so) the United States would be unlikely to welcome such a prospect but would have to acknowledge that without an agreement, China would be able to do this in any case, or could even increase the number of its intercontinental missiles in addition to its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.”(Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, “The Great Strategic Triangle,” Carnegie Moscow Center, April 2013)
North Korea denounced an offer of dialogue by South Korean President Park Geun-hye to defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula as a “cunning ploy,” implicitly rejecting any dialogue with Seoul for the time being. The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, which is in charge of handling relations with South Korea, made the remarks days after Park offered to engage in dialogue with Pyongyang, saying she was willing to “activate the trust-building process” on the peninsula. The offer of dialogue is “a cunning ploy to hide the South’s policy of confrontation and mislead its responsibility for putting the Kaesong Industrial Complex into a crisis,” said a spokesman for the North’s committee in an article carried by KCNA. The North’s committee also described the South’s offer of dialogue as an “empty shell” and blamed South Korea and the U.S. for raising tensions with their annual joint military drills, which will be wrapped up by the end of this month. “Under these circumstances, is it possible to hold a dialogue? ... Such a dialogue would be meaningless,” said the spokesman for the North’s committee. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Denounces S. Korea’s Dialogue Offer as ‘Cunning Ploy,”’ April 14, 2013)

Secretary of State John Kerry said that the United States was prepared to reach out to Kim Jong-un of North Korea if he made the first move to abandon his nuclear weapons program. “We need the appropriate moment, appropriate circumstance,” Kerry told reporters in Tokyo. While he did not say specifically what steps would be needed, according to the long-standing United States position they might include a public commitment to denuclearization and such measures as halting the production of nuclear material, refraining from testing missiles and ceasing threats to attack its neighbors. Over the past week, there has been considerable attention on the United States’ vows to militarily defend its Asian allies and its warning that North Korea should forgo a test firing a Musudan medium-range missile. But the United States has also postponed tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile and toned down its statements in recent weeks to try to create an atmosphere in which talks with North Korea might begin, a theme that Kerry emphasized. “What we really ought to be talking about is the possibility of peace,” he said in a joint news conference on Sunday with Kishida Fumio, Japan’s foreign minister. “And I think there are those possibilities.” Sketching out his approach in his meeting later in the day with reporters, Kerry said that before talks could begin, North Korea needed to take tangible steps to demonstrate that it was serious about denuclearization. But it seemed unlikely that that precondition for talks would be met by North Korea, given the country’s announcements that it considers itself to be a nuclear state and its dedication to a “military-first” stance that channels resources to its armed forces. The Obama administration has been willing to conduct direct talks with Iranian officials but the White House, in a policy that some have called strategic patience, has remained unwilling to meet openly with top North Korean officials unless they first committed to denuclearization. Kerry indicated there were some circumstances in which he could imagine sending a representative to talk to North Korean leaders or engaging directly with the North Koreans through a diplomatic back channel. “It may be that somebody will be asked to sit down,” he said. “I am open personally to exploring other avenues; I particularly want to hear what the Chinese have to say,” Kerry said. “I am not going to be so stuck in the mud that an opportunity to actually get something done is flagrantly wasted.” “But fundamentally the concept is they’re going to have to show some kind of good faith here so that we
are not going around and around,” he said. “They have to indicate that seriousness of purpose to go toward the denuclearization, and there are ways that they can do that.” In his news conference in Tokyo, Kerry expanded on his remarks yesterday that the United States would be willing to withdraw some of the antimissile defenses it recently deployed if China were able to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Those remarks, made at a news conference in Beijing, were seen as a lure to elicit China’s cooperation. “The president of the United States deployed some additional missile defense capacity precisely because of the threat of North Korea,” Kerry said. “And it is logical that if the threat of North Korea disappears because the peninsula denuclearizes, then obviously that threat no longer mandates that kind of posture.” “But there have been no agreements, no discussions; there is nothing actually on the table with respect to that,” he added. (Michael R. Gordon, “Kerry Says North Korea Talks Are Possible, But Hints at Conditions,” New York Times, April 15, 2013, p. A-8) The United States and Japan offered new talks with North Korea to resolve the increasingly dangerous standoff over its nuclear and missile programs, but said the reclusive communist government first must lower tensions and honor previous agreements. North Korea has a clear course of action available to it, and will find “ready partners” in the United States if it follows through, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry told reporters. Japan’s foreign minister, Kishida Fumio, who appeared with Kerry at a news conference, was more explicit, saying that North Korea must honor its commitment to earlier deals regarding its nuclear and missile programs and on returning kidnapped foreigners. (Associated Press, “U.S., Japan Raise Chance of New N.K. Talks,” April 14, 2013)

KERRY: “I briefed Foreign Minister Kishida on my meetings in Beijing yesterday, and before that in Seoul on Friday. And I told Foreign Minister Kishida that the goal of both China and the Republic of Korea is the denuclearization of North Korea. And that was strongly, strongly reaffirmed by my counterparts in Beijing yesterday. We are committed to take action together – we, Japan, the United States. And the other countries that I have met with in the last two days are committed to make that goal of denuclearization a reality. I also confirmed to the Foreign Minister that the U.S.-Japan alliance has really never been stronger than it is today, and the U.S. is fully committed to the defense of Japan. We agreed to have further dialogue at a high level over the course of these next days with respect to the steps that we can all take together in order to try to guarantee a peaceful resolution, which is our first priority. The biggest priority is a peaceful resolution to the issues of North Korea. The Foreign Minister and I also discussed, as he said, the base alignment issue, which has been a difficult issue, but one that both sides have worked effectively and, I think, in good faith. The Foreign Minister and I are confident that we can and will keep making good progress on Okinawa, including moving towards the construction of the Futenma replacement facility. And I want to thank Prime Minister Abe, and I want to thank the Foreign Minister, for their diligent efforts to try to follow through on this. And I think both sides need to fulfill their parts of the bargain, and we will. In our discussion, I reiterated the principles that govern our consideration of the longstanding policy on the Senkaku Islands. The United States, as everybody knows, does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands. But we do recognize that they are under the administration of Japan. And we obviously want all the parties to deal with territorial
issues through peaceful means. Any actions that could raise tensions or lead to miscalculations all affect the peace and the stability and the prosperity of an entire region. And so we oppose any unilateral or coercive action that would somehow aim at changing the status quo. …

Q: (Via interpreter) (Inaudible.) I’d like to ask the two - Minister, Secretary - North Korea is escalating in terms of its provocative action. And I understand that the U.S. and Japan governments will cooperate, but please explain in specific terms how the two countries will cooperate. And also, is it possible to deter North Korea? I’d like to hear your outlook on this. And we also understand that South Korea has called on North Korea to engage in dialogue. What is your take on this approach being taken by South Korea? KISHIDA: (Via interpreter) Allow me to begin. First in regards to the provocative behavior, repeated behavior on the part of North Korea, and the escalation of such behavior, I’d like to say that it’s important that countries related need to take international collaborative action. And through various opportunities, we have been sending out strong messages towards North Korea, and we have to continue to do so, and strengthen our collaboration towards approaching North Korea. And in addition to this, Japan and U.S. and South Korea need to further deepen our collaboration, and we have to consider the framework to enable this to happen. Furthermore, in regards to this issue of North Korea, and in regards to dialogue, it is true that various discussions are underway, as you’ve mentioned. President Park Guen-hye of South Korea and also the Minister for Reunification is making reference to holding dialogues with North Korea. I am aware of this fact. And also Secretary Kerry has stated that the U.S. is prepared to enter into talks, but only if North Korea takes steps towards denuclearization. Japan’s position has continued to be the same, and based on the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, we demand comprehensive resolution of the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues. And there is a need for a such comprehensive resolution. And for this purpose, Japan has been taking and will continue to take a dialogue and pressure policy. Japan has not closed its door towards a dialogue with North Korea for the sake of resolving this issue. And for this reason, North Korea must show that it is truly working towards resolving this issue in - with good faith. And Japan was to collaborate with the United States, South Korea, and other countries so that we can ensure that the obligations under the U.N. Security Council resolutions and Six-Party Talks joint statements are fulfilled by North Korea, and that North Korea behave with integrity and abide by these resolutions and joint statement in full. North Korea must take action to prove that it has changed its position. And we would like to call upon North Korea to choose the road of engaging positively with the international community. KERRY: I think that the Foreign Minister has well answered the question of what might be expected, but let me try to put this, if I can, into a broader context perhaps. I think that what happened yesterday should not be underestimated, and is not a small event in the context of life between China and North Korea, and indeed its relationship to the Korean Peninsula. State Councilor Yang Jiechi sat with me and joined with me in making a strong statement about China’s commitment to denuclearization through, it hopes, obviously, peaceful means. Likewise, a joint statement was issued through the government after my meetings with President Xi and with Premier Li, both of whom confirmed China’s commitment to the denuclearization of the peninsula. In South Korea, obviously in Korea, in the Republic of Korea, a similar declaration was made, but we understand that. That would be expected. Japan
has now joined in, in the very clearest of terms. So what you have, in addition to that, is a China that made it very clear that we can’t simply have a rhetorical policy. And I agree with China. So the question is: What steps do you take now in order to make sure that we are not simply repeating the cycle of the last years? Nobody wants to go there. So I believe that China, by making clear its policy, will join with others in an effort to try to make that policy real and implement it. And I think if we don’t, then all of our nonproliferation efforts on a global basis begin to suffer. If we don’t give meaning to that policy, it will have certainly less meaning to Iran or less meaning anywhere else. And I think everybody understands that. So as a consequence, I think we have to be careful and thoughtful, and frankly, not lay out publicly all the options, but work privately and quietly at the highest levels of government in order to try to take steps to bring about a peaceful resolution. And I want to emphasize to everybody that that is the outcome that we want. So - excuse me - hopefully North Korea will hear our words and recognize that for the future of its people and for the future stability in the region as well as on the peninsula itself, there is a clear course of action that they are invited to take, and they will find in us ready partners to negotiate in good faith to resolve this issue. With respect to the President of the Republic of Korea and her offer, I think it should be welcomed. I think she has shown great courage in her willingness to try to move in a different direction, providing she has a willing partner to move in that direction with. Obviously right now, that can’t happen. But I think it’s important that she has made clear that the policy of her government will be to build a trust-politic approach to this issue in the future, and I think everybody should welcome that. … Q: Margaret Brennan of CBS News. Minister Kishida, April 15th is the birthday of the Great Leader, the founder of North Korea. It’s often an occasion for a military display of force. Pyongyang has said Japan will be the first target if they were to go to war. So if we do see any kind of missile test, can you explain to us what Japan’s response will be? And Secretary Kerry, we’re in a region that’s heavily militarized. There are a number of territorial disputes, and now this crisis on the peninsula. What have you done in the past few days that you think has deescalated tensions here? KISHIDA: (Via interpreter) Well, first, April 15th, this day that you pointed out, there - a lot of information, and Japan is - needs to be fully prepared for any contingencies in Japan. And this provocative behavior by North Korea, once a contingency were to occur because of this behavior, and here in Japan and the relevant divisions, people are making all our preparation for such contingencies. And at the same time, in order to avoid such a situation, we need to strengthen our international collaboration. And therefore, U.S., Japan, and other relevant countries need to further strengthen our relationship, and Japan is working towards this end. Now, the repeated behavior on the part of North Korea, we must not be influenced merely by this action, but instead we have to get North Korea to understand that such behavior will not benefit them in any way whatsoever. And the international community needs to work together to send out such a strong message. Japan needs to be fully prepared for such contingencies, and at the same time we need to make, and continue to make, diplomatic efforts. …. KERRY: Well, I agree with Fumio. I think that - I think it’s really unfortunate that there has been so much focus and attention, both within the media and elsewhere, on the subject of war, when what we really ought to be talking about is the possibilities of peace. And I think there are those possibilities, notwithstanding the rhetoric and the provocations. The North has to
understand, and I believe must by now, that its threats and its provocations are only going to isolate it further and impoverish its people even further. And they have to understand also something that we have consistently made clear. President Obama has made it clear. I think I've tried to underscore the President's policy as much as possible. And it is very simple: that the United States will do what is necessary to defend our allies - Japan, Republic of Korea - and the region against these provocations. But our choice is to negotiate. Our choice is to move to the table and find a way for the region to have peace. And we would hope that whatever considerations or fears the North has - of the United States or of others in the region that they would come to the table in a responsible way and negotiate that. We are confident that we can address the concerns with respect to their security and find ways together with China and the Republic of Korea and Japan and Russia and the members of the Six-Party Talks, we can find a way to resolve these differences at a negotiating table. I hope they will hear that and I hope they will respond to that, and any other choice by them will simply further isolate them in the world and make it clear to the rest of the world where the problem really lies here. That's our hope. With respect to the part of the question about what have I done or what has happened here to reduce the tension, I have to let others answer that question. You can ask the other interlocutors that we’ve talked to. But I do know that with every person I have talked I have tried to emphasize the interest of the United States in resolving all of these differences differently, that we want to avoid unilateral actions and coercive actions that take very old and contentious historical differences and somehow make them an issue of currency that threatens the peace of the region. I am convinced that even those difficult historical issues can be resolved in a peaceful way over a period of time. So I have urged people to step back. I have urged people at every step not to engage in provocative actions, whether it’s around rocks or islands or land or in the Sea of Japan or in the East China Sea - everywhere. And hopefully, and I do believe this, I believe the responses I heard from every leader I talked to is that people want to avoid the provocations, they recognize the volatility, they recognize the possibility for mistake. And I hope that the behavior over these next weeks and months will reinforce those statements. … Q: (Via interpreter) Matsuura from Mainichi Shimbun newspaper, to both of you. You’ve been talking about North Korea and the fact that China has the strongest influence over North Korea, and what action will you be asking China to take? Specifically, Kerry said that such talks should take place quietly, but because there’s great concern here in Japan, to the extent that you can disclose what have you discussing with China. And also on the Japanese side there is the issue of Senkakus and it’s difficult for Japan to hold dialogues with China, but how is Japan going to approach China? KISHIDA: (Via interpreter) Minister, please allow me to first respond. First you say this issue of North Korea, China’s role will continue to be very significant. I do understand that that is China’s position. China has had a longstanding relationship with North Korea, and also looking at the (inaudible) situation we understand that China’s role is very significant. U.S., Japan, and South Korea and these countries need to have strong collaboration, as I mentioned. But at the same time, we need to have China play its role and we need to hold discussions to enable this to happen. … Well, yes, as you say, with China we do have this difficult issue between us, but Japan and China, our relationship for Japan is one of the most important bilateral relations. And the fact that there is a stable relationship between
these major two economies in the region will lead to the stability and prosperity of the region. So I think that both countries hold a major responsibility, and therefore we need to promote from a broad perspective the mutually beneficially relationship based on common strategic interests. And therefore, Japan’s door for dialogue is always open. That is a basic position. I hope that such dialogue can be realized. We on our side will make every effort towards this end and we would like to also see that the relevant countries understand Japan’s position and support Japan as well. **KERRY:** As I said previously, we had very, very extensive and candid conversations at the highest level in China. And China, as everybody knows, has a very long and close relationship with North Korea, but it is fair to say from their statements yesterday that China is very concerned about where the situation is today. It would be entirely inappropriate for me to lay out to you any of those options, particularly since they are under consideration and in discussion. And it really is important for China to speak for China, obviously, and so I am going to just say to you that there’s no question in my mind that China is concerned and takes this issue very seriously, and we will continue our high-level discussions in the days ahead….**Q:** Yes, my name is Guy Taylor of the *Washington Times*. My question is first for Foreign Minister Kishida. Concerning the escalated tensions on the Korean peninsula now but also in the long term, does Japan feel sufficiently protected against the threat posed by North Korea in light of the remarks made in Beijing yesterday by both the Chinese and U.S. sides but also in light of the possibility that the United States may reduce its military footprint in the region? And for Secretary Kerry, could you please clarify what you meant or elaborate on your comment yesterday that if the threat from North Korea — if the threat from North Korea is not there, then the U.S. does not need a forward-leaning military posture? **KISHIDA:** (Via interpreter) Minister, please, yes. If I were to respond to your question first, the United States will continue to maintain its strategy towards its rebalancing towards the Asia Pacific and the fact that the U.S. will continue to maintain its defense capability in this region based on the alliance is something that we were able to reaffirm in today’s talks, and that is our understanding of the U.S. position. Now, this issue pertaining to North Korea and the provocative speech and behavior, the situation has become very uncertain because of the repetition of such speech and behavior. But we need to continue to reaffirm the U.S.-Japan alliance and understand what role each country needs to carry out, the roles to be fulfilled by both sides, and also what the alliance needs to do. And by implementing what we have agreed, we believe that we can protect the peace and stability of this region. I think that we need to try to carry out this effort. So by carrying out such effort for sure, we will be able to peacefully pave the way towards peacefully resolve this issue. And with this confidence, we would like to continue to make efforts. **KERRY:** Let me emphasize that President Obama is committed to the current force posture that is deployed in the region, which was augmented, as you know, with the rebalancing, as well as to our general commitments to the region. And there’s no discussion that I know of to change that posture whatsoever. We stand by our commitments. We stand by our commitment to Japan and our allies as well as to our interests in the region with respect to freedom of navigation and other treaty alliances that we have, and there’s no discussion of changing that. Nor was there any discussion of trading or somehow getting involved in a deal with respect to the augmented posture in direct response to what has happened in Korea. I made the statement, and I’ll
make it again because it’s a matter of logic and it is, in fact, policy: The President of the United States deployed some additional missile defense capacity precisely because of the threat of North Korea; and it is logical that if the threat of the North Korea disappears because the peninsula denuclearizes, then obviously, that threat no longer mandates that kind of posture. But there have been no agreements, no discussions, there’s nothing actually on the table with respect to that. I was simply making an observation about the rationale for that particular deployment, which is to protect United States’ interests that are directly threatened by North Korea, specifically Guam, Hawaii, possibly at some point, given the direction Kim Jong-un has indicated he wants to go, the continental United States, and very much our current allies, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and others in this region. And that is the reason for the deployment.” (Secretary of State John Kerry, Joint Press Availability with Foreign Minister Kishida after Their Meeting,” Tokyo, April 14, 2013)

North Korea’s fatal artillery attack on this border island more than two years ago uprooted old wooden houses from their foundations. One shell punctured the concrete side of a soccer stadium. Another struck a rooftop oil tank. Residents rushed to underground bunkers, and when they emerged hours later, much of their island was aflame. Among dozens of North-led provocations against the South over decades, the shelling of Yeonpyeong – which killed two marines and two construction workers – is far from the deadliest or most audacious. But the attack carries oversize importance as tensions again soar between the Koreas, because it redefined the South’s thinking about how strongly its military should respond if attacked again. South Korean officials cite Yeonpyeong as an instance in which their forces returned fire too late and too timidly – a mistake that they pledge will not be repeated. If faced with a similar attack, President Park Geun-hye has told her military, the South should strike back “without political consideration” and without waiting for top-level approval. South Korea’s hardened line, analysts say, provides an important backdrop as North Korea threatens the region – and the United States – with nuclear and more small-scale artillery attacks. The prospect of a South Korean counterstrike, the analysts say, might explain why the North hasn’t made good on any of its recent threats. But it also means that if the North does attack, the conflict is far likelier to escalate. South Korea’s new stance is not just rhetorical. After the Yeonpyeong shelling, Seoul revised its rules of engagement, allowing front-line commanders to “take aggressive action . . . and then report it up the chain of command,” Lee Myung-bak, South Korea’s president from 2008 until this year, recently told a major South Korean daily. Lee added that the United States was initially opposed to the rule changes. Although the United States has about 80,000 troops in the region, with 28,500 of them in South Korea, it would be up to the South to defend itself in the opening minutes of a North-led attack. Still, Seoul and Washington recently drew up what they call a “counterprovocation” plan that lays out potential responses to North Korean attacks. The goal of the plan, Adm. Samuel Locklear III, commander of U.S. troops in the Pacific, told Congress last week, is to ensure that responses are “predictable” and to prevent an “unnecessary escalation that none of us want.” On the afternoon of Nov. 23, 2010, North Korea briefly turned the island into a war zone. In the span of an hour, according to independent and South Korean government reports, the North lobbed 170 shells and rockets toward the island. Many fell in the sea,
missing their target. But some struck the hillside military areas and the shoreline rows of one-story homes. The municipal loudspeaker system, piped throughout town, urged residents to flee underground. South Korea’s military on the island didn’t respond until 13 minutes after the attack had started; its heaviest weapons had been facing south, for firing drills, and needed to be turned around. The South eventually fired 80 shells at the North, aiming at its army barracks and command areas. It remains unknown whether the South Korean counterstrike caused any casualties. The South’s slow response was perplexing because it had been warned of the attack. That morning, Pyongyang had sent a telegram to Seoul saying that its army would not “sit idly by” as South Korean troops shot practice rounds of artillery into contested border waters that the North considers its own. South Korean officials said later that they didn’t take the warning seriously. “The content of the warning was almost the same as previous warnings given when we were conducting shooting drills,” then-Defense Minister Kim Tae-young testified to the National Assembly. (Chico Harlan, “Island Attack Boosted S. Korea’s Will to Strike Back against North,” Washington Post, April 14, 2013)

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo confirmed with visiting U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry that the two countries will closely cooperate to deal with North Korea, which continues to threaten to fire ballistic missiles. During their meeting at the Prime Minister’s Office, Abe told Kerry, “It is unforgivable that North Korea continues to take extremely provocative actions.” “We are looking forward to cooperating [with the United States] closely, including imposing new sanctions [on North Korea],” Abe said. The meeting, which lasted about an hour, was also attended by Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio and other officials. However, Abe spoke with Kerry one-on-one in the final minutes at Abe’s request. Abe and Kerry also discussed the Senkaku Islands in Ishigaki, Okinawa Prefecture, which have been a source of ongoing confrontation with China. “China’s actions have been backed by its [military] power, but Japan will make no compromises,” Abe told Kerry. “China’s increased maritime activities have become a common concern in the Asia-Pacific region. An unyielding response based on the rule of law is necessary.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Abe, Kerry in Lockstep on N. Korea; Agree to Cooperate, Pressure Pyongyang,” April 16, 2013)

President Obama expressed hopes for a diplomatic solution to the tensions on the Korean peninsula, saying that he does not believe North Korea has the capacity to load a nuclear warhead onto a long-range missile. The comments came during an interview with NBC News broadcast on April 16 prior to the April 15 Boston Marathon bombings and prior to the statement by North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson. Regarding North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, Obama said “Based on our current intelligence assessments we do not think that they have that capacity. But we have to make sure that we are dealing with every contingency out there. That’s why I repositioned missile defense systems.” President Obama hinted that if North Korea ends its provocative actions, dialogue could begin. “All of us would anticipate that North Korea will probably make more provocative moves over the next several weeks,” he said. “But our hope is, is that we can contain it and that we can move into a different phase in which they try to work through diplomatically some of these issues, so that they can get back on a path where they’re actually feeding their people.” It has been analyzed that at the end of this month when the annual South Korea-US Foal Eagle
combined military exercises conclude, there will be a chance to open talks. However, President Obama did not mention under what specific conditions talks could begin. Obama again emphasized the principle of not rewarding provocative behavior. “Since I came into office, the one thing I was clear about was, we’re not going to reward this kind of provocative behavior. You don’t get to bang your spoon on the table and somehow you get your way.” (Park Hyun, “Obama Says N. Korea Isn’t Capable of Mounting a Nuclear Warhead,” Hankyore, April 18, 2013)

White House spokesman Jay Carney: “Q. On missile defense, about North Korea -- the Secretary of State made sort of an interesting proposal over the weekend in Beijing, where he said that were the nuclear threat from North Korea to decline over time, the U.S. would consider taking out some of the missile defense batteries that it’s installed in the past few months. I’m interested in your thinking about what’s behind this sort of offer, this proposal. And I’m also curious about the timing. Given that you said at the top that there’s no evidence that the provocations from the North have subsided and there may be further provocations, why dangle the possibility of pulling back these batteries at a time like this? CARNEY: Well, I think you may be reading a little too much into it. I think we have been clear that these precautionary measures, including the steps taken to enhance anti-missile defense systems have been in reaction to the provocations. And clearly, if North Korea were to commit itself in a verifiable way to denuclearization and commit itself to abiding by its international obligations with regards to its nuclear program and to its missile program, that would be a positive thing and would result in steps that we and our international partners would take also to help bring down tensions in the region. But first things first -- North Korea knows what path is available to it. Pyongyang and the leaders there understand that they need to embrace as a principle that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized. They need to demonstrate in a verifiable way that they are committed to that. And they need to abide by their international obligations on their nuclear program as well as their missile program. So that’s the path available. And if North Korea shows that it’s serious about pursuing that path, then negotiations are the course through which that can be achieved. But I don’t think that the statement that you cited is inconsistent with where we’ve been for quite some time. And the actions that we’ve taken on the anti-missile defense arena have been in direct reaction to these provocations. Q. And then just one quick follow, which is in the short time since the Secretary was in China, have you seen any evidence that the Chinese have taken some of this on board in terms of the communications, the warnings that they may or may not be issuing to North Koreans? CARNEY: I don’t have anything new, so nothing to convey to you in the last day or so. We have certainly seen in the statements by the new Chinese President, President Xi, an indication that -- a welcome indication that China is frustrated, as so many nations are, with North Korea’s provocative behavior. And so we are urging the Chinese to use their influence to prevail upon the North Koreans to cease this course of action and to take steps to reassure China, Russia, the United States, the international community that it would prefer a path that can lead to denuclearization and fulfillment of its international obligations.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Daily Briefing, April 16, 2013)
A senior House Republican is questioning Secretary of State John F. Kerry’s recent offer to China to trade U.S. missile defense upgrades for help in pressing North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. Rep. Mike Rogers, Alabama Republican and chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, expressed his concerns in a letter sent today to Mr. Kerry. “Many of our Asian allies have watched with consternation the success with which Russia has obtained concessions from the Obama administration about U.S. missile defenses that NATO allies have agreed to host,” Rogers stated. “No doubt, many Asian allies wondered when China would begin to seek similar concessions.” Kerry told reporters April 13 in Beijing that the U.S. missile defenses are needed to defend against direct North Korean missile threats. Asked if he discussed limiting U.S. missile defense deployments in talks with the Chinese, Kerry said: “Now obviously, if the threat disappears, i.e., North Korea denuclearizes, the same imperative does not exist at that point in time for us to have that kind of robust, forward-leaning posture of defense.” A day later in Tokyo, Kerry was asked to elaborate and said there were no agreements, discussions or concrete proposals laid out. “I was simply making an observation about the rationale for that particular deployment, which is to protect United States’ interests that are directly threatened by North Korea, specifically Guam, Hawaii, possibly at some point given the direction [North Korean leader] Kim Jong-un has indicated he wants to go the continental United States, and very much our current allies, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and others in this region,” he said. According to U.S. officials, Kerry has discussed canceling the Pentagon’s recently announced plan to add 14 additional ground-based interceptors to the 30 missiles now deployed in Alaska and Hawaii. In his letter Rogers, “I urge you to earnestly issue a clarification of your remarks that under no circumstances will the United States ‘trade’ its missile defense deployments in Asia to China.” Noting his position as chairman of the subcommittee responsible for missile defense, Rogers added, “I can assure you that my subcommittee will not fund any removal of U.S. missile defenses from the region under any circumstances.” Mr. Rogers suggested that North Korea is not the sole state posing a missile threat to the United States and its allies, noting that another country China lacks transparency about its military program. It is building up its military with double-digit military spending and is expanding its missile and nuclear programs. In a statement, Rogers also criticized the Obama administration’s handling of North Korea. “It is disturbing, yet sadly no longer surprising, the administration’s response to North Korean aggression is further provocative weakness,” he said. “Not only did Secretary [of Defense Chuck] Hagel delay a needed reliability test of our ICBM systems, he has forced into the Air Force budget an environmental impact study that can only be necessary to shut down an ICBM missile wing or squadron.” The measure sends the wrong message to U.S. allies and adversaries, Rogers said. (Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: North Korea War Strategy,” Washington Times, April 17, 2013)

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DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman’s statement: “Recently U.S. high-ranking officials are vying with each other to talk about dialogue. This is nothing but a crafty ploy to evade the blame for the tension on the eve of a war by pretending to refrain from military actions and stand for dialogue. It is none other than the U.S which sparked off a vicious cycle of tension, pursuant to its hostile policy to stifle the DPRK by force of arms, and pushed the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the worst phase.
The tension began escalating there due to the U.S. wanton violation of the DPRK’s right to satellite launch for peaceful purposes. There is no country in the world which does not react to the encroachment upon the legitimate right of a sovereign state to develop space and its sovereignty. The nuclear war maneuvers staged by the U.S. against the DPRK in the wake of its prodding of the UN Security Council into the cooking up of brigandish "resolutions on sanctions" one after another compelled the latter to clarify its stand to take military countermeasures for self-defense. One may know well who is to blame for the tension when looking into who benefits from this. The U.S. benefited from drastically increasing its military deployment pursuant to its Asia-Pacific-pivot strategy by massively introducing all latest weaponry while inciting military confrontation with the DPRK. The U.S., which regards the DPRK as the primary target of its attack in the Asia-Pacific region, not only deployed all its operational nuclear strike means but also posed the threat of the largest-ever physical nuclear strike to the DPRK in recent months. It openly introduced strategic nuclear subs out of its three major strategic nuclear strike means into the waters off the Korean Peninsula, and let its strategic bombers openly make sorties into the sky of the peninsula for drills of dropping nukes. The third strategic nuclear strike means, the inter-continental ballistic missile launch, was reportedly postponed for the time being, but it is scheduled for May. Even now the U.S. is letting its nuclear-powered carrier strike groups operate in waters off the peninsula, staging ceaseless DPRK-targeted nuclear war drills. It is the height of rhetoric intended to mislead the world opinion to talk about dialogue for dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear deterrent under this situation. The U.S. is sadly mistaken if it calculates the DPRK will pay slightest heed to such talk about dialogue as a robber’s calling for a negotiated solution while brandishing his gun. Worse still, the U.S. claim that it will opt for dialogue when the DPRK shows its will for denuclearization first is a very impudent hostile act of disregarding the line of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the law of the DPRK. The DPRK is not opposed to dialogue but has no idea of sitting at the humiliating negotiating table with the party brandishing a nuclear stick. Dialogue should be based on the principle of respecting sovereignty and equality--this is the DPRK’s consistent stand. Genuine dialogue is possible only at the phase where the DPRK has acquired nuclear deterrent enough to defuse the U.S. threat of nuclear war unless the U.S. rolls back its hostile policy and nuclear threat and blackmail against the former. This time when the DPRK has been exposed to the U.S. direct and substantial threat of nuclear attack, it keenly felt the need to bolster up its nuclear deterrence both in quality and quantity. It is quite natural for the DPRK to take counteractions for self-defence by beefing up nuclear force now that the U.S., world’s biggest nuclear weapons state, threatens and blackmails the former with a nuclear stick. The nuclear strike drills staged by the U.S. against the DPRK leave the latter with no option but to conduct drills to cope with them. There is no guarantee that these drills will not go over to a real war and the U.S. will be held wholly accountable for all the ensuing consequences. The DPRK will escalate its military countermeasures for self-defense unless the U.S. ceases its nuclear war drills and withdraws all its war hardware for aggression.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman Dismisses U.S. Talk about Dialogue as Rhetoric Misleading World Opinion,” April 16, 2013)
Korean People’s Army Supreme Command ultimatum: “The world is in a festive mood on the auspicious Day of the Sun. It is only the south Korean puppet forces who hurled a group of anti-communist gangsters into a rally against the DPRK in the heart of Seoul in broad daylight at which they set fire to the portraits, the symbols of its supreme dignity. In view of this situation the Supreme Command of the KPA sends the following ultimatum to the south Korean puppet forces: Our retaliatory action will start without any notice from now as such thrice-cursed criminal act of hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK is being openly committed in the heart of Seoul under the patronage of the puppet authorities. To be included in the targets of retaliation are those directly or indirectly involved in the operation to hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK and those who instigated the perpetrators and connived their crime and the relevant organs and departments of the authorities involved. The DPRK’s revolutionary armed forces will start immediately their just military actions to show how the service personnel and people of the DPRK value and protect the dignity of the supreme leadership. The military demonstration of the DPRK’s revolutionary armed forces will be powerful sledge-hammer blows at all hostile forces hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK. If the puppet authorities truly want dialogue and negotiations, they should apologize for all anti-DPRK hostile acts, big and small, and show the compatriots their will to stop all these acts in practice.” (KCNA, “Supreme Command Sends Ultimatum to S. Korean Puppet Forces,” April 16, 2013)

President Obama, speaking in an interview with Savannah Guthrie of NBC News that was recorded just before the bombings in Boston yesterday, said, “You know, based on our current intelligence assessments, we do not think that they have that capacity” to fit a warhead atop a missile, he said. “But, you know, we have to make sure that we are dealing with every contingency out there. And that’s why I’ve repositioned missile defense systems to guard against any miscalculation on their part.” For the first time, Obama spoke about Kim Jong-un, the North’s young leader, whose motivations have been scrutinized since the latest escalation of threats and tensions began. “I’m not a psychiatrist,” Mr. Obama said, suggesting that he had to judge Kim by his actions rather than his words. But he added: “This is the same kind of pattern that we saw his father engage in, and his grandfather before that. Since I came into office, the one thing I was clear about was, we’re not going to reward this kind of provocative behavior. You don’t get to bang your – your spoon on the table and somehow you get your way.” He also hinted at the administration’s strategy, which seems to be one of letting Kim blow off steam before trying anew to engage with him. Obama said he would “anticipate” that “North Korea will probably make more provocative moves over the next several weeks, but our hope is we can contain it and we can move into a different phase, in which they try to work through diplomatically some of these issues so they can get back on a path where they’re actually feeding their people.” Obama’s statement seemed to hint at a dialogue, though he did not say under what conditions it could take place, and he did not repeat a promise he made during his first presidential campaign, in 2008, to engage with the North unconditionally. During his recent trip to Asia, Secretary of State John Kerry outlined the Obama administration’s formal position that it will not open negotiations with North Korea unless it takes tangible steps that indicate it is willing to eventually abandon its nuclear weapons program.
“Fundamentally, the concept is they’re going to have to show some kind of good faith,” said Kerry, who added that North Korea would need to show its “seriousness of purpose to go toward the denuclearization.” Some experts say that given the tensions with North Korea, it is a mistake for the Obama administration to insist on such preconditions. “Rather than setting preconditions, which means there will be no dialogue, our interests and those of our allies would be better served by a serious, no-holds-barred diplomatic exploration of whether there is a peaceful path forward,” said Joel S. Wit, a former State Department official. The North Korean Foreign Ministry rejected the Obama administration’s conditional overtures today. “This is nothing but a crafty ploy,” a ministry spokesman said in the North’s first reaction to Kerry’s visit. In a statement carried by KCNA, the spokesman said genuine dialogue would be possible only when North Korea “has acquired nuclear deterrent enough to defuse the U.S. threat of nuclear war unless the U.S. rolls back its hostile policy and nuclear threat and blackmail.” If the statement can be taken at face value, it would suggest that the North is not willing to engage in talks on the basis Kerry discussed when he was in the region: with an underlying agreement that the goal was to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. That was the basis of talks in 1994, and again in 2005 and 2008. But Kim has rejected that approach in recent months, saying that the world must simply accept the North as an established nuclear power. The United States has refused to do so, insisting that it will never accept the North as a nuclear weapons state. (David E. Sanger and Michael R. Gordon, “Obama Doubts That North Korea Can Make a Nuclear Warhead,” New York Times, April 17, 2013, p. A-4)

North Korea may be looking to relieve tensions on the Korean Peninsula after having increased them to a near-boiling point over the past weeks with almost daily threats against South Korea and the United States, a senior U.S. military official in Seoul said. "I think the DPRK leadership is trying to figure out a way off from the heightened state of rhetoric we have seen over the past couple of weeks," the senior U.S. official told reporters and correspondents in Seoul. Although the reclusive communist nation has ratcheted up its bellicose rhetoric recently -- particularly against the South Korea-U.S. joint annual drills this March and additional U.N. sanctions imposed earlier on the North for its third nuclear test in February -- North Korea's threats have been "always conditional," the official said. "So if the U.S. does this, then (the North says) we are going to do this. So there was always a backdoor to it (tension)," the official said. "What I would hope is that they are exploring the use of that backdoor to scale back their rhetoric." The U.S. official said Seoul and Washington have been closely watching for signs of a missile launch or any provocations, but North Korea has not recently shown any large-scale troop movements or exercises. "The launch of an intermediate-range missile is one of many tactical levels of provocations we’ve been exploring and trying to figure out what the true intentions are," the official said. "Any of those things can happen with little to no notice and we may not know that it happens until the missiles are launched." (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea May Be Eyeing Exit Plan as Tensions Peak: USFK Official,” April 16, 2013)

The United States has virtually stopped funding anti-North Korean civic groups in South Korea due to its financial downturn, sources said. Organizations such as the North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity (NKIS) and the North Korea Reform Radio said in a
A seminar in Seoul that Washington’s financial assistance for groups that support liberty and human rights has all but dried up this year. “At its peak, the U.S. provided US$5 million in support annually, but the general lack of similar support from the Seoul government may have played a role in the latest cutbacks,” said NKIS executive director Kim Heung-kwang. He also speculated that current economic troubles in the U.S. and implementation of across-the-board budget cuts are affecting overseas financial support. (Yonhap, “U.S. Cuts off Subsidies to Anti-N. Korean Groups in S. Korea,” April 17, 2013)

U.S. intelligence officials assessing North Korea’s recent bellicose statements are increasingly concerned that Kim Jong-un could use his limited nuclear arsenal as part of offensive military attack that would be calculated to improve the prospects for reunifying the country rather suffering a collapse of his regime. According to officials familiar with unclassified assessments, the North Korean leader and his military hampered by economic sanctions and a declining conventional military force remain paranoid about a U.S. military offensive. The regime is also growing increasingly worried that China will not support its fraternal communist ally and so could calculate that it must launch a military attack. Pyongyang also fears the Chinese will replace the Kim family dynasty with a pro-China puppet regime. Launching a war might present China with a reunified Korean Peninsula, then North Korea could seek Beijing’s support for negotiating a settlement to civil war. Kim may take a page from his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, who launched the Korean War in part because he feared losing power. The North Koreans are calling their strategy “the spirit of the offensive.” It calls for decisive, surprise attacks carried out very rapidly. The strategy also calls for a four-front war against South Korea and the United States involving strategic missiles with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to destroy U.S. and allied military bases. It would launch conventional military strikes through the demilitarized zone and into South Korea. Special operations commandos would mount rear-guard attacks. Cyberwarfare would take down critical infrastructure. A North Korean nuclear strike could translate into a long-range missile either a Taepodong-2 or KN-08 road-mobile missile topped with a small nuclear warhead or use a suitcase nuclear bomb in downtown Seoul or at the gate of a U.S. military base. Rep. Michael R. Turner, a senior Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, questioned President Obama about U.S. missile defense strategy following Kerry’s comments in China. “I am greatly concerned that your missile defense strategy is languishing, resulting in increased risk to the United States, increased cost to the taxpayer and needless alienation of our allies,” the Ohio Republican stated in a letter sent to Obama on April 17. “Mr. President, the world is not becoming a safer place,” Turner said. “Offering to weaken our defenses in hopes of irrational nations suspending their weapons programs is not an effective security strategy. Simply put these offers are of greater benefit to our adversaries and to the detriment of the American people.” China is continuing an interrupted flow of oil into North Korea, contrary to recent press reports indicating Beijing may have curtailed Pyongyang’s key source of energy as a punitive action. U.S. officials with access to intelligence reports dismissed reports that China suspended crude oil shipments to North Korea in February. The oil pipeline from Dandong, China, to North Korea was not disrupted, and the pipeline continues to transfer oil that amounts to 500,000 tons annually, they said. The officials added that North Korean
officials were seen at an oil-measuring station in Dandong. The North Koreans visit the facility monthly to check on planned oil deliveries. Reports from China also indicated that oil trucks travel daily to North Korea from Dandong. Also, no travel agencies or Chinese news outlets in Dandong reported any disruptions of tour groups visiting North Korea. Reuters reported March 21 that China did not export any crude oil to North Korea in February the first time there was such a cutoff since 2012. The report, based on customs data obtained in Beijing, said the temporary cutoff might have been a sign of China’s displeasure over North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests. China provides an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 tons of crude oil to North Korea every month as part of an aid program. (Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: North Korea War Strategy,” Washington Times, April 17, 2013)

Policy Department of the National Defense Commission (NDC) statement: “An acute situation that has persisted on the Korean Peninsula since the end of last year is now putting the peninsula on the verge of war. Much upset by the development, U.S. President Obama on April 11 reportedly stated in public of his intention to seek a negotiated and diplomatic settlement of the situation, saying that he does not want a war on the Korean Peninsula. The chief of Chongwadae of south Korea, who is accustomed to currying favor with her master, let the “minister of Unification” make public a “statement.” She even loudly spoke of “the authorities’ proposal for dialogue to tide over the situation”, a U-turn from her previous attitude of stoking confrontation. She used to say that there can be neither dialogue nor dispatch of a special envoy at present. The rhetoric about dialogue raised by the master and the stooge almost at the same time is a political decision made by them out of their calculation that they can never bring the DPRK into submission with military threats and "sanctions." It will be very much gratifying if they took a proper political decision to bring under control the grave situation prevailing on the Korean Peninsula with true interest in dialogue and negotiations. But matter is that the U.S. and the south Korean puppet regime cried out for starting dialogue in an appropriate environment, in an appropriate time and under appropriate condition despite their loud claim that the U.S. and south Korea made a U-turn toward dialogue and negotiations. The preconditions for dialogue raised by them include a stop to “provocative” remarks which the DPRK has so far been engaged in and demonstration of its intention to realize denuclearization and suspend missile launch. These are absurd ones. The U.S. and south Korea are opt-repeating "provocation" and "threats" from the DPRK, describing them as a stumbling block in the way of dialogue hoped for by them, while making the story of “north-south dialogue first and north Korea-U.S. dialogue next” an established fact as if the north had agreed to it.

In this regard, the Policy Department of the National Defense Commission (NDC) of the DPRK brings to light the nature of the prevailing situation and clarifies once again the principled stand of the DPRK. There is a Korean saying which goes "Thief calls stop thief." The U.S. and all kinds of hostile forces following it are the very ones who pushed the situation on the Korean Peninsula to such a grave phase as now. But the masterminds of the tense situation are portraying the DPRK as "provoker," while describing them as victims. It appears that they are not afraid of divine punishment. The "provocation" charge brought against the DPRK by the U.S. has become
undisguised since they called the DPRK’s legitimate and peaceful satellite launch as a "missile launch." The DPRK’s working satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 was confirmed to be going around its orbit by the North American Aerospace Defense Command. Russia and several other countries also admitted this and shortly ago a scientific and research institute of south Korea photographed the DPRK’s satellite and made it public. But with their eyes shut to this stark fact, the U.S. and the south Korean puppet regime are stepping up provocations against the DPRK. No wonder, the world public has now become increasingly vocal, condemning the U.S. and its allies’ vicious provocation of getting the UN Security Council pass the "resolution on sanctions" and calling the satellite launch a "missile launch" as a "deception that disgraced justice and conscience" and an "act of blind men unable to discern skirt from trousers." The UNSC’s "resolution on sanctions" following the DPRK’s legitimate satellite launch was a prelude to an open provocation by the U.S. and the south Korean puppet regime to inveigle all the forces following it to the worldwide campaign for isolating and stifling the DPRK. The nuclear war exercises being staged against the DPRK for nearly two months is a vicious, all-out military provocation. The U.S. even brought to south Korea and to waters off it super-large nuclear-powered carrier task force equipped with nuclear warheads, B-52, B-2 and other nuclear strategic bombers, nuclear-powered submarines capable of launching cruise guided shells and guided shell destroyers and even F-22 Stealth fighter formation to be used for making maiden strikes at the targets of the DPRK’s army in the early days of war. They have stepped up the military provocation in an all-round way which now has reached the most dangerous phase of nuclear blackmail. The DPRK has never termed the U.S. satellite launches missile launches and attempted to urge the UN to adopt resolutions on sanctions under that pretext. It has never threatened and blackmailed the U.S. by deploying its elite armed forces in waters off the U.S. If the U.S. and south Korean puppet forces are not wolves in human form, they should properly understand the word provocation and feel ashamed of their brigandish behaviors. It is another provocation against the DPRK that the U.S. urged the former to show the "will for denuclearization" as a precondition for dialogue.  

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains the unshakable will of the army and people of the DPRK. The joint declaration on denuclearization adopted by the north and the south early in the 1990s was a gain common to the nation as it was initiated by the DPRK with such will. The U.S., however, introduced nuclear weapons into south Korea and its vicinity in league with puppet forces and began to escalating threat and blackmail against the DPRK, bringing this precious gain to naught. In order to cope with the U.S. escalating hostile policy and nuclear blackmail against the DPRK, it was compelled to have access to just nuclear force for self-defense. Accordingly, nothing is more foolish and brigandish than pressurizing the DPRK to show its "will for denuclearization" first.  

The nuclear force of the DPRK will always remain in the hands of its army and people as the most powerful means to protect the sovereignty of the country and its supreme interests and deal a retaliatory blow at the strongholds of aggression against it till the world including the U.S. is denuclearized.  

Not content with terming the DPRK’s toughest countermeasures "provocations," the U.S. and south Korean puppet regime went the lengths of ceaselessly hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK and its social system. The army and
people of the DPRK are demonstrating their just will to stand up against the enemies’ moves to isolate and stifle it and nuclear war moves against it. They are, however, describing this will as one for “consolidating the heir’s system,” “enhancing image” and “rallying unstable ranks”. This is the thrice-cursed politically-motivated provocation. This is nothing but rigmarole let loose by the imbeciles who know nothing about the DPRK. The bad-tempered U.S. and south Korean puppet regime can never imagine the tears of emotion shed by artillery women when the Supreme Commander took them to his arms and the warm feelings of service personnel and people shouting “hurrah” after jumping into cold sea waters. As long as they persist in all sorts of provocations against the DPRK, its army and the people will steadily escalate the tough political and military counteractions as the days go by.

The U.S. and the south Korean puppet regime should make a bold decision to take the following practical measures if they want to shirk off the historical responsibility for the prevailing grave situation on the Korean Peninsula, escape sledge-hammer retaliatory blows of the army and people of the DPRK and if they truly stand for dialogue and negotiations:

First, they should immediately stop all their provocative acts against the DPRK and apologize for all of them. As the first phase, they should take the measure of retracting the UNSC’s “resolutions on sanctions” cooked up under absurd pretexts. They should bear in mind that doing so would be a token of good will towards the DPRK. The south Korean puppet forces should promptly halt all their anti-DPRK rackets, not linking their own mishaps such as Cheonan warship sinking incident and the “March 20 hacking case” to the north.

Second, they should give formal assurances before the world that they would not stage again such nuclear war drills to threaten or blackmail the DPRK. Dialogue can never go with war actions. Frequent nuclear war maneuvers will only strain the situation and totally block the way of dialogue. The army and people of the DPRK will not be taken in by sophism that the nuclear war drills being staged under its very nose are annual and defensive military actions for defending the U.S. and guaranteeing the security of south Korea.

Third, they should make a decision to withdraw all nuclear war means from south Korea and its vicinity and give up their attempt to reintroduce them as their immediate duty. They should bear in mind that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula can begin with the pullout of the nuclear war means introduced by the U.S. and this may lead to the global denuclearization.

The chief of Chongwadae should not forget that the prospect of south Korea may be rosy when the north’s nukes are considered as a property common to the nation but south Korea is bound to go to ruin when it remains under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The situation on the peninsula is directly linked with peace and security in Northeast Asia and the rest of the world. The army and people of the DPRK together with the world peace-loving people who sympathize with justice and value conscience will closely follow the future behavior of the U.S. and its followers.” (KCNA, “DPRK NDC Policy Department Issues Statement,” April 18, 2013)

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) spokesman’s statement: “There will be neither dialogue nor improved relations between the north and the south as long as south Korea persists in such hostile acts as enforcing sanctions
against the DPRK, taking part in the acts to stifle it, deliberately accusing it of its space development and bolstering of its nuclear force and staging war exercises after massively introducing sophisticated war hardware into south Korea.

Recently the south Korean authorities expressed "regret and disappointment" at the DPRK’s rejection of their proposal for dialogue, the statement said, and went on: They went the lengths of making impudent remarks that "the north should make a right choice," jabbering that "it chilled the atmosphere and overturned the table." Had they have a true will to have dialogue, they should have halted all acts of hurting the dignity of the DPRK, stopped the north-targeted war exercises and smear campaign and given assurances to the nation that they would not resort to such hostile acts in the days ahead. However, a spate of invectives slandering the celebrations of the Day of the Sun was let loose and such thrice-cursed crime as infringing upon the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK was committed in the heart of Seoul in broad daylight at the tacit connivance of the south Korean authorities. Puppet minister of Defense Kim Kwan Jin and other warmongers kicked up confrontation hysteria, crying out for "a total war, strong counteraction and stern and decisive punishment." Worse still, the chief of Chongwadae let loose a whole string of jargons seriously hurting the dignity of the north. She blustered that "it is necessary to terminate the vicious cycle of renegotiating and assisting the north when it poses a threat and perpetrates a provocation and that such threat and provocation would isolate the north."

All these facts prove that the south Korean authorities were compelled to propose dialogue under the pressure of the public, having no sincere heart. They clearly indicate that the proposed dialogue is nothing but a deceptive artifice to cover up their act of having pushed the situation to a state of war, tide over the crisis and mislead the public opinion in a bid to shift the responsibility onto the north. The south Korean authorities are employing sleight of hand as regards the issue of the Kaesong Industrial Zone but the crisis there most vividly reflects the present state of the inter-Korean relations. They, along with their American master, are still talking such nonsense as "denuclearization" in the north in a bid to make a bargain over its nukes. They would be well advised to drop such daydream. As a matter of fact, the DPRK was technically at a nuclear war with the U.S. The U.S. has posed a threat to the DPRK with all its ultramodern nuclear strategic weapons and hardware. This showdown was sparked by the U.S. and other hostile forces as they took issue with the DPRK over its legitimate satellite launch for peaceful purposes. The confrontation maniacs should properly understand that the principled stance of the DPRK will never change, warned the statement. (KCNA, “DPRK’s Principled Stand on Inter-Korean Dialogue Remains Unchanged: CPRK Spokesman,” April 18, 2013)

North Korea demanded the lifting of United Nations sanctions and an end to joint American-South Korean military exercises as preconditions for starting dialogue to defuse tension on the Korean Peninsula. By making demands that both the United States and South Korea had no intention of accepting, North Korea signaled that it would not stand down anytime soon from a military standoff that has lasted for weeks. But the fact that North Korea has recently begun responding to American and South Korean offers for dialogue, even though they came with steep preconditions, has raised cautious hopes among South Korean analysts that the North might be ready to
wind down weeks of hostile rhetoric that at times appeared to bring the peninsula close to a point of conflict. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Sets Conditions for Return to Talks,” New York Times, April 18, 2013)

North Korea has shown no signs of preparing or is not even capable of conducting a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, but the communist nation can still carry out localized provocations at any time, South Korea’s top presidential security adviser said Thursday. “We can know of indications two to three weeks earlier if (North Korea) is going to start a full-scale war,” Chief of National Security Kim Jang-soo said during a parliamentary committee meeting, adding that Korea-U.S. intelligence assets are fully capable of detecting such signs. Kim, a former defense minister, said that North Korea, however, is maintaining preparedness to carry out “localized provocations, artillery fire from currently-readied bases toward South Korean troops or people, or cyber attacks at any time.” The torrent of war threats from the North has given rise to calls among some conservatives in South Korea that the country should seek nuclear armament or redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance to North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. But Kim said such calls make no sense. “We have committed a denuclearization declaration to the Korean Peninsula and have a policy priority on removing North Korea’s nuclear weapons. If we arm ourselves with nuclear weapons, that would be a logical contradiction,” Kim said, adding the remark is his personal view, not an official government position. The official also dismissed calls for redeploying American nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, stressing that when it comes to such strategic weapons, their location matters little, even if they are either on the peninsula or on Guam. Kim also stressed that nuclear armament would put South Korea under an array of international sanctions that would deal crushing blows to the country’s economy.

Asked how to respond in case of North Korean attacks, Kim said South Korea will fully exercise its self-defense rights and launch retaliatory strikes with every possible means not only on the source point of provocations, supporting forces and but also command forces as well. Lawmakers asked if “command forces” would include North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, and the official responded that what he meant was commanders directly involved in the attacks. (Korea Times, “N.K. Can Carry out Local Provocations at Any Times,” April 18, 2013)

4/18/13

The nation’s top intelligence official said today that a one-paragraph assessment about North Korea’s ability to arm a nuclear missile was mistakenly declassified by the Pentagon’s intelligence agency, an inadvertent disclosure that revealed competing views on the country within the United States’ spy agencies. After the conclusion became public at a Congressional hearing last week, James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence, issued a statement saying that the position by the Defense Intelligence Agency did not reflect the consensus view of the 15 other intelligence agencies. But Clapper, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, offered new details and a fuller explanation of why the D.I.A.’s conclusion last month – with “moderate confidence” – that North Korea has learned how to shrink a nuclear weapon to fit into a nuclear warhead was at odds with all the other intelligence agencies. “The difference has to do with the confidence level in the actual ability of the North Koreans to make a weapon that will work in a missile,” Clapper, said, adding that since the
North has yet to test such a weapon, “neither we nor the North Koreans know whether they have such capability.” Clapper continued: “D.I.A. has a higher confidence level than the rest of the community on that capability. That’s the difference.” At issue is a seven-page classified report, one sentence of which was mistakenly labeled unclassified, Clapper said. The assessment’s existence was made public on April 11 by Representative Doug Lamborn, (R-CO) in a budget hearing of the House Armed Services Committee. (Eric Schmitt, “New Details on Disclosure Regarding North Korea,” New York Times, April 19, 2013, p. A-6) "I still don’t think they have enough nuclear-testing experience," Stanford University’s Siegfried Hecker told a seminar of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. Pyongyang’s nuclear arms still are probably primitive and it would likely need several more tests to be able to make one small enough for a missile and have "sufficient confidence that you can put a nuclear weapon on a warhead," Hecker said. The most important and serious short-range threat could instead be delivery of a nuclear bomb by other means than a missile, for example on a boat or even in a car or van. "That would be the simplest delivery mechanism. However, it is very difficult to pull that off," he added. "In the shorter term, most likely a boat would be the most serious threat." Hecker made clear he did not agree with a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) produced in March and revealed at a congressional hearing that triggered alarm last week that North Korea might be able to deliver a nuclear-tipped missile at a time of heightened tensions in Asia over Pyongyang’s threats of war. "They (North Korea) are very determined people," Hecker said. "They can probably develop an ICBM), they can probably miniaturize nuclear weapons. But they need lots of missile tests and they need more nuclear tests." (Fredrik Dahl, “North Korea Could Conduct New Nuclear Test Soon – Hecker,” Reuters, April 18, 2013)

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that North Korea’s preconditions for any dialogue are unacceptable. But he said the demand is the initial sign of the isolated country returning to the negotiating table. A day earlier, the North’s National Defense Commission called for the scrapping of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a permanent end to joint South Korea-U.S. military drills if the South or the United States wants to talk with it. “That’s the first word of negotiation or thought of that we’ve heard from them since all of this has begun,” Kerry told lawmakers in Washington. “So, I’m prepared to look at that as, you know, at least a beginning gambit — not acceptable, obviously, and we have to go further.” “The United States would not return to past cycles of here’s a little food aid, here’s a little of this, then we’ll talk,” he said. “We’ve got to make some fundamental determinations here.” While meeting Chinese leaders last week, Kerry emphasized China’s role in calming the tensions. “One of the calculations I know that has been in Kim Jong-un’s mind is that he can kind of do this and get away with it because he doesn’t believe China will crack down on him," Kerry said. "So that’s a key consideration here and hopefully that in fact will be proven to be not true.” White House Deputy Press Secretary Josh Earnest said, “We’re open to credible, authentic negotiations, but it’s going to require clear signals from the North Korean regime, clear signals we haven’t seen so far.” (Kang Seung-woo, “Kerry Snubs N.K. Conditions,” Korea Times, April 19, 2013)
The U.S. and South Korea concluded their sixth round of talks on the sensitive issue of the renewal of its bilateral civilian nuclear pact Thursday, without producing a significant agreement. The negotiations were extended by one day from the initial two days, but the differences have yet to be smoothed over. Sources said that due to the difficulty of coming to a consensus, the nuclear cooperation agreement is likely to be extended for another two years. The so-called “123 Agreement,” named after pertinent sections in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, is set to expire next March. “There was likely talk of extending the pact for two years because if we rush to negotiate, we will not be able to sufficiently rewrite the agreement,” said a foreign affairs ministry official. Washington is afraid that allowing Seoul to enrich uranium and produce its own nuclear fuel may bring it closer to making nuclear weapons, as it goes against its nonproliferation stance, especially in light of military tensions with the North. The talks with Park Ro-byug, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ ambassador for energy, heading the South Korean delegation, and the U.S. delegation chief Robert Einhorn, special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control, were urgent for Seoul. (Sarah Kim and Jung Won-yeob, “South, U.S., Fail to Revise Nuclear Accord This Time,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 20, 2013) South Korea said April 24 that it has failed to win U.S. permission to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel in negotiations aimed at renewing a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. Instead, the allies agreed to extend the current agreement by two more years until March 2016, said a senior official at Seoul’s foreign ministry. “The two sides agreed to extend the current nuclear cooperation agreement by two years to avoid a lapse in the agreement, and the next round of the talks will be held in June,” the official said on condition of anonymity. Extending the pact will “give Korea and the U.S. more time for close consultations and lay the ground for the two sides to achieve good results in smoothly revising the agreement,” the official said. In a press briefing, Seoul’s foreign ministry spokesman Cho Tai-young said that there has been "meaningful progress" in the negotiations in terms of "management of spent nuclear fuel, stable supply of nuclear fuel and Korea’s exports of nuclear reactors." Nevertheless, Seoul and Washington decided to extend the accord because "much more technical and specific issues still remain to be resolved," Cho said. "The Korean government will continue to make efforts to revise the accord in an advanced and mutually beneficial manner," Cho said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Fails to Win U.S. Nod for Nuclear Enrichment,” April 24, 2013)

POC: “The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are global leaders and partners in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To renew and modernize this fruitful and longstanding partnership, we have made significant progress in negotiations to replace the current agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, which is set to expire March 19, 2014. We seek to conclude a successor agreement that serves as a strong foundation for U.S.-ROK bilateral civil nuclear cooperation for the future, reinforces our partnership as major nuclear suppliers, bolsters our overall bilateral relationship, and reaffirms our common commitment to nonproliferation. We also seek to work together to address common challenges, including those related to spent nuclear fuel management and reliable supplies of nuclear fuel to undergird our respective nuclear industries. Because our cooperation is increasingly broad and deep, there are several complex technical issues that will take some additional time and effort to resolve. To provide time for our negotiators to finalize an agreement that meets these important goals, and to meet our respective legal requirements for approval of
such an agreement, the United States and the ROK have decided to seek a two-year extension of the current agreement. The Administration will begin immediately to consult with Congress on extending the existing agreement. An extension would ensure there is no lapse in ongoing cooperation and would maintain stability and predictability in our joint commercial activities. During this extended period, the United States and the ROK will continue negotiations in order to finalize a successor agreement. We expect to hold our next round of discussions on that successor agreement in June 2013 and intend to meet approximately quarterly thereafter. (US-ROK Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, April 24, 2013)

CTBTO: “The CTBTO’s radionuclide network has made a significant detection of radioactive noble gases that could be attributed to the nuclear test announced by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 12 February 2013. The detection was made at the radionuclide station in Takasaki, Japan, located at around 1,000 kilometres, or 620 miles, from the DPRK test site. Lower levels were picked up at another station in Ussuriysk, Russia. Two radioactive isotopes of the noble gas xenon were identified, xenon-131m and xenon-133, which provide reliable information on the nuclear nature of the source. The ratio of the detected xenon isotopes is consistent with a nuclear fission event occurring more than 50 days before the detection (nuclear fission can occur in both nuclear explosions and nuclear energy production). This coincides very well with announced nuclear test by the DPRK that occurred on 12 February 2013, 55 days before the measurement. Using Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM), which calculates the three-dimensional travel path of airborne radioactivity on the basis of weather data, the DPRK test site was identified as a possible source for the emission. CTBTO radionuclide expert Mika Nikkinen said: “We are in the process of eliminating other possible sources that could explain the observations; the radionuclides could have come from a nuclear reactor or other nuclear activity under certain specific conditions, but so far we do not have information on such a release.” On 12 February, the DPRK event was detected immediately, reliably and precisely by 94 seismic stations and two infrasound stations of the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System. The first data were made available to CTBTO Member States in little more than one hour, and before the DPRK announced that it had conducted a nuclear test. The event recorded at 02.57.51 (UTC) was found to have a magnitude of 4.9 using the CTBTO International Data Centre’s magnitude scale. The location was in the vicinity of the two previous nuclear tests (Lat.: 41.313 degrees north; long.: 129.101 degrees east).” (CTBTO Press Release, “CTBTO Detects Radioactivity Consistent with 12 February Announced North Korean Nuclear Test,” April 23, 2013)

4/20/13 Rodong Sinmun: “The U.S. is now talking about ‘dialogue’ with the DPRK, putting up the latter’s step for denuclearization as a precondition for dialogue. High-ranking U.S. officials let loose a spate of rhetoric that President Obama ordered to cancel some military drills, contributing to detente, the DPRK should be sincere in the efforts for realizing denuclearization and dialogue is possible only when it opts for denuclearization. Rodong Sinmun Saturday (April 20) observes in a bylined article in this regard: This is nothing but rhetoric prompted by the U.S. crafty ploy to shift the blame for the tension on the Korean Peninsula on to the DPRK and put international
pressure on it. The U.S. should not think about the denuclearization on the peninsula before the world is denuclearized. It is nuclear weapons which the U.S. regards as the only means for containing its regional rivals and establishing its military domination. By taking advantage of its nuclear edge it seeks to browbeat its rivals to make them obedient to it and attain its hegemonic purposes. Its main target is the Korean Peninsula. Its scenario is to put the Korean Peninsula under its military control and establish its control over the Eurasian Continent, using it as a base. What matters is that the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK will remain unchanged. The U.S. policy of threatening the DPRK with nukes will also remain unchanged unless the U.S. abandons its ambition to dominate the world. The above-said precondition raised by the U.S. for dialogue goes to fully prove that the U.S. harbors an ulterior intention to force the DPRK to dismantle its nukes and then put it under the U.S. military control. The DPRK's stand is clear. The U.S. should not think about the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula before the world is denuclearized. There may be talks between the DPRK and the U.S. for disarmament but no talks on denuclearization.” (KCNA, “There Will Be No DPRK-U.S. Talks on Denuclearization: Rodong Sinmun,” April 20, 2013)

Contrary to suggestions by some in the United States that China is not interested in solving the North Korean problem, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, the “Chinese leadership is as concerned as we are with North Korea’s march toward nuclearization and ballistic missile technology.” “And they have given us an assurance that they are working on it, as we are.” He added, “But I didn’t gain any insights into particularly how they would do that.” Dempsey met yesterday with the Chinese leadership, including President Xi Jinping and Gen. Fan Changlong, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, which runs the Chinese Army, Navy and Air Force. They were the most senior-level talks between the American and Chinese militaries in nearly two years. As a symbol of how China’s maritime power is growing, a senior Chinese military officer announced Tuesday in the middle of Dempsey’s visit that China would build a second aircraft carrier and that it would be more sophisticated than the first carrier launched last year. The officer, Song Xue, deputy chief of staff of the Chinese Navy, said the “next aircraft carrier we need will be larger and carry more fighters.” At a news conference with reporters based in China, Dempsey said he warned the Chinese military leaders that the United States would abide by its alliance with Japan in the dispute between China and Japan over who owns the islands known as the Senkaku by Japan and the Diaoyu by China. Yesterday, eight Chinese patrol ships approached the islands, the largest contingent to appear at one time since September. Xinhua said the Chinese ships had forced Japanese fishing boats out of the waters around the islands. Western defense analysts have said the Chinese continue to send surveillance vessels close by the islands to test whether the United States will live up to its alliance obligations with Japan. Dempsey said he left no doubt in his discussions with Chinese officials that “we do have certain treaty obligations with Japan that we would honor.” On the contentious issue of cyberattacks, Dempsey said he asked the Chinese “to put a team of their best and brightest” together to work with the Americans on seeking rules of conduct on computer security. China’s leadership appears to have heard the Obama administration’s admonitions that it will not tolerate the practice of cyberattacks aimed at intellectual property and
gaining commercial secrets from American businesses, American officials say. The Chinese agreed during a recent visit of Secretary of State John Kerry to join a “cyber working group” with the Americans. “There has to be some kind of code of conduct established,” Dempsey said. But the Chinese apparently did not give him any answers on whether they intended to stop these activities, as specifically requested by the Obama administration. At the start of General Dempsey’s visit two days ago, a senior Chinese general, Fang Fenghui, said that breaches in cybersecurity could result in as much damage as a nuclear attack. (Jane Perlez, “U.S. General Sees Hope for China on North Korea,” New York Times, April 25, 2013, p. A-11) “We are no longer in a period of cyclical provocations -- where a provocation occurs and then there is a period of time when concessions are made.... I think we are in a period of prolonged provocations,” Dempsey said. "I think the risk of miscalculation is higher, and the risk of an escalation is higher." "I will leave here with the belief that China is as concerned as we are about North Korea’s march toward nuclearization and missile technology," Dempsey said. “We think there is still time for North Korea’s leader to back away from provocations.” Gen. Fang Fenghui told reporters here two days ago he believed North Korea could carry out a fourth nuclear test -- a rare public statement for the Chinese military. “As far as the Chinese side is concerned, we are willing to work actively with all sides to persuade North Korea to stop nuclear tests and to stop producing nuclear weapons,” Fang said. (Barbara Demick, “In Beijing, Dempsey Wars of Further North Korean Provocations,” Los Angeles Times, April 24, 2013)

Despite repeated denials of historical facts by Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who has led a general rightward shift in Japanese politics, South Korean President Park Geun-hye has chosen not to take a firmer tone in her response. This is what is known as a “low-key” strategy, in which the government issues strong expressions of regret, while the president adheres to her original position in her remarks. “It is unlikely for there to be a forward-looking relationship between South Korea and Japan as long as Japan does not rectify its historical understanding,” Park said during a luncheon attended by chief editors of South Korean media outlets on April 24. “The South Korean government will maintain a consistent position in regard to this issue, and I also hope that Japan will think carefully about it,” she added. Since her inauguration, Park has continued to emphasize a cooperative relationship based on an accurate understanding of history, and the remarks made on the 24th were of a similar tenor, including no aggressive statements. At the same time, Park once again put forward the ‘Seoul Process’, her plan for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia. The plan, which was one of her campaign pledges, would seek to shift from “bilateral conflict” in Northeast Asian countries to a framework for “multilateral cooperation.” “Countries in Northeast Asia must start not by tackling the political issues, but rather by collaborating on climate change, nuclear energy safety and countering terror,” Park said. “This can help us build trust and lead to economic cooperation.” By referencing the plan for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia, Park seems to be trying to make it clear that she still considers exchange and collaboration between the countries in Northeast Asia to be important. At the same time, she also appears to be drawing attention to the fact that Abe’s recent move to the right are ultimately calculated decisions motivated by domestic politics in Japan. “While the government will maintain a tough stance about actions by Japan that are motivated by domestic
political considerations, that doesn’t mean there is any reason for the Blue House and Park herself to come out and make a fuss about them,” a South Korean government official said. (Seok Jin-hwan, “Pres. Park Using a Low-Key Strategy in Dealing with Japan,” Hankyore, April 25, 2013)

South Korea extended an offer to hold government-level talks with North Korea over the joint industrial complex that has been idle since early this month amid heightened inter-Korean tensions. “We are making an official offer to North Korea to discuss ways of normalizing operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and want to hear their position on the matter before noon Friday [tomorrow],” said unification ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk. “If Pyongyang does not respond by the deadline, Seoul will have no choice but to take serious measures,” he said. The official said it is not appropriate to elaborate on what action can be taken if the North dismissed the latest dialogue proposal proposal, but Seoul may take steps to recall all of its people there. Kim stressed the announcement is being made because the North flatly turned down a request on yesterday for informal talks between South Korean representatives at the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee (KIDMAC) in Kaesong and the North’s General Bureau for the Special Zone Development Guidance, that manages the industrial zone. “They not only rejected the talks proposal but did not even bother to accept the list of humanitarian requests being made,” the official said. He said such actions are highly regrettable. The official pointed out that on the issue of sending basic necessities critical for the well being of the people at Kaesong, South Korea is in no position to make compromises. Kim said the purpose of the informal talk was to allow food and medical personnel to reach the complex to alleviate the plight of the 176 South Koreans still remaining at the border town just north of the demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas. North Korea observers, meanwhile, said that Seoul's bid to engage the North is much more detailed than previous calls for dialogue as it calls for working level government officials with actual authorities to take part in discussions. However, they said since there is a good chance the North will not accept the dialogue proposal, South Korea will have no choice but to bring back the Kaesong workers who have no means of remaining in the North with limited food stores. If such developments take place, the North can counter by confiscating assets of South Korean companies, which they did in the case of the Mount Kumgang resort on the east coast. (Yonhap, “Seoul Offers Talks with N. Korea on Kaesong Stalemate,” April 25, 2013)

China has been “positively” considering holding a trilateral, but informal, dialogue with South Korea and the United States for effective policy consultations on North Korea. The idea of holding a so-called 1.5-track security dialogue, in which government officials and academics from South Korea, the U.S. and China participate in their individual capacity, has been floated by South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se with the aim of stepping up their joint policy coordination toward an increasingly belligerent North Korea. Yun and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks in Beijing on Wednesday and agreed to open a 24-hour hotline for prompt policy consultations on North Korea. “China is positively considering starting a 1.5-track strategic dialogue with South Korea and the U.S.,” said the senior official at Seoul's

The Korean government called in the Japanese ambassador to protest Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s remarks glorifying the country’s imperial past and denying wartime violence. Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kyoo-hyun expressed to Bessho Koro “deep regrets” about the Japanese government, and of politicians’ distorted historical understanding and retrospective remarks. “We do not understand why the Japanese society, while it so greatly cherishes honesty and trust internally, shuts its eyes and plugs its ears to the country’s history of invasion and colonial rule,” Kim told the envoy in an unusually stringent tone. “We sincerely hope that Japan will squarely reflect its past and colonial rule with a humble attitude in consideration of the enormous pain and abuse it caused to us, and from there it will correct today’s wrong perception and customs.” Seoul’s Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se shelved his first trip to Tokyo since taking office in protest against a visit to Yasukuni Shrine by Deputy Premier and Finance Minister Taro Aso and other Cabinet ministers. Abe told a parliamentary session April 23 that the definition of invasion varies wildly by country, apparently legitimizing his country’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula in 1910-45 and incursion into China during World War II. He went further yesterday by sheltering the worshippers, saying “my Cabinet members have the freedom to resist any threat. “It’s a natural thing to express respect and reverence for those who devoted their noble lives for the country,” Abe told the upper house’s budget committee. President Park Geun-hye also called on Japan to “think deeply and carefully,” warning its accelerating swing to the right may strain its relations with other neighbors including China. “It’s difficult to move toward a future-oriented relationship if it is not based on a correct historical understanding so that past wounds get infected,” she told senior journalists. (Shin Hyon-hee, “Seoul Gets Tough on Japan’s Satnce on Past Wrongdoings,” Korea Herald, April 25, 2013) Prime Minister Abe vowed that his Cabinet would stand firm against threats from neighbors, and he was not even referring to North Korea’s saber-rattling on missile launches. At an April 24 session of the Upper House Budget Committee, Abe was asked about strong criticism in recent days from China and South Korea over visits to Yasukuni Shrine by his Cabinet ministers. “It is only natural to express feelings of respect to the war dead who gave up their precious lives for the sake of their nation,” Abe said. **We will never bend to any form of threat.** We have secured the freedom (to make such visits).” Abe also seemed to place the blame for the recent controversy on the changing stances taken by Japan’s neighbors. While Abe continued to take a strong stand against criticism from China and South Korea, coalition partner New Komeito called for a more cautious approach. Keiichi Ishii, New Komeito policy chief, said at a news conference: “Cabinet ministers, especially those in influential positions, are asked to show sufficient consideration. Creating a national memorial facility might be one way to resolve the issue.” (Asahi Shim bun, “Abe: Cabinet Will Stand Firm against ‘Threats’ from Neighbors,” April 25, 2013)

Festering resentment over war-related and other issues has left Japan as the odd man out as China and South Korea cozy up politically to counter the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. On April 24, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se went to Beijing for talks with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi.
The two agreed to establish a hotline to discuss pressing issues concerning an increasingly bellicose North Korea. The two countries have also separately criticized Japan, most recently for visits to Yasukuni Shrine by ministers of the Abe Cabinet, making it more difficult for Japan to be included in multilateral discussions on North Korea. Yun told reporters that during his three-hour discussion with Wang, agreement was also reached on strengthening "strategic communications" between their two nations through various channels, including top leaders, Cabinet ministers and high-ranking government officials. Although China had until now focused on economic ties with South Korea out of consideration for its long-time ally North Korea, Beijing and Seoul agreed to strengthen their political ties as well. Regarding heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula due to threats by Pyongyang to launch a long-range ballistic missile and conduct a fourth nuclear test, Yun pointed out that strategic dialogue was being held through a number of bilateral relationships, such as those between the United States and South Korea, the United States and China, as well as China and South Korea. Yun expressed confidence that further cooperation between the United States, China and South Korea will be achieved with the move toward strategic communications at a high level. Yun made almost no specific mention of Japan in his comments. He was asked if South Korea would work together with China in responding to recent comments about history issues by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Yun only said, "It is not an issue of joint response." There were other signs that Japan was being ignored even as China and South Korea nudged closer to each other. Wang called Yun three days after he was picked to be China's foreign minister. Although Wang is known as a Japan expert, he has yet to talk with Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio. China is also moving toward developing closer ties with the United States. Chinese President Xi Jinping met recently with visiting Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Xi said the two nations should "continuously improve the contents of their cooperative partnership." Amid such developments, the gap created by the history issues between Japan and China and South Korea continues to cast a long shadow. On April 24, Ambassador Masato Kitera held a reception in Beijing to mark his arrival there in late December. "While the Japan-China relationship continues to face a difficult situation, we will maintain and strengthen various levels of communications," Kitera said. The Chinese Foreign Ministry was represented by Xiong Bo, a deputy director-general of the Asian Affairs Department. He told reporters, "In order to improve the relationship, the two sides must squarely look at the issue that serves as the largest barrier." In a meeting with executives of South Korean media organizations on April 24, South Korean President Park Geun-hye said, "It would not be good for Japan to move in a direction that tilts toward the right because it would make its relationships with Asian nations more difficult." On the same day, a meeting was held in Seoul of business executives from Japan and South Korea. In a keynote address, Yasuo Fukuda, a former prime minister, said, "I hope that a meeting can be held between the leaders of the two nations as soon as possible." At the same time, South Korea did not appear to be cutting off all ties with Japan. Seoul is prepared to send its environment minister to a meeting scheduled for early May in Japan that is also being attended by a Chinese minister with the same portfolio. A South Korean government source said, "Multilateral meetings are different from the bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea." The United States has informally asked the Abe administration to deal cautiously with history issues because
it did not want them to jeopardize Japan’s ties with China and South Korea. Reiterating that stance at an April 23 news conference, Patrick Ventrell, the acting deputy spokesperson for the U.S. State Department, said, "We encourage (Japan and South Korea) to work through their issues and have a good dialogue and a good relationship." (Hayashi Nozomu, Kaise Akihiko and Nakano Akira and Oshima Takashi, “Japan Can Only Watch from Sidelines As China, S. Korea Develop Closer Political Ties, Asahi Shimbun, April 25, 2013)

4/25/13 Yun testimony: “Home to two-thirds of the world’s population and the world’s fastest growing economies, the Asia-Pacific offers growing opportunities and challenges for U.S. strategic interests. Placing U.S. interests in context, the annual flow of U.S. investment into East Asia has increased from $22.5 billion in 2009 to $41.4 billion in 2011. U.S. exports to the Asia-Pacific totaled over $320 billion in 2012 after growing nearly eight percent since 2008. … I would like to emphasize that security and defense cooperation is only one part of the policy and to provide you with the larger context of our engagement with the region. Though we continue to face military challenges in the region, non-military issues are critically important to American and East Asian prosperity and security and necessitate a broad diplomatic approach. Although our security and defense commitments remain strong and unequivocal, we must put more emphasis on strengthening our non-military engagement. … Indeed, our allies and partners continue to tell us that our clear and visible military presence is reassuring to them and contributes to the stability of the region. But what they also tell us is that, as we deepen our military engagement, we should continue also to emphasize the diplomatic, development, economic, and people-to-people engagement in order to demonstrate our longer-term commitment to our rebalance strategy. … To date we have demonstrated our commitment through intensive engagement at every level, including interacting with our regional partners at the highest levels. Last year, that high-level engagement included 35 bilateral meetings, six trilateral meetings, 32 multilateral meetings, and numerous strategic dialogues. The result of these engagements was progress on trade agreements, closer coordination on law enforcement and counter-terrorism initiatives, and advancing anti-human trafficking measures, and other efforts to advance good governance, democracy and human rights in the region. … Establishment of the he Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement with 11 partners will be one of the cornerstones of our “rebalance” toward the Asia-Pacific. … We are also engaging with an emerging and growing regional architecture of robust regional institutions and multilateral agreements that result in a more positive political and economic environment for the United States and strengthen regional stability, security, and economic growth. Multilateral institutions are positioning themselves to better handle territorial and maritime disputes such as in the South China Sea. … This kind of cooperation very much includes China. We want China and the countries of the region to partner not only with us, but with each other and multilaterally so that we can deal with shared challenges like cyber security, climate change, and North Korea, which were significant points of discussion with the Chinese on Secretary Kerry’s most recent trip. At the heart of our efforts to contribute to a peaceful, prosperous, secure, and stable region is a desire to expand democratic development and human rights. … Each element of our engagement strategy is mutually reinforcing. And thus far, Asian states have warmly welcomed our efforts. Of
course, the stability that has enabled the Asia-Pacific’s remarkable economic growth over the past decade has long been upheld by the U.S. military. And we are seeking to ensure that our military activities, force posture, and presence enable us to improve our cooperation with our allies and partners and respond to current as well as emerging security challenges and threats. Together with our Department of Defense colleagues, we have begun work on a comprehensive defense strategy review to develop a force posture and presence in the region that can better respond to non-traditional security threats, protect allies and partners, and defend U.S. national interests. And in our military-to-military engagement throughout the region, we continue to emphasize norms regarding respect for human rights, civilian populations, and the law. As our military cooperation around the Asia-Pacific continues to evolve and adapt to 21st century challenges, we strive to optimize our military force posture so that it is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. An example of how we’re doing this is our close cooperation with Japan on consolidation and realignment issues. The Japanese government’s March submission of the landfill permit request for construction of a replacement Marine Corps Air Station to the Okinawa governor, together with the April bilateral announcement of a Consolidation Plan, are significant milestones in our bilateral partnership and important steps closer to realizing the vision of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap. Both sides have reaffirmed that the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Henoko remains the only viable alternative to the current location of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. … In addition to this work with Japan, we are also strengthening and modernizing our long-standing treaty alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines…. We also continue to seek improved military-to-military relations with China by advancing our successful high-level dialogues and exchanges, as well as expanding our cooperation on counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. Strengthening our military and broader economic and security relationship with China is a critical component of our rebalance. Let me be clear that we have no interest in containing China, but rather our policy is designed to increase cooperation with China on a wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. … We are working with regional partners, including China, through numerous mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asian Defense Ministerial Mechanism Plus to build military and civilian capacity to respond to natural disasters and to support humanitarian relief efforts.” (Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Joseph Yun, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, April 25, 2013)

On an anniversary known for military showmanship, North Korean generals declared that their forces were ready to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles and kamikazelike nuclear attacks at the United States if threatened. “Stalwart pilots, once given a sortie order, will load nuclear bombs, instead of fuel for return, and storm enemy strongholds to blow them up,” the North’s official Korean Central News Agency quoted its Air and Anti-Air Force commander, Ri Pyong-chol, as saying during a ceremony in observance of the anniversary of the founding of the North Korean People’s Army. Another general, Kim Rak-gyom, the Strategic Rocket Force commander, reiterated the claim that the North is “one click away from pushing the
launch button.” “If the U.S. imperialists and their followers dare make a pre-emptive attack, they will be made to keenly realize what a real nuclear war and real retaliatory blows are like,” he said. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Issues Threat at Ceremony for Military,” New York Times, April 26, 2013, p. A-6) KCNA: “A ceremony of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) took place at the plaza of the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun Thursday, 81st anniversary of the KPA. Present at the tribune of honor was Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, first chairman of the National Defence Commission and Supreme Commander of the KPA. … Air and Anti-air Force Commander Ri Pyong Chol said that the men of his force is waiting for a final attack order to put an end to the enemies, with firm determination to devotedly safeguard the Party Central Committee headed by Kim Jong Un and the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun. The flying corps of a-match-for-a hundred stalwart pilots, once given a sortie order, will load nuclear bombs, instead of fuel for return, and storm enemy strongholds to blow them up, he said. Strategic Rocket Force Commander Kim Rak Gyom said that the DPRK’s inter-continental ballistic missiles have already set the dens of the brigandish U.S. imperialists as their first target and officers and men of the Strategic Rocket Force are one click away from pushing the launch button. If the U.S. imperialists and their followers dare make a preemptive attack, they will be made to keenly realize what a real nuclear war and real retaliatory blows are like and their stooges be made to feel the taste of horrible nuclear holocaust.” (KCNA, KPA Ceremony Marks Founding Anniversary,” April 25, 2013)

4/26/13

North Korea rejected Seoul’s proposal to hold official talks to end the suspension of a joint industrial complex, warning it could be the first to take grave action. “Pyongyang will be the first to take tough and conclusive action if the South insists on worsening the situation at the border town,” the spokesman for the policy office at the North’s National Defense Commission said. The statement, carried by the Korean Central Television and Radio Pyongyang monitored in Seoul, blasted the talks proposal made Thursday as a “mockery” and claimed it was the product of those who pushed inter-Korean relations into a war footing. “Making ultimatums against the DPRK and warning of serious consequences will only lead to final destruction (for the South),” the statement said. The commission also made clear that if Seoul was afraid for the safety of its people at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, it was free to pull them out. “All matters related to the safety of South Korean personnel wanting to leave Kaesong will be guaranteed by our authorities,” it said. The statement said the North had barred entry of South Korean personnel into Kaesong because Seoul’s defense minister hinted of possible military operations in the event hostages were held at the complex. “The step to bar entry and temporarily halt business operations was to prevent the complex from becoming an excuse to start full-fledged war,” it claimed, blaming the South for the overall situation. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Snubs Seoul’s Call for Kaesong Talks,” April 26, 2013)

National Defense Commission Policy Department spokesman: “The DPRK already made public the principled stand of its army and people as to the south Korean puppet authorities’ ‘proposal for dialogue’ under the grave war-like situation created on the Korean Peninsula. All the Koreans in the north and the south and abroad and the world peace-loving people are unanimous in their demand that the south Korean
authorities prove in practice its sincerity regarding the ‘proposal for dialogue.’ The puppet authorities, however, instigated die-hard conservative gangsters to scatter copies of literature malignantly slandering the DPRK on the occasion of its Day of the Army. … Those copies of literature were packaged in dishonest and provocative language slandering the dignified social system in the DPRK and shifting the blame for the situation of the Kaesong Industrial Zone on to the DPRK. What merits serious attention is that human scum who directly scattered the anti-DPRK leaflets made appearance in official media and said that they committed the hostile act after approaching the area close to the “line under civilian control” unrestricted by the authorities. This proves that the scattering operation was conducted at the tacit connivance and under the manipulation of the authorities. This, at the same time, proves that the ‘dialogue offer’ made by them is nothing but a crafty trick to make the mockery of the public and evade from the responsibility for the war-like situation. The recent operation can not be overlooked as it was openly carried out at a time when the Chongwadae chief is loudly crying out for ‘abidance by north-south agreements.’

There were times in the past when the north and the south adopted valuable agreements for reconciliation, unity, peace and prosperity such as the June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration, bringing delight to the nation. If these agreements, gains common to the nation, had been abided by and implemented, there would not have been such a nightmare of the confrontation between fellow countrymen as today and this land would not have turned into a hotbed of war. The chief of Chongwadae in public appearance asserted that the north should observe the north-south agreements but behind scene let human scum scatter leaflets, revealing her true colors as an element seeking confrontation with fellow countrymen. The most frantic south Korea-U.S. naval landing drill is going on in the East Sea of Korea at this time quite contrary to her much touted dialogue and negotiations, pushing the tense situation to the point of explosion. … The Korean People’s Army made a bold decision such as offering the major military vantage point in the area along the Military Demarcation Line as a plot for the KIZ though huge armed forces are standing in acute confrontation. In the subsequent period the KPA made every possible effort for its normal operation despite all the obstructive moves of the U.S. and the puppet regime. This is fully evidenced by the fact that traitor Lee Myung Bak’s heinous ‘May 24 step against the north’ dared not affect the KIZ. Even when the smear campaign launched by the regime with ultra-right conservative politicians and media involved reached an intolerable phase, the DPRK did not take such important steps as forcibly expelling personnel of the south and totally closing the KIZ. But, there is now a limit to the DPRK’s efforts and patience. At a time when the U.S. hostile acts and the resultant nuclear war racket reached an extreme phase, traitor Kim Kwan Jin who is the boss of the military gangsters openly disclosed his scenario to ask the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces to hurl even their commando into the KIZ in anticipation of ‘hostage taking’ there. As the KIZ turned into a de facto scene of ‘hostage taking’ to be abused by the U.S. and south Korean military gangsters for provoking an all-out war any time, the DPRK was compelled to take steps for banning personnel from entering the zone and temporarily suspending operations in the zone in order to ensure the safety of personnel from the south. Nevertheless, the puppet regime floated misinformation that the DPRK ‘refused to take minimum humanitarian step’ for the personnel of the south remaining in the zone. On Thursday [April 25] the
group let a spokesman for the ‘Ministry of Unification’ release a statement little short of an “ultimatum” accusing the DPRK like a wolf concerned about a sheep. The regime plunged the KIZ into the unrecoverable state and escalated the tension while not doing what it should do, not content with viciously hurting the dignity of the DPRK with such rhetoric as ‘financial source’ and ‘drain on resources.’ Its action can never be pardoned under any circumstances. The arch criminals who pushed the inter-Korean relations to the brink of a war floated the deceptive story about ‘talks between authorities,’ not yet coming to their senses and even became vocal about an ‘ultimatum-like crucial measure.’ This will precipitate their final destruction. If they are truly worried about the lives of south Korean personnel in the KIZ, they may withdraw all of them to the south side where there are stockpile of food and raw materials and sound medical conditions. Institutions concerned of the DPRK will responsibly take all the humanitarian measures including the provision of guarantee for their personal safety that may arise in the course of the withdrawal. If the south Korean puppet regime keeps aggravating the situation, in disregard of the situation, it will be the DPRK, not south Korea, that will be forced to take the final decisive and crucial measure first.” (KCNA, “NDC Policy Department Threatens to Take Final, Decisive Step,” April 26, 2013)

South Korea’s Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae announced its decision to withdraw all its workers from Kaesong Industrial Complex after Pyongyang spurned its offer for dialogue to resolve disputes over the last symbol of inter-Korean rapprochement. “We made the decision to withdraw all workers in light of mounting difficulties they face at the complex,” Ryoo told a nationally televised news conference. A total of 175 South Koreans remained at the factory zone as of today, down from the usual 800 workers there, according to Unification Ministry officials. On April 9, North Korea had pulled out all of its 53,000 workers from the zone, virtually shutting it down. The South Korean decision came hours after North Korea turned down Seoul’s proposal for dialogue, warning that it could take “grave action” of its own in regards to the industrial zone. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Decides to Pull out All Workers from Kaesong Complex,” April 26, 2013)

4/27/13

North Korea said that a detained American allegedly tried to “topple” its government and will soon be put on trial, a potential complication as Washington tries to ramp down tensions stemming from Pyongyang’s recent weapons tests and threats of nuclear attack. Kenneth Bae, a tour operator from Washington state, is the sixth American detained by the North since 2009, but he faces more serious charges than the others. The North used several previous cases as bargaining chips with Washington, drawing rescue mission visits from former presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter. The North gave no specifics about its evidence against Bae, saying only that his crimes were “clearly substantiated.” Bae traveled in a small group last November to the North Korean port city of Rajin, where he was arrested by authorities. Bill Richardson, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, tried to negotiate Bae’s release during a trip to Pyongyang in January. But North Korean officials didn’t let Richardson meet with Bae, Richardson said — although they did reassure him that Bae’s health was good. They also told Richardson that Bae had been allowed to meet with members of the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang, which acts occasionally on
behalf of the United States because Washington does not have diplomatic ties with the North. In an interview with CNN after his trip, Richardson said Bae was being held “very far away from Pyongyang, in the northern part of the country.” (Chico Harlan, “N. Korea: Detained American Will Soon Face Trial,” Washington Post, April 27, 2013) A short notification posted on the KCNA website said, “The preliminary inquiry of American citizen Bae Junho has been closed and he was arrested in Rason as a tourist 3rd of November last year. Bae Junho admitted all of his crimes to overthrow the DPRK government with hostility towards it. His crime is proved with evidence. He will be prosecuted and receive a final ruling from the Supreme Court.” (NKNews, N. Korea to Try American Citizen,” April 29, 2013)

4/28/13

In hosting a ceremony to mark the anniversary of the restoration of the nation’s sovereignty after its defeat in World War II, the government apparently aimed at encouraging the people to deepen their perceptions of national sovereignty. Also behind the government’s decision to sponsor the ceremony is the perceived threat to the nation’s sovereignty, as well as Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s pursuit of constitutional revision, observers said. The ceremony was held Sunday in Tokyo to mark the 61st anniversary of the effectuation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on April 28, 1952, which ended the postwar Occupation of Japan by Allied forces. It was Noda Takeshi, chairman of the LDP Research Commission on the Tax System, who called on Abe and others to organize such a ceremony. Noda began suggesting the idea about a decade ago. He believes it is necessary to give the people an opportunity to ponder why the nation lost its sovereignty by considering as a set the April 28 anniversary of the restoration of independence and the August 15 anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II, the day the nation announced its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. He calls the August 15 anniversary “the day of humiliation for losing [the nation’s] sovereignty.” Efforts made by Noda and his followers bore fruit when the LDP, then an opposition party, held a people’s forum to mark the sovereignty restoration anniversary on April 28 last year at its party headquarters. Abe, who was not the party leader at the time, delivered a video message, saying: “[The nation’s] failure to thoroughly review the Occupation period right after sovereignty was restored has left serious problems. The next [task for us] is [to revise] the Constitution.” Holding the government-sponsored ceremony was mentioned in the so-called J-File, in which the LDP explained in detail its manifesto for the House of Representatives election last year and its plan to hold ceremonies on National Founding Day on February 11, and Takeshima Day on February 22. Of the three, however, only the sovereignty ceremony has been realized so far. The prevailing view is that Abe’s strong intention to amend the Constitution had much to do with the event. During recent interviews and on other occasions, Abe has repeatedly emphasized that “When the Constitution was enacted, Japan had yet to become independent...The Constitution was, as one might put it, created by the occupation forces. We haven’t made any constitution on our own.” Abe’s strong desire to establish the nation’s own constitution was seen to have coincided with the holding of the ceremony. During the ceremony, lower house Speaker Ibuki Bunmei said: “What does the restoration of the nation’s sovereignty mean? The most important thing is that the people have the right to decide the law and the systems within their own territory.” Yet the nation’s territory and sovereign power have been threatened daily. China’s maritime surveillance ships have
repeatedly intruded into Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture. Meanwhile, the Takeshima islands have been illegally occupied by South Korea, and Russia has been intensifying its effective control over the northern territories off Hokkaido. The current situation, in which the nation’s sovereignty is in unprecedented danger, also appears to have fueled Abe’s desire to hold the latest ceremony. The attendance of the Emperor and the Empress at the ceremony was included in the decision the Cabinet made March 12 to hold the ceremony. It seems the Imperial couple attended as part of their official duties at the request of the Cabinet, with whom final responsibility for the ceremony lies. According to the Imperial Household Agency, the Cabinet briefed the agency on the purpose of the ceremony. On the basis of the Cabinet’s explanation, the agency requested the attendance of the Imperial couple at the ceremony. “Especially noteworthy is the fact that Okinawa Prefecture, which experienced heavy casualties in cruel infantry battles, remained outside of Japan’s control for the longest period,” Abe said in his speech, referring to the fact that Okinawa Prefecture remained under U.S. administration 20 years after Japan regained its sovereignty. (Yuichi Suzuki and Tetsuya Ennyu, “Rethinking Japan’s Sovereignty,” Yomiuri Shimbun. April 30, 2013)

In early afternoon on a Sunday in March, Makoto Sakurai was spewing words of hate over a loudspeaker from the lead car of a convoy of vehicles in Tokyo’s Shin-Okubo district, known as a Korea town. “Good afternoon, cockroaches in Shin-Okubo. We are demonstrators from ‘Zen-Nihon Shakai no Gaichu wo Kujushiyo Seiso-linkai’ (All-Japan cleaning committee to expel insects that are noxious to society),” said Sakurai, 41, chairman of the Zainichi Tokken wo Yurusai Shimin no Kai (Group of citizens that do not tolerate privileges for ethnic Korean residents in Japan), called Zaitokukai. “Let’s tie ethnic Korean residents in Japan to (North Korea’s) Taepondong (ballistic missiles) and fire them into South Korea,” he said. Asked why he utters such harsh remarks directed at ethnic Korean residents in Japan, Sakurai replied, “As we are really angry at the behavior of South Korea and North Korea, we even say, ‘Kill them.’ Don’t regard our activities as xenophobia. Don’t misunderstand our anger.” Zaitokukai is a citizens’ group that asserts that ethnic Korean residents in Japan have unfairly obtained or are seeking privileges. The group has protested one issue after another, such as the seeking of suffrage for foreigners, the offering of welfare benefits and the waiving of tuition fees at pro-Pyongyang Korean schools. It has held repeated demonstrations with its members strongly criticizing those measures. Zaitokukai was established at the end of 2006. It claims to currently have 12,000 members. When its hatemongers were holding a demonstration in the Shin-Okubo district on the Sunday in March, counter-demonstrators gathered on the opposite side of the road holding placards. Some shouted, “Zaitoku (meaning Zaitokukai), go home.” The skirmish line has been repeated since February. Meanwhile, a 39-year-old man was watching the protest from the crowd of onlookers as if he was concealing himself. The man, whose name is withheld, had participated in demonstrations on behalf of Zaitokukai and other rightist citizens groups 65 times. It was the first time that he witnessed the demonstration from the outside. What he saw made him feel like crying. He discovered Zaitokukai several years ago when he was working as an employee of a manufacturing company. In those days, he often felt that Japan was being unfairly treated in business dealings with overseas clients. He also felt that, even in such issues as historical recognition and
At that time, he found Zaitokukai’s videos on the Internet on his home computer. His wife later told him that he was pounding his desk repeatedly in excitement as he watched them. The man participated in a Zaitokukai demonstration for the first time in August 2011 in a protest against Fuji Television Network Inc. At that time, Zaitokukai asserted that the broadcaster was biased because it was airing many South Korean dramas. In October of that year, he joined a sit-in in front of the headquarters of the Democratic Party of Japan, then the ruling party. He could not overlook the DPJ-led government’s weak attitude to China and South Korea. In drinking sessions held at “izakaya,” or Japanese-style pubs, after demonstrations, he became friendly with many other members of the group. Some were company employees and others were housewives. He quit his company and started his own business. He now has two children, both of whom are elementary school students. The man undertook shooting videos for Nico Nico Nama-Hoso, or the live broadcast portion of the Nico Nico Douga video-sharing website. Carrying a PC and a video camera, he followed demonstrations and sent videos to the site. Wherever he was asked to go, he went in his car. His videos always received many positive comments from viewers. Many of these people were also excited about the demonstrations and later joined them. In the campaign for the December 16 Lower House elections, some Zaitokukai members, carrying “hinomaru” national flags, went to hear the campaign speeches being given on the street by Liberal Democratic Party President Shinzo Abe and other LDP lawmakers, who vowed to take back Japan. The man heard about the LDP’s crushing victory on election night in his car while he was returning home from a demonstration in a local town. After that, the Abe administration was established. “(In those days) I felt elation,” he recalled. After that, however, the man felt that he had lost his path. The number of tweets on the social networking site Twitter among Zaitokukai members also decreased sharply. Then, harsher words began to be used in the group’s demonstrations. In March, a day before the Sunday demonstration in the Shin-Okubo district, he thought seriously about breaking free from Zaitokukai, and finally decided to do so. That night, he aired his break-away declaration from his home in a live broadcast on Nico Nico Nama-Hoso. “I cannot join any more in demonstrations in which participants yell ‘kill’ or ‘cockroaches.’ Probably, people with different opinions will regard the demonstrators as monsters,” he said. “They (Zaitokukai members) say that they will break social taboos to convey their anger. But can’t they do so without using such (harsh) words?” he asked. After he aired his declaration in the video, he received a total of 5,471 comments in an hour. One of them read, “You were recognized as an ethnic Korean resident.” Another said, “You should die.” This time, the hate was directed at him. He felt extreme fear. (Ishibashi Hideaki, “Hate Aimed at Ethnic Korean Residents Continues, But One Man Changes,” Asahi Shimbun, April 28, 2013)

4/29/13

North Korea has stopped work on preparing for the launch of a medium-range Musudan ballistic missile, according to government sources in Japan, the United States and South Korea. Although the U.S. military has also temporarily eased back from being on high alert, the three nations will continue to keep a wary eye on Pyongyang as it is deemed likely that it will continue with its provocative actions in the medium to long term. The sources said that from about April 20, intelligence units have been unable to intercept radio signals that North Korea had been transmitting on a test basis.
in preparing for a missile launch. The signals include telemetry signals transmitted by
the Musudan missiles to ground bases that would track its course, as well as radar
waves used for communications control within the ground base. In early April, North
Korea deployed two Musudan missiles to bases north of Wonsan in Kangwon province
facing the Sea of Japan. Work was conducted on a daily basis to check that
communications between the Musudan and ground bases, as well as the control and
radar systems within the base, were operating sufficiently. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy’s
Observation Island ship, which tracks ballistic missiles, returned to Sasebo Naval Base
in Nagasaki on April 26. The ship, with a displacement of 17,015 tons, had been
deployed to the Sea of Japan until mid-April to prepare for a possible ballistic missile
launch by North Korea. The ship appears to have temporarily relaxed its surveillance
activities after confirmation was made that North Korea had stopped its launch
preparation work. However, the two Musudan missiles are still at the bases. Seven
additional missiles, including the medium-range Rodong and short-range Scud, are
also deployed in South Hamgyong province. Even after the joint military exercise
between the United States and South Korea concludes on April 30, North Korea will
likely continue to monitor the test-launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile by the
United States. Washington has delayed that launch until May. There is a strong
possibility that Pyongyang will continue to keep the nine ballistic missiles in place to
serve as a deterrent against the U.S. military. (Makino Yoshihiro, “Sources: North Korea
Halts Missile Launch Preparations,” Asahi Shimbun, April 29, 2013)

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and Russian President Vladimir Putin held talks in Moscow
on reviving long-stalled negotiations on a territorial dispute that has prevented the
countries from concluding a postwar peace treaty. Although the content of the leaders’
discussions wasn’t immediately available, strengthening bilateral economic ties is also
believed to have featured prominently on the agenda. Before their meeting began,
Japanese diplomatic sources said the two leaders would issue a joint statement
confirming that the two countries would restart territorial talks. Abe’s official visit to
Russia is the first by a Japanese prime minister in some 10 years. Accompanied by a
delegation of more than 100 corporate executives, Abe arrived yesterday in Moscow
on the first leg of a four-nation tour that will also take him to the Middle East. On the
economic front, Abe was expected to press Putin to let Japanese companies play a
larger role in energy and other development projects in Russia’s Far East, in hopes that
binding the two countries’ economies tighter might create more momentum to kick-
start the talks. The issue concerns Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan islands and the
Habomai islet group, which were seized by Soviet forces off northern Hokkaido at the
end of World War II. Japan has demanded they be returned to its jurisdiction since the
1950s, and their failure to resolve the issue has stopped them from signing an accord
formally end wartime hostilities. Abe, who took office in December, has repeatedly
said he wants to build a relationship with Putin founded on “personal trust” to resume
dialogue on the disputed islands. But officials of both countries have acknowledged
that the Abe-Putin meeting will not result in a breakthrough on the decades-old
impasse. To bolster ties with Moscow, Abe was also expected to propose to Putin that
the Japanese and Russian foreign and defense ministers start holding talks on a
regular basis. If they do, the “two-plus-two” ministerial framework would be the third
involving Japan, following similar arrangements with the United States and Australia.
North Korea has kept the Asian region on edge in recent weeks primarily by using its weapon of choice in times of warmongering: the state-run news agency. The massive wire service, known as the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), serves as the primary mouthpiece for the North's authoritarian government. But the agency also serves a broader purpose, setting the mood for a nation - and changing that mood at the direction of the nation's leaders. Analysts and several defectors who have worked in the North Korean media say any message published by the agency is part of an elaborately coordinated effort that requires much the same work as a screenplay. Although the North is popularly portrayed as a loose cannon operated at the whims of young leader Kim Jong Un, those familiar with the North's media say the messages come from a slow-grinding process involving dozens of meetings and thousands of people - strategists, storytellers, ideological advisers and journalists. South Korea's Defence Ministry maintains a team of readers who try to interpret the significance of the news agency's output, according to an official with the ministry who spoke on the condition of anonymity to provide details about intelligence-gathering. "They don't hesitate to drop so-called verbal bombshells," the official said. "But a lot of it is exaggeration for the sake of their own pride." Much of the KCNA's content is mundane, but its employees - numbering more than 2,000, according to estimates - are not free to churn out content as they please. The North's media rank among the most restricted in the world and are under the absolute control of the ruling elite, the group Reporters without Borders said in its most recent press freedom report. But analysts and defectors paint a more complex picture. Few, if any, of those who work in the media are following direct orders from Kim, the North's supreme leader. Rather, they are trying to anticipate the sort of content that he would like and that would benefit him. In times of rising tensions, the KCNA leads the way, delivering key statements for foreign consumption. Two decades ago, a previous high point for strained relations on the Korean Peninsula, reporters and editors at the news agency received a memo from the Propaganda and Agitation Department, the high-level body that guides and censors the North's news, said Chang Hae Song, a defector who worked at the KCNA from 1976 to 1996. The memo called on KCNA reporters to increase their criticism of the United States and told broadcasters to raise their voices. It also suggested that the state television station, in its intermittent musical interludes, use selections that would help create a "warlike atmosphere." "After those instructions came out, we'd brainstorm about ways" to raise the tensions, Chang said. "Our ideas would go back to the propaganda department for approval." In addition, Chang said, reports faced six levels of editing and censorship before publication. Every Thursday, Chang said, a bundle of prepared reports would be sent to then-leader Kim Jong Il. "But for some cases of emergency reporting, we could write it and the story would be published more quickly," although it would still go through several layers of scrutiny, he said. (Chico Harlan, "North Korea Uses News as WMD," Washington Post, April 29, 2013)

North Korea is moving toward closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex in accordance with orders issued by Kim Jong Il before he died, according to a Workers' Party cadre
based in Pyongyang. Kim is said to have decreed the closure out of concern that Kaesong was capable of shaking the foundations of the North Korean system thanks to the effect it was having on the minds of those who worked in or near it. The cadre told Daily NK, “Kim Jong Il’s greatest concern of all was that as the Kaesong Industrial Complex got bigger it would cause a growing number of workers to harbor feelings of interest and longing for South Korean society. Kim Jong Eun is now focusing on Kim Jong Il’s injunction that ‘you must move decisively to close it as soon as you see a chance.’” According to the cadre, in the aftermath of the 2007 summit between former South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang, one North Korean cadre was removed from post for reporting to Kim Jong Il, “The feeling is that the Kaesong Complex has run well for a few years and the people’s lives are noticeably improving so everyone welcomes it.” Kim allegedly told the man, “You must’ve lost your mind, acting so rashly with no idea about Party policy.” News of the case is said to have reached not only Central Party officials but also some ordinary citizens, causing a rumor to circulate in early 2008 whereby “The Kaesong Complex could now shut down at any time on Kim Jong Il’s word.” The source added, “Kim Jong Il was always telling Party cadres not to expect anything from the Kaesong Complex. It has only ever been used as a propaganda tool symbolizing inter-Korean relations, and this time South Korea has been caught in North Korea’s trap.” Meanwhile, a second source, this time from northerly Chongjin, also told Daily NK, “The Kaesong Complex started a process of changing people’s awareness; away from the idea that South Choson people are our sworn enemy to the notion that we are compatriots, and this thought has now spread far and wide.” But, the source added, “I have heard the cadre’s words many times, that ‘the Central Party has a plan to get rid of it at any moment.’” (Choi Song Min, “Kim Issued ‘Close Kaesong’ Order, Daily NK, April 29, 2013)

North Korea’s imports of Chinese fertilizers surged in the first quarter of this year, an indication that the country may be focused on improving agricultural output. According to the report by the Korea Rural Economic Institute (KREI), Pyongyang bought 29,791 tons of chemical fertilizers from its neighbor, up 3.6 fold from the 6,530 tons it imported for the same three month period in 2012. It said for March alone, the country brought in 28,725 tons of fertilizer. “Normally the North imports fertilizers in April,” said Kwon Tae-jin, a research fellow at KREI. He said the fact that it bought so much ahead of when it usually imports the product means Pyongyang may be interested in improving farm output. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un had said earlier in the year that the North needs to concentrate on farming and light industries in 2013 because they directly impact the everyday lives of people. The expert, in addition, speculated that a surge in imports could be the result of problems in local fertilizer production. The latest findings based on data provided by Korea International Trade Association, meanwhile, showed the North importing 54,178 tons of grain from China in the first quarter, an increase of 31.6 percent from the year before. Total imports also jumped 39.2 percent on-year to US$24.71 million from $17.75 million in the first three months of last year. (Yonhap, “N. Korea’s Imports of Chinese Fertilizers Jump in Q1: Report,” April 30, 2013)

The fate of the Kaesong industrial park appeared to be hanging in the balance on as Seoul remained firm that the inter-Korean project cannot normalize without Pyongyang
accepting dialogue. “It is pointless to normalize operations at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex if it entails accepting unreasonable claims and preconditions,” Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae told a gathering of the National Unification Advisory Council. “Operations at Kaesong will return to normal as soon as the North realizes its actions were wrong and backtracks on the measures taken so far.” Despite the Seoul government’s decision to withdraw its citizens, some observers were pinning hopes on the remaining officials as the last communication channel between the two Koreas. With South Korea-U.S. military drills finished as of today, a breakthrough may be reached while discussing the payment issue, they said. “Our government told North Korea that the forum for dialogue remains open and our offer of talks is still valid,” the ministry official said. “This (normalization) issue can be resolved if responsible North Korean authorities accept the South’s proposal.” Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se also said yesterday that Seoul is “still leaving open the door for dialogue” with Pyongyang. “While ensuring a firm security posture, the government has been urging North Korea to implement its promises with regard to the Kaesong complex and resolve the problem through dialogue,” he told a forum hosted by the Foreign Ministry and the private East Asia Institute. “We will continue to strongly press and strongly strive to convince North Korea to induce a change in its behavior.” (Shin Hyon-hee, “Kaesong Hangs in the Balance,” Korea Herald, April 30, 2013)

State prosecutors raided the headquarters of the National Intelligence Service of South Korea to investigate accusations that the spy agency used its agents and hired bloggers to influence the presidential election in December. The raid the psychological intelligence bureau, which started this morning and continued into the evening, was highly unusual, dealing a blow to the reputation of the spy agency. Such a raid would have been unthinkable decades ago when the agency had served as the main tool of political control for South Korea’s military dictators. Even after South Korea was democratized in the early 1990s, prosecutors raided the secretive agency only once — in 2005, when it was revealed that the agency illegally ran an extensive operation of bugging the telephones of politicians, businessmen, journalists and others. Although the intelligence agency has repeatedly vowed not to meddle in politics, accusations of wrongdoing by its agents resurfaced during the campaign for the December 19 presidential election. The main opposition, the Democratic United Party, and government critics accused the agency of trying to influence online debates in favor of President Park Geun-hye, the governing party’s candidate at the time. Ms. Park beat her opposition rival, Moon Jae-in, by a million votes. Last month, the police said that at least two agents from the National Intelligence Service illegally posted comments online criticizing the political opposition ahead of the election. But they said they could not determine whether the two were part of a much bigger operation by the leadership of the agency to influence the election, as the opposition party alleged. A chief police investigator, who had been replaced in the middle of the investigation, said in interviews with domestic news media that her bosses had intervened in an effort to whitewash the inquiry. The National Police Agency denied the accusation. Prosecutors have since taken over the investigation. They themselves faced a long-running accusation from the political opposition and other critics that they shied away from offending the top political power. Because of that mistrust, the political parties have agreed to begin a separate parliamentary investigation. Their action came a day
after prosecutors summoned the former intelligence service director, Won Sei-hoon, a close ally of former President Lee Myung-bak, for questioning. Two other senior intelligence officials were questioned in the past few days. (Choe Sang-hun, “Prosecutors Raid South Korean Spy Agency in Presidential Election Inquiry,” New York Times, May 1, 2013, p. A-9)

North Korea is nearing completion of a light-water reactor that is primarily intended to generate electricity but which could add to concern over its nuclear program, a U.S.-based institute said. Satellite photos, the latest taken this month, show the North appears to be putting finishing external touches to the reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, according to 38 North, the website of the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. The reactor could potentially begin operation within a year or so, although considerable technical hurdles remain, 38 North says in its analysis. (Matthew Pennington, “U.S. Institute: N. Korea Reactor Nearing Completion,” Associate Press, May 1, 2013) Lewis and Hansen: “According to new commercial satellite imagery, North Korea is nearing completion of an experimental light water reactor (ELWR) that is primarily intended to generate electricity for civilian purposes. The North now appears to be putting the finishing external touches on the reactor and may be completing work inside the building as well. The key factor determining whether Pyongyang can then move on to the start-up period within the next few months—which precedes regular operation of the reactor—is the availability of reactor fuel. Pyongyang unveiled a uranium enrichment plant nearby in 2010 and experts believe that, if the facility has been operating over the past few years, it may have produced sufficient low-enriched uranium that can be used to power the ELWR for several years. This would mean start-up activities could begin in the coming weeks. However, it remains unclear to what capacity the facility has been operating. Also unclear is whether the North has mastered the technology for producing the fuel assemblies necessary to power the reactor. If the North has fuel on hand it will then need to conduct a number of activities during the start-up period which normally takes 9-12 months for commercial power reactors before moving to a full power test and the facility becomes operational. Before loading the nuclear fuel, extensive verification and validation steps will need to be taken to assure the design, manufacture, assembly of nuclear components and construction meet whatever requirements the North Koreans have set for the safe and successful operation of the reactor. But it is worth noting that since Iran has suffered repeated setbacks in operating its own light water reactor, North Korea may have similar troubles. If the start-up period proceeds smoothly, the ELWR could become fully operational during the first half of 2014. Because North Korea lacks experience in designing, engineering, manufacturing and operating light water reactors, it may also run into difficulties operating the ELWR, which raises serious safety concerns. For example, if defective fuel is inserted into the core, the cladding may fail to maintain physical integrity and release fission products possibly into the pressure vessel and containment building, forcing a shut down. Iran recently unloaded the fuel from its Bushehr reactor, implying a serious safety problem. Operating the reactor cooling system may also pose challenges as the Iranians discovered when a faulty pump led to lengthy delays in 2011. Moreover, North Korea has no experience in the specialized task of fabricating the large steel pressure vessels that contain the reactor core. Considerable care must
be taken to ensure that the welds holding the vessels together can survive the highly radioactive environment of a nuclear core or risk a catastrophic loss of pressurized coolant that would result in a meltdown. Finally, as the Fukushima event in Japan demonstrated, even a well designed, constructed and tested plant must be capable of addressing unanticipated contingencies such as natural disasters. It is unclear whether the North can deal with such events. Satellite imagery suggests that North Korea may have begun to install additional equipment in the reactor hall beginning in September 2012. Several large containers and possible equipment covered by tarps visible that month (see figure 2) were no longer present by November. The contents may have been unloaded and placed inside the reactor building. Since nuclear reactors contain equipment of all sizes, it is not possible to positively identify the specific components but they were of sufficient size—generally about three meters by three meters and of varying heights with one rectangular eight meter by four meter object—to contain items such as smaller pumps, piping and electrical equipment. (Jeffrey Lewis and Nick Hansen, “Start-Up of North Korean Experimental Light Water Reactor Could Begin by Mid-2013 If Fuel Available,” 38North, May 1, 2013)

South Korea said it was edging toward a deal with North Korea to ensure the return of the remaining workers at Kaesong. The last South Korean workers had all been due to return from the North two days ago but seven remained to settle unresolved issues such as unpaid taxes and wages for North Korean workers, believed to amount to millions of dollars. “Differences are being narrowed even if the pace is slower than we expected,” a spokesman for the Unification Ministry told reporters. He said the South Koreans had remained at the Kaesong industrial complex “voluntarily” to resolve the issues at the North’s request, downplaying fears they might be held hostage. Seoul has been reluctant to elaborate on the demands being made by the North, but wages that should have been paid to the 53,000 laborers for March may reach $7.2 million, with additional claims likely to push up the total to around $8 million, according to some estimates. “The government stance is that while the North is responsible for the halt in operations that forced the pullout of the 123 South Korean companies from the inter-Korean economic zone last month, it is willing to meet all obligations as outlined in regulations governing the operation of the complex,” said the official, who declined to be identified. He said that in exchange, the South Korean team headed by Kaesong management committee chairman Hong Yang-ho wants the North to agree to allow finished products and industrial materials to be handed over to the companies. “The core differences are centered on the amount being asked by the North and the return of finished products and industrial materials,” he said. He conceded that this problem is taking longer to resolve than previously anticipated. “Time is needed since demands being made by the North need to be cross-checked with companies,” he said. Rep. Hwang Woo-yea, chairman of the ruling Saenuri Party, said South Korea should continue to send power and water supplies to Kaesong from humanitarian perspectives. But Seoul is considering cutting off the supplies now that the industrial zone has been suspended. “Water and electricity supplies should continue on humanitarian grounds,” Hwang said during a meeting of party leaders. “Though business operations at the Kaesong complex have been effectively terminated, water and electricity there are also used by Kaesong residents.” Hwang also urged North Korea to resolve the problem through dialogue and allow essential South Korean staff
to freely visit the complex. He also called for swift financial support measures for South Korean companies suffering from the suspension.

Rep. Park Ji-won of the main opposition Democratic United Party echoed the view. “Continued supplies of water and electricity are required to protect the property of South Korean firms left at Kaesong and to leave room for the resumption of the industrial park,” Park said in a radio interview earlier today. (Korea Herald, “Seoul Seeks Progress on Kaesong Row,” May 1, 2013)

North Korea said that its Supreme Court had sentenced an American citizen to 15 years of hard labor for committing hostile acts against its government. The citizen, Kenneth Bae, 44, a Korean-American from Washington State who ran a tour business out of China, was arrested in the special economic zone of Rason in northeastern North Korea in November after leading a group of businessmen there from Yanji, China.

KCNA said the Supreme Court had sentenced Bae during a hearing two days ago. The court convicted him of “hostile acts,” a charge less grave than the original charge that prosecutors pressed. The crime of trying to overthrow the government could have resulted in the death penalty. Under North Korean law, Bae should be transferred to a labor camp within 10 days of the ruling. South Korean human rights advocates have said that Bae not only ran tours to North Korea but also was interested in helping orphans there. They said security officials in the North may have been offended by pictures of orphans that Bae had taken and stored in his computer. North Korea has often used the plight of detained Americans as a bargaining chip in its dealings with Washington. Some were freed only after former American presidents traveled to the North to seek their release. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Imposes Term of 15 Years on American,” New York Times, May 2, 2013, p. A-8)

“The charges that have been levied against Kenneth Bae have nothing to do with proselytization; I don’t think he has been detained on religious grounds,” Tony Namkung tells me. “I don’t know what he did, I don’t believe he was just picked up arbitrarily, but I don’t think it was for religious reasons, I don’t think it had anything to do with the distribution of Bibles. I can only offer you my speculation on the subject, but they did tell some foreigners – and I can’t name them by name – but they did say, some two months ago now, I think, that there were two charges that had been levied upon this man.” “One, plotting to overthrow the North Korean regime, and two, plotting to kill the leadership – without specifying who,” Namkung explains. “Likely Kim Jong Un, though his name was never mentioned. The story has never been quoted by the outside press, even though I was quoted as saying that those were the two charges, but nobody ever picked up on that. At the same time, it’s true that the North Koreans never announced it publicly until recently, but even then they only mentioned the plot to overthrow the regime, nothing about Kim Jong Un.” Namkung says he is “sure they will use it to pull the U.S. back into talks.” “The State Department has already stated that nothing is more important than U.S. citizens who are caught up in this kind of situation. I think it is likely that someone of some stature will go over there to retrieve him. I think he will be found guilty, but don’t think he will be sentenced until someone can come pick him up.” “That person,” Namkung emphasizes, “will not be Governor Richardson; when we went to Pyongyang for the Google trip, the North Koreans made clear that this was off the table, they said we could not see him or even talk to him, only
those with consular authority.” “We, and by ‘we,’ I mean the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, have to look at North Korea as an extremely resilient society that’s not going anywhere, that cannot be controlled by China, and that has a very rigid ideological system under-girding it, suggesting that it’s going to be around for a while,” explains Namkung. “Secondly, it can’t be simply be bought off, you can’t get them to denuclearize for a handful of trinkets, you’ve got to look at this larger picture – what do they want?” To answer this, Namkung says we must “look at the larger East Asian situation, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the success of East Asian economies in the West, including Japan and South Korea – it’s all part of a much larger picture if you’re going to find a way out of this, avoiding this constant cycle.” “Having said that,” he tells me, “I’m sure that in a physical sense, the North Koreans will come back to the table much sooner that we think. The question is, will we get to some new modes of thinking about these issues?” Between outright engagement and draconian sanctions lies a middle ground Namkung believes fertile for strategic North Korea policy and cautions against moving forward in a simple, binary manner. “I think it’s safe to say the North Koreans are going to return to a path of engagement, there’s no question in my mind about that,” he says. “The real question is, will the U.S. and other parties be able to figure out some new ways of engaging, and that I’m not so sure about. Especially after the recent ratcheting up of tensions and aggravations, I don’t think anyone is really ready to define a new path to engagement. What I mean by that is, I don’t think anyone has really thought about what a new pattern of engagement might look like.”

The usual tools, maintains Namkung, “are either sticks or carrots and I’m not sure people are capable of coming up with combinations of the two in one.” “For example, in the official talks, I’ve always believed that the issue of human rights should be right up there with the nuclear issue, and that if the U.S. were to offer the normalization of relations and a peace treaty, they also ought to put on the table that North Korea’s political camps be opened to the Red Cross as a start, and ultimately at some point be dismantled in the interest of human rights,” says Namkung, “but people aren’t able to think in such terms; they think you either pressure [North Korea] into a collapse scenario, or you reward them.” Sanctions on their own, Namkung tells me, “plainly don’t work. And they don’t work, not in regard to any other countries – Cuba for example – but they don’t work because people don’t understand the North Korean mentality. One way to look at it is through the people who died during the famine in the 1990s. Segments of the population who were loyal [to the regime], would rather that their own people die before they bend to the will of outside powers who are trying to impose their will on North Korea. So, a few sanctions are not going to result in anything there.” One thing that continues to stump western analysts is the seeming lack of any concrete goal on the part of the North Koreans. Over the years, there have been fleeting glimmers of improving relations before some provocation or another by Pyongyang erases any gains that had been made. Is there a method to, as it appears to most of the world, North Korea’s madness? “I think they’ve always had an end game, that’s not changed over the years,” Namkung tells me. “The only problem is, it’s not the same end game.” “Basically, in the post-Cold War era, much of the Eastern Bloc has morphed into a combination of Socialist and Communist,” he says. “For 20-some years, North Korea has been trying to find a peace treaty and achieve normal relations – not just with us, but with Japan and South Korea, those countries being North Korea’s principal adversaries – in order to preserve their own system and to try to position
themselves in the best possible place between East and West in Cold War terms.” At times, Namkung says, “they’ll tilt toward China, at times, toward the U.S., at times, Russia – all in a bid to preserve their self-reliance. Nothing is more important to them than the survival of the Korean race. If it takes standing at rapt attention while the Star Spangled Banner is played by the New York Philharmonic in Pyongyang, they’ll do it. Not because they like the Star Spangled Banner, but because they want to preserve their identity.” “Secondly,” Namkung says, “the U.S. has never really understood this dynamic; the U.S. always thought that this was just another way to extort us for economic assistance or a way to prop up a small family-based regime that seeks to preserve its power at the expense of its own people or a way to buy time to build up a nuclear arsenal and become more of a threat to the outside world. They’ve never really understood the North Korean way of thinking, a seriously nationalistic way. We conveniently ignore this, much like the Japanese imperial army at the end of WWII, they were prepared to die, practically to the last man, for the sake of their spiritual essence, whatever that is.” The United States, South Korea, and Japan, on the other hand, “care more about their nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles – that’s one issue, that the end games are completely different. All we care about is dismantling their weapons, which is why we never get anywhere.” (Justin Rohrlich, “Meet the Fixer Who Took Google’s Eric Schmidt to Pyongyang,” NKNews, May 2, 2013)

OSD: “North Korea’s use of small-scale attacks and provocative acts leaves much room for miscalculation that could spiral into a larger conflict. … We assess that the DPRK’s emphasis will be to leverage the perception of a nuclear deterrent to counter technologically superior forces. … North Korea continues to develop the TD-2 which could reach parts of the United States if configured as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of carrying a nuclear payload. Developing a SLV contributes heavily to North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile development since the two vehicles have many shared technologies. However, a space launch does not test a re-entry vehicle (RV), without which North Korea cannot deliver a weapon to target from an ICBM. Development also continues on a new solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). North Korea showcased its TBM force in its October 2010 military parade … including two missile systems shown publicly for the first time: an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and a version of the No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) fitted with a cone-cylinder-frare payload. All of these systems, as well as what appeared to be a new road-mobile ICBM were paraded in 2012. The new mobile ICBM has not been flight-tested.” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2012, pp. 7, 9)

South Korea has offered 300 billion won ($272.41 million) million in special loans to companies affected by Pyongyang’s decision last month to close a jointly run industrial zone in North Korea, a government official said. A government taskforce will provide the assistance from May 6 in the form of loans with interest rates of 2 percent. More than 120 South Korean businesses have invested in the border complex at Kaesong. “The government is currently trying to provide tailored support for these businesses and once we finish determining the current status of the companies, we will continue
to make more support available,” said Suh Ho, a director-general at the Unification Ministry which deals with inter-Korean affairs. Suh said cash handouts to the companies were legally impossible and that loans - money for which will be taken out of various government funds - were the only available solution in the short-term. (Christine Kim, “South Korea Pledges $272 Million in Loans for Kaesong Companies,” Reuters, May 2, 2013)

Cho Tae-yong, Seoul’s ambassador to Australia, will replace top nuclear envoy Lim Sung-nam who has filled the position since 2011. Lim will be transferred to Britain to lead the South Korean embassy there, according to the sources. “Such a reshuffle for the top nuclear envoy position will take place soon,” said an official well-versed on the issue, adding Kim Bong-hyun, South Korea’s deputy foreign minister for multilateral and global affairs, was named Cho’s successor. The 57-year-old Cho served diverse positions at the foreign ministry as a career diplomat, including deputy chief of the South Korean delegation to the six-party talks on denuclearizing North Korea from 2004-2006 and the ministry’s chief of protocol. Cho is a son-in-law of former foreign minister Lee Beom-seok who was killed in 1983 in the so-called Rangoon bombing, an assassination attempt by North Korea against then President Chun Doo-hwan. (Korea Herald, “Seoul to Replace Top Nuclear Envoy,” May 2, 2013)

KCNA: “The Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) is now on the verge of complete shutdown after a decade of operation as a valuable gain of the June 15 joint declaration and a symbol of the north-south cooperation and exchanges. Far from feeling responsibilities for the prevailing grave situation, the present puppet authorities of south Korea have behaved impudently like a thief crying stop the thief. They are urging the north to re-open and re-link the traffic and communication line that have been cut off, while claiming that the DPRK is to blame for the situation. In this regard the spokesman for the Policy Department of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK gave an answer to a question put by KCNA [today]. Revealing the confrontation and war moves perpetrated by the chief culprits who pushed the KIZ into the crisis of the complete shutdown while crying out for “normal operation”, the spokesman continued: Consistent and clear is the stand of the DPRK. If the south Korean puppet forces are truly worried about the destiny of the KIZ and are fearful of the catastrophic north-south relations at a war-like state, they should take measures of stopping all the hostile acts and military provocations, the source of the prevailing situation. Herein lies a way for re-opening the traffic, re-linking the communication line and putting the KIZ on a normal operation. They should also know that this is the way for achieving the country’s reunification and guaranteeing peace and prosperity desired by all Koreans.” (KCNA, “Fate of KIZ Complex Depends on S. Korean Authorities: Spokesman,” May 5, 2013)

DPRK FM spokesman: “Pae Jun Ho was arrested and prosecuted for various crimes he committed in the DPRK aimed at the state subversion. He entered the DPRK with a disguised identity in an intentional way under the back-stage manipulation of the forces hostile toward the DPRK. During investigation by a relevant institution and trial, Pae confessed and admitted his crimes. A variety of his belongings also confirmed his crimes for which he was convicted. Whenever Americans were put under custody in
the DPRK for violating the country’s law, former or incumbent high-ranking American officials flew to Pyongyang and apologized for their crimes and promised to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. Therefore, the DPRK showed generosity and set them free from the humanitarian point of view. Pae’s case proves that as long as the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK remains unchanged, humanitarian generosity will be of no use in ending Americans’ illegal acts. As long as the U.S. hostile policy goes on, American’s illegal acts should be countered with strict legal sanctions. This is a conclusion drawn by the DPRK. Some media of the U.S. said that the DPRK tried to use Pae’s case as a political bargaining chip. This is ridiculous and wrong guess. The DPRK has no plan to invite anyone of the U.S. as regards Pae’s issue.” (KCNA, “DPRK Plans No Deal over Pae Jun-ho Case: Spokesman,” May 5, 2013)

The last seven South Koreans who had negotiated the settlement of accounts on behalf of local businesses at Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea returned home. The Ministry of Unification said after all South Korean nationals crossed over the border, issues revolving around the payment of outstanding wages, the amount of taxes that South Korean companies owed Pyongyang and various service charges were resolved. It said a total of USD$13 was paid that reflected demands made by the North, with the provision being added that called for adjustments after a more detailed tally is carried out at a later date. The sum includes $7.3 million owed by South Korean companies for wages that were not paid for March, $4 million for corporate taxes, and $1.7 million in various utility charges. South Korea sent two vehicles carrying cash to Kaesong as part of the agreement, which returned over the demarcation line separating the two countries after the negotiating team. The ministry in charge of cross-border affairs, in addition said it asked the North to reopen communications lines that were cut earlier in the year to carry out further talks on settlement that were not ironed out, such as the $1.2 million Pyongyang asked for to account for wages its workers did not receive for the first eight days of April when they reported to work. “We had moreover asked the North to return finished goods and manufacturing materials that were still at Kaesong, but did not get a positive reply,” said an official, who declined to be identified. He said Seoul plans to continue raising this issue. Since it began operations, total output at the complex reached $2.05 billion, with the value of last year’s production hitting a record $469.5 million. The complex has also been a key source of hard currency for the impoverished North. South Korea used to pay the North about $90 million in worker wages annually. (Yonhap, “Last S. Koreans Return from Kaesong Complex,” May 3, 2013)

North Korea used disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan’s notorious network to supply atomic materials to Libya and Syria, the Pentagon has said, as it warned against Pyongyang’s proliferation efforts. “One of our gravest concerns about North Korea’s activities in the international arena is its demonstrated willingness to proliferate nuclear technology,” Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel said in a report running into 20 pages. “North Korea provided Libya with uranium hexafluoride, a compound used in the uranium enrichment process that produces fuel for nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons, via the proliferation network of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan,” the Defense Secretary said. North Korea also provided Syria with nuclear reactor technology until 2007, said the report titled “Military and Security Developments
Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2012.” Hagel said North Korea uses a world-wide network to facilitate arms sales activities and maintains a core group of recipient countries including Myanmar, Iran and Syria. He informed the US Congress about North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities and development of long-range ballistic missile programmes, saying it makes Pyongyang one of the most critical US security challenges. “North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development programme and has exported missile technology to other countries, including Iran and Pakistan. North Korea has produced its own version of the SCUD B, as well as the SCUD C, an extended-range version of the SCUD B,” Hagel said. “North Korea has exported conventional and ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials and technical assistance to countries in Africa, Asia, and West Asia. “Conventional weapons sales have included ammunition, small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, and surface-to-air missiles,” he said. “In addition to Burma, Iran and Syria, past clients for North Korea’s ballistic missiles and associated technology have included Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen,” he said. Hagel said Pyongyang remains a security threat because of its willingness to undertake provocative and destabilising behaviour, including attacks on the Republic of Korea, its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of its international agreements and UN resolutions. “The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocations and steadfast in commitments to Allies in the region, including the security provided by extended deterrence commitments through both the nuclear umbrella and conventional forces,” Hagel added. (The Hindu Business Line, “N. Korea Provided Libya with N-Material through A.Q. Khan Ring: Hagel,” May 3, 2013)

Sigal: “In response to North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, the UN Security Council voted to tighten financial sanctions on North Korea to “prevent the provision of financial services” that could “contribute” to the North’s missile and nuclear programs. US financial sanctions dating back to September 2005 are more comprehensive than those authorized by the Security Council, targeting not just weapons-related and other trade that the UN sanctioned, but all transactions by North Korea with any bank in the world. Denied access to international financial institutions, North Korea should have had a lot of trouble conducting trade. International trade usually requires a letter of credit issued by a bank to guarantee payment to a seller of goods by the issuer whether or not the buyer eventually pays, and often also to assure the quality of goods to the purchaser. One myth widely accepted in policy circles is that the US financial sanctions imposed on the North in 2005 were creating severe problems for Pyongyang and that the new sanctions will have a similar effect. Yet, North Korean trade has grown substantially since 2005—not just with its main partner China, but also with countries throughout South and Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe. Even its trade with South Korea set a record high in 2012 despite the South’s reduced engagement with the North. The transactions are often opaque, making calculations imprecise, but EU data puts North Korea’s trade with the world at 5553 million euros in 2011, up 26.7 percent from 2007. Its trade with Europe in 2011 was 159 million euros, one-third higher than in 2007.[1] Imports from India, much of it petroleum, reportedly topped 1 billion USD in 2010, a tenfold increase from mid-decade. Some evidence compiled by Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard even
suggests that for the first time in its history, the North may have enjoyed a current account surplus in 2011—“bad news” for those who want to believe that economic pressure will bring North Korea to heel. So how has North Korean trade continued to grow despite sanctions intended to crimp it? The US Treasury first threatened to invoke Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act against the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao, which it accused of money-laundering for North Korea, in September 2005. So-called “Super 311” would bar BDA from correspondent relations with any US financial institutions. In short, BDA would be unable to transact business with US banks on behalf of its clients. The reputational risk to BDA of the mere threat to invoke Super 311 was immediate: a run on the bank that prompted the authorities in Macao to shut it down. From a broader perspective, the US Treasury’s action proved counterproductive. Interpreting the freezing of its accounts at BDA as a breach of the September 19, 2005 Six Party joint statement and a sign of US hostility, Pyongyang boycotted Six Party Talks until its funds were repatriated. In 2006, it test-launched seven missiles including the longer-range Taepodong 2, ending a seven-year moratorium on such launches first concluded with the Clinton administration. Pyongyang then conducted its first nuclear test. Within days of that test, the Bush administration began bilateral talks with Pyongyang to unfreeze its BDA accounts, but the US Treasury impeded resolution of the dispute for months. This US Treasury action, euphemistically called “financial measures,” was ostensibly part of the Illicit Activities Initiative (IAI) initiated by the Bush administration. IAI was designed to crack down on North Korean counterfeiting of currency and cigarettes and manufacture of amphetamines. Yet the US Treasury’s efforts extended far beyond BDA. It threatened to apply Section 311 to any bank in the world doing any business with North Korea. In July 2009, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the US Treasury, Stuart Levey, made public what he and other US officials had been telling banks in private for over three years—that the US Treasury was not only targeting the North’s illicit trade or its dealings with just one bank: ‘The bottom line is that because of this kind of deceptive conduct that North Korea engages in that obscures the nature of their transactions, it’s virtually impossible to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate North Korean business. In the financial world, transparency is a fundamental value. … And North Korea acts in a way that is intended to be opaque. And so it’s for that reason that this has a powerful effect not only with governments, but with the private sector, and particularly banks around the world that have every incentive to protect themselves from this kind of illicit activity. They don’t want to get involved in illicit transactions, whether it’s a nuclear transaction, a missile transaction, whether it’s a transaction that involves the provision of luxury goods to North Korea, which is a violation of the Security Council resolutions. They don’t want to get involved in those transactions, both because they’re good corporate citizens, but also because they are very protective of their own reputations.’ The next month, Philip Goldberg, Coordinator for Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874 on North Korea at the State Department, told the UN sanctions committee, ‘Financial companies must use caution in dealing with not only companies listed on the U.N. blacklist subject to sanctions, but all North Korean companies and individuals.’ Similarly, in 2010, Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, warned that banks that violate United Nations Security Council resolutions and help North Korea’s illicit trade ‘will be at the risk of falling on the wrong side of these measures and being targeted by
these measures,’ and added, ‘I think we’ve shown in the past that sanctions have been very effective in applying pressure on North Korea. I think we’ve shown in the past that we can take targeted measures with respect to North Korean entities involved in illicit activities and have those measures have a profound systemic effect on North Korea’s ability to engage with the international financial system.’ The ultimate risk for such banks is that they would be denied access to SWIFT, or the Society for World Interbank Financial Telecommunications. SWIFT transmits orders for payment from one bank to another to facilitate secure and rapid international settlements. Any bank that is shut out of SWIFT would, in effect, be put out of business. Banks exercising due diligence are supposed to ascertain the identities of those with whom they conduct business. Rather than unwittingly risk a failure to do due diligence and thereby jeopardize correspondent relations with US financial institutions, many reputable banks abroad simply refused to do business with any entities dealing with North Korea. Washington understandably wants to curb Pyongyang’s money-laundering and other illicit activities, but it seems perverse to impede its legitimate trade when North Koreans are relying more on markets than the state to meet their everyday needs. When North Korea revalued its currency in 2009, so widespread were the protests to the confiscatory measure that it forced the regime to reverse course—evidence that weaning the populace from dependence on the state is transforming its political-economic system. The flow of goods into North Korea’s markets from outside, especially from China, facilitates that transformation. Isolation, by contrast, would only tighten the regime’s grip. Yet the question remains, how has North Korea managed to circumvent financial sanctions to conduct trade? As with many aspects of North Korea, it is difficult to know with much confidence, but in this case, educated guesses are possible. Talking to American bankers with many years of experience in Asia reveals several intriguing possibilities. One way to circumvent financial sanctions, these bankers say, is to disperse funds into small accounts in many banks and keep transactions from each account small enough to avoid triggering the bank’s due diligence. Due diligence requirements in Asia are not always as stringent as those in the United States. Yet even banks operating in good faith, the bankers say, will have trouble vetting documents for trade that is re-invoiced, run through transshipment centers or conducted through one or more intermediaries. Moreover, some banks knowingly run the risk because they can charge more for transactions with suspect entities or those without extensive correspondent relations with US financial institutions. Shady banks in the Balkans, Russia, Cyprus, the Middle East and China are suspected of doing such transactions, the bankers say, for which they charge 10-20 percent commissions. So are some private banks in Singapore, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg and Austria. Regional banks in China are suspected of doing substantial business with North Korea, although most of its trade with China does not use the banking system there at all. John Park, who has long studied the subject, says, ‘North Korea is doing all its transaction in cash via trading companies inside China, so even BDA-style sanctions will not be able to harm them.’ China has signed on to UN Security Council sanctions curbing weapons-related financial transactions, but the US Treasury is reportedly now picking a fight with China over other transactions as well. As a US Treasury official put it recently, ‘Treasury has been using tools at its disposal to increase financial pressure on the North Korean regime by targeting individuals and entities responsible for facilitating payments.
connected to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program, as well as financial institutions such as the Foreign Trade Bank, which has served as a key node for the regime’s foreign exchange. Such action would impede the North’s legitimate trade—a step China is unwilling to take. Yet, even if the authorities in Beijing want to curb bank transactions, they may not find it easy to do so. Regional banks in China operate with considerable autonomy, thanks to political protection from powerful local party officials or provincial authorities. Their autonomy was evident after China adopted the world’s largest fiscal stimulus in response to the global financial meltdown. Regional banks put much of the money to work building office and apartment complexes—far in excess of existing demand. When Beijing ordered the banks to redirect investment to more productive uses, it was ignored. Central bankers had to resort to raising reserve requirements for the regional banks in an effort to pop the resulting real estate bubble. If Beijing cannot control its regional banks’ allocation of domestic investment, will it have more success curbing the banks’ lucrative dealings with murky North Korean entities? That may be especially problematic for banks in the poorer provinces bordering on North Korea whose growth has been spurred in recent years by dealings with the North. Another way around the financial system, the bankers say, is hawala, informal networks of brokers or middlemen who transfer money for clients in countries with large Muslim populations like Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as Syria, Lebanon, the Gulf States and Iran—even India. Hawala operates on the honor system, eliminating the need for a paper trail. According to a financier with experience in Asia, similar networks of money brokers or middlemen operate in China to facilitate the transfer of funds by Chinese trying to evade taxes and seeking safe havens abroad for their wealth—for a hefty fee. “A lot of the money passes through Hong Kong and Singapore, where I worked,” he said. Macao’s casinos have also been known to launder Chinese money. If so, Beijing may have trouble trying to turn off this flow of funds for North Korea as it does for its own people. ‘If we’re serious about going after illicit transactions, how do we do that if a lot of it takes place through Chinese firms?’ a US official acknowledged in 2010. “I don’t know.” Another way around the banking system is to carry payment in the form of gemstones, specie or antiquities. North Korea has been known to sell gold for hard currency through shell companies and hire couriers or even use its diplomats to transport the bulk cash wherever it is needed. In 2006, the year after the US Treasury imposed financial sanctions, North Korean exports to Thailand shot up 82 percent to 163 million USD. The US embassy in Bangkok estimated that sales of gold accounted for some 30 million USD of that increase, up from nil the previous year. UN Security Council Resolution 2094, enacted this March, extends sanctions to bulk cash couriers suspected of involvement in prohibited weapons technology transactions, including DPRK diplomats. Tracking and intercepting them could prove difficult, however. And finally, the North can circumvent the banking system by barter—exchanging goods without the use of money. What works for legitimate trade would also enable North Korea to finance illicit trade—including exports and imports of nuclear and missile technology. In a world where money flows like water, trying to plug all the leaks is doomed to fail. Circumventing the international banking system may make transactions more costly for North Korea, but financial sanctions have not slowed legitimate trade—or stemmed the trade in weapons-related technology that is rightly the focus of those sanctions. North Koreans may condemn the financial sanctions as evidence of US hostile intent, but they’re
crying all the way around the banks.” (Leon V. Sigal, “How North Korea Evades Financial Sanctions,” *38North*, May 3, 2013)

KCNA: “A spokesman for the Supreme Court of the DPRK gave the following answer to a question raised by KCNA Thursday as regards the assertion made by the U.S. government and media about the alleged unreasonable legal action taken against American Pae Jun Ho who committed crimes against the DPRK, claiming that he was not tried in a transparent manner and it was trying to use this issue as a political bargaining chip: Pae set up plot-breeding bases in different places of China for the purpose of toppling the DPRK government from 2006 to October 2012 out of distrust and enmity toward the DPRK. He committed such hostile acts as egging citizens of the DPRK overseas and foreigners on to perpetrate hostile acts to bring down its government while conducting a malignant smear campaign against it. He was caught red handed and prosecuted while entering Rason City of the DPRK, bringing with him anti-DPRK literature on November 3 last year. Pae visited different churches of the U.S. and south Korea to preach the necessity and urgency to bring down the DPRK government. He was dispatched to China as a missionary of the Youth with a Mission in April, 2006. After setting up plot-breeding bases disguised with diverse signboards in different parts of China for the past six years, avoiding the eyes of its security organs, he brought together more than 1 500 citizens of the DPRK, China and foreigners before whom he gave anti-DPRK lectures. He invited even south Korean pastors hell-bent on the moves to escalate confrontation with compatriots to give lectures for malignantly slandering the Juche idea of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the socialist system in the DPRK and instigating them to the acts to bring down its government. He planned the so-called ‘Jericho operation’ to bring down the DPRK through his anti-DPRK religious activities from December 2010 to March 2012. In order to carry out the plan he infiltrated at least 250 students who had been educated at the plot-breeding bases operated by him into Rason City under the guise of tourists. He failed to set up an anti-DPRK base at Rajin Hotel in Rason City. He collected and produced several anti-DPRK videos to make the false propaganda sound plausible and showed them many people in a bid to egg them onto activities to bring down the DPRK government. He bribed Song Je Suk and other citizens of the DPRK on foreign tours in an effort to get them involved in activities to topple the DPRK government. He dared commit such hideous crime as hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK. The DPRK Supreme Court held a trial of Pae at its court behind closed doors on Apr. 30, 2013 at his request in accordance with Section 270 of the DPRK Criminal Procedure Law. As he refused pleading, the court did not allow the presence of a counsel, pursuant to Section 275 of the above-said law. In the course of hearing Pae admitted all his crimes and they were clearly proved in an objective manner by evidence and testimonies made by witnesses. The court sentenced him to 15 years of hard labor in consideration of candid confession of his crimes though they are liable to face death penalty or life imprisonment for an attempt at state subversion according to Section 60 of the DPRK Criminal Code. Pae will be fully guaranteed the right as a prisoner according to the DPRK law while in jail.” (KCNA, “DPRK Supreme Court Spokesman Exposes Crimes of American Pae Jun-ho,” May 10, 2013)
North Korea has taken two Musudan missiles off launch-ready status and moved them from their position on the country’s east coast, U.S. officials told Reuters, after weeks of concern that Pyongyang had been poised for a test-launch. One U.S. official cautioned that the missiles were still mobile and the fact that they had been moved was no guarantee they would not be set up elsewhere and fired at some point. “It is premature to celebrate it as good news,” said another U.S. official, Daniel Russel, the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council. However, a third U.S. official said the United States did not believe the missiles had gone to an alternate launch site and that they were now believed to be in a non-operational location. The Musudan missiles have a range of roughly 3,000 to 3,500 kilometres (1,900 to 2,200 miles).

North Korea’s move coincided with preparations by President Barack Obama to meet South Korean President Park Guen-hye at the White House tomorrow. Pentagon spokesman George Little declined to comment on the status of the North Korean missiles. “I wouldn’t again comment on intelligence. But what we have seen recently is a ‘provocation pause.’ And we think that’s obviously beneficial to efforts to ensure we have peace and stability on the Korean peninsula,” Little told reporters. (Phil Stewart, “North Korea Missiles Moved away from Launch Site: U.S. Officials,” Reuters, May 6, 2013)

On the eve of her first summit with U.S. President Barack Obama, South Korean President Park Geun-hye voiced strong commitment to ending North Korea’s nuclear programs and making the communist regime “pay” if it attacks the South. “The reason I am pushing for the Korean Peninsula trust process is that we can never tolerate North Korea’s nuclear programs. There can never be any reward for North Korean provocations, and we will make them pay if they launch attacks,” she said during a meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The Korean Peninsula trust process is Park’s trademark policy on Pyongyang. It is basically a two-track approach of pressure and flexibility on North Korea, under which Park has pledged strong retaliation against any provocations while at the same time calling for dialogue and exchanges to foster trust and reduce tensions. But the focus of today’s remarks -- first in the meeting with Ban and then in a media interview and a meeting with South Korean residents -- was more on the “stick” side than the “carrot” side, which could have been aimed at dispelling doubts in the U.S. about the policy. Park said the North should give up its nuclear program if it wants a better economy. “North Korea is trying to take the course of developing its economy while possessing nuclear weapons in a parallel way. But in fact, (the two) are not compatible, and this is an impossible goal,” she said during talks with Ban, according to her spokesman Yoon Chang-jung. Park also held out the prospect of a better future for the North. “If North Korea chooses the right path, we will provide assistance and seek cooperation, and will use our maximum strength to help (North Korea) move forward on the path of co-prosperity,” she said. On humanitarian assistance, however, Park renewed her commitment not to link aid for the impoverished North to security issues, a departure from her predecessor Lee Myung-bak, who insisted on linking any assistance to progress in disarming the North. “There are concerns about infants and other vulnerable people in North Korea, and I also believe that we need to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korean residents,” she said. “Under the Korean Peninsula trust process, I intend to provide aid transparently regardless of political situations.” During a meeting with South Korean
residents in Washington, Park also said that the South "is always leaving the door open for dialogue" with the North. Park’s tone was tougher in an interview with CBS television broadcast today. "Yes, we will make them pay," Park said in response to whether South Korea will respond militarily if North Korea launches small-scale attacks like the ones in 2010 that claimed the lives of 50 South Koreans. She also called for an end to rewarding North Korea’s bad behavior. "North Korea engages in provocations, threats. This is followed by negotiations and assistance. And so, we saw an endless continuation of this vicious cycle, and it's time for us to put an end to that cycle," she said. Park said she wants to tell North Korean leader Kim Jong-un that the country "must change." “That is the only way for survival and the only way for development,” she said. Park also said the North has such a weak rationale that it is resorting to personal attacks against her, such as the accusation that the “venomous swish” of her skirt is making South Korean officials engage in “warmongering.” "In my view the various facts that they are not basing their comments on facts, but resorting to various ad hominem attacks, referring to my dress ... is a sign that they have a very weak rationale and their rationale is extremely weak, and so they feel very cornered," she said. "I think it’s a telling sign of that." (Chang Jae-soon, “Park Vows to Make N. Korea ‘Pay’ If It Attacks S. Korea,” Yonhap, May 6, 2013)

The U.S. Department of Justice’s Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois announced the arrest of a Taiwanese father and son for allegedly conspiring to send U.S. machines relevant to the production of advanced weapons systems to Taiwan in violation of U.S. sanctions put in place against the father in 2009. Since he had a history of working for North Korea’s advanced weapons program procurement arms, the Justice Department believes the goods may have been sent onward to North Korea. According to the Department of Justice press release on the arrests, the father, son, an unnamed associate, and their network of companies were “engaged in the export of U.S. origin goods and machinery that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction.” The U.S. machines sought could be “used to fabricate metals and other materials with a high degree of precision.” The father, Hsien Tai Tsai, or “Alex Tsai,” 67, resided in Taiwan and was arrested in Tallinn, Estonia at the request of U.S. authorities. His son, Yeuh-Hsun Tsai, or “Gary Tsai,” 36, who was born in Taiwan but is a legal permanent resident of the United States, was arrested at his home in Glenview, Illinois. He is alleged to have assisted his father in obtaining the U.S. machines through a trading company in Illinois that he set up for the explicit purpose of obtaining these goods. He would allegedly arrange their export to Taiwan where his father may have re-exported them to North Korea. One prominent North Korean entity is referenced in this case in the context of Alex Tsai’s 2009 sanctioning by the United States, the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), although Alex Tsai may have dealt with other entities. KOMID may have been the recipient of the machines and the Tsais may have acted at its direction. KOMID was designated by the United Nations Security Council resolution 1718 Committee in 2009. The State Department indicates that KOMID is “Pyongyang’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons...KOMID has offices in multiple countries and facilitates weapons sales for the North Korean government.” According to case documents, Alex Tsai is a major procurement agent for North Korea’s KOMID with activity spanning back to the 1990s. Alex Tsai and two of his
companies in Taiwan, Trans Merits Ltd. and Global Interface Company, Inc. were sanctioned in January 2009 by the United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for procurements on behalf of KOMID. He and his company, Trans Merits Co., were also indicted in Taiwan in June 2008 for “illegally forging invoices and shipping restricted materials to North Korea.” That year, Alex Tsai and Trans Merits were convicted. Subsequently, Alex Tsai allegedly created new companies, one called Trans Multi Mechanics Co., to act as the claimed end-users of the U.S. machines and thereby evade U.S. trade controls. His son, Gary Tsai, allegedly assisted his father from Illinois by creating his own company that enabled this prolific smuggler to continue doing business, despite the sanctions and his conviction in Taiwan.

Another alleged conspirator named as “Individual A” in the indictments, a Taiwanese associate of Alex Tsai, may still be under investigation. The Tsais are each charged with three identical counts of conspiring to defraud the United States in the enforcement of its anti-WMD proliferation laws, conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by evading the U.S. sanctions against exporting to Alex Tsai and his two companies, and money laundering. Starting in 2008, Alex Tsai in Taiwan, and Gary Tsai, his son in Illinois, began procuring U.S. machine goods. According to the indictments, the alleged criminal acts took place between August 2009 and August 2010, after Alex Tsai was sanctioned by OFAC in January 2009. After his designation, Alex Tsai allegedly created a company in Taiwan called Trans Multi Mechanics Co. and used it interchangeably with Trans Merits in an attempt to thwart U.S. sanctions.

The indictment of Alex Tsai indicates that the alleged scheme “attempted to hide Alex Tsai’s and Trans Merit’s involvement in those transactions by conducting business under different company names.” In September 2009, Gary Tsai created an import/export company called Factory Direct Machine Tools. The indictment alleges that Alex Tsai and Individual A were partners in Factory Direct. The indictment claims that Factory Direct was used by Gary Tsai to negotiate machinery purchases on behalf of front companies Trans Merits and Trans Multi Mechanics and to import goods into the United States for unknown buyers. The three allegedly conspired to visit specific U.S. machine companies and purchase machinery from them. Gary Tsai would request from Alex Tsai payment for goods procured. The goods were allegedly exported to Taiwan to Trans Merits/Trans Multi Mechanics and then may have been sent on to North Korea. Gary Tsai assisted with several transactions that preceded Alex Tsai’s January 2009 OFAC designation. In August and September 2008, Gary Tsai arranged the export of a used Sansei 20” SS-501 rotary surface grinder from a U.S. company located in Michigan. The indictment explains that this machine “is used to produce precision ground surfaces” and could be used “to produce rocket parts.” Gary Tsai arranged its export from Los Angeles, California to Taiwan using Air Tiger Express. Trans Multi Mechanics in Taiwan sent funds in the amount of $12,000 to pay for this machine. In September and October 2008, Gary Tsai arranged the purchase of another used Sansei 20” SS-501 rotary surface grinder from a U.S. company in Santa Paula, CA. Alex Tsai and Individual A flew from Taiwan and joined Gary Tsai in an inspection of the machine. Trans Multi Mechanics’ bank account was the source of payment for this item, which was sold for $10,500. The machine was exported to Trans Merits Co. Ltd. in Taiwan using Air Tiger Express. In September and October 2008, Gary Tsai negotiated the purchase of a Mitsui Seiki HT-4A Horizontal Machining Center, which is “a machine tool capable of producing extremely accurate
President Obama offered an endorsement of South Korea’s new president, Park Geun-hye, and her blueprint for defusing tensions with North Korea, but warned that the first move was up to the erratic, often belligerent young leader in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-un. In a news conference after an Oval Office meeting, Obama said Park’s policy, which mixes deterrence with an openness to engagement, is “very compatible with my approach.” But after weeks of warlike statements from Kim, which subsided only in recent days, Obama emphasized that the “burden is on Pyongyang to take meaningful steps to abide by its commitments and obligations, particularly the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” It was the first meeting for Obama and Park, a steely conservative who is the first female leader of South Korea and the daughter of an assassinated South Korean strongman, Park Chung-hee. “If Pyongyang thought its recent threats would drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States, or somehow garner the North international respect, today is further evidence that North Korea has failed again,” Obama said. “President Park and South Koreans have stood firm, with confidence and resolve.” Yet behind the display of unity, some analysts questioned whether Park’s emphasis on engagement, as well as deterrence, could end up at odds with Obama’s more hands-off approach with the North Koreans. Much of their meeting, a senior administration official said, was devoted to Park, 61, explaining her strategy—called “trust-politik”—which aims to rebuild trust between the North and South by looking for ways to engage, even while responding strongly to acts of provocation. The Obama administration has eschewed direct contact with North Korea and has made negotiations contingent on getting a commitment from the North to abandon its nuclear weapons. Whether Park believes that must be a precondition is not clear. She appears to be open to initial talks while turning to denuclearization later. “If there is no nuclear component to it, or a security component, than I doubt if the North Koreans are going to be responsive,” said Joel Wit, a former State Department negotiator on North Korea. “Without active U.S. participation on the security issues, it’s not going to get very far.” The administration official played down those fears, noting that in her meeting with Obama and in the news conference, Park declared that the “ultimate objective that all of us should be adopting is for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons.” There were other modest tensions just beneath the surface, involving how far to allow South Korea to go in developing its own nuclear fuel cycle. That issue surrounded the renewal of a civilian nuclear accord with South Korea—a major issue in Seoul, because it prohibits the South from enriching or reprocessing its own nuclear fuel. That restriction is considered critical by the United States because it keeps the South from gaining the technology it would need to build its own nuclear weapon, something it tried to do decades ago, before the effort was detected and stopped by the Central Intelligence Agency. (Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “Obama Backs Policy of South Korea’s President on North,” New York Times, May 8, 2013, p. A-10)

Obama-Park press conference: Obama: We are on-track for South Korea to assume operational control for the alliance in 2015, and we’re determined to be fully prepared

machine parts,” from a company in Barberton, Ohio. Alex Tsai allegedly sent $36,650 for the machine from Taiwan. (Andrea Stricker, “Case Study: United States Busts Likely North Korean Transshipment Scheme,” ISIS Reports, May 24, 2013)
for any challenge or threat to our security. And obviously, that includes the threat from North Korea. If Pyongyang thought its recent threats would drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States or somehow garner the north international respect, today is further evidence that North Korea has failed again. President Park and South Koreans have stood firm with confidence and resolve. The United States and the Republic of Korea are as united as ever, and faced with new international sanctions, North Korea is more isolated than ever. In short, the days when North Korea could create a crisis and elicit concessions -- those days are over. Our two nations are prepared to engage with North Korea diplomatically and, over time, build trust. But as always, and as President Park has made clear, the burden is on Pyongyang to take meaningful steps to abide by its commitments and obligations, particularly the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. And we discussed that Pyongyang should take notice of events in countries like Burma, which, as it reforms, is seeing more trade and investment and diplomatic ties with the world, including the United States and South Korea. For our part, we’ll continue to coordinate closely with South Korea and with Japan. And I want to make clear that the United States is fully prepared and capable of defending ourselves and our allies with the full range of capabilities available, including the deterrence provided by our conventional and nuclear forces. As I said in Seoul last year, the commitment of the United States to the security of the Republic of Korea will never waver. …Park: First of all, the president and I share the view that the Korea- U.S. alliance has been faithfully carrying out its role as a bulwark of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and that the alliance should continue to serve as a linchpin for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia. In this regard, I believe it is significant that the joint declaration on the 60th anniversary of our alliance we adopted spells out the direction that our comprehensive strategic alliance should take. Next, the president and I reaffirmed that we will by no means tolerate North Korea’s threats and provocations, which have recently been escalating further, and that such actions would only deepen North Korea’s isolation. The president and I noted that it is important that we continue to strengthen our deterrent against North Korea’s nuclear and conventional weapons threats and shared the view that in this respect, the transition of wartime operational control should also proceed in a way that strengthens our combined defense capabilities and preparations be made -- (inaudible) -- as well. We also shared the view that realizing President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons should start in the Korean Peninsula, and he stated that we could continue to strongly urge North Korea, in close concert with the other members of the six-party talks and the international community, to faithfully abide by its international obligations under the September 19th joint statement and the relevant Security Council resolutions. Korea and the U.S. will work jointly to induce North Korea to make the right choice through multifaceted efforts, including the implementation of the Korean Peninsula trust-building process that I spelled out and take this opportunity to once again send a clear message: North Korea will not be able to survive if it only clings to developing its nuclear weapons at the expense of its people’s happiness. Concurrently pursuing nuclear arsenals and economic development can by no means succeed. This is the shared view of the other members of the six-party talks and the international community. However, should North Korea choose the path to becoming a responsible member of the community of nations, we are willing to
provide assistance together with the international community. First, we noted together that Northeast Asia needs to move beyond (conflict and divisions?) and open a new era of peace and cooperation, and that there would be synergy between President Obama’s policy of rebalancing to Asia and my initiative for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia as we pursue peace and development in the region. We share the view about playing the role of co-architects to flesh out this vision. Furthermore, we decided that the Korea-U.S. alliance should deal not just with challenges relating to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia but confronting the broader international community. ...Q. With regard to actions towards Syria, what kind of message would that communicate to North Korea? That was the question. And recently North Korea seems to be de-escalating its threats and provocations. What seems to be behind that? You asked these two questions. Obama: In fact, North Korea is isolated at the moment. So it’s hard to find anyone that could really actually fathom the situation in North Korea. But it’s actually -- they’re also very unpredictable. And whether the Syrian situation would have an impact is hard to say, for sure. Why is North Korea appearing to de-escalate its threats and provocations? There is no knowing for sure, but what is clear and what I believe for sure is that the international community, with regard to North Korea’s bad behavior and its provocations -- (inaudible) -- one choice: a firm message -- and consistently send a firm message that they will not (stand?) and that North Korea’s actions in breach of international norms will be met with so-and-so sanctions and measures by the international community. At the same time, if it goes along the right way, there will be a so-and-so reward. So if we consistently send that message to North Korea, I feel that North Korea will be left with no choice but to change. But instead of just hoping to see North Korea change, the international community must also consistently send that message with one voice to compel them communicate to them that they have no choice but to change and to shape an environment where they are left with no choice but to make the strategic decision to change. And I think that’s the effective and important way. Q: (Through interpreter.) My question goes to President Park. You just mentioned that North Korea -- in order to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, what is most important is the concerted action of the international community. With regard to this, during your meeting with President Obama today, what was said and the views that you shared? And with regard to with Russia and China, the role that they’re playing in terms of getting North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, how do you feel about that? My next question is for President Obama. Regarding the young leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, I would appreciate your views about leader of North Korea. And if you were to send a message to him today, what kind of message would you send to him? Park: With regard to the North Korea issue, we and the United States, as well as the international community -- the ultimate objective that all of us should be adopting is for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and to induce them to become a responsible member of the International community. It serves the interest of peace on the Korean Peninsula and the world, and it also serves the interest of North Korea’s own (development in the?) world. That is my view. And so in order to encourage North Korea to walk that path and change -- (inaudible) -- we have to work in concert. And in this regard, China’s role, China’s influence can be extensive. So China taking part in these endeavors is important, and we shared views on that. With regard to China and Russia’s stance, I believe that China and Russia must make -- (inaudible) -- share the
need for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and are cooperating closely to engage North Korea to take the right path. In the case of China, with regard to North Korea’s missile fire and nuclear testing, China has taken active part in adopting U.N. Security Council resolutions and is faithfully implementing those resolutions. And with regards to Russia, Russia is also firmly committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And with regard to the adoption of U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea, it has been very active in supporting them, and they’ve also sent a very -- and they’ve also worked very hard to include a stern message to North Korea in the joint statement of the G-8 foreign ministers’ meeting. Such constructive efforts on the part of China and Russia are vital to sending a unified message to North Korea that their nuclear weapons will not stand and encouraging and urging North Korea to make the right decision. Obama: Obviously I don’t know Kim Jong Un personally. I haven’t had a conversation with him, can’t really give you an opinion about his personal characteristics. What we do know is the actions that he’s taken that have been provocative and seemed to pursue a dead end. And I want to emphasize President Park and myself very much share the view that we are going to maintain a strong deterrent capability, that we’re not going to reward provocative behavior, but we remain open to the prospect of North Korea taking a peaceful path of denuclearization, abiding by international commitments, rejoining the international community and seeing a gradual progression in which both security and prosperity for the people of North Korea can be achieved. You know, if what North Korea has been doing has not resulted in a strong, prosperous nation, then now’s a good time for Kim Jong Un to evaluate that history and take a different path. And I think that should he choose to take a different path, not only President Park and myself would welcome it, but the international community as a whole would welcome it. And I think that China and Russia and Japan and other key players that have been participants in six-party talks have made that clear. But there’s going to have to be changes in behavior. You know, we have an expression in English. You know, don’t -- don’t -- don’t worry about what I say, watch what I do. And we’re -- so far, at least, we haven’t seen actions on the part of the North Koreans that would indicate they’re prepared to -- to move in a different direction. Q: (Through interpreter.) President Obama, President Park has been talking about the Korean Peninsula trust- building process as a way to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula. I wonder what you feel about this trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula. Obama: Well, as I indicated before, President Park’s approach is very compatible with my approach and the approach that we have been taking together for several years now. And as I (may ?) -- understand it, the -- the key is that we will be prepared for deterrence, that we will respond to aggression, that we will not reward provocative actions, but that we will maintain an openness to a -- an engagement process when we see North Korea taking steps that would indicate that it is following a different path. And that’s exactly the right approach. All of us would benefit from a North Korea that transformed itself. Certainly the people of North Korea would benefit. South Korea would be even stronger in a less tense environment on the peninsula. All of the surrounding neighbors would welcome such a transition, such a transformation. But I don’t think either President Park or I are naive about the difficulties of that taking place. And we’ve got to see action before, you know, we -- we can have confidence that that in fact is the path that North Korea intends to take. But the one thing I want to emphasize, just based on the excellent meetings and
consultation that we had today as well as watching President Park over the last several months dealing with the provocative escalations that have been taking place in North Korea, what I’m very confident about is President Park is tough. I think she has a very clear, realistic view of the situation, but she also has the wisdom to believe that conflict is not inevitable and is not preferable. And that’s true on the Korean Peninsula; that’s true around the world. (The Nelson Report, May 17, 2013)

The state-controlled Bank of China said that it had halted all dealings with a key North Korean bank in what appeared to be the strongest public Chinese response yet to North Korea’s willingness to brush aside warnings from Beijing and push ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In a single-sentence statement this afternoon, the Bank of China said that it “has already issued a bank account closing notice to North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank, and has ceased accepting funds transfer business related to this bank account.” Chinese analysts said that the Bank of China’s move carried clear diplomatic significance at a time when the Obama administration has been urging China to limit its longtime support for the North Korean government. The Bank of China’s action also dovetails with a longstanding American effort to target the North Korean government’s access to foreign currency. Most countries’ banks already refuse to have any financial dealings with North Korea, making the Bank of China’s role particularly important. “I personally don’t believe that this would have been a business decision by the bank alone and it’s probably a signal from the government to reflect its views on North Korea,” said Cai Jian, a professor and the deputy director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. “This appears to be a step by the government to show that it’s willing to cooperate with the international community in strengthening sanctions or perhaps taking steps against illicit North Korean financial transactions,” he said. Ruan Zongze, a former Chinese diplomat in Washington who is now a vice president of the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing, said that the Chinese government was responding to a recent United Nations resolution imposing further sanctions on North Korea after its nuclear and ballistic missile tests and was not responding to American pressure. He noted that the Chinese government had recently encouraged state-controlled enterprises to follow the resolution in their dealings with North Korea. “This is, I think, one of the concrete actions taken by China, that we will surely follow what the U.N. requires,” he said in a telephone interview. Cai said that the move by the Bank of China appeared to be “predominantly symbolic,” while later adding, “But it could have practical consequences, because North Korea is already under such heavy international sanctions, and China is such an important economic channel for it. “If China narrows the door to North Korea, then its economic operations or financial flows could be affected,” he said. “But primarily this appears to be a way of China showing its views about their behavior, so that North Korea is more likely to rethink its actions.” Cai said Chinese policy toward North Korea appeared to be undergoing measured recalibration, rather than a fundamental shift. “There is some adjustment, but no major, fundamental change,” he said. “It’s small adjustments.” (Patrick Zuo, Chris Buckley, and Hilda Wang, “China Cuts Ties with Key North Korean Bank,” Reuters, May 7, 2013)

When President Obama and South Korea’s new president, Park Geun-hye, meet for the first time at the White House today, intelligence officials and outside experts say, they
will be working, by necessity, from a deeply incomplete understanding of their common adversary. Its understanding of North Korea’s leadership and weapons systems has actually gotten worse. The most recent intelligence failures included what administration officials now acknowledge was the C.I.A.’s initial judgment — now reversed — that the North’s young new leader, Kim Jong-un, was probably more interested in economic reform than in following his father’s and grandfather’s “military first” policy of bolstering the North’s missile and nuclear arsenals, and threatening to use them unless the world came to its door. At the same time, North Korea’s ability to hide critical facts about its weapons capability has improved. Nearly three months after the North’s third nuclear test dangerously escalated tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the United States remains unable to answer the most crucial question about the blast: whether the country figured out a way to enrich uranium and dramatically speed its nuclear buildup. The North has managed to contain the telltale gases that would have provided the answer, thwarting U.S. efforts to sniff out the evidence from Air Force sensors flown along the North Korean coast. Since then, new mobile missile systems have appeared and then been whisked out of the view of spy satellites, leaving their whereabouts, to say nothing of their ability to reach Guam or the West Coast of the United States, uncertain. American officials said yesterday that two missiles they once believed the North could launch imminently had been moved from launching sites, perhaps a sign that for now, at least, the North wants to de-escalate. In a sign of continuing confusion, the Defense Intelligence Agency recently declared with “moderate confidence” that the North can now shrink a nuclear warhead to fit onto one of those missiles, only to find its assessment disputed, in public, by both President Obama and the director of national intelligence. “We lack uniform agreement on assessing many things in North Korea,” the director, James R. Clapper Jr., recently told Congress in a blunt assessment of the disagreements within the intelligence world. “Its actual nuclear capabilities are no exception.” The depth of the inability to figure out what is happening was reflected on May 2 in an unclassified Pentagon report to Congress on North Korea’s military capabilities, which read much like it had been written in the late 1980s. It also cast, by implication, significant doubt that returning to negotiations would do much good: “In North Korea’s view,” it concluded, “the destruction of regimes such as Ceausescu, Hussein and Qaddafi was not an inevitable consequence of repressive government, but rather of a failure to secure the necessary capabilities to defend their respective autocratic regime’s survival.” But the more immediate concern is that Kim Jong-un could follow North Korea’s recent playbook and create another provocation — akin to the sinking of a South Korean navy ship in 2010 or the recent cyberattack on South Korean banks and news media companies. It took weeks of investigation before South Korea could blame the North for those past provocations. More broadly, the lapses also raise a question of why, 63 years after the outbreak of the Korean War — itself a move the United States did not see coming — gathering information about the North has, in the words of one frequent intelligence consumer, “made Syria and Iran look like an open book.” At the same time, Kim has stepped up efforts to collect information about South Korea, as evidenced by the recent arrest in Seoul of a North Korean homemaker who posed as a defector to the South. “It’s an open question, who has penetrated whom more effectively,” said Gary Samore, Obama’s former director for weapons of mass destruction. North Korea has always been the hardest target, but the difficulties of figuring out what is happening
now range from longstanding to brand new. The North has long been among the most brutal police states in the world, “very good at scouting human spies,” says one American intelligence official, “and finishing them off fast.” Thus, South Korean intelligence services have a hard time inserting agents. It is all but impossible for an outsider to travel unnoticed to the North, a land of many checkpoints, few cars and a lot of neighborhood informers. Moreover, the technique that has been so useful in the case of Iran – recruiting scientists and others at international conferences – has been virtually impossible in the case of the North, whose officials rarely travel. When they do venture abroad, there are political officers and other minders who monitor what they do and say. Even the biggest potential bonanza – the arrival of cellphone networks – has been of limited use to intelligence gatherers. And the technique used so effectively on Iran through 2010 – cyberespionage, and ultimately an attack on the centrifuges that run its nuclear enrichment center at Natanz – does not appear to have been as useful in North Korea. Computer use there is so limited – as is Internet access – that America’s technological advantage has yielded fewer results, according to officials familiar with the efforts. The North, meanwhile, has become more skilled at launching cyberattacks – some through China – at South Korean banks and television networks, including a devastating series of intrusions in March. But the heart of the intelligence weakness centers on Kim, who is thought to be in his late 20s. The Chinese, who regularly invited his father, Kim Jong-il, to Beijing for consultations, praise and occasional dressing-downs, contend they have had few meetings with him. The only American to have dealt with him, quite famously, is Dennis Rodman, the former basketball star, whom the F.B.I. was reported to have debriefed after he returned from a recent trip to North Korea. “There was a time that he was trying to open up the nation with Western-style reforms,” Japan’s defense minister, Onodera Itsunori, said of Kim in an interview last week during a visit to Washington. “We were impressed that he admires Disneyland and loves American basketball. But then he realized he could not control the country, and he moved back to the military-first policy.” Onodera said he was worried that “his father and his grandfather knew when to shift to ‘peace mode’ and shake hands; it seems that Kim Jong-un doesn’t know when to put his fist down.” In fact, in South Korea there is a theory that behind his baby-faced look and easy smile is a Machiavellian who already has top generals and party secretaries cowering at home, and is gambling that he can force Washington to accept the North as a nuclear power. South Korean officials were surprised to conclude in recent months that despite Kim’s youth and inexperience, his government and party are exerting control over the military, which many regarded as too influential and too corrupt for that to occur. By some counts, two-thirds of the North’s senior generals have been demoted, replaced or shunted to less-powerful jobs; a few have been banished by the young leader. All have had to sign loyalty letters. Yet the view that Mr. Kim has become as powerful as his father is not universal. “Who is in charge in North Korea? It’s hard to say,” said a senior South Korean policy maker. “How strong is Kim Jong-un? We don’t know exactly. Who is giving orders in Pyongyang? Apparently, it’s Kim Jong-un, but we are not sure about the inner-circle decision-making process.” It is a measure of the varying interpretations inside the United States government that, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, the head of the Pacific Command, called Kim “impetuous” and “more unpredictable” than his father. But speaking to the same committee, Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, the
Defense Intelligence Agency’s director, called Mr. Kim a leader “firmly in control” who “possesses a charisma that his father did not,” and who understands realpolitik, including that he could not survive full-scale war. Kim’s government has also played a complex game with American intelligence agencies. He knew the West would be intensely interested in whether he tested another plutonium weapon or his first uranium weapon, the product of a new uranium-enrichment capacity that the North has only just unveiled. But the test site was sealed to make it harder to gather atmospheric evidence. “It’s inevitable that sooner or later they will want us to know they can make a uranium weapon,” said Samore, the former Obama adviser. “But no one knows quite why he is waiting.” One possible explanation for the secrecy is that the technology is not working as advertised. (David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, “Intelligence on North Korea, and Its New Leader, Remains Elusive,” New York Times, May 7, 2013, p. A-6)

The United Nations Human Rights Council appointed three experts to investigate widespread human rights violations in North Korea for its landmark commission, Seoul’s foreign affairs ministry said. U.N. special rapporteur Marzuki Darusman; Michael Kirby, a former Justice of the High Court of Australia; and Sonja Biserko, a Serbian human rights activist, will lead the special commission to launch a formal investigation into human rights abuses in the isolated state for one year. (Yonhap, “U.N. Appoints Three Investigators for N. Korea Human Rights Abuses,” May 7, 2013)

The U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz plans to make a port call in South Korea to participate in the Seoul-Washington joint naval drills, a government source here said. The 97,000-ton Nimitz, one of the world’s largest warships, “is scheduled to arrive at South Korea’s southern port city of Busan on Saturday [May 11] for a three-day stay and to participate in the joint military drills” set for next week in waters around the Korean Peninsula, said the source. The Nimitz Strike Group, consisting of the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and guided-missile destroyers and cruisers, arrived in the U.S. 7th Fleet on May 3, according to the U.S. Navy’s Web site. Following a five-day anti-submarine drill in the Yellow Sea as part of regular exercises that last until Friday, South Korea and the U.S. are planning to hold their maritime readiness drills along the South’s southern and eastern coasts over the weekend which would involve the Nimitz, according to the Seoul source. The ongoing anti-submarine warfare exercise is the second in a planned series of this year’s combined military maneuvers following the last one in February. It mobilizes a nuclear-powered Los Angeles-class submarine, Aegis destroyers, P-3C maritime surveillance aircrafts deployed from U.S. bases as well as South Korean destroyers, submarines and maritime aircrafts, military officials said. (Yonhap, “U.S. Flattop to Arrive in S. Korea for Military Drills,” May 7, 2013) The South Korean military is investigating a possible security leak after North Korea on May 5 alluded to the imminent arrival of the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz in Busan this week. An initial check shows that there had been no announcement by either Seoul or Washington about the plan, and no press reports in either country. A military source said yesterday that North Korea normally relies on official South Korean or U.S. announcements or media reports to comment on joint Seoul-Washington military exercises or movements of weapons and equipment. “But the comment on the Nimitz by the [North Korean] National Defense Commission on Sunday is different, so we’re
looking into the details,” the source said. No U.S. aircraft carrier had been involved in a joint military drill near the Korean Peninsula or docked in Busan in the month of May for several years. (Chosun Ilbo, “How Did N. Korea Know about U.S. Aircraft Carrier Plan?” May 7, 2013)

KPA southern sector command report: “No sooner had the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises against the DPRK been ended than the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces restarted shelling drills targeted against the areas of the north side from the waters off Paekryong and Yonphyong islands in the West Sea of Korea from May 5. The prevailing situation goes to prove that they are persisting in their premeditated military provocations in a bid to push the present state of war to an actual war. What matters is that such military provocations are timed to coincide with the U.S.-south Korea joint anti-submarine exercises started in the West Sea of Korea from May 6 and the dangerous U.S.-south Korea joint naval war drill to be staged in the East Sea of Korea from about May 10 even with the super-large nuclear-powered carrier Nimitz involved. The Command issued the following order to those units under it in view of the prevailing situation: KPA units in the southwestern sector of the front will take immediate counteractions in case even a single shell drops over the territorial waters of our side due to the enemies’ provocative shelling in the southwestern waters. In case the enemies recklessly counter our counterstrikes, all striking forces will turn the five islands in the West Sea of Korea into a sea in flames with prompt actions of units of the rocket forces deployed in the southwestern sector of the front. All the units and sub-units under the KPA Command in the southwestern sector of the front will simultaneously start military actions, in line with the operation plan finally ratified by the KPA Supreme Command, by the future order. If the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet military gangsters finally launch an adventurous war of aggression against the DPRK, it will never miss an opportunity.” (KCNA, “KPA Command in Southwestern Sector of Front Issues Order for Units to Make Counterstrike at Enemies,” May 7, 2013)

Park Guen-hye: “Q: Do you think China could do more to promote North Korean denuclearization? A: After President Xi Jinping took office in China we were able to see some changes, which President Obama also referred to as positive. I believe that China can exert more influence on [North] Korea, I think they can do more....In order for North Korea to change, and in order for the Korean Peninsula to enjoy greater peace, North Korea needs to choose the right path, and China should exert greater influence in inducing North Korea to do so. Q. You have a good relationship with the new president of China and you are going to visit China soon. China has recently distanced itself from North Korea. Is China prepared to cooperate more with your government and the United States in respect to curbing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions? A. When I meet with President Xi Jinping I look forward to engaging in very candid discussions with him on issues that encompass North Korea, its nuclear weapons, as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia. I also hope to be able to engage in candid discussions with him about whether, if North Korea decides not to become a responsible member of the international community, and chooses not to take the right path, whether this current path that it is taking is sustainable. Is there a future there? Q. What more could China do? A. Of course, we can’t expect China to
do everything, and the Chinese also say they can’t do everything. But I do believe there’s room for them to undertake more with respect to some material aspects. At the same time China has been able to achieve growth and development through reform and opening, and I think this offers a very good model for [North] Korea to follow, and so they can perhaps strengthen their persuasion of Korea in this regard. Q. What do you mean by material aspects? A. North Korea is very heavily dependent on China. Q. How do you assess Korean-Japanese relations? A. I remember eight years ago, when I had an interview with the Washington Post, that was also a time when the North Korean nuclear crisis was ongoing, and when the Japanese were also making comments about [disputed islands], thereby raising the temperature between Korea and Japan. Eight years later I’m very disappointed and frustrated to see that we haven’t made any progress. Japan and [South] Korea share many things in common - our shared values of democracy, freedom and a market economy - and there is a need for us to cooperate on North Korea and on economic issues as well as security issues.... But the Japanese have been opening past wounds and have been letting them fester, and this applies not only to Korea but also to other neighboring countries....This arrests our ability to really build momentum, so I hope that Japan reflects upon itself. Q. How dangerous are the tensions among Japan, China and other countries in the region, and what more could the United States do? A. This could be referred to as the Asian paradox. We see deepening economic interdependence in Northeast Asia uneasily coexisting with tensions deriving from various historical issues that spill over into the political and security realms.... Unlike Europe, this region does not have a framework for multilateral discussions, and this just simply doesn’t make sense. This is why I propose to advance the Peace and Cooperation Initiative for Northeast Asia, whereby the countries of Northeast Asia, including the United States - and this would be firmly anchored to our alliance with the United States - could engage in discussions of nonpolitical issues, such as climate change, terrorism and nuclear safety....We could build trust and then move on to larger issues of cooperation. This is what I proposed, and while it may not seem like much, I think the state of emotions here in the region can be quite risky and dangerous, so if we could build trust, this is a project which I wish to pursue jointly with the United States and in fact it is what I suggested to President Obama in my meeting with him today. Q. Is the U.S. "rebalance" to Asia aimed at China? A. The reason we see the security posture in the region being strengthened is because of what North Korea has been doing, as North Korea escalates the level of threats and provocations.... The basis of peace in this area is to maintain a firm deterrence posture, especially with regard to North Korea. If North Korea were to choose to become a responsible member of the international community and desist from provocations ... I’m sure we would not need to see the strengthening of military postures in the region. Q. Would you meet with North Korea’s leader? A. I’ve proposed a trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula. We will never tolerate North Korea’s nuclear weapons and North Korea’s provocations. Its threats will not pay. At the same time, this trust-building process is about keeping open the window to dialogue with North Korea at all times. If it chooses the right path, there can also be consequences. ... But what use would it be at this moment? As the Korean saying goes, it takes two hands to clap. Q. Who is responsible for the tensions in the region, apart from North Korea? I wasn’t referring to a specific country; it’s more about history. It can be said that if territory constitutes the body, history constitutes the
soul. ... Even a very small fire can be greatly inflamed, so it is imperative that we have a hard-headed and correct understanding of history. Q. Should South Korean and U.S. leaders talk about human rights in North Korea? A. The ultimate objective of reunification is to improve the quality of lives of people in South and North Korea, to further expand freedom and human rights, and thereby build a happy Korean Peninsula. That is why...North Korean human rights is a very important issue that we need to take up, that we cannot turn a blind eye to. Q. Will you ask China to stop sending North Korean defectors back into North Korea? A. If North Korean defectors are forced to return, I know very well from various reports the tragedy that awaits them, so this is a humanitarian issue that should not continue. ... is my hope that China will send them directly to the Republic of Korea.” (Washington Post; “South Korean President Park Guen-hye Answers Questions,” May 7, 2013)

Park address to Congress: “It is my hope that as we make this journey, our partnership will be guided by a three-part vision. The first is to lay the groundwork for enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula and over time for reunification. That future, I know, feels distant today. North Korea continues to issue threats and provocations firing long-range missiles, staging nuclear tests that undermine peace on the Peninsula and far beyond it. The Korean government is reacting resolutely, but calmly. We are maintaining the highest level of readiness. We are strengthening our cooperation with the US and other international partners. Korea’s economy and financial markets remain stable. Companies—both domestic and foreign—see this, and are expanding their investments. Korea’s economic fundamentals are strong. Its government is equal to the task. And it is backed by the might of our alliance. So long as this continues you may rest assured: no North Korean provocation can succeed. I will remain steadfast in pushing forward a process of trust-building on the Korean Peninsula. I am confident that trust is the path to peace—the path to a Korea that is whole again. The Republic of Korea will never accept a nuclear-armed North Korea. Pyongyang’s provocations will be met decisively. At the same time, I will not link humanitarian aid provided to the North Korean people, such as infants and young children, to the political situation. And with the trust that gradually builds up, through exchange, through cooperation, we will cement the grounds for durable peace and—eventually—peaceful reunification. But as we say in Korea, it takes two hands to clap. Trust is not something that can be imposed on another. The pattern is all too familiar—and badly misguided. North Korea provokes a crisis. The international community imposes a certain period of sanctions. Later, it tries to patch things up by offering concessions and rewards. Meanwhile, Pyongyang uses that time to advance its nuclear capabilities. And uncertainty prevails. It is time to put an end to this vicious cycle. Pyongyang is pursuing two goals at once, a nuclear arsenal and economic development. We know these are incompatible. You cannot have your cake and eat it, too. The leadership in Pyongyang must make no mistake. Security does not come from nuclear weapons. Security comes when the lives of its people are improved. It comes when people are free to pursue their happiness. North Korea must make the right choice. It must walk the path to becoming a responsible member in the community of nations. In order to induce North Korea to make that choice, the international community must speak with one voice. Its message must be clear and consistent. Only then will we see real progress in inter-Korean relations. Only then will lasting peace be brought to the
60 years ago, a stretch of earth bisecting the Korean Peninsula was cleared of arms. Today, that demilitarized zone drawn to prevent armed collision is the most militarized place on the planet. And the standoff around the DMZ has the potential to endanger global peace. We must defuse that danger. Not just South and North Korea. The world must also get involved. The demilitarized zone must live up to its name, a zone that strengthens the peace not undermines it. It is with this vision in mind that I hope to work toward an international park inside the DMZ. It will be a park that sends a message of peace to all of humanity. This could be pursued in parallel with my Trust-building Process. There, I believe we can start to grow peace—to grow trust. It would be a zone of peace bringing together not just Koreans separated by a military line, but also the citizens of the world. I call on America and the global community to join us in seeking the promise of a new day. ..The second leg of our journey extends beyond the Korean Peninsula to all of Northeast Asia where we must build a mechanism of peace and cooperation. Sadly, today the nations of this region fail to fulfill all that we can achieve collectively. That potential is tremendous. The region’s economies are gaining ever greater clout and becoming more and more interlinked. Yet, differences stemming from history are widening. It has been said that those who are blind to the past cannot see the future. This is obviously a problem for the here and now. But the larger issue is about tomorrow. For where there is failure to acknowledge honestly what happened yesterday, there can be no tomorrow. Asia suffers from what I call “Asia’s paradox,” the disconnect between growing economic interdependence on the one hand, and backward political, security cooperation on the other. How we manage this paradox—this will determine the shape of a new order in Asia. Together, we must meet these challenges. And so I propose an initiative for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia. **We cannot afford to put off a multilateral dialogue process in Northeast Asia.** Together, the United States and other Northeast Asian partners could start with softer issues. These include environmental issues and disaster relief. They include nuclear safety and counter-terrorism. Trust will be built through this process. And that trust will propel us to expand the horizons of our cooperation. The initiative will serve the cause of peace and development in the region. But it will be firmly rooted in the Korea-US alliance. In this sense, it could reinforce President Obama’s strategy of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific. Of course, North Korea could also be invited to join. If we start where our interests overlap, then later on it will be easier to find common ground on the larger challenges—easier to find solutions to our mutual benefit. I firmly believe that Korea and the United States will work hand in hand as we shape an emerging process for cooperation in the region. The third and final leg of our journey extends even farther beyond the Peninsula—beyond Northeast Asia to the rest of the world.” (Text of President Park Guen-hye’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress, May 8, 2013)
American-led missile shield, the South Korean defense ministry said the military has already been cooperating with U.S. forces on missile defense, but the scope is only limited to intelligence sharing. "South Korea has its own missile defense system for uses against missiles in the terminal stage, which is best suited for countering growing North Korean missile threats," ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said. "Under the current circumstances, we have cooperated with the U.S. missile defense system for intelligence sharing and are seeking ways to develop the cooperation." Although Seoul is not opposed to the U.S. program, Kim said the two sides have been working together to monitor and trace North Korea's missiles without establishing additional installations. "(South Korea and the U.S.) have cooperated with each other to trace North Korean missiles with available resources," Kim said, denying installation of advanced missiles and radars tied to the American system. South Korea has gradually been building an independent, low-tier missile shield called the Korea Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD) since 2006 by acquiring Patriot missiles and long-range early warning radar. The KAMD involves an early warning radar as well as ship-to-air and land-based missile defense systems, arming Seoul with the ability to track and shoot down the North's low-flying, short- and medium-range missiles, with help of U.S. early warning satellites. South Korea currently operates Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-2) batteries, which can hit an incoming missile at an altitude of up to 30 kilometers. In late April, the South Korean military approved the plan to upgrade the PAC-2 system to the PAC-3 version and buy additional rounds. PAC-3 interceptors provide back-up protection as the missile returns to earth. Several foreign navies are participating in sea-based ballistic missile defense jointly with U.S. forces, including Japan and Australia. In response to Pyongyang's threat to strike the U.S. with its missile and nuclear weapons against South Korea-U.S. drills in April, the Pentagon stationed two Aegis guided-missile destroyers in the western Pacific and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in Guam. (Kim Eun-jung, "Seoul Declines Joining U.S. Missile Defense," Yonhap, May 9, 2013)

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DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman: “Shortly ago, the U.S. president let loose a spate of invectives falsifying truth, talking about ‘provocation’ and ‘threat’ from the DPRK in a bid to give a shot in the arm to the chief executive of south Korea during her visit to her master. The recently escalated confrontation between the DPRK and the U.S. was sparked off by its high-handed hostile act of pulling up the former over its satellite launch for peaceful purposes. The DPRK just took minimum countermeasures for self-defense to protect its sovereignty and security in order to cope with the U.S. escalating hostile actions. The U.S. let B-52, B-2A, F-22 and all other air nuclear strike means make open sorties into the air over the peninsula for the first time in history, posing the biggest-ever nuclear threat to the DPRK. This compelled Pyongyang to take tough countermeasures for self-defense and pushed the situation in Korea to the brink of war. There is world public opinion that the situation on the peninsula has shown a sign of detente since the U.S.-south Korea joint military exercises were over. This goes to prove that the U.S. hostile policy and military threat to the DPRK are the root cause of the tension. After escalating the tension on the peninsula, the U.S. is talking a lot about the updating of security alliance, re-confirmation of defense commitments, establishment of joint missile defense system and investment in it. Lurking behind this is a sinister intention to push ahead with its pivot-to-Asia-Pacific strategy. The U.S.
claim that all its military actions are ‘defensive’ whereas all actions of the DPRK are ‘provocative’ is more sheer sophism than Washington’s propaganda made in the 1950s and the 1960s that the “Reds” had horns on their heads. No matter how hard the U.S. president tries to cover up his sophism with rhetoric, he can neither change it into truth nor pull the wool over the eyes of the awakened people of the world. The root cause of tension will not be removed but the tension and danger of conflicts are bound to repeat themselves unless the U.S. stops its hostile acts against the DPRK and drops its hostility towards it. The U.S. president would be well advised not to talk about “change” in the DPRK but reflect on his own wrong view in good time and make a bold decision to correct it at least. ”(KCNA, “DPRK Accuses U.S. President of Evading Blame for Tension on Korean Peninsula,” May 10, 2013)

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) spokesman: “The present chief executive of south Korea during her trip kept herself busy holding ‘summit talks,’ a ‘joint press conference’ and making an ‘address at Congress.’ Her junket to the U.S. was nothing but a despicable sycophantic trip to please her master, confirm the master-servant relations, tighten the nexus against the DPRK and escalate the confrontation with fellow countrymen. Her American master praised her to the sky, bringing to light his intention to use her as a head of a shock brigade in carrying out the U.S. Korea policy and Asia strategy for aggression and she for her part tried hard to court the pleasure of her master, fully revealing her confrontation nature. It was disgusting, indeed, that she and her master spoke volumes about ‘comprehensive strategic alliance,’ ‘blood ties’ and ‘core axis.’ She let loose a spate of venomous remarks about ‘dismantlement of nukes,’ ‘provocation’ and ‘reward’ while toeing the U.S. hostile policy the DPRK and backing its moves for aggression against the DPRK only to spark off ridicule and disillusion among all people. She slandered the DPRK’s line on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force, in particular, terming it ‘impossible goal’ and the like. She did not hesitate to let loose a whole string of arrogant outbursts, talking about ‘change’ whenever a chance presented itself. Great irony is she is vocal that it was the biggest result of her U.S. junket that she advertised ‘confidence process on the Korean Peninsula’ and Chongwadae garnered Washington’s support for it. She is not entitled to talk about ‘confidence’ and the like as she malignantly slandered the social system and hurt the dignity of the DPRK and staged together with the U.S. madcap nuclear war maneuvers against the DPRK. The south Korean chief executive did not hide that by ‘confidence process’ she meant south Korea cannot tolerate the north’s access to nukes, there can be no reward for its provocation and threat and it will be forced to pay a price for its provocation. This means her self-recognition of the fact that what she touted is the policy of confrontation, a new version of ‘nukes, opening and 3 000 dollars’ advocated by traitor Lee Myung-bak. Her recent U.S. junket was, in a nutshell, a disgusting meeting between the master and his servant aimed to strain the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the region and a curtain-raiser to a dangerous war to invade the DPRK and carry out the strategy for dominating Asia. It suggests a lot that the White House boss uttered he fully agreed with the mode of access proposed by her in her policy toward the north and it was very similar to his own. She seems to calculate that she can maintain power, get protection and realize her ambition for the confrontation of the social systems if she relies on the U.S, but she would be well
advised to think twice, not forgetting the lesson taught by her father who met a miserable end for such behavior. **We are following the present authorities in south Korea with patience.** (KCNA, “CPRK Spokesman Assails S. Korean Chief Executive’s Anti-DPRK Remarks,” May 10, 2013)

Government officials thought they had found a way to quell the international criticism that erupted after Prime Minister Abe Shinzo suggested that Japan’s wartime actions should not be defined as “aggression.” Abe, however, did not follow their script. Although he says Japan caused much damage and suffering before and during World War II, he has refused to acknowledge “aggression” on the part of the Japanese military. His stance on the nature of Japan’s military actions differs from those of his predecessors. It even contradicts his own opinion stated when he was prime minister the first time around. The source of his inflexibility over the “aggression” issue may have been the criticism lodged against him from the international community, especially from the country with which Abe has gone all out to appease. "The prime minister ended up becoming stubborn (on the issue) because he felt antipathy to the U.S. reaction," said an official close to the Japanese government. The latest controversy began when Abe told an Upper House Budget Committee session on April 23 that what constitutes aggression has not been settled. He was referring to the 1995 statement under Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi that was released to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. “Japan … through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations,” the statement said. Abe, however, took issue with the word “aggression” in the statement. “The definition of aggression has yet to be established in academia or in the international community," Abe told the Upper House session. “Things that happened between nations will look differently depending on which side you view them from.” South Korea, which Japan colonized from 1910 to 1945, reacted strongly to Abe’s remarks, saying the Japanese leader was again denying the truth about Japan’s past. Following the fierce backlash from Seoul, the prime minister’s office and the Foreign Ministry worked together to prepare Abe’s answers to a question in the May 8 session of the Upper House Budget Committee, according to sources. The officials planned to have Abe clarify that the Japanese government has never said there was no aggression in World War II. However, Abe decided on his own to neither read the officials’ prepared text nor discuss aggression at the Diet session, according to senior government officials. But he did say: “Japan caused great damage and suffering to the people of many nations, particularly to those of Asian nations. I have the same perception as that of past Cabinets.” Japan endorsed the 1974 U.N. General Assembly resolution on the definition of aggression. The resolution states that an invasion of a state by the armed forces of another state--a violation of the U.N. Charter--is top on the list of aggressive acts. But it also states that the U.N. Security Council may ultimately determine acts of aggression. At the May 8 session, Abe said the U.N. General Assembly’s definition is reference material for the U.N. Security Council, particularly its dominant members. “Regrettably, issues are resolved politically at the U.N. Security Council,” he said. “Permanent members have veto rights.” Japan first acknowledged its wartime aggression in 1993, when Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro became leader of the first Japanese government not led by the Liberal Democratic Party since 1955. Two years later, Murayama, leader of the
Japan Socialist Party, released the statement as head of the coalition government comprising the JSP, LDP and New Party Sakigake. The Murayama statement, which expresses “remorse” and “apology” for Japan’s militarism, has served as the fundamental document for the Japanese government’s stance toward war. All succeeding prime ministers adopted this policy line, including Koizumi Junichiro, who angered China and South Korea for visiting war-related Yasukuni Shrine, and Abe, when he held the nation’s top post from 2006 to 2007. At the Lower House Budget Committee on Oct. 5, 2006, Abe, as prime minister, said the Murayama statement admitted Japan’s “colonial rule and aggression” and offered an apology to the people victimized. “I support the Japanese government’s stance (shown by the Murayama statement),” he said at the time. But Abe has been long skeptical about the argument that Japan’s colonial rule and aggression caused considerable damage to many Asian nations. When he returned to power in December after the LDP’s landslide victory in the Lower House election, he expressed his intention to issue a new government statement in 2015, the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. At the April 22 session of the Upper House Budget Committee, he said his administration “has not necessarily embraced the Murayama statement in its entirety.” Abe’s series of comments alarmed South Korean President Park Geun-hye. In a meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington on May 7, Park stressed the need for Japan to have an accurate perception of history for peace in Northeast Asia. Leaders rarely discuss relations with third countries in bilateral summits. Park further pushed the agenda by raising the history issue in her address at the U.S. Congress on May 8. Although Abe is used to criticism from South Korea, he did not expect a report released on May 1 by the U.S. Congressional Research Service that said Abe’s perceptions of history could end up hurting U.S. interests, according to Japanese sources. The report titled “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress” said U.S. officials welcome Abe’s position to allow for Japan’s participation in collective self-defense. “Other statements, however, suggest that Abe embraces a revisionist view of Japanese history that rejects the narrative of imperial Japanese aggression and victimization of other Asian nations,” the report said. Abe, who is bringing Japan to negotiations for the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade arrangement and is pushing for a solution to stalled relocation of a U.S. military base in Okinawa Prefecture, was surprised by the report, the sources said. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide criticized the report on May 9, saying its descriptions of Abe were based on “misunderstanding.” “Japan has striven to achieve peace and prosperity,” Suga told a news conference. (Yamagishi Kazuo, “Abe Stands Firm on Definition of ‘Aggression,’ amid International Outcry” Asahi Shimbun, May 10, 2013)

North Korea has replaced its hard-line defense minister with a little-known army general, according to a state media report Monday, in what outside analysts call an attempt to install a younger figure meant to solidify leader Kim Jong Un’s grip on the powerful military. Jang Jong Nam’s appointment is the latest move since Kim succeeded his late father in late 2011 that observers see as a young leader trying to consolidate control. The announcement comes amid easing animosities after weeks of warlike threats between the rivals, including North Korean vows of nuclear strikes. Jang replaces Kim Kyok Sik, the former commander of battalions believed responsible for attacks on South Korea in 2010 that killed 50 South Koreans. Mention of Jang’s new
role was buried in a state media dispatch listing those who attended an art performance with the young leader. It’s not known exactly when Jang was formally appointed to the ministerial post. State media previously identified Jang as head of the army’s First Corps and said he pledged allegiance to Kim and threatened South Korea in a speech last December. Jang was quoted as saying that his corps would annihilate its enemies and “turn each ravine into their death pitfall when the hour of decisive battle comes.” Kim appears to be naming someone from a new generation to bolster his rule of the 1.2 million-member military, said Chang Yong Seok at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. Jang is believed to be in 50s, while his predecessor, Kim Kyok Sik, is in his early 70s, according to Seoul’s Unification Ministry, which is responsible for dealings with the North. Kim was appointed to the ministerial job last year, but Chang portrayed him as belonging more to the era of Kim Jong Il. Because outsiders know so little about Jang, it remains to be seen whether his appointment will lead to Pyongyang refraining from attacking South Korea, Chang said. Cheong Seong-chang, an analyst at the private Sejong Institute in South Korea, said it’s unlikely that Jang is a moderate. A moderate figure appointed defense minister after weeks of high tension with the outside world could trigger whispers at home that the North is surrendering to Seoul and Washington, he said.

(Associated Press, “North Korea Replaces Hard-Line Defense Minister in Move Seen as Young Leader Asserting Control,” May 13, 2013) The appointment appeared to be a recent one, based on state media reports. When the KCNA reported Kim Jong-un’s visit to Unhasu Orchestra on May 4, it said the defense minister was Kim Kyok-sik. In that report, Jang was sitting next to Jang Song-thaek, powerful uncle and guardian of Kim Jong-un. Kim Kyok-sik, who is reportedly in his 70s, was named defense minister in October. Sources in Seoul said the new minister, Jang Jong-nam, is in his 50s and is a member of a junior circle in the North Korean People’s Army.

In December, North Korea held a military rally in front of the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang where a series of North Korean commanders swore their loyalty for the leader. The state media revealed their names and positions at the time. At that time, Jang was introduced as a two-star general and the commander of the 1st Corps of the North Korean military, a front-line unit in charge of border security near Kangwon Province of the North. In his oath, Jang said he would “wait for the order from the supreme commander [Kim Jong-un] for the ultimate attack” on the enemy. However, Rodong Sinmun released a photo of Jang in military uniform with three stars. When Jang was appointed, the specifics of his career were not verified. South Korea’s Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said the North Korean military appears to be getting younger. “Our military is cautiously monitoring the current situation in the North Korean military, including the replacement of key figures,” Kim said at a daily briefing yesterday. “We will have to figure out whether or not all of the hard-line members have been replaced, but the generation [of the military men] is becoming younger.” (Kim Hee-jin, “North Replaces Defense Minister after 7 Months,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 14, 2013)

Sigal: “In response to North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, the UN Security Council voted to tighten financial sanctions on North Korea to “prevent the provision of financial services” that could “contribute” to the North’s missile and nuclear programs. US financial sanctions dating back to September 2005 are more
comprehensive than those authorized by the Security Council, targeting not just weapons-related and other trade that the UN sanctioned, but all transactions by North Korea with any bank in the world. Denied access to international financial institutions, North Korea should have had a lot of trouble conducting trade. International trade usually requires a letter of credit issued by a bank to guarantee payment to a seller of goods by the issuer whether or not the buyer eventually pays, and often also to assure the quality of goods to the purchaser. One myth widely accepted in policy circles is that the US financial sanctions imposed on the North in 2005 were creating severe problems for Pyongyang and that the new sanctions will have a similar effect. Yet, North Korean trade has grown substantially since 2005—not just with its main partner China, but also with countries throughout South and Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe. Even its trade with South Korea set a record high in 2012 despite the South’s reduced engagement with the North. The transactions are often opaque, making calculations imprecise, but EU data puts North Korea’s trade with the world at 5553 million euros in 2011, up 26.7 percent from 2007. Its trade with Europe in 2011 was 159 million euros, one-third higher than in 2007. Imports from India, much of it petroleum, reportedly topped 1 billion USD in 2010, a tenfold increase from mid-decade. Some evidence compiled by Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard even suggests that for the first time in its history, the North may have enjoyed a current account surplus in 2011—“bad news” for those who want to believe that economic pressure will bring North Korea to heel. So how has North Korean trade continued to grow despite sanctions intended to crimp it? The US Treasury first threatened to invoke Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act against the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao, which it accused of money-laundering for North Korea, in September 2005. So-called “Super 311” would bar BDA from correspondent relations with any US financial institutions. In short, BDA would be unable to transact business with US banks on behalf of its clients. The reputational risk to BDA of the mere threat to invoke Super 311 was immediate: a run on the bank that prompted the authorities in Macao to shut it down. From a broader perspective, the US Treasury’s action proved counterproductive. Interpreting the freezing of its accounts at BDA as a breach of the September 19, 2005 Six Party joint statement and a sign of US hostility, Pyongyang boycotted Six Party Talks until its funds were repatriated. In 2006, it test-launched seven missiles including the longer-range Taepodong 2, ending a seven-year moratorium on such launches first concluded with the Clinton administration. Pyongyang then conducted its first nuclear test. Within days of that test, the Bush administration began bilateral talks with Pyongyang to unfreeze its BDA accounts, but the US Treasury impeded resolution of the dispute for months. This US Treasury action, euphemistically called “financial measures,” was ostensibly part of the Illicit Activities Initiative (IAI) initiated by the Bush administration. IAI was designed to crack down on North Korean counterfeiting of currency and cigarettes and manufacture of amphetamines. Yet the US Treasury’s efforts extended far beyond BDA. It threatened to apply Section 311 to any bank in the world doing any business with North Korea. In July 2009, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the US Treasury, Stuart Levey, made public what he and other US officials had been telling banks in private for over three years—that the US Treasury was not only targeting the North’s illicit trade or its dealings with just one bank:
The bottom line is that because of this kind of deceptive conduct that North Korea engages in that obscures the nature of their transactions, it’s virtually impossible to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate North Korean business. In the financial world, transparency is a fundamental value. ... And North Korea acts in a way that is intended to be opaque. And so it’s for that reason that this has a powerful effect not only with governments, but with the private sector, and particularly banks around the world that have every incentive to protect themselves from this kind of illicit activity. They don’t want to get involved in illicit transactions, whether it’s a nuclear transaction, a missile transaction, whether it’s a transaction that involves the provision of luxury goods to North Korea, which is a violation of the Security Council resolutions. They don’t want to get involved in those transactions, both because they’re good corporate citizens, but also because they are very protective of their own reputations.

The next month, Philip Goldberg, Coordinator for Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874 on North Korea at the State Department, told the UN sanctions committee, “Financial companies must use caution in dealing with not only companies listed on the U.N. blacklist subject to sanctions, but all North Korean companies and individuals.” Similarly, in 2010, Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, warned that banks that violate United Nations Security Council resolutions and help North Korea’s illicit trade “will be at the risk of falling on the wrong side of these measures and being targeted by these measures,” and added, “I think we’ve shown in the past that sanctions have been very effective in applying pressure on North Korea. I think we’ve shown in the past that we can take targeted measures with respect to North Korean entities involved in illicit activities and have those measures have a profound systemic effect on North Korea’s ability to engage with the international financial system.” The ultimate risk for such banks is that they would be denied access to SWIFT, or the Society for World Interbank Financial Telecommunications. SWIFT transmits orders for payment from one bank to another to facilitate secure and rapid international settlements. Any bank that is shut out of SWIFT would, in effect, be put out of business. Banks exercising due diligence are supposed to ascertain the identities of those with whom they conduct business. Rather than unwittingly risk a failure to do due diligence and thereby jeopardize correspondent relations with US financial institutions, many reputable banks abroad simply refused to do business with any entities dealing with North Korea. Washington understandably wants to curb Pyongyang’s money-laundering and other illicit activities, but it seems perverse to impede its legitimate trade when North Koreans are relying more on markets than the state to meet their everyday needs. When North Korea revalued its currency in 2009, so widespread were the protests to the confiscatory measure that it forced the regime to reverse course—evidence that weaning the populace from dependence on the state is transforming its political-economic system. The flow of goods into North Korea’s markets from outside, especially from China, facilitates that transformation. Isolation, by contrast, would only tighten the regime’s grip. Yet the question remains, how has North Korea managed to circumvent financial sanctions to conduct trade? As with many aspects of North Korea, it is difficult to know with much confidence, but in this case, educated guesses are possible. Talking to American
Bankers with many years of experience in Asia reveals several intriguing possibilities.

One way to circumvent financial sanctions, these bankers say, is to disperse funds into small accounts in many banks and keep transactions from each account small enough to avoid triggering the bank’s due diligence. Due diligence requirements in Asia are not always as stringent as those in the United States. Yet even banks operating in good faith, the bankers say, will have trouble vetting documents for trade that is re-invoiced, run through transhipment centers or conducted through one or more intermediaries. Moreover, some banks knowingly run the risk because they can charge more for transactions with suspect entities or those without extensive correspondent relations with US financial institutions. Shady banks in the Balkans, Russia, Cyprus, the Middle East and China are suspected of doing such transactions, the bankers say, for which they charge 10-20 percent commissions. So are some private banks in Singapore, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg and Austria. Regional banks in China are suspected of doing substantial business with North Korea, although most of its trade with China does not use the banking system there at all. John Park, who has long studied the subject, says, “North Korea is doing all its transaction in cash via trading companies inside China, so even BDA-style sanctions will not be able to harm them.” China has signed on to UN Security Council sanctions curbing weapons-related financial transactions, but the US Treasury is reportedly now picking a fight with China over other transactions as well. As a US Treasury official put it recently, Treasury has been using tools at its disposal to increase financial pressure on the North Korean regime by targeting individuals and entities responsible for facilitating payments connected to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program, as well as financial institutions such as the Foreign Trade Bank, which has served as a key node for the regime’s foreign exchange. Such action would impede the North’s legitimate trade—a step China is unwilling to take. Yet, even if the authorities in Beijing want to curb bank transactions, they may not find it easy to do so. Regional banks in China operate with considerable autonomy, thanks to political protection from powerful local party officials or provincial authorities. Their autonomy was evident after China adopted the world’s largest fiscal stimulus in response to the global financial meltdown. Regional banks put much of the money to work building office and apartment complexes—far in excess of existing demand. When Beijing ordered the banks to redirect investment to more productive uses, it was ignored. Central bankers had to resort to raising reserve requirements for the regional banks in an effort to pop the resulting real estate bubble. If Beijing cannot control its regional banks’ allocation of domestic investment, will it have more success curbing the banks’ lucrative dealings with murky North Korean entities? That may be especially problematic for banks in the poorer provinces bordering on North Korea whose growth has been spurred in recent years by dealings with the North. Another way around the financial system, the bankers say, is hawala, informal networks of brokers or middlemen who transfer money for clients in countries with large Muslim populations like Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as Syria, Lebanon, the Gulf States and Iran—even India. Hawala operates on the honor system, eliminating the need for a paper trail. According to a financier with experience in Asia, similar networks of money brokers or middlemen operate in China to facilitate the transfer of funds by Chinese trying to evade taxes and seeking safe havens abroad for their wealth—for a hefty fee. “A lot of the money passes through Hong Kong and Singapore, where I worked,” he said. Macao’s casinos have also been known to
laundry Chinese money. If so, Beijing may have trouble trying to turn off this flow of funds for North Korea as it does for its own people. “If we’re serious about going after illicit transactions, how do we do that if a lot of it takes place through Chinese firms?” a US official acknowledged in 2010. “I don’t know.” Another way around the banking system is to carry payment in the form of gemstones, specie or antiquities. North Korea has been known to sell gold for hard currency through shell companies and hire couriers or even use its diplomats to transport the bulk cash wherever it is needed. In 2006, the year after the US Treasury imposed financial sanctions, North Korean exports to Thailand shot up 82 percent to 163 million USD. The US embassy in Bangkok estimated that sales of gold accounted for some 30 million USD of that increase, up from nil the previous year. UN Security Council Resolution 2094, enacted this March, extends sanctions to bulk cash couriers suspected of involvement in prohibited weapons technology transactions, including DPRK diplomats. Tracking and intercepting them could prove difficult, however. And finally, the North can circumvent the banking system by barter—exchanging goods without the use of money. What works for legitimate trade would also enable North Korea to finance illicit trade—including exports and imports of nuclear and missile technology. In a world where money flows like water, trying to plug all the leaks is doomed to fail. Circumventing the international banking system may make transactions more costly for North Korea, but financial sanctions have not slowed legitimate trade—or stemmed the trade in weapons-related technology that is rightly the focus of those sanctions. North Koreans may condemn the financial sanctions as evidence of US hostile intent, but they’re crying all the way around the banks.” (Leon V. Sigal, “How North Korea Evades Financial Sanctions,” 38North, May 13, 2013)

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South Korea extended an offer for working-level talks to North Korea on the return of industrial production materials and finished goods from the inter-Korean industrial complex. The 123 companies with factories at Kaesong had to halt operations from early April onwards after Pyongyang, citing South Korean provocations, pulled out all of its 53,000 laborers from the joint complex. While all South Korean citizens have been pulled out, raw materials needed to make products and finished goods remain at the border town. Seoul proposed the talks to be held at the truce village of Panmunjom, and said the North can respond to this latest call at their convenience. “The South will be represented by the head of the inter-Korean cooperation support organization, while the North can send representatives from the General Bureau for the Special Zone Development Guidance,” the ministry said. The statement, however, said that talks should be held as soon as possible to respond to calls of mounting damages. (Yonhap, “Seoul Offers N. Korea Talks on Kaesong Issue,” May 14, 2013) “I hope the unification ministry will propose talks with North Korea so as to bring back finished products and raw and subsidiary materials left behind at Kaesong as early as possible and reduce damage for companies,” Park said during a Cabinet meeting. Park also expressed regret about North Korea’s suspension of the complex. “The Kaesong Industrial Complex needs revolutionary changes for internationalization, not just normalization. In order for that to happen, safety devices for the promises North Korea made with the international community should be guaranteed,” she said. The amount of losses Kaesong’s suspension caused South Korean investors is unclear, but estimates vary from around 1 trillion won (US$910 million) to around 3 trillion won. The
government already pledged last week to provide more than 300 billion won in emergency funds to help Kaesong investors. (Yonhap, “Park Instructs Unification Ministry to Propose Talks with N. Korea over Kaesong,” May 14, 2013)

An adviser to Japan’s Cabinet, Iijima Isao, has arrived in North Korea amid a slight easing of tension on the Korean Peninsula after weeks of threats from the North aimed at Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. The purpose of the trip wasn’t immediately known. Tokyo’s Foreign Ministry said it has no information about Iijima’s whereabouts and the prime minister’s office refused to comment. Iijima was a senior aide to former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, who met with late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in 2002 and 2004. (Associated Press, “Japanese Cabinet Adviser Arrives in North Korea,” May 14, 2013) North Korean state television showed the aide, Isao Iijima, arriving in Pyongyang. Japan’s Kyodo news agency said he was met by Kim Chol-ho, vice director of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s Asian Affairs Department. (Reuters, “Japan P.M. Adviser Iijima Arrives in North Korea,” May 14, 2013) South Korea criticized an adviser to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on May 16 for making an "unhelpful" visit to North Korea, voicing concerns that the trip may undermine efforts in forging a coordinated approach toward Pyongyang. Foreign ministry spokesman Cho Tai-young made the remarks two days after the aide to Abe, Isao Iijima, arrived in Pyongyang in a surprise visit that spawned speculation that Japan may be trying to mend frosty ties with the North amid a deepening territorial dispute with China. "It is important to maintain a close coordination, among the Republic of Korea, the U.S. and Japan, toward North Korea," Cho told reporters. "In that sense, we think that the visit by Iijima to North Korea is unhelpful," Cho said. Through a "diplomatic channel" on May 15, Japan notified South Korea that Iijima is on a visit to North Korea and expressed "regrets" over its late notification, Cho said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Slams Japan Official for ‘Unhelpful’ Visit to N. Korea,” May 16, 2013) Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s adviser, when visiting North Korea last week, called for setting a “deadline” in bilateral talks aimed at resolving the thorny issue of the abductions of Japanese, sources said May 24. The North Korean side, for its part, demanded that Japan lift its original sanctions imposed on North Korea and asked it to allow the Tokyo headquarters of Chongryon, or the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, to continue to use its premises and that the site not be sold, according to the sources. The Chongryon headquarters, whose premises are now subject to a foreclosure sale, serve as Pyongyang’s de facto diplomatic mission in Japan. North Korea is thought to be desperate to keep the building. The North Korean side replied to Iijima that it would convey the Japanese intention to young leader Kim Jong Un. But it remains unclear whether Pyongyang is ready to change its long-held position that the abduction issue has already been resolved, the sources added. Pyongyang maintains that no abductees remain alive in the North. Iijima called for a deadline in meetings with Kim Yong Il, a secretary of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea who doubles as director of the party’s International Department, and Song Il Ho, ambassador for talks to normalize relations with Japan, according to the sources. The setting of a deadline for talks on the abduction issue fits in with Abe’s pledge to resolve the matter while he is prime minister. Present in a separate meeting between Iijima and North Korea’s No. 2 leader, Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the country’s legislature, was an official in charge of
Chongryon at the Workers’ Party’s intelligence arm, the sources said. The continued use of the Chongryon building is believed to have been discussed during the meeting. (Kyodo, “Abe Adviser Called for Deadline to Resolve Abductions during North Trip,” Japan Times, May 25, 2013)

Top Chinese banks have halted most dealings with North Korea, an unprecedented move to use financial leverage against Pyongyang that reflects Beijing’s exasperation with Kim Jong-un’s regime. The Chinese financial blockade against North Korea goes beyond what Beijing had agreed to implement in UN resolutions, with several leading banks saying they have stopped all cross-border cash transfers, regardless of the nature of the business. A UN resolution this year only called for sanctions in cases where money might contribute to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Nevertheless, the blockade is far from watertight. A smaller bank based in northeastern China across the border from North Korea said it was still handling large-scale cross-border transfers, an indication that Beijing is not willing to entirely cut off North Korea. Trade between the two countries has grown rapidly in recent years, providing a vital cash lifeline to the isolated, impoverished state. But diplomatic relations between the two neighbors have suffered over the past year. Kim has yet to visit China since taking power at the end of 2011 and has rebuffed Chinese entreaties to refrain from nuclear bomb and missile tests. Concerned about the consequences for regional security and also angered by Kim’s disregard for China, Beijing has started to use the financial sanctions to ratchet up the pressure on North Korea. Concerned about the consequences for regional security and also angered by Kim’s disregard for China, Beijing has started to use the financial sanctions to ratchet up the pressure on North Korea. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of China - China’s three biggest banks - said they had suspended all financial dealings with North Korea. “CCB strictly adheres to all decisions taken by Chinese regulators and the UN Security Council,” CCB said. “At present, CCB has no business contact whatsoever with North Korean banks and all representative accounts [of North Korean] banks are closed.”

“We welcome these steps to protect the financial system from illicit North Korean activity,” a senior U.S. Treasury official said. Bank of China, the country’s primary institution for foreign exchange transactions, said last week that it had closed the account of Foreign Trade Bank, North Korea’s main foreign exchange bank. However, asked whether it had also frozen other financial dealings with North Korea, Bank of China declined to comment. “We welcome these steps to protect the financial system from illicit North Korean activity,” said a senior US Treasury official. Cai Jian, an expert on North Korea at Shanghai’s Fudan University, said it appeared to be the first time that Chinese banks had taken such coordinated action against Pyongyang. “Previously even when China signed on to sanctions against North Korea, there was still a lot of economic activity between our two countries,” he said. “This time, I think, China’s banks received orders from the government to cut ties.” Among China’s smaller banks, the picture is more mixed. A manager at the Bank of Dalian branch in Dandong on the border with North Korea said transfers to the country were still possible. “As long as the company is doing normal trade, not sensitive goods like arms, we can process the transfer,” he said. The bank sanctions threaten to undermine the financial architecture that keeps goods moving between the two countries,” He said. “This time, I think, China’s banks received orders from the government to cut ties.” (Simon Rabinovitch, “Chinese Banks Cut Support for N. Korea,” Financial Times, May 14, 2013, p. 6)
Increasingly tough financial sanctions, an arms embargo and other international restrictions on trade with North Korea have significantly delayed Pyongyang’s illicit nuclear arms program, according to a confidential report by a U.N. panel of experts seen by Reuters. “While the imposition of sanctions has not halted the development of nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it has in all likelihood considerably delayed (North Korea’s) timetable and, through the imposition of financial sanctions and the bans on the trade in weapons, has choked off significant funding which would have been channelled into its prohibited activities,” the 52-page report said. In the report to the U.N. Security Council’s North Korea sanctions committee, the panel also recommended sanctioning three North Korean entities and 12 individuals. It will be up to the 15-nation council whether or not it follows the recommendations. The three entities the panel said should be blacklisted are the newly created Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry, the Munitions Industry Department of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party (KWP), and the State Space Development Bureau. The individuals the panel wants sanctioned include the atomic energy industry minister, once he is nominated, and four senior officials at the KWP Munitions Industry Department. It also recommends the blacklisting of one national from Kazakhstan, Aleksandr Viktorovich Zykov, and two from Ukraine, Iurii Lunov and Igor Karev-Popov, for their involvement in North Korea-related arms deals. “The DPRK (North Korea) has continued to defy the international community in a series of actions which have heightened concern about its intentions,” it said. Among potential violations the panel listed were the seizure by a U.N. member state of aluminium alloys suspected to be nuclear-related in August 2012 and the seizure of missile-related items bound for Syria in May 2012. “The DPRK has continued its efforts to import and export items relevant to missile and nuclear programs and arms,” it said. “There was no major change in either the number or nature of the incidents investigated by the panel over the reporting period.” (Louis Charbonneau and Michelle Nichols, “Financial Sanctions Delay North Korea’s Atom Bomb Program,” Reuters, May 15, 2013)

Davies: “Q: I think you talked about President Park’s trust-building process. President Obama says that her process is very compatible with his approach. But President Park seems to be seeking your unconditional talk, at least on the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The United States still maintains a severe condition before entering into official talks with North Korea. So, it seems there is some kind of contradictions between two policies. So, can you explain why they are compatible.

DAVIES: I do not think that they are incompatible. I think that they are very compatible. In fact, I see in recent weeks and months since the coming to power of President Park Geun-hye a real convergence in South Korean and American approaches on North Korea. Kaesong is a very particular case, and that is very much a matter in the first instance for the government of the Republic of Korea to deal with. I think it has been dealt with with great maturity and responsibility and firmness and very correctly by Seoul. And we understand completely why the government here would continue to reach out and try to find ways to have conversations with the North Koreans about matters that remain from what is still, as I understand it from the North Korean side, described as a temporary closure of Kaesong. So there are issues to resolve and I think that it is positive that the President here is looking for ways forward to resolve those issues. Q: How long are you going to wait for North Korea to live up to its obligations
and, like you said, return to diplomatic actions or return to talks? How long is the U.S. willing to wait for this impasse to break? **DAVIES:** Well, see, here is the important thing: The United States is not waiting for North Korea. The United States is engaged in very active diplomacy, in the first instance with the government of the Republic of Korea. Next, obviously, with Japan, our allies. But importantly, at the level of the five parties. Very active diplomacy, constant stream of consultations, conversations. You know that Ambassador Wu Dawei was just in Washington a matter of weeks ago. I will see him again in Beijing when I go there tomorrow. And then, beyond that core set of nations, the five parties, is the rest of the world. And the rest of the world, we have been active in discussing this problem with nations all over the world. And I think the world saw the result of that after the February 12 nuclear test when, as you have all reported, some 80 nations and international organizations condemned North Korea’s actions. So, the United States is not waiting for anything. We continue our very active diplomacy, at the center of which, as I said at the beginning and I will repeat it again, is this strong alliance relationship with the ROK and, of course, with Japan, which has a role to play on this issue as well. **Q:** What is your satisfaction with China reaction right now? **DAVIES:** Well, I have to go China first before I can answer questions where we are with them at the moment, but we had very successful conversations with Ambassador Wu in Washington, talked about all aspects of the issue. And we believe that China, because it has a unique role to play, with its relationship with North Korea, because it has this very strong, traditional relationship with North Korea, strong economic relationship and so forth, that China is in a position perhaps more than most to help clarify for North Korea the choices that it faces and to impress upon North Korea the importance of returning to the path of denuclearization because it is quite alarming that North Korea has said that they are no longer interested in following through on their commitments as they have made them in the September 2005 Joint Statement. So China has a very, very important role to play, and I look forward to talking to the Chinese about how we can continue to work together, certainly bilaterally, but more importantly, I think, at five, to try to find a way forward so that this issue ultimately can be resolved as it should be resolved, peacefully and diplomatically. So that is really the task that I have set myself for Beijing. I am happy to take one more question. **Q:** Ambassador, when you said these Musudan missiles have been removed from the launch site to North Korea has been interpreted by some as a conciliatory sign from North Korea. Is that how you like to expect to interpret it? **DAVIES:** I am not going to get into talking about intelligence matters and what may or may not have happened with missiles in North Korea. But I think the important point that I would like to make related to that is that I do not think that we should any longer be in the business of treating the absence of bad behavior as something that needs to be rewarded. It is, of course, on the face of it, a good thing that North Korea did not fire missiles. But that in and of itself does not get us very far toward the goal that we all seek, which is that North Korea gets back on the path of denuclearization by taking concrete steps to demonstrate that they understand they have obligations in that regard, much less that they must fulfill their obligations to the international community because of the series of UN Security Council Resolutions that pertain to North Korea’s actions. So, without getting into the types of details that I cannot get into, that is really all I have got to say on that.” (Glyn Davies, Special Representative for North Korea Policy, Remarks to Press In Seoul, May 14, 2013)
Human Rights Watch: “The North Korean government regularly arrests, abuses, tortures, and imprisons citizens for a variety of economic “crimes,” Human Rights Watch said today. The harsh punishment of these “crimes,” which are often no more than attempts to engage in private economic activity to support livelihood and basic rights to food, clothing and shelter, should be investigated by the recently established Commission of Inquiry created by the UN Human Rights Council to examine human rights violations in North Korea. Human Rights Watch interviewed more than 90 North Koreans who have fled the country within the past two years. They told of facing harsh punishments, including imprisonment, physical abuse while in detention, and forced labor, for engaging in unauthorized economic activities. These “crimes” include violating travel permits, engaging in private trading activities, using mobile phones to call overseas, and possessing DVDs and CDs containing music and drama shows from China and South Korea. “The collapse of North Korea’s public distribution system of food and other necessities fuelled a survival response resulting in increased private economic activities,” said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “North Koreans also have greater access to information through technology, so they know how the rest of the world is living and how bad the situation is at home. The response by North Korean police and security officials has been to crack down on efforts to survive by trading goods and services, showing the determination of the government to maintain control over people’s everyday lives.” The 2004 criminal code contains a chapter on “Offenses against the Management of the Economy” that criminalizes a wide swath of economic activities, including engaging in “illegal commercial activities, therefore gaining large profits” (articles 110 and 111) and “illegally giving money or goods in exchange for labor” (article 119). These restrictions, when combined with other parts of the law that criminalize violations of trade and impose foreign exchange controls, allow the North Korean government to prosecute people for conducting almost any economic activity. Initial hopes in the international community that the ascension in January 2011 of Kim Jong-Un, the young, foreign-educated son of Kim Jong-Il, to power in Pyongyang might lead to economic and political changes have been dashed. North Korea’s restrictions on movement and economic activities, when combined with the failure of government services, violate article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that sets out that all persons have the “right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.” Moreover, the government is violating article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ratified by North Korea in 1981) that “recognize[s] the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.” Human Rights Watch has collected testimony about the specific crimes currently being prosecuted in North Korea. They include:

- Selling - or even watching - CDs or DVDs of unauthorized content such as South Korean entertainment shows;
- Movement or travel inside or outside North Korea without official permission;
- Using a mobile phone, with severe punishments for calling outside of the country; and
- Any contact, either economic or personal, with South Korea.
North Korea has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and should fully comply with article 19 of that instrument, which states: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” A former military officer who had served as a senior official in the North Korean State Security Department told Human Rights Watch that on the border where he was stationed “every captured defector was sent to me.” One of his primary tasks was to assess the person’s intent, especially if they were seeking to go to South Korea or be involved with South Korean groups on the Chinese side of the border. He said, “To catch a defector who intended to go to South Korea would be the best accomplishment for people like me,” and added that, “Defectors related to South Korea ended up being sent to the State Security Department…. Once the State Security Department is involved, defectors are sent to political prison camp.” Another North Korean defector’s account given to Human Rights Watch supports this contention. “Staying in China was considered as a misdemeanor, but as far as being accused [of something] relating to South Korea, people got punished severely.” “Crossing into China to buy and sell is widespread but still risky,” Robertson said. “However, suspicion of using a mobile phone to call South Korea or trying to flee through China to travel to South Korea crosses a line that the North Korean authorities do not tolerate.” While private economic activities are carried out openly in many parts of the country, farmers and traders risk arbitrary arrests and crackdowns, opening them to abuse, extortion, and imprisonment. As one long-time trader who succinctly described it to Human Rights Watch, “Doing a business is considered as a crime, regardless of the kind of business.” “The government’s predatory behavior towards those involved in trading activities is underpinned by a willingness to arbitrarily arrest and abuse traders taken into custody, and then squeeze them for bribes in order to be released,” Robertson said. “Economic desperation will continue to fuel movement and trading, leaving local officials in the driver’s seat of North Korea’s unofficial market economy.” (Human Rights Watch, “North Korea: Pyongyang Cracks down on ‘Economic Crimes,’” May 14, 2013)

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General Bureau for Central Guidance to the Development of the Special Zone spokesman: “The spokesman accused the south Korean authorities of being so imprudent as to groundlessly take issue with the DPRK, far from paying due attention to the issues as regards the crisis in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) and working hard to bring it into normal operation. This is a crafty ploy to evade the blame for the crisis in KIZ and mislead public opinion, the spokesman said, adding: It is needless to say that lurking behind this is a crafty attempt to calm down discontent of south Korean minor businesses and public accusation. It is also aimed to divert elsewhere public concern about the sexual scandal of Yun Chang Jung unprecedented in the international history of diplomacy and thus veil their shame and bring about a ‘turn in the phase.’ Instructing her officials to propose talks to the north side this time, the chief executive of south Korea made an impertinent remark that ‘innovational change is necessary for internationalizing KIZ, not just putting it on normal operation’ and ‘the north should keep its promise with the international community and ensure security mechanism for reform.’ Her remark is another provocative invective against the
DPRK. If the south side wants to propose talks, it should observe elementary courtesy. When proposing talks last time, the south side made nonsensical ‘ultimatum’ that it would take important steps if the north side fails to answer till 12:00 next day. This time the south side slandered the north side, crying out for ‘internationalization’ and ‘security mechanism.’ It is unimaginable to ‘internationalize’ the economic development zone common to the nation built in the spirit of the June 15 joint declaration. Worse still, ‘security mechanism’ is nothing but confrontational outcries with another ‘hostage’ and ‘detention’ incident in mind. The south Korean regime is hell bent on madcap nuclear war moves against the DPRK, introducing even a super-large nuclear-powered carrier from the U.S. mainland. At the same time it is revealing its more heinous attempt to stifle the DPRK in league with its master, the U.S. The DPRK is now making a serious examination of whether it will deal with such regime or not and whether there will be something to be solved in dealing with it or not. **If the south side truly intends to normalize the operation of KIZ, it should not talk about dialogue with unessential issues such as the issue of communications and carrying out of goods but opt for settling basic issues and stop provocative remarks and confrontation racket against the DPRK.** Availing ourselves of this opportunity, we remind the south Korean authorities once again that the prospect of KIZ and the future orientation of the north-south relations entirely depend on their attitude.” (KCNA, “Prospect of KIZ, North-South Relations Depends on Attitude of S. Korean Authorities: Spokesman,” May 15, 2013)

North Korea has yet to develop a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on a missile, a senior US official [Davies] said, contradicting a recent US military intelligence report. The North claimed its third atomic test staged in February involved a “miniaturized and lighter” warhead, prompting speculation that it had acquired the crucial technology to fit nuclear devices to a missile delivery system.”I don’t believe they have the capability to miniaturise the nuclear warhead, put it on top of the missile, work the launch and reentry problem, and target,” said the senior US official who declined to be identified. “I don’t think they have been able to put the whole piece together,” he told a press briefing for foreign media in Seoul. The US official said the deployment of nuclear-capable US B-52s and B-2 stealth bombers in recent joint drills with South Korea were proof of US commitment to providing a complete nuclear deterrent. “I don’t think South Korea needs to develop its own nuclear capability,” he said, adding that such a move carried “a lot, a lot, a lot of responsibility.”“And the headache it brings is more than you understand right now. And I think that the US is able to be there to provide what we call an extended nuclear deterrence,” he said. (AFP, “Senior U.S. Official: No, Noreth Korea Can’t Fit a Nuke on a Missile,” May 15, 2013)

Davies: **Q: Ambassador, did you ask for more information about Bank of China’s closure of North Korean account? Were you able to confirm that they actually did it, and how do you evaluate the impact it will have on the North Korean regime? DAVIES: Well I’ve spoken about the Bank of China issue before, so that’s on the record. We talked really about all aspects of the North Korean issue, to include touching on the question of sanctions. But as I’ve already said on the Bank of China, I think it’s a significant step that has been taken by the bank. I don’t think this was at the direction necessarily of the Chinese government. I think this was a decision made by the bankers**
at the Bank of China, so it’s not a topic that it would be fruitful, I think, for me to get into in depth with the Chinese government. But I do think nonetheless, as I’ve said, that it is a significant development, and I think it does help sharpen the choices that Pyongyang faces as it goes forward. **Q:** Ambassador, follow up on that. Ambassador, so in today’s talk with the Chinese officials, do you think you will ever find what you said, a real shift, in how they cooperate with North Korea and also are you able to find some other ways where you can send, with China, to North Korea, unified signals to North Korea? **DAVIES:** Well, I don’t think it is useful for me to try to attach any sort of label to where Chinese thinking is at the moment. China acts on its own interests. We respect Chinese decisions that relate to North Korea. Obviously we are seeking, with the Chinese, to achieve as great a level of cooperation and communication on the North Korea issue. What I said before, I’ll repeat: that it is very much the case that both China and the United States share the view that denuclearization of the peninsula is absolutely essential if we are to move forward in any diplomatic process with North Korea. So we talked a great deal about what is happening now in North Korea, how we evaluate it, and how we might move forward diplomatically with North Korea. But I don’t have any specific ideas to report to you today. This fits in the frame of a long, strategic conversation that we’re having with the Chinese. **Q:** Are you satisfied with the way China is enforcing sanctions on North Korea? **DAVIES:** Well, I think this is all a work in progress. The Chinese have said to us that they will faithfully implement UN Security Council sanctions and are doing so. And as I’ve said before, we take them at their word. I think China is, in its own fashion, seeking to convey messages to Pyongyang, so that they understand the importance that China attaches to denuclearization, but beyond that, I don’t want to comment because I don’t work for the Chinese government, don’t represent them, and I’d like them to speak for themselves.” (Glyn Davies, Special Representative for North Korea Policy, Remarks to Reporters in Beijing, May 15, 2013)

President Barack Obama nominated Daniel Russel, senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council from 2009 to 2011, as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. State Department officials welcomed the nomination of Russel, who joined the department in 1985 and has since handled mostly Asia-related issues. "He really understands the importance of South Korea being in lockstep with the U.S.,” a senior department official told Yonhap on background. Russel also understands that South Korea needs to take the initiative in dealing with the North Korea issue, the official added in a phone interview. “He has been quite supportive of South-North (Korea) dialogue and he also understands history issues (in the region) and related backgrounds,” the official said. Joe Yun, a Korean-born official, has been serving as acting as assistant secretary since Kurt Campbell left the position in February. Before joining the NSC, Russel was director of the Office of Japanese Affairs at the Department of State. (Lee Chi-dong, “Obama Taps Russel as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia,” Yonhap, May 15, 2013)
nothing to help South Korean companies seriously hurt by the temporary closure of the inter-Korean complex. “It is better for the North to stop making demands that have nothing to do with the complex and focus more on keeping promises to protect the investment and property of South Korea, which they guaranteed in the past,” the official said in a news conference. Late Wednesday, the communist country berated the proposal for talks as a “crafty ploy” and claimed that if Seoul truly wants to normalize the operation of the Kaesong complex, it should not talk about dialogue in regards to unessential matters but strive to settle “basic issues” and stop provocative remarks against the North. It did not elaborate on what it meant by basic issues, but it had said the reason it pulled all of its 53,000 workers from the Kaesong complex on April 9 was because the South had “seriously insulted” the dignity of its leadership. This stance is tantamount to rejecting the talks proposal and opens the possibility that the standoff will not be settled soon. Pyongyang also said it is seriously contemplating whether or not it should try to talk to the South Korean government in the future and disclosed that fact that it had offered to hold talks on raw materials, finished goods and matters pertaining to future visits when Seoul pulled its citizens from Kaesong and even set a date. Kim confirmed that the communist country had stated its willingness to engage in talks for the return of South Korean production materials on May 3, although it took no follow-up measures and set no date as claimed. “A representative from the North’s General Bureau for the Special Zone Development Guidance unexpectedly told the senior South Korean official sent to Kaesong to deliver the US$13 million to cover overdue wages and taxes, that it will allow businessmen to visit Kaesong to settle their unpaid accounts, give entry permits to personnel needed to maintain the power lines and water supply operations,” Kim said. The spokesman also said the bureau in charge of managing the industrial zone, expressed its willingness to hold discussions on the return of raw production materials and finished products still at the border town at that time. This move represents a waiver on the part of the North, which on April 3 barred all new entry into Kaesong, with the exception of the cash shipment. “In response, the official delivering the money notified the North Korean that he had no authority or means to convey such a message to Seoul, and said Pyongyang should contact the South directly through the communication lines it disconnected earlier in the year,” he said. Kim then pointed out that the North made no attempt after making its initial proposal to contact the South and move forward on this issue, until President Park Geun-hye and the unification ministry called for fresh talks on May 14. Despite the explanation given, the official acknowledged that the ministry in charge of cross border relations did not mention the important proposal made by the North. Such a move can be construed as an attempt to withhold information from the public. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Regrets N.K.’s Negative Reponse to Talks Offer,” May 16, 2013)

Chinese authorities notified North Korea of plans to resume food aid before the Bank of China closed its account with North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank (FTB), a diplomatic source in Beijing said. With China also supplying fertilizer aid, the situation suggests that while Seoul and Washington are both working to bring it on board with their pressure offensive against Pyongyang, Beijing is sticking to a dual approach using the carrot as well as the stick in its dealings with North Korea. On May 15, Radio Free Asia reported on China’s plans to soon add food aid on top of the large amounts of fertilizer it has recently been supplying to North Korea. Sources within North Korea
were quoted as saying that the estimated 200,000 tons of fertilizer provided late last month was larger than last year, and delivered more quickly. An official with the Hamgyeong provincial agricultural bureau said the amount of fertilizer distributed to collective farms suggested that the total amount supplied by the Chinese government was “probably more than 200,000 tons.” A farmer in Yanggang province noted the speedy delivery. “Last year, the fertilizer from China was given out some time around June 10, but this year it started on April 26,” the farmer said. The farmer also commented on the increased amount, saying that “the fertilizer supply last year was so small than each collective farm only got around 10 tons.” An official with the North Pyongan province trade bureau reported hearing that China would shortly begin providing food aid as well, saying authorities in Pyongyang had begun rationing out rice from its reserves in anticipation of the delivery. China was also reported to have notified Pyongyang of its plans before the Bank of China announced the FTB account closure on May 7. “China didn’t freeze or close the Foreign Trade Bank account all of a sudden,” a diplomatic source in Beijing said. “It let North Korea know it was going to close it and gave enough time to take action by withdrawing funds.” (Seong Yeon-cheol and Park Hyun, “China to Resume Food Aid to North Korea,” Hankyore, May 16, 2013)

North Korea has appointed a new vice defense minister, a report showed Friday, in what appeared to be an ongoing reshuffle of the communist country’s military personnel. Jon Chang-bok, who was promoted to colonel general in 2010, accompanied North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on a field guidance trip to a food processing plant as the first vice minister of the People’s Armed Forces, KCNA said in the report, monitored in Seoul. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Replaces Vice Minister of Defense,” May 17, 2013)

President Barack Obama plans to replace the top commander of U.S. forces in Korea, the Pentagon announced, a move that comes as North Korea shows no signs of returning to dialogue aimed at easing military tensions and denuclearizing the peninsula. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the Pentagon would promote Lt. Gen. Curtis “Mike” Scaparrotti, formerly deputy commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, to the rank of a four-star general to serve as commander of the 28,500 troops in South Korea. The nomination requires Senate confirmation. If confirmed, he will succeed Army Gen. James Thurman, who assumed the post two years ago and is retiring soon. Scaparrotti served in Afghanistan as the commander of the International Security Assistance Force’s Joint Command in Kabul from 2011 to 2012. He has since worked as director of the Joint Staff, serving under Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “He commanded the 4th Infantry Division when it served as the nucleus of the Multinational Division Baghdad in 2006,” according to the American Forces Press Service. “Scaparrotti, too, is an officer sculpted by combat.” There is no fixed tenure for the top U.S. commander in Korea. Retired Gen. Walter Sharp served as USFK leader for three years until 2011. His predecessor, B.B. Bell, served two and a half years. (Lee Chi-dong, “Obama to Replace Chief of U.S. Forces Korea,” Yonhap, May 18, 2013)
North Korea launched three short range guided missiles into the sea off the Korean Peninsula's east coast, South Korea's Ministry of Defense said. The ministry said it detected two launches in the morning, followed by another in the afternoon. It said the missiles were fired in a northeasterly direction away from South Korean waters. "A more detailed analysis will be needed but the missiles launched may be a modified anti-ship missile or the KN-02 (Toksa) surface-to-surface missile derived from the Soviet era SS-21 that has a range of about 120 kilometers," a Seoul official said. He said judging by the trajectory and distance traveled, those missiles fired were not medium- or long-range ballistic missiles. The communist country had deployed two Musudan intermediate-range missiles on its east coast along with medium-range Rodong missiles in April in an apparent countermeasure against joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises under way but they were later pulled back. "All missiles launched fell into the sea," a South Korean Defense Ministry official said, requesting that he not be identified. He speculated that the launch is likely part of a military exercise or a missile test. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Launches Three Short-Range Missiles: Defense Ministry,” May 18, 2013) North Korea fired what appeared to be four short-range guided missiles into the East Sea over the weekend, ratcheting up tension that had seemed to have deescalated amid South Korea's repeated overtures for dialogue. Experts said the surprise launches appeared intended to show Pyongyang's discontent over the recent Korea-U.S. summit during which Presidents Park Geun-hye and Barack Obama repeated their resolve not to tolerate the North's provocations. The North fired one device between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. on May 19. The launch came after it fired two devices between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m. on May 18 and another between 2 p.m. and 3 p.m., Seoul's Defense Ministry said, noting that the type of weapon remained unclear pending investigation. Some observers said the launches underscored that the North was unwilling to positively respond to Seoul's proposals for dialogue and might continue its confrontational stance for some time. "The North has shown its hard-line stance through its bellicose rhetoric for months and is expected to continue its hostile moves until July 27 (the anniversary of the armistice agreement)," said Ahn Chan-il, the director of the World North Korea Research Center. Some others dismissed any political interpretation of the launches, saying they were intended to upgrade their missile capabilities. "It would be just part of its routine exercises. If it were meant to pressure the U.S., it wouldn't have launched a short-range delivery vehicle," said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies. (Song Sang-ho, “N.K. Ratchets up Tensions Again,” Korea Herald, May 19, 2013) North Korea fired another short-range projectile into the East Sea on May 20, marking the third straight day of launches, South Korea's defense ministry said. "North Korea again launched a short-range projectile that appears to be a KN-02 (surface-to-surface) missile," said a ministry official. "We are closely watching the movements of the North's military in case of further launches." The May 20 launch occurred between 11 a.m. and noon. North Korea has launched a total of five short-range projectiles in the past three days. "We are currently trying to determine what the projectile was and the North's intentions (behind the launch)," said a military official. "It appears that the North is trying to renew military tensions on the Korean Peninsula." The projectile, which was fired from a mobile launcher off North Korea's east coast, flew about 120 kilometers in the northeasterly direction before falling into the sea, officials said. The other four projectiles are also thought to have had a range of about 120 kilometers. "Whether it's...
a test-firing or armed demonstration, North Korea should not engage in tension-creating acts," Kim Jang-soo, head of the national security office, was quoted as saying by presidential spokeswoman Kim Haing. North Korea claimed the firing of projectiles is "a normal military exercise." “Conducting military drills to build up a strong deterrence capability is a legitimate right of any sovereign country,” said the Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, which is in charge of inter-Korean relations. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Fires Projectile into Sea for Third Day,” May 20, 2013)

DAVIES: “We in the United States, and indeed I believe many who follow North Korea, expected sooner or later that North Korea would shift from the threats and belligerency of recent months, in some respects an almost unprecedented succession of unacceptable, dangerous acts and pronouncements with which you are all familiar. The December missile test, the February nuclear test, all of the threats not just to the United States, but also to the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China - you know as well as I the long list of recent provocations. We knew that North Korea would eventually shift their strategy to that of seeking engagement, in an effort to split us and to exploit any difference in our respective national positions. What I would like to report to you about my meetings here is that they helped increase my confidence that the Government of Japan is fully aware of the challenges and pitfalls of engaging North Korea. I received assurances about the centrality of denuclearization to our collective efforts to engage North Korea on the right terms, in other words, to convince North Korea that it has no choice but to live up to its long-standing commitments and obligations to take steps to abandon nuclear weapons and indeed, to abandon its pursuit of missile technologies. … Q: Ambassador, are you saying that this visit by Mr. Iijima to Pyongyang is an effort by the North Koreans to split up your coalition, and what assurances did you get from the Japanese government that this won’t be the case? DAVIES: Well, what I don’t want to do is get into commenting directly on this issue of the Iijima visit. And that is because, like the rest of you, I am suffering from a deficit of information. I simply don’t know much at all about the visit, I’ve seen the reporting from North Korea but my understanding is that Mr. Iijima has only just come back from Pyongyang and from Beijing and is now reporting to Japanese authorities. So we look forward to getting a report on what it was he discussed, and I think what we’ll do is we’ll take it from there. Q: I think you learned more about Mr. Iijima’s trip to North Korea, also in yesterday’s meetings with several Japanese officials. Now how do you understand the reason why Japan has sent Iijima to North Korea, and did you express some concerns to Japanese officials about Iijima’s trip, because it might have a negative impact on your effort to apply pressure on North Korea. DAVIES: I understand the question, and it’s a very legitimate question. But I would suggest that at this stage, this is not so much a question for me. I think that’s a question that you may put to your own authorities. What I do not want to do is get into the business of betraying the confidences that were extended to me by these gentlemen that I met with yesterday. If I were to betray those confidences, then I would be acting like North Korea, and I don’t want to do that. … Q: What conditions do you think are necessary for the Japanese Government in trying to move this abduction issue forward? DAVIES: It would be quite improper for me as an American diplomat to try and interpose myself into this issue
from the standpoint of the Japanese Government. The Japanese government, we respect them, we have excellent relations with Japan, a close ally and friend, so we'll see going forward what might have developed from this visit. But I am not going to suggest strategies and tactics other than simply to say what I have already said, that we in the United States believe that this issue of denuclearization, because it is the foundation issue, the corner issue of the Six-Party Process, is one that we must all continue to work on. Which does not mean that all of the other issues are not also exceedingly important.” (Glyn Davies, Special Representative for North Korea Policy, Remarks at Narita Airport, May 18, 2013)

5/19/13 Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said he is ready to promote talks with North Korea to resolve the issue of the country's past abductions of Japanese nationals. "I hope I can promote negotiations and dialogue (with Pyongyang)," Abe told reporters in the city of Fukuoka. "I will continue pressuring North Korea as long as the abduction issue remains unresolved.” His comments came after his adviser, Iijima Isao, made a surprise visit to Pyongyang, during which he demanded in talks with North Korean officials that Pyongyang return all of the Japanese abductees, hand over the abductors and provide a full account of the abductions. (Kyodo, “Abe to Promote Talks with N. Korea over Abduction Issue,” May 19, 2013) Iijima Isao, a special adviser to the Cabinet, returned home in the afternoon of May 18 after his four-day visit to North Korea. Iijima met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide later in the day and reported on his meetings with key North Korean officials during the trip. At the meeting with the top government spokesman, Iijima said that he urged Pyongyang to immediately return Japanese kidnapped by North Korean spies decades ago, fully investigate the abduction incidents and hand over the suspects, informed sources said. Iijima also told the North Korean officials that Japan will not budge unless the issues are resolved, according to the sources. Speaking to reporters in Beppu, Oita Prefecture, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said, “I plan to receive a report from Suga about Iijima’s North Korea trip.” “I will speak directly to Iijima if necessary,” he added. “The abduction issue must be resolved during my tenure as prime minister,” Abe said, expressing his strong determination to reunite all abductees now in North Korea with their families. During his stay in North Korea, Iijima met with the reclusive country’s No. 2 leader Kim Yong Nam, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and Kim Yong Il, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and one of the highest-ranking foreign affairs officials. (Jiji Press, “Iijima Returns Home after Visit to North Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 19, 2013)

North Korea test-fired a short-range guided missile off its east coast into the East Sea. (Jung Ha-won, “N. Korea Fires Another Short-Range Missile,” AFP, May 19, 2013)

5/20/13 Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea Secretariat information bulletin No. 1038 “accused the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet group of pulling up the Korean People’s Army over its regular military exercise to bolster up the country’s defence capability in every way. A spokesman for the White House blustered that the DPRK “should honor its commitments made before the international community”, terming the KPA's rocket launching drills on May 18 and 19 “provocations”. Meanwhile, the puppet group of south Korea in a “statement” let loose a whole string
of vituperation grumbling about the "north's provocative action" and urging 'responsible behavior.' The information bulletin dismissed this as another unpardonable challenge to the DPRK and an undisguised provocation driving the situation on the Korean Peninsula to an extreme phase. Their description of the drills as a factor of escalating the tension on the peninsula and in the region reminds one of a thief crying 'Stop the thief!' It is the height of shamelessness for the puppet group to talk about someone's "provocation" as it is hell-bent on the moves to escalate the confrontation with fellow countrymen and ignite a war against the north, while imploring its U.S. master to tighten the military alliance. They are making desperate efforts to mislead the public opinion through the trumpeting about fictitious 'provocations' in a bid to calm down the international community's criticism of their moves to beef up aggressor forces and provoke a nuclear war against the DPRK and escalate their military threat to it. Lurking behind their renewed smear campaign is a sinister aim to quell the anti-'government' actions of the south Korean people sparked off by the unpopular policy, sex scandal and the like and get rid of their serious ruling crisis. Facts go to clearly prove that the DPRK's line on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force is entirely just and it is the only way to defend the country's sovereignty and dignity and achieve the nation's reunification and prosperity. The DPRK will bolster up the nuclear deterrence of the powerful revolutionary Paektusan army, true to the ever-victorious line and wipe out hostile forces to the last man if they dare infringe upon the DPRK's sovereignty even a bit." (KCNA, "U.S. and S. Korea's Groundless Accusations over KPA Regular Military Drills Refuted," May 20, 2013)

General Bureau for Central Guidance to the Development of the Special Zone spokesman: "The south Korean authorities are busy making excuses following the publication of the DPRK's magnanimous measure over the KIZ issue. Had they responded to the DPRK's offer, the KIZ would not have reached such a phase as now, to say nothing of the phase of taking out raw materials and products. But they have resorted to a sleight of hand, concealing their sinister design. This resulted in the huge damage to the innocent south Korean businessmen. The south Korean authorities claim to have deep interest in the livelihood of the businessmen. But as was proved by a recent statement, they kept silence about the normalization of the operation in the KIZ and touched only on the issue of taking out raw materials and products. This proves that they are not pleased with the resumption of the operation in the KIZ. What is more urgent than the taking out of the products is whether to keep or break the KIZ. This is an issue on which hinges the living of the south Korean businessmen and the future of the north-south relations. What the south Koreans truly want today is the normalization of the operation in the KIZ rather than the taking out of the products from the KIZ. Now is the time for the south Korean authorities to state before the public whether it has intent to fundamentally settle the KIZ issue or not. They should not try to distort the essence of the issue and deceive the public but clarify its stand on this issue. Their attitude will affect the DPRK's decision." (KCNA, "S. Korean Authorities Urged to Clarify Stand on KIZ," May 20, 2013)

North Korea gave Seoul until May 6 to submit an opinion for discussions on the Kaesong Industrial Complex. A document containing this information was faxed
recently to tenant companies. The government disputed the sincerity of the request, but questions remain as to why it did not reveal the content of Pyongyang’s offer at the time. On May 18, a second document in the name of North Korea’s Central Special Zone Development Guidance General Bureau was sent to some of the companies. The two-page text stated that North Korea had told Seoul it was willing to cooperate on the recovery of businesses’ finished products and raw materials, asking for a schedule for concrete discussions and travel plans by May 6. This came after another fax in question-and-answer format that was sent to seven to eight tenant businesses on May 16 in the name of a General Bureau spokesperson. In a May 19 statement, Ministry of Unification spokesperson Kim Hyung-seok said the good faith of the May 3 proposal had been “highly questionable,” noting that it came at a time when all dialogue channels had been cut off and all South Koreans withdrawn, making discussions “practically impossible.” Kim also said North Korea had been sent a reply from South Korea asking to “formally state the issues through a suitable liaison channel,” but had taken no action by the time Seoul proposed working-level talks on May 14. (Kang Tae-ho, “N. Korea Offered May 6 as a Deadline for Kaesong Talks,” Hankyore, May 20, 2013)

China repeated its call for North Korea to free a Chinese fishing boat and crew seized earlier this month, and the boat’s owner voiced concern about the safety of the detained fishermen, in the latest episode to lay bare recent discord between the two governments. The Chinese Foreign Ministry revealed on yesterday that the vessel’s owner, Yu Xuejun, had called the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang on May 10 to seek help after North Korea captured the fishing boat, which operates from Dalian, a northeastern Chinese port city. The ministry said it urged North Korea to release the boat and crew as soon as possible, and a ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, demanded that the North ensure that the crew members were kept safe. “China is in close communication with North Korea over the Chinese fishing vessel held by the North,” Mr. Hong said. “China has made representations to North Korea through the relevant channels, demanding that it properly deal with the matter as quickly as possible and effectively safeguard the legitimate rights of the Chinese fisherman, as well as the safety of their lives and property.” The ministry did not explain why it had waited so long to reveal the seizure, which has come at a time of brittle tensions with North Korea, an isolated country that depends on Beijing for diplomatic and economic support. The Chinese media reports said that the boat was seized May 5, with 16 men aboard, and that the North Korean authorities demanded payment of 600,000 renminbi, or about $98,000, to release them and the vessel, apparently on the grounds that it was fishing in waters claimed by North Korea. The deadline for payment was Sunday, the Beijing Times newspaper said. The owner of the boat drew public attention to its capture through messages on Tencent Weibo, a Chinese microblog service. And on Monday he issued a message saying that he feared his crew had been beaten. “The captain of the seized boat communicated using a satellite phone, and when I asked questions, it was clear that he didn’t dare speak,” Yu wrote. “We’re afraid that the crew have been beaten.” In May of last year, Beijing disclosed that three Chinese vessels had been seized by North Korea, which demanded payment of a fine before it released them and the crew. They were freed several days after Beijing made
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo raised the bar with Pyongyang on May 20, saying all Japanese believed to have been abducted by North Korea must be repatriated to resolve the long-standing issue. The Japanese government has recognized 17 individuals as abduction victims, but a citizens group has compiled a list of about 470 Japanese believed to have been snatched by North Korea. “There is the possibility of other victims in addition to those who have been recognized,” Abe said at the Upper House Audit Committee session. “In referring to a resolution of the abduction issue, it will have to involve the return to Japan of all victims, including those believed abducted.” Abe was responding to a question by Ryuji Yamane, a member of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, about the possibility of meeting with people connected to individuals believed to have been abducted by North Korea. Furuya Keiji, state minister in charge of the abduction issue, echoed Abe’s sentiments on a TV program broadcast on May 20. “Regardless of whether individuals have been recognized by the central government, we will bring back all abduction victims,” Furuya said. “That naturally includes those believed to have been abducted.” The citizens group Investigation Commission on Missing Japanese Probably Related to North Korea was established in 2003 and has looked into Japanese who may have been taken by Pyongyang. Among its list of about 470 Japanese, 73 are designated as “very likely” abducted by North Korea. Five Japanese who were abducted by North Korean agents in the 1970s were returned to Japan in 2002. Pyongyang has said the other Japanese on the government’s list had either died or never set foot in North Korea. Japanese officials and politicians, including Abe, have disputed North Korea’s assertion. Abe was asked in the Upper House Audit Committee about the recent visit to North Korea by special Cabinet adviser Iijima Isao. “Regrettably, other nations will not play a leading role in resolving the abduction issue,” Abe said. “If there is progress only on the nuclear weapons and missile (issues), the nations of the world might come to the conclusion that most issues related to North Korea have been resolved. There was a need to demonstrate our strong resolve on the [abduction] issue.” Abe indicated that he did not think there was anything wrong with Japan negotiating independently with North Korea on the abduction issue. “There are times in diplomacy when there is a need for close communications (with the relevant nations) and other times when Japan acts based on its own judgment,” Abe said. “I am confident at this stage that the United States understands our position.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Abe: North Korea Must Return All Japanese Believed Abducted,” May 21, 2013) A senior Japanese official said Tokyo will make its own overtures to North Korea on what it claims are abductions of Japanese citizens, dismissing U.S. and South Korean concern that the North may try to drive a wedge between the three allies. Furuya Keiji, state minister in charge of the abductions issue, said Japan must take the initiative in resolving the abductions, which are an obstacle to normalizing relations between the two countries. “The United States and South Korea cannot solve Japan’s abduction issue,” Furuya said in an interview. “Since these are Japanese nationals who have been abducted, it’s necessary that our nation solve it as a sovereign state,” he added. A South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said there had been no prior notice from Tokyo about the trip, calling it “unhelpful.” Glyn Davies, U.S. special representative on North Korea, warned the North would try to
play the three allies off against each other. He said "the U.S. was aware Pyongyang would shift its strategy to seek engagement in an effort to split us and to exploit any differences in our respective national positions." Furuya played down the allies' concerns, stressing the importance of the alliance. He questioned whether Seoul’s reaction to Iijima’s visit was productive. "Sometimes South Korea shows such a reaction," he said. "Would it benefit South Korea if it were to take an antagonistic approach to Japan? The answer is no." Few details of Iijima’s visit have been revealed. Furuya said Iijima told Pyongyang it shouldn’t expect concessions from Tokyo unless the abductions are fully resolved. Iijima "clearly conveyed this" to Kim Yong Nam, head of the North’s Parliament, Furuya said. North Korea is suspected of abducting foreigners in the 1970s and 1980s. It has admitted to abducting 13 Japanese nationals, and has returned five along with family members. It claims the rest are dead. Tokyo officially recognizes 17 abductees and suspects there may be hundreds more. Furuya expressed confidence about finding a solution: "Kim Jong Un is not directly involved in the abductions...when considering various factors necessary to maintain the regime, there will come a time when he himself will need to make a decision regarding which direction to steer North Korea." (Alexander Martin and George Nishiyama, “Japan Confronts Pyongyang Abductions,” Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2013)

North Korea continued firing short-range weapons over its own eastern waters after a weekend of what it called "rocket launching tests" intended to bolster deterrence against enemy attack. South Korean officials were investigating exactly what it was that Pyongyang was testing. The two projectiles fired by North Korea had similar trajectories as four previous launches over the past two days, according to officials at Seoul’s Defense Ministry and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Officials were analyzing whether the projectiles were missiles or rockets fired from a large-caliber gun North Korea may be developing, the officials said on condition of anonymity, citing department rules. (Associated Press, “South Korea Says North Fires Sixth Projectile into Waters,” May 20, 2013) The Pentagon yesterday sought to play down a stream of North Korean short-range missile launches, saying tensions on the peninsula are low compared with "a few months ago." The U.S. military also announced a plan to test-fire a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile this week, a move that it delayed last month amid worries over Pyongyang’s provocations. Speaking to reporters, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little said, "We have noticed broadly that North Korea has ratcheted back its provocative actions in recent weeks, and its bellicose rhetoric. We hope that is a trend they hope to follow." "A few months ago, we saw underground nuclear tests, we saw long-range missile tests, we saw heated rhetoric," he added. "So I think we can safely say that we remain in a period of tensions that are relatively on a small scale by comparison." He said North Korea’s launch of six short-range missiles, although the acts can be construed as provocative, "do not necessarily violate their international obligations." Pyongyang is banned from conducting any launch using ballistic missile technology under U.N. Security Council sanctions. Seoul, however, issued a different view. "Given U.N. resolutions banning (the North's) missile launch using rockets, it could be seen as a violation of them," Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said in a briefing May 21. Although South Korea is still determining what types of projectiles -- missile or rocket -- the North has fired, it reportedly believes the projectiles fired over the past three days to be a modified version of KN-02, a type of ballistic missiles. But,
the U.S. is reportedly assuming that the North test-fired large-caliber multiple rocket launchers, which do not use ballistic technology. "They test-fire the KN-02 all the time. It’s not a ballistic missile," Bruce Bechtol, associate professor of political science at Angelo State University in Texas, told Yonhap by phone. "For short range missile tests like the KN-02, that’s just a standard military test, a training exercise. Those are anti-ship missiles, and they’re going to do that two or three times a year anyway, no matter what the geopolitical situation is," added Bechtol, known for his expertise on North Korea issues. "I wouldn’t think that they’re trying to do any signaling on that. Now, if they test a ballistic missile, that would probably mean they were trying to send us a signal but simply testing KN-02, I mean, they do that all the time," he said. (Yonhap, “U.S. Not Overreacting to N. Korea’s Missile Launches,” May 21, 2013) The South Korean government has concluded that the six missiles North Korea launched into the sea aimed to test new bigger multiple rocket launchers. The missiles flew about 150 km, but their maximum range is estimated to be 180-200 km, a South Korean government official said. Until now the North was believed to have three kinds of multiple rocket launchers -- 107 mm, 122 mm, and 240 mm with a maximum range of less than 65 km. But the new launchers could threaten South Korean military headquarters at Gyeryongdae in South Chungcheong Province and U.S. bases in Pyeongtaek and Osan, both in Gyeonggi Province, as well as the entire Seoul region. With six to 12 launch tubes, mobile rocket launchers can fire more projectiles -- eight or nine rockets in 10 minutes -- than missile launch vehicles. The launchers are difficult to detect until they start firing. "South Korean and U.S. authorities concluded that they were multiple rocket launchers rather than short-range missiles given their launch speed, trajectory, and the shape the vehicles," the official said. But the official added it is unlikely the new launchers have been deployed warfare-ready. Meanwhile, the U.S. test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile dubbed Minuteman 3 on Tuesday, about a month after it decided to postpone the test in consideration of rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. On May 18, North Korea denounced the Minuteman test as a "military provocation." With a range of 13,000 km, the missile has three W-68 170-kiloton nuclear warheads, each of which can strike a different target. (Chosun Ilbo, "N. Korea ‘Tested New Rocket Launchers,’” May 22, 2013) KCNA: “The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces have portrayed the recent rocket launch by the Korean People’s Army (KPA) as a ‘provocation.’ They are calling for “tightened posture for counteraction” and “immediate punishment”, while describing the launch as an ‘intentional provocation by the military to maintain tension till the war victory day.’ This is an unpardonable provocative act to deter the DPRK from exercising its right to self-defense for peace and stability of the country. The rocket launch is part of a regular military exercise of the KPA aimed at increasing the defence capabilities in every possible way. However, the U.S. and the south Korean warmongers have described the military exercises, common occurrences in any country, as a factor straining the tension in the Korean Peninsula and the region. This is the height of impudence. It is the exercise of the legitimate right of a sovereign state that the KPA stages military exercises to build a powerful deterrence to cope with the nuclear war exercises that have been staged with increased intensity by the U.S. and south Korea. The tension is still running high on the Korean Peninsula. Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises waged by the U.S. and south Korea were barely ended before they kicked off provocative war exercises such as a combined naval drill and a combined anti-
submarine drill. They are launching missiles on a daily basis and openly posing nuclear threats to the DPRK with nuclear carrier flotilla. Still, they are calling them ‘regular exercises for defense.’ A war has been deterred on the Korean Peninsula where war situation has constantly prevailed due to the U.S. and south Korea. It is entirely thanks to the powerful deterrence of the DPRK that has put a brake on it. The DPRK has confronted the U.S. and its followers’ reckless aggression moves with powerful countermeasures. The army of the DPRK has diverse war methods and tactics for countering any sudden provocations and wars by the enemies. It also has all kinds of offensive and defensive means including nuclear deterrence for self-defence. Through the development and bolstering of powerful nuclear deterrence it is making a breach in the U.S. ‘nuclear umbrella’ and decisively thwarting the attempt at a war on the DPRK. The military of the DPRK conducts exercises on a regular basis and always maintains combat posture to defend lasting peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and the region, not to secure a sort of ‘fundamental change.’” (KCNA Commentary: KPA’s Rocket Launch Is Part of Regular Military Exercises,” May 23, 2013)

North Korea has released 16 Chinese fishermen and their boat, Xinhua said, after reports that armed assailants had taken the sailors hostage and demanded a ransom. “All the fishermen with the boat are safe on their way back,” Xinhua, citing a Chinese embassy official in Pyongyang it said had heard the news from the shipowner. (AFP, “North Korea Releases Chinese Sailors: Xinhua,” May 21, 2013)

5/22/13

After months of ignoring China’s warnings to give up its nuclear program, Kim Jong Un sent a high-level confidant to Beijing, in a possible effort to mend strained ties with its most important ally and the latest sign that Pyongyang may be giving diplomacy a chance. The trip by Vice Marshal Choe Ryong Hae, a senior Workers’ Party official and the military’s top political officer, is taking place as tensions ease somewhat on the Korean Peninsula after near-daily vows from Pyongyang to attack Washington and Seoul in March and April. Choe’s visit is the first this year by a top North Korean official to China, which is under pressure from the U.S. and others to rein in its belligerent neighbor. It’s also the first since a change of leadership in Beijing, whose new leaders have demonstrated a willingness to work with Washington to harry Pyongyang over its nuclear weapons programs even as stability in North Korea remains the Chinese government’s priority. The last high-level North Korea-China meeting took place when Chinese Communist Party chief Xi Jinping sent a Politburo member to Pyongyang in November. “The North Korean side has been feeling China’s pressure,” said Ma Xiaojun, a North Korea watcher at the Central Party School, a think tank for the leadership in Beijing. “Our policies and stance have tended to be tougher and more clearly express our unhappiness and displeasure,” said Ma. He added, quoting President Xi, “causing trouble on China’s doorstep is not right, and China will not tolerate it.” Choe’s priority is to mend ties, Ma said. Immediately upon landing in Beijing, Choe went to see Wang Jiarui, head of the Chinese leadership’s international affairs office and long the point man for China’s dealings with Pyongyang. Meanwhile, North Korea also revealed that a former defense minister, Kim Kyok Sik, was promoted to chief of the Korean People’s Army in the latest in a series of high-level military reshuffles as Kim Jong Un elevates a new generation of military leaders. He was among the North Korean officials who went to the tarmac to see Choe off. Kim is believed to
be commander of the North Korean battalions Seoul accuses of orchestrating two attacks in 2010 that killed 50 South Koreans. Kim Kyok Sik had served as defense minister until being replaced recently by a little-known general, Jang Jong Nam, in one of several military reshuffles that have taken place since Kim Jong Un took power.

(Associated Press, “N. Korean Leader Sends Envoy to Ally China, Veering from Nuclear War Threats to Diplomacy,” May 22, 2013) North Korea’s top military official proposed talks with South Korea, China and the United States to discuss its nuclear weapons program, but the proposal was met with skepticism in Seoul and Washington, a diplomatic source said August 27. Choe Ryong-hae, the vice marshal of the North Korean People’s Army, proposed the “four-party talks” to China in May, when he visited Beijing as a “special envoy” of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, the source said. The North’s proposal for such talks, which include all parties to the six-nation nuclear negotiations aimed at ending its nuclear weapons program except for Russia and Japan, was apparently aimed at speed up the process to reconvene the broader multilateral forum, according to the source. “Vice Marshal Choe made the proposal for the four-party talks during his visit to Beijing in May, but such talks are unlikely because there is no pledge from Pyongyang to take sincere steps toward denuclearization,” the source said. “The U.S. side won’t agree to hold such talks unless North Korea meets preconditions on denuclearization.” China’s chief nuclear negotiator, Wu Dawei, arrived in Pyongyang on Monday, the North’s official Korean Central News Agency reported in a one-line dispatch, without giving details of his itinerary.

Last week, a senior Chinese military official said he sees a chance to resume nuclear talks with North Korea, citing recent signs of easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Guan Youfei, the director of the external affairs office of China’s defense ministry, made the remarks during a press conference in Washington, D.C. while accompanying Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan, according to a report by Xinhua News Agency. “An opportunity or a window has emerged to open talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue,” the report said, with Guan citing “signs of eased tensions” on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea’s “willingness to conduct multilateral talks.” (Yonhap, “N. Korea Seeks Four-Party Talks, August 27, 2013)
sides uphold the aim of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, maintain peace and stability and the using of dialogue and consultation to resolve problems, take practical steps to ameliorate the tense situation ... to restart six party talks as soon as possible and work hard for long-lasting peace and stability in northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula.” North Korea’s official KCNA news agency said Choe had been taken to a Beijing economic zone, much in the same way China used to take late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to see modern Chinese factories on his swings through the world’s second-largest economy. “North Korea hopes to concentrate on the economy and improve people’s livelihoods and is willing to create a peaceful foreign environment,” Choe told Liu. (Ben Blanchard and Sui-Lee Wee, “North Korea Says Willing to Take China’s Advice to Start Talks,” Reuters, May 23, 2013)

5/24/13

A high-level North Korean envoy delivered a letter from North Korea leader Kim Jong Eun to Chinese President Xi Jinping – ending an unusually long period of schism between the two countries. Xi responded after the meeting by forcefully urging North Korea to resume dialogue with other countries, according to China News Service. Xi said: “China has a very clear position: that all the concerned parties should keep to the goal of denuclearization, safeguarding peace and stability on the peninsula, and resolve disputes through dialogue and consultation.” And according to Chinese media, the envoy, Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, has said at least twice during the three-day visit that North Korea is “willing to accept the suggestion of the Chinese side and launch dialogue with all relevant parties.” (William Wan, “North Korea Sends Signals It May Be Willing to Rejoin Disarmament Talks,” Washington Post, May 25, 2013) A North Korean envoy visiting China said his country would “accept the proposal” by Chinese officials to open up dialogue, the state-run China News Service reported yesterday, a possible signal that the North would agree to talks on its nuclear program. The comments were reported after the envoy, Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, met Liu Yunshan, who is a member of the Communist Party Standing Committee in China and the politician who heads ideological affairs for the party. Liu was quoted as repeating a frequent appeal by China for a resumption of talks that would result in the removal of nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula “as soon as possible.” Few diplomats believe that the North is prepared to be involved in so-called six-party talks that aim to strip it of its nuclear weapons. The visit by Choe, a close aide to the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, was seen by many analysts as a fence-mending mission. Choe was quoted by the China News Service as being “highly” appreciative of “China’s huge efforts to maintain peace and stability” on the Korean Peninsula. There have been no reports so far on whether Choe has met with senior Chinese officials involved in foreign policy and military affairs. The publicized meetings have been with senior officials of the Communist Party who are the usual interlocutors with North Korea. Yesterday, Vice Marshal Choe met with Wang Jiarui, head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China. KCNA said Vice Marshal Choe visited an industrial park in Beijing. Wang Junsheng, an analyst at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said the visit of Marshal Choe could be interpreted as a “kind of apology” by North Korea for its recent behavior. (Jane Perlez, “North Korea Envoy Agrees to Dialogue, China Says, in Possible Sign for Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, May 24, 2013, p. A-4) South Korea is skeptical of a suggestion made by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s special envoy that his communist regime is willing to re-join long-suspended six-party talks, a
Seoul official said May 25. “Unlike China, North Korea did not say the word ‘denuclearization,’” a high-ranking South Korean government official said. “We have to wait a little longer and keep watch over the words and behavior of North Korea regarding nuclear issues.” The official also said it is “too early” to believe the truthfulness of Pyongyang’s intentions to return to the six-party forum. “Kim Jong-un in his personal letter underlined the need to carry forward and consolidate the traditional DPRK (North Korea)-China friendship provided and cultivated by the revolutionaries of the elder generation of the two countries,” KCNA reported. “Xi Jinping expressed deep thanks for this and asked Choe Ryong-hae to convey his cordial greetings to Kim Jong-un.” (Yonhap, “S. Korea Skeptical of N. Korea’s Intent to Return to Six-Party Talks: Official,” May 25, 2013) “We oppose talks for talks’ sake,” said Yun Byung-se, the South Korean foreign minister, on Monday. “North Korea must demonstrate its sincerity through action by honoring its international obligations and promises regarding denuclearization.” Asked to elaborate, Yun referred to the international agreements the North had signed, as well as United Nations resolutions imposing sanctions on the country. Those documents, among other things, called on North Korea to freeze its nuclear programs before their eventual dismantlement and to accept nuclear monitors from the United Nations. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Urges North To Be Serious before Talks,” New York Times, May 28, 2013, p. A-5) Seoul remained cautious about the suggestion by the unpredictable and reclusive communist neighbor. “It is at the moment, where the North Korean envoy’s visit to China is still on-going, not fully clear what was discussed between the two countries,” Unification Ministry spokesperson Kim Hyung-suk said. “It is premature to evaluate (the offer).” Foreign Ministry spokesman Cho Tai-young also said his agency will “defer” its assessment of Choe’s trip. “The government is closely watching Choe’s activities in China,” he said in a news briefing. “North Korea must follow through on its promises and obligations to the international community and show a sincere attitude.” Washington echoed the cautious approach. “I don’t think we know enough one way or another to characterize it,” State Department deputy spokesman Patrick Ventrell told reporters. (Korea Herald, “Seoul, Washington Wary of N.K. Talks Offer,” May 25, 2013) The Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, bluntly told a North Korean envoy on May 25 that his country should return to diplomatic talks intended to rid it of its nuclear weapons, according to a state-run Chinese news agency. “The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and lasting peace on the peninsula is what the people want and also the trend of the times,” Xi said in a meeting at the Great Hall of the People with Vice Marshal Choe, the China News Service reported. In telling the North that it should return to negotiations with the United States and others, Xi struck a stern tone, saying, “The Chinese position is very clear: no matter how the situation changes, relevant parties should all adhere to the goal of denuclearization of the peninsula, persist in safeguarding its peace and stability, and stick to solving problems through dialogue and consultation.” Vice Marshal Choe had already suggested yesterday that the North was open to at least some type of dialogue. But Xi’s warning made clear that he was insisting on international talks, and appeared to signal China’s frustration with its troublesome ward. Although China is North Korea’s economic benefactor, Mr. Kim has been dismissive of Chinese entreaties that it not upend the status quo in the region by provoking the West with missile and nuclear tests. In calling for a resumption of the so-called six-party talks – the diplomatic effort among countries including China and the United States that collapsed in 2008
when North Korea walked out – Xi might also have been posing a challenge to the Obama administration. The United States and South Korea have insisted on preconditions for the talks, including a pledge from North Korea that it would abandon its nuclear program. The North has rebuffed that condition in the past, and American experts say Kim is unlikely to back down. China would most likely agree to new six-party talks without preconditions, according to Cai Jian, deputy director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. “China believes that the parties sitting down for talks is progress in itself,” Cai said. Xi’s statement followed another clear message delivered in April, when he said that “no one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain.” In an earlier encounter May 25 with the vice marshal, a senior Chinese military commander delivered a message similar to Xi’s, and suggested that North Korea’s nuclear program was responsible for the rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. By the standards of China’s carefully worded statements, the remarks by the commander, Gen. Fan Changlong, a vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission, were unusually strong. They were devoid of any ritualistic references to the friendship between the allies. “In recent years, the Korean Peninsula has frequently seen rapidly escalating tensions due to the Korean nuclear issue,” General Fan was quoted as saying by the China News Service. “Strategic differences between parties have been exacerbated, endangering the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.” General Fan appealed for “dialogue and consultation” and “unremitting efforts” toward peace. In reply to General Fan, the vice marshal was quoted as saying that North Korea was willing to “search for a way to solve problems with dialogue.” An American expert on North Korea, Jonathan D. Pollack, said there was “no realistic prospect for any near-term resumption of diplomacy with Pyongyang.” But Pollack, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, added that “North Korean actions in recent months have enabled the most candid and realistic discussions between Washington and Beijing that have ever taken place.” (Jane Perlez, “China Bluntly Tells North Korea to Enter Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, May 25, 2013, p. A-8) North Korea has displayed a shift to a dialogue phase by dispatching a high-level envoy to China last week, a May 25 article in Choson Shinbo said. The visit of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s envoy to Beijing that Pyongyang appears to have signaled its intention to shift toward dialogue for peace and prosperity, citing Chinese media reports that envoy Choe Ryong-hae, the director of the General Political Bureau of North Korea’s People’s Army, mentioned the willingness to rejoin the long-suspended six-party talks. “If the phase is changed from confrontation to dialogue, efforts to avoid conflict wished by the U.S. president himself should be made first,” the paper said. South Korea’s government, however, feels North Korea’s policy direction expressed through Choe lacks specifics, according to officials in Seoul. “North Korea appears to have delivered its intention to resume dialogue to China, and the two sides seem to have shared the need for dialogue,” a high-ranking official in Seoul said. But the official painted a cautious picture of the outlook for the resumption of dialogue, noting Pyongyang’s failure to mention denuclearization. Another Seoul official also said North Korea failed to mention denuclearization and the six-party talks in its media coverage of the outcome of Choe’s Chinese trip. “North Korea and China are still wide apart as far as the denuclearization issue is concerned,” the official said. Also clouding the outlook for the resumption of dialogue, the North poured out raw criticism of
South Korean President Park Geun-hye in an official statement released on Saturday.

Using Park’s name for the first time since her inauguration in late February, the spokesman for the Policy Department of the North’s National Defense Commission issued a statement and said, “Park Geun-hye, puppet president of South Korea, openly revealed her sinister intention to stand in confrontation with the DPRK (North Korea) again on Thursday [May 23].” “When meeting with the director of the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies and his party that day, she said that the north has played a ‘game’ escalating the tension on the Korean Peninsula. Recently she was so pitiful as to coquettishly behave, blustering that the north is attempting a new ‘gamble’ called new line on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force,” said the statement. “Personally hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK, she made such reckless remarks as uttering the north cannot succeed in implementing the above-said line. She foolishly tried to shift the responsibility for having strained the overall situation on the Korean Peninsula onto the north.” (Yonhap, “N. Korea Has Dialogue Phase in Mind, Paper Says,” May 26, 2013)

China told an envoy of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un that Pyongyang should stop conducting nuclear and missile tests, but the North showed little sign of heeding the request, said a source with knowledge of the talks held late last month. Kim dispatched Choe Ryong-hae, vice chairman of the country’s top military body, to explain North Korea’s recent actions but he got a lukewarm reception from his Chinese hosts, said the source, who has close ties to Beijing and Pyongyang. Choe presented a handwritten letter from Kim to Xi. Chinese media gave no details of its contents at the time, but the source close to Pyongyang and Beijing described it as “terse.” Kim stressed in his letter that “the traditional friendship created by the older generation of revolutionary leaders should not waver at any time”, said the source. “(North) Korea has not mellowed,” said the source, who did not attend the meetings but has since spoken to both sides to which he has regular access. Beijing tried to convince Pyongyang to stop its nuclear and missile tests, which “put China in a difficult position and are not conducive to (North) Korea”, the source said. China advised North Korea to focus on rebuilding its ruined economy instead, something it has said before. Asked if Pyongyang had agreed to halt nuclear tests, the source said that for the North: “It hinges on necessity.” The source did not say if Beijing spelt out any consequences should the North conduct further tests. A former senior U.S. official said Beijing’s insistence that North Korea halt testing would be in line with recent signs it was running out of patience with Pyongyang. “What I’ve heard from talking to Chinese officials and American officials who are talking to them is that top Chinese officials now emphasize that the principal goal is to terminate the nuclear weapons program of North Korea,” the ex-official said. “Usually, in the past that’s been buried (by the Chinese).” (Benjamin Kang Lim, “China Tried to Convince North Korea to Give up Nuclear Tests - Source,” Reuters, June 4, 2013)

Beijing rebuffed attempts by senior North Korean Army figure Choe Ryong-hae, who visited China last month, to get it to recognize North Korea as a bona fide nuclear power, a military source here said June 16. “We verified through numerous channels that Choe demanded that North Korea be recognized as a nuclear power during a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping,” the source said. Choe apparently argued that the purpose of his country’s nuclear weapons program was to counter what it perceived as a U.S. threat. The source said, “We believe Choe was directed by Kim Jong-un to make the request.” But Xi,
according to Chinese media reports, told Choe, "Our stance is very clear. No matter how the political climate changes, the countries involved must firmly maintain their goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula." Chinese Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Gen. Fang Fenghui told his South Korean counterpart Gen. Jung Seung-jo in Beijing earlier this month that China made it clear to the North that its three principles for the peninsula are denuclearization, peace and stability, and negotiation and dialogue. (Chosun Ilbo, "N. Korea Urged China's to Recognize It as Nuclear Power," June 17, 2013)

KCNA: “Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and president of the People’s Republic of China, met with Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army Choe Ryong Hae, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the C.C., Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and director of the KPA General Political Bureau, on a visit to China as a special envoy of Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK, at the Great Hall of the People on Friday. Present there from the DPRK side were the party of the special envoy: KPA Col. Gen. Ri Yong Gil; Kim Song Nam, vice department director of the WPK Central Committee; Kim Hyong Jun, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs; KPA Lieut. Gen. Kim Su Gil; and Ji Jae Ryong, DPRK ambassador to China. Present from the Chinese side were Yang Jiechi, state councilor; Wang Jiarui, vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee; Zhang Yesui, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs; the deputy director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee; Liu Jieyi, deputy head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee; Yang Yanli, assistant to the head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee; and officials concerned. Choe Ryong Hae conveyed greetings sent by Kim Jong Un to Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping expressed deep thanks for this and asked Choe Ryong Hae to convey his cordial greetings to Kim Jong Un. Choe Ryong Hae courteously conveyed Kim Jong Un’s personal letter to Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping expressed deep thanks once again to Kim Jong Un for dispatching Choe Ryong Hae as his special envoy and conveying his personal letter. Kim Jong Un in his personal letter underlined the need to carry forward and consolidate the traditional DPRK-China friendship provided and cultivated by the revolutionaries of the elder generation of the two countries, Xi Jinping said, noting that the Chinese party and government deem it very important to develop the Sino-DPRK friendly relations on a strategic level and from a long-term viewpoint and that it is the consistent policy of the Chinese party and government to inherit the tradition, face up to the future and strengthen cooperation. The Chinese party and government hope for expanding the friendly exchange and cooperation with the party and government of the DPRK, he noted. The Chinese party and government have consistently supported the building of a thriving socialist nation of Korean style, he said, wishing the DPRK success in developing the economy and improving the standard of people’s living. Choe Ryong Hae said that the DPRK and the PRC are friendly neighbors linked by the same mountain and rivers and their friendship has a long history and tradition. It is the invariable stand of the party and government of the DPRK to boost the long-standing traditional friendship between the DPRK and China, he said. The armies and peoples of the two countries know well that the DPRK-
China friendship associated with the devoted efforts of the revolutionaries of the elder generation of the two countries is a precious one which cannot be exchanged for anything, he said, expressing the belief that the traditional friendship would further flourish in the future under the particular care of the top leaders of the two parties and two countries.” He expressed hope that the Chinese people would realize “the dream of China” and achieve bigger successes in accomplishing the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics under the leadership of the CPC with Xi Jinping as its general secretary. (KCNA, “Chinese President Xi Jinping Meets Choe Ryong Hae,” May 24, 2013)

5/25/13 DPRK National Defense Commission Policy Department statement: “Park Geun Hye, puppet president of south Korea, openly revealed her sinister intention to stand in confrontation with the DPRK again on Thursday [March 23]. When meeting with the director of the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies and his party that day, she said that the north has played a "game" escalating the tension on the Korean Peninsula. Recently she was so pitiful as to coquettishly behave, blustering that the north is attempting a new "gamble" called new line on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force. Personally hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK, she made such reckless remarks as uttering the north cannot succeed in implementing the above-said line. She foolishly tried to shift the responsibility for having strained the overall situation on the Korean Peninsula onto the north. It is not the first time that she made such reckless remarks. She has kicked up confrontation hysteria seriously rattling the nerves of the north through a spate of malignant invectives and sheer sophism since she was busy with a shameful presidential campaign. Recently, she orchestrated a reckless confrontation charade in collusion with her American master during her U.S. junket, not content with staging such political burlesque in the corrupt south Korean society, unaware of domestic and foreign public criticism of her. Now that she can no longer hide her heinous confrontation stance towards the north, we cannot but argue about this. There is an old adage that an ignorant person had better not pretend to know anything and one should not dare mouth anything one does not know. Such mouthing is bound to reveal ignorance and reckless tongue-lashing causes unpredictable trouble. The same can be said of her rigmarole slandering the above-said line of the north. As far as this line is concerned, it is a great inheritance of the line on simultaneously developing the economy and defense up-building laid down by the DPRK to cope with the grave situation in the 1960s of the last century as it developed the line at a new stage as required by the prevailing situation on the eve of a war created by the U.S. This is the line which no other country in the world can ever advance. Thanks to this line the army and people of the DPRK are building a socialist land of bliss desired by all people and it is demonstrating its might as a political and ideological power, military power and nuclear weapons state envied by world people and feared by enemies. It is thanks to this strategic line that the DPRK has reliably protected the sovereignty of the nation and dignity and security of the people from the U.S. constant nuclear blackmail and moves for aggression. It is Park Geun Hye who does not know at all the great meaning and tremendous weight of this strategic line the justice and vitality of which have been irrefutably proved for decades. That is why she dared let loose such vituperation as “south Korea cannot allow nukes of the
North Korea must demonstrate its “sincerity” through actual deeds in its
denuclearization efforts, South Korea’s top diplomat said, reacting coolly to a reported
offer by the North that it is open to dialogue over its nuclear weapons program.
Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se also took note of the lack of indications from North
Korea that it is willing to return to the six-party talks, while China’s state media stressed
that Chinese President Xi Jinping applied pressure on Pyongyang to rejoin the long-
stalled negotiations during a meeting with North Korean special envoy, Choe Ryong-
hae, last Friday. "Our stance is that there should not be talks for the sake of talks with
North Korea and the North must show its sincerity to the international community by
implementing its past denuclearization pledges," Yun told reporters. "With regard to
the six-party talks, the most important thing is North Korea’s willingness for
denuclearization. It is very important for North Korea to show its willingness through
specific actions," Yun said. China’s official news agency Xinhua said Choe delivered a
hand-written letter from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Xi, while the contents of
the letter were not known. North Korea "is willing to make joint efforts with all parties
to appropriately resolve related issues through multilateral dialogue and consultations
like the six-party talks, and maintain peace and stability on the peninsula," Xinhua
quoted Choe as telling Xi. However, KCNA, in its May 25 report on Choe’s meeting with
Xi, made no mention of the six-party talks or dialogue. "There has been discord in
media reports by the Chinese and North Korean side" about the meeting between Xi
and Choe, Yun said. "Depending on the actions North Korea takes in the future, we
could accurately determine what the North’s intentions are and how serious it is about
denuclearization," Yun said. On bilateral relations with Japan, Yun warned that ties will
not be normalized unless Japanese leaders repent for their country’s wartime atrocities
during its imperial past and stop making “retrograde comments and behaviors.”
frosty ties between Seoul and Tokyo were further strained after Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto made remarks last week that the Japanese military’s sexual enslavement of Asian women was "necessary." Yun slammed the remarks by Hashimoto as "shameful." "By making such remarks, Japan will be further isolated in the international community," Yun said. Up to 200,000 women, mostly Koreans, were coerced into sexual servitude at front-line Japanese brothels during World War II when the Korean Peninsula was a Japanese colony, according to historians. Those sex slaves were euphemistically called “comfort women.” (Yonhap, “S. Korea Urges N. Korea to ‘Show Sincerity’ on Denuclearization,” May 27, 2013)

South Korea's ambassador to Australia Cho Tae-yong was formally appointed as Seoul's new chief envoy to multilateral denuclearization talks on North Korea, an official said, in a regular shake-up of senior diplomats under the new government. Cho, 57, replaced Lim Sung-nam, who had served as the nation's top nuclear envoy since 2011, the foreign ministry official said on the condition of anonymity. Lim has been named as Seoul's new ambassador to London. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Appoints New Envoy for N. Korea Nuclear Talks,” May 27, 2013)

South Korea on Monday rejected the North's offer to host a joint gathering to mark the 13th anniversary of the June 15 inter-Korean joint declaration. The Ministry of Unification said in a statement that Pyongyang should not try to stir internal discord within South Korea by calling for a joint gathering involving private organizations who do not have the authority to resolve outstanding issues that can only be handled at the government level. The June 15 declaration reached at the historic 2000 summit meeting between late South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il kicked off a period of rapprochement between the two countries that saw large-scale bilateral cooperation and the expansion of economic ties. Seoul cannot accept plans to arrange a ‘political event’ that can stir North-South friction, and we again call on the North to come to the working-level negotiating table proposed on May 14,” ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk said in a news conference. The official said that the North's position of persistently ignoring calls for direct talks between officials and only striving to make contact with progressive and liberal groups in the South can only be viewed with suspicion. “If the North genuinely wants dialogue, the first step should be responding to our repeated call for working-level governmental talks on the Gaeseong industrial complex,” the spokesman said. (Korea Herald, “S. Korea Spurns Pyongyang’s Offer to Hold Joint June 145 Event,” May 27, 2013)

New international sanctions aimed at thwarting North Korea's nuclear weapons program are having unintended consequences: halting money transfers by foreign humanitarian groups working to help those most in need and forcing some agencies to carry suitcases of cash in from outside. At the same time, some restrictions are meant to sting the country's elite by crippling the import of luxury goods, such as yachts, fancy cars and jewelry. But they do not appear to be stopping the well-heeled from living large in the capital Pyongyang. Much of the aid group difficulties are linked to the state-run Bank of China’s decision earlier this month to follow Washington’s lead and sever ties with the North’s Foreign Trade Bank, the main money transfer route for most foreign organizations, U.N. agencies and embassies in Pyongyang. With that line
cut, aid workers in North Korea say they are left with few other options to receive foreign currency for expenses including rent, bills and salaries for local staff. The sanctions are not supposed to affect humanitarian aid, but six Pyongyang-based aid organizations headquartered in Europe issued a communique earlier this month spelling out their frustrations and calling the difficulties in transferring money to North Korea a “big problem.” They warned that they may be forced to suspend their operations if they cannot find ways to access cash. A handful of American non-governmental organizations also work in North Korea, but they cycle in and out and do not maintain a permanent presence. Gerhard Uhrmacher, program manager for German humanitarian aid organization Weltungerhilfe, said when recent bank transfers failed, he managed to keep projects running by routing 500,000 euros ($643,000) to Chinese or North Korean accounts in China to pay for building supplies and other goods. He said Weltungerhilfe, which signed the communique and works on agriculture and rural development projects in North Korea, has some reserves in Pyongyang but must also resort to carrying cash into the country by hand. “It doesn’t give a good impression. We’re trying to be transparent, to be open to all sides and now we’re more or less forced to do something that doesn’t really look very proper because people who carry a lot of cash are somehow suspect,” said Uhrmacher who is based in Germany and has worked in North Korea for the past 10 years. “Whatever you’re doing, everybody looks at you very closely,” he said. “That’s why we don’t like it because bank accounts are proper. Everybody can have a look at it and everybody can control it. Now we are forced to do something else." The U.S. State Department said May 29 it was aware of the concerns of humanitarian groups and was exploring ways to address them. But spokeswoman Jen Psaki said the onus was on North Korea to provide for its people and make alternative financial services available to international organizations. “This is essentially on the plate of the North Korean government which has made the decision not to provide funding and the necessary aid to their own people, which is the reason why this (aid) is so necessary from the outside," spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters in Washington. "We are aware of the challenges. We want aid to make its way to the people of North Korea." The EU has not sanctioned Foreign Trade Bank, but he said due to U.S. political pressure and fears of becoming entangled in controversy, European banks do not want to be associated with it. Bank of China had typically been used as a channel to route money to the aid groups’ North Korean accounts. Foreign embassies and NGOs can only have accounts with the FTB. “We are concerned regarding possible unintended effects of certain sanctions, in particular with regard to humanitarian assistance, and stress the need to overcome these unintended effects," said Maja Kocijancic, spokeswoman for EU foreign policy head Catherine Ashton. Embassies and U.N. agencies are also affected by the banking transfer issues, but several officials refused to comment due to the sensitivity of the issue. However, the U.N. in Pyongyang said last month that the sanctions were hurting its ability to raise funds, resulting in a shortage of drugs and vaccines. The World Health Organization also said it’s harder to import equipment and medicine because everyone has become over cautious at all levels before clearing materials. The World Food Program said it has not yet been affected by the banking problems. It only needs limited funding within North Korea as financial transactions for its food aid are completed outside the country. (Margie Mason, “N. Korea Sanctions Squeeze Cash for Aid Groups,” Associated Press, May 29, 2013)
Nine North Korean defectors have been repatriated from China after being caught in Laos earlier this month, a Seoul official said, raising fears that they are likely to face harsh punishment. The North Koreans, aged between 15 and 23, fled their country to Laos via China last month, but were forced to return to China on Monday after being rounded up by the Lao authorities on May 10. South Korea had asked Laos to send them to Seoul, but Laos rejected Seoul’s plea. “It is judged that the nine North Korean defectors were repatriated to North Korea on Tuesday [May 28] afternoon through an Air Koryo flight,” the senior foreign ministry official said. (Korea Times, “Nine Defectors Repatriated to N. Korea from China: Official,” May 29, 2013)

The U.S. Air Force nuclear weapons command this month accused North Korea and China of each developing new cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but analysts on Thursday cast doubt on the credibility of the military assertions. China's CJ-20 air-fired cruise missile and the North Korean KN-09 could both be ready within five years, the head of the Air Force Global Strike Command indicated in briefing slides dated May 7 and made public on Wednesday by Hans Kristensen, who heads the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. Several issue experts, though, said Lt. Gen. James Kowalski exaggerated the threats in a possible bid to secure additional U.S. nuclear arms modernization expenditures. A Defense Department report from earlier this month references only the "conventional strike capabilities" of China's B-6 bomber, the aircraft intended to carry the CJ-20, noted Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Lewis characterized the Air Force nuclear command’s branch’s warnings as a “gimmick,” and argued that any missile capable of carrying a 1,100-pound payload could be considered "nuclear capable." North Korean missile specialist Markus Schiller offered a similar take. “A missile doesn’t care what you put on top of it as long as it is small and light enough, be it a hippo or a nuclear warhead,” the aerospace engineer stated by e-mail. “The decisive thing is: It must go off when it should go off, and only then. And this is a task of the warhead, not the missile. Therefore, every missile is nuclear capable, depending on the available warhead.” A South Korean television station last month described the North Korean KN-09 as a ballistic missile with an approximate range of 62 to 75 miles, Kristensen said in his analysis. The Air Force, though, described the system as a “coastal defense cruise missile”; ballistic missiles follow an arc-shaped flight path that in some cases exits the atmosphere, whereas cruise missiles maintain a lower, more consistent trajectory. Pyongyang could fire a coastal defense cruise missile at the South, but hitting a nearby U.S. aircraft carrier battle group would be the "most extreme" use of such a weapon, Kristensen said by telephone. The expert voiced doubt that North Korea would seek to expand its limited nuclear potential to embrace a “whole new type of mission.” Observers have disputed North Korea’s present technical capacity to create a nuclear device capable of fitting onto a ballistic missile, and Kristensen said making one small enough for a cruise missile would pose "even more" of a technical challenge. “We don’t know the size of this system, but they tend to be smaller than ballistic missiles,” he said by telephone. One Air Force slide separately indicates North Korea has “fielded” its Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile, even though no trial launch of the weapon has taken place, Kristensen noted in his analysis. “In this case, ‘fielded’ apparently means it has appeared but not that it is operational or necessarily deployed

Rodong Sinmun bylined article: “The south Korean puppet authorities’ constant policy for confrontation is a root cause of the downgraded inter-Korean relations and escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula....The ultimate purpose sought by the puppet forces in their policy for confrontation with fellow countrymen is a "change" in the DPRK and "unification under the liberal democratic system" and this, therefore, has become a major factor of the distrust and confrontation and the war crisis that had mounted between the north and the south. The inter-Korean relations have been strained as the days went by, not an inch away from the catastrophic situation that lasted for the past five years. This is entirely ascribable to the puppet authorities' extreme confrontation policy. What they seek is to realize their ambition for 'unification of social systems' at any cost by steadily intensifying the moves to isolate and stifle the DPRK in league with outside forces. It is because of such group of traitors who are finding a way out in the confrontation with compatriots, quite indifferent to the nation's destiny that there created a serious hurdle in the cause of the country's reunification and all Koreans have been exposed to the constant danger of a nuclear war.'If the south Korean authorities truly want to see trust, dialogue and mended relations, they should roll back their confrontation policy and implement the June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration." (KCNA, "S. Korean Authorities Urged to Drop Policy for Confrontation with Compatriots," May 31, 2013)

President Park Geun-hye declared at a luncheon with reporters at the Blue House’s Nokjiwon Garden to commemorate her upcoming 100th day in office that dialogue between governments was "the way to build trust between North and South [Korea] and develop a normal relationship" on issues such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Her remarks were interpreted as a direct signal that the administration is insisting any dialogue between the two sides taking place between government authorities. They came after North Korea recently announced it would allow Kaesong Complex businessmen to visit the complex and proposed holding civilian events to celebrate the June 15 Declaration of 2000. "As long as [North Korea] keeps saying, 'Hurry up and send over private groups' or 'Let them hold June 15 memorial events,' things are just going to get more and more tangled up, and there will be no way out of the vicious circle," she said. Stressing the importance of having the two governments work out a solution, Park also said, "There will be no choice but for the government to take action if some [security] issue arises." She also voiced her displeasure with Pyongyang’s approach on the Kaesong issue. "If they had any respect for the South Korean citizens there, I don’t think they could just kick them out overnight," she said. "And if they really did respect those tenant businesses, they couldn’t have threatened not to let [employees] go if they didn’t pay all their bills." “At this point, how can anyone guarantee the safety [of complex employees] when North Korea refuses to deal with the [South Korean] government, but keeps telling private citizens to come over?” she added, referring to Pyongyang’s rejection of dialogue offers from Seoul. Park spoke at length about North Korea preventing seven South Koreans from leaving the complex over unpaid wages and other outstanding expenses. "Up until the end, I was terribly worried about the safety of those seven South Koreans - even more so because of my
sense of responsibility,” she said. “When [the North Koreans] said they wouldn’t let them go until we paid the balance, I thought, ‘They’re being held hostage.’ It was an unimaginable moment of tension, and we must not allow such things to happen again.” Stressing the importance of dialogue between government authorities, she expressed displeasure with Pyongyang’s approach to date. “We [the administration] kept saying we should continue having dialogue, that we should talk and try to work out the Kaesong issue, and North Korea kept rejecting that, and then turned around and told our civilians, ‘We’ll guarantee your safety. Come and collect everything,’” she said. “Does that make any sense at all?” “With tourism at Mount Kumgang, our citizens trusted North Korea, and there ended up being a death,” she added, referring to a South Korean tourist who was shot by a North Korean soldier while visiting the mountain in 2011. “The people at our companies aren’t criminals, and we can’t allow this vicious circle to go on, where the government steps in to pay the bills whenever something happens and we’re constantly worried about whether our citizens are going to get hurt.” (Seok Jin-hwan, “President Park Criticizes N. Korea for Inviting Citizens, But Not Agreeing to Government Talks,” Hankyore, June 1, 2013)

Farmers say they have begun working under the new policies, which are designed to boost production by giving managers and workers financial incentives. Foreign analysts say the moves to spur North Korea’s moribund economy suggest Pyongyang is taking cues from Beijing on how to incorporate free market ideas within its rigid socialist system. Under new measures announced April 1, the managers of farms, factories and other enterprises have been given leeway to set salaries and offer raises to workers who help drive up production. “This is definitely significant,” said John Delury, an assistant professor of Chinese studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea. Providing material incentives and loosening central control over economic decision making are two key elements in the transition from a command economy to a market-based system, he said. Also announced April 1: the reappointment of Pak Pong Ju as premier after his dismissal from the post in 2007. Pak was central to attempts at economic change more than a decade ago. “You just wouldn’t bring back Pak Pong Ju unless you were going to try readjusting economy policy. There would be no reason to do that,” said Delury, calling it a strong sign of Kim Jong Un’s interest in lifting living standards. Delury and others cautioned that if North Korea is intent on economic reform, it is likely to be a fitful process. “We have to be careful not to say: Aha, it’s all change, it’s finally here,” he said. “The point is, and we see this from the Chinese case, this is a process that unfolds over time and there are starts and stops, too. But this is a strong signal of a push.” The Associated Press reported last September that farmers were notified of upcoming management changes at collective farms that would put decision-making and responsibility for crops in the hands of local officials and give farmers the right to hold onto surpluses. “Last year, we studied reasonable economic management methods in different fields of economic work, and introduced it to some units on a trial basis,” Ri Ki Song, an economist from North Korea’s Academy of Social Sciences, told AP this week. North Korea formally announced the policy, and its expansion to include factories and other enterprises, a day after holding a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party. Rodong Sinmun, the party newspaper, called it part of a “new strategic line.” Ri, however, dismissed characterizations of the changes as reform. What’s new, he said, is allowing managers
to dole out goods and cash as incentives. In addition, after paying back investments provided by the state, managers can set their employees’ salaries and offer raises to those who help drive up production, he said. The main goal: to encourage "greater profits" and solve North Korea’s chronic food shortage, Ri said. He said North Koreans work hard, but the new incentives give them motivation to work even harder. "They are saying that higher salaries and shares will improve their life." Political and military expert Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Hawaii, noted that North Korea has rolled back past attempts at economic reform. "The North Koreans have played reform games before and then just sort of pulled the rug out from under it," he said. Cossa cited international aid groups as saying the military is pressuring farmers to donate their portion to the army. Last year, a farmer’s wife in Sariwon, south of Pyongyang, told the AP she planned to donate any surplus harvest to the state as a token of her patriotism. At the Tongbong farm in the eastern city of Hamhung, farmers are in the midst of a busy rice planting season after a long, cold winter. This year, things are being managed differently, said Kim Jong Jin, deputy chairman of the farm’s managing committee. He said the state provided the farm with the rice seedlings, which farmers are now transplanting to paddies by hand. Farmers are on smaller teams that have direct responsibility over their plots. After the rice is harvested, farmers must "repay" the state for the seeds. At Tongbong that means giving the state about 193 kilograms of rice as payback for every 140 kilograms of seedlings they received. But any surplus can be kept by the team to sell, barter or distribute – a change from past policies that required farmers to turn all harvests over to the state. "This encourages enthusiasm for production and we get more of what's produced," Kim said. (Jean H. Lee, Foster Klug and Sam Kim in Seoul, South Korea; Kwang Hyon Kim in Pyongyang, North Korea; Charles Hutzler in Beijing; and Margie Mason in Jakarta, “N. Korean Farmers Planting Rice with Profits in Mind,” Associated Press, May 31, 2013)

6/2/13 North Korea is pushing to give greater autonomy to its distribution sector, a senior Pyongyang official said, in what is seen as another sign of the communist country loosening its tight grip on the planned economy. In an interview with a monthly magazine published by the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), Oh Young-min, a director of the North’s Ministry of Commerce, said the ministry will overhaul the way wholesalers distribute consumer goods. "Wholesalers will offer information on all goods -- those manufactured under a government plan, surplus products and unplanned goods -- and deliver them after receiving orders from unspecified retail networks," Oh said in the June edition of the magazine. The ministry is drawing up a detailed plan to revolutionize the commerce and distribution network in order to meet the needs of the new century, the official said, adding that an order system should be implemented thoroughly in order to boost the efficiency of the distribution sector. "In line with the June measure, North Korea appears to be seeking a change of course by granting individuals greater authority in the distribution of goods," said Cho Bong-hyun, an analyst at the IBK Economic Research Institute. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Seeks to Ease State Grip on Distribution,” June 2, 2013)

6/3/13 Chinese currency and U.S. dollars are being used more widely than ever in North Korea instead of the country’s own money, a stark illustration of the extent to which the
leadership under Kim Jong-un has lost control over the economy. The use of dollars and Chinese yuan, or renminbi, has accelerated since a disastrous revaluation of the North Korean won in 2009 wiped out the savings of millions of people, said experts on the country, defectors and Chinese border traders. On the black market the won has shed more than 99 percent of its value against the dollar since the revaluation, according to exchange rates tracked by Daily NK, a Seoul-based news and information website about North Korea. Experts said the growing use of foreign currency is making it increasingly difficult for Pyongyang to implement economic policy, resulting in the creation of a private economy outside the reach of the state that only draconian measures could rein in. For now Pyongyang appeared to be capitulating, rather than trying to stamp out foreign currency use, they said. Estimates of how much hard currency is in circulation vary, but an analyst at the Samsung Economic Research Institute in Seoul put it at $2 billion in an April study, out of an economy worth $21.5 billion, according to some assessments. Pyongyang doesn’t publish economic data. In the Chinese town of Changbai in Jilin province, just across the border from the hard-scrabble North Korean city of Hyesan, one Chinese trader said North Korean officials he dealt with wanted yuan more than anything else, even food. The yuan they earned from doing business quickly gets circulated into Hyesan, a city of roughly 190,000 people whose industry-based economy has slumped since the 1990s. “The only thing they want is foreign currency,” said the trader, who sells products including medicine and tea in Changbai. He declined to be identified because he did not want to jeopardise his business or endanger his North Korean partners. In April, Daily NK posted video it said was shot secretly in February at an open-air market in Hyesan. The shaky footage showed vendors openly quoting prices in yuan for products like gloves and jackets, and one accepting payment in yuan. Pyongyang has waged periodic campaigns to try to stop the use of foreign currency but with no success. North Korea made circulating foreign currency a crime punishable by death in September 2012, the Paris-based International Federation for Human Rights said in a report last month. Another group, Human Rights Watch, recently interviewed more than 90 defectors who had fled North Korea in the past two years about punishment they had received for economic crimes. None said they were penalised for using or holding hard currency. Nevertheless, ordinary North Koreans are very careful. “I have heard multiple stories of people hiding foreign money under the floorboards in the house, or burying it up the hill in the woods out back,” said one person in northeastern China who has lived in Pyongyang and regularly interacts with North Koreans. “Nobody puts it in the bank because nobody trusts the government.” North Koreans increasingly did not refer to prices in won, Dong Yong-Sueng, senior fellow at the Samsung Economic Research Institute in Seoul, wrote in the April study on the use of foreign currency in the country. Prices were marked in U.S. dollars for beer, university preparation courses and apartments, Dong wrote. South Korea’s central bank estimated foreign currency in circulation at $1 billion in 2000. Dong reckoned $2 billion in foreign cash was now sloshing around the economy. Around half was in U.S. dollars, 40 percent in yuan and 10 percent in euros, he told Reuters. Dollars seeped into the market because trading firms exploited government quotas for exports and imports, making profits when prices diverged from those set by the state, Dong said. It was not possible to estimate the amount of North Korean won in circulation, Dong added. He said the North Korean informal economy was now bigger than the formal, state-led economy. “Without
foreign exchange, the economy would stop functioning," Dong said. One official at a European embassy in Pyongyang, who has been visiting North Korea for more than a decade, said the most noticeable change had been the increased use of yuan. Most shops carried prices in dollars, yuan or euros, said the official. "People ... pay in yuan at the market for rice and other daily necessities," said Ji Seong-ho, a defector living in South Korea who stays in touch with friends in the North. An estimated 70 percent of defectors in South Korea also send cash back to family in North Korea, according to the Organisation for One Korea, a South Korean support and research institute on North Korean defectors. A Reuters report last year showed how this money was getting to North Korea via underground agents in China, mostly Chinese of Korean descent. They use ties on both sides of the border to funnel around $10 million into the North each year, usually in yuan given the defectors send money to banks in China where it is collected by agents. Use of the South Korean won is unheard of in North Korea. Even in the recently closed Kaesong industrial zone between the two Koreas, which employed 53,000 workers from the North, wages were made to a North Korean management committee in U.S. dollars, not the South's legal tender. There are small signs some in the North Korean government may be coming to grips with the hard currency reality. In the Rason special economic zone in the far northeast of the country on the border with China, the government-run Golden Triangle Exchange Bank changes yuan into North Korean won. The rate - according to people who visited the bank recently - was 1,200 won per yuan, or 7,350 won per dollar. That's a long way from the official rate of 130 won for one dollar. (John Ruwitch and Park Ju-min, “North Korean Economy Surrenders to Foreign Currency Invasion,” Reuters, June 3, 2013)

New commercial satellite imagery confirms that North Korea is making important progress in activating key nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, including the 5 MWe gas-graphite reactor and the 20-30 MW(th) Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR). In addition, imagery of a transshipment yard created in 2011 for handling equipment and cargo to support construction at the ELWR and now probably the 5 MWe reactor shows a high-level of recent activity at these sites. Pyongyang is nearing completion of work necessary to restart the 5 MWe reactor used to produce North Korea’s supply of weapons-grade plutonium. A new system to provide secondary cooling for the reactor using a nearby pump house appears almost finished. Two tanks adjacent to the spent fuel handling building have also been buried to ensure adequate water is available for the safe storage of used rods from the reactor. External activity suggests that work is continuing inside the reactor building. The 5 MWe reactor may be 1-2 months from start-up but the availability of fresh fuel rods to power the reactor remains uncertain. Once operational, the facility will be able to produce approximately 6 kilograms of plutonium per year that can be used for manufacturing nuclear weapons. Whether production can continue indefinitely depends on the availability of fresh fuel rods. The North Koreans appear to be finishing interior work on the ELWR and are connecting the end of the existing power line with the electrical substation adjacent to the reactor building in order to provide power to the reactor and possibly carry it to the grid. They may still be months away from beginning a shakedown period that could last as little as 9-12 months before the reactor becomes fully operational. Once again, the availability of fuel is uncertain and remains the key hurdle. (Jeffrey Lewis and Nick Hansen,
The two Koreas agreed to hold talks for the first time in 28 months to normalize ties, including reopening the Kaesong industrial park and a joint tour program to Mount Geumgang. South Korea proposed that the two Koreas’ ministers meet in Seoul on June 12, accepting the North’s offer made earlier in the day. In a news conference in the evening, Unification Minister Rhyu Kihl-jae called on the North to reopen the severed communications line across the border tomorrow for working-level contacts to prepare for the meeting. The Unification Ministry expressed hopes that the intergovernmental talks will be an opportunity to build trust between the two Koreas. The North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea made the offer to take part in the talks, saying Pyongyang was also willing to discuss the reopening of inter-Korea communication channels and arranging a reunion of separated families. It also proposed the two Koreas co-host an event to mark the 41st anniversary of a landmark inter-Korean cooperation agreement. “On the occasion of the anniversary of the June 15 Joint Declaration, we propose talks between the North and South governments for the normalization of the Kaesong industrial zone and the resumption of Mount Geumgang tours,” the North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea said. “In the talks the two sides could discuss humanitarian issues including the reunion of separated families and relatives if necessary,” said the agency in charge of cross-border affairs. It also suggested the two governments jointly celebrate the anniversaries of the first inter-Korean agreement reached on July 4, 1972, and the first cross-border summit on June 15, 2000. “It will be significant and contribute to the improvement of North-South relations if the two sides jointly mark the June 15 and July 4 statements with the participation of the authorities and civilian groups.” “By proposing such formal talks as demanded by the South, it would have the effect of toning down the level of sanctions or denouncement against the North during the U.S.-China summit talks this week as well as in the South Korea-China summit meeting later this month,” said North Korean studies professor Yoo Ho-yeol of Korea University. “While holding dialogue is always preferable, talking without substantive progress in denuclearization would be meaningless. Seoul should thus approach with prudence so as not to allow Pyongyang to take the lead.” (Lee Joo-hee, “Two Koreas Agree to Hold Talks to Normalize Ties,” Korea Herald, June 6, 2013) The CPRK added that it wants to hold ceremonies marking not only the June 15 declaration, but the July 4th North-South Joint Statement reached in 1972. “We propose realizing the joint national events to mark the 13th anniversary of the June 15 declaration and jointly commemorating the 41st anniversary of the July 4 joint statement in the presence of the authorities of both sides,” it said. The CPRK said that the events can take place with both government authorities and non-governmental organization (NGO) members in attendance. It repeated its calls for Seoul to allow South Korean NGOs and businessmen to visit the North, which have thus far been rejected by Seoul as a ploy to fuel internal discord in the South. Others said that a noteworthy development of the North talks proposal can be found in its calls to celebrate the July 4 statement, that has not generated a lot of attention in recent years. The statement, which was the first official document signed by the two countries that are technically still at war, outlined three key principles of bringing about unification as well as announcing steps to end hostilities, promoting
exchanges, Red Cross talks and setting up emergency hotlines linking the two capitals. The three key principles call for self-reliance, peace and unity in bringing about unification of the Korean Peninsula. "President Park has frequently made references to the historical statement and it is noteworthy that the North has recognized this in the proposal it has made," said Kim Yeon-chul, a professor in the unification studies department at Inje University. Besides such changes, North Korea experts said that Pyongyang may have opted to engage in talks following the visit to China by a special envoy late last month. At the talks the North agreed to hold dialogue with interested parties and return to the stalled six-party talks. "The move can be seen as the first tangible step in fulfilling its plan to hold talks to resolve sticky issues facing the region," said Yang Moo-jin, a political science at the University of North Korean Studies. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Suggest Inter-Korean Dialogue in Seoul Next Week,” June 6, 2013)

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea special statement: “It is 13 years since the publication of the historic June 15 joint declaration. All the Koreans still remember the June 15 era when the spirit for national reunification ran high all over the country and are ardently wishing for the earlier improvement of the north-south relations and opening of a new phase for reunification. The publication of the joint declaration was a special event for the Korean nation in making steps toward ending the history of division and confrontation forced by outsiders and opening up a new era for independent reunification. Signal events that were presented on this land after the advent of the June 15 era proved that there is nothing impossible for the Koreans to do and that they can achieve the common prosperity of the nation and reunify the country for sure if they pool their efforts. But the advance of the June 15 era has been held back and the last legacy of the era has been placed at the peril of destruction due to the serious challenge by anti-reunification forces at home and abroad. This is truly deplorable. South Korean businessmen are now strongly calling for the normalization of the operation in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) and the resumption of tour of Mt. Kumgang. Families and their relatives separated in the north and the south are also craving reunion with their kinsfolk in their lifetime. Whoever are Koreans can never shun this tragic situation of today. We have so far made every possible effort to improve the north-south ties now at a deadlock, resume tour of Mt. Kumgang, normalize the operation in the KIZ and settle humanitarian issues. But all the sincerity and magnanimity shown by the DPRK have been denied and defiled with such sophism as ‘sincerity,’ ‘contradiction among southerners’ and ‘evasion of talks between authorities.’ We have never sought to create ‘contradiction among southerners.’ We have neither treated the south side’s authorities lightly nor approached it the way of making a fun of it as claimed by the south Korean authorities. It is none other than the south Korean authorities who are abusing north-south dialogue for the purpose of escalating confrontation in a bid to meet their strategic aims. However, we have no idea of idling away time with useless word-playing and exchange of rhetoric. If the north and the south insist on their own assertions, it will never be possible to find a way of solving pending issues between the two sides. This will further increase despair of south Korean businessmen and other people and disappointment of all fellow countrymen. In view of the prevailing situation, the desire of all fellow countrymen and the ardent request of south Korean businessmen and other people, the CPRK clarifies the following crucial stand upon the authorization: **We propose holding talks**
between authorities of the north and the south for the normalization of the operation in the KIZ and the resumption of tour of Mt. Kumgang on the occasion of the anniversary of the June 15 joint declaration. Such humanitarian issues as the reunion of separated families and their relatives can be discussed at the talks, if necessary. The venue of the talks and the date for their opening can be set to the convenience of the south side. We propose promptly realizing visits to the KIZ and the Special Zone for International Tour of Mt. Kumgang by south Korean businessmen and working contacts and promoting visits, contacts and cooperation among NGOs of the north and the south. We have already approved the visits to the KIZ by businessmen and will allow the visits to the areas of the north side by south Korean businessmen concerned with the tour of Mt. Kumgang. We also flung open the door to visits, contacts and cooperation among NGOs of south Korea. We propose realizing joint national events to mark the 13th anniversary of the June 15 joint declaration and jointly commemorating the 41st anniversary of the July 4 joint statement in the presence of the authorities of both sides. The commemoration of the June 15 joint declaration and the July 4 joint statement in the presence of the authorities together with NGOs of both sides will be significant and contribute to improving the north-south ties. As soon as the south Korean authorities respond to our proposal with a view to ensuring talks between the authorities of the north and the south, visits to the KIZ and Mt. Kumgang by south Korean businessmen and joint national events and smoothly settling pending issues between the north and the south, all the relevant measures concerning communications and liaison will be taken including the issue of reopening the Panmunjom Red Cross liaison channel. Consistent is our stand to promote national reconciliation and unity and achieve reunification, peace and prosperity. If the south Korean authorities truly stand for building confidence and improving the north-south relations, they should not miss this opportunity but positively respond to our bold decision and sincere proposal, away from misguided speculation and suspicion.” (KCNA, “CPRK Special Statement Proposes Talks between Authorities of North, South,” June 6, 2013)

China has offered to provide North Korea with food and crude oil worth a total of US$200 million on condition that Pyongyang returns to six-party nuclear talks, informed sources told Japan’s Jiji Press. The proposal was made when Choe Ryong Hae visited China as special envoy of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on May 22-24, said the sources familiar with relations between the two countries. (Bernama, “China Proposes US$200 Million in Aid to N. Korea,” June 8, 2013)

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea spokesman as regards the positive response of the south Korean authorities to the proposal made by the DPRK on holding talks between the authorities of the north and the south in its special statement: “As already reported, we issued a special statement on Thursday [June 6] clarifying its crucial stand with the aim of providing a fresh and decisive phase in the north-south relations. We appreciate the fact that the south side promptly and positively responded to the proposal made by us for holding talks between the authorities of both sides. It is our view that working contact between the authorities of the north and the south is necessary prior to ministerial-level talks proposed by the south side in the light of the prevailing situation in which the bilateral relations have
been stalemated for years and mistrust has reached the extremity. So, we propose holding working contact between the authorities of the north and the south in Kaesong on June 9. To this end, we will reopen the Panmunjom Red Cross liaison channel from 14:00 on June 7. We hope the south side will send its answer to our proposal through the channel.” (KCNA, “CPRK Spokesman Proposes Working Contact with South Side,” June 7, 2013)

The two Koreas restored a telephone line across the border Friday as part of rapid steps to set up next week’s official talks to normalize relations. North Korea reopened the communication channel in the afternoon which was severed amid military tension in March. It also proposed holding a working-level meeting in Kaesong on Sunday to prepare for the first formal talks in 28 months. Later in the day, Seoul sent a telegram through the line and suggested holding the preparatory talks at the South’s side at the border village of Panmunjeom at 10 a.m. on June 9. (Shin Hyon-hee, “Koreas Restore Cross-Border Phones Lines,” Korea Herald, June 7, 2013)

North and South Korea agreed to hold their first government dialogue in years, an abrupt change after tensions over the North’s nuclear program this year escalated into one of the divided peninsula’s worst crises. The announcement raised hopes that the two countries were moving toward a thaw in relations after a prolonged standoff in recent years that included military provocations from the North and retaliatory economic penalties from the South. The agreement came after North Korea made a surprise overture yesterday, proposing official negotiations with the South on reopening two shuttered joint economic projects, including the recently closed Kaesong industrial park, as well as humanitarian programs. South Korea, which has demanded such talks in recent months, quickly accepted the offer, proposing a cabinet minister-level meeting in the South Korean capital, Seoul, next Wednesday.

North Korea welcomed the quick response from the South and proposed working-level talks in Kaesong on Sunday to prepare for the proposed cabinet-level meeting. It also said it was restoring cross-border communications lines it had cut off earlier this year out of anger over joint United States-South Korean military drills. The sudden change comes a day before President Obama’s scheduled meeting in California with President Xi Jinping of China, North Korea’s main ally. The North’s recent belligerence – including threats of nuclear attacks if provoked – was expected to be a main topic of discussion. “It is trying to shift the international focus from applying sanctions and pressure on the North to starting dialogue with it,” said Koh Yu-hwan, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in Seoul. Some analysts were skeptical of any long-term change. “There is no fundamental change in their positions,” said Dong Yong-seung, a North Korea specialist at the Samsung Economic Research Institute. “Denuclearization remains a stumbling block.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North and South Korea Agree to First Official Dialogue in Years,” New York Times, June 7, 2013, p. A-6)

North Korea made a surprise June 6 proposal for talks between government authorities, and South Korea responded affirmatively by proposing a minister-level meeting. With dialogue back on track between the two sides, observers are expecting efforts to resume North Korea-US dialogue and the six-party talks on the nuclear issue to also gain traction. The question now is whether this marks a first step in easing the old hostility and frictions between the two sides through dialogue and reconciliation. The offer, which came in a special statement by the Committee for the Peaceful
Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), appears to be a response to the "trust-building process" that forms a central pledge of President Park Geun-hye's administration. Korean People’s Army vice marshal Choe Ryong-hae visited China on May 22 to 24. Speaking as a special envoy for leader Kim Jong-un, Choe said North Korea intended to resolve its issues through dialogue and negotiations, including the six-party talks. But comments that followed suggested that Pyongyang would reject any dialogue between authorities for the time being. In particular, it leveled its first direct criticisms at President Park in a May 25 statement by a National Defense Commission politburo spokesperson, blasting her as a “puppet president” and saying she had revealed her “true atrocious hostility.” For this reason, observers are saying North Korea’s offer to return to cooperative relations, including normalization of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Keumgang tourism, as well as reunions of separated families, represents an earlier-than-anticipated shift in policy. The most notable aspect is the timing. The offer came on the eve of a US-China summit meeting scheduled for June 7 and 8 in California. The aim appears to have been to get inter-Korean dialogue back on track in the hopes of using it as a stepping stone toward eventual dialogue with Washington. “When Choe Ryong-hae told [Chinese President] Xi Jinping he was hoping for ‘talks in various formats, including the six-party talks,’ he was thinking about dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington,” said former Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun. “If dialogue does take place between North and South, it could set the stage for Xi to work during his talks with [US President] Barack Obama to bring Washington into dialogue with Pyongyang,” he explained. In a recent contribution to a South Korean daily, Song Ronghua, secretary-general of China’s Public Diplomacy Council and a China Foreign Affairs University visiting professor, predicted that the two leaders would “send a strong message on Korean Peninsula issues” at the talks. This bolsters a claim made on May 25 by Choson Sinbo, which said that China was opening up some room for the six-party talks chair state to maneuver diplomatically by practicing a more forward-thinking approach to dialogue in various forms. The offer also comes in the wake of a number of economic management improvements implemented in North Korea to bolster the weak economy, including a limited recent expansion of autonomy at collective farms and factories. Such measures are unlikely to pay off substantially without support from South Korea, China, and other countries. This suggests that the offer also had the aim of making the international environment more favorable for the economic steps. The CPRF spokesperson’s statement appeared to regard inter-Korean dialogue as more than just a stepping-stone to talks with Washington. In addition to talks between authorities toward normalizing operations at the Kaesong Complex and Mt. Kumgang for the 13th anniversary of the June 15 Joint Declaration of 2000, it also proposed commemorative events with the South Korean government and civic groups. In short, it advocated restoring relations between the two sides - after five years of deterioration and disruptions under Park’s predecessor Lee Myung-bak - in the spirit of the 2000 declarations. This suggests a favorable view from Pyongyang toward the Park administration, which has respected basic agreements and opened the door for dialogue even as it has refused to bow to continued military provocations and threats from North Korea. The statement included a number of suggestions that signal Pyongyang’s sincerity about its offer, including a joint event to commemorate the North-South Joint Declaration of July 4, 1972 - an agreement reached by Park’s father, former President Park Chung-hee - and a
A number of individuals with suspected connections to North Korea are operating ghost companies in international tax havens, a group of independent journalists announced. Although their connection with Pyongyang or its rulers has not been verified, observers say that it cannot be ruled out that the companies are tools for managing the slush funds of the Kim family that has held power for more than 60 years. According to the Korea Center for Investigative Journalism, a British Virgin Islands-based paper company by the name of Larivader Solutions was registered to one Mun Kwang-nam, whose address was given as “2 Kin Mal Dong, Mao Lang Bong District Pyong Yang Republic of Korea.” The company was established in 2004, and is thought to have existed at least until October 2009. In addition to Larivader Solutions, documents on three other companies set up in the region — Chollima, Chosun and Koryo Telecom — showed an individual named Lim Jong-ju as their director. In addition to Lim, the name Wong Yuk-kwan appears in all three companies as a director. “Lim Jong-ju and Wong Yuk-kwan are thought to be businessmen who took part in North Korea’s mobile telecom project,” Korea Center for Investigative Journalism said in a statement. “Lim Jong-ju does not appear to be North Korean, but it can be deduced that the companies are linked to North Korea as the companies’ names are in North Korean style and because there are signs that their directors have been involved in North Korea-linked projects.” (Choi He-suk, “Tax Haven Finds Seen Linked to N.K.,” Korea Herald, June 7, 2013)
countries for years. Although the leaders of the world’s two biggest powers made no public statements on their second day of talks, their disagreements – over cyberattacks as well as arms sales to Taiwan, maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea and manipulation of the Chinese currency – spilled into the open when senior officials from both countries emerged to describe the meetings in detail. Obama and Xi also found areas of agreement over North Korea, which under pressure from China has muted a flurry of belligerent statements after nuclear and missile tests this year. After suspending nearly all contact with South Korea, the North has in recent weeks reversed course, and on Sunday officials of the two countries are to meet at a border village to arrange the first cabinet minister-level meeting in six years. Obama’s administration has welcomed China’s new assertiveness with its neighbor and ally, believing that it reflects a new calculation that a constant state of crisis on the Korean Peninsula is destabilizing for the Chinese as well. The two presidents held a long discussion on North Korea over what Tom Donilon, Obama’s departing national security adviser, called “a very lively dinner” yesterday, and he said that they agreed that dealing with the country’s nuclear arsenal was a promising arena for “enhanced cooperation.” “They agreed that North Korea has to denuclearize, that neither country will accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state” and that their two nations would work together to achieve that through pressure on Pyongyang, Donilon said. The two presidents met for nearly eight hours beginning yesterday evening, and appeared eager to redefine the relationship in a way that would allow their countries to overcome their economic, political and diplomatic differences, rather than letting new – or old – crises derail progress across the spectrum of issues. On the most contentious issue in recent months – American accusations that Chinese corporations linked to the military had pilfered military and economic secrets and property in cyberspace – the officials seemed to speak past each other. That dominated today’s talks here at a secluded estate, but ended without a clear acknowledgment by Xi of any culpability. China’s state councilor, Yang Jiechi, said China strongly opposed hacking and cyberespionage and was itself a victim, while Donilon warned that the threat from China threatened to constrain the spirit of partnership Obama and Xi publicly declared they wanted. Obama warned that if the hacking continued, Donilon said, it “was going to be a very difficult problem in the economic relationship.” In remarks during a joint appearance last night, Obama at least publicly softened his language and spread the blame for the hacking and theft of business, financial and military information. “Those are not issues that are unique to the U.S.-China relationship,” the president said. “Those are issues that are of international concern. Oftentimes it’s nonstate actors who are engaging in these issues as well.” He added, “We’re going to have to work very hard to build a system of defenses and protections, both in the private sector and in the public sector, even as we negotiate with other countries around setting up common rules of the road.” And, Obama said, China would face similar threats as its economy develops – Xi suggested it already had – “which is why I believe we can work together on this rather than at cross-purposes.” Secretary of State John Kerry, who attended the meetings, has previously announced that the two countries would discuss the matter as part of the annual meetings known as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, to be held in Washington in July. Yang said that the two discussed a host of contentious issues and “did not shy away from differences.” Xi called on the United States to end its arms sales to Taiwan, he said, and reasserted its territorial claims, while pledging to resolve them
peacefully. Yang also defended China’s control of its currency and said it was not the core trade issue between them. Broadly, though, both leaders urged cooperation, not conflict. Obama called for joint efforts to address climate change, including through sharing clean-energy technologies, and to establish better military communications so “that we each understand our strategic objectives at the military as well as the political levels.” Xi agreed. “China and the United States must find a new path,” he said, “one that is different from the inevitable confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past.” The Chinese president, who as a young man lived for a time with a family in Iowa and visited again during a trip to the United States last year as vice president, said he and Obama would keep “close communication” through letters, phone calls, bilateral meetings and visits, adding, “I invited President Obama to come to China at an appropriate time for a similar meeting like this.” Xi said, “Both sides have the political will to build this relationship.” After breakfast today, the two presidents resumed discussions. While their talks last evening delved into security and geopolitical issues, the meetings today focused on economic and trade issues. (Jackie Calmes and Steven Lee Myers, “Divisions Aside, U.S. and China Moving Closer,” New York Times, June 9, 2013, p. 1)

PRC State Councilor Yang Jiechi: “In their discussions about cooperation without avoiding differences, they strive to be thorough and candid instead of trying to reach every aspect of a matter. It is unprecedented no matter in the time and quality of interaction, or the depth and breadth of communication, which reflects the great importance both sides attach to China-US relations, conforms to the requirement of the China-US relationship development in the new period and shows the strategic significance and global impact of China-US relations. … Both sides agreed to work together to construct a new pattern of relationship between great powers on the basis of mutual respect, cooperation and win-win results for the benefit of the people of the two countries as well as the world. … The two presidents exchanged views on the North Korea nuclear issue. President Xi reiterated the principled stand of China, emphasized that China insists on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, persists in the safeguarding of peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and adheres to the solving of the North Korea nuclear issue and the peninsula issue through dialogue and negotiation. China will continue to make unremitting efforts towards it. China and America share identical principled stand and overall objective on the North Korea nuclear issue. It becomes imperative to resume dialogue as soon as possible. China is willing to maintain close dialogue and cooperation with America.” (PRC Embassy in Washington, Yang Jiechi’s Remarks on the Results of the Presidential Meeting between Xi Jinping and Obama at the Annenberg Estate, June 9, 2013)

The United Nations’ aid group has approved emergency food aid to North Korea to help feed 2.4 million undernourished people in the impoverished communist country, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported. The plan calls for the World Food Program (WFP) to send 206,800 tons of food to North Korea during one year starting from July, the Washington-based radio station said. The shipment will include nutrition biscuits for some 1.9 million children and nutrition-balanced meals for some 500,000 pregnant women, it said. In its survey of 87 North Korean families from January to March, the WFP found that 80 percent of them were undernourished mainly due to a lack of
South and North Korea agreed to hold a ministerial meeting in Seoul later this week at their first government-level contact in more than two years, seeking to build mutual trust and ease uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula. In the morning and afternoon sessions of the government-level talks held at Freedom House on the South Korean side of the joint security area of Panmunjom, the two sides exchanged views on the agendas and delegations for Wednesday's ministerial meeting in Seoul, the Ministry of Unification said. "The two sides shared the understanding in regards to the ministers' meeting," said ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk, stressing that both Seoul and Pyongyang effectively want the meeting of senior policymakers to take place. Seoul will be represented by Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae as chief negotiator, with authorities here asking the North to send Kim Yang-gon, the head of the United Front Department of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea as its top negotiator. The spokesman also said that discussions were conducted in a calm manner without any particular contentious issue having been raised that could have halted negotiations. A source, who declined to be identified, said all were in agreement on holding the ministers' meeting for more than a day. "I can't elaborate on details, but several more meetings may be needed for an agreement is finally ironed out," he said. The official declined to say if Seoul touched on denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Chun Hae-sung, head of the unification ministry’s policy bureau, is leading the three-person South Korean delegation at the truce village. For the North, Kim Song-hye, an official at the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) with extensive experience in dealing with the South, is leading the talks. She is one of the few female officials at the CPRK with experience in handling inter-Korean talks. (Yonhap, “Koreas Agree on Ministerial Meeting in Seoul,” June 9, 2013) Who will lead the North Korean delegation to the “government-to-government” meeting rather than a ministers one as suggested by the South. Chun Hae-sung, the Unification Ministry official who was Kim’s counterpart, told a news conference that he didn’t accept Seoul’s request for Kim Yang-gon, head of the North’s United Front Department of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea. During their marathon talks that ended early Monday morning at the truce village of Panmunjeom, Pyongyang insisted on being unclear about its lead delegate. The North’s Kim Song-hye, who led the working-level talks, insisted that the event should be called a “government-to-government” meeting rather than a ministers one as suggested by the South. Chun Hae-sung, the Unification Ministry official who was Kim’s counterpart, told a news conference that he didn’t know who would lead the northern delegation, saying that it would travel to Seoul by road. Each delegation will be composed of five officials and the meeting will be held in the Grand Hilton western Seoul. North Korean experts say it is unlikely for Kim to lead the North Korean delegation because he has never taken the helm in inter-Korean minister-level talks on previous occasions. Alternatively, Won Dong-yeon, deputy chief of the United Front Department, and Maeng Kyong-il, a high-ranking official at the North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, are seen as potential chief delegates. The two are considered inferior in status compared to Ryoo. (Chung Min-uck, “Who Will Be Chief N. Korean Delegate?” Korea Herald, June 10, 2013)
The Obama administration has begun helping Middle Eastern allies build up their defenses against Iran’s growing arsenal of cyberweapons, and will be doing the same in Asia to contain computer-network attacks from North Korea, according to senior American officials. The American officials would not say which countries in the Persian Gulf have signed up for help in countering Iran’s computer abilities. But the list, some officials say, includes the nations that have been the most active in tracking Iranian arms shipments, intercepting them in ports and providing intelligence to the United States about Iranian actions. The three most active in that arena are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. In Asia, the countries most worried about being struck by North Korean computer attacks are South Korea and Japan. The Defense Department’s assertive new effort in the gulf and Asia is the latest example of how the Obama administration is increasingly tailoring its national security efforts for a new era of digital conflict, in this case assuring the defense of computer networks and, if necessary, striking back against assaults. A directive signed by the president that surfaced on June 7 – the third in a series of leaked documents published by the newspapers The Guardian and The Washington Post – underscored how the Obama administration is trying to prepare itself and its allies. The leaks also revealed how the Obama administration has put in place a large Internet surveillance operation to identify terrorism threats. The presidential directive included the declaration that the United States reserved the right to take “anticipatory action” against “imminent threats,” a reference, it seemed, to the kind of crippling infrastructure attacks that Iran appears to be working on against American and allied targets. The new help for strengthening computer-network defenses for allies, which has not been publicly announced, closely parallels earlier efforts by the Obama administration in two volatile parts of the world. In recent years it has helped install advanced missile-defense systems and early-warning radars in Persian Gulf nations to counter Iran’s missile ability, and it has done something similar in Asia in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. But deterring cyberattacks is a far more complex problem, and American officials concede that this effort, which will include providing computer hardware and software and training to allies, is an experiment. It has been propelled by two high-profile attacks in the past year. One was against Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s largest, state-run oil producer, and according to American officials it was carried out by Iran. That attack crippled 30,000 computers but did not succeed in halting production. The other, an attack on South Korea’s banking and media companies this spring, was later attributed to North Korea. It froze the ability of several banks to operate for days. “The Iranian attack on the Saudis was a real wake-up call in the region,” said one senior administration official, who would not speak on the record about the American efforts to counter Iran. “It made everyone realize that while the Iranians might think twice about launching a missile attack in the region, they see cyber as a potent way to lash out in response to sanctions.” The new interagency effort in Washington comes at a time when Israeli and American intelligence officials have been concerned by Iran’s swift advances in its computer weaponry, particularly its ability to disrupt existing infrastructure. As one former senior American military commander said recently, “They have startled everyone with the speed at which their capabilities have increased.” But one continuing point of dispute is whether Iran and North Korea are working together on the development of cyberweapons, the way they have worked together for years on the development of missile technology. A senior Israeli military
official said Israel had evidence that Iran and North Korea were beginning to collaborate on developing cyberweapons. He declined to cite the specific evidence. Although there is concern in Washington that cooperation between Iran and North Korea could spread to computer tools, American officials say there is no proof of such collaboration. A senior Defense Department official said the program to develop computer skills among allies would focus solely on defending against disruptive and destructive attacks on networks for the military and critical infrastructure. The United States will not share its growing arsenal of offensive cyberweapons, which, like nuclear arms, can be deployed only on presidential order. Those have been used in only one major case: the American and Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear enrichment system, part of a covert program called Olympic Games that delayed, but ultimately failed to destroy, Iran's nuclear ability. Officials pledge that computer hardware and software eventually provided to allied nations will be evaluated to avoid providing the type of defensive systems that also can be used for domestic surveillance or to punish political opponents. This new focus on adding computer-warfare skills to a global effort the Pentagon calls “building partner capacity” — and usually refers to more traditional training of conventional forces — is another indication of the high level of concern in Washington about the growing danger of computer-network attacks from Iran or North Korea. After the attacks on energy firms in the Persian Gulf, "we recognized that we really need to bolster our working relationships with key allies in the region," said one senior Defense Department official. "We made a very conscious strategy decision to make that a priority, both in the gulf and also in Asia." (Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Helps Allies Trying to Battle Iranian Hackers,” New York Times, June 9, 2013, p. 1)

UN Panel of Experts Report: “Overall, the Panel believes that while the imposition of sanctions has not halted the development of nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it has in all likelihood considerably delayed the timetable of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and, through the imposition of financial sanctions and the bans on the trade in weapons, has choked off significant funding which would have been channelled into its prohibited activities. In both its export and import of goods under sanctions, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to use a variety of techniques to circumvent national controls, indicating that the imposition of sanctions has hampered its arms sales and illicit weapon programs. The resolutions are also crucial in preventing the country from exporting sensitive nuclear and missile technology, thereby increasing the overall risk to international peace and security. The Panel, however, continues to highlight the uneven implementation of the resolutions in the present report, which creates gaps that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exploits. …

On 11 April 2013, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced that it was creating a new “Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry”, whose purpose will be to modernize its atomic energy industry and increase the quantity and quality of nuclear materials. This new Ministry will undoubtedly take over the responsibilities of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (designated by the Committee on 16 July 2009 as the primary Democratic People’s Republic of Korea agency overseeing nuclear programs, including the operation of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre). In the light of this and of recent official declarations clearly linking the supposed
“industry of atomic energy” to the production of fissile material to be used in nuclear weapons, the Panel recommends that the Committee designate the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry, as well as the new Minister, upon nomination, for their role in and support for the nuclear programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. …

Given the continued development by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its nuclear programs, the Panel considers that transfer to and from the country of key items, especially for uranium enrichment, should be more strictly controlled and the scope of prohibition should be expanded. The Panel notes a broad consensus among nuclear experts that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could use items outside the parameters adopted by the Security Council to expand its nuclear programs, especially its enrichment program. Following extensive consultations with a range of governmental and independent technical experts, the Panel recommends that the Committee determine the following items and materials to be subject to the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) using the technical parameters described in annex VIII:

(a) Maraging steel;
(b) Frequency changers (also known as converters or inverters);
(c) High-strength aluminum alloy;
(d) Fibrous or filamentary materials, and prepregs;
(e) Filament winding machines and related equipment;
(f) Ring magnets;
(g) Semi-hard magnetic alloys in thin strip form. …

Analysis of the debris showed that most of the first stage is of indigenous manufacture, even though some components were foreign-made. The Panel examined the retrieved fuselage and identified a number of foreign-sourced components, which include sensors, pressure switches, wire cables and other electronic devices. Most appeared to be common commercial products. The fact that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea acquires even mundane components abroad demonstrates certain limitations of its domestic industry and the foreign-trade dependency of its prohibited activities and programmes. In this respect, the Panel believes that all Member States should pay appropriate vigilance and take necessary steps in accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 2094 (2013) regarding such items. …The Panel recommends that the Committee designate the following entities and individuals for their role in and support for the ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea:

• The Munitions Industry Department of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party
• The State Space Development Bureau
• Ju Kyu-Chang, Director, KWP Munitions Industry Department
• Jon Pyong-Ho, former Director, KWP Munitions Industry Department
• Pak To-Chun, Secretary, KWP Munitions Industry Department
• Hong Sung-Mu, Deputy Director, KWP Munitions Industry Department
• Choe Chun-Sik, Director, Second Academy of Natural Sciences
• Ri Ung-Won, Chief Secretary, State Academy of Sciences …

In July 2012, the Republic of Korea reported to the Committee that it had inspected and seized an illicit shipment of missile-related items on board the container vessel Xin
Yan Tai operated by China Shipping Container Lines while in transit at the Port of Busan in May 2012. The cargo, which originated from Tianjin, China, and was destined for Lattakia, Syrian Arab Republic, contained about 10 metric tons of graphite cylinders, falsely declared as lead pipes. The result of laboratory tests conducted by the Republic of Korea showed that these graphite cylinders were “fine grain graphite” defined by item 6.C.3 of S/2012/235, the export of which by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is prohibited under paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006). The Panel inspected the seized items in August 2012. The bill of lading (see annex IV) names the shipper, Dalian Haicheng International Freight Agency Co. Ltd., and the consignee, Electric Parts Company. According to the Republic of Korea, the real consignor is a branch of Korea Tangun Trading Corporation, an entity designated by the Committee on 16 July 2009. According to China, its investigation revealed that the Syrian company purchased the items through a middleman in China. They further indicated that the Chinese company was unaware of the real nature of the cargo and that penalties would be imposed on any Chinese entity found to have violated Security Council measures. The Panel needs to obtain further information regarding the role of Dalian Haicheng International Freight Agency as well as of other entities or individuals possibly involved and determine whether the items were produced in and originated from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or were acquired by it in another country. According to the Panel’s investigation, Electric Parts Company, the consignee, shares an address, telephone and fax number with Megatrade, a known front company for the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre. The Panel previously reported the Centre’s involvement in several violations of sanctions (see paras. 57, 65 and 66 of S/2012/422 and para. 88 of the present report).

It was publicly reported in June 2012 that the Ukrainian Security Services prevented an attempt by two nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to obtain classified missile design materials. Corroborating information provided by Ukrainian and Belarus authorities shows that these two individuals, Ryu Song-Chol and Ri Thae-Gil, were officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accredited to its Trade Representative Office in Belarus (see passports in annex X). In 2011, Ryu and Ri travelled to Ukraine and approached an employee of the State-owned Yuzhnoye Design Office (an entity formerly engaged in the development of medium-range to intercontinental ballistic missiles and now developing space launcher vehicles) to obtain photographs of secret academic theses. According to Ukrainian authorities, these would have provided the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with information on advanced technologies and new forms of technological processes for the design of missile systems, liquid-propellant engines, spacecraft and missile fuel supply systems and associated computer programs. The Ukrainian national having reported this approach, the Ukraine Security Services arrested Ryu and Ri in the middle of a prearranged delivery. Both were sentenced in May 2012 to terms of imprisonment of eight years.

Officials and diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have been involved in illicit activities even before the imposition of sanctions. Between 1993 and 1998, while he was the representative of the country to IAEA, Yun Ho-Jin (who was designated by the Committee in July 2009), was running an illicit procurement network and conducting other illicit and criminal activities out of his country’s embassy in Vienna. It is regularly reported that intelligence officers of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea working under diplomatic cover in Berlin are particularly interested in acquiring technology and technical know-how about metal processing. It is highly likely that similar activities are conducted out of the country’s other embassies, diplomatic missions and commercial and trade missions abroad. Diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or officials travelling on diplomatic or service passports, have also been involved in numerous violations of the arms embargo. A diplomat and a KPA Senior Colonel travelling under diplomatic status (see annex XVII, sects. D and E) were involved in the illicit refurbishment of armoured vehicles and other military equipment in the Congo and used diplomatic bank accounts to transfer funds (see paras. 99 and 100). Documents related to Michael Ranger’s attempt to broker Democratic People’s Republic of Korea man-portable air defence systems to Azerbaijan show that O Hak-Chol, his main contact in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, was travelling under a diplomatic passport at least until 2004 and probably later (see para. 91). Diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were also involved in several violations of the luxury goods embargo, including the export of eight Mercedes Benz vehicles from Austria and the attempt to export two yachts from Italy (see paras. 84 and 85 of S/2012/422).

As noted in paragraph 38 of its 2012 final report, the Panel continued to examine and gather information about new 8-axle transporter-erector-launchers that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea displayed during its April 2012 military parade in order to determine if those vehicles had been procured in violation of the resolutions expressly prohibiting the transfer of transporter-erector-launchers, related technology and “all arms and related materiel”. China briefed the Committee in October 2012 that their investigation showed that Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company (hereinafter “Wanshan”) had exported six lumber transporters to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2011. They said that these vehicles had a substantive distinction from transporter-erector-launchers or missile transporters and could not be used for transporting or launching missiles. China further stated that there had been no violation of sanctions or Chinese law. When asked about the transporter-erector-launchers on 23 April 2012, a United States White House spokesman said that the United States had “raised the allegations with the Chinese Government […] as part of [its] ongoing close consultations on North Korea”. During private consultations on 12 February 2013 with the Panel, United States State Department officials stated their understanding that the export had not been of transporter-erector-launchers, but only of trucks. China later furnished the Panel with a copy of the end user certificate provided by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea buyer (see annex XII, sect. A). Dated 5 November 2010, it stated that the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Forestry Ministry Rim Mok General Trading Company, Limited” certified that “the six units of the off-road trucks (WS51200) which are imported from Wuhan Sanjiang Import and Export Company, Limited (China), according to the contract (contract No. IME10S054) are the vehicles for transporting the timbers in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. Both Wuhan Sanjiang Import and Export Company and Wanshan are subsidiaries of the China Sanjiang Space Group. The China Sanjiang Space Group’s parent company, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, announced on 19 October 2010 its first-ever export agreement with a non-governmental foreign customer for the sale of WS51200 vehicles worth RMB 30 million (see annex XII, sects. B and C). Its personnel
had been negotiating with the customer since 2008 regarding this state-of-the-art special vehicle technology, which involved the adaptation of military technology for civilian use. Image analysis conducted by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research Operational Satellite Applications Programme concluded that features of the cab’s fronts and sides, the fenders, the exhaust systems, fuel tanks and tires of the vehicles seen on parade exactly matched those of the WS51200 series advertised by Wanshan. This analysis is based on all available parade images, including a satellite image, and public commercial information from the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (see photographs in annex XII, sects. D and E). On the basis of the information currently available, the Panel considers it most likely that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea deliberately breached the end user guarantee that it officially provided to Wuhan and converted the WS51200 trucks into transporter-erector-launchers. While nothing in the resolutions prohibits the export of lumber transporters to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the particulars of the transaction remain unclear and the Panel will continue its investigations. …

In March 2013, Kim Jong-Un officially directed that computer numerically controlled (CNC) technology be incorporated into the atomic energy industry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a sector also tasked with the development of nuclear weapons. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also assigns strategic importance to computer numerically controlled technology in its military industry, especially ballistic missile programmes. Certain computer numerically controlled machine tools with nuclear and ballistic missile-related applications are at present included in the lists of items whose export and import are prohibited by the resolutions. There is, however, broad consensus among technical experts that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could make effective use in its illicit programs of machine tools outside current parameters. The Panel’s research shows that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in the past, illegally acquired computer numerically controlled machine tools and related equipment from companies based in Taiwan Province of China. This machinery and equipment were classified as strategic high-tech items, and their export to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was prohibited by law. In every instance, the Panel confirmed press reporting through court documents that it was able to obtain online. These records give details of these incidents:

• Various items, including industrial computers, exported by Royal Team Corporation in 2006 and 2007
• One horizontal machining centre exported by Ching Hwee International Trading Company Limited in June 2006 to Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation, designated by resolution 2087 (2013)
• Three computer numerically controlled machine tools exported by Ho Li Enterprises Limited in June 2010 (see para. 61 of S/2012/422)

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is also suspected of acquiring advanced machine tools from the United States: On 6 May 2013, the United States indicted two individuals who are alleged to have laundered money and conspired to export machine tools for use in the production of weapons of mass destruction to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2008 and 2009. The Panel will investigate this incident. The efforts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to acquire restricted goods and technology continue, as shown by a failed attempt in 2011 (see
The country’s own industry produces and exports computer numerically controlled machines. Ryonha Machinery Corporation (which the Panel has determined is an alias used by the recently designated Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation (see para. 136) advertises its computer numerically controlled machine tools for export to other countries in publications of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Pamphlets obtained by the Panel show a variety of products but not their detailed specifications (see annex XXI, sect. B). The Panel suspects the quality to be low, but does not know if these machines fall within the specifications set out by the Security Council. …In March 2013, Japan reported to the Committee that in August 2012 it had inspected a cargo at the Port of Tokyo containing aluminium alloys, suspected to be nuclear-related, that originated from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel has yet to inspect these items or obtain further information about the entities involved. The Panel will report the result of its investigation to the Committee in due course. …The Panel notes with concern the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation signed between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran in September 2012, reportedly in the presence of the Vice-President of the latter and the head of its Atomic Energy Organization, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, who was designated by resolution 1747 (2007) for being involved in the nuclear or ballistic missile activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and of the Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics, Ahmad Vahidi. The two countries operate sensitive nuclear programmes relevant for the production of nuclear weapons and have previously collaborated on missile development. In spite of repeated calls by IAEA to cooperate fully regarding unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site, very likely to have been a nuclear reactor built with the assistance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, no progress has been made during the reporting period owing to non-cooperation on the part of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Panel underscores that the Syrian Arab Republic is involved in one third of all weapons of mass destruction and arms-related incidents of non-compliance investigated by the Panel (see paras. 44-46, 86-89 and 121 of the present report, paras. 57, 65 and 66 of S/2012/422 and para. 62 of S/2010/571). These incidents prove the persistence of close ties between the two countries, which continue to be a matter of serious concern. The announcement by the Government of Myanmar, in advance of a visit by the United States President, Barack Obama, in November 2012, that it would sign the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements is an important step, given the close traditional military relationship between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Myanmar and the likelihood of past violations of sanctions. The Panel plans to engage with the Government of Myanmar in discussing its implementation of the resolutions related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. …In July 2012, Michael Ranger was convicted in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of attempting to sell Azerbaijan between 70 and 100 man-portable air defence
systems produced in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other items in 2008. Court documents and information that the Panel obtained in an interview with Mr. Ranger offer a rare insight into the arms-selling practices of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Mr. Ranger told the Panel that he had done business with representatives of Hesong Trading Corporation, identified by several Member States as a subsidiary of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, since 2004 (see annex XVI, sect. A). He was in regular e-mail correspondence with O Hak-Chol (see diplomatic passport in annex XVI, sect. B), his primary contact at Hesong, and occasionally met him and two other representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at public places (hotels, restaurants and bars) in third countries where the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea maintained embassies. At those meetings, Mr. Ranger said that they would never mention whom they were representing or name superiors. The operatives’ tight-lipped restraint with a business partner is indicative of the challenge of obtaining reliable information on details and entities involved in illicit transfers. Mr. Ranger was unable to conclude the deal for man-portable air defence systems because of unbridgeable differences over quantities and phasing of delivery. Had the deal been concluded, uncontested parts of the negotiations showed that the arms would have been delivered using a chartered cargo (IL-76) or passenger (IL-18) aircraft at an estimated cost of US$ 250,000 to US$ 300,000. Transportation costs figure significantly in the country’s calculus over terms. Information obtained in the Ranger investigation shows that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea looks carefully at the bottom line and rejects orders for small quantities because of higher per-unit manufacturing and/or transport costs. The Panel learned that the country’s limited direct connections with mainstream shipping companies have posed a major obstacle to finalizing some deals. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has had to use charter feeder vessels to carry cargo to regional hubs in neighbouring countries, which increase the transport costs of arms. To keep costs down, it has insisted on using nearby ports for trans-shipment, none farther than the ports of Hong Kong, China, or Kaohsiung, Taiwan Province of China. Hesong representatives told Mr. Ranger that products available for sale included modern and vintage small arms and light weapons, GPS jammers, multiple launch rocket systems, and (extraordinarily) ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,500 km. He was never shown samples of the weapons before purchase. Mr. Ranger indicated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had recently begun pricing its weapons in euros instead of United States dollars. Among the weapons he obtained, Mr. Ranger said that he never came across anything sourced from a country other than the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate Hesong Trading Corporation and O Hak-Chol as subject to the measures of paragraphs 8 (d) and 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) for activities prohibited by the resolutions. (Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) S/2103337 June 11, 2013)
SM-2 missiles deployed on one of its three Aegis destroyers as they are considered ineffective in shooting down North Korea's ballistic missiles due to their short range. The decision to buy the newest naval missiles is part of Seoul's plan to develop an independent, low-tier missile shield called the Korea Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD). "The defense ministry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will prepare a plan to develop the KAMD system to deter North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons by the end of this year," the official said. The KAMD involves early warning radars, ship-to-air and land-based missile defense systems, arming Seoul with the ability to track and shoot down the North's low-flying, short- and medium-range missiles, with help of U.S. early warning satellites. The KAMD plan includes purchasing hundreds of rounds of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles and additional PAC-2 missiles for deployment from next year, as well as development of mid- and long-range surface-to-air missiles in the next decade. For that goal, the South Korean military has jointly formed a working group with its U.S. counterparts to conduct a study on the Korean missile defense system, the official said. "We will operate a working group with the U.S. to analyze the KAMD program," he said. "The research is expected to be completed around February 2014." (Kim Eun-jang, “S. Korea to Deploy New Surface-to-Air Missiles for Aegis Destroyers,” Yonhap, June 12, 2013)

Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy: “The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review established the Administration’s goal to set conditions that would allow the United States to safely adopt a policy making deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. Although we cannot adopt such a policy today, the new guidance reiterates the intention to work towards that goal over time. Toward that end, the new guidance directs DoD to undertake concrete steps toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. DoD is directed to conduct deliberate planning for non-nuclear strike options to assess what objectives and effects could be achieved through integrated non-nuclear strike options, and to propose possible means to make those objectives and effects achievable. Although they are not a substitute for nuclear weapons, planning for non-nuclear strike options is a central part of reducing the role of nuclear weapons. Recognizing the significantly diminished possibility of a disarming surprise nuclear attack, the guidance directs DoD to examine further options to reduce the role of Launch Under Attack plays in U.S. planning, while retaining the ability to Launch Under Attack if necessary. Finally, the guidance outlines a deliberate strategy for hedging against risk in our nuclear stockpile. As part of this analysis, the Departments of Defense and Energy examined their long-standing hedge approach and developed a more efficient strategy that allows the United States to maintain a robust hedge against technical or geopolitical risk with fewer nuclear weapons. …The new guidance states that the United States will maintain a nuclear Triad …These forces should be operated on a day-to-day basis in a manner that maintains strategic stability with Russia and China, deters potential regional adversaries, and assures U.S. Allies and partners. This includes continuing the practice of open-ocean targeting, so that in the highly unlikely event of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a U.S. nuclear weapon, the weapon would land in the open ocean. …After comprehensive review of our nuclear forces, the President has determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our Allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing a
one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty. ...As part of the NPR follow-on analysis, the Departments of Defense and Energy examined their approach to determining how many non-deployed weapons are required in this hedge. They developed an approach that will allow a robust hedge against technical or geopolitical risk with fewer total nuclear weapons. Based on this approach the new guidance directs that: The United States will maintain a sufficient number of non-deployed weapons to hedge against the technical failure of any single weapon type or delivery system at a time. Where possible, the United States will provide intra-leg hedge options - i.e., uploading another warhead type from within a leg of the Triad in the event that a particular warhead fails. In instances where the current stockpile will not allow intra-leg hedging, the United States will be prepared to hedge adequately using inter-leg hedging - uploading additional warheads on another leg of the Triad to compensate for the failure of a given type of warhead. DoD should maintain legacy weapons to hedge against the failure of weapons undergoing life-extension only until confidence in each Life-Extension Program (LEP) is attained.

...The new guidance reiterates the 2010 NPR objective of shifting from hedging with large numbers of non-deployed warheads towards a responsive infrastructure over time. The United States has begun to invest in a more modern infrastructure that would allow the United States to make this change. However, because such an infrastructure will not be available for another decade or more, the hedging approach based on retaining additional non-deployed warheads in the new guidance is prudent in the near term.” (OSD, “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C.,” June 12, 2013)

North Korea walked away from two days of talks with South Korea scheduled to start today saying it was insulted by Seoul’s choice of its chief negotiator. “Today, North Korea unilaterally informed us it was postponing the inter-Korean governmental talks arranged in Seoul, criticizing the rank of our chief negotiator,” Kim Hyung-suk, spokesman of the Ministry of Unification of the South said at a press conference yesterday evening. “We highly regret this position of North Korea. It doesn’t accord with common sense or international norms.” Expectations were high for the first high-level talks between Seoul and Pyongyang in six years since the last ministerial meeting in May 2007. But the agenda for the talks was unresolved, and the ranks of the chief negotiators were a source of friction from the start. Seoul wanted the talks to be ministerial-level with its delegation led by Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae. It wanted Kim Yang-gon, director of the United Front Department of the North’s ruling Workers’ Party, to lead the delegation traveling by land from North Korea. Pyongyang considers Kim more important than a minister, while Seoul considers him minister-rank.

According to spokesman Kim, liaison officials from Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously exchanged lists of delegates at around 1 p.m. yesterday at a face-to-face meeting at the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the truce village of Panmunjom. As its chief representative, Seoul named Kim Nam-sik, vice Unification Minister. The North named Kang Ji-yong, director of the Secretariat of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of Korea, a state-controlled independent organization in charge of inter-Korean interactions. Immediately after the exchange, Pyongyang raised objections to Seoul’s chief negotiator. “North Korea said if the Unification Minister doesn’t come, they wouldn’t attend the meeting,” Kim said. “They said the choice [of a
vice-minister] is a grave provocation and a ridiculing of them.” Asked whether the talks were postponed or canceled, Kim said, “Yes, the meeting arranged for tomorrow was canceled. But we want to say to Pyongyang that the door to a dialogue is still open.” Kim said Seoul didn’t raise any objection to the North’s delegation. “We judged that Kang is not the counterpart to a Unification Minister,” Kim said, “Given the duties and the responsibilities of the posts.” At the preliminary working-level dialogue on June 9 and Monday, South Korea requested the North send Kim Yang-gon. North Korean negotiators refused, saying they would send “a senior-level official.” Kim Yang-gon is known to be close to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as a ruling party secretary in charge of Southern affairs. In 2007, Kim had a secret meeting with then-National Intelligence Service chief Kim Man-bok to arrange the second inter-Korean summit, which was held in October 2007. In 2009, he met with Yim Tae-hee, then-special envoy to President Lee Myung-bak, in Singapore, to negotiate a third inter-Korean summit that never came off. But Kim didn’t attend any of the 21 ministerial-level meetings between 2000 and 2007. Instead, North Korea sent a so-called “chief cabinet councilor” as chief delegate, while the South usually sent its Unification Minister. (Kim Hee-jin, “Inter-Korean Talks Called off,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 12, 2103, p. 1) President Park Geun-hye will not back down on the principle of sending a negotiator of the proper rank to any talks with North Korea, despite it leading to the last-minute cancellation by Pyongyang of high-level talks that were supposed to start. Lee Jung-hyun, the senior presidential secretary for public affairs, said Park will not amend her choice of the leader of the South Korean delegation. “President Park once told me, ‘Forms dominate everything,’?” the close aide of Park told reporters. “Although she made that remark way ahead of this meeting, I think that idea sounds really rational.” North Korea has no minister in charge of unification affairs in its cabinet. Instead, they have the United Front Department, an organization under the ruling Workers’ Party in charge of Southern affairs and some espionage activities. Also, there are some state-controlled independent organizations like the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea doing some similar jobs. “President Park is sternly sticking to her principle to normalize the wrong practice of [North Korea’s] ignoring the ranks [of negotiators],” another Blue House official said. According to North Korean materials exclusively obtained by JoongAng Ilbo, the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea is just a civic group. The “Politics Dictionary,” published in Pyongyang by a North Korean publisher in 1973, defines the committee as “a social group formed by a variety of figures from political parties and social entities.” It says the committee’s role is “to reveal and denounce the criminal schemes of U.S. imperialists and their collaborators.” Kang’s duty as the director of the secretariat of the committee doesn’t appear to be minister-level. According to the “Great Joson Vocabulary Dictionary” published in Pyongyang in 1992, the director of the secretariat is “a person who assists high-ranking officials of the committee and helps their business.” North Korea didn’t pick up the phone when Southern liaison officials called at 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. through the Red Cross inter-Korean hotlines at the truce village of Panmunjom yesterday, according to the Unification Ministry. (Kim Hee-jin and Lee Young-jong, “South Won’t Cave in on Talks,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 13, 2103, p. 1) No statement has yet been released by North Korea since. But in a cancellation notice it berated the South for the collapse of the gathering, ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk said. The North called the South’s choice of vice minister a “mockery of the governmental talks, distortion of
the agreement between working-level officials and a grave provocation,” he told a news conference. Seoul dismissed the claim as an “abnormal custom,” saying Pyongyang’s own chief negotiator, who is a senior official from its agency in charge of South Korean affairs, could not be on the same level as minister. “It doesn’t make sense at all to reject dialogue by taking issue with the level of vice unification minister who can take care of, discuss and resolve inter-Korean issues,” Kim said. (Shin Hyon-hee, “Hopes for N.K. Reconciliation Dim,” Korea Herald, June 13, 2013, p. 1) Plans for what would have been the highest government dialogue between North and South Korea in years – and hopes for a rapprochement on the divided Korean Peninsula – collapsed over what appeared to be a minor technical issue: who should lead their delegations to the planned talks. In the decades-old confrontation between the two Koreas, even a matter of protocol can escalate into a highly delicate struggle over pride. The latest tussle began when the two Koreas agreed to hold government-to-government dialogue in Seoul, to start on Wednesday, but could not agree on who should be their chief delegates. South Korea said it would send its vice unification minister, Kim Nam-sik, to the meeting as its chief delegate. North Korea said that Mr. Kim was not senior enough and demanded that the South send Kim’s supervisor, the Unification minister, Ryoo Kihl-jae, as chief delegate. The South retorted that the proposed chief North Korean delegate – Kang Ji-yong, director of the secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea – was already below Kim “in status.” Last-minute negotiations had failed, with each Korea complaining of a bruised ego. On the eve of the talks, North Korea pulled out of the meeting in Seoul, accusing the South of “an insult,” South Korean officials said. South Korean officials said they were still open to dialogue but had no plan to reach out to the North by making a concession over the chief delegate. Yesterday, Chung, the South Korean prime minister, said his government had no intention of succumbing to the North’s “humiliating” demand. Today, the North issued a statement indicating that it would not seek dialogue for the time being. It said the South’s “impolite and immoral provocative behavior” convinced the North that it “has nothing to expect from the talks between the authorities” of the two countries. Critics accused the South Korean government of ruining a chance to engage the North. The latest tussle, over the ranks of their chief delegates, was in part an extension of a struggle that has persisted for decades. “We must think of the pride of our people,” Prime Minister Chung Hong-won of South Korea told the National Assembly on Wednesday, explaining what was at stake in the dispute. During border talks decades ago, the sides took the competition over protocol and appearances to the extreme, with North Korean military officers secretly adding inches to the legs of their chairs so they would look taller than their counterparts across the table from South Korea and the United States. In those cold-war-era meetings, the sides usually exchanged invectives and retorts. But they also sometimes persisted in silence – for over 11 hours in one session in 1969 – challenging the other side to speak first. In the best-known contest of pride on the divided peninsula, North and South Korea once engaged in a race over which country could raise its national flag higher over the heavily fortified border. That battle was eventually settled with the North beating the South; today, the North’s flagpole stands over 500 feet tall, beating the rival South’s by roughly 200 feet. (Choe Sang-hun, “Behind Failure of Korean Talks, a Long History of Squabbling,” New York Times, June 13, 2013, p. 4) President Park Geun-hye expressed “dismay” on June 14 over the cancellation of talks between North and South Korean
authorities, but stressed the importance of the proper format for the talks. "The format shows your mind-set and respect toward the other side," Park was reported as saying. "Form can dictate content." Her remarks, made during a meeting at the Blue House on the morning of June 14 with former Chinese State Council member Tang Jiaxuan, were relayed by Blue House spokesperson Kim Haeng. Kim also quoted Park as saying inter-Korean relations would "not be easy, but we will continue working," and asking that Beijing work with Pyongyang so that North and South could proceed with "real dialogue, not 'dialogue for the sake of dialogue.'" (Seok Jin-hwan, “Pres. Park Says Form Can Dictate Content’ in Inter-Korean Talks,” Hankyore, June 15, 2013)

John DeLury: “Park Geun-hye can be hard to read. But when it comes to her approach to inter-Korean relations, the most striking element has appeared to be her willingness to engage North Korea—particularly since her conservative base finds the very idea anathema. Even after the springtime madness that brought the two Koreas to the brink of accidental war, Park stuck by “trust” as the cornerstone of her policy toward the North. She tweaked the phrasing since her 2011 Foreign Affairs article, which introduced the catchier term “trustpolitik”—these days, officials use the more anodyne “trust building process.” But in either formulation, it is revealing that the Sino-Korean ideograph for “trust” is made up of the characters for “people” and “talking.” And sure enough, last week—for the first time in years—the two Koreas started talking again.

...But then, the prospect of serious talks evaporated almost as quickly as it emerged. Seoul’s story is that North Korea refused to send a ministerial-level delegate, and so South Korea lowered the rank of its own head of delegation accordingly to a vice-minister. Pyongyang says that their head of delegation is equivalent to a South Korean cabinet member and that Seoul’s last minute change was insulting. The Seoul meeting never materialized. Critical assessments here vary as to what went wrong. One view is that Park is not sincere about talking to the North, but merely wants to look more moderate than she is, and so used the protocol issue as an excuse to get out of dialogue. By contrast, some think that Park herself is serious about engaging the North, but is wary of resistance in her own camp from hardliners, and so found a way out because the timing is not right. She may have been caught off guard by the North’s sudden, open-ended invitation for talks on June 6, felt she had to say yes in order to signal openness to Pyongyang, but then looked for an exit since she cannot carry along opposition from her right (yet). Or, she may have read Pyongyang’s decision about who to send to Seoul as indicating that the North is not ready to give her the breakthroughs she wants in order to reconstitute inter-Korean relations. Park after all knows from experience what it’s like to meet with North Korea’s Supreme Leader, and may be over-eager to get to the top of the food chain. A third view is that Park’s insistence on this protocol issue betrays her ignorance of the North Korean system as well as her advisors’ fear of correcting her mistaken perceptions. Park’s North Korea experts should have explained to her that due to the profound differences between the South’s liberal democratic system—with notably weak political parties—versus the North’s Kim family-led nomenklatura system, it is illogical and impractical to insist “form controls content,” as she reportedly said. Park wanted Pyongyang to send Kim Yang Gon as head of delegation—but South Korea has no formal equivalent to Kim, who holds authority through a party position, not a governmental one, and in a department (the United Front, with close links to intelligence activities) that has no counterpart in
the South. Nor does the South have a formal equivalent to the person Pyongyang offered, the director-general of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland. For now, at least, conservatives who hoped that Park's talk of re-engagement with the North during the presidential campaign in the fall was just a tactical political move are feeling buoyed by the breakdown in talks. Progressives who hope she can orchestrate some kind of Sunshine Policy 2.0 are more skeptical that she has the political will and savvy to carry out “trust building” with a notoriously difficult dance partner in Pyongyang. But more broadly, Park seems to have the bulk of the South Korean public behind her, with notably strong public opinion numbers for her handling of inter-Korean relations at the 100 day mark of her administration. Soon after she took office, Park showed she could be tough in the face of aggressive rhetoric coming out of Pyongyang, yet she did not use the tension as an excuse to jettison her commitment to find a way to improve relations and resume dialogue and cooperation. So, by proving her firmness to the public during a sustained security crisis, Park passed the first test. Now comes the harder target of dealing directly with the North, resuming humanitarian and cultural exchange, expanding economic cooperation, and negotiating steps toward mutual security. Fortunately, she is still in a strong position to navigate that process given her mandate from the majority of South Koreans, as well as centrists and pragmatists in the foreign policy establishment, to rebuild trust through dialogue and cooperation. …Park's inter-Korean policy has the right diagnosis—the problem is the total absence of trust. Now it’s a question of whether North and South can handle the cure. (John DeLury, “Park vs. Kim: Who Wins the Game of Thrones?” 38North, June 18, 2013)

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KCNA: “The talks between authorities of the north and the south proved abortive due to the sinister intention of the south Korean authorities to use them for their ulterior purpose from the beginning. All Koreans warmly welcomed and supported the publication of the special statement of the spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea as a bold decision to defuse the worst confrontation between the north and the south. They ardently wished to see the north-south ties improved and a new phase opened for reunification, nostalgic for the June 15 era when a warm atmosphere of national reunification prevailed. But, the south Korean puppet authorities did not wish to hold dialogue from the start but were displeased with the improvement of the inter-Korean ties by concerted efforts of Koreans. No sooner had the special statement was issued than the south side let loose rhetoric that ‘north’s intention was not clear,’ terming it ‘the north’s attempt to escape isolation caused by a campaign to boost cooperation in putting pressure upon it’ in the light of the time it was announced.’As regards the agenda of the talks, the south side tried hard not to include in it the issue of jointly marking the June 15 and July 4 anniversaries and the issue of promoting non-governmental visits, contacts and cooperation projects. When discussing the issues of normalizing the operations in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) and resuming the tour of Mt. Kumgang resort, the south side tried to delete the expression ‘normalization’ and ‘resumption’ in a bid to make wordings ambiguous. The south side claimed ‘the north proposed issues of KIZ, tour of Mt. Kumgang resort, reunion of separated families, joint events for marking June 15 at once like rice with assorted mixtures.’ It went on: ‘If the south rejects these proposals the international community will hold it accountable for them.
And if it responds to them without correct calculation, it will spark domestic outcry. The south should, therefore, be careful about the north's intention lurking behind the proposed dialogue. All this was a spate of invectives let loose by the south side. In short, this was the stand and attitude of the south side towards the talks and an ulterior aim sought by it. It is as clear as noonday that such political charlatans cannot accomplish anything, to say nothing of the great cause of the nation, as they had been compelled to come to the negotiating table for fear of domestic and foreign criticism out of their ulterior motive. Although the south side's stand and attitude were ambiguous from the very outset, the north side made every sincere effort to make the talks for the great cause of the nation successful. When the north side was bold enough to manifest generosity as regards the talks, the south side insisted on its far-fetched assertion at the working contact. After officially agreeing on inter-Korean authorities’ talks, it made such reckless remarks behind the scene as ‘Don’t pin any hope’ and ‘Don’t be too hasty.’ The south side made such remarks as the head of the north side’s delegation is ‘an official hardly recognizable,’ it was ‘abnormal practice’ and that it was ‘beyond the common sense and international standard.’ All these facts go to prove that the south side had neither will for dialogue from the beginning nor an intention to settle any issues after being compelled to appear at the talks; its preoccupation was to torpedo the talks at any cost after throwing hurdles in the way of talks under unreasonable pretexts. The south side thus prevented the talks arranged with so much effort from taking place, quelling the ardent desire of the nation to jointly mark the June 15 anniversary as an event for national reunification. The south side clearly revealed before all Koreans and international community th that it has not an iota of sincerity to improve the north-south relations.” (KCNA, “KCNA Accuses S. Korea of Making Inter-Korean Talks Abortive,” June 14, 2013)

Davies: “North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK, has been no stranger to the headlines over the past year. Of late, the reason hasn’t been the extreme North Korean threats of the type we saw this Spring. Instead, it’s largely been driven by Pyongyang’s recent diplomatic outreach - what some label its "charm offensive" - in the region. Over the past few weeks, we’ve seen North Korea shift-in timeworn fashion, for those of you who have been following this over the years-out of yet another classical provocation phase and into engagement mode. It made overtures to Japan with, thus far, few results. A short while later, it dispatched a special envoy to Beijing, the highest-level DPRK official to visit China since Kim Jong Un’s uncle Chang Song Taek last August. After the visit, the two sides characterized the result in differing terms. On the inter-Korean front, having first created a crisis over the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex, the DPRK then put out feelers to the Republic of Korea to discuss that and other issues. We’ve seen in recent days the difficulty the ROK has faced in overcoming North Korean posturing in order to start up those talks. Beyond its three immediate neighbors, media reports state the North is willing to engage “relevant parties” in dialogue, including, perhaps, in a Six-Party format. Few of us, of course, forget that up until a few weeks ago, North Korea was nearly at the apogee of an almost unprecedented, multi-month stream of provocative threats and actions that spiked tensions on the Korean Peninsula to levels unseen since the 1990s. The North’s graphic threats of nuclear strikes on the territory of the United States and Republic of Korea, its announcement it would restart its
Yongbyon nuclear complex, and its shutdown of Kaesong are just a few of the highlights. And all of this occurred against the backdrop of the most provocative and dangerous of all of North Korea’s recent steps: its detonation four months ago, on February 12, of a nuclear weapon. Sadly, we have all been here before with North Korea. That nuclear blast, North Korea’s third, defied existing UN Security Council prohibitions and brought down upon Pyongyang additional, tougher international sanctions. And of course we need only look back to December 12 of last year to find another of the North’s aggressive steps: its launch of an object into orbit using ballistic missile technology, an action that earned North Korea unanimous censure by the UN Security Council, and new sanctions. As the DPRK has spurned its international responsibilities and commitments and ratcheted up its rhetoric, the international community has stood up, forging a remarkable consensus against North Korea’s dangerous, destabilizing actions. Over 80 countries and international organizations issued statements criticizing North Korea’s nuclear test. The world is wise to the increasing threat North Korea poses to regional and global peace and stability; to international norms of behavior on everything from arms proliferation to human rights; and, indeed, to the very challenge championed by President Obama-and embraced by so many-of moving toward a world without nuclear weapons. The United States has made clear that North Korea has a choice. **We have offered Pyongyang an improved relationship with the United States and our help with its integration into the international community, provided North Korea demonstrates a willingness to fulfill its denuclearization commitments and address other concerns.** When did we do that? How did we do that? Starting in mid-2011 we invested nearly a year in engaging the North to explore a new future. But the DPRK responded by rebuffing our offer of a new relationship-and has since continued to punctuate its response with the missile launches, the nuclear test, and the yearlong cavalcade of threats. Let me just spend a couple of minutes on this. It’s worth backing up to recall promising times and exploring in a bit more detail the series of U.S.-North Korea engagements that started in summer 2011 and eventually culminated in what’s called the “Leap Day Understanding” of February 29, 2012. I’ll then talk briefly about what scuttled that deal, a useful reference point to some concluding thoughts on U.S. policy toward North Korea and diplomatic prospects for the months ahead. Now, everyone in this room knows that when he came to office in 2009, President Obama directed his Administration to engage North Korea if it demonstrated a willingness to fulfill its commitments. [?] In the months that followed, however, the DPRK responded with a series of provocations. It launched a long-range missile. It declared it would reverse disablement steps at its nuclear complex. It kicked out monitors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. It announced its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks. And, in May 2009, for the second time, it tested a nuclear device, firmly establishing itself as the only country to test nuclear weapons in the 21st century. That same year, North Korea also ended a U.S. food assistance program that was to provide a half-million metric tons of nutritional support for needy North Koreans. U.S. and international personnel were ejected from the country after just one-third of the food had been distributed. And then it got even worse. North Korea in 2010 deepened the sense of crisis. It sank an ROK naval vessel, killing dozens of sailors. It shelled a South Korean island, taking the lives of both civilians and service people. And finally, Pyongyang revealed to the world a uranium enrichment program. North Korea chose defiance
over our offer of diplomacy. By mid-2011, however, Pyongyang appeared prepared to enter a period of serious diplomatic engagement, and the United States was quick to respond. We engaged the DPRK in three rounds of talks on three continents over the course of nine months. The purpose of this effort was to explore a possible resumption of the Six-Party Talks by concluding a bilateral understanding between the U.S. and DPRK. The first round took place in New York in July 2011, the second in Geneva in October, and the third and final in Beijing in late February 2012-just a few short months after Kim Jong Il’s death the preceding December. The Beijing talks and resulting “Leap Day Deal” appeared successful in establishing confidence-building measures. It was modest and short, and it was not meant to cover everything. Instead, it was intended to test each side’s sincerity. **North Korea committed to suspending nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and both uranium and plutonium enrichment at its Yongbyon nuclear complex. It also promised to allow the return of international inspectors to monitor North Korean compliance with its nuclear pledge. For our part, the United States pledged security guarantees. And at North Korean insistence, we also at the same time announced the start-up of a new nutritional assistance program.** But in a dramatic twist just two weeks later, in mid-March, North Korea scuttled the deal. Pyongyang announced its intent to launch a satellite to mark the mid-April centennial of founder Kim Il Sung’s birth. Within hours, all five of the other Six-Party states-the ROK, Japan, China, Russia and the U.S.-had condemned the DPRK’s announcement. In the days that followed, dozens of other nations joined us. But despite a month of intensive public and private calls on the DPRK not to proceed with the launch, including strong efforts from China, Pyongyang went ahead with its attempt on April 13, using ballistic missile technology despite express prohibitions by the UN Security Council. The launch did more than put an end to almost nine months’ of American diplomatic effort. It also, sadly, ended humanitarian outreach we had been working on for quite some time. We had hoped to re-start the process of providing food assistance to vulnerable North Koreans- the very young and very old, who no longer get what they need from the regime. This was not because we linked humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. Rather, it was because we could not trust Pyongyang to live up to its end of the nutritional assistance deal. At the international level, the launch triggered unanimous censure from the UN Security Council. With unprecedented speed, the Council-over the course of a weekend-adopted a strong statement condemning the launch and expanding existing UN sanctions. By reneging on its commitments announced on February 29, North Korea not only spurned an improved relationship with the United States and a path back to Six-Party talks, but also made its priorities clear. It was choosing, yet again, confrontation over diplomatic collaboration and isolation over engagement. And we saw this with increasing clarity over the past year, as I noted at the beginning of my remarks. North Korea’s flagrant, ongoing violations of UN Security Council resolutions; its December 12 rocket launch and February 12 nuclear test; and its stream of bellicose rhetoric and provocative actions have all dug the DPRK deeper into its international hole. So where does this leave United States policy? With a redoubled resolve to continue our principled approach to the North Korean challenge. **First and foremost,** the United States will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. **We will not reward the DPRK for the absence of bad behavior. We will not compensate the DPRK merely for returning to dialogue.** Doing either would only reinforce North
Korea's extortionist habits. We have also made clear that U.S.-DPRK relations cannot fundamentally improve without sustained improvement in inter-Korean relations and human rights. Nor will we tolerate North Korea provoking its neighbors. These positions will not change. Second, the United States will not engage in talks merely for the sake of talks. Rather, what we want are negotiations that address the real issue at hand: North Korea's nuclear program. Authentic and credible talks will first require a serious, meaningful change in North Korea's priorities demonstrating that Pyongyang is prepared to meet its commitments and obligations to achieve the core goal of the September 2005 Joint Statement: the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. Some question the importance we place on the nuclear issue. North Korea says it will no longer even talk about it, so why do we insist it must not merely talk about it, but act? Because North Korea's advancing nuclear and ballistic missile programs constitute a serious, growing, and unacceptable threat not just to our national security, but to the security of our allies, the stability of the region, and the global nonproliferation regime. Ultimately, it can only be through the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea in a peaceful manner that we-the United States, our partners in the Six-Party process, and the entire international community - will be able to durably address this global threat in any meaningful way. Recognizing that this is not just a bilateral U.S.-DPRK issue, but a much broader one requiring a multilateral solution, a third key principle is our commitment to close and expanded cooperation with our allies Japan and South Korea-as well as with our partners China and Russia-to address the joint challenge presented by North Korea. The U.S., ROK, and Japan share democratic values, a commitment to peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and a dedication to international cooperation and the rule of law. These are shared approaches essential in addressing the many aspects of the DPRK problem. U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation, as well as close trilateral coordination, has been essential not only in responding to North Korea's provocations and threats, but also in addressing a range of other issues. So it is now more crucial than ever that the United States, Japan, and the ROK continue to work together-along with China and Russia-to prevent North Korea from exploiting any perceived differences in our unified position. A special word is in order on U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea. It has become a timeworn truism to say that Beijing has the central role to play on North Korea, given its economic, diplomatic, and historical ties with that country. Ultimately, there are no shortcuts to a solution to this problem that do not involve China - centrally involve China. Because of that, we've enhanced our consultations with the PRC-whether at the UN, here in Washington, in Beijing or, at the seniormost level, just a week ago at Sunnylands in California. Both the United States and China agree on the fundamental importance of cooperating to make progress toward our shared goal of a denuclearized North Korea. This is why you saw two rounds of important new UN sanctions in January and March of this year. It's why you saw Ambassador Wu Dawei, China's Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, visit Washington in April, and why I frequently travel to Beijing. And it why you've seen North Korea figure so prominently in so many of our recent high-level bilateral diplomatic engagements with China-most dramatically at last week's summit between our respective leaders. We have every expectation that Beijing will use its special relationship with the DPRK to encourage Pyongyang to choose a different path. And we very much look forward to continuing to work with our Chinese partners on this in the months
Lastly, I’d highlight one other key principle, second-to-none in importance. For those of you who have been following the news in recent months, it needs no elaboration: our steadfast commitment to the defense of our homeland and the defense of our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan—including through our nuclear umbrella and our conventional forces. I’d like to talk finally and briefly about diplomatic prospects for the period ahead. Up until late last year, there had been much talk about change occurring in the DPRK under Kim Jong Un, the world’s youngest leader. But despite his fresh image and promising initial rhetoric of a better future for North Korea’s people, Kim Jong Un’s changes have proven to be illusory-stylistic, not substantive. He appears to have rooted his vision for his country firmly in the past: a small, privileged hereditary elite lavishing vast resources on long-range missile and nuclear projects—as well as luxuries for their own gratification—at the expense of the regime’s long-suffering subjects. Indeed, we remain gravely concerned about the grievous human rights situation in the DPRK and about the well-being of the North Korean people, who bear the brunt of their government’s decision to perpetuate its self-impoverishing policies. The DPRK’s economy is largely stagnant. Its health-care infrastructure is abysmal. One in three North Korean children is chronically malnourished. Reports suggest the regime has locked away between 100 and 200,000 citizens in a vast network of political prisons, where inmates are subjected to forced labor and inhuman conditions. Whole families have been condemned—most cases without trial—when one member is condemned. The courageous and charismatic Shin Dong-hyuk, whose life story is chronicled in Blaine Harden’s excellent book, *Escape from Camp 14*, was born in one of the most infamous political prison camps and spent the first 23 years of his life there. He was tortured and subjected to forced labor. He was forced to witness—at the age of 14—the execution of his mother and his brother. Addressing human rights in North Korea remains an essential component of U.S. policy going forward. And while we have not yet seen North Korea take action to improve conditions for its citizens, we have seen the international community take strong measures to increase pressure on Pyongyang to improve its human rights record. The UN Human Rights Council recently established an independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate North Korea’s widespread, systemic human rights violations. The resolution that established the Commission was introduced by Japan and the European Union, with the co-sponsorship of the United States, South Korea and many other nations. This united step by the international community is meant to continue to sharpen the choices facing the North Korean regime. It must be said that we would welcome meaningful measures-economic and otherwise—that would improve the lives of the people of North Korea. Frankly, one way for Pyongyang to do this would be to undertake good-faith efforts to denuclearize, something that would offer tangible benefits to all parties involved. We’ve been consistent on this score. Successive U.S. administrations have made clear we are open to improved relations with the DPRK if it is willing to take concrete actions to live up to its international obligations and commitments—though given the events of this past year, the bar for a resumption of meaningful engagement is certainly now higher. President Obama made this abundantly clear during a major speech he gave in November in Burma. In a passage directed at Pyongyang, he said: "...let go of your nuclear weapons and choose the path of peace and progress. If you do, you will find an extended hand from the United States."
States of America" Just last month in his joint press conference with President Park in Washington, the President came back to this theme, exhorting Pyongyang to (quote) "take notice of events in countries like Burma, which, as it reforms, is seeing more trade and investment and diplomatic ties with the world." If North Korea ultimately wants to take steps to join the international community, it needs to refrain from actions that threaten the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and comply with its commitments in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations under United Nations resolutions to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. Ultimately, we will judge the DPRK not by its words, but by its actions—the concrete actions it takes to address the core concerns of the international community, ranging from human rights to nuclear proliferation. North Korea’s choice is stark. Meaningful steps toward denuclearization can lead to a path of peace, prosperity, and improved ties with the world, including with the United States. But if Pyongyang instead elects to push forward with its illicit WMD programs and continues to engage in destabilizing provocations, it will face only further international isolation—no matter how many "charm offensives" it launches. We hope Pyongyang will make the right choice—for the sake of the North Korean people, for the sake of all Koreans, North and South, for the sake of the increasingly important Northeast Asia region, and for the greater good of our ever-more globalized, interconnected world." (Special Envoy on North Korea Policy Glyn Davies, Speech at the Wilson Center, June 14, 2013)

Nine agents from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service wrote more than 5,000 posts on the Internet in a psychological warfare campaign against North Korea since 2009, using some of them to attack domestic opposition parties and their candidates ahead of South Korea’s presidential election last December, state prosecutors said. The agents’ top supervisor, Won Sei-hoon, the former director of the intelligence agency, was accused of overseeing the online operation and was indicted on Friday. Prosecutors said they did not indict the nine agents because they were simply obeying Won’s instructions—a decision that the political opposition called a whitewash today. Won, who was not arrested, faces trial on charges of breaking the national election law, which bars government officials from using their influence to affect a vote, and of violating a separate law that prohibits government intelligence officials from meddling in domestic politics. While announcing the results of their two-month investigation, prosecutors did not comment on whether or how the operation affected the December 19 election. President Park Geun-hye, the governing party’s candidate, won one million more votes than her chief rival, Moon Jae-in, candidate of the main opposition Democratic Party and a major target of the online criticism. The agents used hundreds of Internet IDs to upload comments as part of what the intelligence authorities have called a normal psychological campaign against North Korea. The intelligence agency has accused North Korea of using the Internet to try to spread Communist propaganda and spawn antigovernment sentiment in South Korea, one of the world’s most Internet-connected countries. But the intelligence agents also uploaded more than 1,700 posts that meddled in South Korean domestic politics, the prosecutors said in a statement. The agents’ online comments often attacked labor activists, opposition politicians and other critics of the government, branding them as “leftist followers of North Korea.” The government critics “are trying to take power in
connection with the North, and if we don’t respond decisively this year, the National Intelligence Service will disappear,” Won said during a meeting with senior intelligence officials in February 2012, according to the prosecutors’ statement. Prosecutors saw at least 73 of the posts uploaded by the agents between September and December as attempts to influence the presidential election. The posts criticized the main opposition Democratic Party and a minor progressive party and their presidential candidates, accusing them of being too soft on North Korea or sympathizing with it. In their nationally televised announcement of the investigation’s results, prosecutors said the intelligence agents overstepped their duties by using their anti-North Korean psychological operations to attack the domestic opposition’s North Korea policies. The opposition parties have called for a new parliamentary investigation, claiming that the intelligence agency’s online activities were directly aimed at helping Park’s election. Today, they also called on President Park’s justice minister and chief secretary of legal affairs to step down, accusing them of pressuring the prosecutors to whitewash their inquiry and limit the potential political fallout against Park. They and the prosecutors denied the opposition’s accusations. Park’s office did not comment on the prosecutors’ announcement. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korean Intelligence Agents Accused of Tarring Opposition Online before Election,” New York Times, June 15, 2013, p. A-8)

A group of Chinese scholars, analysts and military officials convened on a recent morning in a spartan schoolroom to draw attention to China’s simmering territorial dispute with Japan. Participants spoke in urgent tones. Reporters took notes. A spirit of solidarity reigned. But the deliberations were not about the barren rocks in the East China Sea that are known as Diaoyu in China and Senkaku in Japan and that the two nations have been sparring over with competing naval patrols. Instead, the group that gathered at Renmin University was focused on a more enticing prize—Japan’s southernmost island chain, which includes the strategic linchpin of Okinawa, home to 1.3 million Japanese citizens, not to mention 27,000 American troops. The Chinese government itself has not asserted a claim to Okinawa or the other isles in the Ryukyu chain. But the seminar last month, which included state researchers and retired officers from the senior ranks of the People’s Liberation Army, was the latest act in what seems to be a semi-official campaign in China to question Japanese rule of the islands. A magazine affiliated with the Chinese Foreign Ministry published a four-page spread on the issue in March. People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s official newspaper, weighed in next with an op-ed by two scholars at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Two more pieces appeared in Global Times, another state newspaper. And a week before the seminar, a hawkish Chinese military official argued that the Japanese did not have sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands because its inhabitants paid tribute to Chinese emperors hundreds of years before they started doing so to Japan. “For now, let’s not discuss whether they belong to China—they were certainly China’s tributary state,” the official, Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, told the state-run China News Service. “I am not saying all former tributary states belong to China, but we can say with certainty that the Ryukyus do not belong to Japan.” Another senior Chinese military official appeared to back off those remarks. The official, Lt. Gen. Qi Jianguo, a deputy chief of staff, assured a conference in Singapore this month that China’s position on the islands had not changed. “Scholars are free to put forward any ideas they want,” he said. “It doesn’t represent the views of the Chinese government.” But almost all the voices in China
pressing the Okinawa issue are affiliated in some way with the government. Many of them, including General Luo, are known for spouting nationalistic views that can go beyond the official line – and for being called on to do so when it serves a wider propaganda goal. In this case, the goal may be to strengthen China’s claim on the islands known as the Senkaku and the Diaoyu, more than 250 miles west of Okinawa. At the Renmin seminar, Zhang Shengjun, deputy dean of the school of political science and international studies at Beijing Normal University, said that questioning the ownership of Okinawa was useful for projecting China as a regional power. “People think that China’s foreign policy has only one face – wanting a harmonious world,” Zhang said. But the Okinawa issue, he said, was helpful in showing the “black face” of Chinese foreign policy. In Chinese opera, the black face is a reference to a tough, bold character. Yamaguchi Noboru, a retired Japanese Army general and now a professor at the National Defense Academy in Tokyo, said the approach will make the Japanese resist Chinese efforts to get control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands even more, he said, and it will have broader effects. “I don’t think it is wise for the Chinese to do this, because it hurts their reputation in the international community,” he said. Though it may seem far-fetched for China to have any claim over Okinawa, where tens of thousands of Japanese and American troops were killed in World War II and the United States still maintains several military bases, Chinese nationalists have for years pointed out that the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom made tribute payments to imperial China. Zhang Haipeng, one of the authors of the People’s Daily article, said Okinawa was important to China’s ambitions of projecting naval power into the Pacific Ocean, noting that the Ryukyu are at the northern edge of a chain of islands that include Taiwan and part of the Philippines, both of which Beijing regards as American allies alongside Japan. “Our navy wants to push through the island chains and reach the eastern Pacific,” Zhang said at the seminar. “As my wife says, if the Ryukyu were independent, this problem would be solved.” By focusing attention on Okinawa, the Chinese are touching on an issue that has sometimes strained relations between the United States and Japan. The local population blames Tokyo for the noise and crime associated with the American bases. The Chinese are hoping to exploit this unease, said a Japanese official who declined to be named because of diplomatic sensitivity. But the official warned that local antipathy toward Tokyo, and the emergence of a small independence movement on Okinawa, did not translate into a desire to be part of China. Like other territorial disputes in Asia, the debate over the Ryukyu centers on competing versions of history. Thomas U. Berger, an associate professor of international relations at Boston University, said Japan conquered the islands in 1609 but allowed them to pay tribute to China starting in 1655. General Luo, however, said the islands began paying tribute to China as early as 1372 and were not truly subjugated by Japan until 1872. Berger said China’s strongest case might be based on the Cairo Declaration of 1943, in which the allied powers promised that territory taken by Japan would be returned. “These are territories that historically fell into the Chinese sphere of control until Japan forcibly began its course of aggressive expansionism in the late 19th century,” he said. “Since the Cairo Declaration committed the Allies to reversing Japan’s history of aggression, Okinawa could be included.” But Berger said the American occupation of Okinawa was considered vital to the United States’ ability to keep peace in the region, and three presidents – Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson – affirmed that Okinawa belonged to Japan before President Nixon returned
the island to Tokyo’s control in 1972. “Historically the United States was involved at several stages in determining the status of the Ryukyus,” Berger said. “Geopolitically, Okinawa is critical to our strategy in East Asia, and is the bedrock on which our alliance with Japan is founded.” (Jane Perlez, “Calls Grow in China to Press Claims for Okinawa,” New York Times, June 14, 2013, p. A-4)

Rodong Sinmun bylined commentary: “The talks between the authorities of the north and the south, which were scheduled to start on June 12, proved abortive, due to the arrogant and intentional disturbance by the south Korean authorities. The purpose of the south side was to tarnish the image of the DPRK making positive efforts for dialogue and tension-easing, keep applying international anti-DPRK sanctions and pressure and realize its confrontation policy at any cost, the commentary says, and goes on: It is the sinister intention of the south Korean puppet authorities to scuttle the talks and tighten collusion with outside forces to escalate confrontation with the DPRK, while pretending to have intent for dialogue under the public pressure at home and abroad. The abortion of the talks fully proved that the south Korean authorities’ cry for “trust-building process” is equal to the confrontation policy of the preceding regime. It is as clear as noonday that the issue of the inter-Korean relations cannot be settled with those who seek confrontation, not dialogue. The present situation will have very serious impact on the future development of the inter-Korean ties. The responsibility will rest with the south side for sure. The Korean nation will settle accounts with the wicked south Korean puppet authorities who resorted to the anti-reunification moves of unhesitatingly wasting the hard-won opportunity for the north-south dialogue, making a mockery of the wishes of Koreans for the overhaul of the north-south ties.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun Discloses Sinister Intentions of S. Korean Authorities in Torpedoing Dialogue,” June 15, 2013)

KCNA: “The inter-Korean authorities talks proved abortive due to the obstructive behavior of the south Korean puppet regime. The puppet regime proposed ministerial-level talks and promised to send the minister of Unification as head of its delegation at a working-level contact with the north. However, it behaved so rudely as replacing him by a vice-minister of Unification just before the start of talks. Not content with it, the puppet forces talked such rubbish as the head of the north's delegation is ‘a figure hardly recognizable’ and ‘it was contrary to common sense and international standard,’ aborting the talks. This was a rude and immoral provocation unprecedented in the history of the north-south dialogue. It was such unpardonable hooliganism as making a mockery and fooling all Koreans desirous of national reconciliation, unity, peace and prosperity. Such impudent behavior was a revelation of ignorance of the social system in the DPRK. Whenever inter-Korean ministerial-level talks were held in the past period, the DPRK sent the first vice-director of the Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) who is in the capacity of the Cabinet chief councilor and a vice-director of the Secretariat always dealt with the vice-minister of Unification of south Korea. It is a well-known fact. But this time the DPRK sent the director of the Secretariat of the CPRK, not the first vice-director. This is an expression of the DPRK’s sincere efforts to promote the mutual confidence by sincerely fulfilling the north-south commitments and achieve the unity of the nation without fail as desired by the compatriots. The south Korean authorities
must know well about the authority and level of the Secretariat of the CPRK. The Secretariat of the CPRK is a prestigious official organ of the DPRK in name and reality which specially supervises the inter-Korean relations and looks after affairs related to reunification. The south side should have properly approached the talks by sending its chief delegate in line with good faith of the north side and as it promised at the working-level contact. Nevertheless, it unilaterally degraded the level of its chief delegate. It went the lengths of speaking ill of the delegation of the north side like a guilty party filing the suit first, aborting the talks. This is the height of impudence that can never be justifiable. The political charlatans in south Korea are now going so foolish as to pressurize the north to make a concession by sticking to ‘confrontation accompanied by dialogue’ and the ‘theory of adhering to principle’ and thus improve their clout. Their recent disgusting behavior that resulted in aborting the talks cannot be construed otherwise than a cynical ploy to realize the above-said scenario of those guys and their invariable intention to escalate the confrontation with compatriots. The puppet forces will never be able to escape condemnation by all compatriots for their recent reckless provocation." (KCNA, “KCNA Commentary Accuses S. Korean Regime of Aborting Inter-Korean Talks," June 15, 2013)

North Side Committee for Implementing the June 15 Joint Declaration spokesman: “The joint national events for marking the 13th anniversary of the June 15 Joint Declaration proved abortive due to the obstructive moves of the south Korean authorities though preparations for them had been in the making amid the great expectation and concern of Koreans at home and abroad. Such obstructive moves are an open negation of the north-south joint declaration supported and approved by all Koreans and an unpardonable challenge to them calling for its implementation. From the beginning, the puppet forces opposed the opening of the joint events of the nation, claiming that such events are designed to ‘stir up conflict among south Koreans,’ they are pursuant to ‘the strategy of the united front’ and ‘dialogue between authorities should be preceded’ and the like. They also disallowed the participation of those concerned of the South Side Committee for Implementing the June 15 Joint Declaration in the working-level contact in Kaesong. The puppet group persistently rejected the north side’s just and magnanimous proposal to include the issue of the June 15 joint national events, in particular, as an agenda item and realize it without fail at the working-level contact for the talks between authorities of the north and the south of Korea. Consequently, it aborted the hard-won north-south dialogue quite contrary to elementary common sense and etiquette, making the joint events abortive. The present puppet rulers are asserting that they cannot allow joint national events and dialogue should be conducted, taking “level” into proper consideration according to an international standard, as they cannot trust anyone with a hue and cry over ‘trust’ whenever an opportunity presents itself. All facts go to clearly prove that the ‘confidence-building process’ touted by the puppet authorities is not a policy aimed to sincerely settle the inter-Korean relations but is nothing but rhetoric to mislead public opinion, and they remain unchanged in their sinister intention to fan up confrontation and hostility. All Koreans are now standing at the crucial crossroads of whether they will pave a wide avenue for the nation by bringing back the June 15 era or they will allow the vicious cycle of confrontation with compatriots and tension repeat itself in the coming five years. All Koreans will certainly force the puppet group to pay for its
National Defense Commission (NDC) “crucial” statement: “The present U.S. administration is now asserting that the development of the situation depends on the DPRK, urging the DPRK to show the will for denuclearization first and stop ‘provocation’ and ‘threats’ in order to defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is misleading the public opinion and deceiving the world, trying to give impression that the DPRK is to blame for the tensions that have so far mounted on the peninsula. The present south Korean authorities that have been accustomed to sycophancy and submission and the forces following the U.S. are dancing to its tune. In this regard the NDC of the DPRK clarifies the following crucial stand upon authorization: We state to the world once again that it is none other than the U.S. which has steadily strained the situation on the Korean Peninsula century after century and decade after decade. It was the U.S. which provoked the war of aggression on the Korean Peninsula in the 1950s and it is again the U.S. which has systematically scrapped the Korean Armistice Agreement for the past six decades after the end of the war. Entering into the first decade of the new century, the U.S. has persistently tried to ignite a war against the DPRK again. From December last year, the U.S. has pulled up the DPRK, describing its legitimate and just satellite launch as a long-range missile launch and its military measures for self-defense to cope with the U.S. open aggression moves as sort of ‘provocation.’ This fully discloses its nature as the worst provoker and aggressor. The gangster-like resolution on ‘sanctions’ which the U.S. masterminded and all the hostile acts that have been intensified following the adoption of the resolution were an intolerable and serious provocation against the army and people of the DPRK. There is a limit to patience. The U.S. should no longer cling to acts of misleading the public opinion and deceiving the world while vociferating about the non-existent ‘provocation’ and ‘threats.’ It will be a foolish calculation for the U.S. to think that its arbitrary practices reminding one of a thief crying ‘stop the thief’ will work on the bright world today. **We state to the world once again that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an invariable will and resolve of the army and people of the DPRK.** The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was behests of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il and a policy task which the party, state, army and people of the DPRK have to carry out without fail. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula does not only mean ‘dismantling the nuclear weapons of the north.’ **It is the complete one that calls for denuclearizing the whole peninsula including south Korea and aims at totally ending the U.S. nuclear threats to the DPRK.** As for the possession of nuclear weapons by the DPRK, it is the strategic option taken by the DPRK for self-defense to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The legitimate status of the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state will go on and on without vacillation whether others recognize it or not until the whole Korean Peninsula is denuclearized and the nuclear threats from outside are put to a final end. Therefore, the U.S. should stop nuclear threats and blackmail and all forms of provocations including “sanctions” against the DPRK, before urging it to show first its sincerity regarding the will for denuclearization to open the phase for dialogue. We propose senior-level talks between the authorities of the DPRK and the U.S. to defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula and ensure peace.
and security in the region. If the U.S. has true intent on defusing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and ensuring peace and security in the U.S. mainland and the region, it should not raise precondition for dialogue and contact. The talks can have broad and in-depth discussions on defusing military tensions, replacing the armistice system with peace mechanism and other issues of mutual concern including the building of a ‘world without nuclear weapons’ proposed by the U.S. The U.S. can set the venue and date of the talks to its convenience. Consistent is the stand of the DPRK to defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula and ensure peace and security of the region. If the U.S. truly wants to realize a ‘world without nuclear weapons’ and bring detente, it should positively respond to the DPRK’s bold decision and good intention, not missing the opportunity. All the future developments entirely depend on the responsible option of the U.S., which has strained the situation on the Korean Peninsula.” (KCNA, “DPRK Proposes Official Talks with U.S.,” June 16, 2013)

North Korea proposed high-level talks with the United States, saying that it was ready to discuss the easing of tensions and eventually, the removal of nuclear weapons from the peninsula. The North’s proposal indicated that it was moving toward negotiations after months of bellicose language, including threats to launch nuclear strikes at the United States and South Korea. In the past few weeks, North Korea has invited a special envoy from Japan and sent one to Beijing, where it told Chinese leaders that it was willing to return to the negotiating table. It had also proposed discussions with South Korea, though the initial agreement to hold talks in Seoul collapsed last week because of differences over the level of seniority of the delegations. Washington, however, has been skeptical of such overtures, given North Korea’s history of alternating between provocations and engagement. “We have always favored dialogue and, in fact, have open lines of communication” with North Korea, Caitlin Hayden, spokeswoman for the National Security Council, said, according to Reuters. “Our desire is to have credible negotiations with the North Koreans, but those talks must involve North Korea living up to its obligations to the world, including compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and ultimately result in denuclearization,” Reuters quoted Hayden as saying. “We will judge North Korea by its actions, and not its words and look forward to seeing steps that show North Korea is ready to abide by its commitments and obligations.” A spokesman of the North’s National Defense Commission said that the United States would not raise preconditions if it was sincere in its efforts to defuse tensions on the peninsula. In its “crucial statement,” carried by KCNA, the commission’s spokesman said the United States can set the venue and date of any talks. By mentioning the security of the “U.S. mainland,” North Korea appeared to challenge Washington to appease it with dialogue and concessions or face the prospects of North Korea continuing to expand its nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs. The United States and North Korea reached an agreement in February 2012 in which Washington promised 240,000 tons of food aid and Pyongyang agreed to place a moratorium on uranium enrichment and nuclear and missile tests. But that deal quickly collapsed when the North launched a long-range rocket in April 2012 and the United States, seeing the launching as a provocative test of missile technology, scrapped the food aid and led efforts at the United Nations to tighten sanctions against the North. That experience hardened Washington’s position. “The United States will not engage in talks merely for
the sake of talks,” State Department’s senior envoy on North Korea, Glyn T. Davies, said June 14 in a speech at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Davies said Washington was open to improved relations with North Korea “if it is willing to take concrete actions to live up to its international obligations and commitments, though given the events of this past year, the bar for a resumption of meaningful engagement is certainly now higher.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Proposes Talks on Security with the U.S.,” *New York Times*, June 16, 2013, p. 9) Some watchers point out that North Korea has changed its tone, possibly due to the failure of its tried-and-tested “diplomatic approach.” “The North seems to feel a sense of urgency. Some of its leaders may question its time-worn strategy of gaining concessions via talks that follow provocations,” said Chang Yong-seok, a researcher at Seoul National University. “This is the first time [?] that the North has talked about a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula without asking first for the abolition of the world’s nuclear arsenal including that of the U.S.,” Chang said. “It may be ready to make a concession in giving up its nuclear program. We need to recognize this.” (Kim Tae-gyu, “North Korea Calls for Meeting with U.S.,” *Korea Times*, June 16, 2013)

6/17/13 North Korea’s surprise offer of dialogue with the U.S. on Sunday was met with a frosty reaction by Seoul and Washington, which both call on Pyongyang to prove sincerity with its actions before resuming talks. President Park Geun-hye expressed her misgivings about the North’s intention during her telephone conversation with U.S. President Barack Obama. “Having talks for the sake of talks only earns North Korea time to make its nuclear weapons more sophisticated,” Park was quoted by her spokesperson Kim Haing as telling Obama during the 20-minute call. Obama briefed Park on the outcome of his summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Obama told Park that Xi expressed China’s commitment to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and promised not to recognize Pyongyang as a nuclear weapons state, according to the spokesperson. Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said he sees “little possibility” for talks between the North and the U.S. While reaffirming no change in the delegates, he reiterated calls for dialogue with the communist neighbor to normalize the Gaeseong industrial complex. “You don’t have to worry about (any talks excluding South Korea),” Ryoo said at a parliamentary session, adding that the allies continue to consult closely. “We’re still urging a working-level meeting to ship out raw and subsidiary materials from Gaeseong.” Washington also responded by expressing its openness to dialogue but said that Pyongyang must fulfill its international obligations such as U.N. Security Council resolutions banning its atomic activity. “As we have made clear, our desire is to have credible negotiations with the North Koreans, but those talks must involve North Korea living up to its obligations to the world, including compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, and ultimately result in denuclearization,” National Security Council spokesperson Caitlin Hayden said in a statement yesterday. “We will judge North Korea by its actions and not its words and look forward to seeing steps that show North Korea is ready to abide by its commitments and obligations.” Denis McDonough, U.S. President Barack Obama’s chief of staff, echoed the view, urging action before sugarcoated promises. “The bottom line is they’re not going to be able to talk their way out of the very significant sanctions they’re under now — sanctions that Russia supported and, very importantly, that China supported,” he told CBS yesterday. North Korea’s faster-than-expected peace offensive followed a flare-up in
Cho Tae-yong, chief envoy of South Korea’s six-party talks, began trilateral talks with his Japanese and U.S. counterparts in Washington on taking action towards denuclearizing North Korea. His visit coincided with the trip of Kim Kye-gwan, North Korean veteran negotiator and vice minister, to Beijing to have strategic talks with his Chinese counterparts, including Wu Dawei, Chinese chief representative on North Korea policy, whom Cho is also to meet with on June 21.

Cho, 57, and Kim, 70, have had a long run of attending negotiating tables together in regard to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Both are the top envoy of their homeland in dealing with North Korean affairs. In South Korean diplomacy, Cho has been evaluated as a cautious strategist in dealing with Pyongyang. In fact, his family history is related to North Korean affairs as well. In 1980, Cho married Lee Jin-yeong, a daughter of then-Foreign Minister Lee Beom-seok. However, three years after the marriage, in 1983, Cho lost his father-in-law, Lee, who was killed by North Korea’s terrorist attack against then-South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan at Aung San National Cemetery in Burma. It was February 2004 when Cho met with Kim for the first time. The situation on the Korean Peninsula was grave, with North Korea’s declaration of defecting from the Non-Proliferation Treaty of nuclear weapons in 2003. Cho attended the second six-party talks as a South Korean delegate, and it was Cho’s debut at a negotiating table with Pyongyang. There, North Korea’s Kim appeared as chief delegate, as counterpart of Lee Soo-hyuck, then-assistant secretary for Seoul’s Foreign Ministry. Kim was already recognized as a veteran negotiator at the time, who had attended bilateral talks with Washington starting from the early 1990s. Kim had been chief negotiator for North Korea at the 12 four-party talks under the Bill Clinton administration as well. Since the six-party talks in 2004, Cho and Kim had met with each other at several major talks, struggling with overnight negotiations together. “Kim was always confident, and Cho was cautious and persistent,” a South Korean official who attended talks with Pyongyang along with Cho, said. They also successfully made a major accomplishment in September 2005, issuing the September 19 joint statement in which Pyongyang promised to return to the NPT and allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to come to their country and monitor their nuclear facilities. The diplomacy war between Cho and Kim ended in February 2006, when Cho was appointed head of the North Korea-U.S. bureau of the ministry, an organization in charge of indirect support for negotiations with Pyongyang. After that, Cho was named...
First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan repeated an offer for international talks over his country’s disputed nuclear program during a meeting with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui. China’s Foreign Ministry cited the North Korean, who has previously represented his country at talks to get it to halt its nuclear program, as saying North Korea wanted talks. “The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was the dying wish of Chairman Kim Il-sung and General Secretary Kim Jong-il,” the Chinese ministry said in statement, citing Kim as saying. ”North Korea is willing to have dialogue with all sides and attend any kind of meeting, including six-party talks, and hopes to peacefully resolve the nuclear issue via negotiation,” Kim Kye-gwan was cited as saying. Zhang, for his part, said that talks, stability and the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula were in everyone’s best interests, China’s Foreign Ministry added. “China supports talks between the various parties and hopes for an early resumption of the six-party talks,” Zhang said. North Korea was looking for holes in the international consensus that it must denuclearise by seeking dialogue with various countries, said Wang Dong, an international relations professor at Peking University in Beijing. ”If China’s stance is still firm, North Korea will understand that there are no loopholes to exploit,” Wang said. “You can’t have your cake and eat it too. I think China will make this clear to North Korea,” he said, referring to Pyongyang’s refusal to give up its nuclear weapons while at the same time trying to mend ties with key powers. Li Bin, a nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy in Beijing, said he did not believe North Korea was ready to discuss its nuclear programme with China. “But now they see that China is very serious with sanctions and is very angry. My guess is that they are coming to Beijing to avoid a situation in which the relationship between the two countries gets worse,” he said. (Ben Blanchard and Michael Martina, “North Korea Repeats Offer for Nuclear Talks,” Reuters, June 19, 2013)

South Korea raised the bar on conditions for resuming stalled nuclear talks with North Korea, saying Pyongyang must show its sincerity through more pledges than those it had agreed to in a scuttled aid-for-disarmament deal with the U.S. more than a year ago. ”For meaningful talks with North Korea to be convened, the North must show its sincerity through actions, not words,” foreign ministry spokesman Cho Tai-yong said. Asked about what specific actions North Korea must take if the talks resume, Cho replied, “The February 29 agreement explicitly shows what actions North Korea should take. In addition to those actions, North Korea should show its sincerity.” He was referring to the scuttled deal with the U.S. In Washington yesterday, South Korea’s top nuclear envoy also laid out tougher conditions for any talks with North Korea, saying Pyongyang must meet "stronger requirements" than the Feb. 29 deal with the U.S. After holding a trilateral meeting with his American and Japanese counterparts -- Glyn Davies and Shinsuke Sugiyama -- Cho Tae-yong, Seoul’s chief envoy to the six-party talks, told South Korean journalists, “Stronger requirements should be imposed (on North Korea) than the February 29 agreement between North Korea and the United States.” The U.S. also repeated its demand that North Korea must be serious about giving up its nuclear weapons. “We reaffirmed our commitment to the U.N. Security Council resolutions on the DPRK (North Korea), and
the need for full and transparent implementation of those resolutions," the U.S. State Department said in a statement following the trilateral meeting in Washington. "We agreed a path is open for the DPRK toward improved relations with the United States, Japan and the ROK (South Korea) if the DPRK takes meaningful steps on denuclearization; we will judge the DPRK by its actions, not its words," the statement said. "We also agreed on the importance of an improvement in inter-Korean relations and the resolution of the issue of abductions." (Yonhap, “S. Korea Raises Bar on Conditions to Resume Nuclear Talks with N. Korea,” June 20, 2013)

China called for an early resumption of the long-stalled six-party talks aimed at denuclearizing North Korea, one day after China expressed its willingness to help the North open dialogue with its neighbors. “The pressing issue is to improve mutual trust and relations through talks and contacts and to resolve the problem through negotiations," China’s foreign ministry spokesman, Hua Chunying, said in a press conference, referring to the nuclear row with the North. The multilateral dialogue is still an effective system for the six nations' efforts to denuclearize the North, and the countries should capitalize on the current reconciliatory mode in order to revive the talks, Hua said, calling on the countries to join hands. (Yonhap, “China Calls for Early Resumption of Six-Party Talks on N.K.'s Nuke,” Korea Herald, June 20, 2013)

Russia has proposed that the four disputed islands off Hokkaido be jointly developed with Japan, based on Russian legislation to help settle the prolonged territorial row, several diplomatic sources said July 28. Tokyo is reluctant to accept the proposal because it would mean recognizing Russian sovereignty over the islands and undermine Japan’s claim. Tokyo has requested that Moscow reconsider the proposal, the sources said. The idea was suggested by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov during his meeting with Senior Vice Foreign Minister Masaji Matsuyama in St. Petersburg on June 20. At the meeting, Russia proposed that the Japanese government and private sector participate in large infrastructure and energy development projects on the islands, echoing similar proposals made in the past. Matsuyama refused to accept the idea and repeated Tokyo’s basic position that all four islands belong to Japan, the sources said. A senior Foreign Ministry official expressed concern that the participation of Japanese companies in joint development projects under Russian law would amount to recognition of Russian sovereignty. The two countries are expected to discuss how to resolve the territorial dispute in subcabinet-level talks scheduled for late August and during Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Japan in the fall. (Kyodo, “Russia Proposes Joint Development of Disputed Isles,” July 28, 2013)

North Korea’s top envoy to the United Nations said Friday that high-level talks with South Korea can be resumed only when Seoul drops its preconditions for the rank of Pyongyang’s top delegate. “We have intent on responding to any dialogue whether on a bilateral or multilateral level,” Amb. Sin Son-ho told Yonhap News Agency after a rare news conference in New York about his country’s position dealing mainly about relations with the United States. He said the ball is on the South Korean side, saying inter-Korean dialogue is not possible unless the South retracts its preconditions. The South originally wanted the North to be represented by Kim Yang-gon, the head of the
United Front Department and Workers’ Party of Korea secretary. He is known to be one of the most influential North Korean officials on inter-Korean affairs. But the North actually appointed an official whose rank is believed to be a step or two lower than that of South Korea’s ministerial official. Sin said the South should drop its demand regarding the North’s top delegate. In the press conference at the U.N. headquarters, meanwhile, Sin reiterated Pyongyang’s war threats coupled with a typical dialogue offer. He said another military conflict is possible at any time as long as U.S. hostilities continue. Pyongyang often takes issue with what it calls U.S. hostile policy, apparently referring to economic sanctions and American troops stationed in South Korea. He stressed the need to replace the Korean War Armistice with a lasting peace mechanism. The South originally wanted the North to be represented by Kim Yanggon, the head of the United Front Department and Workers’ Party of Korea secretary. He is known to be one of the most influential North Korean officials on inter-Korean affairs. But the North actually appointed an official whose rank is believed to be a step or two lower than that of South Korea’s ministerial official. Sin said the South should drop its demand regarding the North’s top delegate. In the press conference at the U.N. headquarters, meanwhile, Sin reiterated Pyongyang’s war threats coupled with a typical dialogue offer. He said another military conflict is possible at any time as long as U.S. hostilities continue. Pyongyang often takes issue with what it calls U.S. hostile policy, apparently referring to economic sanctions and American troops stationed in South Korea. He stressed the need to replace the Korean War Armistice with a lasting peace mechanism. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Issues War Threat Plus Dialogue Offer,” June 22, 2013)

South Korea’s spy agency yesterday declassified records of a secret dialogue at a 2007 summit in Pyongyang in which President Roh Moo-hyun told Kim Jong-il that he didn’t recognize the Northern Limit Line, the de facto maritime border between the North and South. He also seemed to accept North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. The National Intelligence Service had previously released a summary of the records to lawmakers on the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee. Today, it released the full transcript of the closed-door meeting on the sidelines of the inter-Korean summit to lawmakers. As of press time, lawmakers did not show the media the full transcript. But Saenuri Party lawmakers did release the eight-page summary. According to the summary, North Korea’s Kim proposed to Roh a joint fishery zone near the NLL, and Roh replied: “In regards to this matter, I have the same perception. The NLL must be changed.” Roh said, “There is no legal or logical basis” to the legitimacy of the border but the border “is actually effective.” “For North Korean people, it could be a matter of their pride,” Roh said. “For the Southern side, we also have some people making territorial claims based on this border.” Roh said some people in the south were “sensitive” to the NLL issue, “and their voices are really loud ... So what we want to propose is to cover the current military map with a large map of peace and economy,” referring to a joint economic zone. When Kim asked Roh if there was any resistance in the South to such a plan for a zone, Roh said, “There is no one in the South who opposes the idea of creating a peaceful cooperation zone in the Yellow Sea. If he did, he would become a fool on the Internet.” When it came to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, Roh made a shocking comment that he supported the North Korean position, according to the summary. “I have fought against the U.S. over the North’s position on the matter of
the nuclear weapons program,” Roh said. “At international venues, I have advocated the Northern side.” Roh also urged Kim to resume the interrupted construction of two light-water reactors in North Korea, based on the 1994 Agreed Framework. In terms of Pyongyang-Washington relations, Roh said “the biggest problem is the United States. “I also have the perception that the imperialist history [of the U.S.] has never been apologized for and it shows its hegemonic ambition.”

The unprecedented decision by the spy agency to declassify the transcript followed a political feud between the ruling party and opposition over whether the late South Korean president, who died in 2009, actually disavowed the western maritime border drawn up after the 1950-53 Korean War, which North Korea has never accepted.

“Although the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee saw summarized records of the summit on June 20, there has been constant controversy over whether the summary was distorted and manipulated [by the NIS],” an official statement released by the NIS said. “Both ruling and opposition parties are also strongly demanding the opening of all the records.”

The spy agency said it concluded that releasing the conversation between two deceased leaders would not affect current inter-Korean relations. “The NIS judged the content of the conversation, which was held six years ago, would not have a significant impact on national security at this moment,” the statement read. “Most of the content of the conversation has already been revealed through media reports over the past six months and there is no reason for us to keep this as a state secret now.” According to the NIS, the legal basis for the revelation is presidential decree No. 21214, Article 13, Section 2, Clause 2, which allows it to reclassify a state secret if “there is a request from the chief of the NIS.”

Last October, Chung Moon-hun, a Saenuri Party lawmaker, said that a transcript existed of a conversation between Roh and Kim at a closed-door meeting on the sidelines of the summit. Chung said Roh described the border as “a line unilaterally drawn by the United States, which wanted to conquer more territory” and he went on to tell Kim, “South Korea won’t recognize the NLL anymore and all the disputes surrounding the line will be resolved if the two Koreas carry out some joint fishing activities.” The political football died down after the December presidential elections and after the NIS refused to open the records to the public, despite persistent requests from the Saenuri Party. The issue re-emerged June 20 when Suh Sang-kee, a ruling Saenuri lawmaker and head of the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee, made the bombshell revelation that he requested records of the 2007 inter-Korean summit from the National Intelligence Service and the spy agency gave him an eight-page summary of the secret meeting, which he read with four other Saenuri lawmakers. He said the summary confirmed Roh’s disavowal. Immediately after the NIS announcement today, the NIS said it would hand over copies of the transcripts to both ruling and opposition lawmakers who are members of the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee. But lawmakers from the opposition Democratic Party refused to receive the documents because they suspected the spy agency could have distorted them to make Roh look bad. The DP is a descendent of Roh’s Uri Party. “What the DP demands is not the document that the NIS has but the original transcript stored in the National Archives of Korea,” Representative Jung Chung-rae, a member of the Intelligence Committee, said. In fact, after the 2007 summit, the South Korean government handed over a copy of the original transcript to the NIS, while storing the original version in the state-run archive. Under the law, publicizing a NIS record with
the second-highest security classification is possible if the chief of the agency orders it. But opening up a record in the state-run archive is harder, requiring approval from more than two-thirds of the lawmakers in the legislature. Kim Hyun, another DP lawmaker, said the NIS is trying to divert public attention from an ongoing probe by prosecutors into its agents’ alleged attempt to sway the December presidential election. “We express anger against the NIS as they are attempting to dilute the matter of the NIS meddling in the election campaign,” Kim said. (Kim Hee-jin, “NIS Declassifies 2007 Transcript,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 25, 2013) The eight pages of excerpts from the transcript of the inter-Korean summit that took place in Oct. 2007, which the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) released to the press on June 24, contain a detailed description of the process through which former president Roh Moo-hyun worked to persuade then-North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and resolve the issue of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West (Yellow) Sea. The excerpts confirm that Roh had not abandoned the NLL as the conservative establishment is contending. Rather, they show that he was trying to resolve the ultimate reason for the NLL’s existence - that is, the confrontation between North and South - by building trust as North and South made peaceful use of the West Sea. According to the transcript excerpts, the first person to mention the NLL (and other disputes between North and South pertaining to the West Sea) was Kim Jong-il. On page 18, Kim suggests that the maritime area located between the South Korean Northern Limit Line and the North Korean Military Demarcation Line be declared as a peace zone. This suggests that Pyongyang also considered it an important security objective to stabilize the West Sea area from Yeonpyeong Island to Baeknyeong Island - the site of a series of accidental military clashes between North and South Korean forces. In response to this, Roh said, “Yes, I’m very interested in that as well,” sparking a spirited discussion between the two leaders. Following this, on pages 40 and 41, Roh was recorded as saying, “The NLL has no grounds in international law, and its logical basis is not clear either, but at present it has a considerable influence on the situation.” These remarks refer to the historical fact that the NLL was not a maritime demarcation line agreed upon through the armistice, but rather was unilaterally announced by the UN military command in August 1953. Next, Roh acknowledged the maritime dispute surrounding the NLL. “The NLL is probably a point of pride for people in the North, while there are people in the South who regard it as South Korean,” Roh said. “So the plan that you are outlining now would be for both sides to remove their military forces from the region and to use it as a joint fishing zone. I am of the same opinion as you regarding the peace zone,” Roh said, expressing agreement with Kim. However, he also had his own plan. “The problem is that, when anyone even mentions the word ‘NLL,’ people start getting all stirred up like a beehive. This issue is something that would be good for us to discuss at greater length,” said Roh. Roh continued: “Consider this: we make a peace zone in the West Sea and turn it into a joint fishing zone. We jointly develop the estuary of the Han River, and continue by combining the entire Incheon and Haeju regions into a joint economic zone and allow ships to move freely in those waters. In that case, we would have to redraw the map to allow that movement,” he said. Elaborating this point, Roh said that this would be a free navigation zone and a joint fishing area, and that consequently the military would not be allowed to enter that area. Essentially Roh was proposing to erode the South’s insistence on the NLL along with the North’s insistence on the Military Demarcation Line through the idea of creating a single peace
zone managed by police from both North and South. Thus, instead of suffering a backlash in public opinion by taking a definite stance on the NLL, which many people view as a conflict, his plan was to resolve the problem in a more vague and indirect fashion. Kim’s reaction to this proposal is not included in the excerpts that were released. Former NIS director Kim Man-bok claimed that Kim had agreed with the plan in the Feb. 2011 issue of Japanese monthly magazine Sekai. “I discussed the issue with the senior generals on the National Defense Commission,” Kim Jong-il told Roh when they met again after lunch, according to Kim Man-bok. “When I asked them whether an industrial complex in Haeju would be possible, they said there would be no problem with that,” Kim said. “Haeju is fine. We can use Gangryong from Haeju to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and we can also open up Haeju’s port for use.” After securing Kim’s approval and returning home, Roh announced the plan to create a special zone for peace and cooperation in the West Sea, which would include the waters in the West Sea and the area around Haeju. This is to say that Roh had not abandoned the NLL, but had rather tried to resolve the issue of the NLL through helping both North and South recognize the greater value of peaceful cooperation. (Gil Yun-hyung, “Summit Transcript: Roo Moo-hyun’s Idea Was a Peace Zone, Not Abandonment,” Hankyore, June 25, 2013) Six months after their presidential elections and four months after President Park Geun-hye was sworn in, South Koreans found this week that the election skirmishing was not quite over. At the National Assembly, some liberal opposition lawmakers have begun questioning the legitimacy of the election, citing the recent indictment of a former director of the National Intelligence Service on charges of orchestrating an online smear campaign against Park’s rivals in the December 19 elections. University students, who have staged relatively few political protests in recent years, have held several rallies on campuses and in downtown Seoul, shouting, “Out with Park Geun-hye!” And support appears to be growing for a parliamentary inquiry into the accusations of a smear campaign, to determine if blame should be spread further. So far, Park remains popular – supported for her tough stance on rival North Korea and its nuclear program – but the political squabbling has reached a high enough decibel level that her conservative party has begun to fight back. The party, New Frontier, has reloaded the weapon it had used effectively to rally conservative votes last year: its claim that the last liberal president, Roh Moo-hyun, was so consumed by trying to foster good relations with North Korea that he – and by extension the liberal opposition – undermined South Korea’s national security. The conservative counteroffensive gained a new intensity this week when the embattled intelligence agency released what it called the transcript of the 2007 inter-Korean summit meeting between Mr. Roh and the North Korean leader at the time, Kim Jong-il. The release was a controversial move that some say could hurt South Korea moving forward but that governing party lawmakers have long called for, saying it would prove the summit meeting was a political sellout. The most controversial part of the summit meeting was what Mr. Roh said about the Northern Limit Line, or N.L.L., the temporary sea border established by the United Nations Command at the end of the three-year Korean War in 1953. North Korea has never accepted the boundary, claiming a border line farther south, and the navies of the two Koreas have fought bloody skirmishes in nearby disputed waters. Roh had already broached the idea of creating a “peace-economy zone” in the disputed waters that would have allowed joint fishing, and the 100-page transcript of the summit meeting quoted Mr. Roh as saying that the “N.L.L.
should be changed." Today Park again referred to the subject, which had been part of her successful campaign against the opposition liberals. “We must never forget that the N.L.L. has been defended by the blood and lives of many young men,” she was quoted as saying during a cabinet meeting. (Choe Sang-hun, “Liberal Lawmakers Question Legitimacy of Korean Election,” New York Times, June 26, 2013, p. A-8)

Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader who died in 2011, developed a strong distrust in Abe Shinzo during his first tenure as Japan’s prime minister. Kim confided his feelings to the late South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun during an inter-Korea summit held in Pyongyang in October 2007. Kim’s sentiments were described in records of the meeting released by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service on June 24. During the summit, Roh told Kim that he could not easily grasp assertions by the Japanese government on the issue of abductions of its citizens by North Korean agents during the 1970s and ‘80s. The Japanese government had intended to develop closer ties with North Korea by using the summit meeting as a springboard. The two countries still do not have formal diplomatic relations. With that idea in mind, Japan asked Roh to serve as a mediator. However, the records of the meeting show that Japan basically got the cold shoulder from both Koreas. Abe, who returned as prime minister last December, had just resigned from the post. During the summit talks, Kim mentioned to Roh an episode concerning Abe when he was deputy chief Cabinet secretary. It was in reference to the time Abe was part of a delegation to a watershed summit in Pyongyang led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in September 2002. It was during that summit that Kim informed Koizumi that 13 Japanese had been abducted and that eight of them were dead. Kim recalled telling Abe, "I want you (to work) not to betray our expectations." However, "Abe became hard-line as soon as he became the prime minister (in September 2006). He changed suddenly," Kim told Roh. With regard to Abe’s successor, Yasuo Fukuda, Roh told Kim, "Fukuda is different from Prime Minister Abe." While calling Abe’s stance "ultra hard-line," Roh evaluated Fukuda’s stance on issues as "pretty soft." During the year that Fukuda was in office, Japan and North Korea agreed that Pyongyang would hold a new investigation into the abduction issue. Tokyo also pledged to ease sanctions imposed against the reclusive country. With regard to the abduction issue, Roh showed solicitude toward Kim, saying, "I heard Japan’s assertion, but couldn’t really understand what it was getting at." Kim told Roh, "There are no (abduction victims)." Roh also confided to Kim that Japan was keen to put the past behind it and develop closer ties with North Korea with an offer of $10 billion (977 billion yen). The Japanese government had never officially given a figure of $10 billion. Roh did not publicly say where he got the information. With regard to North Korea’s nuclear development programs, the country’s vice foreign minister, Kim Ky Gwan, stepped in for Kim Jong Il to offer an explanation about an agreement reached at six-party talks, which was announced during the inter-Korea summit. The agreement contained only ambiguous descriptions on the range of declarations North Korea should make about its nuclear development programs. But Kim Ky Gwan stated, "We will not declare those that have become weapons." (Kaise Akihiko and Nakano Akira, “Kim Jong-il Made Clear He Didn’t Trust Abe in 2007 Summit with Roh,” Asahi Shimbun, June 26, 2013)
The Liberal Democratic Party won a sweeping election victory in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, winning 59 seats to become the largest party in the 127-seat assembly for the first time in four years. All LDP candidates won seats in the election. New Komeito, the LDP’s coalition partner, also saw all 23 of its candidates win seats. The combined 82 seats won by the two parties far exceeds the simple majority of 64 seats in the assembly. The results of the election, which is seen as a harbinger for the House of Councillors election scheduled for next month, is likely to give a strong impetus to the two parties, which are seeking a majority in the upper house. The election proved a disaster for the Democratic Party of Japan, which lost 28 seats to 15 and fell from first place to fourth in terms of party strength in the assembly. Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Restoration Party) waged its first Tokyo assembly election campaign ever with 34 candidates. Ishihara Shintaro, one of party’s co-leaders who generally enjoys a high profile in Tokyo, crisscrossed the capital, appealing for the support of the party. But Ishin no Kai lost one of the three seats it had held, apparently as a consequence of a verbal gaffe committed by Hashimoto Toru, the party’s other co-leader, regarding the issue of so-called comfort women. Hashimoto also invited controversy last month when he said U.S. servicemen in Okinawa Prefecture should use the local sex industry as an outlet for their sexual energy. Your Party, which held one seat before the election, won seven seats after fielding 20 candidates. The JCP, which fielded a total of 42 candidates, increased its seats to 17 from eight. Your Party also increased its seats. Voter turnout in the Tokyo election was 43.5 percent, the second lowest on record. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “LDP Sweeps Tokyo Election; All Candidates Win, Making Party Largest in Assembly,” June 25, 2013)

6/25/13

Major government and news media Web sites in South and North Korea were shut down after anonymous hackers claimed to have attacked them on the 63rd anniversary of the start of the 1950-53 Korean War. In South Korea, the Web sites of the presidential office and at least one other government agency were down. According to the national news agency Yonhap, when the attack began today, the Web site of the presidential Blue House was splashed with a large hacker’s message that said in Korean: “Hurrahs to Kim Jong-un, the president of a unified Korea!” Among the Web sites inaccessible in North Korea were those belonging to Air Koryo; Rodong Sinmun, the main Communist Party newspaper; and the official Korean Central News Agency. It remained unclear if the two longtime rivals had attacked each other, or whether the attacks were the work of third parties, perhaps proponents of Internet freedom who criticize both countries. The two governments have denied involvement in previous cyberattacks. Neither North Korea nor South Korean officials commented on what may have caused the Internet disruptions in the isolated North, where the government allows relatively few people to use the Internet and all Web sites are tightly controlled by the state. But people who have claimed to be a loose global network of hackers called Anonymous had warned through Twitter that they would attack North Korean Web sites on Tuesday. They have criticized North Korea in the past for keeping most of its people off the Internet. South Korean officials said they were investigating who was behind the hacking attacks on their Web sites. Yonhap cited Twitter users who claimed responsibility for the attacks in South Korea, saying they demanded that the South’s government stop censoring Internet content. (Choe Sang-hun, “Cyberattacks Disrupt Leading Korean Sites,” New York Times, June 26, 2013, p. A-8) The government on
July 16 named North Korea as a suspect in the latest cyber attack against the presidential office website and dozens of other government offices and news outlets here. The attack took place from June 25, the anniversary of the outbreak of the 1950-53 Korean War, to July 1, in which the websites of 69 government and private organizations, including the prime minister’s office, were attacked. The ministry said the hackers in the latest attack used at least one IP address that had been used in previous attacks by North Korean hackers. The ministry said the methods, pattern and other characteristics of attacks used in the latest incident were also the same as those identified in previous attacks by the communist North. "In addition, the malware used in the latest attack against websites and in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks has been confirmed to be a variation of the malware found in the March 20 cyber attack (by North Korea)," it added. (Yonhap, “Seoul says N. Korea ‘Likely’ behind June 25 Cyber Attack,” July 16, 2013)

Recent satellite imagery of North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear test site has revealed new tunneling work being done at the West Portal area, the site of the 2009 and possibly 2013 nuclear tests. This activity appears to have begun by late April 2013 and gathered momentum over the next few months. Imagery from June 1 shows a large new spoil and tailings dumpsite along the road between the West Portal and the old dump site that went into a canyon to the east. The light gray color of the new spoil/tailings indicates that it is rock from inside the mountain and not the surrounding brown dirt. While it is too early to determine the exact purpose of this new activity, three possibilities are: 1) construction of another tunnel at the West Portal that will take several years to complete; 2) completion or repair of a tunnel at the West Portal area; and 3) the clearing of debris from existing tunnels probably caused by past nuclear tests. The dangers of radioactivity from past detonations are probably minimal in the first two cases, but opening a sealed tunnel previously used for a nuclear test would be hazardous. (Nick Hansen and Jack Liu, “New Tunneling Activity at the North Korean Nuclear Test Site,” 38North, June 25, 2013)

South Korean President Park Geun-hye said she reached an agreement with Chinese President Xi Jinping that a nuclear North Korea is unacceptable “under any circumstances” and ending its atomic program serves the national interests of the two countries. “We shared an understanding that North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated under any circumstances and confirmed that realizing the denuclearization of North Korea and maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula conform to the common interests of the two countries,” Park said during a joint news conference with Xi. Xi said the two sides agreed to work together to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, but he stopped short of saying explicitly that North Korea should disarm. Instead, he put a greater emphasis on calling for restarting the long-stalled six-party talks with the aim of ending Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions. On Thursday, the two sides agreed to significantly bolster political and security cooperation. The communique said the two countries will seek all forms of exchange between their leaders, in face-to-face meetings, by phone and by letter, on a frequent basis. They also agreed to establish a dialogue channel between South Korea’s presidential national security chief and China’s state councilor in charge of foreign affairs. On economic issues, the two sides agreed to step up efforts to expand bilateral
trade volume to US$300 billion by 2015 and make progress in ongoing negotiations to free up trade between two of Asia's biggest economies, according to the communique. Last year's trade volume between the two sides amounted to $215 billion. The two countries also agreed to extend their currency swap deal by three years to keep it valid until 2017. South Korea and China agreed in 2011 to double their won-yuan swap line to 360 billion yuan. That accord was to expire in 2014. After the summit, the two sides signed eight memorandums of understanding, including agreements that call for visa waiver for diplomats from each side, greater cooperation in maritime affairs, energy and other areas. An appendix to the communique laid out a series of specific commitments the two sides made to move forward all-round cooperation from political sectors, investment and trade to people-to-people and cultural exchanges, consular affairs and regional and international issues. In what appears to be an unusual move, the communique has a clause on Taiwan. South Korea expressed its "understanding and respect" for Beijing's "One China" policy, which considers Taiwan a renegade province that should be reunified with the mainland. (Chang Jae-soon, "Park: S. Korea, China Agree Nuclear N. Korea Unacceptable," Yonhap, June 27, 2013) South Korean and Chinese officials held "frank discussions" about Korean reunification during President Park Geun-hye's visit to China last month, Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se said July 11. "Reunification issues have been a taboo in bilateral relations, but Chinese leaders this time spoke about them openly," which indicates "how much the bilateral ties have improved," Yun told said. China also "used resolute and clear expressions about North Korean denuclearization. It was impossible to doubt its sincerity," Yun said at the Kwanhun Club, a fraternity of journalists. "The idea of some academics that North Korea is becoming a strategic burden to China rather than a buffer state is now shared by the Chinese leadership," he added. He said China's top priority in Korean Peninsula policies used to be stability, denuclearization and negotiations, but the order of those priorities has changed to denuclearization, stability and negotiations. Yun stressed, however, that the Park administration is not pursuing reunification based on projections of an implosion of the North Korean regime. (Chosun Ilbo, "Seoul Had 'Frank Discussions' in Beijing about Reunification," July 12, 2013) After all the media glare and scrutiny of President Park Geun-hye's summit meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping late last month, experts point out three fundamental differences that exist between the two leaders, concerning their policies toward North Korea. "Park, Xi and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang strongly emphasized 'denuclearization' during the summit," said Moon Chung-in, a political science professor at Yonsei University in Seoul, speaking at a seminar hosted by the East Asia Foundation (EAF), a non-profit organization, last week. "But Xi and Li emphasized denuclearization of 'Korean Peninsula,’ whereas, Park emphasized denuclearization of ‘North Korea.’” China objected to using the term ‘denuclearization of North Korea’ in the joint communique adopted after the Korea-China summit, factoring in the relationship with its Cold War ally, Pyongyang, which is on its worst terms with Seoul. Instead, the two sides mentioned ‘denuclearization of Korean Peninsula’ in the communique. Experts say using the words "Korean Peninsula" means that China is still maintaining a balanced stance between the two Koreas, meaning it still wants unification of the peninsula from mutual consensus. Moon also said that the two leaders are on different pages in the interpretation of launching a ‘dialogue’ with North Korea. “Xi stresses dialogue but focusing on a resumption of the six-party,
South-North and U.S.-North Korea talks,” said Moon. “However, Park tends to interpret dialogue as strategic discussion between Washington, Beijing and Seoul to take a coordinated approach on Pyongyang.” According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seoul is preparing to host 1.5 track strategic dialogue comprised of officials, academics and experts from the three countries as early as this month. Insiders say the dialogue has been delayed several times due to China’s unwillingness. Whereas, many high-ranking Chinese officials including Xi have urged numerous times an immediate resumption of the six-party talks, but South Korea and U.S. say there will be no engagement with North Korea unless Pyongyang takes concrete steps to scrap its nuclear programs. Lastly, the most striking conflict between the two lies in the fact that Park welcomes the so-called ‘pivot to Asia-Pacific’ by U.S. “Park fully committed support on the U.S.’ rebalancing to Asia-Pacific and stressed a comprehensive strategic alliance with the US,” said Moon. “She hopes she can enhance ties with China as well but I see conflict.” Beijing has been raising concerns over a U.S. strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region because it sees the move as a containment strategy by strengthening ties with allies in the region such as South Korea and Japan. “Suppose North Korea undertakes a fourth nuclear test and launches another rocket. Then South Korea would strengthen its alliance with the U.S. in terms of missile defense and conduct more joint military exercises in the West Sea,” Moon said. “I don’t think President Xi’s personal relationship with President Park would excuse South Korea to do that.” Responding to Moon, Zhu Feng, an international relations professor at Peking University in Beijing, who also attended the EAF seminar said “Yes, there is some sort of difference and they cannot disappear overnight.” “China is concerned about America’s strategy and policy. Concerning denuclearization, I see no difference. Chinese vocabulary has been the same for 20 years.” The Chinese professor added that it will take time to see tangible changes in China’s foreign policy as it focuses more on domestic issues such as the narrowing down of income disparity. “Any successful redirection of China’s foreign policy must be based on very successful domestic change. Without this there won’t be any welcoming change in China’s foreign policy,” said Zhu. “The apparent change in China’s foreign policy is largely due to the personal attractions of Xi.” (Chung Min-uck, “Park, Xi Still Differ over Details on N.K. Policy,” Korea Times, July 15, 2013)

A joint statement issued after the meeting between the leaders, President Xi Jinping of China and President Park Geun-hye of South Korea, also said they had agreed on the importance of faithfully carrying out United Nations Security Council resolutions that called for sanctions against North Korea, as well as a multilateral agreement in 2005 under which the North was obliged to give up its nuclear weapons programs in return for economic and diplomatic benefits. Although South Korea and China have separately declared their opposition to North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs many times, their leaders speaking in one voice at a rare joint press appearance carried diplomatic symbolism: South Korea is the North’s archrival, while China is its biggest ally. “Both sides confirmed that denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and keeping peace and stability there were in their common interest, and they agreed to make joint efforts to that end,” the statement said. Although the statement said Park and Xi agreed to take “active efforts to create positive circumstances for the resumption of the six-party talks,” it did not divulge any details. The friendly meeting
between the Chinese and South Korean leaders came as the United States escalated its sanctions on North Korea, blacklisting Daedong Credit Bank, a related company and a North Korean nuclear research official. The action, announced by the Treasury Department, was part of what it called “our ongoing efforts to disrupt North Korean financial networks supporting the regime’s illicit ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs and proliferation activities.” David S. Cohen, the Treasury under secretary in charge of American financial sanctions, said the timing of the action was purely coincidental to the meeting in Beijing. “We are committed to increasing the sanctions pressure on North Korea until it complies with its international obligations,” he told reporters in a telephone news conference. (Jane Perlez, “China and South Korea Reaffirm Efforts Aimed at North,” New York Times, June 28, 2013, p. A-9)

6/29/13

President Park Geun-hye delivered a friendship address at the alma mater of Chinese President Xi Jinping on Saturday, calling for the two neighbors to build relations of “trust” based on the big strides they have made in just 20 years of diplomatic ties. Park began the 20-minute speech before students and faculty members at Tsinghua University in Beijing with about five minutes of greetings and opening remarks in the Chinese language, including an ancient Chinese maxim about the importance of education. “Only about 20 years have passed since South Korea and China established diplomatic relations in 1992, but friendship and cooperation developed at a pace nearly unprecedented in the world,” Park said, offering a series of figures showing the rapid increases in economic and other exchanges between the two sides. “I believe that Korea-China relations should now move forward into a more mature and substantial partnership … I intend to pursue dialogue and cooperation in a more forward moving way based on the deep trust forged with President Xi through the summit,” she said. “Beyond the successful Korea-China relations over the past 20 years, I intend to begin a journey of trust that opens up new 20 years,” she said, adding that a joint communiqué the two sides adopted at the summit is a “blueprint and roadmap” for her efforts. Park outlined her vision for peace with the North. “I want to bring genuine peace to the Korean Peninsula,” she said. “What is more important than anything else is to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and for North Korea to become a responsible member of the international community. North Korea should listen to the united voice from the international community that its nuclear program is unacceptable.” Park said she is ready to help North Korea revive its broken economy if it gives up its nuclear program. She also stressed that a peaceful Korean Peninsula would also be of help to the prosperity in Chinese provinces bordering with North Korea. “A Northeast Asia without geopolitical risks stemming from the issue of North Korea would serve as a ‘growth engine’ for the world through the combination of a rich labor force and the world’s best capital and technologies” in the region, she said. “It will offer more opportunities of success for your lives as well.” Park also outlined her “Northeast Asia peace and cooperation initiative,” saying countries in the region have a high level of mutual economic interdependence, but their political and security cooperation lag far behind due to historical and security disputes. The initiative, also known as the “Seoul process,” calls for countries in the region to start with softer, non-political issues, such as environmental issues, disaster relief, nuclear safety and counter-terrorism, so as to foster trust and expand cooperation to political and security matters. (Yonhap, “Park Calls for Relations of ‘Trust’ with China,” June 29, 2013)
One of the most important peculiarities of the North Korean economy is the existence of numerous Foreign Currency Earning Companies (FCEC), usually with flowery Chinese-style names, that sell resources to China, and import consumption goods to North Korea. Most communist states historically followed the Soviet model that made foreign trade the nearly exclusive preserve of a particular branch of the central government – typically this branch was known as the ‘Ministry of Foreign Trade’. All exportable items had to be submitted to this ministry which in turn negotiated and made deals with overseas partners. However, as early as the 1970s, North Korea began to move away from this Soviet-style system. A number of government agencies were given permission to establish their own foreign trade companies that operated with remarkable autonomy and with very little control from central government bureaucracy. The number of Foreign Currency Earning Companies increased dramatically in the late 1990s. The exact total number of FCECs is not known, but is estimated at around 200-250. Most of the FCECs are established by the bureaucratic agencies, many of which at first glance have little to do with foreign trade or even manufacturing. The largest and most powerful FCEC are run by the Party and by the military, while the FCEC fathered by police agencies and intelligence services are also quite significant. In practice, every single one of these power agencies has not one but several FCECs under its control. Frequently, powerful departments within these state agencies run their own FCEC. Within the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces the Department of Intelligence runs the Pirobong Foreign Trade Company, the Department of Roads runs the Unhasu Trade Company, and the Department of Mobilization runs the Ryonghun Foreign Trade Company. The Korean People’s Air Force and Navy also operate their own foreign trade companies. North Korean exports are completely dominated by mineral resources, seafood and medicinal herbs, as well as by some exotic goods – frog oil, for example, a substance which is extracted from a particular species of frog. Most of such items are exported to China which now controls well over 80% of North Korea’s foreign trade. A peculiar feature of the North Korean economy is the increasingly blurred line between state and private income-generating activities. This line is particularly blurred within FCECs. In most cases, bureaucrats within an FCEC parent organization have a lot of power but almost no money. They can usually secure export and extraction quotas, but they do not have the means to collect or buy the goods – and goods, be it mushrooms, coal or gold have to be either purchased at the local market, harvested or mined. This is where private investors come into play. In most cases, FCEC bureaucrats work together with North Korea’s nascent bourgeoisie, known as the tonju (lit. ‘master of money’). The latter typically use their own money to buy the exportable items from local producers. In more complex schemes, a tonju might invest in a mining enterprise, so he or she essentially ends up running a private mine. In such a case, a tonju will hire workers, purchase equipment, arrange transportation, and even commission geological surveys. In exchange, a tonju is given a measure of protection because his operations are ostensibly part of the government economy. In some cases, tonju might receive help from the police and other powerful government institutions and usually become official staff members of the FCEC. If the particular FCEC is part of the military, police, or security services, they might even be issued military ranks too. A tonju entrepreneur might deal with harvesting or mining exportable resources, but in many cases he or she might also use connections in China to arrange the sale of said resources. Of course, legal sale is only
possible if the FCEC has the *wakhu* quotas to hand. In exchange for access to export quotas and a modicum of legal protection, private entrepreneurs are supposed to pay the FCEC central offices an agreed amount of money. Additionally they must also pay kickbacks to their partners and protectors in the bureaucracy. Without doing so, they would be unable to continue this lucrative work. After obligatory payments to the state budget and the equally obligatory payments to bureaucratic partners are made, the rest goes to the tonju. This is profitable, so many of the Tonju prefer to work within the FCEC system. Even if an FCEC’s operations are handled by bureaucrats and not the tonju, a remarkable amount of autonomy is given to its personnel. It is normal for an overseas (in nearly all cases, Chinese) office or even an individual manager to be given an annual obligation, usually denominated in US dollars. After the office or individual pays the amount required, they are free to keep any other money they can earn. Some FCECs are also charged with buying particular luxury goods for the elite. It appears that in most cases such luxury goods are bought not for profitable resale but as a kind of obligatory tribute that every FCEC is supposed to give to the state. In most cases, such tribute takes the form of money transfers, but in some cases, ostensibly, bottles of expensive cognac or even a Mercedes can be provided in lieu of such transfers. Predictably, this system leads to a great amount of corruption. Chinese companies frequently report that their North Korean partners ask them to include into a contract an inflated or deflated price, or misreport the amount of goods delivered. Such techniques are often the only way for low-level managers to make some money for themselves. At the same time, such managerial freedom has created an entrepreneurial class. It also has helped to bridge the gap between private entrepreneurs, the tonju, and the bureaucracy. This may have far reaching consequences for North Korea in the future. (Andrei Lankov, “How North Korean Trading Companies Make Money,” *NKNews*, June 29, 2013)

KCN: “DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun, head of the DPRK delegation, made a speech at the ministerial meeting of the 20th ASEAN Regional Forum held in Darussalam of Brunei on Tuesday. He referred to the fact that the DPRK has further reenergized the country’s overall economy and achieved successes in the improvement of the people’s standard of living by stepping up the building of a thriving nation under the wise leadership of the dear respected Kim Jong Un. He reiterated the DPRK’s will to bolster up its capabilities for national defence and, at the same time, exert efforts for developing the economy and improving people’s standard of living for the purpose of making sustained efforts for peaceful development.

Referring to the repeated vicious cycle of confrontation and escalated tensions and the touch-and-go situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula due to the U.S., he said: The U.S. aims to disarm the DPRK and bring down its social system by employing all means and methods. It also seeks to further reinforce its military deployment to contain other countries by massively introducing latest war equipment into the Asia-Pacific region under the pretext of the “threat” from the DPRK. The U.S. is still trumpeting about ‘provocation’ and ‘threat’ from the DPRK, which reminds one of a guilty party filing the suit first. All facts go to prove that the real provocateur and main culprit of acute tensions is none other than the U.S. Such unceasing vicious cycle of acute tensions on the peninsula is attributable to the deeply-rooted hostile policy of the U.S. toward the DPRK. The U.S. has not recognized the sovereignty of the DPRK but pursued all sorts of
sanctions, pressure and military provocation against it for more than half a century since it designated the DPRK as enemy from the very day of its founding for the mere reason that it has differing ideology and social system. It is impossible to settle the nuclear issue on the peninsula and any other matters and the vicious cycle of tensions will persist nonstop unless the U.S. rolls back its hostile policy toward the DPRK and defuses its nuclear threat to the DPRK. The U.S. drop of its hostile policy should start from the conclusion of a peace treaty between the U.S. and the DPRK on the basis of the respect for the latter’s sovereignty and halt to all sanctions and military provocations against it. This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Korean Armistice Agreement. We once again call for an immediate dismantlement of the ‘UN Command’ which has existed so far by abusing the name of the UN as a leftover of the Korean War. Consistent is our stand to put an end to the tensions on the peninsula through dialogue and negotiations and to contribute to the regional peace and security.

Recently the DPRK proposed high-level talks between the authorities of the DPRK and the U.S. to have sincere discussions on wide-ranging issues including defusing military tensions on the peninsula, replacing the Armistice Agreement by a peace mechanism and “building a world without nuclear weapons” touted by the U.S. Now that the international community is expressing serious concern over the tense situation on the peninsula, if the U.S. truly wants detente, it should respond to the bold decision and goodwill of the DPRK without any precondition. Proceeding from its invariable stand for independent reunification of the country and peace and prosperity of the nation, the DPRK will make responsible and patient efforts to implement the June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration. The DPRK foreign minister expressed belief that the member states of the forum would extend support and solidarity to the sincere efforts of the DPRK to end the vicious cycle of tensions and achieve durable peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK government will as ever make every effort to boost the friendly and cooperative relations with the regional countries, guided by the idea of its foreign policy — independence, peace and friendship – and protect peace and security in the region including the peninsula, he stressed.

“ (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Minister Speaks at Ministerial Meeting of Asian Regional Forum,” July 3, 2013)

South Korea has offered working-level talks with the North on reopening the jointly-run Kaesong industrial zone. Seoul made the proposal a day after Pyongyang said South Korean officials could visit the closed complex to inspect and maintain equipment. (Yonhap, “South Korea Proposes Kaesong Talks, with North,” July 4, 2013) Seoul and Pyongyang are at loggerheads horns over the inter-Korean joint industrial complex in the North’s border city of Gaeseong, with the South making a counteroffer for working-level talks on July 6 at the truce village of Panmunjeom. The Ministry of Unification made clear that it would not accept North Korea’s original offer to allow Southern entrepreneurs’ to visit closed zone on July 3. “We came up with the counteroffer in consideration of our companies’ difficulties after the shutdown of the Gaeseong complex three months ago. Things are feared to worsen as the monsoon season starts,” Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk said. “The offer is in line with our consistent stance that the Kaesong issue can only be addressed through inter-governmental talks. We suggested working-level dialogue several times.” Seoul has opposed Pyongyang’s attempts to deal with inter-Korean topics via contacts with private players, as opposed to the government. It regards the latter’s green light on
Kaesong visits as similar maneuver. The South has not agreed with the idea of normalizing the Kaesong Industrial Complex (GIC), the last remaining symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation, through talks between South Korean companies there and the North. “Instead of just returning to the past, we should make an advance in resuming the operations of the GIC. We should not hurry and need to have a long-term vision,” Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said. A Cheong Wa Dae official concurred. “The doors are always open for inter-Korean talks but we will stick to principles on North Korea policies. What is most significant is trust. If trust is not abided by, any attempts or steps can hardly succeed,” he said. He added that Park feels sorry for the businesspeople who have suffered greatly because of the closure of the GIC but she doesn't think that the area can reopen without the North's pledges not to unilaterally suspend it. (Kim Tae-gyu, “Government Proposes Talks on Kaesong,” Korea Times, July 4, 2013)

South Korea will try to adopt internationally accepted "safeguards" that would make it more difficult for North Korea to disrupt the operations of a joint industrial complex in its territory when the two Koreas meet this weekend, an official said July 5. North Korea apparently is interested in reopening the complex as early as possible, but South Korean officials said they are more keenly interested in working out what they called "constructive" arrangements that would ensure sustainable development of the factory zone free of politics. "The government has pointed out on numerous occasions that Kaesong must be developed as an area that follows international standards and where common sense prevails," Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk said at a news conference. South Korean policymakers have previously said on numerous occasions that "constructive" development includes safeguards to prevent work stoppage caused by arbitrary actions taken by the North. They have hinted that they will not allow operations at Kaesong to slide back to the way they were before the present crisis. Kim said that besides creating an environment that can allow the complex to expand, negotiators will discuss was to permit technicians to check manufacturing facilities that have been left idle for some time and make it possible for South Korean companies to bring back their finished goods and raw production materials. On the issue of South Korean businessmen with factories in Kaesong being allowed to visit the border town, the spokesman said that matter will be part of agendas to be discussed at Panmunjom. (Yonhap, “S. Korea to Focus on Future of Kaesong Park at Talks,” July 5, 2013)

Russia said it still had "a number of substantial" differences with North Korea concerning efforts to resume stalled six-party. Deputy Prime Minister Igor Morgulov's comments after his talks Thursday with Pyongyang's main nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-Gwan suggest that no breakthrough was achieved at the negotiations. "A number of substantial differences remain," Morgulov told Russian news agencies. "The positions (of Russia and North Korea) for the moment diverge," he said without giving further details. Kim held separate talks lasting a reported five hours with Morgulov and First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov. Morgulov said that the sides "reaffirmed their mutual desire to find a diplomatic solution to the existing Korean peninsula problem and discussed various options for relaunching the six-party talks." "On the whole, we access this exchange of opinions positively," he added. (AFP, “Substantial Differences with N. Korea on Nuclear Talks: Russia,” July 5, 2013)
KCNA: “Talks were held in Moscow Thursday [July 4] between Kim Kye Gwan, first vice minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK and Vladimir Titov, first vice foreign minister of the Russian Federation. Present there from the DPRK side were the party of the first vice foreign minister and Kim Yong Jae, DPRK ambassador to Russia, and from the Russian side officials concerned. The two sides exchanged views on the issue of boosting the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries and other matters of mutual concern. The talks proceeded in a sincere and friendly atmosphere. That day the first vice foreign minister of the DPRK had talks with Igor Morgulov, vice foreign minister of Russia.” (KCNA, “Talks Held between First Vice Foreign Ministers of DPRK, Russia,” July 5, 2013)

UN experts tasked with probing human rights violations in North Korea said Friday Pyongyang has refused to cooperate with the investigation, but that they still hoped to travel to the country next month. "A letter was sent under my hand ... seeking to reach out to the DPRK, North Korea, in order that we would have cooperation, contact and dialogue," said former Australian judge Michael Kirby, who heads the newly formed UN commission of inquiry on the secretive country. That letter, sent ahead of the initial meeting of the three commission members in Geneva this week, received "a polite but negative response," he told reporters in the Swiss city. The commission, which includes Serbian human rights campaigner Sonja Biserko and former Indonesian attorney general Marzuki Darusman, who since 2010 has been monitoring North Korea for the UN Human Rights Council, nonetheless hopes it will be allowed into the country, he said. "We will be sending a request today (for access)... and we are hopeful that that will have a positive response," Kirby said, stressing the commission's efforts to communicate to Pyongyang "reassurances of the neutrality and independence with which we will discharge our task." He said the commission hoped to visit North Korea August 11-17. (AFP, “N. Korea Refuses to Cooperate with U.N. Rights Probe,” July 5, 2013)

South Korea sent back home three North Koreans who were rescued off its east coast, government officials said. The North Koreans were rescued by a South Korean civilian vessel on July 3 after their boat capsized, they said. The three men were handed over to the North at 6:30 p.m. at the border truce village of Panmunjom after their wish to return home was confirmed, the officials said. (Yonhap, “Seoul Send back North Koreans Rescued in East Sea,” July 5, 2013)

South and North Korea agreed in principle to normalize operations at the inter-Korean industrial complex that has been idle for nearly three months, helping to keep alive the only viable economic link between the two countries, the government said Sunday. Seoul’s Ministry of Unification said after 16 hours of negotiation, the two sides were able to find middle ground on various outstanding issues. It said under the agreement signed at 4:05 a.m., inspections of manufacturing facilities will be carried out at the Kaesong Industrial Complex starting on July 10. South Korean businessmen with factories in the North Korean border town will carry out the inspections with the help of engineers. The ministry said Pyongyang agreed to discuss ways to implement safeguards to prevent another shutdown of the industrial park in the future. This meeting is scheduled to take place in Kaesong on the same day the facility inspections
kickoff. Seoul said from the outset, that normalization must be contingent on the North pledging not to unilaterally disrupt operations at the complex again, and the introduction of international standards of doing business. The two sides, moreover, concurred on allowing South Korean businessmen to collect finished goods and raw materials needed to make products from the border town, with the North agreeing to extend safe passage over the demilitarized zone for South Korean personnel. The agreement comes after marathon talks conducted at Tongilgak, in the North Korean-controlled part of the joint security area. Earlier in the talks, negotiations made little headway due to very different priorities expressed by the two countries. Such developments caused some to worry that negotiations will fall through. South Korea made clear Pyongyang must take responsibility for the disruption in operations and guarantee such problems will not be repeated. It also wanted the right to permit the retrieval of finished goods from Kaesong that can alleviate the plight of local companies, which have been hit hard by the work stoppage. North Korea, on the other hand, wanted operations to resume as soon as possible at the complex that was created as a result of the historic 2000 summit meeting between the leaders of the two Koreas. Related to the talks itself, Suh Ho, director of the unification ministry's exchange and cooperation bureau, told reporters the North showed considerable aggressiveness in trying to iron out differences. “I received the impression that they were committed to tackling the issue,” the chief delegate to the working-level talks said. He said that while the South Korean delegates brought up the issue of fingerling who was to blame for the work stoppage, his counterparts did not share the same view. Suh added that the checkup of facilities and retrieval of finished goods and other manufacturing materials needed to be seen as one package, with the normalization of Kaesong being an entirely different issue. “While the agreement reached is vague and broad on the safeguard issue, Seoul is determined to touch on this issue in the next meeting set for Kaesong,” he said, pointing out that in some areas negotiators left the agenda open for future talks, because they didn’t have time at the Panmunjom meeting. The official emphasized that “constructive development” of the complex is needed to ensure Kaesong long-term health. The official, moreover, said that the South will comment on the need to ensure better protection for personnel, property and movement to and from Kaesong at the upcoming meeting. Cheong Wa Dae said it was a “significant development” that the Koreas finally had talks over Kaesong. “There has been a preliminary agreement between the Koreas for the positive normalization (of the industrial park),” a Cheong Wa Dae official told reporters. “(The suspension of the Kaesong complex) should never have happened in the first place, but the two sides have made some progress in their efforts to resolve the issue.” The meeting came after North Korea sent invitations to South Korean businessmen with factories in Kaesong, assuring them of safe passage to the border city. The South countered this move by calling for government-to-government negotiations, while putting off allowing visits by businessmen until after officials hold talks. (Yonhap, “Koreas Agree in Principle to Normalize Operations Suspended Joint Industrial Park,” July 7, 2013)

KCNA: “Working-level talks between authorities of the north and the south of Korea for the normalization of the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) were held at the Thongil House in the north side of Panmunjom on Saturday and Sunday [July 6-7]. The talks discussed the issues of decreasing the damage to be done to the south side businesses during
the rainy season and normalizing operations in the KIZ and adopted an agreement. According to it, the north and the south will let those businessmen concerned of the south side and other personnel visit the KIZ from July 10 to check and readjust equipment to reduce the damage. The north and the south will let the south side businessmen take finished products and raw and subsidiary materials out of the zone and carry equipment out of it according to related procedures. The north and the south will ensure the passage of south side personnel and vehicles coming in and out of the zone, communications and their safe return and personal safety for the above-said purpose. The north and the south will make sure that the businesses in the KIZ will restart, depending on their preparations, and decided to hold the next round of talks in the KIZ on July 10 for the normalization of operations in the zone, including the prevention of recurrence of suspension of operation." (KCNA, "Working-Level Talks of Inter-Korean Authorities Held," July 7, 2013)

A number of independent U.S. analysts are saying the Obama administration appears to be reluctantly accepting that the North Korean military might never be fully denuclearized. Since the last round of regional nuclear talks in 2008, the North has substantively advanced its nuclear weapons program -- carrying out two underground atomic tests; launching several long-range rockets, one of which made it into space; showing off a prototype for a road-mobile ICBM; declaring a uranium enrichment program; and initiating efforts to reopen a disabled plutonium production reactor. All of this illustrates, according to some issue experts, just how much ground has been lost in nearly five years of unsuccessful international efforts to resume negotiations on an end to Pyongyang’s nuclear program. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry last week in an appearance with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts in Brunei told journalists, "We join you in making it absolutely clear that the policy of the United States, together with the Republic of Korea and Japan, is the denuclearization of … North Korea." The Obama administration has shown little interest in responding to recent overtures by Pyongyang asking for unconditional bilateral security talks. Washington has said it is willing to return to the six-party aid-for-denuclearization talks, but it has qualified that on the requirement that North Korea first demonstrate a willingness to halt its prohibited weapons work. The six-nation talks also involve China, Japan, South Korea and Russia. While the U.S. demand would seem to represent proof that the Obama team would not accept continued North Korean nuclear arms work, some analysts say maintenance of the status quo, without talks, suggests Pyongyang’s military efforts simply will proceed forward. Victor Cha, the Bush administration’s former special envoy for North Korea policy, in an e-mail said he does not see an explicit policy shift on the part of Washington. However, "having said that, a policy of non-action on the diplomatic front, with everyone sitting on their hands, is tantamount" to acquiescence of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, he said. "Objectively, the North Koreans are just making progress and as the North Korean program advances, I suspect that -- particularly in the U.S. and South Korea and Japan -- there is a declining confidence that we will be able to get them to bargain it away," said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "I wouldn’t represent it as a kind of [policy] discontinuity. It isn’t that something changed overnight. It is that there has been this gradual accumulation of North Korean capabilities,” said Lewis, who writes for the Arms
Control Wonk blog and Foreign Policy magazine. “I think when they came into office, [Obama administration officials] were in this whole benign neglect mode. They didn’t press very hard and the North Koreans went kind of crazy with the tests.” Pyongyang has signaled that its plan in any new diplomatic talks will be to attain some form of recognition of its status as a nuclear-armed nation, according to observers. “Part of North Korea’s diplomatic strategy is working -- carving out a space where it’s tacitly accepted as a nuclear weapon state,” said Joel Wit, editor of the website 38 North, at an event at the American Security Project in late June. “To me, all of this is leading to a reality, whether we want to acknowledge it or not, that we are acquiescing to North Korea as a nuclear power,” argued Wit, a one-time State Department official who, in the 1990s, supervised an ultimately failed U.S.-North Korea denuclearization accord. Not all analysts agree with the view that the Obama administration, by not aggressively pushing for new negotiations, is implicitly accepting the North’s nuclear weapons status. Anthony Cordesman, a former director of Defense intelligence assessments at the Pentagon, in an interview last week emphasized the idea that language remains important. While Washington “recognizes the very nature of North Korea’s nuclear efforts,” the Obama administration has not “undertaken any diplomatic efforts that would signal, even tacitly, that the United States accepts” the isolated state as a nuclear weapon country, he said. Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, in an e-mail said he sees it both ways: “We keep on saying [North Korea’s nuclear work is] not acceptable.” On the other hand, there is an implicit recognition of Pyongyang’s strategic status “in terms of how we respond to their nuclear threat … which, de facto, recognizes that they are a nuclear-armed state, if not a nuclear weapons state, under international law,” he wrote. The U.S. State Department did not respond by press time to a question about whether it is moving toward tacit recognition that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is here to stay. Lewis in a July 2 phone interview said the problem the Obama administration is confronting, as it ponders whether to re-engage with Pyongyang, is how politically unpalatable it has become to negotiate freezes to the East Asian country’s nuclear and missile programs, which were signature characteristics of previous aid-for-denuclearization efforts. “In the past, we were negotiating with the North Koreans to freeze their program and give up things they hadn’t yet built,” such as a uranium enrichment capability and longer-range ballistic missiles, Lewis said. The negotiations inevitably always stumbled when the United States and its allies pushed Pyongyang to dismantle or surrender nuclear weapon technology it already possessed, he said. Now that North Korea has advanced its weapons of mass destruction efforts so much, the prospect of getting it to agree to permanently give up all of its new capabilities seems even more remote, according to Lewis. “The old formula of freezing the program just looks less appealing,” he said. Still, Lewis said he believes it is better to negotiate freezes to North Korea’s nuclear weapons work -- even if they end up being temporary -- than to have no moratorium in place at all. The last freeze Washington negotiated with Pyongyang, the so-called 2012 Leap Day deal, never even got off the ground. The aborted accord would have provided North Korea with a limited quantity of U.S. food aid in exchange for its moratorium of all nuclear and long-range missile tests and a halt on its uranium enrichment work. The United States walked away from the deal after the North fired a space rocket in April 2012. Michael Green, an East Asia specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said there is no “clear option” for ending the
North’s nuclear work. Participants in the six-party talks “will probably go for some second-best solution, which involves sanctions and pressure to impose a cost on the regime, slow down their program, dissuade other proliferators, and strengthen the net needed to prevent [weapons] leakage.” Such an outcome is not satisfactory but is the “reality,” Green, a former National Security Council staffer under President George W. Bush, said in an e-mail. Wit said he would like to see more coercive diplomacy on the part of the Obama administration. What currently exists, he said, is coercion in the form of deepening international sanctions and interdictions of smuggled weaponry but no substantive diplomacy, which could involve routine contacts through both official and semi-official channels. The United States must also be persistent when engaging with Pyongyang, he said. “We need to have the patience to sustain a dialogue with North Korea,” Wit said. “Even if we get traction, it’s going to be long and difficult, so we need to be able to stay with it.” Additionally, the Obama administration should be open to sending high-level “diplomatic assets” to engage with the North, said Wit, who is a visiting scholar at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. “We need to lead from the front of the pack on this issue, not from way behind, which is what we are doing now.” (Rachel Oswald, “Some Experts See North Korean Nuclear Arms as Here to Stay,” National Journal, July 8, 2013)

The special sports adviser to the United Nations secretary-general is visiting North Korea at the invitation of the communist country. Wilfried Lemke, the special advisor on sport for development and peace to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, is on a four-day visit to the North ending on July 11 at the request of the North Korean regime, Radio Free Asia said, citing U.N. deputy spokesman Eduardo del Buey. del Buey said the special advisor will discuss ways to promote sports for women and disabled people, meet with high-ranking officials and tour sports facilities during the visit. KCNA reported a day earlier that Lemke toured the construction site for a ski resort near the Mt. Masik pass. The country has repeatedly publicized the construction of the so-called Masikryong ski resort and pledged to finish it within this year. The U.N. official also visited a newly built open-air ice rink, roller-skating rink and a sports park in Pyongyang, according to the North Korean report. North Korea’s Western-educated leader Kim Jong-un has shown great interest in promoting sports in the reclusive country. In February, he invited former U.S. National Basketball Association player Dennis Rodman to the country in a bid to facilitate sports diplomacy. (Yonhap, “U.N. Sports Adviser Visting North Korea at Its Request,” July 9, 2013)

Japan sounded the alarm on rising security threats in Northeast Asia, warning in a government report of a potential military confrontation with China over maritime disputes, as well as a North Korean weapons program that appeared intent on producing longer-range nuclear missiles. Japan’s annual defense paper, the first since Prime Minister Abe Shinzo took office in December, also raised concerns that budget cuts in the United States and a range of other distractions would hinder Washington’s much-touted “pivot to Asia” – a strategic reorienting of American interests from Europe and the Middle East toward East Asia. “In its defense strategic guidance, the U.S. presented policies emphasizing a rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region,” the report drawn up by Japan’s Defense Ministry said. “But how its harsh financial situation will impact efforts to translate these policies into reality attracts attention,” it said. In
January, Abe ordered his government to replace the nation’s five-year military spending plan and to review guidelines adopted in 2010 by the left-leaning Democratic Party, which would have shrunk the Japanese military’s ranks. Instead, Abe plans to increase Tokyo’s military spending for the first time in a decade. Abe has also sought to bolster military cooperation with the United States, including holding joint military training drills with Tokyo’s longtime security ally. But Japan has struggled to hold America’s attention. President Barack Obama skipped a meeting with Mr. Abe on the sidelines of the G-8 summit in Northern Ireland last month. Even as Washington has remained distracted by other matters, the report warned, the security situation in Northeast Asia was turning increasingly volatile. Tokyo is particularly worried by what the report called Chinese intrusions into waters around islands claimed by both countries. Since last year, Japanese and Chinese patrol ships have been engaged in a tense face-off near the Senkaku islands, a set of uninhabited islets in the East China Sea that China calls the Diaoyus. China’s “intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters, its violation of Japan’s airspace and even dangerous actions that could cause a contingency situation, which are extremely regrettable,” the report said. “China should accept and stick to the international norms.” The Japanese government has also been rattled by renewed belligerence from North Korea, which fired off a long-range rocket in December and conducted its third nuclear test in February. Those moves suggest that North Korea is pushing ahead with plans to develop more advanced and longer-range missiles that could ultimately carry nuclear warheads. “We assess that North Korea’s ballistic-missile development is considered to have entered a new phase,” the report said. Coupled with its nuclear tests, North Korea’s weapons program “has developed into a more real and imminent problem for the wider international community,” it said. (Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Warns of Threats from China and North Korea,” New York Times, July 10, 2013, p. A-5)

South Korean factory managers returned Wednesday to a shuttered industrial park in North Korea for the first time in two months as the two governments tried again but failed to agree on terms for reopening the complex, once an iconic symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Sixty factory managers from the South arrived in the Kaesong Industrial Zone, the factory park in the North Korean border town of the same name, for a day trip to check on their factories, which have been idle since the last of the managers withdrew in late April. North Korea halted production there in early April by withdrawing all 53,000 of its workers, blaming tensions it said were caused by joint American-South Korean military drills. The factory managers inspected their manufacturing equipment ahead of the possible resumption of operations. Another group of South Korean factory managers planned to make a similar trip to Kaesong tomorrow. (Choe Sang-hun, “South and North Korea Fail Again to Agree to Reopen Shuttered Complex,” New York Times, July 11, 2013, p. A-1) At a working-level meeting held in the North Korean border city of Kaesong, South Korea called on North Korea to put forward strong safeguards against another unilateral shutdown of an inter-Korean industrial complex that has remained idle for three months. In the keynote speech at the morning session of the meeting that ran for 25 minutes from 10:35 a.m., South Korea’s chief representative Suh Ho outlined South's plans for "constructive development" of the joint venture. He pointed out that for Kaesong to grow it must become a "safe" place to do business and where free business activities are
guaranteed. “The South wants the North to announce solid actions that will convince everyone that it has no intention of taking unilateral action to prevent movement or pull out its laborers in the future,” he said. The official, the director of the exchange and cooperation bureau at the Ministry of Unification, also said that there is a need to allow foreign companies to invest in the park and to transform it into an international industrial region. “Pyongyang must take responsibility for its actions that caused considerable damage to South Korean companies with factories at the border town,” he said. In response, the North avoided touching on who was responsible for the suspension of operations, and called for both sides to respect the spirit of the 2000 inter-Korean summit that laid the foundation for the complex to be created. North Korea’s chief representative Park Chol-su, the vice director, of the General Bureau for Central Guidance to the Development of the Special Zone, said both sides should desist from taking actions that affect normal operations at the complex, and that inspection of facilities needs to be completed so operations can resume as soon as possible. Related to the negotiations, 60 businessmen representing mostly electricity and electronics companies along with 36 support personnel from utility companies and the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, crossed the border at around 9:00 a.m. to check their production facilities. Sources accompanying the delegation said factories looked clean on the outside, although the complex as a whole looked unattended. They are to inspect facilities and take inventory of finished goods and raw materials that can be used to make products at the complex. Under the deal reached on Sunday, the North will guarantee safe passage for the businessmen and permit the retrieval of finished goods and other production materials that have been left at Kaesong. (Yonhap, “Seoul Demands Safeguards before Reopening Kaesong Park,” July 10, 2013) South and North Korea agreed yesterday to hold talks on reunions of families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War next week as they continue to negotiate the restarting of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Pyongyang also proposed talks to restart tours to Mount Kumgang but Seoul is still reviewing the offer. South and North Korea held a second round of low-level talks on Kaesong yesterday at the industrial complex in the morning and the afternoon. Separately through the Panmunjom liaison channel, the North proposed Red Cross talks on reunions July 19 and talks on restarting tourist visits to the Mount Kumgang resort on July 17. South Korea responded that it will participate in the Red Cross talks because of the urgency of reunions of aging family members. But it rejected the Mount Kumgang talks because Seoul wants to focus on the Kaesong talks, according to the Unification Ministry. “The North made a proposal in the afternoon and the South’s government spent time internally reviewing the proposals,” Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk said. “It briefed reporters right after it informed the North of its response.” The North proposed the Red Cross talks at Mount Kumgang or Kaesong but Seoul countered with a proposal to hold them at Panmunjom. In Kaesong yesterday, Southern negotiators said they pressed for an ironclad assurance that Pyongyang wouldn’t take the complex and its businesses hostage in the future when relations get tense. “We explained in detail our idea of the constructive normalization and development of the complex into an international business zone,” Suh Ho, South Korea’s chief negotiator, told reporters yesterday after the one-day talks held at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which has been shut for more than three months. “We repeatedly stressed that a unilateral shutdown of the complex should not be allowed
“North Korea said the reason for the disruption was because of some fundamental problems, like the fact that we insulted their utmost dignity,” Suh said. “But we stressed that, like them, we also have our own utmost dignity.” North Korea denounced Southern media reports saying the revenues from the joint venture park were a vital source of hard currency for the impoverished regime and that meant that it would never shut it down. The entry ban came shortly after that denunciation. The North also said South Korea-U.S. joint military drills carried out in March upset it. The two sides agreed to hold a third round of talks on July 15 in Kaesong. At the 25-minute morning session, friction arose over two issues: Whether they would immediately reopen the complex and whether they could develop the zone into an international business district by inviting in foreign investors. “We emphasized that the complex should be a safe park, guaranteeing stable activities of the firms, and we should develop the complex into an international zone to attract foreign companies,” a Unification Ministry official told reporters. “We demanded solutions to ensure everyone that there would be never such an entry ban or disconnection of communications or withdrawal of workers again. “Meanwhile, North Korea asked us to stop all activities that worked against the normal operations of the complex, mentioning [the remarks of] the June 15 Joint Declaration and Uriminzokkiri,” the official said. “They also called for fast maintenance checks and resumption of operations.” (Kim Hee-jin, “North Makes New Proposals,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 11, 2013)

So Se Pyong, North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, warned that a joint U.S.-South Korean military exercise planned for August would raise tensions on the divided Korean Peninsula. So, speaking in English, said the situation was approaching detente and an “atmosphere of dialogue is in progress”, but added: “The U.S. will stage another joint military exercise in August with South Korea. In this case, the whole Korean Peninsula will fall into the same critical wartime situation.” He also reiterated his country’s call for dismantling the U.S.-led U.N. Command in South Korea, which dates from the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean war without a peace treaty. The 60th anniversary of the armistice falls on July 27. “The DPRK (North Korea) will never give up its nuclear deterrent unless the U.S. fundamentally and irreversibly abandons its hostile policy and nuclear threat towards my country...and dissolves the U.N. Command, a mechanism which is an aggressive military tool against the DPRK,” So said. He was speaking at a rare news conference held in North Korea’s mission in Geneva. So, asked about returning to nuclear negotiations, said: “For six-party talks, we are now ready to have any kind of talks to ease the tension on the Korean Peninsula and to solve any kind of issues, mostly the security issues, because all the problems are security concerned (related).” A Russian statement last week after a visit by North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-Gwan seemed to echo U.S. statements that any talks must involve action by the North to show it is moving toward disarmament. So, asked about the impact of sanctions, said that economic development was a priority under Kim Jong-un, the third generation leader who succeeded Kim Jong-il in December 2011. “Under the leadership of my new leader, His Excellency Kim Jong-un, we are now concentrating more and more on economic development and to increase the people’s livelihood, even the quality of life for the people,” he said. “We built many such as water parks, and (despite being in) the difficult position, we built water parks
Satellite imagery of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (also referred to as Tongchang-ri), where North Korea conducted two long-range rocket launches in 2012, indicates that Pyongyang tested a rocket engine in late March/early April 2013. The number of tests and the type of engine tested remain unclear. However, in view of the facility’s role since mid-2008 as the primary test site for North Korea’s Unha rocket, it may have been related to that space-launch vehicle (SLV). One possibility is that the test was part of Pyongyang’s effort to develop the recently announced Unha-9 (Taepodong-3), believed to be able to lift slightly heavier satellites into orbit. (38 North, “New Long-range Rocket Engine Tests at North Korean Launch Facility: Development Continues,” July 10, 2013)

North Korea cancelled talks on the resumption of family reunions and the Mt. Geumgang tour, according to the Ministry of Unification. A day earlier, Seoul had accepted Pyongyang’s offer to begin talks on the family reunion program but put off the offer to resume tours to the Geumgang resort area in the North. “The North sent us a message that it will cancel both meetings,” said a Unification Ministry official. “I believe the North will now focus on restarting operations at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC).”

Observers say Pyongyang’s cancellation of the talks is a response to Seoul’s refusal to participate in talks on the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism. The official added that the government had urged the North to accept the South’s wishes to resume the reunions for family members separated by the Korean War (1950-53). (Chung Min-uck, “N.K. Stalls on Family Reunions,” Korea Times, July 11, 2013)

Making headway at the ongoing talks to normalize the inter-Korean industrial park in Kaesong can help resolve the long-drawn standoff surrounding suspended tours to Mount Kumgang, the South Korea unification minister said. Speaking at a North Korean policy forum gathering in Seoul, Ryoo Kihl-jae said that Seoul wants to first concentrate on dealing with the impasse over the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but hinted a satisfactory conclusion can lead to the resumption of the tours to the east coast resort that have been halted for five years. “We have sent a message saying that an understanding on Kaesong can naturally lead to the finding of a solution for the suspended tours,” he said. (Yonhap, “Kaesong Resolution Can Revive Mt. Kumgang Tours: Government,” July 11, 2013)

North Korea’s economy may have expanded for a second consecutive year in 2012, South Korea’s central bank said in an estimate published today. But the figures -- which rely on a lot of guesswork -- attribute at least some of that growth to the generosity of international donors. Meanwhile, decisive North Korean policy changes to kickstart the moribund economy remain elusive despite the regime’s stated priority of boosting growth. The reclusive state’s economy expanded by 1.3% in 2012, up from a 0.8% expansion in 2011 and the fastest growth rate in four years, the Bank of Korea said in its report. One of the problems is that the BOK’s North Korean data, which it collects from the National Intelligence Service and other South Korean institutions specializing for people and rollercoasters for children.” (Stephanie Nebehay and Tom Miles, “North Korea Says Could Resume Nuclear Talks If U.S. Ends Hostility,” Reuters, July 10, 2013)
in the North, assume price changes and other variables of South Korea’s in the same period. The BOK said the North’s agricultural and fishery industry grew 3.9% in 2012. Despite the apparent rare economic growth, the North’s per-capita income stood at just 1.371 million (South Korean) won, or about $1,222, the BOK said. That’s only a nineteenth of South Korea’s level. “The North’s economy still remains in the stage of the South’s in the 1970s. And many people there are starving,” said Kim Chun-goo, an economist at Hyundai Research Institute. “South Korea needs to exert continuous effort to narrow the economic gap with the North. That will eventually help Seoul lower the huge unification costs.” According to Seoul’s Unification Ministry, the total, multi-year cost of unification could reach some 250 trillion won, or almost a quarter of South Korea’s GDP last year. By the BOK’s estimate, North Korea’s 2012 GDP totaled 33.21 trillion won, or 2.6% of South Korea’s economic size. (In-soo Nam, “Did North Korea’s Economy Expand Again?” WSJ Real Time, July 12, 2013) Per capita gross national income (GNI) rose by 2.7 percent to 1,371,000 KPW against the previous year. However, the gap between the South and North has not narrowed. Last year, North Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth was estimated to be 1.3 percent. This is the highest level since the financial crisis of 2008 when it surpassed the South Korean economic growth and reached the 3.1 percent growth. Agricultural production improvement as well as international aid in heavy oil in 2008 permitted the North Korean economy to rebound briefly but it began to decline resulting in minus growth in 2009 (-0.9 percent), 2010 (-0.5 percent), and 2011 (0.8 percent). In terms of industries that accounted for the growth, agriculture, forestry and fishery made up about 23.4 percent of the nominal GDP, recording a production increase by 3.9 percent. Production of livestock such as swine and poultry husbandry rose by 12.3 percent and rice and corn production also increased due to improved fertilizer supply. Production in manufacturing (21.9 percent of North Korean GDP) made a 1.6 percent increase. The rate of manufacturing production increased by 2.6 percent in 2008 but began to decline from 2009 at -3.0 percent; 2010, -0.3 percent; and 2011, -3.0 percent. Production improved in food, tobacco and light industries by 4.7 percent, and heavy chemical industries rose by 0.2 percent. Mining (14 percent of GDP) also rose by 0.8 percent due to improvement in coal production. Electricity, gas and water supply (3.5 percent of GDP) also increased by 1.6 percent from the expansion of hydroelectric and thermal power generation. Service industry (29.4 percent of GDP) rose by 0.1 percent. Government services dropped by 0.2 percent but transportation and communication, wholesale and retail, food and lodging services increased by 2.0 and 2.2 percent, respectively. However, construction (7.8 percent of GDP) fell by 1.6 percent due to the decrease in the civil construction such as road works. Last year, North Korea’s gross national income (nominal GNI) was estimated to be 33.5 trillion KPW. Compared to South Korea’s 1.28 quadrillion KRW, this is a ratio of about 1 to 38.2. By dividing the GNI by North Korean population, per capita gross national income is calculated to be 1,371,000 KRW. Compared to South Korea’s (25,589,000 KRW) it is 1 to 18.7. This is comparable to the figures recorded in 2011 (1 to 18.6). North Korea’s foreign trade volume (based on only import and export excluding the inter-Korean trade) increased 7.1 percent to 6.81 billion USD. North Korea’s exports (2.88 billion USD) increased by 3.3 percent, mainly in chemical products (38.0 percent) and animal products (23.6 percent). As for imports (3.93 billion USD), textiles (17.6 percent) and transport equipment (6.2 percent) increased by 10.2 percent. Last year,
the size of trade between North-South Korea rose by 15.7 percent over the previous year at 1.97 billion USD. Import and export to and from the Kaesong Industrial Complex accounted for 99.5 percent of the total amount. North Korea’s export increased 12.1 percent -- mainly machinery (28.2 percent) and electrical and electronic equipment (16.1 percent) -- and imports to South Korea increased by 17.5 percent -- electrical and electronic products (25.8 percent) and textiles (12.8 percent). (IFES, “North Korean Economy Records Positive Growth for Two Consecutive Years,” NK Briefs, July 17, 2013)

7/14/13 South Korean President Park Geun-hye says she won’t rush to reopen a jointly run industrial complex in North Korea unless the communist regime makes a firm commitment never to shut down the complex unilaterally again. Park made the remark in an interview with the French magazine Politique Internationale, stressing that the fate of the factory park in the North’s border city of Kaesong depends on “North Korea’s choice.” The interview, conducted on June 9, was published in the magazine’s current edition. The presidential office released the questions and answers from the interview. “It is North Korea that suspended the Kaesong complex and it is also North Korea that is responsible for resolving this,” Park said. “I won’t repeat the vicious cycle of North Korea unilaterally breaking its promise and the complex’s operations being suspended.” Yonhap, “Park: Onus Is on N. Korea to Resolve Kaesong’s Suspension,” July 14, 2013)

7/15/13 South and North Korea failed to reach an agreement on the normalization of a suspended industrial complex after their third round of talks, Seoul’s unification ministry said. “The talks held in the North Korean border city of Kaesong did not lead to any understanding being reached,” said the Ministry of Unification that handles dialogue with the communist country. “The two sides agreed to hold the next round of talks on Wednesday.” At the day-long meeting, South Korea reiterated its call for the North to guarantee the safety of its businessmen who have to work at an inter-Korean industrial park and to transform the complex into an international manufacturing zone.

“The two sides held their last talks for five minutes beginning at 5:01 p.m.,” an official source said. He declined to say why the talks failed to make progress. In a briefing held after the morning talks, a ministry official said Seoul pointed out that the fallout from the disruption to operations was caused by Pyongyang’s unilateral action, and emphasized that such a development should not happen again in the future.

“Delegates said there must be strong legal and administrative assurances related to the safety of South Korean personnel and protection for assets invested in the complex,” the official said. In addition, Seoul wanted the communist country to provide business activities at Kaesong that meet international standards. This can include reforming communications and customs rules. Such a development could make it difficult for political and other noneconomic events to disrupt operations. “Overall conditions were not easy, but if both sides have faith in the ’constructive normalization’ of the joint venture, positive results could be reached,” South Korea’s chief delegate Kim Ki-woong said in his opening remarks. (Yonhap, “Koreas Again Fail to Hash out Deal on Industrial Park,” July 15, 2013)
Panama’s president said that a North Korean ship captain tried to kill himself after the vessel was stopped en route from Cuba and found to have suspected missile material on board. Outlining a dramatic sequence of events, President Ricardo Martinelli said the ship was targeted by drug enforcement officials as it approached the Panama Canal and was taken into port, but a search revealed cargo of far greater concern. The vessel’s estimated 35-man crew also rioted when police stepped aboard, according to Martinelli, who said the suspicious goods were found hidden in a consignment of sugar. “The world needs to sit up and take note: you cannot go around shipping undeclared weapons of war through the Panama Canal,” he told Radio Panama listeners. “We had suspected this ship, which was coming from Cuba and headed to North Korea, might have drugs aboard so it was brought into port for search and inspection,” on the Atlantic coast of the country. Initial reports said the ship was boarded July 12. “When we started to unload the shipment of sugar we located containers that we believe to be sophisticated missile equipment, and that is not allowed,” Martinelli said. The ship, Chong Chon Gang, is being held as are the crew, who not only resisted the approach from the Panamanian authorities but attempted to sabotage the search, he said. “The captain has tried to commit suicide, and the crew rioted” during the operation, the president said. The boat was headed back to North Korea when it was stopped and taken to Manzanillo, east of the Atlantic opening of the Panama Canal, which is a major cargo distribution center. The vessel “aroused suspicion by the violent reaction of the captain and the crew from Friday afternoon”, Panama’s Security Minister Jose Raul Mulino told the radio station. And Javier Caraballo, an anti-drugs enforcement official, said: “Until now we have not found drugs in the boat, we found military equipment.” Presidential spokesman Luis Eduardo Camacho said later that “at first glance" the cargo appeared to include missiles, but an examination of the ship by specialists may take as long as a week. (Juan Jose Rodriguez, “Panama Stops N. Korea Ship over ‘Weapon Material,’” AFP, July 16, 2013)

It started with a tip: that a rusty North Korean freighter, which had not plied the Caribbean in years, was carrying drugs or arms amid more than 200,000 sacks of Cuban brown sugar. It ended with a five-day, eventually violent standoff between Panamanian marines and 35 North Korean crew members, armed largely with sticks, who were subdued and arrested while their captain, claiming he was having a heart attack, tried to commit suicide. Underneath all that sugar, it turned out, were parts for what appeared to be elements of an antiquated Soviet-era missile radar system that was headed, evidently, to North Korea – a country that usually exports missile technology around the world, rather than bringing it in. Late tonight, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying the cargo stashed in the vessel, the Chong Chon Gang, consisted of “240 metric tons of obsolete defensive weapons” bound for North Korea, where it was to be repaired and then sent back to Cuba. But American and Panamanian officials were still trying to understand why the ship’s crew had fought so hard to repel a boarding party as the ship tried to traverse the Panama Canal. After all, the equipment they were protecting would make a nice exhibit in a museum of cold war military artifacts. “We’re talking old,” one official briefed on the episode said. “When this stuff was new, Castro was plotting revolutions.” The Cuban Ministry did not seem to be offended, describing the equipment to be repaired as “two anti-aircraft missile complexes Volga and Pechora, nine missiles in parts and spares, two Mig-21 Bis and 15 motors for this type of airplane, all of it manufactured in the mid-twentieth
century” The episode also offered a window on the desperate measures North Korea is taking to keep hard currency and goods flowing at a time when its ships are tracked everywhere, old customers like Syria and Iran are facing sanctions and scrutiny of their own, and its partners have dwindled to a few outliers. Still, Cuba’s role was puzzling – at a time when Washington has talked of relaxing restrictions and Cuba’s leadership has seemed more eager to improve its ties with the West than to strengthen relations with cold war-era partners. “What I can say for sure is that looking at illicit North Korea trade, their ships in particular, these guys are stumped for money, they are incredibly poor,” said Hugh Griffiths, an arms trafficking specialist at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “Business deals that might look silly to us don’t look ridiculous to them.” Panama’s president, Ricardo Martinelli announced the discovery in a radio broadcast on Monday night, making it clear that the North Korean ship was in blatant violation of numerous United Nations sanctions. He even posted a photograph of the contraband on his Twitter account. Based on that picture, IHS Jane’s Intelligence, a defense consultancy, identified it as an SNR-75 “Fan Song” fire control radar for the SA-2 family of surface-to-air missiles. The component is important for guiding a missile to its target; the Soviets began building similar systems in the mid-1950s, well ahead of the Cuban missile crisis. In a statement, IHS Jane’s speculated that the system might be headed to North Korea for an upgrade, and that “the cargo of sugar could be a payment for the services.” But it also said the radar equipment could have been en route to North Korea to augment that country’s air defense network, which it said was based on obsolete weapons, missiles and radars. That raised the possibility that other elements of the shipment were aboard, or on other ships. “We’re going to keep unloading the ship and figure out exactly what was inside,” Martinelli said. “You cannot go around shipping undeclared weapons of war through the Panama Canal.” The Chong Chon Gang, a 36-year-old freighter, had its own peculiar history, and this was not the first time the vessel had encountered run-ins with maritime authorities. It had been stopped in 2010 for carrying narcotics and ammunition, Mr. Griffiths said. He also said it had been attacked by Somali pirates. According to IHS Fairplay, a London-based vessel monitoring service, the freighter had not traveled the Western Hemisphere in at least four years. The monitoring data shows it visited Panama in 2008 and Brazil in 2009. Griffiths noted that its reappearance, even with the cover of a Cuban cargo of sugar, was bound to attract attention. He said interest in the vessel’s itinerary in recent weeks, which included a stopover in Havana, might have been heightened because of the July 3 visit to Cuba of North Korea’s top military commander, who conferred with President Raúl Castro. Cuban and North Korean news media publicized the trip. “There are very few states where the North Korean chief of staff is welcomed for a high-level meeting,” Griffiths said. American spy satellites regularly track North Korean vessels – but usually to stop weapons proliferation, not drugs. And as the intelligence agencies discovered several years ago, failure to monitor can lead to other lapses: the United States missed the construction of a North Korean nuclear reactor in Syria until Israeli officials brought evidence of it to Washington in 2007. Israel destroyed the reactor later that year. Matthew Godsey, editor of the Risk Report, a publication of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a proliferation research group in Washington that follows North Korean behavior, said the Chong Chon Gang may also have traveled in the region undetected previously by turning off its satellite transponder, used by tracking services to monitor
vessels for their own safety. “I think North Korean vessels have been known to do that,” he said. “It’s dangerous, but when you’re carrying dangerous stuff it can happen. When you have a captain willing to kill himself, it wouldn’t surprise me.” Martinelli and other Panamanian officials said the vessel’s 35 crew members were taken into custody on Sunday after they violently resisted efforts to redirect the vessel to the Panamanian port of Manzanillo, at the Atlantic end of the canal. He did not explain how the captain sought to commit suicide, and the captain’s condition was unknown. José Raúl Mulino, Panama’s minister of security, said in a telephone interview that the entire crew had been detained at a naval base after committing what he called an act of “rebellion and sabotage” in trying to resist the boarding of the vessel. It was unclear whether they would face criminal prosecution or be sent back to North Korea. Mulino said that the suspect cargo was hidden in two containers behind the sugar, and that all 220,000 to 230,000 sugar sacks aboard would be removed before the ship could be completely investigated. The process could take a while, he said, because the crew had disabled the unloading cranes, forcing the Panamanians to remove the bags by hand. (Rick Gladstone and David E. Sanger, “Panama Seizes North Korean Ship, and Sugar-Coated Arms Parts,” New York Times, July 17, 2013, p. A-1) The slow-going Chong Chon Gang, its smokestack emblazoned with the colors and emblem of the North Korean flag, has had several adventures on the high seas. It has been detained on suspicion of trafficking drugs and ammunition, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute says. It was stopped in 2010 by Ukraine authorities in the Black Sea for reasons that are unclear. It was attacked by pirates in the Arabian Sea in 2009. Two of its sailors were injured in the unsuccessful hijacking attempt, according to the Lloyd's List's vessel report. That year, the ship caught the attention of maritime officials when it made a stop at the Syrian port of Tartus, home to Russia’s only overseas naval base, says Hugh Griffiths, an arms trafficking expert at the institute. Why it was there is not known. The Maritime Database shows the Chong Chon Gang has operated mostly in Asia with occasional trips to Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Brazil and Turkey. In previous years the ship’s operator, technical manager and owner have all been listed as the North Korean state-run Chongchongang Shipping Co. Ltd, according to IHS Maritime Analyst Gary Li. It has also been to Iran, the Jordanian Red Sea port of Aqaba, according to Lloyd’s List. Its latest voyage appears to have begun in April in Russia. Lloyd’s List analyst Richard Meade said the Chong Chon Gang’s last recorded port call was in Vostochnyy, Russia, where it listed its destination as Havana, Cuba. Before its visit to Russia the ship spent several months visiting Chinese ports, leaving Tianjin on Jan. 25, Meade said in a report Lloyd’s List provided to USA Today. But the vessel’s route after departing Vostochnyy on April 12 is a mystery because the ship stopped sending signals to an international tracking system that allows global maritime authorities to know the location of ocean-going vessels. (Kevin A. Kepple, Anne R. Carey, Tony Hagro, and Oren Dorell, “North Korea Ship in Panama Has a Colorful Past,” USA Today, July 18, 2013) Two Cuban MiG-21 jet fighters found aboard a seized North Korean cargo ship three months ago were in good repair, had been recently flown and were accompanied by “brand-new” jet engines, Panamanian officials say. The assertions deepen the mystery around the Cuban military materiel that was found aboard the 508-foot North Korean freighter Chong Chon Gang, which Panamanian authorities intercepted July 10 off the Atlantic entrance to the Panama Canal. “They had jet fuel still inside their tanks,” Foreign Minister Fernando Nunez Fabrega told McClatchy in an
interview earlier this month. “They were not obsolete and in need of repair.” One of the MiG-21s contained manuals and maintenance records that indicated it was flying just a few months earlier, said prosecutor Javier Caraballo, who’s handling an arms trafficking case against the 35 North Korean crew members. Caraballo declined a reporter’s request to see the records. In publicly acknowledging the shipment after it was discovered, Cuban officials insisted that the ship was carrying only old aircraft and other parts that were being sent to North Korea for repair when Panamanian authorities, acting on a tip that it was carrying drugs, intercepted it. Panamanian officials now think that the shipment was part of what Nunez Fabrega called “a major deal” between the two countries, though they aren’t certain of its scope. (Tim Johnson, “Cuban Weapons aboard N. Korean Ship Part of ‘Major Deal,’ Panama Says,” McClatchy, October 10, 2013) The authorities in Panama said October 21 that they would release 33 of the 35 North Korean crew members of a rusting freighter impounded more than three months ago for carrying a secret stash of Soviet-era Cuban military gear hidden under bags of brown sugar. Neither the captain, who tried to slit his throat when the Panamanian marine police boarded the vessel, nor the captain’s aide is free to go, said a top official at Panama’s Foreign Ministry. The official, who spoke by telephone on the condition of anonymity because of ministry policy, said the two North Koreans had not cooperated and may still face criminal charges. The Foreign Ministry official said that the other crew members had cooperated, and that all of them had asserted that they had no idea the vessel was carrying military cargo. Two North Korean diplomats have been granted visas, the official said, to travel to Panama and to complete arrangements for those crew members to leave the country. (Rick Gladstone, “Panama Says It Will Release Most from Ship to North Korea,” New York Times, October 22, 2013, p. A-8)

Panamanian authorities have found two Soviet-era MiG-21 fighter jets aboard a North Korea-flagged ship seized this month. (AFP, “Two Soviet-Era Fighter Planes Found on N. Korea Ship,” July 22, 2013)

7/16/13

North Korea’s deputy envoy to the U.N. has contacted a Washington official in an apparent attempt to reengage with the U.S. amid its peace offensive, Yonhap reported, citing an unnamed government source. Jang Il-hoon met with Robert Rapson, director for Korean affairs at the U.S. State Department, apparently to get acquainted, Yonhap News

Jang, formerly the director of the international organization office at the North Korean foreign ministry, has recently succeeded Han Song-ryol. Han was in charge of the so-called New York channel with Clifford Hart, who served as Washington’s special envoy for the six-party denuclearization talks and is now consul general in Hong Kong. Rapson is expected to take Hart’s place until his successor is named. (Shin Hyon-hee, “U.S., N. Korean Officials Meet in New York: Report,” Korea Herald, July 16, 2013)

7/17/13

South and North Korea failed to iron out differences over the resumption of a shuttered joint factory park during the morning session of their fourth working-level talks, Seoul officials said. “Our side stressed that it is important that both sides share their perceptions of the nature of the suspension of the Kaesong Industrial Complex,” Unification Ministry spokeswoman Park Soo-jin told reporters after the second
discussion session in the morning. Seoul urged the North to promise not to cause another closure of the complex and to take a respectful and constructive position to resolve the suspension issue, Park said. (Yonhap, “Two Koreas Divided over Resumption of Kaesong Park,” July 17, 2013)

A top U.S. government official said Tuesday that South Korea has requested another delay in the schedule to regain operational control (OPCON) of its troops in the event of war. “I know that has been proposed by the South Korean government, and we are looking at that, working with the South Korean government,” the official told Yonhap. Related consultations are under way between the allies, with the White House and the State Department handling the issue, added the official. He emphasized that the U.S. would not “abruptly make decisions that would impair or endanger the security of South Korea.” “We need to keep working on this,” he said. A senior South Korean official confirmed that Seoul made such an offer to further postpone the OPCON transfer currently slated for Dec. 1, 2015. “From the past, there have been discussions on the timing of the OPCON transition. There are works that don’t necessarily need to be implemented on schedule,” he said. (Lee Chi-dong, “S. Korea Requests Another Delay in OPCON Transfer,” Yonhap, July 17, 2013)

KCNA: “The fourth round of working talks between the authorities of the north and the south of Korea were held in the Kaesong Industrial Zone on Wednesday to normalize the operation in the zone. At the talks the north side advanced sincere and practical proposals for normalizing the operation in the zone at an early date and developing it. They included the issue of refraining from all political and military acts of hindering the normal operation in the zone, the issue of preventing the reoccurrence of suspension of operation, the issue of building institution and mechanism for fully ensuring secure operation and business in the zone, the issue of ensuring personal safety and protecting investment and properties, the issue of passage, communications and customs and the issue of developing the zone into a zone for economic cooperation with international competitiveness. But the south side took such very dishonest and insincere attitude as creating artificial hurdles in settling the issues, insisting only on the blame for the crisis in the zone and unilateral assurances against reoccurrence. The south side claimed it has the stand of normalizing the operation in the zone but came out to the talks without any draft agreement, the basis of negotiations. It only pretended to have the talks and keep them going on, thus making them fruitless. The talks ended without fruit due to the unreasonable assertions and insincere attitude despite the north side’s sincere efforts. Both sides agreed to hold the fifth round of working talks in the zone on July 22.” (KCNA, “Fourth Round of Talks between North and South Authorities Held,” July 17, 2013)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “There occurred an abnormal case in which the DPRK trading ship Chongchongang was apprehended by the Panamanian investigation authorities on suspicion of ‘drug transport,’ a fiction, before passing through Panama canal after leaving Havana Port recently. The Panamanian investigation authorities rashly attacked and detained the captain and crewmen of the ship on the plea of ‘drug investigation’ and searched its cargo but did not discover any drug. Yet, they are justifying their violent action, taking issue with other kind of cargo aboard the ship. This cargo is nothing but aging weapons which are to send back to Cuba after overhauling...”
them according to a legitimate contract. The Panamanian authorities should take a step to let the apprehended crewmen and ship leave without delay.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman Urges Panamanian Authorities Let Apprehended Crewmen, Ship of DPRK Leave,” July 17, 2013)

Sources say that Pyongyang is quite interested in developing the DMZ as a tourist destination. “North Korea has been interested in developing a DMZ park since early 2000s,” a key North Korea source said. “It may not be able to respond to the offer immediately because resuming the business in the Kaesong Industrial Complex is more urgent. Once the issue is addressed, however, the North might become more aggressive in developing the DMZ.” A source from the South Korean ruling party said, “I heard that North Korea proposed a project to develop an ecological park in the DMZ to a South Korean company early this year. The North also thinks it could be a good opportunity to attract foreign capital.” The source also said North Korea showed interests when Ted Turner, CNN founder and head of the Turner Foundation, proposed the ecological protection and peaceful uses of the DMZ to North Korean high-ranking officials during his visit to the North in 2005. Pyongyang took a negative stance when South Korean Park Geun-hye announced her initiative to build a world peace park in the DMZ in early May. The North’s state-run media outlet Uriminzokkiri criticized, saying, “Attracting foreign tourists to the military border line, the symbol of hatred between the same people will only propagate the people’s tragedy.” It is reported that North Korea is also interested in the economic effect of the DMZ development. (Dong-A Ilbo, “N. Korea Seems Interested in Developing DMZ as Peace Park,” July 17, 2013)

North Korea has strong technical reasons to carry out another nuclear test but may be hesitating because it would anger China, Stanford University’s Siegfried Hecker said. He said the North had “everything in place” for what would be its fourth such explosion since 2006. Hecker said North Korea “needed additional tests in my opinion to miniaturize,” referring to the effort to develop a bomb small and robust enough to fit onto a delivery vehicle such as a missile. Hecker said the North’s tunnel preparations had caused speculation that there could be two tests back in February, but this did not happen and one tunnel remained ready. “There are strong drivers for them to test again,” said Hecker, believed to have been the last Westerner to visit North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex. “They have a tunnel that’s ready to go if they want to test again,” he told a seminar held by an international nuclear-test-ban treaty organization in Vienna. But China’s displeasure was an important reason “why I think they are hesitating now... The price they have to pay is mostly determined by China”, Hecker said. Hecker said he believed the North was weighing the benefits and costs of further testing: “The important part is to increase the cost ... and the Chinese are absolutely key to that.” Hecker, former head of the U.S. Los Alamos National Laboratory, said he was concerned about the possibility of cooperation between North Korea and Iran. Any sharing of the North’s test data would be dangerous, he said, “That would be very, very troublesome and indeed could give the Iranian program a significant boost.” An Iranian diplomat in the audience took issue with Hecker’s comment, saying Tehran “does not need any nuclear weapon.” Hecker said he believed Iran had developed a nuclear weapon option. “Iran ... has put all the things in place to be able to develop the
bombs should it decide to do so," he said. (Fredrik Dahl, "North Korea Has Everything in Place for New Atom Test: U.S. Expert," Reuters, July 17, 2013)

7/18/13 Biden: “With regard to North Korea, the one thing I think everyone now agrees on -- we agree that its nuclear and missile programs present a clear and present danger to stability in the area, in East Asia in particular. That’s why we’re working closely with our allies, Japan and South Korea. But we’re also working more closely than the 40 years I’ve been engaged with China and with Russia. In light of North Korea’s recent provocative behavior, we welcome President Xi’s important statement: achieving a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, as that being a Chinese priority. Not just something they wish for, but a priority. We welcome that firm assertion. Now, North Korea is calling for dialogue. As my mother would say, I’ve seen this movie before. (Laughter.) We’ve been there before. But we are ready. We are ready, but only if North Korea is prepared to engage in genuine negotiations. We will not countenance North Korea’s pattern of provoking a crisis and then insisting they be rewarded in order to cease and desist from the actions they are taking. We’ve been there before, only to find that once they’ve gotten the space or the aid they need, they return to the same provocative, dangerous behavior and continue their nuclear march. North Korea can have peace and prosperity like the rest of the region, but only without nuclear weapons. North Korea has a clear choice: It can choose a better path for its people, or continue down the road they’re on. Make no mistake about it, though. We are open to engaging with any nation that’s prepared to live up to its international obligations.” (Vice President Joseph Biden, Remarks on Asia Pacific Policy, George Washington University, July 18, 2013)

7/19/13 Rodong Sinmun: “To defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula and replace the armistice system by a peace one is a pressing task for ensuring durable peace. The DPRK has advanced proposals of epochal significance on establishing peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula and made every possible effort to carry them out while exercising maximum patience and self-restraint. But the U.S. and south Korean authorities, seized with their ambition for invading the DPRK, have doggedly stood in the way of the Korean nation in its struggle for durable peace on the peninsula, hobbling the efforts for establishing peace mechanism. The fact proves that to end the ceasefire and build lasting peace mechanism is essential for fundamentally removing the danger of war from the peninsula. The U.S., regarding the peninsula with great geopolitical significance as a vantage area for laying military siege to restrain the emergence of big powers which can be match to it in the Asia-Pacific region, is opposed to signing a peace treaty with the DPRK in a bid to invent a pretext for activating military intervention in the region. The U.S. is claiming that the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence for self-defense is a factor of aggravating the regional situation but it is nothing but a cynical ploy to cover up its hostile policy toward the DPRK and the aggressive nature of its Asia-Pacific strategy. As the U.S. and the south Korean regime are to fully blame for the total nullification of the armistice agreement which existed for mere form’s sake, they are duty-bound to establish peace mechanism on the peninsula. The DPRK will never tolerate the moves of the belligerent forces escalating military confrontation and tensions and hindering the establishment of durable peace

The family of Kenneth Bae, the American sentenced to 15 years of hard labor in North Korea, received letters from him in the mail for the first time this past week, telling them that his health is worse and asking them to press the United States government to help secure his release, Bae’s sister said today. North Korea experts said the message of the handwritten letters — and their method of delivery, which could not have happened without North Korea’s approval — suggested that the authorities there were open to the idea of negotiations on Bae. That had seemed remote three months ago when he was found guilty of committing “hostile acts” against the government. North Korea said Bae, 44, was a Christian missionary who had sought to build a clandestine proselytizing base in the country, where the Communist government regards missionary work as sedition. The possible opening in Bae’s case came against a backdrop of other indications that North Korea, despite its harsh public language toward the United States, is pursuing multiple ways of pushing for direct contact after months of threats and new weapons tests. So far, the Obama administration has resisted the overtures. Bae’s sister, Terri Chung, said in a phone interview from her home in Edmonds, Wash., that Bae had been able to communicate a few times during his imprisonment, which began with his arrest in November, though those contacts were through intermediaries acting on behalf of Sweden’s ambassador in North Korea, who monitors American interests. Then weeks went by with no further word. “This past week, we were surprised to receive a packet of letters from Kenneth through the U.S. Postal Service, bearing a Pyongyang postmark,” she said. “The packet contained four letters, dated June 13th, addressed to his wife, his mom, me and his supporters.” She said that “all the letters contained the same message — Kenneth’s health is failing, and he asked us to seek help from our government to bring him home.” Chung said her brother suffered from diabetes, an enlarged heart and back problems. The postmark on Mr. Bae’s mailed letters to his family suggested they were written at about the same time that the North Korean authorities had permitted a pro-North Korea group based in Tokyo, Choson Sinbo, to interview him in prison. A videotape of that interview, broadcast July 3 on CNN, showed Mr. Bae looking distressed and thin, his head shaved, dressed in a stained blue jumpsuit with his prison number, 103. His message was similar to those in the letters: an appeal for the United States government to help secure his release. “Although my health is not good, I am being patient and coping well,” Bae said in that interview. “And I hope that with the help of the North Korean government and the United States, I will be released soon.” In what appeared to be an effort to show the outside world that the North Korean penal authorities had been treating him well, Bae was seen seated in a comfortable cell with a radiator and a window. The video also zoomed in on what was described as his daily work schedule, posted in Korean and English, showing he was given three meals and had four rest breaks in between field labor. No other inmates were seen at the prison, and its precise location was unclear. Diplomats who have dealt with North Korea said the unspoken message in both the video and the letters was that the North Korean authorities wanted to see more publicity about Bae as part of their broader effort to seek direct contact with the United States government. The top North Korean diplomats at the United Nations have twice over the past month publicly called for
direct talks, citing the impending 60th anniversary of the armistice that halted the Korean War as a juncture for a changed relationship. Dennis Rodman, the former basketball star who visited North Korea this past winter and met Kim, has called for Bae’s release and has said he intended to return to North Korea in August, although it is unclear whether that will happen. E-mailed queries to Rodman’s representatives in the United States were not returned today. In another possible signal from North Korea to the Obama administration, an American Navy pilot who flew combat missions in the Korean War, Capt. Thomas J. Hudner Jr., was en route to North Korea on Friday as part of his own lengthy effort to retrieve the remains of a colleague, Ensign Jesse L. Brown. Ensign Brown, the Navy’s first African-American aviator, died after his plane was shot down on Dec. 4, 1950. Hudner, who is white, crash-landed his own plane near Ensign Brown’s in a valiant but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to pull him from the wreckage, and was forced to evacuate. But Hudner’s action became part of military lore and is regarded as having helped promote racial equality in the United States armed forces.

(Rick Gladstone, “Inmate’s Letters Hints at North Korea Opening,” New York Times, July 20, 2013) Chosun Sinbo posted video footage of Kenneth Bae sitting in a Pyongyang hospital, where he was moved from a labor camp a week ago as his health deteriorated. “As an American citizen, I request the U.S. government to make active efforts so I can be pardoned and return home,” he said in the interview, which Chosun Sinbo said took place on August 9. “I think that a high-ranking U.S. official should come here and bring me home, and that such an official should come here as a representative of the U.S. government and apologize and make a request of an early pardon for my release.” It was unclear whether Bae was speaking of his own free will. The State Department has called on Pyongyang to grant Mr. Bae amnesty and immediate release. (Choe Sang-hun, “American Inmate in North Korea Asks for High-Level U.S. Visit,” New York Times, August 14, 2013, p. A-7)

Japanese voters handed a landslide victory to the governing Liberal Democrats in parliamentary elections, strengthening the grip of a party that promises accelerated changes to Japan’s economy and a shift away from its postwar pacifism. Although a lackluster turnout indicated that Abe might not have as much of a mandate as his supporters hoped, the margin of victory was large enough to suggest he has an opportunity to also bring stability to the country’s leadership after years of short-lived and ineffective prime ministers. The win comes at a time when many Japanese seem more open than ever to change, after years of failed efforts to end their nation’s economic slump, and as an intensifying territorial challenge by China has nudged this long pacifist nation toward accepting a more robust military. Abe, 58, seems eager to become an agent of change. He campaigned on this being Japan’s last chance to regain its economic stature as the country has been eclipsed by China, with Sunday’s victory apparently largely because of the early successes of his bold economic plan, called Abenomics. But his party’s calls to stand up to the Chinese by rewriting Japan’s antinuclear Constitution to allow a full-fledged military rather than self-defense forces have raised fears he will go too far and further isolate Japan in the region. A week before the election, he became the first prime minister to visit a tropical island near the group of uninhabited islets at the heart of the dispute with China. He had earlier raised eyebrows by riding in a tank and climbing into a fighter jet in front of cameras. “Abe has a pragmatic side and a strongly nationalistic side,” said Hiroshi Shiratori, a
professor of political science at Hosei University in Tokyo. “This election could free him up to do more of the latter, which is what he really wants.” It remains unclear how far the Japanese people will let him go. While Sunday’s results gave his governing coalition a comfortable majority in the upper house, the voters failed to deliver the two-thirds majority that the conservative Liberal Democrats and other similarly minded parties had hoped for to easily revise the Constitution, something that has not happened since it was crafted by American occupiers after World War II. And the sparse turnout – at 52 percent the third-lowest showing in postwar history – suggests less popular support than the results implied. By early morning on Monday, officials said the Liberal Democrats had won 65 of the 121 seats being contested. When combined with the 11 seats secured by its junior partner, a small Buddhist party, the Liberal Democrat-led coalition had taken enough seats to gain a majority in the 242-seat chamber. The largest opposition group, the Democratic Party, suffered a humbling setback, the party’s worst since its creation in 1998. The Democrats secured just 17 seats from voters who still blame it for failing to deliver on promised reforms after a landmark election four years ago that ousted the Liberal Democrats in what had seemed to herald the advent of a vibrant two-party democracy. Before the vote on Sunday, one weekly tabloid criticized the impending return of the Liberal Democrats’ effective monopoly as “a return to the ways of our ancestors.” So long as the Liberal Democratic Party’s coalition holds together, it will not face new elections for three years. That could free Abe to follow his early economic stimulus initiatives with the type of structural reforms that will challenge powerful vested interests. While Abe has been somewhat vague about these plans, he has already pushed the country to join trade negotiations that could loosen small farmers’ grip on agriculture. The party has also called for nurturing Japan’s weak entrepreneurial culture and making it easier to hire and fire workers. Speaking to reporters after the victory, Abe thanked voters for ending the so-called twisted Parliament, in which opposing parties had each controlled one house of Parliament since 2007, adding to Japan’s political paralysis. But he admitted that he faced a serious challenge in convincing other lawmakers and also voters about changes to the Constitution. (By law, revisions passed by Parliament must then be approved in a public referendum.) “There is still a need to widen and deepen the debate on the Constitution,” Abe said. “Voters have given us this new period of political stability, so we have time to deepen the debate.” He said he would also pursue an intermediate step to make the Constitution easier to revise by requiring a simple majority in Parliament instead of the current two-thirds. But making this change would also require changing the Constitution, and gathering enough votes to do so. “This is not unconditional support for Mr. Abe’s whole agenda,” said Jun Iio, a political scientist at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “Public support could evaporate if the economy starts to sour.” (Martin Fackler, “Premier’s Party Wins Big in Japan,” New York Times, July 22, 2013, p. A-1) About a quarter of voters who support no particular political party cast their ballots for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the proportional representation part of Sunday’s Upper House election, according to a Jiji Press exit poll. With 25.8 percent, the LDP garnered the largest share of unaffiliated votes in the poll, which the ruling bloc won in a landslide, the survey showed, up 5.1 percentage points from December’s Lower House election. It was the first time in the past decade that the LDP has captured the largest share of unaffiliated votes in a national election. In the nationwide proportional representation
section of the Upper House poll, voters were asked to choose either a political party or a candidate listed under the system. In addition, each voter cast a ballot for a candidate in a prefectural constituency. The LDP was followed by Your Party, with 15.4 percent, up 2.6 points from the Lower House election. Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Restoration Party), which took the top share of unaffiliated votes in the Lower House poll, came third, with 15.3 percent, down 8.8 points. The share for the Democratic Party of Japan fell 3.3 points to 13 percent. Combined, the three opposition parties accounted for 43.7 percent of the unaffiliated vote — a figure much higher than the LDP number — suggesting that a realignment of opposition parties could create a competitive alternative to the LDP-led ruling coalition. The Japanese Communist Party held a share of 11.2 percent, up 5.7 points, for fifth place, up from seventh. It was followed by New Komeito, the LDP coalition partner, with 7.5 percent, up 1.2 points. (Jiji, “LDP Nets Quarter of Unaffiliated Proportional Ballots,” Japan Times, July 23, 2013)

 Rodong Sinmun bylined commentary: “If peace is to settle on the Korean Peninsula and in its vicinity, it is necessary to get the ‘UN Command’ in south Korea dismantled and the U.S. troops withdrawn from south Korea as soon as possible. …As long as the ‘UN Command’ remains in south Korea, it is absolutely impossible to ensure peace and stability on the peninsula. The ‘UN Command’ has been used as a tool for the U.S. to justify the maneuvers escalating the tension. If this ghost-like machine is allowed to stay, this will only increase the danger of war. What is the most urgent for defusing the tension on the peninsula at present is to remove helmets of ‘UN Forces’ from the U.S. troops and force them out of south Korea as early as possible. The dismantlement of the ‘UN Command’ would help deprive the U.S. of a legal lever for straining the situation on the peninsula and igniting a war and a crafty smokescreen for covering up its aggressive nature. The pullback of the U.S. troops from south Korea would help completely defuse the danger of war caused by foreign forces. It would also be beneficial for the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. The dismantlement of the ‘UN Command’ is urgently necessary for preventing the start of a new Cold War in the Asia-Pacific. If the U.S. disbands the command, this will be one of the actions which will prove that it has no hostile intent on the DPRK. This would also exert a positive influence on the confidence building between the DPRK and the U.S.” (KCNA, “‘UN Command’ Should Be Dismantled: Rodong Sinmun,” July 21, 2013)

The U.S. should not be keen on the existence of the command and its strengthening but positively opt for dismantling it. “The United States again tries to open a large-scale joint military exercise in August,” said an article carried by Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the North Korean Workers’ Party. It warned the Korean Peninsula will fall “into a state of catastrophe” if the UFG gets underway. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Warns of ‘Catastrophe’ from S. Korea-U.S. Military Drill,” North Korean Newsletter, No. 272, July 25, 2013)

The two Koreas made some headway in their talks to restart a joint industrial park in Kaesong, Seoul officials said. The delegates exchanged new draft agreements but continued to haggle over Seoul’s demands principally for a framework to prevent a unilateral suspension of the complex. “We made progress on some parts but we
needed to more fine-tune our stances on others,” the South’s chief negotiator Kim Ki-woong told reporters after the fifth round of dialogue. “The biggest difference was over how to prevent a relapse. Our position is that we need the North’s firm promise to safeguard against a future suspension,” Kim said. “The North side displayed a positive stance toward developing the Kaesong complex into an international one.” Another key issue at stake is whether to set up a separate body to formulate “institutional assurances,” Kim added. During a meeting of senior secretaries, President Park Geun-hye stressed the significance of such assurances as “beneficial” for both sides. “This round of working-level talks puts emphasis on the park’s normalization, but you should keep in mind that it will make a critical basis for crafting principles and a framework for new inter-Korean relations,” Park said, expressing hopes for a “meaningful, sustainable agreement.” “Many countries around the world including China and Vietnam have set good precedents and affirmed that securing an investment climate that meets international standards brings much greater benefits.” (Shin Hyon-hee and Joint Press Corps, “Koreas Make Progress in Talks on Kaesong,” Korea Herald, July 22, 2013) South and North Korea failed to agree on safeguards against future unilateral shutdowns of a joint factory park in the communist North that has been closed for more than three months, but will meet again later this week. Delegates from the two sides, who met four times during the day to iron out differences, will meet July 25 for the sixth round of negotiations, said a spokesman for the Ministry of Unification that handles dialogue with the North. The two sides exchanged proposals on how to normalize operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex during the day, but no agreement was reached, the spokesman said. However, he added that some common ground did exist that required further deliberation. Kim Ki-woong, Seoul’s chief delegate, forwarded a draft proposal at the first meeting that began at 10 a.m. He added there has to be systemic and legal protection of business interests at Kaesong and the need to transform the complex into an international business zone. The ministry said the North forwarded its own counter-proposal during the second meeting that was held for 22 minutes starting at noon. It did not elaborate on details of the proposals. (Yonhap, “Koreas Agree to Meet Again without Agreement on Safeguards,” July 22, 2013) An official from the Ministry of Unification, which handles dialogue with the North, told reporters that Seoul has sought from the outset to get a guarantee and set up a system to prevent Pyongyang from closing down the zone in the future. “Getting the guarantee and transforming Kaesong into a globally competitive industrial complex has been the goal from the start, and there has been no wavering on this demand in the five previous talks to normalize the complex,” said the official, declining to be identified. He stressed that Seoul’s stance on safeguards is firm and will be maintained in future talks. The sixth round of talks is scheduled to take place on Thursday. “The North needs to show sincerity on this issue because this is a matter of key interest,” the official claimed. The two Koreas have so far agreed in principle to normalize operations and some understanding was made in “internationalizing” Kaesong so foreign companies can set up operations there alongside South Korean companies. “A total of six proposals and counter-proposals have been exchanged in past meetings, yet much more work needs to be carried out before an agreement is possible,” he said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Resolute on Kaesong Safeguards: Official,” July 23, 2013)
The fifth round of working-level talks between authorities of the north and the south of Korea for normalizing the operation in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) took place in the zone on Monday. At the talks, both sides sincerely discussed the contents of the draft agreement and decided to discuss some matters at the next round of the talks. Both sides agreed to hold the sixth round of working-level talks in KIZ on July 25. (KCNA, “Fifth Round of Working-Level Talks between Authorities of North and South Held,” July 23, 2013)

New commercial satellite imagery confirms that major construction projects at the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground have been halted. These projects—the building of a new launch pad, missile assembly building and launch control center—are designed to handle larger rockets than the Unha-3 space launch vehicle (SLV) able to handle heavier payloads and to fly greater distances. Work slowed and stopped at the end of 2012. While it was expected that construction would continue this spring, new imagery indicates that work had not resumed as of late May 2013, almost eight months later. Exactly why construction halted remains unclear. Initial speculation at the end of 2012 focused on the need for equipment and troops elsewhere to repair damage done by last summer’s typhoons and heavy rains. That explanation now seems less plausible given the amount of time that has passed since last year’s rains. An alternative explanation is that the DPRK may have decided that testing from the modern, already completed Sohae Satellite Launching Station will be sufficient to support its development of rockets larger than the Unha. Or the stoppage may reflect a decision either to slow or even halt development of larger rockets. If work resumes, completion of the new launch facilities at Tonghae would appear to be at least a year behind the estimate of their original schedule. Depending on the pace of renewed construction, the facility may not be complete until 2017. Construction of these new facilities—a launch pad, missile assembly building and launch control center—progressed rapidly in mid-2012 before slowing and stopping after heavy rains and typhoons hit North Korea. One explanation was that construction equipment and troops were needed elsewhere to repair damage caused by bad weather. While it might have been expected that work on the new facilities at Tonghae would resume in spring 2013, new commercial satellite imagery indicates that construction has now remained at a standstill for almost eight months. Specifically: There are no signs of activity, equipment or personnel at the new launch pad where work began in mid-2011 and where most construction took place during the first half of 2012. While the foundation of a large new rocket assembly building was completed by August 2012, work appears to have stopped. Moreover, imagery shows grass growing inside the foundation. Construction of a launch control building, started in spring/summer 2012, progressed rapidly until late October when the building was nearly externally complete except for the roof over the control room. There may have been some additional work done on part of the roof earlier this year but little has changed since then. An improved dirt road intended to facilitate the transport of construction material and equipment as well as eventually large rocket stages from railheads in the cities of Kilju and Kimchaek remains incomplete, as does the road connecting key support buildings to the new launch pad. (38 North, “North Korea Halts Construction of New Long-Range Rocket Launch Facilities,” July 23, 2013)
Weeks-long inter-Korean talks aimed at reopening a shuttered industrial park in North Korea faced collapse, with both delegates exchanging sharp accusations. After the latest round of talks ended without progress, North Korea threatened to re-position its military at the factory park in its border city of Kaesong. The zone was opened in 2004 after North Korea had relocated its military units stationed there. South Korea, on its part, refused to back down, warning that it will be forced to take "grave actions" unless North Korea accepts its demand for firm guarantees that the factory park will never be shut down again. "The Kaesong industrial complex is at a crossroads," South Korea’s Unification Ministry said in a news release. "In the sixth round of talks we have consistently made known that unilateral closure must not occur in the future and Kaesong must become 'internationalized' so it can grow." Chances of reopening the industrial park any time soon appear to be slim as another major joint South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises are scheduled to be held in mid-August. After Thursday’s talks ended without agreement, the chief North Korean delegate, Park Chol-su, put the blame on South Korea. "If the South does not have any will to normalize the industrial park, the fate of the joint venture is clear," Park told South Korean reporters. When asked whether he thought the talks have broken, Park said, "it is moving in that direction." (Yonhap, “Talks on Shuttered Industrial Park Rupture; Seoul Warns It Can Take Grave Action If N.K. Refuses to Accept Safeguards," July 25, 2013) Throughout the talks, the two sides failed to bridge the divide between them. South Korea asked the North to clearly express its position, arguing that the Kaesong crisis had been caused by "inappropriate measures", including North Korea’s unilateral decision to block traffic into the complex. While the South did not ask for an apology per se, it said that the North must offer a responsible expression of its position that would be acceptable to the South Korean people. Effectively, it was requesting an apology or an expression of regret. North Korea did not accept this request. North Korea contended that it had withdrawn its workers from Kaesong because it took issue with reports by South Korean media that Kaesong was North Korea’s “dollar box” and with South Korean Defense Minister Kim Gwan-jin’s remarks about “an emergency at Kaesong.” The North argued that the fundamental cause of this situation was that South Korea had “belittled the complex on a political level and threatened it on a military one,” sources say. Despite this, the North said that it submitted a draft of an agreement on five issues in which it accepted some of the proposals made by South Korea, including a guarantee for the personal safety of South Korean workers, a guarantee for transportation, communication, and customs clearance, and the internationalization of the complex. But South Korea ignored all of this and stubbornly refused to accept anything but a guarantee to prevent a similar situation from occurring, North Korea said. In this sense, North Korea appears to have distributed the documents to reporters to draw a line in the sand and say that it will not give up any more ground.

**There was a section in their proposed draft agreement that North Korea that appeared to be dealing with the issue of preventing another crisis at Kaesong.**

“We will continue regular operation of the complex without any influence from the political situation no matter the circumstances and we will not do anything that would interfere with such operation,” the North Korean draft said. But South Korea did not accept this as a responsible expression of North Korea’s position, as was illustrated by remarks made by Kim Ki-woong, head of the South’s delegation. “It is not even clear whether this can be called a proposal to prevent
another crisis from occurring at Kaesong,” Kim said. In the end, North Korea’s position is that both sides are to blame for the suspension of work at Kaesong, while South Korea’s position is that only the North is responsible. (Kang Tae-ho, “South and North Korea Both Fail to Budge in Kaesong Negotiations,” Hankyore, July 26, 2013) North Korea threatened to send troops into Kaesong if the jointly-run industrial complex in the city is shut down permanently. According to South Korea’s Joint Press Corps, about 20 North Korean officials, including the chief negotiator Pak Chol-su, suddenly entered the South Korean press center on the fourth floor of the General Support Center for the Kaesong Industrial Complex at 5:23 p.m. to complain about the breakdown of the talks. They made the military threat and distributed a press release and drafts of agreements that South Korea didn’t approve. Then South Korean officials appeared in the press center, tried pulling the North Koreans out, and clashed with reporters who wanted to keep the documents distributed by the North’s officials. Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk said in a statement last night that it regretted North Korea “effectively declaring the breakdown of the negotiation” and “the fate of the Kaesong Industrial Complex is at a critical stage.” A total of 17 South Korean reporters, photographers and video camera crews were in the press center when the melee took place. The failed negotiations took place on the 13th floor of the same building. The North Koreans distributed 21 pages of documents to the reporters, including a three-page press release, two basic statements and three draft agreements they had proposed to their South Korean counterparts at the third, fourth and sixth rounds of the talks. In the press release, North Korea warned that if the Kaesong park was permanently closed, it would send troops to the strategically important city of Kaesong, which is only about seven kilometers (4.3 miles) away from the Military Demarcation Line with South Korea. “If the Kaesong cooperative businesses once again face disruption, our troops will occupy the areas [near] the Military Demarcation Line [near Kaesong],” the press release said. “The roads [toward Kaesong] off the west coast would be permanently blocked.” The North Korean delegates went to the press center after they finished closing discussions with Southern negotiators at 5:20 p.m., the Joint Press Corps said. In the press release, the North said it “made sincere efforts to resolve the matter of the Kaesong complex as soon as possible.” North Korea claimed that “both parties reached agreement to prevent any further shutdown” and “both sides agreed to operate the complex without being affected by any political circumstances and never commit acts to deter the operation.” The North Koreans claimed they accepted all of the South’s demands, such as ensuring the safety of South Korean workers; restoring telecommunications with the South and the entry of Southern cargo; internationalization of the complex sought by Seoul; and putting into place concrete measures to prevent further disruptions of business in the future. But the South continued “making vague claims,” the press release said, and “unilaterally demanding us to take all responsibility for the shutdown.” It blamed the South for “driving the talks to the brink of breakdown.” It also said it suspected South Korea of wanting to permanently shut down the complex by “deliberately dragging out the talks.” In the basic statement yesterday, North Korea demanded the immediate resumption of operations. Then South Korean officials appeared in the press center and tried to drag the North Koreans away, the Joint Press Corps said, shouting, “What are you doing here?” and “You should have told us in advance!” They scuffled with the North Korean officials. Then the South Korean officials clashed with reporters as they
attempted to seize the documents that the Northern officials distributed. Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk said in the statement last night that if North Korea doesn’t show “sincerity” to prevent a shutdown of the complex in the future, the South would “make a grave decision.” The Unification Ministry said it asked Pyongyang to hold additional talks but North Korea argued the negotiations “were already broken.” The most controversial issue at yesterday’s talks was North Korea demand that the South “not to make any defiant political remarks and military threats,” which refers to the South Korean media’s comments on its use of the Kaesong park as a source of hard currency and upcoming Korea-U.S. joint military drills. But South Korea didn’t accept the demand, leading to the conflict. (Kim Hee-jin, “Kaesong Breakdown Leads to Melee,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 26, 2013)

KCNA: “The sixth round of the working-level talks between the authorities of the north and the south of Korea for the normalization of operation in the Kaesong Industrial Zone took place in the zone Thursday. At the talks the north side mentioned the need to reduce some differences that still remain and reach at a full agreement as both sides approached much closer on many issues after exchanging draft agreements and sharing full discussions at the past five rounds of talks. The north side proposed a realistic and reasonable draft revision of the agreement, fully reflecting the south side’s proposals including the issue of refraining from all acts of hindering the operation in the zone so that it may run on a normal basis unaffected by the situation under whatever circumstances, the issue of protecting safety of the personnel entering the zone and the properties invested by south Korean businessmen, the issue of settling communications, passage and customs clearance, the issue of ensuring world-level business activities and developing the zone into an economic zone with international competitive edge, reopening the north-south economic cooperation consultative office, the issue of forming and operating a joint committee, the issue of pushing forward in a simultaneous way the package progress of all the measures taken for the re-starting and normalization of operation in the zone. Both sides held discussions over these issues. The north side made a suggestion of reflecting in the agreement the will to give assurances that the north and the south shall refrain from acts of hindering the normal operation of the zone in the meaning that both sides draw a lesson from the past incident and prevent its recurrence as there will be no end if the reason for the suspension of operation in the zone is to be probed and the responsibilities to be taken as for the issue of preventing recurrence and the north side has ample reasons to make claim to the south side as regards the issue. As for the issue of the passage, communications and customs clearance, the north side suggested that the north and the south make joint efforts, discuss the issue of ensuring smooth communications through internet communication and mobile phones, streamlining the clearance procedures and cutting down the hours of customs clearance. It proposed referring the relevant military measures to the military authorities of both sides for the discussion and settlement of the issue at military working-level talks between the north and the south. The north side also raised a reasonable way of reopening the already established north-south economic cooperation consultative office and providing an institutional mechanism as forming and running the joint committee and setting up necessary panel committees under it. Taking into consideration the earnest requests of the south side’s businessmen to resume the zone so that they can reduce business
damage as much as possible, the north side proposed making package promotion of all the measures for the re-operation and normalization of the zone. It suggested that heads of the delegations, persons directly responsible for the discussion, sign the agreement upon authorization. But the south side came to the talks without any substantial preparations and only shunned the sincere efforts exerted by the north side for the successful talks. It consistently claimed that the north side is to blame for the suspension of the zone and made uncouth assertions that the north side should compensate for the damage. The south side also asserted that this is its fixed stand and urged that unless the north side accepts it, there can never be the normalization of the zone. The south side openly resorted to delaying tactics, taking an insincere approach to the talks even before 4 o’clock in the afternoon. The north side made every possible effort to prevent the talks from not making any results but the south side persisted in its arrogant stand, pushing the talks to the point of stalemate. The north side held a press conference on the spot right away and vehemently denounced the south side for torpedoing the talks. The south side can never escape its responsibility for all the aftermaths to be entailed by its move of having pushed the talks to a deadlock.” (KCNA, “North-South Working-Level Talks End in Stalemate,” July 25, 2013)

Kim Jong-un used his meeting with the visiting vice president of China this week to stress a “blood” alliance with Beijing, and expressed his support for reconvening six-nation talks on ending Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, the official news media of the two allies reported. The Chinese vice president, Li Yuanchao, arrived in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, yesterday to attend ceremonies marking the 60th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, whose battles were halted with an armistice signed on July 27, 1953. Reporting on Kim’s meeting today with Li, both the North Korean and Chinese news media said that the two sides stressed the importance of increasing bilateral ties. But they also highlighted the different priorities Beijing and Pyongyang appeared to place in their relations, as the allies tried to mend their strained ties after the North’s recent nuclear test and other provocations angered many Chinese. Li delivered a personal message from President Xi Jinping to Kim. In his published comments, Li – the highest-ranking Chinese official to visit North Korea since Kim took over following the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in late 2011 – appeared to nudge North Korea to rein in its confrontational approach. He reiterated Beijing’s call for the “denuclearization” and “peace and stability” of the Korean Peninsula and “dialogue,” the state-run Chinese news agency Xinhua reported. Xinhua quoted Kim as saying that North Korea “supports China’s efforts to restart the six-party talks, and is willing to work together with all sides to maintain the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.” Kim was also quoted as saying that his country needed “a stable external environment” so it could focus on developing its economy. Reporting on the same meeting, however, KCNA made no direct mention of “denuclearization” or supporting China’s efforts to reconvene six-nation talks. The absence of such wording was noticeable, even though North Korea has recently made overtures toward Washington and Seoul after the prodding from Beijing. Instead, North Korea highlighted its shared history with China during the war. Its news media quoted Kim as saying that the North Korean military and people “will never forget” the sacrifices of Chinese soldiers who fought and died during the Korean War. For his part, Li affirmed the Chinese party and government’s “unshakable will to ceaselessly strengthen the
traditional ties of friendship,” and said that he was visiting North Korea with a task of reaffirming bilateral relations “forged in blood” and developing them “for generation after generation,” KCNA reported. The People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, also quoted Li as saying that the anniversary of the armistice was a time to “recall with deep fondness the outstanding sons and daughters of China and North Korea who heroically sacrificed themselves to defend their homes and countries.” Such references indicated that both Beijing and Pyongyang were once again falling back on their old battlefield ties to manage their increasingly complicated relationship through a period of deep anxiety. Li’s visit as vice president of state, rather than as a representative of the Chinese Communist Party, implies that “China will define relations with North Korea as a normal relationship between states, and not as an alliance in blood,” Ji Mingkui, a teacher at the People’s Liberation Army’s National Defense University in Beijing, said in a commentary published on July 26 in The Global Times. “Establishing normal state relations with North Korea will cast aside the reactivenss that has come with the blood alliance relationship,” the commentary said, accusing North Korea of abusing the treaty of friendship with China. “Cutting the fetters can help advance the denuclearization of the peninsula and the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula.” (Choe Sang-hun and Chris Buckley, “North Korean Leader Said to Support Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, July 27, 2013, p. A-7)

With a fresh coat of paint and a new home along the Pothong River, the USS Pueblo, a spy ship seized off North Korea’s east coast in the late 1960s, is expected to be unveiled this week as the centerpiece of a renovated war museum to commemorate what North Korea calls “Victory Day,” the 60th anniversary this Saturday of the signing of the armistice that ended hostilities in the Korean War. In 2002, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Donald P. Gregg said a North Korean foreign ministry official hinted at a deal to return the Pueblo. But when he later visited Pyongyang, he said he was told the climate had changed and a return was no longer an option. In January the next year, Colorado Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell reintroduced a resolution in Congress asking North Korea to return the ship. There has been no progress since, however, at least none that has been made public. “The ship was named after Pueblo, Colorado, and they would have loved to have the ship back,” Chicca said. “It’s very disappointing to have it still there, and still being used as anti-American propaganda.” (Associated Press, “North Korea to Put Captured Cold War-Era Spy Ship on Display,” July 25, 2013)

Christian Friends of Korea (CFK), which is already engaged in providing humanitarian assistance to people living in the Hwanghae region, will offer clean drinking water, food and medicine to North Korean flood victims in the southwestern part of the country after it was hit hard by torrential rains in recent weeks, Radio Free Asia reported. The move by CFK comes after the start of the monsoon season early this month brought heavy rainfall causing considerable loss of life and property to the communist North. The United Nations said that as of Monday, 24 people have been killed because of flooding while many others have been injured. It said a fact-finding mission has been sent to the isolationist country to assess the full extent of the damage so assistance can be provided. (Yonhap, “U.S. Non-Profit Group to Help Flood Victims in N.Korea,” July 25, 2013)
South Korea and the United States failed to narrow differences on how to share the cost of funding the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). In the second round of talks in Seoul, called the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) meeting, the U.S. government demanded that Korea expand its financial burden to more than 1 trillion won ($895 million) to reach a 50-50 share, according to sources familiar with details of the deal. Korea stuck to about 889 billion won. The SMA is to supplement the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which governs the legal status of U.S. troops in Korea. They agreed to meet again in August in the United States. The U.S. claimed that Seoul needs to share a greater burden because U.S. troops should strengthen its military readiness in the wake of growing threats from North Korea. Korea contributed 869.5 billion won for this year, which accounts for about 42 percent, based on the U.S. assessment. In addition, according to a report by the Senate Armed Services Committee in April, Korea-funded contributions of $707 million in 2011 and $765 million in 2012, accounting for 40 and 41 percent, respectively, compared with those from the U.S. side. However, Korea said that direct and indirect costs provided for the USFK are considerable and any increase of the contribution should be limited to last year’s inflation rate of 2.2 percent. Korea claims that it provides police and the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA), worth around $42 million. Besides the troop support, it provides land for bases and firing ranges for free along with exemptions from taxation and benefits including cheaper electricity and reduced telephone charges. The latest five-year SMA regarding Korea’s cost-sharing support for the USFK, signed in 2008, is scheduled to expire at the end of this year. (Kang Seung-woo, “Seoul, Washington apart over USFK Bill,” Korea Times, July 25, 2013)

The interim report of new National Defense Program Guidelines focuses on potential threats from China and North Korea and includes calls for the creation of a U.S. Marine-like strike force. “The national security environment that Japan faces has become more serious,” says the report, an advance copy of which was obtained by Asahi Shimbun. Its official release is on July 26. It cited military expansion by China and North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as particularly worrisome. With the maritime advances being made by China in mind, the report states: “In order to respond to attacks against outlying islands, it will be indispensable to maintain advantages in both air and sea capabilities.” A Marine-like unit capable of amphibious landings would be one way to quickly respond to attacks on outlying islands. The new guidelines are being compiled by the Defense Ministry and are scheduled for completion by the end of the year. The current guidelines were drawn up in 2010 when the Democratic Party of Japan controlled the government. With the return to power of the Liberal Democratic Party last December, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Abe decided to compile new guidelines in order to strengthen the alliance with the United States and review the nation’s defense structure so it could more rapidly respond to a changing international environment. In defending against ballistic missiles from North Korea, the report states that “consideration should be given for strengthening comprehensive deterrence measures as well as response capabilities.” The report stops short of clearly mentioning the acquisition of pre-emptive strike capabilities to attack enemy bases, as has been previously called for by Abe, but that topic will likely continue to be discussed in the process of compiling the guidelines in
coming months. An executive with the ruling LDP said the biggest question about the new guidelines will be how the issue of collective self-defense is handled. While the Defense Ministry continues its work on the guidelines, the Abe administration will at the same time discuss the possibility of changing the current government interpretation of the Constitution, which prohibits exercising the right to collective self-defense. Abe wants to change the interpretation to allow Japan to exercise that right as a way of strengthening the Japan-U.S. military alliance. However, a high-ranking Defense Ministry official said, “That would fundamentally change Japan’s position from its current exclusively defensive posture.” To strengthen reconnaissance against North Korean ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, the report also calls for considering the acquisition of high altitude unmanned drones that would conduct around-the-clock surveillance over wider areas than is currently possible and monitor North Korea for possible ballistic missile launches. (Sonoda Koji, “Interim Defense Report Cites China, North Korea in Call for Stronger Measures,” Asahi Shimbun, July 25, 2013) Japan is considering the acquisition of offensive weapons and surveillance drones and will assume a more active role in regional security, the country’s defense minister said, providing an early glimpse of ways the new conservative government could lead the nation farther than ever from its postwar pacifism. The minister, Onodera Itsunori, said Japan was considering taking such steps to counter the growing military capabilities of North Korea and of China, which has been extending its influence in the region and is embroiled in a territorial dispute with Japan over islands in the East China Sea. The drones would be used to monitor Japan’s vast territorial waters, presumably including the area around the islands. Onodera spoke after his ministry released an interim report on an overhaul of Japanese defense strategy ordered up by the cabinet of the country’s hawkish prime minister, Abe Shinzo. The interim report is meant to start debate on the issues before decisions on changes to defense policy that are expected to be announced by the end of the year. Abe has vowed to reverse the long decline of his nation, which was Asia’s dominant local power during much of the last century but is being eclipsed by China. He has said he wants to change Japan’s antiwar Constitution, written by American occupiers after World War II, to allow its forces to become a full-fledged military. Such a fundamental shift would require parliamentary approval and a referendum. But analysts said acquiring an offensive weapon, like a cruise missile, would be an important symbolic step away from the current constitution’s limitations. “It would be a big deal, a fundamental change in our defense philosophy,” said Michishita Narushige, director of security studies at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “For Abe, this would be an important step toward normalizing Japan and its military.” The changes in the defense report would continue a broader shift in military strategy begun under an opposition government three years ago that ended Japan’s cold-war-era focus on fending off a Russian invasion from the north in favor of developing a more dynamic air-sea capability to defend its far-flung islands to the south. Even before then, Japan had been slowly strengthening its ability to respond to threats from North Korea’s increasingly sophisticated missile and nuclear programs, and to China’s growing assertiveness. Since taking office in December, Abe has nudged Japan even farther toward a more robust military. This year, his government passed the first increase in Japan’s defense budget in a decade, though the size of the gain was tiny compared with China’s growth in military spending. Some in Abe’s party have already been
calling for strengthening Japan’s military capabilities by developing or buying from the United States cruise missiles or other weapons that could be used to launch a strike on a North Korean missile before it was launched. However, Onodera stressed that any such weapons, if acquired, would be used only if Japan was attacked first and thus did not represent a shift from the purely defensive nature of the Japanese military, called the Self-Defense Forces. The caution reflects the challenge that Abe faces as he seeks to raise Japan’s military profile in a region where memories of Japan’s wartime aggression remain raw. During visits to Southeast Asian nations, Abe has tried to cast Japan as a reliable partner that can help offset the growing influence of China, which has been embroiled in heated territorial disputes with many nations in the region.

Today, Abe invited China’s leader, Xi Jinping, to an immediate summit meeting aimed at lowering tensions. Still, analysts and politicians say Abe’s message of a more robust military has struck a chord among a Japanese public that feels increasingly anxious as China has appeared to challenge the long-held military dominance of the United States in Asia. This has fed growing calls for Japan to build up its own ability to defend itself, while also trying to keep the United States engaged in the region at a time when the Pentagon faces deep budget cuts. “Over the last few years, the Japanese people’s feelings about the national security environment, and also about the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, have changed,” Onodera told reporters. “This has led to the current revision” that the Liberal Democrats have under way. The anxiety over China has also led to a growing public acceptance of the Japanese military, which was long blamed for leading Japan into catastrophic defeat in World War II. In one symbolically important change, the report called for creating a single, unified command for Japan’s army, the Ground Self-Defense Forces, to improve coordination and efficiency. That would reverse a decision made after Japan’s postwar armed forces were created in 1954 to break the ground forces into several smaller regional commands so they would be too weak and divided to hijack the civilian government, as the Imperial Army did during World War II. In another significant step, the report called for increasing Japan’s military presence in Southeast Asia by helping those nations build their own defense capacities to respond to possible Chinese provocations. The report also called for closer military cooperation with Australia and South Korea, two other former targets of Japan’s early-20th-century aggression. In addition, the report called for building up the country’s ability to help Japanese citizens during a terrorism or hostage crisis like the one in Algeria earlier this year, in which nearly 40 gas plant workers were killed, 10 of them Japanese. Many of the changes were stated only vaguely in the report and had to be elaborated upon by Onodera. He said Japan was considering the acquisition of drones like the American-made Global Hawk, though he refused to name China as a possible target of surveillance. He also said Japan was considering the purchase of tilt-rotor aircraft like the U.S. Osprey as part of an established plan to build an amphibious infantry unit similar to the Marines that could defend outlying islands. “Japan has 6,800 islands,” Onodera said. “Any country should be able to defend itself.” (Martin Fackler, “Japanese Minister Proposes More Active Presence in Region,” New York Times, July 27, 2013, p. A-4) Japan’s possession of the capability to conduct pre-emptive attacks on potential enemy bases, which an interim report on a review of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) urges the government to consider, would lead to a drastic change in the division of Japan and U.S. defense roles. The current division of roles
between the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and U.S. forces under the bilateral security alliance is compared to a shield and a spear -- with Japan concentrating on defending itself and the U.S. attacking Japan's potential enemies. The interim report calls for considering a departure from such an arrangement and ensuring the "independence" of Japan's defense capabilities. However, opposition to this idea is certain to appear domestically and abroad, and it remains to be seen whether the proposal can be fully incorporated into the new NDPO to be drawn up by the end of this year. Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori told a news conference on July 26, "Possessing the capability to attack missile bases is something that we should consider to defend our country." The SDF has established a missile defense (MD) system comprising ground-based PAC3 missiles and sea-based SM3 missiles. Experts say that the system could shoot down 97 to 98 percent of missiles launched toward Japan. However, Onodera conceded, "There's a small chance we would fail to shoot down some missiles, and if many missiles were launched toward Japan, there would be serious consequences." In a Diet statement in 1956, the government clearly stated that attacking potential enemies' bases is permissible under the war-renouncing Constitution if the move is purely for defensive purposes. However, the government interprets the supreme law to ban Japan from possessing certain offensive weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers. Furthermore, possession of cruise missiles would require advanced technology and large budget spending. Such being the case, Japan has relied completely on the United States to carry out any attacks on the bases of its potential enemies. However, calls are mounting mainly within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for Japan to possess the capability to attack its potential enemies' bases, as North Korea's missile program poses a growing threat to Japan. At the same time, Japan's missile technology has greatly improved. "If Japan had striking capability, it would increase deterrence and discourage potential enemies from launching missiles at Japan," said a senior member of the LDP. The party's policymakers urged the executive branch of the government this past June to consider possessing such capabilities. Another factor behind the proposal is a decline in the United States' influence on East Asia. "We shouldn't give the international community the wrong impression that the United States won't use its 'spear.' However, I wonder whether it's acceptable for us to have no choice but to ask the United States to attack (our potential enemies)," Prime Minister Abe told a House of Councillors Budget Committee session in May. One Japanese government source commented, "Now, the United States is less enthusiastic about being fully responsible for the defense of Japan." However, were Japan to possess striking capability, its neighboring countries would be wary of the move, possibly ending up increasing tension in the region. Since it is difficult for Japan to identify potential enemies, Japan's study of possessing striking capability could also raise anxiety among other Asian countries. Natsuo Yamaguchi, leader of the LDP's coalition partner New Komeito, warned the LDP against leaning toward possessing such capabilities. "Having the capability to attack potential enemies' bases in itself would be risky. It's necessary to exercise caution in discussing the matter," he said. (Aoki Jun, “Capability to Stage Pre-emptive Attacks Could Change Japan-U.S. Defense Arrangement,” Mainichi Shimbun, July 27, 2013)

North Korea observed the 60th anniversary of the end of the Korean War by showing off its military might to the outside world in a parade through the center of the capital.
Pyongyang, that featured columns of rocket tubes, goose-stepping paratroopers and intercontinental ballistic missiles, or at least mock-ups of the weapons. When Kim Jong-un, the young leader, sauntered onto the reviewing stand in his trademark Mao suit, a sea of spectators cheered and waved flags and paper flowers. As fighter jets screamed overhead, Kim clapped and chatted with Li Yuanchao, the visiting vice president of China, North Korea's wartime ally. As with other celebrations in the police state, this one was highly choreographed, and North Korea invited some international journalists to cover the events. Mobile launchers rumbled before Kim and a crowd of journalists and other foreign visitors carrying the KN-08, widely believed to have been designed as the North's first intercontinental ballistic missile. Some analysts suspect that the KN-08, unveiled during a military parade in Pyongyang last year, is still being developed and that the missiles displayed might be mock-ups. The North would need such missiles to be able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons, but it remains unclear if the country has been able to miniaturize bombs so they could fit on a long-range missile. The North says its missiles are a deterrent against U.S. hostility. The parade also featured truckloads of baleful-looking soldiers hugging packs with radioactive warning symbols. With such a display, North Korea appeared to suggest that it may have created radioactive “dirty bombs,” said Shin In-kyun, a military expert who runs Korea Defense Network, a civic group. “North Korea is exaggerating and showing off its nuclear and missile threats,” Shin said. Fears of North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities have increased since it successfully launched a three-stage rocket in December — which the West considers a test of its missile technology — and claimed to have “smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear strike means" after a nuclear test in February, its third. Also on display were Musudan mobile missiles, believed to have a range of 2,500 miles, enough to reach the United States territory of Guam. North Korea has never flight-tested the Musudan. Still, when North Korea showed signs that it might launch a couple of them this spring, Washington announced plans to speed up the deployment of an advanced antimissile system to Guam. In a speech on Saturday, Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, director of the army's General Political Department, called for a strong military to support North Korea's “urgent task of building the economy and improving the living standards of the people.” Also today, South Korea’s president, Park Geun-hye, warned that her government would never tolerate North Korean provocations. And President Obama said American veterans should have been celebrated more than they were for service in a grueling war. “Here, today, we can say with confidence that war was no tie,” Obama said in Washington. “Korea was a victory.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Showcases Its Military Might at Mass Rally,” New York Times, July 28, 2013, p. 8)

North Korea’s economy is believed to be virtually lifeless after decades of mismanagement, isolation and sanctions aimed at foiling its nuclear ambitions but its showcase capital, Pyongyang, shows no hint of calamity. Secretive North Korea allowed in a large group of foreign journalists last week to cover lavish celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the truce that ended the 1950-53 Korean War, which North Korea says it won. No expense seems to have been spared for monuments to the conflict upon which the state was founded. A cemetery for war dead unveiled at a ceremony on Thursday, that leader Kim Jong-un presided over, looked immaculate, with grave stones bearing portraits of the dead and images of the medals they won. A
new war museum, opened to the public with much fanfare on Saturday, boasts top-of-the-line television displays and elaborate recreations of battle sites. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency says in its global fact book that North Korea’s annual per capita income was $1,800 in 2011, in purchasing power terms, the 197th in the world and about 5.5 percent that of South Korea. A famine in the 1990s is estimated to have killed a million people. More than one-quarter of children are chronically malnourished, according to a U.N.-backed survey published in March. But none of that is evident in Pyongyang. Residents, by definition regime loyalists because the government decides who can live there, rely on a rusting cable car system to get around. Long lines of people pack in at busy times of day. People walk a lot along the largely empty, well-swept streets. In recent days, women held up parasols of different colors to shade themselves from the summer sun. Most cars are old European or Japanese models but there are some newer ones including Toyota Land Cruisers, and Mercedes-Benz and Audi sedans. Perhaps surprisingly, a lot of little shops are scattered across the city, in particular book and clothing stores. There are also restaurants and tiny shops selling nothing but locally produced soft drinks, in apple, grape and peach flavors. Apartment blocks may look a bit run-down, just as in many other Asian cities, but many residents had flower pots on their balconies. It is after sunset that North Korea’s economic difficulties are more evident. Large parts of Pyongyang have no street lights, and apparently a patchy electricity supply. Specks of light floating in the darkness look like fireflies, but prove to be bicycle lamps. It goes without saying in the capital of one of the world’s most tightly controlled countries that there is no hint of any unrest or frustration with the regime led by the 30-year-old Kim. “He has been in place for more than a year and a half now; we see no sign of any dissent or opposition or internal discomfort over his position as leader,” one diplomat said of the young leader. While Kim has been more visible, especially over the past week when he looked confident and relaxed presiding over the anniversary celebrations, there is no indication of any change in the policies set by his father and grandfather. “There’s been a change in style, but not substance,” said the diplomat, who declined to be identified. (Se Young Lee, “Little Sign of Economic Stress in Noprth Korea’s Well-Swept Capital,” Reuters, July 28, 2013)

South Korea said it will extend a “final offer” for talks to North Korea to discuss the normalization of a suspended inter-Korean industrial complex in the North’s border town of Kaesong. “The government will make a final proposal for talks with North Korea to discuss (the Kaesong complex issue),” Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said in a statement. The offer will be made “through the border village of Panmunjom tomorrow,” the minister said, adding that the proposed talks are “in line with the working-level meetings” held over the past several weeks. Calling on the North “to give a clear answer” to Seoul’s call for its pledge to prevent a recurrence of the suspension, Ryoo said its failure will leave Seoul with “no other choice but to make a grave decision,” as companies with factories in Kaesong are suffering from ballooning losses. He, however, did not elaborate on the time element of the scheduled talks and what the government’s “grave” measure will entail. The closure of the complex by the North’s withdrawal of all its 53,000 laborers in April is estimated to have caused up to 1.05 trillion won (US$935 million) in damages to the 123 South Korean companies with factories in the industrial zone. “The government has a firm will to make future-oriented
inter-Korean relations based upon principles and with respects for each other,” Ryoo said, urging the North to make “the right decision for the normalization of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and inter-Korean relations.” Stressing its stance to push for humanitarian support regardless of the political situation, the minister also said the government will “approve five civic organizations’ humanitarian aid to North Korea and support projects for infants there pushed by UNICEF,” citing the U.N. Children's Fund. Seoul last approved a shipment of humanitarian aid in March by Eugene Bell, a South Korean charity group, to North Korea. It was the first assistance from Seoul to Pyongyang since the inauguration of President Park Geun-hye in February. (Yonhap, “S. Korea to Offer ‘Final tTalks' with N. Korea on Kaesong Park,” July 28, 2013) Five civic groups were allowed to send medicine, food and clothes worth 1.4 billion won ($1.25 million) to aid North Korean children. Seoul also donated $6.04 million towards a project to help North Korean infants, which is supported by the UN Children’s Fund. Seoul’s ruling and opposition parties expressed hope that Seoul’s latest proposal would lead to the reopening of the industrial complex. “We hope the talks will proceed smoothly,” Rep. Hwang Woo-yea, floor leader of the ruling Saenuri Party, said at a Supreme Council meeting. “North Korea should take steps to ensure that the Gaeseong Industrial Complex meets international standards and continues to develop at a higher level,” he added. Rep. Jun Byung-hun, the floor leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, called on both Koreas to “overcome all difficulties” in order to revive the factory zone. However, he expressed concern over Seoul’s warning of “grave” consequences. “If that refers to the closure of the complex, (the government’s) approach is too emotional and short-sighted,” he said at a party meeting. The shutdown of the complex is estimated to have caused up to 1.05 trillion won ($935 million) in damages to the 123 South Korean firms operating in the factory zone. (Korea Herald, “Seoul Delivers Offer of Dialogue to N.K.,” July 29, 2013)

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter is planning to visit North Korea soon to try to win the release of a U.S. citizen held for committing crimes against the reclusive state, South Korea’s Yonhap reported. Carter has made contact with the North to arrange for the visit, and he is likely to make the trip in a personal capacity to secure the release of Kenneth Bae, the U.S. citizen, a source in Washington was quoted as saying by Yonhap. “The issue of Kenneth Bae who has been held in the North for nine months is becoming a burden for the United States,” the diplomatic source was quoted by Yonhap. “Even if Carter’s visit materializes, it will be focused on the issue of Kenneth’s Bae’s release more than anything else.” (Jack Kim, “Ex-President Carter Plans to Visit North Korea: Report,” Reuters, July 29, 2013)

Seoul and Washington will discuss ways of drawing support from Southeast Asia nations for financial sanctions against North Korea to rally international cooperation against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development programs. David Cohen, undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence at the U.S. Treasury Department, arrived in Seoul for a two-day visit to discuss bilateral collaboration on the matter. “The U.S. knows that sanctions are effective when the entire international community gets involved,” a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said. “In this regard, the U.S. official is visiting here and there.” Cohen is scheduled to make back-to-back visits to Singapore and Malaysia after his Seoul trip. He will hold talks tomorrow with First Vice Foreign
South Korea and the U.S. discussed ways to improve the implementation of sanctions aimed at impeding the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran. David Cohen, Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, met with Vice FM Kim Kyou-hyun. He also visited Cho Tae-yong, the Foreign Ministry’s top nuclear negotiator and special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, and Eun Sung-soo, deputy minister for international economics at the Finance Ministry. They also discussed cooperation on a new set of U.S. sanctions that came into force on July 1, targeting Iran’s gold and currency trade and auto industry. “The two sides in particular reviewed the implementation of the latest sanctions against Iran and we requested proactive U.S. assistance to minimize the damage for our businesses,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Cho Tai-young told a regular news briefing. “The two sides also assessed China’s efforts such as regarding the implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and agreed to reinforce cooperation with China in the future over sanctions against North Korea.” At a separate news conference, Cohen said the Panama case represented a “sign of desperation of North Korea” in the face of increasingly crippling sanctions. “North Korea’s ability to access the international financial system to easily move money to pay for or to get paid for material that it’s either selling or that it’s purchasing for its program has been significantly impaired,” he said. “North Korea tries to sell conventional weapons where they can. They have only a few countries that are interested in purchasing their conventional weapons — they’re not very good, the weapons. It’s very hard to pay North Korea.” South Korea was the second leg of the American sanctions specialist’s four-nation Asian tour including Japan, Singapore and Malaysia. But Cohen dismissed the claim that China is cooperating with the U.S., saying it is “taking steps for their own purposes.” “Whether it’s China or any other country that has exposure to North Korean financial activity, what we have urged is both compliance with Security Council resolutions as well as additional steps to be particularly vigilant to ensure that North Korean illicit financial activity is not allowed in the financial sector,” he said. “The way to prevent that activity which violates every standard of legitimate financial activity for the banks (is) to be very careful about who they’re doing business with.” (Shin Hyon-hee, “S. Korea, U.S. Seek Tighter Imposition of Sanctions on North Korea, Iran,” Korea Herald, July 30, 2013) The United States is interested in following the money of the Kim dynasty in North Korea, according to David Cohen, the U.S. Treasury’s sanctions chief. “Whether we can take action or what action we will take, we will wait to see when we find the money,” he told a panel of five media groups at the U.S. Embassy in central Seoul on July 30. The purpose of the sanctions on North Korea, said the U.S. undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, is “to make it more difficult for North Korea to continue to develop its nuclear and ballistic program” and “to put pressure on the leadership of North Korea so that they have a greater incentive to change their course on the nuclear program.” Cohen added that the U.S. will “continue to increase pressure on the North Korean government until it changes its course.” Cohen, who visited Tokyo on Monday, spoke to First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Kyou-hyun, Deputy Finance Minister
Eun Sung-soo and Cho Tae-yong, Seoul’s top envoy to the six party talks, today in Seoul. He continues on to Singapore and Malaysia for the rest of the week. He said his visit was mainly to make sure Seoul was “synced up” on efforts to reduce the threat from the North’s nuclear program, including proliferation activities and continued development of its nuclear and ballistic capabilities, along with the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. Cohen said China is complying with U.S.-led sanctions for its own purposes. In March, the Treasury slapped sanctions on the state-run Foreign Trade Bank, North Korea’s primary foreign exchange bank, for financing nuclear and missile proliferation activities following the North’s third nuclear test in February. The state-run Bank of China cut off business with the Foreign Trade Bank in May. “What we have seen is Chinese banks taking steps to restrict Foreign Trade Bank’s activities in China,” he said. “China is acting out of its own perception of the risks that North Korea’s nuclear program poses to China and its citizens and its country,” he said. It wasn’t performing a “favor” for the United States. Cohen also referred to the recent case of Panama seizing a North Korean vessel coming from Cuba that carried weapons buried under a cargo of sugar. “This action by the Panamanians to stop the vessel because it was carrying undeclared and illicit North Korean weapons is a good indication of enforcement of UN resolutions,” he said. While there is still more work to do, Cohen said, “the ability of North Korea to access the international financial system to easily move money to pay for or to get paid for material that it’s either selling or purchasing for its program has been significantly impaired.” He added that North Korea has been forced to use front companies, proxies or couriering cash, rather than making traditional financial transactions, a process which he called “cumbersome.” “That makes it all the more difficult for North Korea to either sell the weapons it’s trying to sell or to purchase the material it needs to develop its nuclear and ballistic program.” Regarding loopholes in the sanctions, he said, “We don’t have a complete seal over North Korea, that’s not what we’re aiming for. But we are trying to limit the ability of the elite in North Korea to live a comfortable life while the people of the North Korea suffer desperately under the regime.” (Lee Young-jong and Sarah Kim, “Sanctions Intend to Follow Kim Jong-un’s Money,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 1, 2013)

In a verdict expected to intensify tensions with Japan, a South Korean court ordered Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to compensate five South Koreans who were forced to work in the company’s factories during Japanese colonial rule. The high court in Busan ordered the company to pay $71,800 to each of the five Koreans. It was the second such ruling against a Japanese company this month. On July 10, the Seoul High Court ordered the Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metal Corporation to pay $89,800 to each of four South Korean plaintiffs to compensate them for forced labor. Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi each said they planned to appeal. The Busan court said in its ruling that Mitsubishi forced the South Korean plaintiffs to “toil in poor conditions in Hiroshima and yet failed to pay wages,” and “did not provide proper shelters or food after the dropping of an atomic bomb” there in 1945. All five plaintiffs are now deceased; their families represented them in court. The two rulings were the first in favor of South Koreans in a 16-year legal battle waged in Japan and South Korea, and they could prompt similar lawsuits from other victims or their families. At least 1.2 million Koreans were forced to work for Japan’s war efforts in Japan, China and elsewhere, historians here said. Some 300 Japanese companies still in operation are believed to have used

The South Korean Defense Ministry last week offered its five-year budget proposal, which includes a major focus on increasing the country’s ability to thwart possible North Korean missile strikes from reaching their targets, Yonhap reported. Approximately $26.4 billion is sought for fiscal 2014 to 2018 for the purchase of missile defense-related armaments, including cruise and ballistic missiles, satellites and remotely piloted surveillance aircraft. The spending proposal asks for funding to modernize South Korea’s arsenal of U.S.-made Patriot Advanced Capability 3 missile interceptors and to acquire new PAC-2 missiles. “We are putting [in] efforts to procure weapons to establish the kill chain to preemptively detect and strike North Korean missiles, and to establish the KAMD, which is capable of intercepting the enemy’s missiles,” Ju Chul-ki, the senior presidential secretary for foreign affairs and security, said on Thursday. The South’s evolving domestic Korea Air and Missile Defense framework is focused on defending against lower-altitude missile threats. (Global Security Newswire, “South Korea Plans to Spend Billions on Missile Shield,” July 30, 2013)

South Korean non-governmental organizations started shipping out humanitarian aid to North Korea to help alleviate the plight of children and sick people in the impoverished country. The move comes after Seoul’s unification ministry approved the shipment of goods earlier in the week as a sign that South Korea is open to offering urgent humanitarian assistance to the North in spite of sanctions. The Korea Association of People Sharing Love, one of five NGOs to gain permission to ship goods, said it has ordered the shipment of bread in China for delivery to child-care centers and orphanages in Sinuiju. It said other food shipments will be made in the coming weeks. The NGO was allowed to send US$46,000 worth of bread, baby formulas and nutritional supplements. Medical Aid for Children, another charity group, said it has held a ceremony in Incheon, west of Seoul, to mark the start of its deliveries of antibiotics and anti-inflammatory drugs. The group said medical supplies worth 223 million won ($199,700) will be made to a children’s hospital in the North. Other groups like Green Tree Korea, Okdongmu Children and Stop Hunger said the first of their aid shipments will reach the North next month. These organization plan to send more than 1.2 billion won worth of warm clothing, blankets, flour, powdered milk to the North in the coming weeks. (Yonhap, “S. Korean NGOs Start Shipping Humanitarian Aid to N. Korea,” July 31, 2013)

July 31 marked the third straight day without a response from North Korea to a proposal from Seoul to resume working-level talks to normalize operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Some observers are expressing concern that inter-Korean relations may be settling in once again for a long-term chill, but others are taking a different view.

The Unification Ministry delivered a report on the situation on July 31: “There have been normal contacts and telephone conversations between South and North through Panmunjeom, but no response from North Korea to our proposal to resume working-
level talks to normalize the Complex,” it said. It was the third straight day of silence since South Korean Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae announced on July 28 that he was approving private humanitarian aid to North Korea and proposing “final talks.” With the Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercises between the South Korean and US militaries set to begin in August, the situation on the peninsula is not favorable for a resumption of dialogue. North Korea has called the exercises “war training for an invasion.” Indeed, the Rodong Sinmun, printed an article on July 31 warning that the peninsula would be in another “state of war” after last spring’s once the exercises begin. Based on this, experts are predicting that inter-Korean working-level talks are unlikely to get off the ground for the time being. A North Korea source in Dandong, China told the Hankyoreh that the delay likely had to do with preparations for an upcoming event in North Korea. “From what I’ve heard, all operations were halted through the 29th due to preparations for a 60th anniversary Victory Day event,” the source said. The event celebrates the 1953 armistice that ended the combat phase of the Korean War, which North Korea claims as its own victory in the war. The source’s claim means that the delayed response may not necessarily be a rejection of the proposal to resume the talks. Another factor is that North Korea is ill positioned to bear the burden of responsibility for the complex’s closure if it does refuse Seoul’s offer to hold more talks. Indeed, North Korea’s proposed draft agreement from the last round of working-level talks contains language suggesting it does not necessarily plan to link the Ulchi-Freedom Guardian military exercises to the Kaesong Complex issue. While North Korea’s draft for the third round of talks said South Korea would “under no circumstances engage in political or military activities that hinder the complex’s operation,” another for the sixth round said North Korea would “ensure normal operation of the industrial zone without any influence from any external circumstances.” Meanwhile, South Korean Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk commented on the lack of a reply at a regular briefing on July 31. “We’re not going to call it a ‘no’ [from North Korea] yet,” he said. “We’re only going to reiterate that we urge North Korea to comply quickly and show a sincere change in its position.” (Gil Yun-hyung, “Still No North Korean Response to Seoul’s Offer for Kaesong Talks,” Hankyoreh, August 1, 2013)

Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Aso Taro retracted remarks made a day ago that Japan should learn from Nazi leader Adolf Hitler in changing its pacifist constitution without arousing public concern. The remarks were met by a storm of international criticism. “Germany’s Weimar constitution was changed before anyone realized... Why don’t we learn from that technique?” Aso had been quoted as saying. He said he regretted the “misunderstanding.” “I invited misunderstanding as a result and I would like to withdraw the statement in which I cited the Nazi regime as an example,” he said. He faces mounting calls from within Japan to resign, with critics accusing him of ignorance and saying his comments reveal the true face of the Abe administration. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide yesterday said people should be asking Aso what he really meant. But as international criticism mounted and the Simon Wiesenthal Center demanded clarification, Suga indirectly criticized Aso, saying during a press conference today that the Japanese government “does not perceive the Nazi Germany in a positive light.” Rabbi Abraham Cooper of the Simon Wiesenthal Center said in a statement, “The only lessons on governance that the world should draw from the Nazi
Third Reich is how those in positions of power should not behave." Foreign
governments and the international media also lambasted Aso’s comments. The
Washington Post said they exposed his “lack of understanding” of history, which “hurt
Japan’s national interest.” (Chosun Ilbo, “Japan’s Deputy P.M. Forced to Retract Nazi
Comment,” August 2, 2013)

President Barack Obama finished up appointments for his second-term Korean
Peninsula policy crew by tapping Evan Medeiros, China director at the National
Security Council, as Senior Director for Asia. With this, the new lineup at the three
policy organizations - the White House, State Department, and Defense Department -
is complete. But the names in it suggest that the administration is prioritizing policy
continuity: all of them, with the exceptions of Secretary of State John Kerry and
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, who were appointed early this year, are holdovers
from Obama’s first term. At the NSC, the lineup includes Susan Rice as national security
adviser, Medeiros as senior director, and Sydney Seiler as Korea director. Neither Rice
nor Medeiros has handled Korea policy to date, which means the role of Seiler, a
Central Intelligence Agency veteran with longstanding experience in North Korea
policy, is likely to be key. Rice is known to be one of Obama’s closest and most trusted
associates, but she is also seen primarily as a Middle East and Africa expert. Medeiros,
who is in his early forties, joined the White House in 2009 after previously doing
research on China and nuclear nonproliferation at the RAND Corporation. Because of
his limited experience in government, little is known about his positions. At the State
Department, the key figures working under Kerry include deputy Secretary of State
William Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs Daniel
Russel and deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Japan and Korean Affairs James
Zumwalt, and director for Korean affairs Robert Rapson, as well as Glyn Davies as
special representative for North Korea policy and Robert King as special envoy on
North Korean human rights. All but Kerry and Russell are holdovers. Under secretary
for political affairs Wendy Sherman is nominally in charge of the East Asia/Pacific
bureau, but is not deeply involved in North Korea policy. The position under Davies as
special envoy to the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue has been empty
since being vacated by Clifford Hart. A foreign affairs source reported hearing
"nothing yet about a replacement being hired" for Hart, meaning the post could
remain empty for some time. No major changes happened in the lineup at the Defense
Department, which includes Deputy Secretary Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy James Miller, and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
East Asia David Helvey. The post of assistant secretary for East Asia has been empty
since Mark Lippert left it to work as Hagel’s chief of staff. Two names currently being
mentioned as possibilities to fill it are acting assistant secretary for Asian and Pacific
Security Affairs Peter Lavoy and senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee senior
advisor Michael Schiffer. Diplomatic insiders in Washington said the new faces were
generally more lightweight than in the first term, adding that the aim seemed primarily
to be maintaining consistency rather than looking for changes in North Korea policy.
(Park Hyun, “U.S. Pres. Obama Finishes Selecting Policy Team for KoPorea Peninsula,”
Hankyore, August 2, 2103)
Rep. Park Jie-won, the former main opposition Democratic Party (DP) floor leader and chairman of the National Assembly South-North Korea Relations Committee, asked the government Friday allow him to visit North Korea to persuade the communist regime to accept the South’s proposals over the shuttered inter-Korean Gaeseong complex. “I say to the government, approve my visit to the North so that I will be able to meet with high-ranking officials there such as Kim Young-nam, chairman of the North’s Supreme People’s Assembly, and Kim Gi-nam, a secretary of the North’s ruling Workers’ Party Central Committee, and explain the Seoul government’s position,” Park said in a radio interview. “I will go there as the chair of the Assembly’s inter-Korean committee and talk about our position and the current phase of international relations.” Chung Min-uck, “Rep. Park Hopes to Visit North Korea,” Korea Times, August 2, 2013

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The U.S. Senate has confirmed Army Lt. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti to lead the U.S. forces in Korea, according to the Pentagon. In his confirmation hearing this week, he expressed support for the current plan for Washington to hand over wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean troops to Seoul as scheduled in 2015. Once he assumes command of U.S. Forces Korea, he will be granted authority to lead South Korean troops in the event of war until the OPCON transfer. South Korea’s military recently proposed a delay in the OPCON transition, citing growing threats from nuclear-armed North Korea.

Scaparrotti served in Afghanistan as the commander of the International Security Assistance Force’s Joint Command in Kabul from 2011 to 2012. He has since worked as director of the Joint Staff, serving under Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Yonhap, “Senate Approves Scaparroti as Head of U.S. Forces Korea,” August 3, 2013)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivered a personal message to Hyundai Group Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun during the latter’s visit to the communist state to hold a memorial service in Mt. Geumgang resort for the late Hyundai Chairman Chung Mong-hun. It was the young North Korean leader’s first ever personal message given to somebody from the South. According to KCNA, Kim said in his messages conveyed by Won Dong-yeon, deputy chief of the United Front Department, that: “Chung Mong-hun opened up the way of national reconciliation and cooperation. He contributed a lot to improving inter-Korean relations and preparing for unification.” Kim added, “I pray for the soul of the deceased. I wish Hyun and Hyundai group the best of luck in the future.” KCNA reported that Hyundai Group officials promised to spare no efforts to resume Mt. Geumgang tours and boost reconciliation between the two Koreas in line with the wish of Hyundai Group founder Chung Ju-yung and his sixth son Chung Mong-hun. The Seoul government did not issue its official stance on Kim’s message given to Hyun, saying the visit did not have any political meaning. Hyun, wife of Chung Mong-hun, crossed the demilitarized zone Saturday morning with 38 other executives of Hyundai Asan and returned to the South in the afternoon after holding a ceremony marking the 10th anniversary of Chung’s death. Chung committed suicide in 2003 under pressure of an impending prosecution investigation into allegations that then President Kim Dae-jung secretly sent a large amount of money to the North ahead of the first ever inter-Korean summit in 2000. (Jun Ji-hye, “N.K. Leader Delivers Message to Hyundai Chairwoman,” Korea Times, August 4, 2013)
A panel tasked with reviewing the government’s constitutional interpretation of Japan’s right to collective self-defense will propose far more liberal interpretations of the top law so the nation can exercise this right without being restricted to following certain scenarios of contingencies, a key panel member said. “The report we’ll later compile based on interpretations of the Constitution and international laws as well as the current security environment will contain proposals that go beyond the four categories of contingencies [the panel suggested in 2008],” said Kitaoka Shinichi, acting chairman of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, in an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun. Kitaoka expressed concerns over China’s military buildup and repeated violations of Japan’s territorial waters when describing the nation’s current security situation. The panel, set up by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his first Cabinet and currently chaired by former Ambassador to the United States Shunji Yanai, originally suggested four categories of contingencies in which Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defense, such as launching a counterattack when a U.S. military vessel is attacked during a joint military drill on the high seas. The right to collective self-defense, enshrined in the U.N Charter, allows any sovereign nation to launch a counterattack when another nation with which it has maintained close ties is attacked. Under the government’s constitutional interpretation presented as part of Diet answers in 1981, however, although Japan has this right like any other nation, “the range of self-defense approved under Article 9 of the Constitution should be the minimum necessary” and “exercising the right to collective defense exceeds that range.” But Kitaoka, who is also president of the International University of Japan, objected to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau’s interpretation that the right to collective self-defense by the SDF is unconstitutional. “We absolutely can’t say the right to individual self-defense alone is covered by the requirement of ‘minimum necessary,’” Kitaoka said. “The right to collective self-defense means mutually trusting nations cooperating together to protect security. It’s awkward not to regard the right to collective self-defense as falling under the minimum necessary.”

During a panel session in February, some members called for studying responses to low-level conflicts that do not involve actual armed attacks, such as cyber-attacks and special forces commandos disguising themselves as fishermen landing on Japan’s territories. During the discussions, some members said merely defining four types of contingencies for exercising the right to collective self-defense would be insufficient. In
its 2008 report, the panel proposed some curbs on allowing the right to collective defense by the SDF, such as requirements to win prior Diet approval and abide by relevant laws and making it subject to the judgment of the administration. Doing so would limit cases in which Japan actually exercises the right. Kitaoka said restrictions will be considered for the next report. Kitaoka said the report will probably be compiled “between late September and December” and should be finalized before the new National Defense Program Guidelines come out in late December. The government will study the panel’s report to determine if the constitutional interpretations should be changed. As some within the government are skeptical about the panel’s views being fully reflected in the government’s stance, the government plans to cautiously consider the proposals, given its importance in the nation’s security policy. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Panel Eyeing Wider Defense Right,” August 4, 2013)

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The Ministry of Unification backpedaled on its August 4 remarks about “reaching the limits of patience” with North Korea on the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Speaking at a regular briefing on August 4, Unification Ministry spokesperson Kim Hyung-suk explained that the “gist” of a spokesperson’s statement the day before had been to “once again urge North Korea to show a sincere change in attitude for the sake of normalizing operations at the Kaesong Complex in a forward-oriented way.” The move could be intended to give North Korea more time to respond to a proposal eight days ago for a seventh round of working-level talks on the complex. Kim’s explanation of the previous statement came because many news outlets read it as an ultimatum to Pyongyang. The mood at the August 5 briefing was very different from the previous briefing, when the ministry seemed willing to allow the Kaesong complex to close down permanently. The same day, Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae departed for a weeklong vacation. The deputy minister takes over duties when a minister goes on holiday, but cannot make the kind of “momentous decision” mentioned in a previous ministry statement. Ryoo’s vacation could also be read as giving Seoul more time to gather its thoughts, and North Korea more time to respond. For the South, the decision to go all in with pulling out of the complex and allowing it to close completely is not an easy one to make. Meanwhile, the Unification Ministry said that review procedures had been completed for economic cooperation insurance payments claimed by Kaesong tenant companies, adding that payouts may begin as early as this week. “If reviews by the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Committee [IECC] finish up by early this week, payment procedures will begin as per the tenant companies’ request,” Kim said. The ministry conducted a written review with members of the IECC and related agencies between August 1 and 5, with plans for a final decision on August 6. The total amount paid out, it said, would be 280 billion won (US$251 million) to 109 companies. Companies receiving insurance payouts cede ownership of assets within the complex to the government, which will then have the right to dispose of them. In other words, the companies would be washing their hands of the complex. But Kim avoided giving a direct answer when asked whether the payouts would naturally lead to the complex closing down permanently. “It’s not appropriate for a government authority to discuss the implications,” Kim said as a response. The ministry also said that communications between liaison officers at Panmunjeom took place as usual on August 4, but that there was no reference from
the North Korean side to resuming working-level talks as requested by Seoul. (Gil Yun-hyung, “Seoul Backpedaling on Kaesong Ultimatum Made to North Korea,” Hankyore, August 6, 2013)

More than two million people in North Korea have mobile phones. According to Naguib Sawiris of Egypt's Orascom Telecom, which has the mobile phone license in the isolated country, the number of subscribers hit the landmark in May this year. (Chosun Ilbo, “Over 2 Million N. Koreans Have Mobile Phones,” August 5, 2013)

8/6/13

KCNA: “Shortly ago, the Japanese government released a report calling for ‘increasing and supplementing combined capability to cope with missile attack from north Korea.’ This report which reflects Japan's defense strategy to be carried out for a decade to come openly hinted ‘Japan’s access to capability for preemptive attack,’ stressing the necessity of ‘deterrence and combined capability to cope with the increasing missile threat from north Korea.’ It also underlined the need to bolster up the capacities such as reinforcement of the operational foundation of the ‘Self-Defense Forces’ and the U.S. forces in Japan to cope with the ‘possibility of guerrilla and special units’ actions accompanied by ‘missile attack.’ This is a provocative claim negating the root cause of the escalating regional tension. It is nothing but a broad hoax of Japan to justify its moves to turn it into a military giant which have gone beyond the danger line. The escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula and other parts in the region is mainly attributable to the U.S. persistent hostile policy toward the DPRK and its military build-up in the region. Recently the U.S. has worked hard to disturb all conditions and environment for the DPRK’s peaceful economic construction and its efforts to improve the people’s living standard, a vivid expression of the former’s hostile policy toward the latter. Japan is zealously toeing Washington’s policy toward the DPRK to give spurs to its militarization and realize its ambition for overseas invasion. In May last, the Japanese minister of Defense blustered on various occasions ‘Okinawa, Guam and Hawaii play important roles in ensuring security in East Asia,’ it is ‘very important to increase the U.S. military presence’ in the region and the like. This is a clear indication of Japan’s ulterior design. Moreover, he said at the Asian security meeting that ‘north Korea's nuclear and missile development poses threat to the peace and security of the world community,’ openly revealing Japan’s aim to bolster up its defense capabilities and exercise the right to collective self-defense. Early in July, in particular, it once again pushed for the SDF’s ‘access to capability for preemptive strike,’ claiming that it should examine ‘capability for preemptive strike at enemy bases’ to cope with ‘future crisis’ though the U.S. army has been in charge of it. As a matter of fact, Japan has shown exceptional zeal in offering a base and technology as regards the expansion of the U.S. missile shield in East Asia. Taking this opportunity, Tokyo is frantically accelerating the nuclear weaponization and space militarization. All these facts indicate that Japan’s moves to strain the situation on and around the Korean Peninsula are directly linked with its scenario to meet its selfish interests by fanning up the anti-DPRK atmosphere in the region. Japan is loudmouthed about ‘nuclear and missile threat from north Korea’ to calm down the vigilance of Asian countries against it and its claim for access to ‘capability for preemptive strike’ under that pretext. But no country will agree with its assertion. This is because Japan’s assertion is too unreasonable and illogical to justify its sinister aim. As universally known, Japan offered its territory to the U.S. as an
overseas logistic base for carrying out its Asia strategy after the Second World War. It along with south Korea has become a key source of the escalating tension in the region. **It is the only way of defusing the tension on the peninsula and in the region to force the U.S. to roll back its hostile policy toward the DPRK and pull its troops out of Japan and south Korea.** Japan would be well advised to behave with reason, aware that to do so would be beneficial to its security.” (KCNA, “KCNA Commentary Urges Japan to Make Reasonable Judgment on Regional Situation,” August 6, 2013)

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea spokesman’s special statement: “Four months have passed since the operation in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) was temporarily suspended. The six rounds of the working-level talks between authorities of the north and the south of Korea for normalizing operation in the KIZ proved fruitless and reached serious deadlock, making it hard to expect any prospect. The KIZ brought hope and faith in reunification to the fellow countrymen over the past one decade despite any storm and stress. In case it collapses, it will seriously hurt the feelings of the fellow countrymen in the north and the south and have unspeakable impact on the inter-Korean relations. The Koreans will soon greet the 68th anniversary of the August 15 liberation of the country. The longer the tragedy caused by the national division imposed by foreign forces upon the Koreans lasts, the more unbearable their pain will become and the stronger their hope for reunification grows. At this time how can they allow the KIZ to collapse for good because it pleased the fellow countrymen so much as an icon of national reconciliation, cooperation and reunification? At this moment both sides of the north and the south should save the assets common to the nation from the crisis and keep the zone afloat, not leading it to a total collapse. This is a patriotic and bold decision and just choice. The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) solemnly declares as follows upon the authorization, prompted by its desire to bring about a new phase of reconciliation, cooperation, peace, reunification and prosperity by normalizing operation in the KIZ and improving inter-Korean relations, and by its intention to alleviate the sufferings of south Korean businesses and minimize their damage and meet the expectation and aspiration of public opinion at home and abroad for detente, proceeding from the responsibility and mission it assumed before the nation now when the fate of the KIZ is in a critical situation: 1. **The north side will lift the step for temporarily suspending operation in the KIZ it declared on April 8 last and totally allow the entry of south Korean businesses into the KIZ.** 2. It will ensure the normal attendance of its workers at the south Korean enterprises which are ready to operate after equipment is checked. 3. **It will guarantee the safety of personnel of the south side in the KIZ and fully protect the properties of businesses.** 4. **The north and the south will prevent the recurrence of the suspension of operation in the KIZ and ensure normal operation in the KIZ without being affected by any situation in any case.** 5. If the south side responds to the expression of this bold and magnanimous stand, the north side will hold without any precondition the seventh round of the working-level talks for normalizing operation in the KIZ, which has been repeatedly requested by the south side’s authorities, in the zone on August 14. It also proposes the talks yield good fruits and bring good news to all the Koreans with August 15 as a momentum. We express expectation that the south Korean authorities
will positively respond to this constructive proposal. (KCNA, “CPRK Spokesman on Normalization of Operation in KIZ,” August 7, 2013)

The government said that it has authorized 280.9 billion won (US$251.2 million) in insurance payments to South Korean companies that either have factories at the inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong or provided services to such firms four months after all operations there were halted. The decision to pay the insurance money to the 109 companies comes four months after all operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex came to a screeching halt in early April amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Six rounds of talks in July failed to make headway over how to set safeguards to prevent another work stoppage. Seoul’s Ministry of Unification said the 18-person South and North Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council, which had been checking claims made by the companies, authorized the payment from the inter-Korean insurance policy. The claims have also been checked by the state-run Export-Import Bank of Korea (Eximbank). “Payments will start from Thursday through Eximbank,” said ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk. “There are 140 companies eligible to receive insurance payments with 114 having asked for coverage as of Monday.” The official said requests for insurance payments made by five other companies are being checked at present, while 26 companies have not asked for coverage. He said these companies can request payment at a later date. The spokesman said that companies are being paid in accordance with clauses in the special insurance policy set up in 2004 that authorizes payments if operations are halted due to a breach of contract governing the complex, located just north of the demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas. (Yonhap, “Kaesong Companies to Receive 280.9 Bn Won in Insurance Payment,” August 7, 2013)

Recent satellite imagery of the Yongbyon nuclear complex in North Korea indicates that it has apparently expanded a building in the fuel fabrication complex that houses a gas centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment. The area is now covered by an extended roof that is roughly twice the size of the previous one. The extent of North Korea’s centrifuge enrichment infrastructure is not fully known, and it is possible that some LEU produced in this facility could have been further enriched at a secret centrifuge site to produce weapon-grade uranium. Or weapon-grade uranium could have been made at the Yongbyon plant. A significant question remains whether North Korea has made weapon-grade uranium, and if so, how much it has made. Based on the analysis of ISIS archival satellite imagery and imagery available on Google Earth, construction of the centrifuge building extension appears to have begun sometime in March 2013 preceding shortly the announcement by the North Korean government that it planned on “readjusting and restarting all the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon including uranium enrichment plant and 5MW graphite moderated reactor”. This announcement may have been partially intended as an oblique effort to reveal this new construction; one missed publicly at the time. The new addition to the centrifuge plant matches the overall length and width of approximately 120 x 15 square meters of the original building, effectively doubling its size. Google Earth imagery from June 10, 2013 reveals the internal floor plan of the new addition which is divided into three sections with two smaller rooms of 18x15 m² and 9x15m² and a larger hall of 93x15m². The larger hall appears to be a cascade hall, where the centrifuges would be located.
A doubling of available floor space at this building could allow a doubling of the number of centrifuges installed there. North Korea stated in 2010 that the plant contained about 2,000 centrifuges with an enrichment output of 8,000 separative work units (swu) per year. Thus, North Korea could in theory install 2,000 more centrifuges for a total of 4,000 centrifuges with a total declared capacity of 16,000 swu per year in this expanded building. ISIS has previously assessed that North Korea could have procured enough raw materials and equipment, many acquired from abroad, to build and install that number of centrifuges. Estimating North Korea’s level of uranium enrichment, in particular estimating the amount of weapon-grade uranium it has produced, is fraught with uncertainty. A key uncertainty is whether the Yongbyon centrifuge plant is North Korea’s only such plant. Another problem is the lack of information about the operational performance of the Yongbyon centrifuge plant, and particularly the centrifuge performance there which, could vary greatly. Reflecting this uncertainty, ISIS assessed that through 2012, North Korea could have produced enough weapon-grade uranium for anywhere from 0-13 nuclear weapons. ISIS has estimated that the annual production of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) at the Yongbyon plant could have varied greatly from 4 to 17 kilograms of WGU per year per 1,000 P2-type centrifuges, with a mid-point of 11 kilograms of WGU per year per 1,000 P2 centrifuges. A doubling of capacity from 2000 to 4000 centrifuges would mean that annual WGU production could increase from 8 to 34 kilograms to 16 to 68 kilograms. However, much of the enrichment output of this plant is needed to make LEU for the experimental light water reactor, thus a more realistic estimate is that doubling the capacity would allow for an increase in the production of enough weapon-grade uranium for up to two nuclear weapons per year, estimating that each weapon would require approximately 20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium. As mentioned previously however, it is not known if North Korea intends to produce weapon-grade uranium in this facility. There are also signs of construction or landscaping in an area adjacent to the centrifuge plant. A previously empty lot was cleared and converted into what appears to be a pool. However, it is not clear if this activity is functionally related to the expansion of the centrifuge plant building. Over the past year there has also been ongoing construction at several buildings within the southeastern corner of the fuel fabrication facility perimeter; two new buildings have been constructed, and a third building is in the process of being slowly roofed. These new buildings are suspected to be related to fuel production for the experimental light water reactor. (David Albright and Robert Agavyan, “Recent Doubling of Floor Space at North Korean Gas Centrifuge Plant: Is North Korea Doubling Its Enrichment Capacity at Yongbyon? ISIS Reports, August 7, 2013)
institute said in a study posted on its Web site. That means the expansion would have begun shortly before North Korea announced in April that it planned to restart a mothballed nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and that it intended to use the uranium enrichment facilities there to make weapons. The announcement came when tensions with South Korea and the United States were escalating in the aftermath of the North’s third nuclear test. Previously, North Korea had insisted the Yongbyon plant was for only civilian energy purposes. “This announcement may have been partially intended as an oblique effort to reveal this new construction, one missed publicly at the time,” wrote the authors of the satellite study, David Albright and Robert Avagyan. Efforts to reach North Korean officials for comment were not immediately successful. The telephone went unanswered at the country’s United Nations mission, its main point of contact in the United States. Other proliferation experts who viewed the satellite imagery concurred that North Korea seemed to have doubled the size of its enrichment centrifuge hall. “There is not a lot of reason to expand the building otherwise, unless they wanted a really spacious visitors’ lounge,” said Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Based on North Korea’s own assertion that the original uranium enrichment building housed 2,000 centrifuges, the study said, the expanded building could hold 4,000. By that calculation, it said, North Korea could produce 16 to 68 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium per year, although at least some centrifuges might be used to produce low-enriched uranium needed for the country’s experimental light water reactor. “A more realistic estimate,” the study concluded, is that the doubling of capacity would enable North Korea to produce enough weapons-grade uranium per year for two nuclear weapons. Although the new Yongbyon construction was not a complete surprise, Lewis said it suggested that North Korea had developed ways of producing specialty metals and other components needed for centrifuge construction. United Nations sanctions on North Korea have crimped its ability to procure such material abroad. “My concern is that they’re expanding the site without us seeing the procurements,” Lewis said. “They’re expanding this facility in the face of these sanctions. It looks like they were able to do this without buying more stuff.” The satellite study’s implications risked inflaming tensions with North Korea’s adversaries just as the country says it is trying to calm them down. The study was issued on the same day that North Korea said it would reopen the Kaesong industrial complex, a rare symbol of cooperation with South Korea that the North shut down four months ago. (Rick Gladstone and Gerry Mullany, “Study Suggests North Korea Is Doubling Area Devoted to Uranium Enrichment,” New York Times, August 8, 2013, p. A-7)

South Korea accepted the venue and the date hours after the statement was released. “We judge that North Korea showed a positive response to our proposal for government-level talks to resolve the matter of the Kaesong complex,” said Kim Hyung-suk, spokesman of the Ministry of Unification, said. “We expect the upcoming talks to come up with a rational solution to problems of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and its ‘constructive normalization.’?” In the statement, North Korea reiterated earlier demands such as lifting the entry ban on South Korean workers and cargo into the complex. However, North Korea removed a controversial demand from previous rounds, which read, “South Korea should pledge not to commit political
misbehavior and insults and not to carry out military threats.” “North Korea showed a changed attitude to prevent further disruptions by taking out the clause in regard to ‘political misbehavior’ and ‘military threats,’?” a Unification Ministry official told reporters at a meeting yesterday. The “political misbehavior and insults” apparently referred to South Korean media reports in March that said the North would never be able to shut down the complex because it needed the hard currency it spun off. The “military threats” appear to refer to annual Korea-U.S. joint military drills. In early April, when North Korea abruptly pulled its 53,000 workers from the complex, it said it was upset by two Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, dubbed Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, conducted in March and April. However, one demand remains a source of conflict. It reads, “Both the North and the South will prevent further disruption and guarantee the normal operation of the complex without being affected by any political circumstances.” Southern negotiators said it was North Korea who should promise stable operations regardless of political tensions, not the South. At the six previous rounds of talks, the Koreas have sparred over which side should take responsibility for the four-month suspension of business at the complex. Seoul insists the North is solely responsible, while the North says both sides are. The North Korean proposal for talks came about an hour after the Southern government announced a decision to pay compensation to the business owners in Kaesong for their losses, which raised speculation that Seoul would walk away from the industrial park for good. If the business owners receive compensation, they should surrender ownership of their assets in the complex to the government. Technically, the government would be able to sell off those assets and permanently shutdown the complex. According to the Unification Ministry, the government would provide a total of 280.9 billion won ($251 million) of state money to the 109 South Korean companies under Inter-Korean Business and Cooperation Insurance, which the owners have paid to the government since they started their business in the complex in case of any unexpected disruptions. The owners can request up to 90 percent of their investments with a 7 billion won maximum reimbursement per company. “Due to North Korea’s unilateral violation of the inter-Korean agreement, such as the announcement of a temporary suspension of operations on April 8, there has been a reason for the government to provide the insurance [to the companies] starting May 8,” Unification Ministry Spokesperson Kim said at a briefing yesterday. “Under current law, if an inter-Korean business is suspended for more than one month by a unilateral violation of the inter-Korean agreement by the North Korean regime, the government should pay back the Inter-Korean Business and Cooperation Insurance. “Starting tomorrow, the Export-Import Bank of Korea will offer the insurance to the firms that requested it,” Kim said yesterday. But if operations at the Kaesong park were normalized, the owners could request their assets back if they return the insurance money to the government. “Based on the amount of their investments, the owners have paid different amounts of insurance so far, with annual interest from 0.375 percent to 0.75 percent of the investment,” an official at the Inter-Korean Business Department at the Export-Import Bank of Korea told JoongAng Daily by phone. “It’s compensation for the losses of investments, not losses of sales [due to the suspension],” spokesman Kim said at the briefing. “When it comes to losses of revenues, we have already offered a special loan program.” In May, the government announced 80 billion won in low-interest loans for the Kaesong business owners with 2 percent of annual interest. The insurance will be
paid by the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund and the state-run Small and Medium Business Administration, according to the ministry. Spokesman Kim said the payment of the insurance was not part of the threatened “grave decision.” Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae was criticized for taking summer vacation starting Monday but spokesman Kim said, “Ryoo has fully communicated with officials and is in the country. He is coming to Seoul now.” (Kim Hee-jin, “Kaesong Talks Scheduled for August 14,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 8, 2013), the last remaining point of dispute is the question of who is responsible for the suspension of operations at the complex. The South claims that the North is responsible, since it blocked South Korean workers from entering the complex and withdrew all of its workers. The North counters that both sides are to blame, because of the South’s political words and deeds and its military threats. A positive mood can be detected inside the South Korean Ministry of Unification, which is the government ministry that is in charge of the complex. “Since the party responsible for the incident is the party that guarantees such an incident will not happen again, there is no need to draw fine distinctions between taking responsibility and preventing a reoccurrence. The two issues go hand in hand,” a senior official at the Ministry of Unification told reporters on August 8. This suggests that, insofar as North Korea has already adopted a forward-looking attitude on the question of preventing a reoccurrence, Seoul might not put too much pressure on the North when it comes to accepting responsibility for the shutdown. Indeed, when Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae gave North Korea the final offer for talks on July 28, he said, “we hope that North Korea even now will give a definite answer to preventing a reoccurrence of this problem.” For this reason, even the government would find it difficult to bring up the question of responsibility again. At the Ministry of Unification, there are also rumblings about aiming to get a “final signature” during the seventh round of talks. The problem, however, are the hawks in the government and the Blue House. If some of the hardliners with military backgrounds in the government's diplomatic and security departments insist that negotiators must get the North to clearly acknowledge that it was responsible, the outlook of the talks becomes less clear. If, for example, they demand that the subject of the sentence “North and South will ensure that operations at the complex are not suspended again” (found in the CPRF statement from August 7) be changed to “North,” it does not appear likely that the two sides will be able to come to an agreement in the seventh round of talks, either. On the other hand, if the South Korean government is content with the concessions the North has offered and does not bring up the question of responsibility, it is possible that the negotiations could make major progress. In the end, the question of who takes responsibility is the key to next week's talks. “Talk about North and South working together to resolve problems appeared frequently in inter-Korean agreements even before the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun,” said Jeong Se-hyun, former unification minister and the current president of Wonkwang University. “North Korea has yielded so much in regard to preventing another shutdown. If our negotiators tell them to clarify the subject of the sentence as well, we may end up back at square one.” “If the South Korean government makes it harder to reach a compromise by bringing up the question of responsibility again at the seventh round of talks, we will be forced to conclude that the Park Geun-hye government does not really intend to normalize Kaesong,” said Paik Hak-soon, a veteran researcher at the Sejong Institute. In addition to the key disputed points about who is responsible and how to prevent another
shutdown, it is possible that issues including compensation for damages, the signatories on the agreement, and the timing of reopening the complex could be discussed at the next working-level meeting about Kaesong that will take place on August 14. In previous working-level talks, the South Korean government requested that Pyongyang reduce the taxes and fees charged to companies at Kaesong to compensate them for the losses that resulted from the shutdown of the complex. The North has also indicated its willingness to discuss the proposal. However, since Pyongyang’s position is that both sides are responsible for the suspension of operations at the complex, it is difficult to be sure that the North will accede to the request for compensation. It is also unclear whether North Korea is financially able to cover these losses. On Aug. 4, the Ministry of Unification said that losses suffered during the past four months by South Korean companies operating at Kaesong was 450 billion won (US$404.55 million) in invested assets and 300 billion won in operating losses. Put together, this is seven times the amount of wages earned during an entire year by the nearly 53,000 North Korean workers at the Kaesong Complex, which is around 100 billion won (US$90 million). If the North were required to compensate all of the losses, the cost might outweigh any benefits it would receive from reopening the complex. However, it does not seem impossible that North Korea might offer to reduce fees or cut taxes in the interest of providing symbolic compensation for losses. Even if Seoul and Pyongyang agree to reopen the complex, there is expected to be debate over who will sign the agreement. North Korea reportedly proposed that the heads of the working-level delegations (Kim Ki-woong from the South and Park Chol-su from the North) be authorized to sign the agreement. In contrast, the South Korean government is said to prefer that the document be signed by Unification Minister Ryoo and Kim Yang-gon, Director of North Korea’s United Front Department, for reasons of authority and responsibility. This could lead to a reenactment of the controversy over rank that scuttled the inter-Korean ministerial talks in June. There may also be disagreement about the speed and the timing of reopening the complex. The North is in a hurry to get the complex running again, while the South Korean government wants to wait until the facilities and equipment have been adequately inspected before resuming operations at the factories, even if measures have been taken to prevent another shutdown. The South Korean government might also ask for the establishment of a system to internationalize the Kaesong Complex, something President Park pledged to accomplish during her election campaign. (Gil Yun-hyung and Park Byongsu, “Responsibility and Compensation Will Be Big Issues in Next Week’s Kaesong Talks,” Hankyore, August 9, 2013)

A senior North Korean foreign ministry official had a rare meeting with Joel Wit, a former State Department official, in Geneva early this week, a diplomatic source here said. An Myong-hun, deputy director-general of North Korea’s foreign ministry, led the nation’s delegation to a “Track II” meeting with a group of American academics headed by Wit, according to the source. In Seoul, South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Cho Tai-young confirmed to reporters that Wit met with North Korean officials in Geneva. He did not specify the timing. (Yonhap, “Senior N. Korean Diplomat Met U.S. Academics in Geneva: Source,” August 9, 2013)
The Ministry of Unification sent a belated message of protest to North Korea on August 9 over language used in a telephone message the previous day. It could be that hard-liners in the Park Geun-hye administrations went after moderates concerning Pyongyang’s August 8 message and the ministry’s response. At around 1 pm on August 9, the ministry distributed a press release including content omitted from an announcement about the message the day before, as well as information about the government’s response measures. The message reportedly said that “language in the telephone message sent by North Korea yesterday was inappropriate and outside the bounds of a stance of mutual respect. We hope that discussions at the seventh round of talks [on Aug. 14] will take place in an atmosphere of mutual respect.” The ministry added that the message had been delivered to North Korea. The news came as a surprise, as no reference was made to it at a regular briefing that took place just two and a half hours before. The North Korean message, which arrived at around 5:40 pm on August 8, asked South Korea to “refrain from any language that might throw cold water on our [North Korea’s] generosity and magnanimous proposal.” But the version released to reporters by the ministry omitted this section, including only the portion expressing “hope that North and South can work together to produce positive results at this seventh round of talks.” Experts said this could be taken as expressing the ministry’s own hopes for a positive outcome. It took only a day for the ministry’s moderate approach to be overturned. Now some are questioning whether the August 8 actions of the ministry, representing the moderates in North Korea policy, might have been attacked by the administration’s foreign policy and national security line, which is staffed by hard-liners. The administration’s response was out of proportion. North Korea’s message of protest was read as mainly expressing disappointment that its concessions in making assurances that the Kaesong Industrial Complex would not be shut down again were reported in some South Korean news outlets as a “capitulation to the Park Geun-hye administration,” with the complex described as “North Korea’s cash cow.” The ministry’s response was to call this “outside the bounds of a stance of mutual respect.” This could send the message to North Korea that it cannot protest or criticize anything South Korean news outlets say about it in their reports, no matter how negative. Indeed, Pyongyang could well counter that this approach too falls “outside the bounds of a stance of mutual respect.” With the government’s militant response, prospects for the talks on Aug. 14 are looking somewhat less promising. The possibility remains that Seoul may not content itself with North Korea’s concession in pledging no future shutdowns, but once again press the issue of North Korea taking responsibility for the first shutdown. “It’s hard to be optimistic about the outcome of the talks when hard-liners who think of the Kaesong Industrial Complex as North Korea’s ‘dollar box’ have so much pull in the administration,” said Lee Su-hoon, director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University. (Gil Yun-hyung, “Seoul Sends Message of Protest to Pyongyang over Telephone Exchange,” August 10, 2013)

Tracking flights in and out of North Korea has become increasingly important to those keen on halting Pyongyang’s export of sanctioned military equipment and their related technologies. That’s because the sanctions that have made searches of North Korean boats more common have led to air cargo emerging as the transport system of choice for shipping valuable North Korean military equipment. But despite technological
developments that have made flight tracking possible even from a laptop computer, things are not quite what they seem. “It is disturbingly easy to fly aircraft around without anybody really logging their movements,” one expert familiar with North Korea’s attempts to evade international sanctions told NK News. “Put simply, international monitoring of flights, and particularly of chartered flights, and particularly outside the most frequented air routes, is well below the levels of accuracy that many people assume.” Why then – with 21st century radar capabilities and close scrutiny of DPRK exports – is tracking aircraft in and out of North Korea so difficult? Airspace therefore offers a number of advantages to North Korean actors seeking to ship proscribed arms, especially if planes have the ability of reaching their clients directly or in worst cases, friendly airspace that can facilitate hassle-free refueling services. In terms of air cargo, two options exist for North Korean arms exporters: shipping via scheduled passenger and cargo flights, or through chartering cargo planes especially for the deliveries. In terms of the first option, scheduled services that fly through international hubs like Beijing are subject to high levels of security, making them of limited use in transporting large or high-value military equipment. Also, because Pyongyang is only connected to a handful of international destinations – with just two airlines – the risks associated in being caught following intelligence tip-offs are much higher. In contrast, charter services – though costlier – are subject to less scrutiny, making them particularly useful for high-value arms shipments to far away countries. Indeed, North Korean state airline Air Koryo owns planes that can fly as far as Kuwait without refueling, making them capable of straight-shot routes to customers thousands of miles away. But even these charter flights are not without risks. In December 2009, an East Wing Ilyushin-76 cargo plane operated by Kazakh Aleksandr Viktorovich Zykov was intercepted in Thailand, found to be carrying 35 tons of North Korean weapons intended for a client in Iran. The case highlighted the importance of being able to effectively monitor charter flights in and out of North Korea. “Careful scrutiny should be applied to all non-scheduled flights to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in particular if undertaken by military-type transport aircraft (IL-76 and similar),” the UN’s Panel of Experts said in a report published in June. But while the UN says that since 2005 Air Koryo cargo planes were spotted about 75 times at foreign airports outside of the North Korean airlines’ scheduled flight activity, this number could just be scratching the surface. That’s because the level of scrutiny required to effectively monitor flights in and out of North Korea seemingly doesn’t exist. International flights leaving and departing North Korea must fly through foreign air space and to do so generally first requires permission. This means that North Korean flight crews must file flight plans before departure and receive permission from the nations they intend to fly over for the purpose of their trip. “The bottom line is that all flights in controlled airspace will be tracked via the radar system and the aircraft’s transponder. This data is stored for billing purposes by national authorities and general record keeping,” aviation expert Mel O’Carroll told NK News. “But getting it out of the relevant airspace authorities can be difficult.” The UN, it seems, would agree. In their June report on North Korea the UN Panel of Experts complain that obtaining data on charter flights was extremely challenging, “owing to a lack of cooperation on the part of most civil aviation authorities”. “Of the 58 civilian aviation authorities contacted by the Institute and/or the Panel, only two confirmed flights that had passed through their monitored airspace,” the UN report explained. With South Korea, China
and Japan nearby, it’s easy to think that the UN would have no problem accessing in-depth data on the charter flights going in and out of North Korea. But either it’s not being shared, relevant authorities don’t have the data, or administrative challenges are getting in the way. “It’s possible that many UN member states overlook air freight in their efforts to effectively implement UN sanctions,” explained Lawrence Dermody, an expert at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “Risk assessment of aircraft movement to support implementation of UN arms embargoes and targeted sanctions requires not only political will but also capacity and resources which many states currently lack…Open investigations suggest that a focus on air transport in monitoring UN sanctions on the DPRK is not without warrant.” Another expert familiar with the matter, who asked to stay anonymous, said, “It does not seem that all countries are prepared to go to the trouble to keep, or at least to share, effective records of DPRK (and probably other) flight movements.” It is no surprise then that of the scores of Air Koryo charter flights confirmed as visiting non-scheduled destinations in the UN report, many were noticeable only thanks to photos sporadically uploaded by plane spotters worldwide. While the UN does not name the countries that failed to provide the Panel of Experts with North Korean flight data, the borderline position of China and South Korea make them obvious contenders for countries capable of helping. But conversations with those familiar with regional tracking capabilities say that China is reluctant to provide flight tracking data. Besides its long history in providing minimal cooperation when it comes to implementing North Korea sanctions, China is a country in which the secretive military controls almost all airspace. Calls made to South Korean authorities reflected some of the administrative problems associated with tracking DPRK flight movements. Asked if aviation authorities in Seoul were capable of tracking flights in and out of North Korea, a spokesperson at South Korea’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Aviation Policy Bureau told NK News that they only monitored flights within the Incheon Flight Information Region (FIR). “We are only allowed to manage the flights within our FIR and those outside of the boundary we have no information about. So we cannot verify how many DPRK flights are in the air,” a spokesperson explained. “Monitoring North Korea is the Air Force’s responsibility. We only cover civil aircraft so we don’t know how many flights take off and land from Pyongyang. We can only check what’s in our radar.” Subsequent calls to South Korea’s Ministry of Defense suggested that while they might have the capability, there could be reluctance in sharing data with third parties when it comes to tracking North Korean flights: “We, the Ministry of Defense, cannot confirm on the issue of flights going in and out of the DPRK. But we try our best to watch out for everything that goes in to North Korea,” a spokesperson told NK News. Asked if it was due to security that they could not publicize their capabilities, the spokesperson explained: “The above is the Ministry of Defense’s position.” Even if government assistance is not forthcoming, there are other ways of tracking flights using systems in the public domain. In particular, websites like Flight Radar 24 and Flight Aware have made laptop flight tracking a reality in recent years, but are they of any use when it comes to North Korea? The answer, it seems, is a resounding no. Publicly accessible flight tracking websites like Flight Radar 24 use a combination of technologies to track and visualize air traffic. The primary technology used to receive flight information is called automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B). A secondary source of data is the U.S. Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), which provides radar based data to
tracking websites – albeit with the caveat that it relates only to American airspace and comes five minutes late. The ADS-B system collects data from a worldwide network of receivers and Flight Radar 24 has about 500 of these receivers worldwide, with the majority located in European and East Asian airspace. Aircraft flying near the ADS-B receivers transmit various data, including GPS positions, allowing the network to detect aircraft call-sign, destination, position and more. Through this system, the ADS-B network builds a portrait of aircraft movements around the world. Although roughly 60% of all passenger aircraft are equipped with ADS-B transponders, the bottom line is that there is no obligation for aircraft to carry the transponder, meaning that there will always be significant limitations in using commercial services to track flight movements. The difficulties associated with using this system to track flights are however increased when it comes to North Korea. Firstly, planes going in and out of North Korea don’t seem to have ADS-B transponders (or they deliberately keep them turned off), meaning that their flight paths leave no trace when it comes to commercial tracking systems. Secondly, Flight Radar 24 spokesperson Frederik Lindahl told NK News that even if they did use the transponders, the patchy coverage of ADS-B receivers would still mean many of these flights would be missed: “We are dependent on somebody hosting our ADS-B receiver equipment. Due to how closed North Korea is to the outside world we haven’t even tried to get equipment to that country.” Lastly, it is evident that the ADS-B network is virtually non-existent in many of the parts of the world – including many of the destinations that DPRK arms shipments have been known to routinely go. (Chad O’Carroll, “Why Is Tracking North Korean Aircraft So Difficult?” NKNews, August 9, 2013)

8/12/13

Rodong Sinmun: “The DPRK remains invariable in its stance to improve the relations with south Korea through dialogue and cooperation, not confrontation, and pave the path for peace and national prosperity. … It is required by the times to turn the inter-Korean ties of distrust and confrontation into those of trust and reconciliation. The confrontation between the north and the south of Korea is a product of the policy of aggression pursued by foreign forces. The history of the Korean nation’s division tells a bitter lesson that such escalated inter-Korean confrontation brings the nation nothing but continued partition and horrible war disaster. The DPRK has called for ending the tragedy of national division and achieving the north-south reconciliation and cooperation and has made every possible effort to do so. The improved inter-Korean relations are a prerequisite to ensuring peace on the Korean Peninsula and achieving uniform development and common prosperity of the nation. What is urgent for improving these relations is to conduct brisk multi-faceted dialogue, contact, exchange and cooperation between the north and the south of Korea. There should be visits, contacts, dialogues and cooperation among Koreans of all social standings in the north and the south and overseas along with authorities-level dialogue. Only when the people from all walks of life, the driving force for national reunification movement, take an active part in the work to achieve the unity and reunification of the nation and pool their efforts, wisdom and energy, can the inter-Korean ties turn more dynamic and properly develop in line with the will and desire of all Koreans. It is the only way of saving the inter-Korean ties from a collapse to respect and implement the June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration, a programme for implementing it. Both declarations serve as reunification programs
common to the nation which all Koreans should thoroughly uphold and implement. These declarations comprehensively deal with principles and ways to solve the issues concerning national reunification independently by concerted efforts of the Koreans. The Workers’ Party of Korea and the government of the DPRK will as ever make sustained patient efforts to warm the relations with south Korea and achieve the historic cause of national reunification by concerted efforts of the Korean nation.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun Calls for Improving Relations with S. Korea through Dialogue, Cooperation,” August 12, 2013)

8/14/13 The two Koreas agreed to take steps to reopen the Kaesong factory park after 133 days of suspension, as the sides compromised on the key issue of how to prevent another closure in the future. Under a five-point accord signed at the close of the seventh round of talks in Kaesong, they will meet again “in the near future” to form a new joint committee to discuss compensation for businesses and ways to improve passage, communications and customs and how to protect South Koreans’ assets in the border city. “The South and North will prevent the Kaesong complex from being halted again due to a passage restriction or employee withdrawal, and ensure its normal operation including South Koreans’ stable passage, North Korean workers’ normal attendance and corporate assets’ protection without being affected by any political situation,” the agreement reads. Seoul apparently made concessions by agreeing to the “joint” safeguards. It previously insisted on Pyongyang’s unilateral assurances that it would not shut off the district again. Pyongyang, for its part, accepted other South Korean demands such as “institutional measures” to preclude any relapse, protect business investment, upgrade infrastructure, invite foreign firms and resolve any dispute. “As for the (guarantor) part, it’s not appropriate to use expressions like yield or retreat -- look at the substance,” the South’s chief negotiator Kim Ki-woong told reporters after the meeting. “We all know who blocked passage and pulled out workers. What’s to be guaranteed shows who will do it. In conclusion, I think our government has accomplished its original intention.” The two sides will put back on track the industrial zone after formulating the institutional measures through the envisioned panel, Kim said, without giving a time frame. “For now the joint committee is critical,” said Kim, director-general of inter-Korean cooperation district support at the Unification Ministry. “It will basically handle all issues related to the complex through consultation and agreement between the two Koreas’ governments. In other words, we have agreed to devise a system in which the two governments will run the complex together, thus structurally blocking North Korea from imposing unilateral measures.” Another ministry official said that the hard-won deal contained “three-layer” assurances for the uninterrupted operation of the industrial zone. “Once the panel sets sail, things like what we saw in April can never happen again,” he said on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter. President Park Geun-hye welcomed the agreement. “I hope today’s talks will create momentum for the inter-Korean relations to get a new start,” she was quoted as saying by her public relations secretary Lee Jung-hyun. “I expect South and North to make joint efforts toward the globalization of the Kaesong complex.” North Korea’s chief delegate Park Chol-su expressed his satisfaction with the result. “We can now deliver very good news to the Korean people,” he told South Korean reporters. “We have to move forward through follow-up consultations to contribute to the development and normalization of
the industrial district,” he said. Touching down in Kaesong, Kim quietly said “Good to see you” to his counterpart Park Chol-su, who responded with a smile. During the past encounters they mostly exchanged no greetings or smiles but flat, ceremonial handshakes. “The fact that today we sit face to face for the seventh time underscores that the problem that we representatives have to deal with is not simple at all,” said Kim, director-general of inter-Korean cooperation district support at the Unification Ministry, as the morning session kicked off. “As the old saying goes, where there is a will, there is a way. If we make efforts in unison for the future-oriented normalization of the Kaesong complex, we will be able to overcome any problem, any difficulty.” The North’s Park responded with a rosy outlook for the talks, pointing to good weather and preparations so far. “If the South is actively engaged in discussions through today’s meeting, a good outcome could be brought about ahead of tomorrow (Liberation Day),” said Park, vice director of the General Bureau of the Special Zone Development Guidance. Early in the morning, about 10 company executives visited the Headquarters for Inter-Korean Dialogue in central Seoul, from where Kim’s delegation departed for Kaesong. They were holding small banners calling for “guarantees for stable management activity at the complex” and “allowing trips to the North for facility maintenance and repair.” Some 30 South Korean managers and employees who were forced out of work turned up in the border city of Paju, waving to the delegation aboard a bus with a placard reading, “We want to work: the normalization of the Kaesong industrial complex.” Now the attention is being shifted toward whether the breakthrough will help resuscitate other stalled inter-Korean projects such as reunions of separated families and tours to Mount Kumgang. Pyongyang proposed separate talks with Seoul on resuming the two programs after their second round of Kaesong talks on July 10. But they eventually decided to postpone the plan after the South only welcomed family meetings, saying it would opt to focus on the ongoing negotiations for the time being. In a speech earlier in the day, Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae expressed regret over the now-incalculable losses for companies engaged in the Mount Kumgang tour business. “I feel sorry and desperate for the firms suffering damage. The government is trying to help alleviate their losses but there is a limit. I can’t say here that there are some other ideas but we will try harder,” he said at an event hosted by the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, an association of some 200 political, civic and religious groups. “Like the Kaesong-based firms, those tied to Kumgang would hope for the resumption of the tour and lifting of the so-called May 24 sanctions. But that’s related to inter-Korean relations, so please keep an eye on government policy.” Ryoo also said he was “confident” that the Gaeseong crisis would “provide a chance for the two Koreas to build trust.” Key points of inter-Korean agreement. The two Koreas agreed to -Prevent the Gaeseong complex from being halted again and ensure its normal operation without regard to any political situation -Ensure South Koreans’ safety, protect invested assets and resolve passage, communications and customs issues -Ensure international-standard conditions for business and develop the park into a globally competitive industrial complex -Establish and run a joint committee to implement the agreement -Design institutional frameworks for safe passage and stay, and investment protection, and make efforts for businesses to repair facilities and resume operations. (Shin Hyon-hee and Joint Press Corps, “Two Koreas Agree on Kaesong Normalization,” Korea Herald, August 14, 2013)
KCNA: “The 7th round of the working-level talks between authorities of the north and the south of Korea for the normalization of operation in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) took place in the zone [today]. At the talks ‘Agreement on Normalizing Operation in the KIZ’ was adopted. The agreement reads in full:

**Agreement on Normalizing Operation in the KIZ**

The north and the south had seven rounds of the working-level talks between their authorities to solve the issue of the KIZ from July 6, 2013 to August 14 and agreed upon the following points for the purpose of developmental normalization of operation in the zone:

The north and the south will make sure that the suspension of operation in the KIZ will not reoccur due to limit to passage, workers' withdrawal, etc. but ensure normal operation of the zone such as stable passage of personnel of the south side, the north side's workers' normal attendance and protection of properties of enterprises, unaffected by any situation under any circumstances.

The north and the south will discuss compensation for damage done to the enterprises by the recent suspension of operation and the related issue at the "North-South Joint Committee for the KIZ" to be composed in the future.

The north and the south will ensure the personal safety of personnel of the south side visiting the KIZ, protect the assets invested by businessmen and solve the issues of passage, communications and customs.

They will ensure the safe entry and stay of personnel of the south side in the KIZ.

They will protect the assets invested by businessmen in the KIZ and build an institutional mechanism for settling dispute such as joint investigation in case of violation of law, compensation for losses, etc.

They decided to take measures for ensuring normal passage, providing internet and mobile communications, simplifying the procedure of customs clearance and reducing its time as an immediate task for settling the issues of passage, communications and customs clearance and discuss the related working matters at the "North-South Joint Committee for the KIZ".

The north and south will provide world-level conditions for business to the enterprises in the KIZ and develop it into an industrial zone with international competitiveness.

They will actively encourage foreign businesses' induction in the zone. They will develop various business systems including labor, taxation, wage and insurance applied in the zone to the world-level. They will explore ways to develop the KIZ into the one with international competitiveness such as recognition of preferential tariff in case of export of its products to a third country, etc.

They will push ahead with a joint briefing on foreign investment.

The north and the south will organize and operate the "North-South Joint Committee for the KIZ" to implement the above-said provisions and have necessary sub-committees under it. To this end, they will conclude an "agreement on organizing and operating north-south joint committee for the KIZ" and start the activities of the relevant institutions.

The north and the south will set up an institutional mechanism for ensuring safe entry and stay in the zone and for protecting invested assets and make positive efforts to
ensure that the enterprises in the zone maintain and re-operate the equipment. August 14, 2013.

The adoption of the "Agreement on Normalizing Operation in the KIZ" at the talks will bring joy to all compatriots aspiring after reconciliation, cooperation, reunification and improved inter-Korean relations on the occasion of the 68th anniversary of the liberation of the country." (KCNA, “7th Round of North-South Working-Level Talks Held,” August 14, 2013)

President Park Geun-hye proposed that South and North Korea hold reunions for separated families and establish a peace park in their heavily armed border, a day after the two sides reached a landmark deal to reopen a joint industrial complex. In a Liberation Day address marking the end of Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula, Park also urged Tokyo to face up to history and take "responsible and earnest" measures to console the victims of its wartime atrocities. The North's agreement to reopen the factory park in its border city of Kaesong -- largely under conditions demanded by the South -- represented a victory for the unbending, principled approach Park has taken toward the communist nation in the face of spiraling tensions. "I hope the agreement this time will serve as an opportunity to remedy what went wrong in inter-Korean relations in the past and help build a new relationship of mutual prosperity," Park said during the address. "Through the trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula, I hope that peace will take a firm root and that the two Koreas will be able to realize common progress," she said. The process is Park's signature policy on North Korea. It calls for the two sides to take confidence-building measures so as to reduce tensions across one of the world's most heavily fortified borders, while maintaining a firm deterrence against provocations. "First and foremost, we have to ease the pains of separated families. I hope the North will be able to work together to make the reunion of the separated families possible around the time of the upcoming Chuseok holidays," she said, referring to one of Korea's most important traditional holidays, which falls on Sept. 19 this year. "In addition, I propose to the North the creation of an international peace park at the Demilitarized Zone, which is a legacy of division and confrontation between the two Koreas," she said. The DMZ is a four-kilometer buffer zone bisecting the Korean Peninsula. Park unveiled the DMZ park vision during her visit to the United States earlier this year, but the idea has since gained little traction due largely to questions about its possibility amid heightened tensions. It was the first time that she has made a formal proposal to the North about the ambitious project. The unification ministry said later that it will take steps to follow up on Park's proposals. "Considering that about a month is left before Chuseok, we will study and carry out specific measures as early as possible," a ministry official said of the family reunion proposal, adding that at least 30 days are necessary to set up such reunions. The ministry is expected to send a formal message to North Korea as early as tomorrow. The government also plans to begin inter-agency discussions on the peace park project as well. Park also urged Pyongyang to give up its nuclear programs, saying Seoul is ready to "actively help the North in an open-hearted manner" if it forgoes nuclear ambitions and changes its attitudes. She also said the South will continue humanitarian assistance regardless of the political situation. "Safeguarding peace requires deterrence. Building peace requires a foundation of mutual trust," she said. "Even if it takes some time, the trust-building process on the
Korean Peninsula will be steadily pursued as our means to establish South-North relations that accord with common sense and international norms and to carve out true peace and trust.” (Chang Jae-soon, “Park Proposes Family Reunions, Peace Park Establishment in DMZ with N. Korea,” Korea Herald, August 15, 2013)

Missiles paraded through the streets of Pyongyang in recent displays of North Korean military might – said to be capable of hitting targets throughout Asia and even in the U.S. – are incapable of flight and are almost certainly nothing more than fakes, according to U.S. government experts and independent analysts. "My opinion is that it’s a big hoax," Markus Schiller, an aerospace engineer in Munich and former RAND Corp. military analyst, said of the intercontinental and medium-range missiles displayed in the North Korean capital in April 2012 and again two weeks ago. U.S. government experts agreed after reviewing unclassified images from the most recent parade on July 27, including high-resolution photos provided by NBC News. “Our assessment is that what we are looking at is most likely simulators used for training purposes,” according to a statement to NBC News. The experts, who spoke on condition of anonymity, would not discuss the methods used to make their determination. There also are signs that the missile program may be in disarray, including a failed attempt to launch a satellite in April 2012 and the recent disappearance from public view of Pak To-Ch’un, the Politburo member who managed North Korea’s weapons production, including its missiles. “That the guy in charge seems to have been purged is the clearest indication we’ve seen so far that they’re having some problems,” said Alexandre Mansourov, a Korea expert and visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins University. He told NBC News that technical problems with the Musudan – not political pressure – led to the roll-back. Mansourov and other experts caution that while the North has been having problems, that doesn’t mean the North Koreans don’t have a significant long-range missile program edging closer to success. Schiller, who wrote a detailed report questioning advances in North Korea’s missile program last year, said that images were just as unrealistic as those he saw when the Hwasong-13 made its debut in an earlier parade in April 2012. For example, he noted, there was no evidence on the rear of the Hwasong-13 of retro rockets necessary to separate the stages – critical if an ICBM is to reach sub-orbital space and strike distant targets. Schiller also said varied features on the rockets – such differing placement of small guidance nozzles and hatches – are telling. They make him believe that these are not even training "simulators" but "crude fakes." Schiller said the North also seems to be trying to inflate the number of Hwasong-13s it claims to possess. "I can tell that on the mock-ups, they simply changed the markings and serial numbers from last year’s parade to make it look like they have more missiles," he said. James Oberg, an NBC News space and missile expert who traveled to North Korea in April 2012 to observe the satellite launch that ended in failure, pointed to another discrepancy that would make the missiles less airworthy -- "undulating skin" near the warhead on one. "Upper-stage missile skin has got to be really smooth, or else it sets off high-speed turbulent air flow that can both heat the region - and the hardware inside it - and also create localized drag effects that can pull the missile far off attitude (direction), or even pull it sideways and thus lead to loss of control and disintegration," he said. Experts also note that neither the Hwasong-13 nor the Musudan, a ballistic missile ostensibly capable of reaching targets up to 2,200 miles away that has
purportedly been around for 10 years, has ever been flight tested. "The fun thing is it never left the ground," Schiller said of the Musudan. "... Imagine Lockheed building a fighter jet and it never flew!" Norbert Brugge, a German missile engineer who also studied the parade imagery, and others suggest that even if the parade missiles are fake, the North may have real missiles that it has has not shown or tested. "There are real missiles, not mock-ups!" he said in an email to NBC News this week. Victor Cha, who directed Asian affairs for the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration, thinks the assessment may permit the Obama administration to put North Korea on the backburner at a time when other issues, like Egypt, are more pressing. "Some thought the Musudan and [Hwasong-13] development might put pressure on the U.S. to come back to the negotiating table," said Cha, who wrote extensively about the missile program in his book, "The Impossible State: North Korea." "This gives them some breathing space, if you will." Why Pyongyang would show off phony missiles if it had real ones is anyone's guess. But David Wright, director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program, thinks that the North probably believes it can gain domestic prestige and, possibly, diplomatic leverage at the same time. "If they know they are posturing and posturing gets them high-level talks (with the U.S.), then they gain from them (the fake missiles)," he said. "They get what they want without fielding a usable weapon." And even though the U.S. has seen through the ruse, it could be a potential positive for U.S.-North Korea relations, Wright said. "My sense is that (the assessment that the missiles are fakes) could embolden the U.S. to open direct negotiations with the North," he said. Despite the apparent fakery, Oberg says North Korea should not be taken lightly, citing his experience last year at its space launch facility and the fact that it finally succeeded in launching a rocket into space in December. "So much of what we were shown -- factories, retail stores, farms -- were 'Potemkin' facades, it's tempting to relegate all their paraded weapons to the same fantasy land," he said. "But with the big rocket, they did place a satellite into orbit, and other nations confirmed it. You can't bluff and bamboozle your way into outer space." (Robert Windrem and M.L. Flynn, "'A Bib Hoax' Experts Say North Korea Showing off Missiles That Can't Fly," NBC News, August 15, 2013)

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose perception of history is being called into question by Japan's Asian neighbors, left a controversial footprint on his speech marking the 68th anniversary of the end of World War II. In a break from a nearly two-decade tradition, Abe dropped all mention of Japan's responsibility as an aggressor against other Asian countries at an annual memorial ceremony honoring those killed in the war on August 15. Abe, who followed the precedent in 2007 during his first stint as prime minister, called for a review of this year's speech, according to sources. "I wanted (the speech) written from scratch," Abe was quoted as telling his aides. "I would like you to fundamentally rethink for whom and for what purpose the ceremony is held." A small group of officials at the prime minister's office drafted the speech, reflecting the prime minister's intention to extend his thoughts to the war dead and their bereaved families. "The style has been changed to one in which we address the departed souls," a source close to Abe said. In 1993, Hosokawa Morihiro became the first Japanese prime minister to express “condolences” to Japan's Asian neighbors in his speech at the memorial ceremony. In his speech on August 15, 2007, Abe said: “Our country caused considerable damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly Asian
countries. ... On behalf of the (Japanese) people, I offer deep remorse and express my heartfelt condolences to those who were killed.” In explaining Abe’s thinking, a senior official said, “An apology to Asia does not fit the occasion (for a memorial ceremony honoring the war dead).” Abe also broke ranks from his predecessors by dropping the “pledge not to make war again” from his speech at Nippon Budokan. He only said, “We will make every effort to contribute as much as possible to eternal peace in the world.” Abe refrained from visiting Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 to prevent a further deterioration in relations with South Korea and China, already strained by territorial disputes. Three Cabinet ministers did pay their respects on that day, but Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga and Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida all stayed away. (Asahi Shimbun, “Abe Shows True Colors in War Memorial Speech,” August 16, 2013)

China launched a four-day live-fire naval exercise in the East China Sea to mark the anniversary of Japan’s defeat in WWII. Chinese officials summoned the Japanese ambassador to protests visits to Yasukuni shrine by Japanese politicians. (Jamil Anderlini, “China Jabs at Japan in Navy Drill,” Financial Times, August 17, 2013, p. 4)

South Korea’s Red Cross proposed a meeting with its North Korean counterpart on August 23 at the Peace House on the South’s side of Panmunjeom to “consult on humanitarian issues such as family reunions around Chuseok,” the Korean Thanksgiving that falls on September 19 this year. “We hope the North Korean side will positively respond to a Red Cross working-level contact to resolve the separated family issue which is a pure humanitarian matter,” the organization said in a statement. Pyongyang offered a new consultation to resume family reunions and Geumgang tours on July 10 but it called it off after Seoul only accepted the more urgent reunions to focus on the then ongoing negotiations over the industrial park. According to the Unification Ministry, only 72,882 of the 128,842 South Koreans registered since 1988 remain alive as of July 31, meaning that some 2,000 have died each year. Of the survivors, 9.3 percent were aged over 90, 40.5 percent were in their 80s, 30.6 percent in their 70s and 11.4 percent in their 60s. With the recent breakthrough in Kaesong, inert inter-Korean projects appear to be coming to life again. Seoul has been calling the factory zone a “touchstone” for cross-border exchanges and collaboration. Thirty officials from the complex management committee, KT Corp., Korea Electric Power Corp., Korea Water Resources Corp. and other agencies are scheduled to visit the North Korean border city Saturday for repair and maintenance of infrastructure. Meanwhile, humanitarian assistance is also gathering steam, prompted in part by torrential rains that pummeled the peninsula for nearly 50 days until last week. The South’s Red Cross said today it has decided to provide $100,000 for relief supplies to the North at the request of its headquarters, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Last month, the Park administration allowed five civic groups to send aid to the impoverished neighbor, worth 1.47 billion won in total. It also plans to give the U.N. Children’s Fund $6.04 million for programs to help North Korean infants and pregnant women. The president has vowed to continue humanitarian support for the communist country regardless of political circumstances, a key component of her “trust-building process” policy. “We cannot face away the reality that on the other side of the peninsula they are suffering from hunger and
difficulty,” Park said in the Liberation Day speech. North Korea reported at least 46 were killed or missing and nearly 50,000 became homeless across the country due to the unusually-long rainy spell, according to the Geneva-based IFRC, the world’s largest humanitarian organization. A 2012 UNICEF survey showed that more than one in four North Korean children under five suffer from stunted growth and 4 percent of them are acutely malnourished. Despite chronic food shortages and healthcare deprivation there, local and multinational relief groups have been having difficulty in recent years as funds dried up amid tension and sanctions over Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The U.N. said yesterday it is in “urgent need” of $98 million to fund emergency aid for North Korea, where some 2.4 million people need regular food handouts. “While the overall humanitarian situation has improved slightly over the last 12 months, the structural causes of people’s vulnerability persist,” U.N. Resident Coordinator Ghulam Isaczai said in a statement. “External assistance continues to play a vital role in safeguarding the lives of millions whose food security, nutritional status and essential health needs would otherwise be seriously compromised.” (Shin Hyon-hee, “Seoul Offers August 23 Talks on Family Reunions with North Korea,” Korea Herald, August 16, 2013)

North Korea agreed to hold a series of working-level meetings this week as was proposed by South Korea, to discuss the resumption of reunions of families separated by the Korean War, as well as a stalled inter-Korean tourism project. Family reunions were initially proposed by South Korean President Park Geun-hye during her Liberation Day address on August 15, a day after the two Koreas reached a landmark deal to reopen a joint factory zone in North Korea that has been closed for more than four months. So far, there have been a total of 18 reunions, with the most recent held in late 2010. The North proposed that a working-level meeting on resuming the reunions be held on August 23. “The reunions of separated families and their relatives shall be made in Mount Kumgang resort on the occasion of the upcoming Harvest Moon Day and their video meetings be made timed for the anniversary of the October 4 declaration,” the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea said in a statement carried by KCNA. The North also offered to hold a working-level meeting on Thursday for the resumption of a stalled inter-Korean tourism project focusing on the Mount Kumgang resort just north of the inter-Korean border. “The working-level talks shall discuss package issues of the South side’s concern, including the issue of preventing the recurrence of the tourist case, the issue of ensuring personal safety and the issue of property,” the statement said. “The resumption of the tours to Mt. Kumgang following the normalization of the Kaesong Industrial Zone will bring bigger joy to all the Koreans,” it added. (Yonhap, “Pyongyang Agrees to Hold Talks for Family Reunions,” August 18, 2013) Of the survivors, 9.3 percent were aged over 90, 40.5 percent were in their 80s, 30.6 percent in their 70s and 11.4 percent in their 60s. According to the Unification Ministry, only 72,882 of the 128,842 South Koreans registered since 1988 remain alive as of July 31, meaning that some 2,000 have died each year. (Song Sang-ho, “Pyongyang Accepts Seoul’s Proposal for Talks over Family Reunions,” Korea Herald, August 18, 2013)

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) spokesman: “The CPRK clarifies the following proposals upon authorization out of the fixed stand to advance
the north-south ties and open up a new phase for peace, reunification and prosperity:
1. The reunion of separated families and their relatives shall be made in Mt. Kumgang resort on the occasion of the upcoming Harvest Moon Day and their video meetings be made timed for the anniversary of the October 4 declaration. To this end, the north and south Red Cross working-level talks shall be held on Aug. 23, as proposed by the south side, in Mt Kumgang resort and during the talks they will be allowed to look round the hall of reunion and take field measures for its use. 2. The working-level talks between the authorities of the north and the south shall be held for the resumption of tours to Mt. Kumgang resort. The working-level talks shall discuss package issues of the south side’s concern including the issue of preventing the recurrence of the tourist case, the issue of ensuring personal safety and the issue of property. The talks shall be held on August 22 in Mt. Kumgang resort. The resumption of the tours to Mt. Kumgang following the normalization of the Kaesong Industrial Zone will bring bigger joy to all the Koreans. 3. The work for the peace on the Korean Peninsula and prosperity common to the nation shall be activated. “(KCNA, “DPRK Proposes Reunion of Separated Families, Relatives, and Resumption of Tours to Mt. Kumgang,” August 18, 2013)

Kim Jong-un is taking a new approach to defectors who have fled his impoverished and repressive state, promising they will not be harmed if they come home, and even offering cash rewards, according to some in the exile community. For some who return from South Korea there’s even the chance of a stage-managed performance on state television, although what happens to them after their prime time appearances is not known in a state where 200,000 people are imprisoned in gulags and where punishment extends to three generations of a family. One woman last year apologized at a televised press conference in Pyongyang for betraying her motherland and thanked Kim for bringing her under his “profound loving care” while another dubbed South Korea a “shitty world with no love.” North Korean security agents have been visiting families in the reclusive state for at least the past year, telling them it would be safe for their loved ones in the South to come back, several defectors in Seoul told Reuters. Some said they had even heard of people posing as defectors trying to tempt North Koreans in the South this year with a promise of 50 million South Korean won ($45,000) and an opportunity to appear on television in Pyongyang if they returned. “My mother said ‘if you have money, come back. General Kim Jong-un will treat you well’,” said one defector in her 30s who lives in Seoul, recounting a recent telephone conversation with her mother who called her from a North Korean town on the border with China. “Other defectors are getting that kind of phone call,” said the defector, surnamed Lee, who asked that her full name not be used because she feared reprisals against her family in the North. It is impossible to verify how many of the 25,000 North Koreans who have defected to the South have returned. One high profile case this year involved a fisherman who stole a trawler and returned to the North for the fourth time. Experts said Kim could be trying to show his people that instead of living happily in South Korea, defectors are miserable, have menial jobs and struggle to fit in - something defectors in Seoul say is not far from the truth. While offering an olive branch to some defectors, Kim has also made it harder for North Koreans to escape by tightening security along the country’s land border with China and defectors and their families still fill the country’s prison camps, experts said. While it’s impossible to verify
what happens to North Koreans who return, a diplomat in Pyongyang said a group of nine defectors who were sent home after being detained in Laos in May while trying to get to South Korea had not been harmed. The United Nations had said it feared for the group, which included up to five minors and who like some defectors were trying to reach a South Korean embassy in Southeast Asia after having first travelled through China. "They actually have been quite well treated since they have been back here," said the diplomat, who declined to be named due to the sensitivity of working in Pyongyang. An Amnesty International official also said there had been no reports the nine had been harmed. "When defectors come back they are not all trucked to prison. What can happen is they are put on TV ... for propaganda," said the diplomat. Last year, the number of defectors entering South Korea fell 44 percent to 1,509 from 2,706 in 2011, South Korean government data shows. In 2010, 2,402 defectors arrived and 2,900 in 2009. During the first quarter of this year, the monthly average of new defectors was down 15 percent from the previous year. "Rumors that the regime will annihilate three generations (of one family) or that border guards will shoot to kill if anyone is caught crossing the river have swirled around a lot," said Cho Jung-hyun, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, who regularly interviews defectors. "On the other hand, under what's called "benevolent politics", the regime keeps sending out a message of embracing those who left in tough times without punishment." Pyongyng has held at least six press events since last year with returning defectors that have been broadcast on North Korean state television. The most recent was in June. All have had the air of choreography familiar to North Korea watchers. The well-dressed returnees usually sing a song pledging loyalty to Kim and stand up to shout: 'Great Marshal Kim Jong-un, thank you so much!' while pumping the air with their fists. In one press conference last November, Kim Kwang-hyok called South Korea a "shitty world with no love". Pak Jong-suk said living in South Korea made her feel like a "miserable slave". Pak was given a new house in Pyongyang, state media said. South Korea's government has noticed Kim’s apparent change of heart and one government official who follows the issue said returning defectors were being used for domestic consumption. "By airing these press conferences in prime time, North Korea is using defectors for internal propaganda," the official said. It was unclear how many had gone back under Kim's rule, the official said. He also had no information on purported defectors trying to entice North Koreans to return with promises of cash. (Ju-min Park, "North Korea’s Kim Tries New Tack with Defectors – Being Nice," Reuters, August 18, 2013)

8/19/13 Seoul is taking a cautious stance on Pyongyang’s proposal to hold working-level meetings on restarting tours to Mt. Kumgang. “We basically maintain the principle of keeping the issue of family reunions separate from the resumption of Mt. Kumgang tours,” a government official said. “We have yet to come up with an answer to the North’s offer.” (Chung Min-uck , "Seoul Cautious on Mt. Kumgang Tour," Korea Times, August 19, 2013)

8/20/13 Shin Dong-hyuk said his earliest memory of life in a North Korean prison camp was the public execution that inmates were forced to watch when he was 5 years old. Inmates, he told a hushed audience here in Seoul, were so hungry that they devoured live rats and the raw hooves of a goat that prison guards had thrown away after slaughtering
the animal. One 7-year-old girl was clubbed to death for stealing a few grains of wheat, Shin said. He said he felt lucky when a warden ordered the tip of his finger chopped off, rather than having him executed, for damaging a piece of sewing equipment. What made the accounts given by Shin and another defector unusual was their audience: the first United Nations panel established to investigate allegations of human rights violations by the North Korean government. The three-member Commission of Inquiry was started by the United Nations Human Rights Council in March with a one-year mandate to investigate what the council called allegations of “systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights,” including possible crimes against humanity, by the North Korean authorities. The panel began five days of public hearings at Yonsei University in Seoul. It hoped to interview 30 North Korean defectors, including some who fled the country only recently. Later this month, another round of hearings is scheduled for Japan, where the fate of Japanese citizens abducted and taken to North Korea decades ago remains a keen concern. “The panel decided to take public testimony to help raise international awareness of conditions in the country and because of a lack of response so far by the Pyongyang government“ to repeated requests to visit North Korea, said Michael Donald Kirby, chairman of the commission. North Korea also has not responded to an invitation to attend the hearings, Kirby said. North Korea denies violating human rights and has rejected United Nations resolutions calling for better treatment of its people as a “political plot” to destabilize its government. In a joint letter delivered to the panel, groups of defectors, including one called Free the NK Gulag, said they hoped that the inquiry would lead to the indictment of “Kim Jong-un and his clique” in the International Criminal Court. “We ourselves or our family members were dragged into prisons without trial, we suffered unspeakable torture and humiliation when we were caught while trying to flee North Korea, and we had to witness neighbors and relatives dying while waiting for food rations,” their statement said. “We were forced to witness almost monthly public executions. Because of our grandfathers’ background, many of us were deprived of an opportunity to join the party or get jobs.” Jee Heon-a, 34, the other defector who testified on Tuesday, said that during a famine in the late 1990s, North Korean women were sold to traffickers in China. Those later caught by the Chinese police were repatriated to the North. Many suffered forced miscarriages through beatings and other forms of torture from North Korean guards at detention facilities, and one woman who gave birth was forced to drown her baby, she said. Kirby said his panel would “seek to determine whether crimes against humanity have occurred and who bears responsibility.” But he cautioned, “It is not possible at this moment to envisage the level of detail that the commission will be able to achieve in establishing lines of responsibility, if any.” The commission has identified nine suspected patterns of human rights violations to investigate, including denial of food, arbitrary detention and torture. In its 2013 white paper on human rights in North Korea, the government-run Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul said between 80,000 and 120,000 political prisoners were held in five prison camps. Inside, “many inmates end up losing their life,” the paper said, because of “forced labor, torture, degrading mistreatment, poor nutrition and lack of medical care.” North Korea denies that such camps exist. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korean Defectors Tell U.N. Panel of Prison Camp Abuses,” *New York Times*, August 21, 2013, p. A-8)
CPRK spokesman: “The south Korean chief executive at the ‘state security meeting’ held in the underground war commanding post in Chongwadae yesterday cried out for escalating confrontation with the DPRK and adopting posture of a war against it. This was timed to coincide with the Ulji Freedom Guardian war exercise, big DPRK-targeted war drill that was kicked off in south Korea under the pretext of ‘annual exercise.’ At the war confab the south Korean chief executive made a string of bellicose remarks calling for ‘getting combat-ready regardless of change in the south-north relations and the situation in surrounding areas’ and said ‘it is necessary to get ready for a war to ensure peace.’ The spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) in a statement [today] denounced the remarks which chill the hard-won atmosphere for dialogue between the north and the south and go against the trend of the times for peace as an intolerable provocation that insults the dialogue partner in defiance of the desire of all the Koreans for national reconciliation and reunification. The chief executive cried out for enhancing war preparedness targeting the DPRK while trumpeting about dialogue and peace. This is an agitation for extreme confrontation, the statement said. The south Korean authorities should not misjudge the sincerity and patience of the DPRK, it added. They should clearly know that if they continue to pursue confrontation with the DPRK, the north-south ties will go back to the worst point, entailing uncontrollably catastrophic consequences, the statement warned.” (KCNA, “CPRK Denounces S. Korean Chief Executive’s Agitation for War against DPRK,” August 20, 2013)

In a sign of improving ties, North and South Korea agreed on Friday to revive an emotionally charged humanitarian program next month that allows family members on both sides of the border to meet for the first time since the Korean War six decades ago. After a day of negotiations, held at the border village of Panmunjom, officials from both capitals agreed to hold a round of family reunions allowing 100 people from each side to meet their relatives from the other side at the Diamond Mountain resort in southeastern North Korea from Sept. 25 to Sept. 30. Another round is expected in November, they said. Separately, they also agreed to hold online family reunions on Oct. 22 and 23, allowing 40 families from each side to meet their relatives through video conferences. The revival of family reunions after a three-year hiatus is expected to further accelerate the rival Korean governments’ move toward a thaw after months of high tensions. It was particularly welcome news for 73,000 South Koreans — half of them more than 80 years old — who are on a waiting list for a chance to meet with relatives in the North. Out of them, only 100 will be selected by lottery for the reunions in September. North Korea is believed to give priority to those considered loyal to its government. “South and North Korea agreed to continue their efforts to make family reunions regular events, help families learn the fate of their relatives and exchange letters,” read the joint agreement signed on Friday. During the talks today, the chief North Korean negotiator, Pak Yong-il, urged South Korea to seize the momentum created by the Kaesong agreement, South Korean officials said. (Choe Sang-hun, “North and South Korea Set Date for Family Reunions after 3-Year Hiatus,” New York Times, August 24, 2013, p. A-) On the issue of the venue, the official said that realistic restraints compelled the meeting to take place at the resort. The South had originally proposed the reunions should take place in Seoul and Pyongyang, but the North had insisted from the outset that the meetings take place at Mount Kumgang where there is
a center for such meetings. The official then said that the North did not bring up the matter of humanitarian aid or resumption of tours to Mount Kumgang at the talks. The North had insisted on linking the reunions with the restarting of tours, although Seoul had insisted that the two are separate. (Lee Joon-seung, “Koreas Agree to Hold Family Reunions on Sept. 25-30 at Mt. Kumgang Resort,” Yonhap, August 24, 2013)

Out of six prison camps in North Korea, two of them have virtually been dismantled, according to an NGO report released. The author David Hawk, a prominent human rights researcher and advocate, and a former Executive Director of Amnesty International USA, as well as a former United Nations human rights official, said so in the report “North Korea’s Hidden Gulag: Interpreting Reports of Changes in the Prison Camps.” Initially, in mid-2012, North Korean defectors in Seoul and the news bureaus reported that Camp No. 22 had been closed. And Hawk wrote, “The consensus in the North Korean defector community in South Korea is that Camp No. 22 is no longer operating.” This claim is further supported by a reporter from DailyNK, an online news media outlet specialized in North Korea reporting. He wrote several of the stories on Camp No. 22’s closing and is also a former North Korean citizen who fled to China and South Korea.

The reporter told Hawk that he “presumed the transferred prisoner population to include some 7,000 to 8,000 persons. A dramatic diminution from 30,000 estimated prisoners only several years ago.” Hawk also said that one of the camps closed “simply because prisoners had been dying, or had gone missing, at an extremely high rate.” Sometime around 2006, Hawk added, the last villages within Camp No. 18 were decommissioned as forced-labor camps with the exception of a small number of prisoners. Most of the remaining former prisoners were “cleared,” and the mines, formerly operated with prison labor, “now operate as civilian enterprises.” The people in the area now known as the former Camp No. 18, haejemin, or cleared people, now have their “liberties” restored. However, not everyone was set free, and some 130,000 prisoners are dispersed in four different camps, the report added. (Lee Kyung-min, “2 out of 6 N.K. Prison Camps Dismantled,” Korea Times, August 29, 2013)

U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel views diplomacy on North Korea “fundamental” along with continued efforts to maintain security on the peninsula, his department said. Hagel had bilateral talks with his South Korean counterpart, Kim Kwan-jin, on the sidelines of the ASEAN defense ministers meetings in Brunei earlier in the day. “The two leaders discussed the importance of the recent U.N. Security Council Resolutions that are designed to limit North Korea’s progress on its nuclear and missile programs,” the Pentagon said in a press release. While the Department of Defense remains focused on fulfilling security commitments, Hagel stated, “Diplomatic efforts are fundamental to encouraging North Korea to pursue the path of peace.” (Yonhap, “U.S. Defense Chief Stresses Diplomacy on N.K.,” August 29, 2013)

North Korea has been carrying out construction work at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, including near a mothballed reactor that experts say could produce plutonium for bombs, a U.N. nuclear agency report showed. The IAEA, which monitors the isolated state’s nuclear developments via satellite, said the activities appeared to be broadly consistent with the North’s “statements that it is further developing its nuclear
The IAEA report suggested North Korea may have enough uranium for a “full core load” of fuel but it was "not possible to determine when the reactor may start operation." It said construction activities on buildings adjacent to the reactor building and the excavation of trenches in the vicinity were observed between March and June. "These trenches appear to be related to the reconfiguration of the reactor's cooling system," it said. "If this is the case, such a reconfiguration could possibly enable the reactor to be restarted without rebuilding the cooling tower." (Fredrik Dahl, “Construction Work Seen Near Mothballed North Korean Reactor: IAEA,” Reuters, August 28, 2013)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un made an “important decision” while presiding over an expanded meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Military Commission (CMC), according to North Korean media. The nature of the decision was not stated, but experts believe he may have set a course for actively mobilizing the military to build the North Korean economy under party leadership. KCNA reported Kim’s decision on August 26, saying only that it would “serve as a guideline for firmly guaranteeing the nation’s autonomy and safety and taking another step closer to the great goal of the party’s Songun (military first) revolution.” It also reported on discussions and decisions at the meeting on “practical concerns in stepping up the combat strength of our revolutionary firepower and strengthening the country’s defense capabilities in all directions, based on the demands of the current political situation and the current state of the people’s military.” Organizational issues were also reportedly discussed. (Kang Tae-ho, “N. Korean Leader Makes ‘Important Decision’ at Military Meeting,” Hankyore, August 27, 2013)

Agents from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service raided the homes and offices of an opposition lawmaker and other members of a far-left opposition party, detaining three of them on charges of plotting to overthrow the government. The highly unusual raids and charges of treason touched off a political storm in a country already rocked by accusations of meddling in domestic politics by the country’s powerful intelligence agency. Opposition politicians said the conservative government of President Park Geun-hye was resorting to a witch hunt to divert attention from a scandal involving the agency. A spokesman for the intelligence agency said it worked with state prosecutors in conducting the raid. South Korean media showed intelligence agents hauling away boxes filled with documents from the National Assembly office of Lee Seok-ki, one of the six lawmakers affiliated with the far-left party, the United Progressive Party. Officials of the party vehemently protested the raid, shouting slogans condemning what they called political oppression. “Faced with an unprecedented crisis, the presidential office and the National Intelligence Service are concocting a Communist witch hunt in the 21st century,” Lee Jung-hee, the head of the party, said in a statement. “Just as they attacked opposition supporters as pro-North Korean followers during the last presidential election, they are now strangling democratic forces with treason charges.” Lee was referring to the indictment of Won Sei-hoon, a former head of the spy agency, on charges of ordering a team of intelligence agents to start an online smear campaign last year against government critics, including candidates who ran against Ms. Park in the presidential election in December. Prosecutors in that case said the agents often derided the candidates and their parties as sympathetic to North Korea. But the
The country’s political parties have been squabbling over whether to appoint a special prosecutor for a new investigation. Those detained for questioning on Wednesday include three leaders of the progressive party, one of them a provincial vice chairman, Hong Soon-soek. Lee, the lawmaker whose office was searched, was not detained because members of the National Assembly are generally immune from arrest while it is in session. “If the charges are true, this is shocking beyond word,” said the president’s chief spokesman, Lee Jung-hyun, whose office denied that the investigation was politically motivated. Neither prosecutors nor the intelligence service revealed details of the treason charges against the opposition politicians. The national news agency Yonhap, quoting unnamed intelligence officials, reported that they were accused of plotting to sabotage communications, oil facilities and other installations as part of a plot to overthrow the South Korean government, a charge the progressive party called absurd. Like many other members of his party, Lee, the lawmaker, is a former student activist who was prosecuted under the country’s anti-Communist national security laws. He served a prison sentence for participating in an underground political party that was manipulated by the North Korean government during the 1990s. Since he and other progressives won seats in the National Assembly in 2012, some conservative South Koreans have attacked them as “jongbuk,” or blind followers of North Korea. The progressive party’s platform calls for “rectifying our nation’s shameful history tainted by imperialist invasions, the national divide, military dictatorship, the tyranny and plunder of transnational monopoly capital and chaebol,” the latter referring to South Korea’s giant family-controlled business conglomerates. The party wants to end the American military presence, dismantle South Korea’s “subordinate alliance with the United States” and unify the North and the South. In a television interview last year, Lee said that “a problem far bigger than jongbuk” was blindly following the United States, or “jongmi.” Conservatives have often accused progressives here of being too quick to question their country’s alliance with Washington but too reluctant to say a harsh word about North Korea over human rights abuses and the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Before she was elected president, Park once proposed a parliamentary vote to force Lee from the legislature, calling his ideology “questionable.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Leftist Leaders Accused of Trying to Overthrow Government,” New York Times, August 29, 2013, p. A-5)
the devotions and painstaking efforts made by leader Kim Jong Il and heritages bequeathed down by him out of his patriotic will for reunification, and thus pave the wide avenue for national reunification and peace and prosperity. Unfortunately, however, the atmosphere for reconciliation hardly in the making has faced a serious challenge from the beginning due to the improper attitude taken by the U.S. and the south Korean authorities who are still seized by the old confrontational concept. The present chief executives of the U.S. and south Korea are loudly speaking about ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and building reconciliation and confidence between the north and the south. But in fact, they directly choreographed dangerous war racket and confrontation moves, quite contrary to their call. This is a stark reality today. They started on August 19 the DPRK-targeted Ulji Freedom Guardian war exercises as before under the pretext of "annual" exercises. In mid-August they started the operation of scattering leaflets slandering the DPRK with the use of human scum. We cannot but question if it is the U.S.-style way of "improving ties" and south Korean-style way of "building confidence" to level guns at the dialogue partner and to respond to the magnanimous and peaceful step with war drills and sinister psychological warfare. It is well known by the world that the U.S. and the south Korean authorities cried out for the DPRK's "dismantlement of nuclear weapons" more loudly than any others. During the recent war exercises they flied formations and flying corps of B-52H nuclear strategic bombers from Guam and the U.S. mainland to the sky above the Korean Peninsula round the clock, openly posing nuclear threat to the DPRK. If the U.S. truly wants denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it should stop the nuclear blackmail against the DPRK. The present rulers of south Korea should drop the double-dealing attitude of tolerating outsider's nuke while denying the nation's nuke. It is important for the south Korean authorities to stop vitriolic rhetoric against the DPRK and clear themselves of discord, antagonism, distrust and hostility, to begin with, if they do not want to see the north-south ties repeating the bitter history of the past five years. The present rulers of south Korea, without deep knowledge about war and military affairs, are taking the lead in inciting confrontation and escalating tensions while touring what they called wartime commanding posts and field command posts, being lost to reason. They will only face shameless fate, being marginalized by the public. They are calling a small agreement that was reached with much difficulty a "victory of principle" and making a mockery of the public, being guided by its own unilateral yardstick called "common sense and international norms". This will only cast shadow to hard-won atmosphere for dialogue. The army and people of the DPRK will neither give up nor make even a step backward in the road for ensuring peace and security of the country and building a powerful and prosperous country. The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK equipped with powerful striking means have followed with vigilance not only the whole process of the war exercises but all the movements of the flying corps of nuclear strategic bombers, with their guns aimed at them, being considerate of the nation's desire and wishes. We are seriously examining issues for planning and realizing several constructive and bold peaceful measures while still exercising utmost patience for genuine peace and detente on the Korean Peninsula. Time has come to drop for good the hostile concept and the policy for confrontation with the fellow countrymen, leftovers of the Cold War era. Now is the time to stop anachronistic act of targeting the dialogue partner and take political decisions favorable for creating atmosphere for dialogue and
peaceful environment. This is the demand of the times and the people. The U.S. and the south Korean authorities should clearly face up to the trend of the times and think twice. They should remember that there is limit to the magnanimity and patience of the DPRK. The army and people of the DPRK will closely follow with high vigilance every movement of the present chief executives of the U.S. and south Korea. (KCNA, “NDC Policy Department Warns U.S., S. Korea against Anti-DPRK Acts,” August 29, 2013)

South and North Korea formally signed an agreement to create a new joint committee that will be in charge of running their joint industrial complex in the communist country. The committee is an integral part of the August 14 deal that calls for the reopening of the industrial complex, while adopting safeguards to prevent any work stoppages in the future. It gives Seoul an equal say as the North in running the complex. In the past, the North Korean body, dubbed the General Bureau for Central Guidance to the Development of the Special Zone, effectively ran Kaesong. Seoul’s Ministry of Unification said that under the agreement, the two sides will appoint one chairperson and five members to sit on the committee board. “The committee will be tasked with improving rules for running the factory park and discuss and resolve all issues raised by both parties,” an official said. The official also said four sub-committees are to be established to regulate and oversee movement of people, investment protection, communications and customs, and international competitiveness with provisions in place to create additional panels as the need arises. The ministry in charge of all inter-Korean relations said that the committee will meet once every quarter while subcommittees will be convened every month. Seoul and Pyongyang, moreover, agreed to set up a standing secretariat in Kaesong that will support the operations of the joint committee. (Yonhap, “Koreas Ink Deal on Kaesong Park Panel,” August 29, 2013)

U.S. spy agencies have built an intelligence-gathering colossus since the attacks of September 11, 2001, but remain unable to provide critical information to the president on a range of national security threats, according to the government’s top-secret budget. The $52.6 billion “black budget” for fiscal 2013, obtained by the Washington Post from former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden, maps a bureaucratic and operational landscape that has never been subject to public scrutiny. Although the government has annually released its overall level of intelligence spending since 2007, it has not divulged how it uses the money or how it performs against the goals set by the president and Congress. The 178-page budget summary for the National Intelligence Program details the successes, failures and objectives of the 16 spy agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community, which has 107,035 employees. Formally known as the Congressional Budget Justification for the National Intelligence Program, the “top-secret” blueprint represents spending levels proposed to the House and Senate intelligence committees in February 2012. Congress may have made changes before the fiscal year began on October 1. Clapper is expected to release the actual total spending figure after the fiscal year ends on September 30. Among the notable revelations in the budget summary: The governments of Iran, China and Russia are difficult to penetrate, but North Korea’s may be the most opaque. There are five “critical” gaps in U.S. intelligence about Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, and analysts know virtually nothing about the intentions of North Korean leader Kim
Jong Un. A table of "critical" gaps listed five for North Korea, more than for any other country that has pursued or is pursuing a nuclear bomb. A section on North Korea indicates that the United States has all but surrounded the nuclear-armed country with surveillance platforms. Distant ground sensors monitor seismic activity and scan the country for signs that might point to construction of new nuclear sites. US agencies seek to capture photos, air samples and infrared imagery "around the clock." (Barton Gellman and Greg Miller, "U.S. Spy Network's Successes, Failures and Objectives Detailed in 'Black Budget' Summary," Washington Post, August 29, 2013, p. A-1)

South Korea and the United States completed a 12-day joint military drill, the Combined Forces Command said, amid North Korea's unusually low-key stance as the two Koreas are engaged in talks over a number of cross-border projects. About 56,000 South Korean troops and approximately 30,000 U.S. soldiers, including some 3,000 from the U.S. and other bases in the Pacific region, carried out the computer-aided Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) from Aug. 19 to test and improve their defense posture against the North. (Yonhap, "S. Korea, U.S. Finish Low-Key Military Drill amid Cross-Border Talks," August 30, 2013)

The North Korean regime appears to have sacked the hawkish army chief in what some pundits see as attempts by young leader Kim Jong-un to bring the unruly military to heel. Kim Kyok-sik (75) masterminded the sinking of the Navy corvette Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. A South Korean government source said Thursday, "We're closely watching developments in the North, believing that Kim Kyok-sik has been replaced by Ri Yong-gil, the Army's General Staff chief of operations." Rodong Sinmun mentioned Ri Yong-gil after senior regime figures Choe Ryong-hae and Jang Song-taek in a report about Kim watching a soccer tournament alongside selected soldiers. It mentioned Ri before Jang Jong-nam, the minister of the People's Armed Forces, while Kim Kyok-sik was not mentioned at all. Ri was seen with four-star insignia rather than the three stars befitting his previous post. "Ri seems to have been promoted to chief of the Army's General Staff, because the chief of operations is never mentioned ahead of the Armed Forces minister," the source added. Kim Kyok-sik's dismissal may have been discussed at a meeting of the Workers Party's Central Military Commission chaired by Kim Jong-un August 25. At the time, North Korean media reported that the meeting discussed "organizational matters" and that the leader made an "important decision." Kim Kyok-sik was commander of the 2nd Army Corps, which covers the western frontline area, from 1994 to 2007 and then promoted to army chief. In February 2009 he was ostensibly demoted but put into aggressive action at the head of the 4th Army Corps, which covers Hwanghae Province and the Northern Limit Line. There he masterminded a naval skirmish in November 2009, the sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. In May this year he was made army chief again after the ouster of his predecessor. But experts believe Kim Jong-un is more interested than his father in economic development and probably feels he cannot afford a stone-age hawk at the helm of the powerful military if he wants cooperation from South Korea and China. Chung Sung-jang at the Sejong Institute speculated, "It's likely that Kim Kyok-sik got in the way of Kim Jong-un's attempts to reform the economy, open
markets and improve relations with the South.” (Chosun Ilbo, “N. Korea Fires Hawkish Army Chief,” August 30, 2013)

New commercial satellite imagery indicates that North Korea has embarked on a major construction program at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (commonly referred to as “Tongchang-ri”), mounting six important new projects at the site since mid-2013. This activity, along with Pyongyang’s abrupt halt of a program to modernize its older Tonghae launch facility in late 2012, suggests that Sohae will remain Pyongyang’s main long-range rocket test center in the future. Of particular interest is a construction site 100 meters west of the existing launch pad on level ground. Aligned on the same azimuth as the existing pad that would enable southward launches like the two previous Unha rocket launches, the area is about 65 meters long and 40 meters wide at the west end where the foundation for an end wall is visible. It is much smaller than the existing launch pad that measures 56 meters wide and 190 meters long. While it is too early to identify the exact purpose of this site, one possible explanation is that Pyongyang is building a “flat launch pad,” a large concrete area that would be used to test mobile ballistic missiles fired from a transporter-erecter launcher (TEL). Alternatively, a modified version of the KN-08 long-range mobile missile could launch small satellites from the pad although this would probably require a more complex arrangement with a permanent gantry tower and flame trench. (38 North, “Major Construction at the Sohae Rocket Test Site,” August 30, 2013)

New commercial satellite imagery indicates North Korea probably tested a long-range rocket engine between August 25 and 30, 2013 at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. While the dimensions of the rocket stage—about 2.5 meters wide and 9-10 meters long—indicate use as a long-range rocket engine, it is not possible to positively identify the type of engine tested given uncertainties in the resolution of commercial satellite imagery. Other possibilities include the second stage of the Unha-3 space launch vehicle (SLV), an improved version of that engine or a second or third stage engine for a much larger rocket suspected to be under development. (Nick Hansen, “Probable Rocket Test Conducted at Sohae,” 38North, September 13, 2013)

Satellite imagery from August 31, 2013 shows white steam rising from a building near the reactor hall that houses the gas-graphite reactor’s steam turbines and electric generators. (Nick Hansen and Jeffrey Lewis, “North Korea Restarting Its 5 MW Reactor,” 38North, September 11, 2013)

Without explanation, North Korea abruptly canceled its invitation for a U.S. special envoy to visit Pyongyang, bewildering American and South Korean officials who apparently expected the release this week of an American man detained there. “We are surprised and disappointed by North Korea’s decision,” Marie Harf, deputy spokeswoman for the department, said in a press release. “We have sought clarification from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea about its decision and have made every effort so that Ambassador King’s trip could continue as planned or take place at a later date,” she added. “Ambassador King intends to return to Washington from Tokyo the afternoon of August 31.” A U.S. government source said that Washington is still waiting for Pyongyang to allow King’s trip. “Many people here
are scratching their heads. Such a move by North Korea will only lead to a further loss of trust and credibility,” the source said. “There is growing impatience here, with North Korea apparently playing a game with the life of an American citizen.” (Yonhap, “N. Korea Rescinds Invitation for Envoy on Detained,” Korea Herald, August 31, 2013)

DPRK Foreign Ministry as regards “the U.S. act of floating misinformation that the DPRK disallowed all of a sudden the visit of the special envoy for Human Rights and Humanitarian Cooperation of the U.S. Department of State without any proper reason: We intended to allow the visit of the special envoy of the U.S. Department of State proposed by the U.S. side and have a sincere discussion with him on the issue of the U.S. citizen serving a prison term in our country from a humanitarian viewpoint. As well known, the U.S. and south Korea staged large-scale joint military exercises against the DPRK in recent days but we exercised utmost self-restraint to prevent a vicious cycle of escalating tension at any cost. Notwithstanding, the U.S. perpetrated such a grave military provocation as infiltrating B-52H strategic bombers into the sky above the Korean Peninsula in succession, an unprecedented act, for a drill for nuclear bombing, far from positively responding to our tolerance and patience. As shown by the situation which reached the brink of a war in last April, the strategic bombers’ intrusion into the air over the Korean Peninsula is the most blatant nuclear blackmail against us and a military threat to us as it is the most striking manifestation of the offensive and aggressive nature of the joint military drills. The U.S. thus beclouded the hard-won atmosphere of humanitarian dialogue in a moment. Despite the fact that we clearly notified the U.S. side of this through the New York contact channel, it is something surprising that the U.S. is making irrelevant remarks that it was surprised by our action.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for the DPRK FM Accuses U.S. of Spoiling Atmosphere for Humanitarian Dialogue,” September 1, 2013)

South Korea will give $6.3 million won in humanitarian aid to North Korea through a United Nations agency, the unification ministry said. The move comes as Seoul has maintained it will provide assistance to underprivileged people in the North regardless of political and diplomatic developments. Inter-Korean tensions that spiked in the first half of this year have eased in recent months with the two Koreas engaged in talks to fully reopen the factory park in Kaesong and hold family reunions for people separated by the 1950-53 Korean War on Sept. 25-30. “The money to go to the World Health Organization (WHO) will help repair medical facilities, train healthcare workers and give essential drugs to the North that can help all people,” a unification ministry official said. The funds will come from the inter-Korean cooperation fund managed by the state with final approval to be given by the South and North Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council. Besides money to be sent to the WHO, Seoul plans to allow 12 civic groups to send 2.35 billion won (US$2.13 million) worth of aid to the North in 13 different projects, the ministry official said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea to Give US$6.2 Million in Humanitarian Aid to N. Korea,” September 3, 2013)

South and North Korea showed a schism regarding when to reopen the inter-Korean Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC) during the first joint GIC committee talks. Seoul maintained that the complex will be opened after the North fully implements
preventive measures and changes are made to the GIC to attract foreign investment, the Ministry of Unification said. Pyongyang, however, called for an immediate opening, quoting several South Korean companies as saying that they are willing to open their factories this month. (Chung Min-uck, “2 Koreas Differ over When to Reopen GIC,” Korea Times, September 2, 2013)

President Park Geun-hye offered to help North Korea build infrastructure and join international organizations if it abandons its nuclear weapons. Park made the offer in an interview with Russia’s ITAR-TASS news agency at Cheong Wa Dae ahead of her trip to the G20 summit in St. Petersburg. “If the South and the North build up trust in each other and denuclearization makes progress, I intend to provide support for North Korea to beef up infrastructure, such as communication, transportation and electricity, and to join international organizations,” Park said. (Chosun Ilbo, “Park Makes Fresh Offer to N. Korea,” September 6, 2013)

North Korea has the ability to “weaponize” its nuclear technology and put a warhead on a missile, the South Korean Defense Ministry said, contradicting the U.S. position that the country is years away from gaining the technology. The report presented to lawmakers said the North can turn its nuclear devices into weapons at any time. After details of the study became public, the ministry toned down the findings, saying in an e-mailed statement that the report meant that the possibility of a North Korean ballistic missile being paired with a nuclear warhead was “high.” “The report is an acknowledgment that the North has the capability to put nuclear bombs on at least short-range missiles,” Yang Uk, a senior researcher at Seoul’s Korea Defense and Security Forum think tank, said by phone. Yang questioned whether the North can tip a long-range missile with a nuclear warhead. Last December, North Korea succeeded in launching a rocket to put a satellite in space for the first time. The U.S. and South Korea called the event a test of long-range missile technology in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. The North routinely tests short-range missiles. It claimed in February after its third nuclear test that it had succeeded in making its nuclear bombs smaller and lighter. “Just having short- or mid-range nuclear missiles would give the North far more considerable destructive power over the South,” Yang said. (Sam Kim, “North Korea Could Launch a Nuclear Weapon Strike, South Says,” Bloomberg News, September 3, 2103)

South and North Korea engaged in detailed negotiations on ways to reform management rules of the suspended joint industrial park in the communist country, protect investments and strive for ways to internationalize the complex. The two sub-committee meetings began in North Korea at 10 a.m. The joint committee, co-chaired by officials representing Seoul and Pyongyang, is made up of four sub-committees, and will receive administrative assistance from a permanent secretariat. The committee will be in charge of running the industrial complex, which remains the main economic link between the two countries, just north of the Demilitarized Zone. A full committee meeting held September 2 failed to make serious headway as the two sides were unable to resolve the critical issue of when the complex will be fully opened for business. Related to the meetings, Seoul’s Ministry of Unification said officials at the management reform sub-committee will touch on safeguards to protect investment at
Gaeseong, and revise rules to prevent future work stoppages for non-economic reasons. At the internationalization sub-committee, the two sides will seek ways to attract foreign investment that can raise the stature and competitiveness of the industrial complex that is home to 123 South Korean companies. “Results of the talks will be forwarded to the second joint committee meeting set to take place next Tuesday when officials will try to reach an agreement on issues where there are no differences and carry out further discussion if more deliberations are needed,” said ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk. However, he said it is unlikely that details of the sub-committee meetings will be released to the press since they are only working-level negotiations that can lead to agreements being signed at the joint committee. Besides the ongoing meeting, the Koreas will hold two other sub-committee meetings on Thursday that will touch on the safe movement of personnel and materials over the DMZ and the safety of South Korean workers who have to stay at the complex for days at a time. Officials will also deliberate on the lifting of restrictions on the restoration of a military hotline along the west coast that the North cut in late March, along with wider access to communications devices, the Internet and customs inspections.

Reconnecting the hotline is seen by Seoul as key to pushing forward the reopening of the factory complex.

“From Aug. 18 South Korean technicians have done what they could to make repairs, but moving forward will require the hotline to come back on line,” a government source said. Pyongyang has pledged to reconnect the communication line since July but has not done so, with some speculating that the communist country may be trying to use it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the South. “There is a chance that the North Korean military is reluctant to reconnect the line, which is holding up the process,” said Yang Moo-jin, political science professor at the University of North Korean Studies. (Yonhap, “Koreas Discuss Kaesong Management Rules,” Korea Herald, September 4, 2013)

The National Assembly passed a motion to allow the arrest of Representative Lee Seok-ki of the Unified Progressive Party, who is under investigation on suspicion of plotting a rebellion against the South Korean government on behalf of North Korea. At a plenary session of the Assembly, 289 out of 298 National Assembly members cast ballots, and 258 voted to strip Lee of his immunity from arrest as a lawmaker. The voting was done anonymously, and 14 representatives voted against the motion. There were 11 abstentions, and six ballots were nullified. In South Korea, lawmakers cannot be arrested while the National Assembly is in session unless the legislature strips the lawmaker of immunity. The Suwon District Court, which issued the original arrest warrant request for Lee, issued an emergency warrant to detain him for a hearing before an official arrest warrant is issued. National Intelligence Service agents and policemen scuffled with UPP members as they tried to take Lee into custody at his office at the National Assembly. Lee finally emerged with them. A hearing for the official arrest warrant will be held in Suwon at 10:30 a.m. today. According to the prosecution, Lee attended a meeting of members of a group in the UPP, known as the Revolutionary Organization, on May 12 at a building belonging to a religious group in Mapo District’s Hapjeong-dong. A transcript released by prosecutors quotes Lee as saying he was determined to assist the North in the event of war by destroying oil storage facilities, communication centers and attacking police stations. He urged 130
attendees of the meeting to arm themselves with explosives. "The National Intelligence Service carried out detailed investigations into this case for the past three years and confirmed Representative Lee Seok-ki is suspected of assisting the national enemy and conspiring in a rebellion based on various evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses, the comments Lee made at several secret meetings, confiscated documents and some other materials contained in USB devices," Justice Minister Hwang Kyoung-an said during a speech at the Assembly session before the vote. Hwang said that Lee is "the head of the RO" during his speech. Given the risk that Lee could destroy evidence or flee the country he should be detained by the prosecution, Hwang added. At the session in the Assembly, Lee was given a chance to make a final explanation before the vote. He described the legal case against him a "witch hunt from the medieval era" and "political persecution." Lee argued the NIS had no smoking gun to prove its charges. "One hundred NIS investigators searched my office for three days and didn’t find any evidence," Lee said. Ha Tae-keung, a Saenuri Party lawmaker who was a pro-North Korea student activist in the 1980s, said hard-core pro-North Korea sentiments are still alive. “They’re just waiting for a time called ‘the decisive moment.’” Ha said in a speech at the session. “When such a moment comes, such as North Korea invading, the underground forces will all rise up and fight to occupy the Republic of Korea. “They [the RO members] seemed to be in a hurry and urged members to arm themselves because they thought a war was imminent at the time,” Ha said. “Some say they are insane, or the allegations must have been distorted or manipulated. But I guarantee you that they are indeed blind followers of North Korea.” (Kim Hee-jin, “Assembly Approves Arrest of UPP’s Lee,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 5, 2013)
but there are no such signs,” the source said. “Under the circumstance, it is difficult for the Chinese efforts to make a significant achievement.” (Yonhap, “Chin a Proposes Holding Informal Six-Party Meeting on N. Korea,” September 5, 2013)

During a sub-committee meeting to discuss details on the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the North, the two Koreas decided to restore the military hotline starting tomorrow, according to officials of Seoul’s unification ministry. (Yonhap. “Two Koreas Agree to Resume Military Hotline,” September 5, 2013)

North Korea should first be prepared to implement the denuclearization commitments it has made in order to resume the long-stalled disarmament talks, the chief United States official on East Asia said Friday. “The place where we all must focus is in facilitating authentic negotiation in which North Korea comes to the table prepared to implement the commitments it has already made, prepared to live up to the obligations it has,” Daniel Russel, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, told reporters in Seoul. "The focus must be on eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program." He arrived in Seoul yesterday as part of his first Asian trip since assuming the position in July. His remarks followed meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Kyou-hyun and Lee Kyung-soo, an assistant deputy minister. He was also to meet with the unification minister as well as the defense minister later in the day. Russel’s remarks are in line with the U.S. government’s stance that the communist country should first prove its commitments to implementing previous disarmament-for-aid agreements, including the Agreement on a Joint Declaration in 2005, before the six-party talks can be restarted. "It is crystal clear from the Joint Statement in 2005 that the goal of the six-party talks and the goal of all diplomatic efforts here was complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” Russel said. The assistant secretary said North Korea’s security and interests are undermined by its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and he discussed strategies with the South Korean officials to make the North realize that, Russel said. "Only by full compliance with its international obligations with the United Nations Security Council resolutions and only by adhering to its own commitments under the six-party process, can North Korea achieve the security, let alone the respect, prosperity and economic growth." China’s chief nuclear envoy Wu Dawei traveled to North Korea last week for meetings with his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan. As part of mounting efforts to restart the multilateral talks, the Chinese government has reportedly proposed to hold an informal meeting with high-ranking officials from the six concerned nations later this month. The U.S. has not decided on whether to join the meeting, Russel said. "I don't believe there is final decision about participation in this informal meeting. There are a number of track II types of efforts underway," he said. Russel’s visit precedes the South Korean trip by U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies slated for next week. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Should Live up to Its Past Denuke Commitments,” September 6, 2013)

Danny Russel: “Q: What is your prospect of the resumption of the Six-Party Talks?
RUSSEL: Well, I think the right way to ask the question is not “what is the resumption of the Six-Party Talks looking like?” but “what is the purpose of Six-Party Talks?” It is crystal clear from the Joint Statement of 2005 that the goal of Six-Party Talks, the goal of all
diplomatic efforts here, is the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And so, what we are focused on, and what I am discussing with our colleagues here in Seoul, is the strategy and the steps that can bring North Korea to the realization that its security and its interests are undermined by its pursuit of nuclear weapons and a nuclear program, and that only by full compliance with its international obligations with the UN Security Council Resolutions, and only by adhering to its own commitments under the Six-Party process can North Korea achieve the security, let alone the respect, let alone the prosperity and economic growth that it says that it wants. Q: What is your position with regard to China’s proposal for Track 1.5 meetings of party nations in Beijing? RUSSEL: Right. I do not believe that there is a final decision about participation in these informal meetings. There are a number of Track 2 types of efforts under way. The place where we all must focus is in facilitating authentic negotiations in which North Korea comes to the table prepared to implement the commitments that it has already made, prepared to live up to the obligations that it has. The focus must be on eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program, which constitutes the driver of instability in the region and is vastly out of sync with the developments, not only in Asia but in the international community.” (DoS, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel, Remarks to the Press, MOFA, Seoul, September 6, 2013)

President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China discussed North Korea’s nuclear weapons program during a private meeting at the G-20 summit in Russia. “China has been a cooperative partner in underscoring the importance of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula,” said Ben Rhodes, White House deputy National Security Council adviser. Another NSC official, Evan Medeiros, said North Korea must show a willingness to discontinue its nuclear program before China and the U.S. will engage in talks with Pyongyang. “We don’t support resumption of talks simply for the sake of a resumption of talks,” Mr. Medeiros said. “Until North Korea demonstrates that it’s serious about denuclearization, until it recommits to denuclearization, until it signals that it’s serious about some kind of dialogue or negotiation process, we’re really not interested.” (Dave Boyer, “Obama, Chinese President Huddle on North Korea’s Nuclear Issue at G-20,” Washington Times, September 6, 2013) President Xi Jinping, in a private meeting with President Obama at Constantine Palace in St. Petersburg, Russia, warned against putting too much pressure on Kim Jong-un, the North’s young, volcanic leader. “A barefoot person does not fear those who wear shoes,” Xi told Mr. Obama, invoking a Chinese proverb to convey that an impoverished nation like North Korea had nothing to lose by standing up to China and the United States. The conversation was recounted by an American diplomat familiar with the talks, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of angering the Chinese. (Javier Hernandez, “China Resists Pressure to Curb North Koreans,” New York Times, January 16, 2016, p. A-7)

KCNA: “Supreme leader Kim Jong Un met ex-NBA star Dennis Rodman and his party on a visit to the DPRK. He warmly greeted them and had a cordial talk with them. Warmly welcoming Dennis Rodman visiting the DPRK again as a friend in a good season, Kim Jong Un told him that he might visit the DPRK any time and spend pleasant days, having a rest. Saying he feels very grateful to Kim Jong Un for sparing a
precious time to meet him and his party despite his tight schedule, Dennis Rodman said this is an expression of good faith towards the Americans. He said that he was fortunate to revisit the DPRK as he has friendly relations with broad-minded Marshal Kim Jong Un. Dennis Rodman evinced his will to contribute to boosting diverse sports and cultural exchange with the DPRK. He presented Kim Jong Un and his wife Ri Sol Ju with a gift he prepared with the deepest respect for them. Kim Jong Un, together with him and his party, watched a basketball match between the April 25 Team and the Amnokgang Team. Kim Jong Un hosted a dinner for Dennis Rodman and his party. Expressing his heartfelt thanks to Kim Jong Un for spending a lot of time for him and his party and according them the warmest hospitality, Dennis Rodman said he would remember this visit as an unforgettable beautiful memory all his life.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong-un Meets Ex-NBA Star and His Party,” September 6, 2013)

The retired N.B.A. star Dennis Rodman said September 9 that on his visit to North Korea last week, the country’s leader, Kim Jong-un, trusted him enough to let him hold his baby daughter and asked him to bring a team of 12 former NBA stars for games in Pyongyang in January and train the North’s basketball team for the next Olympics. Although Mr. Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, was seen pregnant on the North’s state-run television last year, no outsider had reported having seen the baby, much less holding it. In an interview with The Guardian on Sunday, Mr. Rodman called Mr. Kim’s baby “Ju-ae.” Speaking at a news conference arranged in New York by Paddy Power, an Irish betting company that helped finance his trip to Pyongyang, Mr. Rodman also revealed that Kim was 30 years old and that his birthday was January 8. Rodman said Kim gave him the right to write a book about him. “If you meet the marshal over there, he is a very good guy,” Mr. Rodman said. “He doesn’t want a war.” “If he wanted to bomb anyone in the world, he would have done it,” he said. He criticized President Obama for not talking to Kim. Speaking of his “inside track” with Kim, he also challenged Obama to go to talk to him. “Even give him a call, that’s all he wants,” Rodman said, adding that Kim wanted to “change” and wanted conversations with Washington. “We are not a bad country,” he quoted Kim as saying. Rodman said he was not trying to use his friendship with Mr. Kim to win the release of Kenneth Bae, an American missionary imprisoned in the country for “hostile acts.” “If you want this guy to be released, why don’t you ask Obama?” he said. (Choe Sang-hun, “Rodman Gives Details on Trip to Pyongyang,” New York Times, September 10, 2013, p. A-4)

The United States won’t agree to reopen the long-stalled multilateral denuclearization talks with North Korea unless the communist country shows a clear willingness to abandon its nuclear ambitions, a senior U.S. official said. North Korea’s menacing nuclear program was a major topic when Daniel Russel, the assistant U.S. secretary of state for East Asian Pacific affairs, met with South Korean officials in Seoul earlier this week. “The purpose of the six-party talks is to draw up a road map to get to the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula on a clear time table, on a shortest, quickest table as possible,” Russel said in an interview with Yonhap. “So the question that we all need to keep asking ourselves is that does North Korea accept that.” Russel said he is looking for “convincing indications” from North Korea that the six-party forum, if re-convened, would lead to a rapid-paced road map for the North’s denuclearization. “Those are the signs that North Korea needs to send,” he said. “It’s
understandable after so many cycles of broken promises by North Korea that the international community would have high standards of evidence with a call on North Korea to make convincing indications of its seriousness and purpose," Russel said. If North Korea comes to the table only to reject its denuclearization obligations and only to demand a "nuclear status" and the lifting of international sanctions against it, "that's merely grandstanding and it's destructing," he said. (Yonhap, “U.S. Official Calls for Road Map for Denuclearization of N. Korea,” September 8, 2013)

9/7/13

South Korea and the United States have completed a draft of a joint military plan that outlines how to handle the North Korean nuclear threat, a government source said. South Korean and U.S. officials have prepared a customized deterrence plan over the last 10 months, which will be signed at the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the two nation’s defense chiefs slated for Oct. 2, the source said. "The deterrence plan can be considered equivalent to an operational plan," another source said, requesting anonymity. "Making an official document detailing the U.S. nuclear umbrella reflects its firm commitment against North Korea's atomic weapons threat." The written plan encompasses political, diplomatic and military measures to specify how to provide a nuclear umbrella on the Korean Peninsula in the case of North Korean nuclear provocations. The defense ministry later confirmed the drafting of the plan, which it said is aiming to beef up the effectiveness of the U.S. pledge to extend deterrence against the North Korean nuclear threat. "Both countries are in working-level discussions to finalize the plan with an aim to complete it in the forthcoming SCM this year," Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said. The plan details contingency counter-actions against various nuclear provocations from the North, he said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Draw up N. Korean Nuclear Deterrence Plan,” September 8, 2013)

9/10/13

Davies-Cho: “AMBASSADOR CHO: [Translation of Korean] Special Representative Glyn Davies and I had a very serious and productive discussion on the issue of the denuclearization of North Korea. The ROK and the United States once again agreed that the denuclearization is a very important issue that we must resolve. Our two countries are open to resolving this issue through dialogue, and we share the opinion that the dialogue has to be meaningful so that it will lead to real progress in denuclearization. We also have a high assessment of the efforts by China, the chair of the Six-Party Talks. We will endeavor to achieve denuclearization - a goal that we share and must accomplish - through close consultations with others parties of the Six-Party Talks, including China. DAVIES: Thank you very much, Ambassador Cho. The Ambassador and I have just had an excellent hour-long meeting talking about all aspects of the North Korea issue. I have nothing to add to Ambassador Cho’s characterization of the meeting. That is precisely what we discussed, and we reached some strong conclusions in support of the continued solidarity of the United States and the Republic of Korea in moving forward together on this issue. …Q: So why is it so difficult to resume the Six-Party Talks, and what are the obstacles to resuming it? DAVIES: Oh, I am happy to take that on. Well, the obstacle to resuming Six-Party Talks remains very much that North Korea continues to assert its nuclear weapons status. You will recall that not so many months ago they declared the Six-Party process dead, and they said that they would not and would never negotiate on the subject of their
nuclear weapons capability. So I do not believe the issue should be stated in the terms it so often is to the United States, and the ROK, and the other of the five parties, that, you know, “What is the problem? Why can’t you go back to talks?” I think the issue should be, and this was well articulated by my colleague Assistant Secretary Russel during his visit, “What should North Korea be doing to re-establish a basis where Six-Party Talks could meaningfully take place?” And right now, we simply do not see the positive attitude of North Korea toward fulfilling its obligations, its commitments, to living up to UN Security Council Resolutions, and we need to see that. We need to see some sign that they are sincere about what is the central issue of the Six-Party process, which is the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The last thing I will say is we remain open, of course, to dialogue with North Korea. As a diplomat, I would like very much to get back to that, but I think it is important that we only do so when the conditions are right, when North Korea has reversed the direction in which it has been moving for many months now, and when it re-embraces the centrality of denuclearization as the way forward. 

**CHO:** [Translation of Korean] If I may add a few words, the key goal of the Six-Party Talks is denuclearization. North Korea, in the meantime, has declared that it is a nuclear state and has conducted nuclear tests. If we are to resume the Six-Party Talks, we need to once again make clear that we are gathering to achieve denuclearization and be sure that the Six-Party Talks will bring results for denuclearization. In this respect, I can say that not only the ROK and the United States but also countries like Japan, Russia, and China are basically of the same position. 

**Q:** [Translation of Korean] How would you measure North Korea’s authenticity? **CHO:** [Translation of Korean] The September 19 Statement and agreements that were reached during the Six-Party Talks as well as the UN Security Council’s resolutions spell out what actions North Korea has to take. North Korea knows what it has to do. North Korea has to make the fundamental decision to give up its nuclear weapons and walk down the path toward peace. North Korea knows this well. 

**DAVIES:** May I simply add to that? Because first of all, I want to make sure that you know that I associate myself fully with what Ambassador Cho has just said, and I wish to underscore one point that he made earlier, which is that the quality of consultations, of discussions among the five parties really has never been better. Our level of agreement is solid and strong and that, of course, is why we are having this consultation and why I am here in North Asia. 

**Q:** What are your thoughts on the possibilities of holding informal talks between the Six-Party member nations? **DAVIES:** Well, if you are referring to the Chinese proposal, the academic institution that is holding, I believe, a 1.5 meeting on September 18, we commend the Chinese, really, for holding this kind of a discussion, and look forward to hearing from the academics who will gather there to see whether there are any signs that North Korea is willing to reverse direction and come back towards us on the subject, on the question of denuclearization. So I am hoping that it can be an important contribution. I do not think it is yet time, really, for the heads of delegations of the Six-Party process to get together because I do not believe that we yet have the conditions that Ambassador Cho has described for that purpose. But let’s hope that someday soon that consensus is achieved and we are able to go forward. Thank you very much.” Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies and Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Cho Tae-yong, Remarks to the Press at MOFAT, Seoul, September 10, 2013)
U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller, who was in Beijing to meet with Chinese officials, said that a retaliatory strike against the Syrian government would uphold the international norm that chemical weapons must not be used. Miller said he emphasized to his Chinese counterpart that lowering the threshold for chemical weapons use could put U.S. troops at risk and threaten China’s security and that of the entire globe. "I emphasized the massive chemical weapons arsenal that North Korea has and that we didn’t want to live in a world in which North Korea felt that the threshold for chemical weapons usage had been lowered," Miller told reporters at a briefing following his talks Monday with Wang Guanzhong, the Chinese army’s deputy chief of staff. It was strongly in China’s interest that there be a "strong response to Assad’s clear and massive use of chemical weapons," Miller said he told Wang.

China has joined with Russia in blocking action against Syria at the United Nations Security Council and strongly opposes strikes on Syria by the U.S. or its allies in response to an August 21 chemical attack near Damascus. China expressed support, meanwhile, for a Russian plan to avoid military intervention in the Middle Eastern country by getting the Syrian government to agree to put its chemical weapons under international supervision and eventually destroy them. "As long as it eases the tension and helps maintain Syrian and regional peace and stability, and helps politically settle the issue, the global community should consider it positively," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters in Beijing. (Christopher Bodeen, “U.S. Warns of North Korean Chemical Weapons Threat,” Associated Press, September 10, 2013)

South and North Korea agreed to resume operations at a joint industrial complex in the communist country next week after a five-month hiatus, Seoul’s unification ministry said. Under the agreement, which was reached after more than 20 hours of negotiations, South Korean firms will be allowed to restart operations at the site just north of the border after a trial run on September 16, said the ministry. "The understanding reached is significant because it shows various efforts to revise operations systems are making progress and can transform Kaesong into a globally competitive industrial park," said Kim Ki-woong, co-chairman at the committee and Seoul’s top negotiator at the talks. Under the deal, South Korean firms will be exempt from paying taxes for the rest of 2013 and the communist country agreed it will not ask for taxes that went unpaid in 2012 until the end of the year. Originally companies were due to pay taxes for last year in May. "The North said it will waive taxes to compensate losses," Kim said. The Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee and the North’s General Bureau for Central Guidance to the Development of the Special Zone will hold separate talks to resolve the issue of unpaid wages for North Korean laborers who worked several days in April before all operations came to a halt. He said the two sides also adopted an affiliated agreement calling for the realization of a dispute arbitration panel that was never previously established despite existing provisions for such a mediation body. Kim said the Koreas concurred on easing access to the complex by introducing radio-frequency identification devices (RFID) within the year. Even before the RFID system is set up the two sides will work together to make it easier for businessmen to move across the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two countries. At present, the North insists on vehicles forming caravans and strictly regulates the time when crossings can occur. Previously, failure to arrive in time for the crossing can mean being barred from going into Kaesong for three days. "Using RFID
tags can make it possible for people to travel to the North within a given day according
to his or her schedule, and can greatly reduce administrative inconveniences," the top
negotiator said. The agreement also calls for holding an international investor relations
session in October to highlight the merits of the Kaesong complex to potential foreign
companies, and the establishment of a permanent secretariat by the end of the month.
Seoul and Pyongyang said they will continue discussions on allowing South Korean
businessmen to use mobile phones and the Internet in the factory park as part of the
broader effort to transform the mainly Korean economic zone into a true global
manufacturing hub. Lack of Internet connectivity has been cited as a major drawback
to Kaesong’s growth. (Yonhap, “Koreas Agree to Reopen Joint Factory Park Next
Week,” September 11, 2013)

New commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility indicates
that Pyongyang is probably restarting its 5 MWe gas-graphite plutonium production
reactor. Since announcing in early April 2013 its intention to restart this reactor, work
has progressed rapidly over the spring and summer to bring the facility back into
operation. In June 2013, 38 North predicted that the reactor would be ready for restart
by the end of August. Satellite imagery from August 31, 2013 shows white steam rising
from a building near the reactor hall that houses the gas-graphite reactor’s steam
turbines and electric generators. The reactor generates electricity by using the heat
from the nuclear reaction in the core to create steam that spins the turbines. The white
coloration and volume are consistent with steam being vented because the electrical
generating system is about to come online, indicating that the reactor is in or nearing
operation. The 5 MWe reactor is capable of producing six kilograms of plutonium a
year that can be used by Pyongyang to slowly increase the size of its nuclear weapons
stockpile. North Korea now appears to have put the reactor into operation. New
commercial satellite imagery from August 31 shows white steam rising from a building
near the reactor hall. The building in question houses the gas-graphite reactor’s steam
turbines and electric generators. IAEA officials, including then Director General Hans
Blix, visited the building in 1992, examining the turbines and electrical generators
located on the building’s second floor. It is possible to match video footage of the
interior with exterior images of the building in satellite images, based on the distinct
pattern of the windows. The reactor generates electricity by using the heat from the
nuclear reaction in the core to create steam that spins the turbines. The white
coloration and volume are consistent with steam being vented because the electrical
generating system is about to come online, indicating that the reactor is in or nearing
operation. (In the past, steam emissions from the cooling tower were one among many
indicators that the reactor was operating. This is no longer possible now that North
Korea uses the river and pump-house for secondary cooling.) The 5 MWe reactor is
capable of producing 6 kilograms of plutonium a year that can be used by Pyongyang
to slowly increase the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile. (Nick Hansen and Jeffrey
Lewis, “North Korea Restarting Its 5 MW Reactor,” 38North, September 11, 2013)

“These reports, I believe, are unconfirmed. What I can’t do is comment on intelligence
matters ... If it turns out these reports are true ... it would be a very serious matter ... It
would violate a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions,” Special Representative for
North Korea Policy Glyn Davies told reporters in Tokyo. (Reuters, “U.S. Envoy for North
Korea: Reactor Restart Serious Matter, If True,” September 12, 2013) “As we don’t have
inspectors there, we don’t have anything for sure,” Yukiya Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told reporters in Vienna. Pyongyang announced in April that it would revive the aged Yongbyon research reactor, which yields bomb-grade plutonium, saying it was seeking a deterrent capacity. The U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, Joseph Macmanus, said the IAEA board of governors this week “reiterated overwhelmingly” that North Korea must cease all nuclear activities immediately and refrain from taking any steps to restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. (Reuters, “North Korea Reactor Situation ‘Not Clear’: U.N. Nuclear Chief,” September 12, 2013) A Russian diplomatic source told the Interfax news agency, “Our main concern is linked to a very likely man-made disaster as a consequence. The reactor is in a nightmarish state, it is a design dating back to the 1950s,” the Russian source said. “For the Korean peninsula this could entail terrible consequences, if not a man-made catastrophe.” The Russian diplomat speaking to Interfax said he did not know for sure whether North Korea had relaunched the facility mothballed in 2007. “It is obvious that some works are being conducted, and for a long time at that. According to some signs, steps were indeed being taken to relaunch it,” the diplomat said. “We do not have any information that the reactor has been relaunched.” (Anna Malpas, “Russia Warns of ‘Catastrophe’ If N. Koreaa Restarts Reactor,” AFP, September 12, 2013)

“DAVIES: [I’m in] Tokyo for talks with members of the Japanese government, in particular today very good discussions with Director General Ihara on all aspects of the North Korea issue. Then I had a very productive meeting with my good friend Shinsuke Sugiyama again on the North Korea issue. …Q: You have seen the reports that North Korea has restarted its 5 megawatt reactor at Yongbyon? DAVIES: Well of course. We’ve seen these reports, these reports that appeared on the very good and authoritative website “38 North” in the United States. These reports, I believe, are as yet unconfirmed. You’ll understand that what I cannot do of course is comment on intelligence matters, but I will say this about that: If it turns out that these reports are true, that North Korea has restarted the 5 megawatt plutonium reactor, this would be a very serious matter. We think a misstep on the part of North Korea because of course it would violate a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions. It flies in the face of North Korea’s own commitments and promises they’ve made over the years, in particular the September 2005 Joint Statement. So this would be a step that we regard very seriously. I will also point out that the board of governors of the IAEA, which met this week in Vienna, passed a resolution on the subject of North Korea’s nuclear activities. It underscored the importance that North Korea should not follow through on the indication that they made on April 2, when they said that they would restart and repurpose their nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, because it would be in violation of international law and of their own commitments. So we’re watching this very closely. We’ll see what developments occur in the coming days, but this is potentially quite a serious matter. Q: Mr. Davies, this is a very important international issue. Without getting into the details of the intelligence, can you confirm at this time reports that are out there that Yongbyon has restarted? DAVIES: Well, as I said, we obviously watch very closely what is happening in North Korea and what is happening in particular at Yongbyon. What I cannot do is get into - comment on - intelligence matters. We will watch this in coming days, and we’ll see whether it is confirmed that they have
restarted this reactor. It’s serious, and my purpose in coming here today is to continue the very close consultations that we have maintained over recent months and years with our partners in the five-party process, in particular our allies Japan and the ROK, and it is true that in my several years in this job I have never seen a stronger, firmer consensus among the five parties of the Six-Party process about the importance of denuclearization as the issue at the centerpiece of Six-Party. So we’ll see what the news brings us in coming days. Q: The Chinese government seems to be making noise to resume Six-Party Talks. Could you describe briefly the meeting with your counterpart Wu Dawei? DAVIES: Well, I don’t want to get into discussing in-depth diplomatic conversations in China. We had excellent conversations. I can say something very general about the subject of Six-Party Talks: Obviously, ultimately, we hope that we can get back to meaningful, authentic, and credible Six-Party Talks, but you know there’s an issue right now - what are Six-Party Talks to be about? They should be about - because this is what the Joint Statement of 2005 specifies - they should be about the denuclearization in a peaceful fashion of the Korean peninsula. It seems clear that North Korea is attempting to make these talks, when and if they occur in the future, about something very different, which is about their right to be a nuclear weapons state. That is not something we can countenance. That is not something we can accept. And that is the purpose of our diplomacy in talking to all of our partners among the five parties. Certainly that was at the center of our discussions in Beijing, to ensure that as we develop a roadmap back to Six-Party - and as importantly discuss what Six-Party Talks would be all about - that we reaffirm that Six-Party can only be about denuclearization. We hope that North Korea comes back in the direction of that fundamental fact, that when - if - we’re able to get back to Six-Party, it is about denuclearization. It must be about that. That, for us, is the most important issue, and that is increasingly true along all five of the partners with which we are having this intensive diplomacy." (Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies, Remarks at MOFA, Tokyo, September 13, 2013)

9/14/13 A South Korean weightlifter heard his national anthem played after winning gold in an international competition in North Korea, an unusual development between the bitter rivals and a vivid sign of the Koreas' easing tensions after a spring of war threats. (Associated Press, “South Korea Wins Gold in North Korea,” September 14, 2013)

9/16/13 Inmates in North Korea’s prison camps have suffered starvation, torture and other "unspeakable atrocities," U.N. human rights investigators said in their first report on violations in the reclusive state. The paper, swiftly rejected by Pyongyang, uncovered a pattern of human rights abuses, the head of the independent inquiry told the U.N. Human Rights Council. Inquiry head Michael Kirby said the findings were based on testimony from North Korean exiles, including former political prison camps inmates, given at public hearings in Seoul and Tokyo last month. "They are representative of large-scale patterns that may constitute systematic and gross human rights violations," Kirby added. The former justice of Australia’s top court told the council: "I have been a judge for a very long time and I’m pretty hardened to testimony. But the testimony that I saw in Seoul and in Tokyo brought tears to my eyes on several occasions, including testimony of Mr. And Mrs. Yokota." Some North Korean exiles testified that they had faced torture and imprisonment "for doing nothing more than watching foreign soap
opers on DVDs”, Kirby said. A North Korean woman testified how she “witnessed a female prisoner forced to drown her own baby in a bucket”. Kirby cited testimony of torture, starvation, and punishing generations of families under the so-called practice of “guilt by association.” Kirby said the independent inquiry would seek to determine which North Korean institutions and officials were responsible. North Korean diplomat Kim Yong Ho said the inquiry was a fake and defamatory “political plot” to force regime change in North Korea. It had been politicized by the European Union and Japan, “in alliance with the U.S. hostile policy”, Kim said. “We will continue to oppose any attempt of regime change and pressure under pretext of ‘human rights protection’,” he said. North Korea’s main ally China, joined by Belarus and Syria, were among countries defending it during the 90-minute debate. “Politicized accusations and pressures are not helpful to improving human rights in any country. On the contrary they will only provoke confrontation and undermine the foundation and atmosphere for international human rights cooperation,” said Chinese diplomat Chen Chuandong. Shin Dong-hyuk, North Korea’s best-known defector who escaped a political prison camp where he was born, was among those who testified in South Korea. Kirby, referring to Shin, said: “We think of the testimony of a young man, imprisoned from birth and living on rodents, lizards and grass to survive and witnessing the public execution of his mother and his brother.” The investigators, who have not had access to the country despite repeated requests, said the testimony by defectors and other witnesses and “extensive evidence” stood unanswered. Kirby challenged Pyongyang to produce "an ounce of evidence" in its defense. (Stephanie Nebehay, “North Korean Inmates Starved and Tortured, Abuse Widespread: U.N.,” Reuters, September 17, 2013)

PM Abe Shinzo called for the groundwork to be laid for a review of the government’s current interpretation of the Constitution to enable Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Abe issued the call as a government panel of experts on security matters resumed discussions after a seven-month hiatus, as he aims to redefine the country’s defense posture amid security challenges such as China’s maritime assertiveness and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The panel, headed by Yanai Shunji, a former ambassador to the United States, is expected to consider which countries under armed attack Japan would defend and where the Self-Defense Forces could be deployed overseas for that purpose. (Kyodo, “Abe Seeks Debate over Self-Imposed Ban on Collective Self-Defense,” September 17, 2013)

There’s a scene in Kim Jong-dae’s Roh Moo-hyun: Across the Threshold of an Era, when former President Roh’s Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young’s frustration boils over. In the book Chung, who also served as Roh National Security Council Chairman, reacts to then-foreign minister (and current UN Secretary General) Ban Ki-moon’s skepticism toward a peace treaty with North Korea – on the grounds that it might undermine the South Korea-U.S. alliance – by shouting at Ban and banging on a desk. When asked why the September 19 deal collapsed, Chung blamed the neoconservatives in the George W. Bush’s government. “The U.S. neocons believe North Korean nuclear issue is by definition a question of the North Korean regime so the nuclear issue has to be resolved through regime change,” he said, “Generally it is believed that North Korea didn’t keep the agreements but the actual facts tell a
different story. Historical fact shows that the neocons abhorred negotiation and didn’t recognize the September 19 Joint Statement, the product of negotiation with North Korea.” After the exit of the neocons and then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s taking up of North Korea policy, the Bush administration changed its approach and showed an interest in a peace treaty with the North. However, the foreign ministry and the Ministry of Unification had conflicting views on the peace treaty issue. “While the Ministry of Unification enthusiastically supported a peace treaty, the foreign ministry didn’t share such enthusiasm and placed too much weight on the ROK-U.S. alliance,” he said. This led to the dispute so memorably captured in Kim Jong-dae’s book. “But the Ministry of Unification also considered inter-Korean relations a significant axis.” Despite Chung’s insistence that the scene itself is exaggerated, he does not deny that a conflict existed within the Roh government over North Korea policy. “However, (the conflict) was not between Ban Ki-moon and Chung Dong-young as individuals but between the views of the unification ministry and the foreign ministry,” he said. “The foreign ministry basically sees a peace treaty as a North Korean trickery. Peace with the North means an absence of a foreign military presence so they assume the peace treaty is the groundwork for the North to make the U.S. forces in South Korea withdraw.” Chung called this view outdated. “Everything changes. Even the North Korea’s position on a peace treaty and a withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea has changed,” he said. “Before the 1990s, the North was demanding the withdrawal of USFK as a prerequisite for a peace treaty. However in 1992, the Secretary of South Korea policy Kim Yong-sun visited Arnold Kanter, then undersecretary of state, and delivered Kim Il Sung’s message that it would approve the U.S. military presence on the peninsula on the condition of the establishment of diplomacy. “When Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang and when the first inter-Korean summit took place later in 2000, the North agreed that the U.S. military presence in the peninsula is necessary considering the geopolitical conditions of the peninsula.” (Subin Kim, “Former Unification Minister Frustrated by Missed Opportunities,” NK News, September 17, 2013)

9/18/13

“We are ready to enter the six-party talks without preconditions,” North Korea’s First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan told a forum organized by China’s foreign ministry in Beijing. Kim said “preconditions” set by South Korea and the United States, however, “are in violation of the spirit of the September 19 Joint Statement,” referring to a landmark agreement reached in 2005 at the six-party talks. The one-day forum has been arranged by China to mark the 10th anniversary of the launching of the six-party talks and the eighth anniversary of the 2005 agreement. Titled “Retrospects and Outlooks: A Decade of the Six-Party Talks,” the meeting comes amid renewed efforts by China to revive the six-party channel, but South Korea, the U.S. and Japan have shown a cool response to it in the absence of a clear North Korean willingness to disarm. “Attaching preconditions to our offer of dialogue would cause mistrust,” Kim said, urging South Korea, the U.S. and Japan to re-start the six-party process “before it is too late.” “Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula is a dying wish of our late leaders and our country’s policy goal,” Kim said. “We support the six-party talks, and we are willing to resume dialogue under the framework of the six-party talks, including a small-scale dialogue,” he said. Kim’s remarks echoed a proposal made by the North’s top military official to hold “four-party talks” with South Korea, China and the United
States to discuss its nuclear weapons program. (Kim Deok-hyun, “N. Korea Urges Resumption of Nuclear Talks ‘Without Preconditions,’” Yonhap, September 18, 2013)

Kim said, "We support the six-party talks, and we are willing to resume dialogue under the framework of the six-party talks, including a small-scale dialogue." Qu Xing, president of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) who attended the closed-door forum, told reporters after the forum that there were "differences" over ways to resume the six-party talks. "But, I want to emphasize that differences were shown with a very amicable atmosphere as well as constructive atmosphere," he said. North Korea’s chief delegate to the six-party talks, Ri Yong-ho, reiterated his country’s willingness to discuss "all possible things" if the six-party talks resume, Qu said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Urges Resumption of Six-party Talks ‘without Preconditions,'” North Korea Newsletter, No. 280, September 26, 2013) [Kim also reiterated all the key principles of September 2005]

9/20/13

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in a talk about U.S.-China relations at the Brookings Institution said that the North has recently said it is ready to come back to a 2005 commitment on giving up nuclear weapons, and to an agreement it reached with the United States in February last year on freezing its nuclear programs in exchange for food aid. The U.S. remains very skeptical about Pyongyang’s intentions. Wang met yesterday with Secretary of State John Kerry. Beforehand, Wang said he was confident they could reach "a new, important agreement" on how to relaunch the long-stalled disarmament talks that were originally hosted by Beijing. "Now that the DPRK side has reiterated it will come back to the denuclearization goal it is time for the six parties to have serious dialogue to work out how we can achieve that goal," Wang said through an interpreter. (Matthew Pennington, “China: N. Korea Ready to Make Nuclear Commitment,” Associated Press, September 23, 2013)

9/21/13

North Korea abruptly postponed the planned reunions for families separated for six decades since the Korean War, accusing the South of seeking confrontation with it and dealing a blow to the recent warming of relations between the two sides. The North also postponed the planned negotiations with the South, slated for October 2, on how to reopen the mountain resort. Officials at the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae expressed disappointment. "The separated families have been counting down the days until the reunions. North Korea shouldn’t act like this on a humanitarian issue," a presidential official said. Rep. Bae Jae-jeung of the main opposition Democratic Party said the North should understand that such an about-face in its position never contributes to improvement in inter-Korean relations. She also urged the South’s government to make greater efforts to get Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Abruptly Postpones Family Reunions with S. Korea,” September 21, 2013)

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea spokesman’s statement: “Thanks to the DPRK’s sincere proposals for dialogue and its positive efforts, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, which had reached an extreme phase, has been put on the orbit of détente and the north-south relations are improving. However, such hard-won inter-Korean ties are again inching close to a serious crisis due to the reckless and vicious confrontation racket of the south Korean conservative group. It describes a series of
successes registered in the north-south relations recently as a fruition of its "theory of principle", claiming that it is "the result of confidence-building process on the Korean Peninsula", and "the principled policy towards the north" is "pulling" the DPRK. It slandered the tour of Mt. Kumgang, an undertaking common to the nation, as a "source of money making" by the north. In reference to the international games hosted by the north according to practice and rules, it is foolishly trumpeting about "change" and the like. This is the height of the practice of a guilty party filing the suit first. It is an unpardonable mockery and insult to the good faith, magnanimity and sincere efforts of the DPRK. Dialogue and negotiations are taking place between the north and the south despite the extreme confrontation racket of totally negating the social system in the DPRK now under way in south Korea. This is entirely ascribable to the invariable efforts of the DPRK to implement the north-south joint declaration. Nevertheless, the group describes the progress made in the inter-Korean ties thanks to the sincere efforts of the DPRK as the fruition of their "theory of principle". This is shameless and gangster-like behavior. The south Korean regime is now busy with war drills and arms build-up against compatriots in league with its American master, crying out for achieving "unification under liberal democracy" behind the scene of dialogue. It is frantically staging an alarming "witch-hunting campaign" aimed at cracking down upon all progressive democrats, who call for reconciliation and unity and reunification between the north and the south, by branding them as "pro-communist elements" and "forces following the north" on absurd charges that the "case of plotted rebellion" is linked with the north. It is hard to expect any normal dialogue and the development of the inter-Korean ties in such terror-ridden atmosphere in which even the hard-won inter-Korean dialogue is being abused by the group for confrontation with compatriots and it is going mad with war drills against the north and repressive racket. The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) clarifies the following stance as regards the prevailing grave situation:

1. The DPRK puts on hold the reunion of separated families and relatives from the north and the south scheduled to take place between the north and the south till a normal atmosphere is created for dialogue and negotiations. It is impossible to properly settle any elementary humanitarian issue but only a vicious cycle of confrontation will repeat itself as long as the south Korean conservative regime is abusing all dialogues and negotiations as means for confrontation, regarding the north-south relations as hostile ties. The DPRK declares that the talks on resuming the tour of Mt. Kumgang will be postponed, too, which the south Korean puppet regime uses as a lever for smear campaign against the DPRK and regards as a means for confrontation.

2. The DPRK will take strong and decisive counteractions against the south Korean puppet regime’s ever-escalating war provocations to it. Dialogue can never go together with war. It is sadly mistaken if it thinks the bad habit dating back to the era of dictatorship when traitors trumpeted about "confrontation accompanied with dialogue" would work even today. The DPRK will never allow any slight attempt at provocation on the part of the south Korean warmongers but take a strong counteraction against it.

3. The DPRK will never remain a passive onlooker to the conspiratorial moves against the DPRK and all sorts of suppression of the pro-reunification patriots being
perpetrated under the pretext of linkage to it. Such vicious anti-DPRK conspiratorial moves and the harsh suppression of those pro-reunification patriots in south Korea only bring to light the true colors of the conservative group as confrontation maniacs as they are a revelation of extreme hostility towards compatriots. The fascist action of the group to eliminate all those who call for reconciliation and unity with compatriots is nothing but an ulterior intention to pursue confrontation with the DPRK to the last.

The south Korean conservative regime is wholly to blame for the prevailing situation as it abuses dialogue for pursuing confrontation. The DPRK will do its best for the development of the inter-Korean ties and peace and prosperity but it has no idea of showing good faith and magnanimity even for those keen to pursue confrontation with it to the last. The DPRK will closely watch the future developments in south Korea.” (KCNA, “S. Korean Regime Slammed for Abusing Inter-Korean Dialogue for Pursuing Confrontation,” September 21, 2013)

KCNA: “The situation on the Korean Peninsula is reaching the phase of detente and the inter-Korean relations are inching close to reconciliation and cooperation. But there are forces throwing obstacles in this way. Recently the chief executive of south Korea and other high-ranking politicians vied with each other to bluster that the atmosphere of reconciliation created thanks to the DPRK’s sincere proposal for dialogue and positive efforts is ascribable to “their pulling” and it is the fruition of their “principled policy toward the north.” They termed the tour of Mt. Kumgang a source of “money-making” by the north and went the lengths of describing the international games hosted by it according to practice and rules as a "change," a silly story. This is nothing but an unbearable mockery and provocation to the DPRK which has shown magnanimity and sincerity to realize the desire of the fellow countrymen despite all sorts of difficulties. It is worth recalling how the situation on the Korean Peninsula has been put on the orbit of detente though it had been driven into an extreme phase. Who has made sincere efforts to settle in a broad-minded manner such issues as putting the shuttered Kaesong Industrial Zone on the orbit of regular operation and realizing the reunion of separated families and their relatives, a tragedy resulting from the nation’s division, and resuming the tour of Mt. Kumgang which had been suspended. As a matter of fact, the DPRK has so far overlooked even the confrontation racket kicked up by the south Korean conservative group for the sake of national reconciliation and development of inter-Korean relations, though it is something unpardonable in the light of common sense. This being a hard reality, the south Korean puppet regime is rattling the nerves of the DPRK, dialogue partner, by kicking up such extreme rackets for confrontation as totally denying its social system, misinterpreting its good faith and magnanimity. It is busy with north-targeted war maneuvers and arms buildup, vociferating about "unification under liberal democracy" behind the scene of dialogue and “striking the north by crossing the Military Demarcation Line” in league with its American master. It is staging such "witch-hunt campaign" as cracking down on all pro-democracy figures who call for inter-Korean reconciliation, unity and reunification, branding them as "pro-communist elements" and "those following the north" after deliberately linking the "case of attempted rebellion" with the north. Dialogue and negotiations have taken place between the north and the south under such situation, a fruition of the DPRK’s patient efforts. However, the south Korean puppet regime is trumpeting
that progress made in the inter-Korean relations is ascribable to its "theory of principle" and rattling the nerves of the DPRK, its dialogue partner. This is a revelation of its ulterior design to escalate confrontation with the latter. And this cannot be construed otherwise than behaviors of hooligans bereft of even elementary human ethics. The conservative group’s trumpeting about reconciliation and confidence-building is no more than an empty talk to deceive the world public and the compatriots. Its ulterior purpose is to incite confrontation with the DPRK. It is none other than the conservative group which talks about dialogue in public but orchestrates an alarming scenario of confrontation behind the scene. Is it possible to have normal dialogue and discuss the issue of mending the inter-Korean relations with those brandishing daggers before their dialogue partner? It is as clear as a pikestaff that no issue can be properly settled under the prevailing situation where the conservative group abuses dialogue and negotiations as a lever for inciting confrontation, regarding the north-south relations as those between foes.

"confrontation accompanied by dialogue" remains a principle of the group, one should not expect any elementary progress in the inter-Korean relations. The south Korean conservative group is wholly to blame for the prevailing situation."


KCNA: “The working-level talks between authorities of the north and the south of Korea for the reunion of separated families and their relatives scheduled to be held on the occasion of the Harvest Moon Day and the resumption of the tour of Mt. Kumgang have been postponed indefinitely, as reported on Saturday [September 21].

The Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea in its information bulletin No. 1042 on Sunday said: The south Korean puppet regime is to wholly blame for this. It is a product of its vicious moves for confrontation with fellow countrymen as it malignantly slandered the broad-minded and sincere efforts of the DPRK to improve the inter-Korean relations and its will for dialogue and deliberately blocked the undertakings for achieving national reconciliation and improving the inter-Korean relations. All Koreans are expressing surging resentment at the puppet regime which has driven the inter-Korean relations again into confrontation and tensions, the bulletin said, and went on: Much upset by this, the puppet regime made a spokesman for the Ministry of Unification release a "statement to the north" in which he was so base as to evade the responsibility for it, letting loose a string of poor excuses that "it is regrettable" and "the south worked hard to bring the relations to normal by building confidence in the spirit of mutual recognition and peace." Worse still, it termed the just steps and warnings of the DPRK "acts against humanity." It went the lengths of trumpeting about "decisive countermeasure" and "international sanctions and resolute retaliation", revealing again its true colors as confrontation maniacs. This is a revelation of its treacherous scenario to evade its blame for the grave situation through its confrontation with the DPRK and mud-slinging, stoke hatred and antagonism towards the DPRK and stem the trend towards the improved inter-Korean relations. It is talking about "settlement of humanitarian issue" while taking issue with the DPRK but it is nothing but hypocrisy. The south Korean authorities have no face to talk about humanitarianism. There were two rounds of reunion of separated families and their relatives at Mt. Kumgang resort in the period of the previous regime when the inter-
Korean confrontation was at its height, thanks to the proposal and positive efforts of the north as is the case with the planned reunion. This is a well known fact. Feeling extremely uneasy about the desire for peaceful reunification growing strong in south Korea, the regime let conservative media and die-hard confrontation maniacs clamor about the fruition of "process for confidence-building on the Korean Peninsula" and "fruition of the theory of principle." It staged madcap war maneuvers targeted against the DPRK and made much ado about "pro-communist elements" and "forces following the north," going against the trend of improving the inter-Korean relations. It is unpardonable violation and mockery of humanitarianism for the warmongers to talk about "human ethics", while going hysterical with fever of war against the DPRK after massively introducing war hardware into south Korea. The DPRK stands for the settlement of the inter-Korean relations and their improvement including humanitarian undertakings but will never remain a passive onlooker to the reckless acts to encroach upon its dignity and self-esteem even a bit and hurt it. The prospect of the inter-Korean relations will entirely depend on the attitude of the south Korean authorities." (KCNA, “South Korean Authorities Slammed for Confrontation with Fellow Countrymen," September 22, 2013)

Russia re-opened a railway link with North Korea, holding out the prospect of increased trade for the reclusive nation with its biggest neighbors after years of international sanctions. Impoverished and squeezed by sanctions for conducting a series of nuclear and missile tests, North Korea has reached out to Moscow and Beijing for help to fill the gap left by the drying up of South Korean and U.S. economic assistance. The head of Russia’s state railway monopoly said the 54-km (34-mile) track from the Russian eastern border town of Khasan to the North Korean port of Rajin would export coal and import goods from South Korea and other Asian countries. The link is part of a more ambitious plan for a railway line from Europe to Asia, which could offer faster freight transportation than alternative sea routes. "This is part of a trans-Korean transport line that will link ... this region with Europe via Russian territory," Russian Railways chief Vladimir Yakunin said on a visit to Rajin to mark the completion of the railway line. (Gleb Stolyarov, “Russia Reopens Railway Link with North Korea,“ Reuters, September 22, 2013)

New commercial satellite imagery indicates North Korea probably tested a long-range rocket engine between August 25 and 30, 2013 at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. This conclusion is based on analysis of imagery from before and after the probable test and a combination of indicators including the presence of a probable rocket stage, a crane necessary to mount and remove the rocket engine and propellant tanks on the test stand, instrumentation used to monitor tests as well as changes in the appearance of vegetation in front of the flame trench (from green to brown) and inside the flame trench located at the stand. While the dimensions of the rocket stage—about 2.5 meters wide and 9-10 meters long—indicate use as a long-range rocket engine, it is not possible to positively identify the type of engine tested given uncertainties in the resolution of commercial satellite imagery. Other possibilities include the second stage of the Unha-3 space launch vehicle (SLV), an improved version of that engine or a second or third stage engine for a much larger rocket.
suspected to be under development. (Nick Hansen, “Probable Rocket Test Conducted at Sohae,” 38North, September 13, 2013)

North Korean scientists have learned to produce crucial components of gas centrifuges inside their isolated country, undermining years of export controls and sanctions intended to stop the country's enrichment of uranium for nuclear weapons, according to an analysis by two American arms control experts made available today. The analysis comes as experts have reported other signs that North Korea is activating or expanding its nuclear production facilities. Taken together, they suggest a new effort by the North to master all the facets of the nuclear production cycle – or perhaps to give the impression of nuclear progress that would drive new offers of talks or economic aid, in the view of some analysts. The new study focuses on production of advanced centrifuges, a technically difficult feat that the United States and others have tried to make harder for the North with a network of sanctions and bans on the export of sophisticated parts and metals. “That means, unfortunately, that we won’t be in a good position to spot them expanding the program through foreign shopping expeditions, and that policies based on export controls, sanctions and interdiction won’t get much traction, either,” said Joshua Pollack, one of the experts presenting the findings this week. “The deeper implication, if they are able to expand the program unchecked, is that we’ll never be too confident that we know where all the centrifuges are. And that in turn could put a verifiable denuclearization deal out of reach.” Pollack’s findings in collaboration with Scott Kemp, an expert on centrifuge technology at M.I.T., will be presented during a conference organized by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul. Pollack said he and Kemp had analyzed such open-source data as scientific journals, news reports and propaganda from North Korea to find evidence that the country is learning – or has already learned – how to make such crucial centrifuge components and related technologies and materials as uranium hexafluoride, vacuum pumps, frequency inverters, magnetic top bearings and maraging steel. He said that domestic production appeared to have begun no later than 2009. Last month, the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington cited satellite images to report that North Korea appears to have doubled the size of the building that housed the uranium enrichment plant in Yongbyon in recent months, and raising concerns that its enrichment capability would grow along with it. This month, another monitoring group, the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, cited satellite photographs showing steam emerging from the Yongbyon reactor, suggesting that the North was following through on its vow to resume plutonium production. South Korean officials declined to comment on the American scholars’ findings or on the North’s centrifuge capabilities in general. Kang Jung-min, a nuclear scientist at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology who said he was familiar with the work by Kemp and Pollack, said he agreed with their analysis. Hecker, the Stanford professor, said he agreed for the most part with the analysis, though he said it was still unclear whether North Korea can indigenously produce the high-strength grades of maraging steel used in the rotor-tube of a centrifuge – one of the most difficult steps in centrifuge production. “Having said that, if North Korea does indeed double the size of its Yongbyon centrifuge plant (all we know so far is that the roof is now expanded by a factor of two), then the likelihood of indigenous fabrication of maraging steel has increased,” Hecker said in
an e-mail interview. Since Hecker’s visit to Yongbyon in 2010, he and other experts have said that North Korea was likely to have produced and hidden many more centrifuges elsewhere in the country. Unlike the North’s old plutonium program, which involved a highly visible nuclear reactor, centrifuge plants are relatively easy to hide, they say. In 2011, Chosun Ilbo quoted an anonymous defector from North Korea as saying that the country had been building centrifuges in Huichon, an industrial town about 35 miles northeast of Yongbyon, since the late 1990s. He said the North had imported the motors for centrifuges from such countries as Japan, France and Russia.

How to ensure that North Korea does not lie about the scale of its nuclear weapons program was a central dispute behind the collapse of six-nation talks aimed at ending the North’s nuclear weapons programs in late 2008. That dispute will be harder to settle if the North can produce centrifuges indigenously. North Korea and its main ally, China, have recently tried to reconvene the six-nation talks. But the United States and its allies have said they will resume the talks only if the North agrees to eventually give up its nuclear arsenal. As evidence to back up their analysis, Pollack and Kemp cited photographs of Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader who died in 2011, and his son and the current leader, Kim Jong-un, visiting underground tunnels to inspect increasingly sophisticated machine tools of the kind needed to make centrifuge rotors. They also cited accounts of iron- and steelmaking technologies in North Korean publications, as well as scientific reports and patent awards that they said described work on centrifuge production. Pollack said that domestic production of centrifuge components might explain why American officials were caught off guard when the North unveiled its centrifuge plant in Yongbyon in 2010 and why North Koreans seem to have been able to expand the plant lately despite few indications of shipments of specialty steel and other imports from the outside in recent years. “The most likely answer is, by producing the necessary components and materials at home,” he said. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea North Korea Said to Learn to Make Key Nuclear Parts,” New York Times, September 24, 2013, p. A-10)

Albright and Heinonen: “After reading the summary paper presented at a conference in Seoul on September 25, 2013, “New insights into North Korea’s gas centrifuge enrichment program” by Joshua Pollack, with the aid of R. Scott Kemp, we remain unconvinced about its central conclusions. In particular, we disagree with several that have been widely reported in the media, such as that policies based on export controls, sanctions and interdiction “won’t get much traction” and a verifiable denuclearization deal may be “out of reach.” We have identified several problems from the summary of the forthcoming analysis which would undermine those as well as other conclusions they draw. …The summary paper seems to assert that North Korea is likely now self-sufficient in making large numbers of centrifuges. Certainly North Korea can make centrifuge components domestically and would be expected to be seeking, like Pakistan and Iran, independence to the extent possible from foreign supply. But there is a wide range of materials and equipment needed to make these components; many goods are also required for centrifuge and cascade assembly and centrifuge plant operation. Moreover, other cases have demonstrated that proliferant states historically have been unable to rely in each of these aspects on domestic supplies. The analysis as outlined in the Seoul paper has not demonstrated that North Korea is likely producing indigenously the necessary components, materials, and equipment, even in most of the six areas that are called in the paper the “most important” ones, let alone the many goods needed in other critical
areas that are in fact just as important. For example, the conclusions in the summary paper strongly imply that North Korea can indigenous produce computer-numerically controlled (CNC) flow forming machines able to make on a sustained basis maraging steel rotor tubes for P2-type centrifuges. To support this assertion, the summary paper references analysis on Arms Control Wonk, which in turn references other Arms Control Wonk postings, but these postings mainly involve pictures of flow forming machines in North Korean facilities combined with considerable speculation. Some of the speculation has proven wrong. The analyses on Arms Control Wonk do not show that any of these flow forming machines are involved in centrifuge rotor manufacturing or that they are suitable for such manufacturing. One of the CNC flow forming machines in fact looks like a European manufactured one, according to two experts in flow forming machines, who independently looked at the pictures. A European name plate is not visible, but nameplates can be switched. ISIS has moreover learned of recent, on-going illicit diversion of advanced CNC machine tools (>5-axis) to North Korea that were originally exported to China with a proviso that they would not be retransferred out of China. If North Korea were capable of producing CNC flow forming machines able to make thin-walled P2 rotors on a production-scale, would it not be capable of making these advanced CNC machine tools as well? Yet, it still buys these machine tools internationally and in violation of national export laws. North Korea could have also stockpiled many goods for its gas centrifuge program before sanctions and export controls were tightened, a point that would also explain North Korea’s expansion of its centrifuge program. When the U.S. government started to share information about the then suspected centrifuge program, many other governments started to pay increased attention to North Korean imports and its smuggling efforts. These detection and counterproliferation efforts were further intensified by the United Nations Security Council resolutions after the underground nuclear tests. Thus, North Korea may have acquired many of the necessary centrifuge-related goods relatively easily in earlier years and has them now in stock, explaining its ability to expand its centrifuge program. North Korea’s earlier procurement success does not show necessarily that export control and sanctions systems cannot work, only that countries like China should have taken a harder look at North Korea’s smuggling efforts. …We await the full technical paper and hope it will address our concerns. But until the technical paper is publicly available for peer review, we must recommend that the broader conclusions as reported in the media about indigenous centrifuge production, the inability of export controls and sanctions to ever work, and the slim prospects for verified denuclearization be set aside for now as likely incorrect, or at least greatly overstated. The possible conclusion of the paper that export controls and sanctions are no longer effective or are unable to ever control the supply of illicit goods to North Korea may undermine, as a matter of policy, the justification for these efforts. Instead, we have found that these measures remain critically important to preventing North Korea from obtaining the high technology goods and materials that it still cannot produce itself and needs to further expand its centrifuge and other nuclear programs. If anything, the priority is strengthening these measures with China’s cooperation.” (David Albright and Olli Heinonen, “In Response to Recent Questionable Claims about North Korea’s Indigenous Production of Centrifuges,” ISIS Reports, October 18, 2013)
Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications for the White House, said that North Korea is at a different stage of nuclear development than Iran, since the North already possesses nuclear weapons. Rhodes made this statement in response to a reporter who mentioned that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu compared Iran to North Korea and asked whether this was an appropriate comparison. The question was asked during a press gaggle held aboard Air Force One, the plane used by the US President, en route to New York. “The comparison is simply that they are two nations that have not abided by international nonproliferation norms,” Rhodes said. “But the fact of the matter is North Korea already has a nuclear weapon. They acquired one, tested one in the beginning of 2006. And Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapon.” He explained, “And that’s all the more reason why we need to take steps to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon so that we’re not presented with the type of situation that we have in North Korea where you’re seeking to denuclearize a country that has already crossed that threshold.” He added, “That’s why we’ve put in place a sanctions regime. That’s why we’ve also held open the door to a diplomatic resolution.” (Park Hyun, “U.S. Official Makes Open Mention of N. Korean Nukes,” Hankyore, September 25, 2013)

China has tightened restrictions on North Korea by issuing a long list of weapons-related technology and materials banned from export to its neighbor, reflecting Beijing’s desire to get Pyongyang to scrap its nuclear programs and rejoin disarmament talks. The announcement posted on the Chinese Commerce Ministry website comes as two American experts said that Pyongyang can now make crucial equipment for producing uranium-based bombs on its own, cutting out imports that had been one of the few ways outsiders could monitor the country’s secretive atomic work. The list of forbidden items includes those with both civilian and military applications in the nuclear, ballistic, chemical and biological fields. The notice said the list was aimed at boosting enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea passed since 2006. The move is a continuation of China’s new policy of putting slightly greater pressure on North Korea to coax it back to disarmament talks, said Li Mingjiang, China security expert at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. China could have simply implemented the ban, but announcing it so publicly was a sign to the U.S. and the rest of the international community that Beijing is sincere in meeting its commitments, Li said. He said it’s also a rebuke to Pyongyang. “The leaders in Pyongyang will hate this. They’ll be angry,” Li said. Pyongyang likely will "swallow the bitter pill" and may respond with concessions, he said. (Christopher Bodeen, “China Lists Items Banned from N. Korea,” Associated Press, September 24, 2013) In a sign of growing concern about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, China published a long list of equipment and chemical substances to be banned from export to North Korea for fear they could be used in adding to its increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons programs. If put into place, the export controls would be some of the strongest steps taken by China, the North’s closest ally, to try to limit the country’s nuclear programs. The announcement indicates that China is now following through on some United Nations Security Council sanctions it approved months ago, according to a noted American arms expert. The list of banned items was released amid a flurry of reports suggesting that North Korea is accelerating its two nuclear weapons programs. The move also comes less than a week after China made an unsuccessful attempt to revive
talks aimed at persuading the North to give up its nuclear capabilities. The United States continues to resist restarting the talks, which North Korea has used in the past to extract concessions without making long-term changes to its nuclear program. “The release of the new export control list is a signal China is concerned about the speeding up of weaponization” of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, said Zhu Feng, the deputy director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies at Beijing University, who called the move “very important.” In particular, he said, the Chinese are concerned about resumption of plutonium production at the Yongbyon complex, the centerpiece of North Korea’s nuclear program. Another Chinese expert on North Korea, who declined to be identified because of his position in the government, said the publication of the list “says that China is increasingly unsatisfied with North Korea’s actions.” “This is one of the practical actions to show it,” he said. David Albright, the American expert who said China was now implementing the United Nations sanctions passed in March, added that the Chinese ban “will help, since North Korea procures so much from China.” Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, added that China could take additional measures to “dramatically increase the inspection of goods into North Korea by road and rail.” China has moved before to stop the export of other technologies that could be used in nuclear programs, including missile technology, though it did not single out any countries when it did so. The items on the list were called “dual-use technologies” because they can be used for either civilian or military purposes, and they included items that could be used to build more chemical weapons and to make biological weapons. Banned items include Ebola, a virus that can be used for medical research as well as a biological weapon; nickel powder; radium; flash X-ray generators; and microwave antennas designed to accelerate ions. China’s Commerce Ministry, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the General Administration of Customs, and the Atomic Energy Authority jointly published the list. In a statement, the Ministry of Commerce said the items in the 236-page document were prohibited from being sent to North Korea because “the dual-use products and technologies delineated in this list have uses in weapons of mass destruction.” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, who hosted the conference in Beijing last week on nuclear talks, said the time had come to resume the negotiations. And the first vice foreign minister of North Korea, Kim Kye-gwan, who attended the gathering, said North Korea was ready to talk without conditions, a standard phrase from the North Koreans for some time now. But the Obama administration has said it sees no sign that the North Korean government is serious about reducing its nuclear program. Instead, the United States says, North Korea appears to be increasing its nuclear activities. In remarks at the conference, a former senior State Department official and an expert on North Korea, Evans J. R. Revere, whose presence was approved by the administration, said North Korea was “further away than ever from the goal of denuclearization.” Revere said North Korea had “declared itself a nuclear power, revealed to the world that it has not just one but two programs to produce fissile material, confirmed that it is developing strategic rocket forces for the delivery of nuclear weapons, and sworn that it will never give up its nuclear weapons ‘even in a dream.’ ” (Jane Perlez, “China Bans Items for Export to North Korea, Fearing Their Use in Weapons,” New York Times, September 25, 2013, p. A-4) During the George W. Bush era, North Korea and Iran were joined together as the Axis of Evil, but with President Obama’s phone call to President Hassan Rouhani of Iran last week, that
pairing – already out of favor in some quarters in Washington – was no longer so tight. It is virtually impossible, analysts say, to imagine Obama reaching out anytime soon to the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, who has already tested a nuclear bomb and threatened to stage a nuclear attack against the United States. North Korea became even more of an outlier last week. China, its longtime patron, produced a list of equipment and chemical substances it banned for export to North Korea, fearing that the North would use the items to speed development of an intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear bomb on top. The publication of the 236-page list of banned items came as a surprise to many who follow North Korea and China, given China’s longstanding reluctance to do anything that might destabilize the North and allow the United States any more power on the Korean Peninsula. Both Chinese and Western analysts called the export ban an important development – if it is implemented fully – especially since the list appeared to have been approved at the highest levels of the Chinese government. Either the Politburo, or the group’s seven-member Standing Committee, the apex of Chinese power, gave the green light, they said. The compilation of the items, down to their measurements in both inches and millimeters, was probably months in the making, and almost certainly involved the expertise of China’s nuclear and military bureaucracies, they said. The export ban would give a boost to United Nations sanctions imposed this year that were meant to starve the North’s increasingly sophisticated nuclear programs. The North gets many important materials from China, and American officials had long said sanctions would not work without more Chinese cooperation. The release of the list came after new signs of the North’s continued nuclear buildup. Recent satellite photography showed steam emerging from a newly reconstructed nuclear reactor, suggesting that the North might be making good on its promise to resume the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. Last week, two American arms-control experts said that a wide-ranging analysis suggested that the North had learned to produce crucial components for uranium enrichment without obvious foreign help. Roger Cavazos, a former United States Army intelligence officer who specialized in China’s military, said an initial reading of the long list of banned items suggested that China was targeting important aspects of North Korean nuclear programs, including the ceramics needed to protect a warhead as it re-entered the earth’s atmosphere atop a missile. Despite the North’s underground tests of crude nuclear devices, experts say it has not yet tested a vehicle that can withstand the heat of re-entry, an important step in building a deliverable nuclear bomb. Experts also say that North Korea has most likely not yet mastered the difficult task of miniaturizing a nuclear bomb to fit atop a missile. Since China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, came to power earlier this year, Beijing has been tougher toward North Korea on its nuclear abilities, even as it has continued business investment there in a bid to help stabilize the impoverished country. Chinese analysts say Beijing is increasingly frustrated at Kim’s unpredictable behavior since he ascended to the leadership after the death of his father two years ago, including his decision to proceed with a nuclear test this year despite China’s disapproval. The publication of the banned items for export was described by these experts as a sign of further exasperation, and a desire for China to fall in line with the United Nations sanctions that it voted for earlier this year. The diplomatic opening between the United States and Iran today would give China another opportunity to “put the squeeze” on North Korea, said Zhu Feng, the deputy director of the Center for International and Strategic
Studies at Beijing University. “Now Beijing can say to North Korea: ‘If you want to breach your isolation, you should do more.’” A senior official in the Obama administration said American analysts would be poring over the list to determine if China was implementing the sanctions it approved or was rattled enough about North Korea’s nuclear progress to go even further. The timing of the export controls helped China to show a “balanced” public policy toward North Korea, the official said. Earlier this month, in a “good cop” move, China invited several senior North Korean officials to a public event run by the Foreign Ministry in Beijing. The conference was designed to foster the restarting of talks to get North Korea to give up its weapons, and to give a polite gloss to the testy relations between the two countries. The “bad cop” move came with the release of the list of banned items, the administration official suggested. The publication of the list comes with an added benefit for North Korea watchers, who are always struggling to ascertain the highly secretive country’s nuclear abilities. “The list gives a good insight into what China knows about the missile and bomb development of North Korea,” said Cavazos, the former Army intelligence officer who now works as an analyst at the Nautilus Institute, which studies international security issues. “From what I can tell, it lays out almost all China knows about North Korea’s missile and nuclear program.” Among the banned items he mentioned as important were metal alloys needed in the enrichment of uranium; North Korea’s metallurgical skills are thought to be poor. Red fuming nitric acid, the substance that some American experts said fueled a North Korean rocket launched last December, also figured prominently on the list, he said. Still, no matter how definitive the export controls, they would have little impact unless the Chinese authorities enforced them, said Siegfried S. Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and now at Stanford University. “Now they have to make sure their companies are committed to the export control list,” said Hecker, who was the first American to be shown North Korea’s uranium enrichment plant. “Putting out the regulations itself is not going to slow down the North Koreans.” Cavazos also said enforcement would be critical. “I have no idea if a Chinese customs official on the border with North Korea has any idea what most of the things in the 236 pages look like,” he said. Nonetheless, Hecker said China had taken a useful step in potentially slowing North Korean advances. If the contact between the United States and Iran developed into full-fledged negotiations, the North Korean nuclear program could be even further pressed. “One of the most significant benefits of a U.S.-Iran deal could be termination, or at least a curtailment, of nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Iran,” Hecker said. (Jane Perlez, “China Ban on Items of Nuclear Use to North Korea May Stall Arms Bid,” New York Times, September 25, 2013, p. A-4)
audience included many analysts who are critical of China. (Gil Yun-hyung, “Japanese PM Abe Says Sure, Call Me a Far-Right Militarist,” Hankyore, September 28, 2013)

The Obama administration’s onetime point-man for North Korean policy Stephen Bosworth spoke in Berlin with Ri Yong Ho, North Korea’s representative to the six-party talks, Kyodo reported, citing an informed source. In order to pressure the Kim Jong Un regime into giving up its nuclear weapons work, concerned nations should tighten financial penalties against the North, former Bush administration National Security Council staffer David Asher told Yonhap. “The whole process [of the six-party talks] has value, but none of this is likely to succeed in getting North Korea to give up its nuclear program unless we are willing to threaten the regime ... in a way that internally threatens it -- taking away their money and forcing them to fight among themselves,” said Asher, who also served as coordinator of the North Korea Working Group at the State Department. “If we want, or have any hope [of] trying to get them to change their nuclear posture, let alone give up their nuclear weapons, we are gonna have to aim at the financial heart of Kim Jong Un’s regime.” (Global Security Newswire, “U.S., North Korean Officials Rumored to Swap Notes on Atomic Talks,” September 26, 2013)

A series of meetings between government officials and private sector experts from the US and North Korea will be held in Berlin, Germany, and London, England. The participants at the so-called 1.5 track meetings will include Ri Yong-ho, North Korea’s vice foreign minister, and Stephen Bosworth, former US State Department special representative for North Korea policy and former US negotiator at the talks. According to diplomatic sources in Washington, D.C., the Berlin meeting will take place this week, and the London meeting will take place the following week. North Korea will be represented at the meetings both by Choi Seon-hee, deputy director general of the American affairs bureau and Jang Il-hun, deputy ambassador to the UN, sources said. In addition to Bosworth, American participants at the Berlin meeting will include former assistant secretary of state Robert Gallucci, who played a leading role in the agreed framework signed by the US and North Korea in 1994; Robert Carlin, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; and Joel Wit, former North Korea specialist for the State Department. The meeting in London will be attended by Bosworth, along with Morton Abramowtiz, former assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research; Joseph DeTrani, former director of the National Counterproliferation Center under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI); Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council; and Tony Namkung, former assistant director for the Institute of East Asian Studies at UC Berkeley. The reason that Bosworth is attending both of these meetings is because the groups that are organizing these meetings are different, sources say. Most of the American figures that will be attending these meetings are supportive of US-North Korea talks. These figures believe that the US must stop ignoring the North Korean nuclear issue and must instead seek a solution through negotiations. Bosworth and DeTrani are of particular interest as the two were in charge of North Korea policy and intelligence during US President Barack Obama’s first term. North Korea’s decision to dispatch senior officials to these meetings is understood to be tied to its objective of setting the stage for dialogue with the US by increasing contact with American officials. “I think that North Korea’s actions can be
understand partly as a concession to China’s request that it adopt a more cooperative attitude,” said Evans Revere, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. “At the same time, it is connected with a campaign to win hearts and minds, to repair its image, which was tarnished by its threats to use nuclear weapons earlier this year.” (Park Hyun, “1.5 Track Meetings to Be Held between N. Korea and U.S. in Europe,” Hankyore, September 26, 2013)

The United States and China agreed to keep up a tough sanctions regime on North Korea amid warnings that the reclusive nation is still managing to pursue its nuclear program, a US official said. “Sanctions efforts in general were explicitly discussed” in talks between US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, the senior State Department official said. “Notwithstanding any sweet sounding comments that foreign diplomats may think they’ve heard from the North Koreans, the troubling behavior by North Korea continues,” the official told reporters at a briefing in New York. And he stressed “North Korea’s efforts to acquire a nuclear missile capability continue” despite a rigorous international sanctions regime. “That is the problem that needs to be addressed through a combination of diplomatic and pressure means,” he insisted. Even as Pyongyang’s closest ally China announced an export ban to the North of technologies and goods with dual-use potential, experts questioned whether North Korea’s weapons program hadn’t already moved beyond its earlier dependence on external equipment and know-how. “They are not at the start of this process anymore. They’ve been at it a long time,” said Park Jiyoung, director of the Asan Institute’s Science and Technology Policy Center. “It’s clearly likely that the North will try to go beyond its current nuclear capability ... (and) export controls can’t stop that development,” Park said. “Both leaders agreed that it is important for us to coordinate closely to signal to North Korea that it has no alternative but to denuclearize,” the US official said. "And the Chinese decision to impose restrictions on what goes in and what comes out of North Korea, I think, is clearly indicative of their level of concern." (AFP, “U.S., China Warn Tough Korea Sanctions Must Be Kept up,” September 26, 2013)

South Korea and the US once again failed to bridge their differences at a discussion on ways to improve the current arrangement of defense cost sharing. The two-day meeting, which took place in Washington, DC, on September 25 and 26, was the fourth senior-level discussion aimed at signing a special agreement on the two countries’ shares of defense costs as of next year. Seoul reportedly suggested institutional improvements to prevent the use of defense contributions for other purposes - particularly the relocation of US military bases. “The [South Korean] government’s position is that we need to fix some holes in the system for using the shared defense fund if we want to establish a solid South Korea-US alliance and provide a stable environment for stationing US forces,” said a South Korean senior government official. But the US was reportedly against the plan, saying an understanding established at the time the Yongsan Relocation Program (YPP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP) were agreed on in 2004 allowed for the use of defense contributions for construction projects related to the relocation. Diplomatic sources said the US prefers the current “lump sum” approach, where a total amount is set for discretionary use. Another South Korean senior government official acknowledged the
earlier agreement, saying the Ministry of National Defense agreed to the use of defense contributions during negotiations in the early 2000s on the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek. But the official also noted popular attitudes on the issue in South Korea. "Most people are asking why taxpayer money is going to things that the US should be paying for," the official said. Noting that the relocation is scheduled for completion in 2016, the official added, "The US is going to have a hard time appropriating the money if the institutional improvements we're demanding are made." (Park Hyun, "S. Korea and U.S. Fail to Agree on New Arrangement for Defense Cost-Sharing," Hankyore, September 28, 2013) Seoul and Washington have agreed to put off talks about the transfer of full operational control of Korean troops to Seoul until next year. The handover, originally slated for 2012, is now scheduled for December 2015, but Seoul wants another delay for fear of a security vacuum if Combined Forces Command is dismantled. Until they make a decision, the two countries will carry out a comprehensive review of the South Korean military's capability to respond to the nuclear threat from North Korea. Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin and his U.S. counterpart Chuck Hagel reached the compromise at the 45th Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting. They also agreed to launch this month a joint working group headed by assistant ministers to study the issue. The group will review necessary conditions and the timing of the transfer. (Korea Times, "Korea, U.S. Put off Decision about Troop Control Handover," September 26, 2013)

9/27/13

The Obama administration puts a "significant priority" on the North Korean nuclear problem and the communist nation has not shown any signs that it is serious about denuclearization talks, top U.S. officials said. Daniel Russel, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said Pyongyang is trying to "have its cake and eat it, too." The communist nation appears to be seeking economic support from the West but it also wants to be allowed to retain its nuclear weapons program, he pointed out. "That's not going to happen," Russel said in a video conference with reporters here from New York, together with Evan Medeiros, senior director for Asian affairs at the White House National Security Council (NSC). The two are accompanying President Barack Obama at the 68th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly. Russel said the threat posed by North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons is "significant priority and a major component of U.S. policy efforts." He underscored Washington's unswerving goal of "complete, verifiable, peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which for practical purposes means of North Korea." "Negotiations must be to achieve the goal that I've described," Russel said. "There's no interest in talks for talks' sake." His comments are in line with Washington's tepid response to Pyongyang's recent dialogue offer backed by Beijing. Medeiros echoed Russel's view on North Korea. "We've seen no indication that North Korea is serious about resuming talks," he said. On Washington's strategy on Asia, he said Obama's commitment to rebalancing toward the region is "strong and enduring," adding, "The rebalancing is alive and well." (Yonhap, "No Sign of North Korea's Seriousness on Dialogue, U.S. Officials Say," September 28, 2013)

10/1/13

President Park Geun-hye vowed to step up efforts for stronger deterrence until Pyongyang made the "right" choice for peninsular peace, as Seoul marked the 65th anniversary of the founding of its armed forces. During Seoul's largest military parade
in a decade, Park said Seoul would strive to quickly acquire key assets, including a low-tier missile defense system, to counter threats from North Korea’s nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction. “The current security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia is very grave. The North has been gradually upgrading its nuclear capabilities,” Park said during the parade at Seoul Airport in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. “I believe that the genuine value of the military lies not in waging war, but on deterring war. … I will make the North Korean regime recognize that the nuclear arms and missiles it has been constantly pursuing are no longer useful.” For the military event, also attended by U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey, some 11,000 troops, 120 aircraft and 190 ground-based military weapons systems were mobilized. For the first time, the military revealed the Hyunmu-II ballistic missile with a range of 300 km and the Hyunmu-III cruise missile with a range of 1,000 km, both of which are capable of striking key military targets in the North. It also unveiled the Israeli-made Spike missile with a range of 20 km, which is capable of launching precision strikes on artillery pieces on the western coast of the communist state. During the parade, Park pledged to quickly establish the “Kill Chain” system and the Korea Air and Missile Defense program. The Kill Chain system is Seoul’s preemptive strike apparatus. Mobilizing all intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets of the South Korea-U.S. combined forces, the system is designed to launch strikes quickly after signs are detected of an imminent nuclear or missile provocation by Pyongyang. The KAMD is a low-tier missile defense program to counter Pyongyang’s missile threats. Seoul has long argued that it is different from the U.S.-led global multilayered missile defense program in consideration of its relations with Beijing. “With strong security that does not allow for any provocations, (we) can encourage North Korea to come out toward the path for genuine change, while maintaining peninsular peace,” said Park. (Song Sang-ho, “Park Vows Stronger N.K. Deterrence,” Korea Herald, October 1, 2013)

Addressing the U.N. General Assembly, Vice Foreign Minister Pak Gil-yon claimed the South’s Park Geun-hye administration is taking a “confrontational approach,” thus losing a rare opportunity created by North’s “generous” efforts to bring peace to the peninsula.

Seoul’s attitude risks triggering another “destructive stage,” but Pyongyang is exercising its utmost patience in a bid to ease tensions, Pak said. (Yonhap, “N.K. Official Hits Seoul for Hostile Policy,” Korea Times, October 2, 2013)

North Korea’s chief negotiator to the stalled six-party talks and U.S. civilian experts on the Korean Peninsula held informal talks in London on the current impasse surrounding the communist country’s nuclear ambitions, sources said October 2. The meeting comes as Pyongyang has repeatedly called for unconditional talks to resolve the nuclear standoff, although Washington has made clear that the North must first show its firm commitment to past denuclearization pledges before meaningful negotiations can resume.

Sources said Ri Yong-ho, the North’s senior delegate to the six-party negotiations, met Stephen Bosworth, former top U.S. negotiator on North Korea’s nuclear program, and Joseph Detrani, former mission manager at the Director of National Intelligence. They did not give details on what was discussed at the first round of two-day-long talks that
were held behind closed doors. After the meeting, Bosworth told reporters that he was pleased with the event and that both sides touched on issues pertaining to bilateral relations. He, however, emphasized that because he attended the meeting as a civilian, he was not at liberty to talk about details at present. (Korea Times, “Pyongyang Officials, U.S. Experts Meet to Discuss Nuke Issue,” October 2, 2013) Senior North Korean officials at a 1.5 track meeting in London with US experts on Korean affairs expressed a desire to return to the six-party talks and said it was a “misunderstanding” that their country wants to be recognized as a nuclear state, a US participant reported. Speaking to the press after the seminar on Oct. 2, Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York, said that he had seen a “definite willingness” from North Korea to return to the talks and that he thought it was “possible to find common ground for a resolution” through dialogue and negotiation. The “1.5-track” meeting between North Korean officials and US experts was held on Oct. 1 and 2 at Athenaeum Hotel in London. Sigal went on to say he believed dialogue was the “only realistic means” of resolving the nuclear issue, adding that “a number of methods” for resolution could be available. He also reported “getting the sense that it would be possible to return to the spirit of the Sept. 19 2005 agreement,” referring to an agreement at the six-party talks for North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. Significantly, Sigal said the North Korean participants had called it a “misunderstanding” to believe their country wants to be recognized as a nuclear power. Indeed, he reported that the representatives at the meeting indicated that Pyongyang is not interested in such acknowledgement. Experts read the remarks as a message from Pyongyang that it wants to begin negotiations through the six-party talks framework, and that it plans to approach them in good faith. The governments in Seoul and Washington have been reluctant to restart the talks due to concerns that North Korea would not actually want to discuss denuclearization, but instead turn them into a forum for announcing its nuclear capabilities and demanding recognition of its status as a nuclear state. The remarks from the North Korean side at the meeting appeared aimed at allaying those concerns. But with the South Korean and US governments requiring concrete actions to show a willingness to denuclearize before reopening the talks, the North Korean representatives may also have made some different proposals. Stephen Bosworth, a former special representative on North Korea policy for the US State Department, called the atmosphere at the meeting “cordial and respectful.” North Korea’s representatives, including Vice Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho, declined to speak to the press. The meeting was organized by Tony Namkung, the Korean-American former vice director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. The meeting drew notice for the participation of senior officials from US President Barack Obama’s first term, including Bosworth and Joseph DeTrani, former director of the National Counterproliferation Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In addition to Ri, foreign ministry deputy general director Choi Son-hui and UN deputy ambassador Jang Il-hun attended on the North Korean side. (Park Hyun, “N. Korean Officials Discuss Return to Six-Party Talks,” Hankyore, 2013)
The Pentagon chief reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to support deterrence capabilities with its full range of military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike and missile defense. "This strategy establishes a strategic alliance framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean nuclear threat scenarios across armistice and wartime, and strengthens the integration of alliance capabilities to maximize their deterrence effects," the joint communique said. "The Republic of Korea and the United States are committed to maintaining close consultation on deterrence matters to ensure that extended deterrence for the ROK remains credible, capable and enduring." Although the strategy does not prescribe a specific course of action in anticipation of any particular scenario, it looks to harness alliance capabilities to support deterrence against North Korea, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little said. "The goal of the strategy is to enhance bilateral coordination and consultation to ensure that the alliance can address the serious challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs," Little said in an e-mailed statement. "The purpose of the strategy is to provide enhanced alliance consultation and coordination. It does not prescribe specific courses of action." The move comes after Seoul’s defense ministry unveiled a new contingency plan that allows its military to launch a pre-emptive strike against North Korea if it shows signs of an imminent nuclear or missile attack on the South when Pyongyang raised tensions with bellicose rhetoric in April. "The miniaturization issue is a part of technology that North Korea is developing, which further complicates threats on this peninsula, and the region and the world," Hagel said, without elaborating on the North’s nuclear capacity. The two sides also agreed to cooperate to bolster interoperability of the alliances command and control system for missile defense against North Korea, which is believed to have over 1,000 missiles with varying capabilities. In regard to the joint missile shield, Hagel put great emphasis on interoperability of the two nation’s systems to effectively counter threats posed by North Korea. "We’re working with the Republic of Korea on their missile defense system. These don’t have to be identical as long as they are interoperable," he said. "We want systems that work together and that are interoperable. It involves a lot of command and control, which is complicated." The two sides also evaluated the growing security threat on the peninsula and capabilities of South Korean forces to determine whether Seoul is ready to regain its wartime operational control (OPCON) from Washington as scheduled in December 2015, but no final decision was made on the timing during the Wednesday meeting. "Our discussions have been ongoing and will continue regarding OPCON transfer. It has been conditions based," Hagel said during a joint press conference. "I’m very optimistic we will have an agreement on those conditions, and we will get to where we need to be before the OPCON transfer." (Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea, U.S. Sign Contingency Plan against N. Korean Nukes,” Yonhap, October 2, 2013) The sixth item in the joint communique by the South Korean and US Defense Ministers at the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was a “tailored deterrence strategy” for the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Its adoption is significant in that it develops and codifies the US’s abstract promise of a nuclear umbrella into an actual operational plan. But it could increase the chances of a nuclear conflict, since it also contains provisions for a “preemptive response” to the detection of signs of the use of nuclear weapons. South Korean and US military authorities had discussed introducing a tailored strategy by 2014 at last year’s SCM. Its
inclusion this year puts it a year ahead of schedule. Minister of National Defense Kim Kwan-jin said the goal was to “effectively deter the North Korean nuclear threat, which has become a more realistic concern with its third nuclear test [in February].” The strategy identifies plans of response for both sides to three stages of North Korean nuclear weapon capabilities: threat, signs of imminent usage, and usage. “This strategy establishes a strategic alliance framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean nuclear threat scenarios across armistice and wartime, and strengthens the integration of alliance capabilities to maximize their deterrence effects,” the communique said. This means that the two militaries would be mobilizing all available forces to respond actively to a North Korean nuclear threat. Tailored deterrence includes three core elements: the US nuclear umbrella, the two sides’ conventional military power, and missile defense. Key to these are the “kill chain” and “KAMD,” which President Park Geun-hye said South Korea planned to “establish as soon as possible” in remarks the previous day. The kill chain is a system for attacking nuclear weapons and missiles prior to launch, while the Korean missile defense system is for intercepting them after launch. Establishing both of them would cost an estimated 9.6 trillion won (US$8.9 billion) over the next five years. “Having a kill chain requires a number of different capabilities, including detection, interception, confirmation, and additional defense,” said Kim Jong-dae, editor-in-chief of the defense journal Defense 21+. “At the moment, it’s not even clear that the South Korean military has the first of these, the detection capabilities.” Cheong Wook-sik, director of the Peace Network, worried that the plan could increase the risk of a nuclear war on the peninsula. “The two sides may be able to strengthen their alliance and their deterrent against North Korea with a tailored deterrence strategy, but North Korea is also going to step up its nuclear and missile capabilities,” he said. “This could end up increasing the threat of a war on the Korean Peninsula.” (Choi Hyun-joon, “U.S. and South Korea Agreed to ‘Tailored Deterrence’ at Meeting in Seoul,” Hankyore, October 3, 2013)

10/3/13 Secretary of State John Kerry said that Washington was prepared to resume dialogue with Pyongyang and sign a non-aggression agreement if it vows to give up its nuclear program and “engage in legitimate negotiations to achieve that end.” Kerry’s remarks came during a joint press conference after the US-Japan Security Consultative Meeting (2+2) among the US and Japanese foreign and defense ministers in Tokyo. “I think the six parties involved in the six-party talks have made it crystal clear we are prepared to reengage in those talks,” Kerry said. “We are prepared to have a peaceful relationship with North Korea. We are not engaged in regime change. We are prepared to sign a non-aggression agreement -- providing North Korea decides to denuclearize and to engage in legitimate negotiations to achieve that end,” Kerry said. He also said North Korea had “behaved outside of any standards of rule of law and any of the norms of international behavior.” But he stressed that Pyongyang should understand that the US was “prepared to engage in negotiations, providing North Korea makes it clear that those negotiations begin with the issue of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.” His remarks showed a more forward-thinking approach from Washington on the issue of dialogue with Pyongyang and restarting the six-party talks - suggesting that the US would be willing to offer guarantees on North Korea’s biggest concern, security issues, if the North takes steps toward denuclearization. (Park Byong-su, “John Kerry Says U.S. Could Be Prepared to Hold Dialogue with North Korea,” Hankyore, October 5, 2013;
After months of strategic disregard of North Korea, the Obama administration appears to be listing specific actions North Korea should take for the resumption of talks. A senior State Department official described it as a "credible threshold" for North Korea on diplomacy. Secretary of State John Kerry will confer with his Japanese counterpart, Kishida Fumio, "on what that means in terms of specific steps," the official told reporters on background, as they were heading to Tokyo, according to a transcript released by the department. (Yonhap, “Washington Considers Reopening Talks with Pyongyang,” Korea Times, October 3, 2013)

Senior administration official: “The first - and really kind of the most important announcement - is, of course, our announcement that we’ll be revising the U.S-Japan defense guidelines. This is the document that sets the framework for roles and missions between U.S. forces and Japanese forces during peacetime and during contingencies. The last time the guidelines were released was in 1997, so there’ve been a lot of changes in the security environment since then. And the idea is to revise these in a way that reflects new areas, new challenges, such as in the space and cyber domains, that reflect Japan’s more active international role both regionally and globally, and also look for ways to enhance our ability to consult, cooperate during a crisis. So you’ll see a long description in the statement about the objectives of the guidelines review. You’ll also see other sections that discuss our efforts in space and cyber going forward. So that’s kind of number one. I think that’s really the highlight. A second area that I would call your attention to is in the ballistic missile defense area. You’ll see there’s a section that describes our cooperation bilaterally there, and most particularly with this statement we are announcing for the first time the location of the second ballistic missile defense radar. This is an initial - initiative that’s been in the works for some time, but with this announcement we have agreed on a location for the radar. And this radar will provide additional coverage for the U.S. homeland as well as additional coverage against North Korean ballistic missile threats for the Japanese. So that’s what I would say is a second key area from this statement. … Our goal is to have it operational sometime in the next year or so, but there’s no firm - there’s no hard deadline there. A third area that the statement gets into is regional engagement. Of course, the U.S.-Japan alliance is a bilateral alliance, first and foremost, but increasingly in this day and age we cooperate trilaterally and multilaterally. And the statement describes a number of lines of effort that we’ll be pursuing going forward. So there’s a section that describes our cooperation in capacity building in areas like Southeast Asia, working together to help strengthen defense sectors in those countries, improve law enforcement, those kinds of areas, together. Cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief - the Japanese are increasingly active in this area, send their forces around the world in response to humanitarian emergencies, and so we’ll be deepening our cooperation together in that area. And then, of course, there’s our ongoing trilateral initiatives with both Australia and the Republic of Korea, which are really priorities for us as we think about the threats that confront us in the future. A fourth area - and the statement dedicates considerable time to this - relates to the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. There are a couple of different dimensions of this.
One is our agreement on the relocation of Marines, some Marines in Okinawa, to Guam. You may recall that in April 2012 we announced a revision to the agreements that we had in place on this. And what we’re announcing today kind of codifies some of the details of that agreement. So we’ll be moving 5,000 Marines to Guam beginning in probably the mid 2020s. The Japanese Government will be contributing about $3.1 billion in cash to support that effort. And we’ll be formally - Secretaries Kerry and Hagel will be signing protocol that formally revises the Guam International Agreement. And we’ll also be releasing a cost breakdown, so sort of a “who pays for what” as this project goes forward. So that’s very important kind of nuts-and-bolts work in the alliance. Another dimension of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is, of course, taking steps to ensure that the presence that remains in Japan is sustainable politically over the long term. So embedded in the statement are a number of areas that we like to refer to as impact mitigation, reducing the impact of our presence on the local communities in Japan. So there’s language that discusses some land returns that we’ll be making in the near term on Okinawa, as well as referring to our longer-term plan for the consolidation of the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa, some training relocation initiatives that we have underway, as well as some other, sort of, administrative agreements that relate to how our presence is managed there. So that’s an important area, the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. And then finally, I would just point to the section that describes the ongoing effort - and this is really sort of a continuing thing that we’re doing, and that is the introduction of advanced - more and more advanced military capabilities into Japan. So this statement references the introduction of two MV-22 squadrons, which significantly increases the capability, the mobility of the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, the introduction of a P-8 aircraft, which will begin later this year, plans to begin rotationally introducing the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle, as well as the Marine Corps plans to begin introducing the F-35 into Iwakuni beginning in the 2017 timeframe. So this is an example as - even as we deal with a complex and difficult budget environment in Washington, we continue to prioritize Asia and ensure that Asia continues to host the most advanced U.S. military capabilities.” (Background Briefing on the Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, Tokyo, October 3, 2013)

Kim Yong Nam, head of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly and North Korea’s de facto head of state, said economic growth is the top goal of the government under its new supreme leader, Kim Jong Un. But he said such improvements can only be made once North Korea is confident it will not be attacked or ostracized by the United States. “There wouldn’t be any reason for us to be on bad terms with the United States if the U.S. government gives up its hostile policy and opts for a policy change of respecting our sovereignty and right to selection,” he said in a meeting in Pyongyang with Gary Pruitt, president and CEO of The Associated Press. North Korea says it wants a formal peace treaty and all of the U.S. troops removed from the South, and Kim reiterated that position on Friday. But North Korea continues to develop a nuclear weapons program and long-range missiles of its own. North Korea wants to improve its economy, but “for this we need a peaceful environment,” he said. “We need to secure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” Kim, a former foreign minister who is seen as the North’s senior statesman, also accused South Korean authorities of “divisive maneuvers” that have pushed the two Koreas into

A U.S. Navy aircraft carrier and guided-missile warships arrived in South Korea’s southern port of Busan, as part of the routine port call on the peninsula involving joint maritime exercises next week, the U.S. Forces Korea said. The nuclear-powered supercarrier USS George Washington, guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam and guided-missile destroyer USS Preble arrived in the nation’s largest port for a four-day visit, the USFK said. The George Washington Strike Group, belonging to the U.S. 7th Fleet, is forward-deployed to Yokosuka. (Yonhap, “U.S. Aircraft Carrier Makes Port Call in S. Korea,” October 4, 2013)

Washington expressed opposition to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ambitious plan to ensure “enemy base strike capabilities” for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). According to an October 4 report in Asahi Shimbun, US government secretaries responded unenthusiastically to the plan for responding to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, which would give the JSDF the ability to strike enemy bases, when it was explained to them at the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee Meeting the day before. The so-called “2+2” meeting in Tokyo brought together the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers for talks. The newspaper also noted that the topic was not mentioned at all in the joint statement or press conference after the meeting. In an interview, Michael Green, the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the newspaper that “the [Barack] Obama administration does not want to become involved” in an issue that would likely draw objections from Seoul. “Even if Japan possessed the capability to attack enemy bases, it would be limited so it would be the United States that would have to deal with any counterattack,” Green added. (Gil Yun-hyung, “U.S. Voices Objections to Japan’s Plan to Ensure Preemptive Strike Capabilities,” Hankyore, October 5, 2013) One aspect which is different from the past is that this time it was Japan requesting a change. Japan was seeking to draw upon American power to counter China in the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu Islands in China) and to achieve the right to collective self-defense, something that Japanese conservatives have long coveted. Hobbled by its fiscal deficit and troubles in the Middle East, the US appears to have accepted these demands to some degree and called on Japan to take on a greater military role. If the Japanese Self-Defense Forces gain the ability to engage in collective self-defense, it will mean that Japan has effectively scrapped the exclusively defense oriented policy that it has maintained for the past sixty years, focusing strictly on defense and explicitly stating it will not initiate hostilities. In the joint statement, the two countries “decided upon several steps to upgrade significantly the capability of the U.S.-Japan Alliance” and mentioned “revising the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, expanding security and defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.” The US endorsed the policies pursued by Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo such as “exercising its right of collective self-defense, expanding its defense budget, reviewing its National Defense Program Guidelines, strengthening its capability to defend its sovereign territory, and broadening regional contributions, including capacity-building efforts vis-a-vis Southeast Asian countries.” In effect, the US granted Japan its request for collective self-defense, with the proviso that Japan monitor and curb Chinese maritime
expansion by working with Asian countries like the Philippines and Vietnam that are engaged in territorial conflicts with China. By placing the Global Hawk, an advanced unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and the P-8, the latest anti-submarine patrol plane, in Japan, the US signaled its intention to keep an eye on China. These are the conflicting motivations underlying Japan and the US’s superficial consensus on the issue of collective self-defense. The Japanese media also drew attention to the subtle contradictions between the US and Japan. “Japanese Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori referred to the tensions between Japan and China each time that he spoke, while US Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel avoided mentioning this,” Asahi Shimbun reported on October 4. Other papers also made similar observations, referring to “a difference of opinion on the Senkaku Islands” (Mainichi Shimbun) and suggesting that “the US and Japan are not on the same page in their policy toward China” (Tokyo Shimbun). These papers observed that there is a considerable gap between the American and Japanese responses to the dispute over the Senkaku Islands. China lashed out angrily, and South Korea did not conceal its concern. Xinhua ran strident criticism of the statement on October 3. Japan and the US have failed to get rid of their Cold War mentality, Xinhua said, arguing that the two countries are increasing tensions and threatening the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening their military alliance. The South Korean government did not offer an official response. Instead, an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came forward to say on condition of anonymity that there are no changes in South Korea’s existing position that collective self-defense should be developed in a transparent way so as to assuage the concerns of neighboring countries and to contribute to the peace and stability of the region. The New York Times expressed its support for the US move to strengthen Japan’s military capability in a bid to counter China. However, the paper noted that this would not be an easy task given likely opposition from other countries in the region. (Gil Yun-hyung, "U.S. and Japan Agree to Upgrade Military Alliance," Hankyore, October 5, 2013)

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) spokesman’s statement: “As already reported, the spokesman for the Policy Department of the DPRK National Defense Commission released a statement sternly warning Park Geun Hye and her party to behave with discretion as regards their unprecedented moves to escalate confrontation with the DPRK and ignite a war against it in collusion with foreign forces. This is just criticism of the puppet group driving the inter-Korean relations into catastrophe again though they had reached a phase of dialogue thanks to much effort and a due warning to put the prevailing situation under control. Had Park and her group have a reasonable way of thinking even a bit, they would have lent an ear to the profound meaning of criticism and warnings made by the DPRK and behaved with discretion. However, the group, far from pondering over this, let the spokesman for the Ministry of Unification make public ‘a statement’ slandering the advice. Finding fault with what the DPRK said what it should do to Park, the group termed it ‘an unreasonable behavior bereft of elementary courtesy,’ raising a hue and cry over ‘spirit of mutual respect,’ ‘polite demeanor’ and the like. The group should reflect on its wrongdoings before talking about ‘courtesy’ and ‘politeness.’ Is it ‘courtesy,’ ‘polite demeanor’ and ‘spirit of mutual reciprocity’ to deny the dignity of the supreme leadership and social system of the other party and escalate confrontation while letting
loose a whole string of invectives against it? Park is taking the lead in trumpeting about ‘unification under liberal democracy,’ slandering the social system of the dignified DPRK and letting her yes men, reptile media, experts and even human scum do harm to its social system and making much fuss to disturb the world. This is the reality of south Korea. The group has no face to talk about ‘mutual respect’ while totally denying the other party and crying out for confronting with its social system and overthrowing its regime. The group has gone the lengths of taking issue with the DPRK’s politics of love for the people and the true picture of the harmonious whole. This is an uncivilized and immoral behavior hard to find in any part of the world. Park Geun Hye, a politician, must have known about it very well. She should have opened her mouth, well aware of what consequences were to be entailed by her evil remarks rattling the nerves of the dialogue partner. It is unpardonable provocation and unbearable mockery of the DPRK that such depraved villains bereft of elementary common sense and etiquette in the inter-Korean relations are talking about ‘courtesy,’ ‘unreasonable behavior’ and the like. Great irony is that Park and her group claimed as if they were trying to ‘make efforts to build confidence step by step’ through dialogue and cooperation. What Park has done after taking office is nothing but confrontation and war moves she has stepped up under the signboard of ‘confidence,’ deepening the mistrust between the north and the south. It is none other than Park and her group who openly worked out the ‘principal plan for the development of the south-north relations’ in which she scrapped the inter-Korean declarations, a landmark for reunification common to the nation, and officially declared the confrontation of the social systems. It is again the puppet regime which insults the DPRK by describing the operation in the Kaesong Industrial Zone, an offspring of the June 15 era, as someone’s ‘source of money making,’ and worked out a sinister scenario to introduce U.S. special force into the zone, making much fuss about the ‘incident of detention,’ ‘rescue of hostages.’ It is none other than the regime that scuttled the six rounds of the talks for reopening the Kaesong Industrial Zone, which were arranged by the positive efforts of the DPRK, by setting absurd preconditions. The regime, obsessed with the confrontation with compatriots, checked the resumption of the tour of Mt. Kumgang, a cooperative undertaking common to the Korean nation, under the pretext of banning “source of money making” of the DPRK. The regime went so brazen-faced enough as to describe the reunion of the separated families and relatives from the north and the south of Korea, that was arranged with much effort, as the fruition of south Korea’s ‘theory of principle,’ abusing it for escalating the confrontation. The reunion, therefore, proved abortive. The war-like forces’ moves to unleash a nuclear war against the DPRK, in particular, have reached an extremely reckless phase. Madcap south Korea-U.S. joint nuclear war exercises targeting the DPRK are being staged in south Korea even at this moment and massive nuclear strike means, including a nuclear carrier of the U.S., are being transported through the sky, land and sea to be deployed in south Korea. A few days ago, south Korea and its American master held a military confab and worked out and officially announced the ‘tailored deterrence strategy’ aimed at mounting preemptive nuclear attacks on the DPRK. Park and her regime only deepens the feelings of antagonism, confrontation and distrust through the racket for escalating stand-off and igniting a war, not building confidence step by step through dialogue and cooperation. This is the truth of the ‘confidence-building process on the Korean Peninsula’ about which the Park group talks a great deal. Decrying the stand clarified
by the DPRK to adhere to the line of pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force simultaneously to cope with the increasing nuclear threat of the U.S., the group jabbered that ‘the north should dismantle its nukes and opt for changes’ and ‘the line is not helpful to the inhabitants in the north at all.’ As fair-minded world public opinion unanimously recognizes, the DPRK’s nukes serve as a treasured sword for protecting the destiny of the country and the nation from the U.S. threat of nuclear war and a national treasure for reunified Korea. It is quite natural for the DPRK to have had access to nukes and bolstered up them to protect its dignity and the security of the nation under the situation where the U.S. nuclear threat persists. If the nuclear issue on the peninsula is to find a fair solution, it is necessary to defuse the U.S. nuclear threat which spawned the nuclear issue, force it to roll back its hostile policy towards the DPRK and make its aggressor forces pull out of south Korea taking with them all nuclear weapons. It is the height of ridicule for Park and her group to take issue with the above-said line of the DPRK this or that way, bereft of any elementary common sense and reason. ‘Demand of the international community’ touted by the puppet regime is nothing but the brigandish one of the U.S., its master. ‘Trend of the times’ on its lips is no more than the anti-DPRK conspiratorial racket of such followers of the U.S. as the puppet group. The Park group makes much fuss about somebody’s ‘changes’ whenever an opportunity presents itself. This is nothing but sheer sophism intended to force the DPRK to divert from the roads of independence, Songun and socialism and realize its scenario for aggression in league with the U.S. It is none other than Park and her group, servants of the U.S., who should face up to the trend of the times and come to their senses. The U.S. is now driving the south Korean puppet group to use it as a shock force in the war of aggression, making it bound to the military alliance more tightly and placing it deep under ‘nuclear umbrella’ in a bid to realize the scenario for world domination. Poor, indeed, is the south Korean puppet group trying hard to please its U.S. master, ballyhooing about ‘closer south Korea-U.S. alliance,’ unaware of the serious harm done even to its heart by the U.S. Park and her group would be well advised to mind their own business before talking nonsense about someone. If they are not willing to utter proper words in this bright world, they better shut their mouths. The Park group would be well advised to stop making reckless remarks, paying heed to the just criticism and proper warning made by the DPRK, though belatedly. They should behave themselves if they want to escape a miserable end.” (KCNA, “Park Guen Hye Urged to Clearly Understand DPRK’s Criticism and Warnings,” October 5, 2013)

U.S. concerns about the security intelligence it shares with Japan have led to long prison terms being mandated for leaks of top-secret information under a law planned by the Abe administration, sources said. Washington has conveyed doubts about whether U.S. security information will be kept confidential in the Japanese version of the U.S. National Security Council, which Tokyo hopes to establish in January, government sources said. The United States first raised the issue at a meeting of Japanese and U.S. foreign and defense ministers in May 2007 after the first administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe submitted a bill to set up the national security council to the Diet. U.S. officials have reiterated their concerns at a bilateral meeting of senior government officials and on other occasions this year, the sources said. In an interview Asahi Shimbun in September, Dennis Blair, who served as director
of national intelligence in the Obama administration, said Japan has only very weak laws to protect state secrets, and that he hopes they will be strengthened. (Asahi Shim bun, “Japan Trying to Convince Reluctant U.S. That It Can Keep Secrets,” October 6, 2013)

President Xi Jinping expressed staunch opposition to North Korea going nuclear or conducting additional atomic tests, and pledged to vigorously carry out U.N. sanctions resolutions on Pyongyang, a South Korean official said. Xi made the remark when he met bilaterally with South Korean President Park Geun-hye on the sidelines of an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Indonesia’s resort island of Bali, after Park voiced concerns about Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, the official said. "The Chinese side (Xi) said he opposes North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and that he is also resolutely opposed to an additional nuclear test by North Korea," the official said. Xi also pledged to "strictly abide" by U.N. Security Council resolutions on Pyongyang, he said. The remarks came in response to Park citing a need to stop North Korea from honing its nuclear capabilities, and asked China to help prod Pyongyang to focus on rebuilding its broken economy, the official said. "(North Korea) can’t pour everything into nuclear weapons at a time when many North Korean people are said to be suffering from chronic malnutrition," Park said at the start of the talks. "I hope China will work hard to persuade North Korea to concentrate on economic development." The 45-minute meeting came days after North Korea said Friday that it will move steadfastly forward with its line of simultaneously seeking economic construction and nuclear armament, making clear it has no intention of desisting from its nuclear weapons push. Xi also talked about the importance of bilateral relations. Park also expressed her gratitude that China has relayed to Pyongyang her proposal to build an international peace park inside the Demilitarized Zone. "This is our third meeting since June. This shows how important relations between our two countries are," Xi said. "When the president visited China in June, we exchanged in-depth views on bilateral relations, and regional and international issues .... I think this is very meaningful for a permanent and stable development of China-South Korea relations." Xi also said that the two nations have become important partners to each other in all sectors, adding that the sides have established regular dialogue mechanisms in almost all areas, including the diplomatic, parliamentary, defense, and economic and trade sectors. "Thanks to our joint efforts, political trust between our two countries is continuing to deepen," Xi said. (Chang Jae-soon, “China’s Xi Expresses Firm Opposition to N. Korean Nuclear Program: Official,” Yonhap, October 7, 2013)

CPRK spokesman’s statement: “The U.S. and the south Korean top military officials recently held the 45th annual security consultative meeting in Seoul. They adopted a "tailored deterrence strategy" aimed at a preemptive nuclear strike at the DPRK and discussed the issue of extending the period for the transfer of the wartime operational control and the issue of strengthening the capabilities for jointly coping with the DPRK under the pretext of "nuclear and ballistic missile threats" from the DPRK. The “tailored deterrence strategy” is a dangerous nuclear war scenario envisaging the preemptive attack on the DPRK with the mobilization of all military means including the nuclear weapons if there is even the slightest sign of the possible use of nuclear weapons and missiles by the DPRK. The spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification
of Korea (CPRK) in a statement [today] denounced the military confab as an extremely serious provocation to scuttle the process for dialogue and peace, escalate tensions and ignite a nuclear war. The U.S. is trying to ignite a nuclear war while talking about “sign of the use of nuclear weapons” by the DPRK on the Korean Peninsula, the statement noted, and went on: The military confab for aggression has created a touch-and-go situation in which an accidental case or a misjudgment may lead to a nuclear war. It is illogical for the Park Geun Hye regime to cry out for ‘dismantlement of nuclear weapons’ and ‘denuclearization’ of the DPRK while openly revealing its scheme for a nuclear war against the DPRK in league with the U.S. The U.S. and the puppet regime are trying hard to put political and military pressure on the DPRK, deter the DPRK’s offensive for dialogue and peace and escalate the tensions through frantic nuclear war provocation moves and thus attain without fail their aggression purposes. This only heightens the indignation of the army and people of the DPRK. Should the U.S. and the puppet forces opt for the provocation of a nuclear war against the DPRK, defying its warnings, it will resolutely counter them. The U.S. imperialists and the puppet forces should not run amuck, clearly aware of the spirit of the army and people of the DPRK to annihilate enemies.” (KCNA, “CPRK Spokesman Denounces U.S.-S. Korea Military Confab against DPRK,” October 7, 2013)

Shock brigades of soldiers have been deployed to finish a lavish ski resort at Masik Pass by October 10 -- not that there will be any snowpack yet, or ski lifts, for that matter. The full-scale rush, which has builder-conscripts lugging concrete blocks on their backs up the denuded slopes, is aimed at having the resort ready to coincide with the 68th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers’ Party. Like all good communist hero projects, the ski complex, such as it is, will meet its deadline and what there is of it will be ceremonially unveiled on the tenth. But according to the Associated Press, whose journalists got a glimpse of the resort-in-the-making last month, a few critical elements appeared far behind schedule: The two main hotels were still concrete shells; an underground parking lot was little more than an excavation site; and employee housing, access roads and a water supply had yet to appear. What was in evidence during the orchestrated press visit was patriotic music blaring from loudspeakers atop minivans, and inspirational propaganda posters along the resort’s dirt-road entrance urging on the workers: “Full Attack. March Forward. Let’s Absolutely Finish Building Masik Pass Ski Resort Within This Year by Launching a Full Aggressive War and Full Battle.” North Korean ski association leader Kim Tae Yong was quoted by the Associated Press as estimating the number of North Korean skiers at 5,500 -- or about 0.02% of the 24 million population. “Even so, as he sweeps his hand over the scene, the official displays no doubt that what his country really needs right now is a multimillion-dollar ski resort in the secluded depths of North Korea’s east coast,” the AP said of the impassioned ski association chief. The real impetus behind the ski resort, where ground was broken only 10 months ago, is thought to be rival South Korea’s hosting of the 2018 Winter Olympics. Kim said Pyongyang proposed Masik Pass as a venue for some of the 2018 ski events but was shot down by both Seoul and Olympic officials. Undeterred, the ski enthusiast predicted North Korea would have an Olympic ski medalist or world champion soon, now that it has, or will soon have, the Masik Pass resort as a training venue. Project managers suffered their biggest setback last month, when Switzerland’s secretariat for economic affairs nixed
Pyongyang’s $7.6-million order for two ski lifts because U.N. sanctions prohibit the sale of luxury goods to North Korea, First Tracks online ski magazine reported. (Carol J. Williams, “Hungry and Isolated, North Korea Courting Luxury Travelers,” Los Angeles Times, October 7, 2013)

Joseph DeTrani: “It has been 20 years of negotiations with North Korea and all we have is a worse situation. Those who follow events with North Korea and those responsible for resolving issues with North Korea are fatigued and frustrated. Those moments when you thought you accomplished something, like the Agreed Framework in 1994 and the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement, were fleeting. With that fatigue and frustration comes a sense that resolving issues with North Korea has been too frustrating and has taken too much of our time. This sentiment is understandable and technically correct. In reality, however, it’s wrong. It’s wrong because there are 23 million people in North Korea who deserve a better life. It’s wrong because a North Korea with nuclear weapons is a security threat to Northeast Asia, the US and the international community. And the only way to address these humanitarian and national security issues is to expeditiously resolve the core issue with North Korea - their nuclear programs. In the mid-to-late 1990s, there was significant starvation in North Korea. Currently, there are reports of food shortages in the provinces, with significant malnourishment and cases of starvation. Militarily, North Korea reportedly is building more nuclear weapons, with the reconstitution of their plutonium reactor in Yongbyon. Their uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons reportedly continues, with centrifuges spinning in Yongbyon and in other facilities. North Korea is expected to launch their intermediate range Musudan missile, with a range of 4,000 kilometers, and their mobile KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile. Pyongyang previously had declared that they are working on miniaturization of their nuclear weapons, which would enhance their ability to eventually mate these nuclear warheads to missile delivery systems. The nuclear proliferation threat from North Korea is also real. We witnessed this in Syria at Alkabar, where North Korea was assisting Damascus with the construction of a plutonium reactor. Fortunately, this reactor was destroyed by Israel in September 2007, just prior to going operational. When Kim Jong-eun replaced his father, Kim Jong-il, who died in December 2011, there was hope. The new young leader replaced many of his father’s senior military advisors. He appointed a younger generation of military and party leaders and put a senior party official, Vice Marshall Choi Ryong-hae, in charge of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), as the new Director of the KPA’s General Political Department. Hope faded, however, when North Korea launched missiles in April and December 2012, in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and then conducted a nuclear test in February 2013. Vitriolic commentary from Pyongyang followed, with threats of a pre-emptive nuclear attack on the US and South Korea. Fortunately, these threats have ceased and Pyongyang appears to be on a peace offensive, especially with South Korea. The Kaesong Industrial complex recently was re-opened, with the establishment of a joint North-South committee to oversee activities at Kaesong, while determined to internationalize Kaesong and open it up to international investment. The initial agreement to permit family reunions between separated families in the North and South was, unfortunately, cancelled by Pyongyang, as was the visit of ambassador Bob King to Pyongyang to discuss the release of Kenneth Bae, an American sentenced to 15 years of hard labor. Hopefully,
North Korea will permit these family reunions and release Kenneth Bae and see the value in improving relations with the new leadership in South Korea. **North Korea recently said they wanted to return to six-party talks. They said they were prepared to discuss denuclearization and other issues.** Understandably, there’s skepticism about resuming talks with North Korea; talks over 20 years that have been frustrating and useless. There’s concern that with the resumption of talks, North Korea will continue to enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities and push to be accepted as a nuclear weapons state. According to media reports, there’s no interest in returning to six-party negotiations with North Korea. **I believe there would be interest in returning to negotiations with North Korea if Pyongyang stated that they were prepared to implement the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement.** That in return for security assurances, economic assistance and the eventual provision of light water reactors, when they return to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, and ultimately establish normal relations with the US and other countries, North Korea was prepared to comprehensively and verifiably dismantle all of their plutonium and uranium enrichment nuclear weapons programs and that they were prepared to immediately cease all missile launches and nuclear tests as they engage in six-party negotiations. The leadership in North Korea has the power and opportunity to reverse the downward spiral of relations with the international community and return to meaningful negotiations.” (Joseph DeTrani, “The Dangers of North Korea Fatigue,” Asia Times, October 8, 2013)

National Intelligence Service Director Nam Jae-joon shared a considerable amount of sensitive information related to developments in North Korea before the National Assembly’s intelligence committee. Some of the information that he revealed did not have clear evidence to support it, and other parts of what he said was immediately refuted by the Ministry of National Defense. This led to allegations that the NIS was intentionally using unconfirmed intelligence as a “sales pitch” to show off the organization’s intel-gathering ability and to reinforce wariness about North Korea. After the committee meeting adjourned, a press briefing was held by Cho Won-jin, Saenuri Party (NFP) lawmaker and member of the National Assembly Intelligence Committee.

“North Korea is hoping to use an unconditional return to the six-party talks to seize the initiative in sanctions against the North, policy cooperation between South Korea, the US, and Japan, and the political situation on the Korean peninsula,” Cho reported Nam as having told the committee. “North Korea recently reactivated the 5MW nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in order to strengthen its nuclear ability by producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium,” Cho also said. “At the same time, it continues work to secure means of nuclear development. This includes conducting engine tests on long-range missiles at the missile launch pad at the village of Tongchang.” But Defense Ministry spokesperson Kim Min-seok promptly disputed these claims. “Nothing has been confirmed regarding the Yongbyon reactor or the missiles at Tongchang village,” Kim said. In addition to this, Nam also provided a detailed report of negative assessments of the leadership of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inside the North and recent rumours about Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju. “We do not know the circumstances of Ri Sol-ju’s connection with the members of the Unhasu Orchestra, but we do know that those members were executed,” Cho quoted Nam as saying. This suggests that, while overseas media recently reported that members of the orchestra were executed by
firing squad on charges of having shot a pornographic video, it is unclear whether their execution was connected with stories about a sex scandal. “Kim Jong-un is obsessed with projects that imitate foreign countries. He is working on a European-style theme park with grassy lawns based on his experience in Switzerland,” Cho also reported Nam as saying. “Kim is squandering the state budget on projects that he is personally interested in. He has spent a total of 300 million dollars on building sports and recreational facilities for the privileged classes. There is the Mirim equestrian club near Pyongyang, a water park in Munsu, and the ski resort at Masik Pass. That is enough money to buy 800,000 tons of food, which could feed the entire population of North Korea for 2-3 months.” Nam’s report also addressed discontent about Kim inside North Korea. According to Nam, Kim is strengthening his system of control over the country, and to do this he is trying to develop a personality cult for himself by creating a cemetery for his mother, Ko Yong-hui, and forcing North Koreans to pay their respects there. Nam also reported that criticism of Kim’s leadership is spreading among North Korean leaders. In addition, he referred to Kim’s order in April that North Koreans assigned overseas can only keep one of their children with them and must send the rest back to North Korea. Even though Kim is retracting this order, Nam said, he is alienating much of the public in the process. During the briefing, Cho said that “Kim ordered [the military] to be prepared for orders to launch a full-scale attack. When the order for a full-scale attack is given, Kim said, all comrades at each of their posts should be as one in the speed battle and, through strong collective force, should act for each other in a single moment with truly inexhaustible creative thinking.” This resulted in a short flurry of media attention, with some TV stations and wire services releasing short reports claiming that Kim Jong-un had ordered the military to stand by for a full-scale attack. But Jeong Cheong-rae, Democratic Party lawmaker on the Intelligence Committee, held a press briefing to correct the report. “The remarks about Kim Jong-un’s full-scale attack orders were made during Lee Seok-ki’s meeting in Seoul’s Hapjeong neighborhood,” Jeong said. “Cho incorrectly made it sound as if Kim Jong-un had said this himself.” (Song Chae Kyung-hwa, “In Parliament, NIS Director Presents Questionable Info on N. Korea,” Hankyore, October 9, 2013)

China called for “calm and restraint” on the Korean Peninsula, a day after North Korea put its military on full alert against a major joint naval drill involving South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. The three-day drill, led by U.S. nuclear-powered supercarrier USS George Washington, had been originally scheduled to begin off the Peninsula's south coast yesterday, but was postponed for a few days because of an approaching powerful typhoon. “We call on all relevant parties to bear in mind the overall interests of this region ... keep calm, exercise restraint and maintain the momentum of dialogues,” China's foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said when asked about the North's latest moves against the naval drills. (Yonhap, “China Urges Restraint after N. Korea Put Army on Alert,” October 9, 2013)

Apparently, North Korea and the United States are staging a war of nerves over what should come first - dialogue or Pyongyang’s initial steps toward denuclearization. In recent weeks, North Korea’s vice foreign ministers dealing with relations with the U.S. -- Kim Kye-gwan and Ri Yong-ho -- held a series of “Track 1.5 or Track 2” sessions in Beijing, Berlin and London. Those who attended said they came back without feeling
that North Korea is prepared to make a denuclearization commitment for now. "The U.S., as I understand, wants the North Koreans to take these steps even before there's a dialogue. That's not going to happen. I understand the concept. I understand the reasoning, but it's not going to happen," Joel Wit, a former State Department official, told Yonhap News Agency. "They are not willing to accept preconditions for entering into dialogue." But North Koreans are "willing to take confidence-building steps early in a dialogue in the weapons of mass destruction area," according to Wit, who works as a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. He said the measures Pyongyang could adopt include a moratorium on nuclear testing. The U.S. will be able to negotiate other denuclearization-related steps as well through face-to-face talks with North Koreans, added Wit, who sat together with North Korea's nuclear envoy, Ri Yong-ho, in Berlin in late September. Evans Revere, former principal deputy assistant secretary of state, also said he did not hear anything in his recent Beijing meeting with top North Korean officials that suggests Pyongyang is willing to take steps toward denuclearization before the resumption of talks with Washington. "I think North Korea is interested in dialogue. I think China has been pressing Pyongyang quite hard, quite vigorously, to return to the negotiating table," he said in a phone interview with Yonhap's 24-hour television news arm, News Y. However, North Korea has gone in quite the opposite direction of denuclearization, he pointed out. "So, if we are going to get these talks restarted, we need to know without a shadow of a doubt that North Korea is actually interested in denuclearization," Revere stressed, "I don't think the United State is going to change that fundamental position." Revere said he got impression that China is quite serious about reviving the six-way talks also involving South Korea, Japan and Russia. China recently published a list of dual-use items to be banned from export to North Korea that could be used for its nuclear weapons program. It may add some pressure on the Obama administration. Revere did not rule out the possibility of Washington agreeing to having "exploratory talks" with Pyongyang before mulling over full-scale dialogue. "I think it is something worth considering," he said, if North Koreans somehow convey to the U.S. some kind of a message that indicates that it is prepared to take "substantial and definitive" steps toward denuclearization. (Lee Chidong, "N. Korea Wants Talks First, Actions Later: Pundits," Yonhap, October 9, 2013)
outcome of the negotiations will be, must be, the complete elimination of North Korea’s nuclear program. Q: So they don’t even get to - they don’t even get a civilian energy program? They have to get rid of the whole thing? SENIOR STATE OFFICIAL: Under the UN Security Council resolutions, North Korea is prohibited from all nuclear activities. Q: Yeah. There’s no way they can negotiate a - get the same deal? I mean, why is their charm offensive no good and the Iranians’ is okay? That's out of your area, so - I mean, it just seems a bit odd to use virtually the same words that Netanyahu used at the UN: have their yellow cake, he said, and eat it too. And so it just seems to me (inaudible). Why? SENIOR STATE OFFICIAL: Why? Fifteen members of the UN Security Council have three times adopted resolutions - this includes China, this includes Russia that expressly forbids North Korea from all nuclear and ballistic missile activities. And I would hazard a guess that one reason is because of their experience with North Korea repudiating its promises breaking its commitments, and violating international law. (Senior State Department Official, Background Briefing en route to Malaysia, October 10, 2013)

State news media confirmed the removal of a hard-line general as North Korea’s military chief, the latest sign of an overhaul by the country’s leader, Kim Jong-un, who South Korean officials say has replaced nearly half of his top officials in the past two years. The firing of Gen. Kim Kyok-sik and the rise of Gen. Ri Yong-gil to replace him as head of the general staff of the North’s Korean People’s Army were the latest in a series of high-profile reshuffles that Kim has engineered in what is widely believed to be a bid to consolidate his grip on the North’s elites. Since taking power after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in 2011, the younger Kim has replaced 44 percent of North Korea’s 218 top military, party and government officials, the South’s Ministry of Unification said in a report. Analysts say he engineered this and other reshuffles to retire or sideline the generals who served his father and to promote a new set of aides who will owe their loyalty directly to him. Little is known about General Ri. He gained the attention of outside analysts when North Korean news media reported that he was one of the generals who advised Kim this spring during a time of high tension on the divided Korean Peninsula when the North threatened the United States and South Korea with nuclear strikes. Kim’s father and grandfather also made a practice of promoting, demoting and firing generals as a way of taming the country’s powerful military. South Korean analysts say they believe that Kim, while intent on expanding the country’s nuclear and missile abilities, wanted to dilute the military elite’s political and economic power, possibly as part of his stated push to revive the moribund economy. The military has long had strong control of many industries in the nation, but analysts say Kim appears to be giving the party and cabinet bigger roles in trying to resuscitate the economy. Early in his rule, he was reported to have stripped the military of its lucrative export rights for some minerals. As always, part of the analysts’ work is informed guesswork, since the North maintains rigid control of the information that flows in and out of the country. The reordering of top jobs has accelerated since July of last year, when Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho, one of the most powerful men under Kim’s father, was suddenly fired as military chief. He was replaced by Vice Marshal Hyon Yong-chol. Hyon did not last long either; he was demoted and replaced by General Kim in May. General Kim, 74, had been one of the oldest aides of Kim Jong-il still holding a top job even after Kim Jong-un promoted younger generals. South Korean
officials believed General Kim commanded units responsible for sinking one of South Korea's warships and for shelling a South Korean border island in 2010. The two attacks killed 50 South Koreans. The general’s name disappeared from the North’s state news media after the Central Military Commission of the ruling Workers’ Party met in August to discuss personnel matters. South Korean officials concluded that General Ri was appointed military chief during the meeting. North Korean news media did not mention his new title until today. General Ri joins Gen. Jang Jong-nam, who became minister of the armed forces in May, and Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, the military’s top political officer, as Mr. Kim’s top military aides. Among the three, Vice Marshal Choe, director of the General Political Department of the North Korean People’s Army, was considered the most powerful. He has appeared with Kim in North Korean news media more often than any other member of the elite. A former party secretary, he had never served in the army, and South Korean analysts see his sudden rise in the military ranks under Mr. Kim as a sign that the North Korean leader is letting the party reassert its influence over the military as he vowed to channel more national resources into the rebuilding of the economy. Meanwhile, North Korean news media late Wednesday showed Mr. Kim inspecting a housing project together with his wife, Ri Sol-ju, who has been a focus of lurid gossip in the region in recent weeks. In August, Chosun Ilbo reported that Kim had ordered the executions of a dozen North Korean performers, including the singer Hyon Song-wol—who the paper said was Kim’s former girlfriend—for making videos of themselves performing sex acts and then selling the recordings. Then, last month, the Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun reported claims that Kim had ordered the executions to prevent the spreading of rumors that his wife had engaged in similar acts when she was a singer. North Korea called the reports “an unpardonable hideous provocation hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership” and promised a “stern punishment.” Nam Jae-joon, director of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, told lawmakers in Seoul that his agency was aware of the executions but that it could not confirm reports of Ri’s involvement. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korean Leader Tightens Grip with Removal of His Top General,” New York Times, October 11, 2013, p. A-4)

The mother of Kenneth Bae, an American of Korean descent who has been held in North Korea for nearly a year and is in failing health, has been granted permission by the North Korean authorities to visit him and arrived in Pyongyang today, his family reported. (Rick Gladstone, “Mother to Visit American Held in North Korea,” New York Times, October 11, 2013, p. A-7)

North Korea threatened to “bury in the sea” a US aircraft carrier, as it slammed a three-nation naval drill involving US, South Korean and Japanese warships. The latest warning from the isolated regime came a day after the United States launched a two-day joint military drill with South Korea and Japan off the southern coast of the Korean peninsula. The drill involved the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington, guided-missile ships, anti-submarine helicopters and early warning aircraft. “The war drills show that the US-Japan-South Korea tripartite military alliance has developed into the nuclear war alliance and has become operational in actuality," the North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea said in a statement. If the three countries launch "a nuclear war while talking about ‘sign’ and ‘preemptive
attack’ despite repeated warnings of (North Korea), its revolutionary armed forces will immediately mount counter-attack to bury the aggressors, provocateurs in the sea together with the carrier,” it said. (AFP, “N. Korea QWarns of Counterattack on U.S. Warship,” October 11, 2013)

On October 3 U.S. Secretary of State Kerry said that if the DPRK starts denuclearization first, the U.S. will be ready to have dialogue with it and that if it becomes clear that the DPRK started denuclearization, Washington will open peaceful relations with Pyongyang and sign a non-aggression pact. Disclosing the hypocritical nature of his remarks, the statement went on: His remarks, which mean that the U.S. will enter into friendly relations with the DPRK after it is left bare-handed, are the height of American-style impudence and craftiness. We are well aware that even though it clamored for non-aggression, the U.S. is running the whole gamut of intrigues to lead the DPRK to "change" and "collapse", while persistently opposing the withdrawal of its aggression troops from south Korea. The U.S. call on the DPRK to lay down arms and remain bare-handed is an intolerable mockery and insult to the army and people of the DPRK. It is disgusting to see the U.S. playing the role of a leading character with high skill in the charade. The U.S. proposal for non-aggression cannot guarantee peace and security on the Korean Peninsula but the nuclear-armed revolutionary forces for self-defense of the DPRK can defend and guarantee everything. The statement clarified the principled stand of the DPRK as follows as the U.S. takes issue with the nuclear issue and talks about the DPRK-U.S. relations while escalating all sorts of pressure offensives against the DPRK: If the U.S. truly wants to improve the relations with the DPRK, it has to properly understand the DPRK and behave as befitting a big power. The DPRK is no longer a small and weak country which used to be in the past when it was hacked at the point of bayonets of big powers for it had neither sovereignty nor arms. The U.S. is seriously mistaken if it thinks it can frighten the army and people of the DPRK through the "gunboat" offensive, with which it used to browbeat the world and bring its rival to its knees in the past, and through the superiority in the air based on latest science and technology, and can hurt the DPRK through the vicious moves for isolating and stifling it politically and economically. The U.S. tragedy is that it does not know about the DPRK which is demonstrating its strong spirit and its army and people who love and value their country more than their own lives. If the U.S. truly wants to mend the relations with the DPRK, it should properly understand the DPRK supported even by tens of millions of south Koreans, and behave itself as befitting a big country. The U.S. should no longer talk about dialogue and improvement of relations with preconditions nor maintain the brigandish insistence that non-aggression is possible only when the DPRK dismantles its nuclear weapons first. The army and people of the DPRK can discern the ulterior intention concealed in the dialogue and non-aggression proposed by the U.S. The U.S. should discard the old way of thinking and outdated stand and abandon the threadbare hostile policy toward the DPRK, before it is too late.
For a good while the U.S., when meeting with DPRK officials behind closed doors, used to talk volubly that Washington has no intent to pursue policy hostile toward the DPRK. In recent public appearances Washington is working hard to build public opinion, claiming that it has neither hostile policy toward the DPRK nor willingness to replace the regime in the DPRK by attacking it. But in actuality it is working hard to realize its attempt at the regime change while systematically escalating all sorts of sanctions, isolation and blockade against the DPRK after invariably labeling it as part of “an axis of evil” and a “rogue state” behaving contrary to “law standard” and “international cord of conduct.” The situation goes to fully prove that the U.S. assertions that it has neither hostile policy toward the DPRK nor intent to attack it are a poor farce for deceiving the public at home and abroad and mocking at the army and people of the DPRK. If the U.S. wants to escape the pent-up grudge and retaliation of the army and people of the DPRK, it should drop its old way of thinking and outdated stand and make a bold decision to roll back its old hostile policy toward the DPRK before it is too late. The U.S. should clearly understand the meaning of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and lift all steps for isolating and stifling the DPRK. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the consistent policy goal set forth by the DPRK government. It calls for the denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula including south Korea. This denuclearization is a peace-loving and powerful physical means for defusing all the U.S. nuclear threats to the DPRK and denuclearizing the world. If the U.S. continues threat and blackmail against the DPRK, the DPRK will get more time in its favor and the U.S. will only precipitate its miserable end. In other words, the DPRK will prosper with increasing vigor and strength, as it has smaller, diversified and precision nuclear weapons, but the U.S. will remain as a bubble marginalized in history. The U.S. should, first of all, lift all the sanctions it imposed against the DPRK under absurd charges, if it wants to get rid of the present poor situation. It should stop resorting to the stereo-typed nuclear blackmail against the DPRK. The further the U.S. escalates its nuclear threat and blackmail, the deeper it will find itself in self-contradiction and bottomless labyrinth. What we would like to emphasize is that the U.S. should take a bold decision to halt at once all the provocations against the DPRK including war exercises which aim at bringing down its social system and territorial invasion. Explicitly speaking, the U.S. should make a policy switchover by withdrawing all the measures it has taken to isolate and stifle the DPRK as part of its greedy pivot to Asia-Pacific strategy. Herein lies the way for improving the DPRK-U.S. relations and guaranteeing peace and security not only on the Korean Peninsula but in the U.S. mainland.” (KCNA, “NDC of DPRK Clarifies Principled Stand on U.S.-DPRK Relations,” October 12, 2013)

At least 19 North Korean sailors were killed when a naval vessel sank during “combat duties” off the east coast last month, North and South Korean media said. South Korean media said the ship sank during a drill killing “scores.” Photos released by North Korea’s KCNA state news agency showed leader Kim Jong Un laying flowers at the foot of a memorial to the dead, encircled by at least 19 graves emblazoned with the faces of the sailors. “Submarine chaser No. 233 fell while performing combat duties in mid-October,” KCNA said. (James Pearson and Jumin Park, “North Korea Sailors Killed When Ship Sinks during ‘Combat Duties’: State Media,” Reuters, November 4, 2013)
North Korean naval vessel sank last month, killing an unspecified number of sailors, according to North and South Korean news media. The news first appeared on November 2 when KCNA reported that the country’s leader, Kim Jong-un, had visited a newly built cemetery for the sailors “sacrificed” on board the vessel, a submarine chaser, during “combat duties” last month. The news agency gave no further details about what happened but quoted Kim as instructing his navy to “find all the bodies,” hinting at a sizable death toll. Photos of Mr. Kim visiting the cemetery with flowers showed a large mass tomb encircled by what looked like at least a score of headstones bearing the names and photographs of the sailors who had died. South Korean military officials said there was no military clash between the two Koreas last month. Chosun Ilbo reported on November 4 that “tens” of sailors were believed to have died when the submarine chaser and a North Korean patrol boat sank off the North’s eastern coast during a navy drill. The submarine chaser was probably a 375-ton vessel built in China in the 1960s, it said, citing an unidentified military official. The South Korean news agency Yonhap cited an unidentified government official as saying the North’s navy vessel sank during a training mission off the port of Wonsan. North Korea rarely reports accidents involving its military. But during parliamentary briefings in recent months, South Korean officials have said accidents with human casualties are common in the North Korean military, which still relies on outdated equipment from the Soviet era and has trouble finding parts. The building of a cemetery for the sailors and Mr. Kim’s visit there, which was prominently reported in the official North Korean news media, were seen as part of Kim’s attempt to bolster his image as a leader who cares about his troops. “I can’t sleep when I think about those who left us at such young ages,” Kim was quoted as saying about the fallen sailors at the cemetery. He said all members of the North Korean military should learn from their dedication. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korean Sailors Reported Killed in October Sinking; Southg Says There Was No Clash,” New York Times, November 5, 2013, p. A-6)

Seoul and Washington have agreed to reset the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) next year after reviewing North Korean threat and the South Korean forces capabilities to deal with it, the defense ministry here said. ((Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea, U.S. to Decide Timing of OPCON Transfer Next Year,” Yonhap, October 14, 2013)

Japan would be unable to carry out military action in case of emergencies on the Korean Peninsula, such as support for U.S. troops, without South Korea’s prior consent even if Tokyo removes its self-imposed ban on the use of the country’s collective self-defense rights, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung Se said. (Jiji, “Japan Military Action Needs Prior Consent: S. Korean Minister,” October 14, 2013)

South Korea said that it has postponed an investor relations event planned for the end of the month at a joint inter-Korean factory park in Kaesong. The event that was originally set for Oct. 31 was arranged to attract foreign investors to set up factories at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which is currently home to only South Korean companies. “Seoul sent the message to the North last Friday adding that under present circumstances, the reason for holding the event cannot be met,” a unification ministry official said. He said the decision reflects the lack of progress made in talks to
enhance cross-border communication and travel between Kaesong and the South. "As is known, negotiations on Internet connectivity, mobile phone use, utilization of radio frequency identification tag to ease travel and customs inspections have made no headway since the North called off working-level talks for the Sept. 26 meeting," the official said. He said since no headway was made in matters that are critical for foreign investment, it has been decided that there is no point in holding the investors event. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Postpones Foreign Investors Event for Kaesong Complex,” October 14, 2103)

Imports of luxury goods reached $645.8 million last year, up sharply from an annual import average of around $300 million tallied under the current leader's father Kim Jong-il, According to Rep. Yoon Sang-hyun of the ruling Saenuri Party. Citing data provided by the government ahead of the parliamentary audit on the Ministry of Unification, the lawmaker said the isolationist country imported such non-essential goods as pets, feed for such animals, and various European and U.S.-made bath, sauna and maternity products. The report also showed a noticeable rise in imports of expensive musical instruments, cosmetic goods, handbags, leather products, watches, and mid-sized sedans made in Japan and China. "The products were given as gifts to key figures in North Korean society to ensure their loyalty to the regime," Yoon said. The Saenuri lawmaker said that imports of wine, liquor, consumer electronics, fur products and expensive watches led the growth last year. Imports of alcoholic beverages surpassed the $30 million mark, with electronics and watches reaching $37 million and $8.2 million, respectively, for the whole of last year, he said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea's Luxury Goods Imports Surge under Kim Jong-un Leadership,” October 14, 2013)

North Korea must correctly assess its present situation, and work with South Korea to improve cross-border relations, Seoul's unification minister said. Speaking to lawmakers at a parliamentary audit session, Ryoo Kihl-jae said Pyongyang needs to realize what it can do to pull off meaningful growth, what actions are best for the future of the Korean people, and make the right decisions. Commenting on the impasse in inter-Korean relations following the agreement to reopen a joint factory park in Kaesong, Ryoo said Seoul is taking a proactive, yet long-term approach to dealing with the North. "The government will not be swayed by every up and down in relations," the minister emphasized. He said the channel for dialogue remains open and the two sides need to build trust through dialogue and cooperation. "For large-scale cooperation like the 'Vision Korea Project' to take place, the nuclear issue needs to be addressed," he emphasized, although making clear that humanitarian aid will continue to be provided to the North regardless of political situation on the peninsula. The ministry in charge of managing ties with the North told lawmakers in a separate assessment report that Pyongyang is seeking change, although such attempts have not been successful. It said the North has made moves to mend fences with China, and arranged for meetings with former U.S. officials in August and September. "Such moves gained little momentum because Washington has been adamant in calling on the North to first make known its willingness to give up all of its WMD programs," the ministry said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Must Coreectly Assess Present Situation, Work with S. Korea, Minister,” October 15, 2013)
The mother of Kenneth Bae, the ailing American missionary serving a 15-year sentence of hard labor in North Korea, said on Tuesday that “it broke my heart to leave him behind” after the North Korean authorities had permitted her to visit him in a Pyongyang hospital. In a statement released by the Bae family, the mother, Myunghee Bae, 69, also expressed thanks to North Korean officials, who allowed her to see Bae, 45, three times over the course of a five-day stay in the country. (Rick Gladstone, “Mother of American Imprisoned in North Korea Leave without Him,” New York Times, October 15, 2013)

10/16/13

In a bid to bolster its laggard economy, North Korea plans to set up more special economic zones and has created a group to assist potential foreign investors, state media and the organizers of a rare international conference in Pyongyang said. Ri Chol Sok, vice president of the newly formed Korea Economic Development Association, which is hosting the two-day conference, said the zones "are already starting to be organized all over the country." The meeting began Wednesday with academics and experts from 13 countries – including the US, Canada, India, China, Malaysia and Vietnam – and 60 North Korean participants. North Korea is still regarded as too risky by many businesses but has had its eye on expanding its use of economic zones since at least June, when it announced foreign investors would be given preferential treatment for land use, labor and taxes. (Associated Press, “North Korea Plans to Expand Economic Zones,” October 16, 2013) North Korea announced that it had installed the State Economic Development Commission to oversee the national economic development. KCNA reported on October 16 that preamble to raise the existing General Bureau for State Economic Development to State Economic Development Commission was adopted at the recent Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly. Details for appointment of officials and function of the commission are yet to be announced. The bureau was established in 2011 to design and carry out the 10-year plan for the development of the national economy. The elevation of this institution from bureau to commission can be interpreted as increasing emphasis on economic development. KCNA also reported on establishment of a non-state organization called the Korean Economic Development Association for the purpose of “attracting interests of economic, business, and academic communities from abroad in special economic zones (SEZs)” and “to promote SEZs to companies and organizations of other countries to draw investments for development in these areas.” The association is expected to organize and provide support services to foreign investors and coordinate debates, conferences, exhibitions, economic information exchanges, and provide advisory services, in accordance with government mandates and investment agreements. Essentially, the association’s chief focus is to attract foreign investments into SEZs and provide various services to assist their activities in the economic zones. The news reported the first project of the association was the organization of the “Pyongyang International Conference on Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Development,” held at the Yanggakdo International Hotel. The conference brought together economic experts from North Korea, the United States, Canada, India, and Malaysia. The launch of a non-state organization for the promotion of SEZs is a first for North Korea. This is considered as a follow-up measure to the Law on Economic Development Zones, which was enacted in June 2013. (IFES, “North Korea Launches New Economic Development Organizations,” October 24, 2013)
DoS: “**Q:** Recently, North Korean Ambassador to United Nations Sin Son-ho has mentioned that North Korea want peace treaty talks with the United States. How does the United States respond to this peace treaty they **PSAKI:** Well, I haven’t seen those remarks, but our position remains the same, and I think if I remember correctly, on a long trip to Asia, the Secretary talked about this when we were in Asia, which is that North Korea needs to abide by its international obligations, including the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. The ball is in their court. If they take those steps and move toward the objective of a verifiable, denuclearized Korea, then that is something we would be open to discussing. But that has not changed, so our position has not changed. **Q:** So what is the United States resumption of Six-Party Talks, North Korea want – before they want a peace treaty talks, before the resumption of Six-Party Talks **PSAKI:** Well, there are steps that North Korea needs to take, and the ball remains in their court, and we’ll see what happens.” (Spokesperson Jan Psaki, DoS Daily Briefing, October 16, 2013)

10/17/13

North Korea will jointly build a hi-tech industrial park in its border city of Kaesong with a consortium of foreign firms from Singapore and other nations, according to the communist country’s official media. The firms include Jurong Consultants and OKP Holdings of Singapore, P and T Architects and Engineers of Hong Kong and other “well-known” companies in East Asia and the Middle East, according to a brief dispatch released by KCNA. “The consortium agreed with the DPRK’s related organs on collaboration in building the Kaesong Hi-Tech Industrial Park and Highway Toll Road from Capital Airport to Pyongyang City,” KCNA said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “The projects will soon begin,” it added, giving no further details. In May, North Korea introduced a law that calls for building special economic zones, including a hi-tech industrial park, across the country. Under that law, the special zones would give preferential treatment to foreign businesses. "Considering Kaesong’s geographical location, it appears that North Korea is trying to attract South Korea’s advanced technology with the expectation that inter-Korean ties will improve in the long term," said Lim Eul-chul, a research professor at Kyungnam University in Changwon, about 400 kilometers south of Seoul. (Yonhap, “N. Korea to Jointly Build Hi-Tech Industrial Park with Foreign Firms,” October 18, 2013)

By staying away from war-linked Yasukuni Shrine during its autumn festival while leaving the door open for a future visit, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is balancing his desire to repair relations with China and South Korea with pleasing his conservative support base. Abe also appears to have taken care that the United States, which has no interest in seeing an increase in already heightened East Asia tensions, is not aggravated by a visit to the Shinto shrine regarded by China and South Korea as a symbol of Japanese militarism before and during World War II. On October 17, Abe made a ritual offering to Yasukuni but without going there in person, marking the third time that the Liberal Democratic Party leader has eschewed a visit to the shrine on major occasions since becoming prime minister in late December. (Kyodo, “Abe Skirts Yasukuni Snare,” Asahi Shimbun, October 19, 2013)
Hecker: “The restart of the 5-megawatt reactor will strengthen North Korea’s weapons program by producing more plutonium. It may also improve Pyongyang’s negotiating position, giving it more to bargain away, if the six-party talks resume with South Korea, the United States, Russia, China, and Japan. The unveiling of a modern centrifuge facility during our 2010 visit, ostensibly to produce fuel for the ELWR, appeared to confirm that North Korea’s plutonium route to the bomb was at a dead end. It currently has only 24 to 42 kilograms of plutonium, and it may have used 4 to 6 kilograms for the third nuclear test in February 2013. I, along with most analysts, concluded that North Korea had decided to expand its nuclear arsenal by developing highly enriched uranium (HEU) weapons. The size and sophistication of the centrifuge facility, as well as the timing of construction, indicated that it also had a clandestine facility—one that I suspected of producing some HEU. A move to HEU, however, was puzzling since Pyongyang’s declared objective for the third test was to demonstrate that North Korea can make smaller and more sophisticated nuclear devices, ones that presumably can be mounted on its missiles. Plutonium is a more desirable bomb fuel for miniaturization, and I believe it’s what North Korea used in its first two nuclear tests. Nevertheless, I speculated that if Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan had shared his country’s HEU warhead designs and test data it may have led Pyongyang to conclude that HEU provided a quicker and more assured path to miniaturization, in addition to being much easier to hide. The 5-megawatt reactor remained in standby while North Korea’s nuclear specialists made impressive progress on the construction of the ELWR from the time we saw the reactor containment structure just barely emerging from its foundation in 2010, to the spring of 2013 when the exterior of the plant appeared to be complete. North Korea is now keeping the plutonium-bomb option alive with the 5-megawatt reactor restart. Meanwhile Pyongyang has demonstrated once again the adeptness of its technical specialists at nuclear operations. They adapted a new cooling system that will use the Kuryong river to provide cooling for both the ELWR and the restarted 5-megawatt reactor, instead of replacing the cooling tower they blew up in a symbolic gesture to Washington in 2008. They were also able to adapt unused uranium alloy fuel rods that had been stored since the 1994 Agreed Framework. And, they were able to coax the nearly 30-year-old 5-megawatt reactor back into operation after a long shutdown. The most likely technical scenario is that the North Koreans will operate the restarted 5-megawatt reactor for two years with a full load of 8,000 fuel rods, cool this spent fuel and extract roughly 10 to 12 kilograms of plutonium within three years from the fall of 2013. They can likely repeat this cycle multiple times since they previously told me they expect the reactor to function for several more decades. Hence, we can expect Pyongyang to gain one bomb’s worth of plutonium per year as long as it stays on this path. Such a production rate does not constitute a game changer, but it would give North Korea more plutonium to test in order to refine its nuclear devices to fit on its missiles. We were told that the ELWR was designed as a prototype electrical power reactor. I believe that is its primary purpose. However, we cannot rule out that Pyongyang could also use the reactor to annually produce 10 to 15 kilograms of plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons by changing the typical long electrical-power reactor burn cycle to a shorter one. This would require modifications to the Yongbyon reprocessing facility to handle ceramic instead of metallic spent fuel. Any use of the ELWR for weapon-grade plutonium production would be observable.”
using satellite imagery. A more troublesome alternative, however, would be if Pyongyang built a copy of the 50-megawatt reactor that was near completion in 1994, but then abandoned because of the Agreed Framework. It would have to start over since the original reactor is beyond repair, but I believe North Korea has the requisite materiel and skill to do so. Such a reactor construction project would be readily observable using satellite imagery and take at least five years to complete. The 10 bombs’ worth of plutonium this reactor could produce would be a game changer. It is difficult to say what the 5-megawatt reactor restart tells us about the uranium enrichment program and the HEU path to the bomb because we know so little about the enrichment program. The North Koreans gave us only limited access in 2010 and, to my knowledge, no foreigners have been there since. It is possible that the North Koreans ran into greater-than-anticipated difficulty with the centrifuge program. After all, it has taken Iran much longer to bring on line what appear to be technically much less capable centrifuges. However, overhead imagery of the Yongbyon fuel fabrication facility shows an immense amount of construction and activity since 2009, implying that the centrifuge program is in full swing. Moreover, recent overhead imagery showed a doubling of the size of the centrifuge hall building we were shown in 2010, although we don’t know what has gone inside the hall. Pyongyang is moving ahead on all nuclear fronts: It announced in an April 2 statement that it will adjust and alter the use of existing nuclear facilities to simultaneously stimulate the economy and build up nuclear armed forces, implying that it will promote both commercial and military nuclear programs. It underscored its commitment to nuclear energy by promoting the General Bureau of Atomic Energy to the status of government ministry. It is expanding its missile launch facilities. It has at least one new nuclear test tunnel ready to go. It has restarted its plutonium production reactor and continues to progress toward operation of the ELWR, likely to begin in late 2014 or early 2015. Notwithstanding Pyongyang’s bombastic rhetoric of March and April threatening a pre-emptive nuclear attack on the United States and South Korea, its Supreme People’s Assembly passed a law spelling out North Korea’s rights and obligations as a responsible nuclear weapons state. In recent months, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s regime has reached out to engage Washington, albeit in fits and starts. South Korean President Park Gyeun-hye is at the same time reaching out to Pyongyang on economic cooperation while remaining resolute on denuclearization. Beijing and Pyongyang are advocating a return to the six-party talks, which ceased in 2009 when North Korea withdrew. Since taking over the regime in 2011, Kim Jong-un has strengthened the North’s bargaining position by expanding its nuclear program and conducting a successful space launch. He has also complicated negotiations immensely with the reactor restart. Prior to the restart, the other parties could have taken the end of plutonium production as a given, but now the reactor, the spent fuel and the reprocessing facility give Pyongyang more bargaining chits. Moreover, implementation of any agreement will be much more difficult. No plutonium in the pipeline meant no spent fuel. Now, negotiators will have to deal with what to do with 8,000 spent fuel rods. That proved to be a costly and controversial undertaking during the Agreed Framework, which broke down in 2003. Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula must remain the goal, but it is a more distant one following these new developments. It will now be more challenging and costly, although not impossible, to get North Korea to agree to what I have called “the three no’s”—no more bombs (meaning no more plutonium and HEU); no better bombs (no
nuclear testing and no missile launches); and no exports.” (Siegfried Hecker, “North Korean Reactor Restart Sets back Denuclearization,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 17, 2013)

10/7/13 An adviser to Japanese Premier Abe Shinzo held a meeting with North Korean officials in China in October, Kyodo reported, kindling speculation that Tokyo is seeking to reopen talks with Pyongyang over the issue of Japanese abductees. The four-day visit by Iijima Isao was made to the northeastern port city of Dalian, where the two sides had met for covert negotiations in the past, Kyodo said, citing diplomatic sources in Beijing. The latest trip coincides with the pending sale of the headquarters of the General Association of Korean Residents, a Tokyo-based pro-North Korea group better known as Chongryon. Though a Mongolian firm won the bid for the property on October 17, a Tokyo court rejected it, saying its documents were not “trustworthy,” the news outlet added. After Iijima traveled to Pyongyang last May, he advised Abe to pursue talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The nationalist premier has displayed his resolve to tackle the long-festering issue since taking office in December 2012. Iijima was a top aide to former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and accompanied him on his two trips to Pyongyang in 2002 and 2004 for summits with late leader Kim Jong-il. Kyodo also said earlier that Ihara Junichi, director general for Asian and Oceanian affairs at the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and other two officials met with three working-level North Korean officials in Hanoi from January 26-27. Tokyo’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide denied the report. Iijima’s surprise trip last year prompted South Korea and the U.S. to express discomfort over Japan’s failure to inform them in advance. Seoul’s Foreign Ministry openly said the visit was “unhelpful.” (Shin Hyon-hee, “North Korea, Japan Held Secret Meeting,” Korea Herald, February 11, 2014)

10/18/13 Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, in response to questions at an Upper House plenary session, revealed that his current views on historical issues are in line with Japan’s past leaders. In doing so, Abe has shelved—at least for now—his hopes of changing them.

With regard to the wartime “comfort women” issue, Abe said: “My heart aches for those who suffered terrible experiences beyond description. My feelings are no different from those of previous prime ministers.” He added, “I believe that this issue should not be turned into a political or diplomatic matter.” With regard to historical recognition issues, he said, “Japan inflicted tremendous damage and suffering on people in many countries, especially in Asia.” He added, “The Abe Cabinet will take the same stance as that of past Cabinets.” Abe has been critical of the 1993 statement released by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono and the 1995 statement by then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama over Japan’s wartime actions. The Kono statement acknowledged that the Japanese military forcefully recruited “comfort women” to provide sex for its soldiers before and during World War II, while the Murayama statement reflects on and apologizes for the nation’s colonial rule and wartime aggression. Abe had previously indicated that he intended to revise the statements. (Asahi Shimbun, Abe to Retain Japan’s Past Apology Statements,” October 19, 2013)

South Korea and the U.S. have agreed to set up a monitoring system against bioterror threats from North Korea. The Defense Ministry said the contract to build a surveillance
portal system against biological weapons was signed today at the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. This system will detect and respond to the use of around 10 dangerous biological weapons such as anthrax and smallpox. It will enable the South Korean military to receive information on vaccines and diseases from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, while the U.S. will benefit from real-time information gathered by South Korea. (Chosun Ilbo, “S. Korea, U.S to Set up Bioterror Monitoring System,” October 21, 2013)

Often dismissed as a laggard in the global cyberarms race, North Korea has long been seen as a chronic cyber-superpower wannabe. Its poverty, minimal Internet access, and paucity of malicious software to its credit together have indicated that the “hermit kingdom” has just not yet arrived. But that equation is changing. While the North’s nuclear ambitions and maltreatment of its citizens absorb diplomatic bandwidth, a four-year cyberattack-and-espionage campaign targeting South Korean banks, news media, telecoms, and military think tanks has revealed North Korean cyberwarfare capabilities to be far more potent than previously believed, US experts say and new analyses show. What’s more, say American cyberwarfare and North Korea experts, the North’s advancing capabilities show a dangerous potential to slide into real-world conflict. “Over the past four years the North has seriously intensified its cyberwarfare development efforts at South Korea’s expense,” says Alexandre Mansourov, a visiting scholar at the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. “The [Korean People’s Army] is basically planning for a future cyberwar and has been hacking to collect intelligence and prepare to disrupt information and communications, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems of its enemies: South Korea, the US, and Japan.” Analyses of these attacks, while falling short of “smoking gun” proof, leave little doubt North Korea is not only behind major attacks against the South – but that its capabilities are much broader than previously believed, Dr. Mansourov and others say. As a result, these experts are boosting their estimates of the sophistication and pace of the North’s cybermilitary development – and of its threat to the United States. Most revealing is the new linkage between the North and four years of increasingly threatening attacks on South Korea, analyzed by leading cybersecurity firms in the past five months. The attacks have cost the South more than $750 million, South Korean lawmakers said this month, citing Defense Ministry data. The first major attack, on July 4, 2009, began with a modest distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) bombardment – with millions of requests per second (tiny compared with today’s attacks) clogging Korean and US government and financial websites for days. The attacks appeared to emanate from 435 different servers in 61 countries around the world - including in South Korea itself. But a second attack on March 4, 2011, went beyond basic DDoS by launching malicious software that wiped hard drives on systems at one of the South’s biggest banks, leaving 30 million customers without ATM services for days. Initial investigations suggested that the North was responsible, but were ultimately inconclusive. Clarity began to emerge this past spring following the biggest attack. It began at 2 p.m. on March 20 with several South Korean banks and media outlets hammered by a massive malware attack erupting from inside their own networks. In minutes, a cyberweapon dubbed “DarkSeoul” infected and wiped clean the critical master boot records of 32,000 computers, wrecking them and crippling those organizations for days – one of the most costly and destructive cyberattacks the world
has seen. The digital trail initially led to a cybergang called the "Whols Team" - its skull calling card digitally tattooed on the computer hard drives of South Korean banks. Adding to the confusion, another group - the "New Romantic Cyber Army Team" - also claimed responsibility. But US cybersecurity company McAfee saw something else. "Operation Troy," as McAfee dubbed the attack in a June report, was actually the culmination of a "secret, long-term," and "sophisticated" four-year campaign by just one cyberattacker - not the two cybergangs. "Operation Troy had a focus from the beginning to gather intelligence on South Korean military targets," McAfee investigators reported. "We have also linked other high-profile public campaigns conducted over the years against South Korea to Operation Troy, suggesting that a single group is responsible." Which group? South Korean fingers jabbed at North Korea. While McAfee never publicly named a culprit, its officials said privately that Pyongyang was behind the four years of increasingly sophisticated attacks. The McAfee analysis was not the last to track the attacks back to North Korea's doorstep. The same month, cybersecurity giant Symantec issued its own report linking the four years of cyberattacks to a single actor amid not-so-veiled references - "regardless of whether the gang is working on behalf of North Korea or not." In September, researchers at Kaspersky Lab announced discovery of an extensive cyberespionage campaign against six South Korean military think tanks. Far from being a primitive hack, the "Kimsuky" campaign, named after a snippet of malicious code, was "extraordinary in its execution and logistics," wrote Dmitry Tarakanov, a researcher at the Moscow-based firm, who said digital tracks led to the North. "Taking into account the profiles of the targeted organizations ... one might easily suspect that the attackers might be from North Korea," Mr. Tarakanov wrote. "The targets almost perfectly fall into their sphere of interest." Together, the Operation Troy and Kimsuky findings roused cyber experts to upgrade their estimates of the North's capabilities. Just three years ago, James Lewis, an expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, was deeply skeptical of the North as a serious cyberthreat to South Korea or US forces in the Pacific. At the time, he dismissed it in an essay titled "Speak Loudly and Carry a Small Stick: The North Korean Cyber Menace." "McAfee and Kaspersky are really the first credible reports we've seen about North Korea's cyberwar capability," Lewis now says. "The North has obtained the ability to penetrate South Korean systems and potentially cause serious disruption." While still a league away from being a global "cyber-superpower," the North today is flexing its muscles and transforming itself into a potent force, he says. "They have improved considerably their cyberattack capabilities and could pose a threat to US institutions," he says. "Maybe not our military or, say, the Federal Reserve. But are there US targets they could disrupt? Yes, there are." Driving the North's quest for cyberwarfare capability are a combination of the practical and the strategic, experts say. Critical for a poor nation with rich adversaries, such weapons are: • Cheap to deploy and cost effective. Cyberattacks depend on malicious software which can be developed or purchased for far less than aircraft or other conventional military hardware. Cyberattacks can be deployed frequently to harass the South at a tiny fraction of the cost of actually deploying troops and tanks - and with more directly impact on the public. • A strategic counterbalance. Cyberattack systems are seen as a core “asymmetric” warfare strategy vital if the North’s less technologically capable forces are to survive any future fight with the combined forces of South Korea and the US. • Anonymous. Difficulty
attributing cyberattacks makes it easier to avoid sanctions and retaliatory strikes. Another driver is Pyongyang's top-down push. Development began around 1999, about the time Kim Jong-il launched the North's own fiber-optic, computer hardware, and commercial software industries. Together, these provide expertise that can be tapped for a cyberarmy. The pace of cyberarmy-building picked up in 2009, accelerating again after Kim Jong-un took power in 2011. He is said to be a computer and Internet aficionado who presses for cyberforce development and tactics. "They actually consider it to be an 'asymmetric' fifth front in any multi-front warfare against their enemies," says Mansourov. Indeed, North Korea's ongoing attacks on South Korea appear to be a kind of cyber-sword sharpening - refining capabilities and testing defenses - far different from most of today's much more subtle and better-cloaked cyberconflicts, some experts say. "Most nations are not trying to take down the servers of other countries - or at least they are trying hard to hide it," says Bruce Bechtol Jr., associate professor of political science at Angelo State University in San Angelo, Texas, and author of several books on North Korea’s military. "But North Korea's main thing seems to be taking down servers, conducting damaging operations, and instilling fear." At the same time, North Korea's own vulnerability to being hacked is real, despite its outdated reputation as a nearly nondigital nation with few targets of significance. Growth in the North’s fiber-optic cable systems, Internet and intranet-connected national networks, and even a flowering of mobile smart phones among the nation’s elite - all are potential targets for US intelligence agencies or the South’s own cyberforces, Mansourov notes. Indeed, South Korea is ramping up its own cybermilitary. In June, during joint military exercises between the US and South Korea, the North was struck by a two-day outage of all its internal websites. The state news agency decried "concentrated and persistent virus attacks," insisting that the US and South Korea "will have to take responsibility for the whole consequences." "Cyberattacks on the South do not occur in a vacuum," Mansourov says. "Every instance of a North Korean attack is likely something prompted by the actions of us or our allies." Some say the cyber tit for tat could get out of hand and slide toward more serious reprisals. North Korea's capability "poses an important 'wild card' threat, not only to the United States but also to the region and broader international stability," testified Frank Cilluffo, codirector of the Cyber Center for National and Economic Security at George Washington University, in Congress after the March attacks. "North Korea's cyber-development is almost just a new harassment mechanism for them, a low-cost, asymmetric method to harass its neighbor in the south," says Matt Rhoades, director of the cyberspace and security program at the Truman National Security Project, a Washington think tank. Such harassment, he warns, is a "slippery slope that could, through miscalculation, lead to real escalation." Digital attacks attributed to the North are still often characterized as "unsophisticated." Yet hackers for cyber-superpowers such as China typically use the least advanced approach needed for an attack to succeed - saving the most sophisticated for when it counts most. So even if North Korea under Kim Jong-un is not yet a cyber-superpower, its aggressive pace of development puts it squarely on that path, Lewis at CSIS and others say. "North Korea will do its best to keep its actual capabilities secretive," writes Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, a Japanese researcher who analyzed North Korea’s intentions as a fellow at the CSIS Pacific Forum, in an e-mail interview. Today’s attacks are "merely to show frustration towards South Korea.... If North Korea were to get serious, they would directly hit [the
South’s military networks, government, financial, transportation.” For the North, lobbing moderately damaging cyberweapons and DDoS attacks southward may be more about testing the South’s cyber-defenses - while perhaps winning valuable concessions from the South, too, several experts say. “That’s just the North negotiating with us,” Lewis says he was told by South Korean officials after the 2011 attack. Others, too, reject the notion that the North is a laggard, even if it’s not yet able to deploy anything as sophisticated or dangerous as Stuxnet, which targeted Iran’s nuclear fuel facility at Natanz in 2009. “This idea that’s been out there for a while, that the North Koreans are an incompetent or unsophisticated cyberthreat, is really laughable,” says Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute, an Asia-Pacific security think tank in Berkeley, Calif. “They’ve got very high-level programmers, very sophisticated. You have an extremely competent cyberadversary in North Korea.” Besides selecting industry experts for its cyberarmy, the North annually plucks hundreds of its best and brightest to be trained at elite universities in Pyongyang. Russian teachers are brought in, while others are sent to Russia and China for advanced training, defectors say. Eventually those recruits funnel into the North’s two cyberwarfare units. One is the State Security Agency’s communications monitoring and computer hacking group. Others enter Unit 121 of the Reconnaissance General Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, the North’s elite cyberfighting force, experts say. Key elements of Unit 121 operate out of bases in China, including a luxury hotel in the heart of Shenyang, capital of Liaoning Province, which borders North Korea, experts say. Beyond merely pulling itself up by its bootstraps, the North relies especially heavily on China for help in developing and extending its cyberwarfare capability, they say. “The North is using China as one of their major bases for their cyber-operations, and uses servers in China to conduct DDoS and other cyberattacks on South Korea,” Mansourov says. “They [Unit 121] are believed to have conducted hacking operations from inside China that falsify classified data and disrupt US and South Korean systems.” While Russia provides key assistance, China’s help goes much deeper. It includes regular upgrades to the high-speed Internet lines flowing into the North as well as supplying Pyongyang with high-end Chinese-made servers, routers, and other network hardware, experts say. “China plays a major role in supporting the North’s cyber-operations,” says Steve Sin, a former senior analyst at the Open Source Intelligence Branch of the Directorate of Intelligence at US Forces Korea and author of a 2009 study of North Korea’s cyber-capability. “If nothing else, China’s government is complicit in what North Korea is doing, because they could just shut down or throttle back its Internet connection, but they’re not.” China’s Internet services and other infrastructure make the North’s hacking far more effective than it otherwise would be. It would be far easier to identify attacks from the North if they emerged over the few Internet lines flowing out of that country into China, these experts say. And that’s one big reason launching cyberattacks directly from within the North is forbidden, defectors claim. Deniability is critical in order to avoid United Nations sanctions or US bombs. Instead, North Korea’s cyber-espionage, DDoS, and hacking attacks are done by Unit 121 and covert cells around the globe, including in the US, South Asia, Europe, and South Korea, defectors say. Overall, the arrangement leaves China in an excellent position to deny knowledge of any cyberattacks by the North on other nations, experts say. “China can simply say, ‘We don’t know what’s going on, how can you pinpoint this to North Korea,’” says Lee Sung-yoon, a North Korea specialist at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
By bolstering or even enabling North Korea’s cyberwarfare capabilities, China enhances its traditional geopolitical pit-bull-on-a-chain stance in which North Korea buffers China’s southern flank, while also keeping the US, Korea and Japan diplomatically off balance in Asia, he and other experts say. “The Chinese are probably quite pleased with North Korea’s cyber-saber rattling,” Dr. Lee adds. “It’s really no threat to them and strengthens their hand with respect to Washington.” The Chinese embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment on allegations that it aids North Korea’s cybermilitary development and operations. But in the just-detected “Kimsuky” cyberespionage campaign against six military-connected think tanks in South Korea, Kaspersky investigators tracked the digital footprints of the cyberspies to 10 IP-addresses (internet computer identifiers) inside Jilin and Liaoning, Chinese provinces that border North Korea. Did those IP addresses belong to cyberspies of the elite Unit 121 enjoying life at a hotel in Shenyang between hacking attacks on the South? Even though IP addresses can be spoofed, “no other IP-addresses have been uncovered that would point to the attackers’ activity,” writes Mr. Tarakanov, the Kaspersky cyber-sleuth of the Kimsuky cyberspying on the South’s think tanks. While there is still no conclusive proof recent attacks were North Korean, evidence indicates Pyongyang is building a capability that poses a serious and rising threat to the South and the US, experts say. “We in the US tend to dismiss these smaller powers, like North Korea,” says Mr. Sin. “But there’s a danger that comes with that: How many conflicts have we lost to a smaller guy? You know, we kind of dismiss it – and it still comes and bites you.” (Mark Clayton, “In Cyberarms Race, North Korea Emerging as a Power, Not a Pushover,” Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 2013)

China is holding petroleum that was heading to North Korea from Iran in an apparent attempt by Beijing to maintain its control over Pyongyang, sources said. According to Chinese sources, the petroleum was part of North Korea’s contract to import about 500,000 tons of condensate, a light oil, from Iran. North Korea, seeking to diversify its energy sources, started discussions on the deal last year. The agreement was reached with the cooperation of a major Chinese state-run petroleum company. The condensate is believed to have been shipped from Iran over a number of occasions on tankers registered to a third nation. But Chinese authorities ordered the tankers to stop when they reached the Chinese coast in the Yellow Sea this spring. The ships were then towed to ports in Dalian, Liaoning province, and Qingdao, Shandong province. Sources said the condensate remains in those ports, which have restricted access to outsiders. China is believed to have asked North Korea to pay about $2 million for storage expenses. “Once China realized that North Korea was beginning to depend on Iran for petroleum, China began using various measures to remain engaged so it can maintain its influence over North Korea,” a diplomatic source knowledgeable about relations between China and North Korea said. Under the North Korea-Iran contract, Pyongyang is to pay Tehran for the condensate, but the condensate itself must be first sent to a Chinese state-run petroleum company. “Because North Korea does not have the most advanced refineries, it had to ask China to refine the condensate,” a source in the petroleum industry said. It is unclear what legal basis China is using for holding up the shipments because condensate and other petroleum products needed for daily living are not banned under U.N. economic sanctions imposed against North Korea.
However, one source involved in the transaction said, “As part of the economic sanctions that were imposed against military actions taken by North Korea, inspections were carried out by Chinese authorities, which asked that the petroleum be kept at the port.” Until now, China is said to have provided about 80 percent of the petroleum used in North Korea. The main means of transport were through a pipeline that runs along the Yalu River between the border of the two nations as well as by ship. According to Chinese customs statistics, the export volume was about 520,000 tons a year. However, since the end of last year after North Korea launched a long-range ballistic missile and conducted the nuclear test, China has limited some of its petroleum exports. “Not only has a ban on petroleum export shipments been imposed by China, but the total import volume through the pipeline has also been reduced to one-third the level of the same period of the previous year,” a source involved in trade between China and North Korea was told by a North Korean government source in September. (Ishida Koichiro, “China Holding up Shipment of Iranian Petroleum to North Korea,” Asahi Shimbun, October 20, 2013)

Military investigators raided South Korea’s Cyberwarfare Command after four of its officials were found to have posted political messages online last year, in what opposition lawmakers have called a smear campaign against President Park Geun-hye’s opponents before her election in December. In a snowballing scandal, prosecutors have since said that agents of the National Intelligence Service posted thousands of anonymous Internet messages during the presidential campaign supporting Park and her governing Saenuri Party or berating government critics, including opposition presidential candidates, as supporters of North Korea. Last week, opposition lawmakers alleged in the National Assembly that the military’s secretive Cyberwarfare Command had carried out a similar online campaign, separately or in coordination with the spy agency. The Defense Ministry confirmed today that four cyberwarfare officials had posted political messages. It quoted them as saying they had acted on their own. Still, “the ministry will investigate whether there was command-level involvement,” the ministry’s spokesman, Kim Min-seok, said, explaining the raid on the command headquarters. Last month, a Seoul court ordered the prosecution of two more senior intelligence officials for involvement in the alleged online campaign. Yesterday, during a National Assembly hearing, Yoon Seok-ryeol, a senior prosecutor who had led the investigation of the scandal until recently, said his team had been under “external pressure.” Yoon was removed from the investigation last week after his team detained three intelligence agents and searched their homes. He said his team had collected more evidence of the spy agency’s online campaign: 55,700 messages posted or reposted by intelligence agents through Twitter that praised Park or disparaged her opposition rivals before the election. One called Moon, the main opposition candidate, a “servant” of North Korea, and another called Ahn Cheol-soo, an independent who supported Moon, “a woman in men’s clothes.” Cho Yong-gon, head of the Seoul District Prosecutor’s Office, who supervised Yoon, denied putting pressure on Yoon’s team. He said Yoon had been removed from the investigation because he did not discuss the agents’ detentions in advance with his superiors, as regulations require. (Choe Sang-hun, “Investigators Raid Agency of Military in South Korea,” New York Times, October 23, 2013, p. A-4)
DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman’s statement “in connection with the fact that the U.S. is pushing the situation on the Korean Peninsula, which entered the phase of detente, back to the state of tensions and confrontation: The statement said that the ever-mounting nuclear threat and blackmail by the U.S. and its moves for making preparations for a war of aggression are a serious encroachment upon the sovereignty and right to existence of the DPRK, and a wanton violation of the DPRK-U.S. agreements and September 19 joint statement in which Washington gave ‘assurances’ not to use force against the DPRK including nuclear weapons nor pose any threats to it with those forces. It went on: This notwithstanding, the U.S. is trying to make the public convince that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is precisely the DPRK’s dismantlement of nuclear program, while making sophism that the restart of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon are a violation of international obligation and commitments, if it is true. This is aimed to cover up its crimes and shift the responsibility on to the DPRK. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the invariable aim of the policy of the DPRK government, does not mean the unilateral nuclear dismantlement on the part of the DPRK side. This is the process of making the peninsula a nuclear-free zone on the basis of completely removing the substantial nuclear threats posed to the peninsula from outside on the principle of simultaneous actions. Action for action remains a basic principle for finding a solution to the nuclear issue on the peninsula and the DPRK will, therefore, not unilaterally move first. At present there exist only physical moves on the peninsula where there are neither peace nor stability nor dialogue. This is attributable to the U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail and sanctions against the DPRK. Increasing nuclear threat from outside will only compel the DPRK to bolster up its nuclear deterrent to cope with this. It will not be bound to anything in doing so.

The DPRK stands for peace and stability and demands the U.S. roll back its hostile policy towards the former but will never beg the latter to do so. The DPRK will dynamically advance towards a final victory, invariably keeping to the road of independence, Songun and socialism no matter how Washington behaves.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blames U.S. for Posing Nuclear Threat to DPRK,” October 23, 2013)

DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement as broadcast: “Recently, the United States has been leading the situation on the Korean Peninsula, which was relieved of tension, to escalated tension and confrontation once again. We have made sincere efforts to secure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and negotiations and have exercised our maximum patience in order to prevent the vicious circle of escalated tension. The United States, however, is increasing its military provocations step by step, while adamantly clinging to its hostile policy of crushing our Republic by force. A while ago, the United States, along with the South Korean puppets, created a tailor-made deterrence strategy aiming at a nuclear preemptive attack against us; they also staged continual joint military exercises in the Korean East Sea and South Sea, even mobilizing a nuclear aircraft carrier; later on, it incited war madness by introducing a nuclear aircraft carrier into the Korean West Sea.

The current situation closely resembles the time when the United States fabricated the UN Security Council sanctions resolutions over our peaceful satellite launch and self-defense underground nuclear test, followed by their maneuvers to drive the situation
on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of a war with the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises, and by introduction of nuclear strategic bombers and nuclear submarines. The nuclear threats, blackmail, and maneuvers of preparation for a war of aggression by the United States, which are increasing day by day, are a serious violation of our sovereignty and right to exist; they are also a violent breach of the DPRK-US agreements and the 19 September Joint Statement that clearly promised not to use any force, including nuclear weapons, against us and not to make any threat of using such force. This notwithstanding, in order to veil their crimes and to blame us for aggravated tension, the United States is employing sophistry that restarting the Nyo’ngbyo’n nuclear facility, if proven true, constitutes a breach of the international obligations and pledges and the like; the United States is also misleading public opinion by saying that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula means our abandonment of nuclear weapons. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which is one of the unwavering policy objectives of the government of our Republic, never means our unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons before anything else; it is rather a process to turn the entire Korean Peninsula into a nuclear weapon-free zone based on the complete removal of practical nuclear threats on the Korean Peninsula from outside through concurrent actions. Action for action is the fundamental principle for resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula for now as it was in the past; we will never take action unilaterally. There is no peace, no stability, and no dialogue on the Korean Peninsula; the only things physically operating on it are the nuclear threats, blackmail, and anti-Republic sanctions commotion by the United States. As long as the nuclear threats from outside increase, the nuclear deterrence to cope with them will only have to be strengthened, and we will not be restrained by anything in so doing. We want peace and stability and demand that the United States should abandon its hostile policies, but we never beg for it. Whatever path the United States chooses, we will vigorously advance on the path of independence, path of military-first, and path of socialism toward the final victory.” (Korean Central Broadcasting Station, Press Statement by DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman, October 23, 2013)

KCNA: “The DPRK delegate speaking at the meeting of the Fourth Committee of the 68th UN General Assembly on October 23 re-clarified the will of the DPRK to continue launching application satellites for the development of the nation’s economy and the improvement of the people’s living standard. The delegate in a speech made during the discussion on the agenda item “International Cooperation in Peaceful Use of Outer Space” appreciated the efforts of the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs and the committee for the development and application of space science and technology in all countries and for the increase of the capabilities of developing countries to explore space, in particular. The DPRK is also directing efforts to developing space for peaceful purposes in keeping with the worldwide trend of space exploration, he said, referring to a series of measures taken by the DPRK government to intensify the work for space development while launching satellites several times. He went on to say: The DPRK’s exploration of space is an exercise of legitimate independent right by a sovereignty state. It is publicly recognized by international law and inviolable. Nevertheless, the hostile forces unreasonably claim that the DPRK is not allowed to launch satellites even for peaceful purposes, though other countries do. The U.S. and some other countries
Disallow those countries incurring their displeasure to launch satellites for peaceful purposes while shutting their eyes to the launch of satellites or inter-continental ballistic missiles by those countries subservient to them. This is the reality today. The DPRK categorically rejects the “resolutions on sanctions” adopted at the UN Security Council against the DPRK over its launch of satellites for peaceful purposes and reclarifies that it will continue launching application satellites for the development of the nation’s economy and improvement of the people’s living standard in the future, too, ensuring transparency by going through procedures of international law. The DPRK will, at the same time, fulfill its commitments by joining in the worldwide efforts for the active use of outer space as a wealth common to humankind.” (KCNA, “DPRK Delegates Re-Clarifies DPRK’s Will to Continue Launching Application Satellites,” October 28, 2013)

Recent commercial satellite imagery has identified two new tunnel entrances and continued excavation at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. Excavation in the West Portal area, where North Korea’s 2009 and 2013 nuclear tests were conducted, and the South Portal area may be intended to complete new tunnels that will be used for future nuclear tests. An alternative explanation, particularly for work in the West Portal area, is that North Korea is digging a secondary entrance to a nearby existing tunnel intended, for example, to allow increased traffic flow or ventilation. Whether Pyongyang is following this practice remains unclear. Continued observation of excavation at Punggye-ri should reveal additional information since it may take as long as one to two years to dig separate new tunnels. There are no signs that Pyongyang plans to conduct a nuclear test in the immediate future. However, these ongoing activities as well as upgrades to the site’s support areas indicate North Korea is preparing to conduct additional detonations in the future as part of its nuclear weapons development program. (Nick Hansen, “Two New Tunnel Entrances Spotted near Punggye Site,” 38North, October 23, 2013)

10/25/13 Six South Koreans who had been held in North Korea on charges of illegal entry returned to their home country, after the North released them in a gesture that could help ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The six men were handed over to the South Korean authorities at Panmunjom, the South’s Unification Ministry said in a statement. North Korean officials also handed over the remains of a woman. They said that the woman was the wife of one of the six men, and that she had been killed during a quarrel with her husband, South Korean officials said. Little was known about the men beyond their surnames and their ages, said to be between 27 and 67. The Unification Ministry said it would question them to find out how and when they had arrived in North Korea. It is a violation of South Korea’s National Security Act for any of its citizens to travel to the North without government permission. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Hands over 6 South Korean Detainees,” New York Times, October 25, 2013, p. A-6) Six South Koreans, ages 27 to 67, repatriated from North Korea over the weekend said that they had fled to the North through China in recent years to escape bankruptcies and family troubles in the South and in search of a better life in the North, the South Korean news media and government officials said on October 27. After returning home, all six men told investigators that they had entered the North
through its border with China between 2009 and 2012, said a South Korean government official. He also said that the remains of a woman returned on Friday from the North were of the wife of one of the men. South Korean news media quoted anonymous government sources as saying that one of the six had posted pro-North messages on the Internet while in the South. When Rodong Sinmun, quoted one of his online postings, he reportedly decided to defect to the North, hoping that he would be treated well there. Another man hoped for treatment for kidney stones in the North, the Yonhap news agency and other South Korean news media said. But all six ended up going through between 14 and 45 months of interrogations by the North Korean authorities and living in virtual house arrest in guesthouses, the reports said. Investigators said the 65-year-old husband of the dead woman told them that he strangled her and tried but failed to kill himself in what he described as an aborted suicide pact. The press officers at the Unification Ministry and intelligence service of the South Korean government said they could not confirm those details. South Korean officials had said earlier that the six would likely face prosecution for violating the National Security Law, which bars South Koreans from visiting the North without approval. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Koreans Say They Fled to North for Better Life,” New York Times, October 29, 2013, p. A-6)

Bosworth and Gallucci: “As officials in charge of American policy toward North Korea during the Clinton and Obama administrations, we met last month in Europe with senior representatives of the North Korean government to discuss relations between our countries. We believe that the current impasse, which only buys time for North Korea to develop its nuclear program, is unstable and that matters will only get worse if not addressed directly. It’s time for the Obama administration to reopen dialogue with Pyongyang. The United States government has not had direct contact with a senior North Korean official for more than a year. Our private and unofficial meetings were an important opportunity to review the state of the regime’s thinking on bilateral relations and its willingness to give up its nuclear weapons program. The North Koreans – who are longtime participants in government-to-government talks and well plugged-in to their country’s leadership – stated that if dialogue were to resume, their nuclear weapons program would be on the negotiating table. They provided preliminary thinking on a phased approach that would start with a freeze of their program and end with denuclearization. That process, they said, would have to include steps by America, such as the conclusion of a peace treaty to replace the temporary armistice that ended the Korean War, and the lifting of economic sanctions imposed on the North by the United States since the end of that war. We stressed that Pyongyang needs to indicate clearly the concrete steps it would take both before and immediately after a return to the negotiating table. The North Koreans told us that they were prepared to enter talks without preconditions and would consider some confidence-building measures once talks begin. The Obama administration says that the North must take steps to demonstrate its seriousness about denuclearization before, not after, dialogue resumes. Washington also has in mind steps that appear to be more far-reaching than those the North Koreans are considering, such as a moratorium on long-range rocket tests. Pyongyang wrecked a February 2012 agreement by launching a rocket later that year, claiming that space launches were allowed. Overall, the Obama administration’s position reflects a healthy skepticism about the North Koreans, particularly given what
happened in 2012. Still, here we sit, with multiple dangers threatening both countries and the region, while Pyongyang moves ahead with its nuclear program. Whatever risks might be associated with new talks, they are less than those that come with doing nothing. Pyongyang’s nuclear stockpile will continue to expand, the North will continue to perfect its missile delivery systems, the danger of weapons-of-mass-destruction exports will grow, and the threat to U.S. allies will increase. We recognize the pitfalls of negotiating with Pyongyang. The North Koreans have not abided by many of their past commitments. The United States should enter talks with the North with its eyes wide open. While Washington is right to press Beijing to take a firmer hand with Pyongyang given their close ties with the North, we would be wrong to assume that the Chinese will solve this problem for us. The Chinese have their own concerns. They don’t want North Korea to have nuclear weapons, but they also don’t want North Korea to collapse under the weight of sanctions. It is in the interests of both Pyongyang and Washington to show the flexibility needed to jump-start discussions. The United States should relax its requirement that North Korea meet its demands before any dialogue begins. Pyongyang should be ready to take steps not only at the very beginning of talks but also beforehand. A confidence-building step that Pyongyang could take would be to release Kenneth Bae, a U.S. citizen held in a North Korean prison. It should follow up with other moves like a moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and a suspension of operations at its main nuclear facility intended to produce bomb-making material, to be verified by international inspectors. Another important step by the North would be an end to missile tests, including “space launch vehicles.” Finally, Pyongyang should reaffirm the pledge to denuclearize that it made in a 2005 agreement among the United States, China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and Japan. Once talks begin, Washington should embrace two guiding principles. First, any new agreements must be based on “simultaneous, verified steps.” That approach means no unilateral concessions or moves but rather moving forward in lock step. Second, America should move quickly to talks on a peace treaty that formally ends the Korean War and improves our bilateral relationship, which are among the North’s main concerns. Although President Obama and his national security team are busy with issues far from the Korean Peninsula, we believe it is imperative that the United States turn its attention to quickly resolving this dangerous situation.” (Stephen Bosworth and Robert L. Gallucci, “Reasons to Talk to North Korea,” New York Times International, October 27, 2013)

Kerry: “And I will say that it is not words alone, as we call on North Korea to comply with its international obligations. We need to move forward. We need to see how North Korea will respond. How can you excuse a state, a rogue state, that spends its scarce resources on missiles designed to kill rather than investments that makes its citizens lives better?” (Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks at the Ploughshares Fund Gala, Washington, October 28, 2013)

North Korea has designated 14 new special economic zones to resurrect its moribund economy, but it remains unclear whether they will attract the massive foreign industrial, agricultural and tourism investment the reclusive state envisions. Pyongyang is targeting an investment of $70 million to $240 million (6.8 billion yen to 23.3 billion yen) for each zone, according to a proposal to companies prepared by the country’s...
national economic development committee, obtained by Asahi Shimbun. The
document shows that most zones cover 4 square kilometers or less, compared with the
66-square-kilometer Kaesong industrial complex it jointly operates with South Korea
and the 23-square-kilometer special zone on the islands of Hwanggumpyong and
Wihwa in the Yalu river. North Korea in May established a law on economic
development zones, allowing companies to bring in and send foreign currency freely
and guaranteeing the safety of workers. Pyongyang plans to keep the corporate tax
rate low at 14 percent of profits and grant investors the right to use and develop land
over 50 years. In most new zones, foreigners will be able to set up businesses on their
own. The new zones have been designated this year, but any construction of facilities
has apparently not started yet. Pyongyang is believed to be still soliciting investors.
James Yoo, a senior South Korean businessman who was once involved in a North
Korean venture, said the new zones could attract some investors because Pyongyang
has reduced investment risks and made it easier for small businesses to take part.
Companies in Singapore and elsewhere have shown interest, according to the
businessman. The outlines, total investments and surrounding environments for 13
new zones are described in the proposal to companies. The list consists of four
economic development zones, which cover trade, tourism and other sectors, three
industrial development zones and two zones each for agricultural development,
tourism development and export processing. In addition, a 14th zone for high-tech
development has been created in Kaesong, on the border with South Korea. An
industrial development zone in Wiwon, Jagang province, would combine mineral
resources processing, machinery manufacturing and research on silk culture and
freshwater fish farming. The area boasts abundant natural resources, including more
than 100 million tons of limestone, according to the proposal to companies. The
document also said railways can be built. A tourism development zone in Onsong,
North Hamgyong province, would feature a golf course, a swimming pool, a racetrack
and accommodations. The proposal to companies said foreigners will have access to
professional leisure and sightseeing services. (Kaise Akihiko, “North Korea Designates
14 Special Zones, Woos Foreign Investors,” Asahi Shimbun, October 28, 2013)

People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Special Representative for
Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei had a productive set of discussions on North Korea
today with a range of U.S. officials, including the Department of State’s Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel and Special Representative for
North Korea Policy Glyn Davies. Tomorrow he will meet again with Ambassador Glyn
Davies, and also meet with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman and
NSS Senior Director for Asian Affairs Evan Medeiros. (DoS Spokesperson's Office,
“Readout on Ambassador Davies’ Meetings with PRC Special Representative Wu
Dawei,” February 28, 2013)

New commercial satellite imagery indicates that North Korea is moving ahead with
major construction projects at its Sohae Satellite Launching Station (Tongchang-ri).
While it is too soon to reach a definitive judgment, evidence is growing that these
activities are intended to support the two main priorities for North Korea’s rocket
program—launches of larger rockets and of new mobile missiles—and that Sohae will be
the main, and perhaps sole, test facility in the future. Imagery from October 9, 2013
indicates that a possible second flat mobile missile launch pad, in addition to another possible pad first identified in August, may now be under construction. Moreover, a new road connecting the new launch area with the missile assembly building and Sohae railhead is being built along with two new bridges. The new road has been strengthened and widened for use by heavy vehicles, possibly including transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) for mobile missiles. While work on the first flat mobile launch pad stopped over the past two months, construction activities at the Unha launch gantry have continued, possibly to upgrade that facility to handle future larger rockets. Other activities intended to upgrade Sohae for increased future operations, such as the construction of permanent instrumentation buildings to monitor tests, have also moved forward. Activities related to the upgrading of the Unha launch pad may be completed soon, allowing Pyongyang to proceed with another space launch should it decide to do so. Other construction activities, particularly those related to the possible flat mobile missile launch pads, will take longer to complete, perhaps by mid-2014 depending on the rate of construction. (Nick Hansen, “Major Construction Progresses at Sohae: Possible Prep for Mobile Missile Systems,” 38North, October 28, 2013)

A former US special representative on North Korean policy quoted senior diplomats from North Korea on October 27 as saying that “everything is on the table” in possible negotiations. In an interview, former US State Department special representative on North Korea policy Stephen Bosworth responded to a question on whether North Korea’s suspected uranium enrichment facilities outside the Yongbyon nuclear complex might be put on the negotiating table by saying “I assume so.” In late September and early October, Bosworth met with North Korean authorities in Berlin and London, including the North’s senior representative to the six-party talks on the nuclear issue, vice foreign minister Ri Yong-ho. North Korea’s disclosure of information about its uranium enrichment and bringing it to the negotiating table might also help to get the six-party talks started again. Bosworth said, “I do believe NK is very likely prepared to come back to negotiating table. They have said that the denuclearization is not off the table. They want to resume dialogue based on the September 2005 joint statement.” Bosworth said they had expressed their plans to return not only to the framework of the September 19 2005 Joint Statement, but also to the agreement made with the US on February 29 of last year. This may be taken as a sign that North Korea is willing to denuclearize through comprehensive discussions in the two frameworks, and that it plans to work on building trust for a resumption of dialogue. The North Korean representatives were also reported as saying the “trust-building” steps might be taken during the initial stages of dialogue rather than beforehand. However forward-thinking Pyongyang’s position may seem, it also obviously hinges on what it can get in return from talks. Its key demands are a peace treaty to replace the current armistice agreement, and the lifting of economic sanctions. When asked whether he believed North Korea was truly committed to denuclearization, Bosworth said, “it depends upon what they might get in return.” One of the key steps was the inclusion of a halt to all missile (and “space launch vehicle”) launches as a trust-building step by North Korea. The question now is how Pyongyang will respond to the idea, since its satellite launch is what nullified the Feb. 29 2012 agreement. At the same time, Bosworth and Gallucci also seemed to suggest that the US, which is calling for a return to the 2012 agreement “plus alpha” as a preliminary step, should drop the
“alpha” part, which is thought to have to do with uranium enrichment facilities. (Park Hyun, “Former U.S. Officials Describe Path back to Dialogue with North Korea,” Hankyore, October 29, 2013)

A North Korean train carrying military supplies caught fire early this month, causing “significant damage,” a source with knowledge of the North said. The incident occurred in the North’s Ryanggang province close to the Chinese border, the source said, adding that he could not confirm whether there were any casualties. “I learned that a military supply train caught fire early this month in Ryanggang Province and it caused significant damage,” the source said. Last month, an explosion ripped through a munitions factory in North Pyongan province of North Korea, the source said. (Yonhap, “Military Supply Train Caught Fire in N. Korea,” Korea Herald, October 29, 2013)

10/31/13 DPRK FoMin spokesman’s answer “as regards a coarse remark made by U.S. State Secretary Kerry against the DPRK: On October 28, Kerry, far from reflecting on the U.S. crime of persistently standing in the way of resuming the six-party talks, called the DPRK a “rogue state,” a serious politically-motivated provocation reminding one of a thief crying “Stop the thief!” The U.S. diplomatic chief insulted the DPRK, a dignified independent and sovereign state, fully revealing again the U.S. deep-running hostility toward the DPRK. Washington is inflaming bitterness toward the DPRK even by putting forward the State secretary and other diplomatic authorities while steadily escalating military threats to the DPRK. This shows that the U.S. has no intent to hold dialogue with the DPRK. The U.S. set brigandish demands unacceptable to the DPRK as preconditions for the six-party talks, a crafty trick to check the resumption of the talks and evade the responsibility. The true aim sought by the U.S. is to leave the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula unresolved and use it as a pretext for arms buildup pursuant to its return to the new Asia-Pacific strategy. Consistent is the stand of the DPRK to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula but as the DPRK is exposed to the constant nuclear threat of the U.S. and the U.S. gets ever-more undisguised in its hostile moves against the DPRK, while reneging on its commitments, the DPRK will be left with no other option but to bolster its nuclear deterrence, unbound to anything. As the DPRK has consistently insisted, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be impossible unless the U.S. rolls back its hostile policy toward the DPRK. Unless Washington proves in action its intent to withdraw the hostile policy, a root cause of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK will never unilaterally move first for the resumption of the talks. In case the old U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK leads to the escalation of tension, the U.S. will be held entirely accountable for it.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts U.S. State Secretary’s Invective against DPRK,” October 31, 2013)

South Korea and the United States are discussing how Seoul can contribute more to regional missile defense. Rose Gottemoeller, acting under secretary of state for arms control and international security, emphasized bolstering missile defense in the region is crucial in promoting diplomatic efforts toward North Korea. “The United States stands ready to work with the Republic of Korea (ROK) to strengthen its ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities,” she said at a multinational BMD forum in Poland,
according to a transcript released by the State Department. She said the allies are working together to “define possible future ROK BMD requirements and the United States looks forward to taking further steps to build upon this ongoing missile defense relationship.” (Lee Chi-dong, “Talks Underway over S. Korea's Requirements for Missile Defense: U.S. Official,” November 1, 2013)

11/1/13 Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said that the government is considering lifting its 2010 blanket sanctions on North Korea that virtually halted all inter-Korean exchanges except for the joint inter-Korean complex at Gaeseong. “The government is thinking in many ways on what to do with the so-called May 24 measures,” said the minister during a parliamentary session aimed at auditing his ministry. “Public opinion is divided on whether the sanctions should be scrapped… it is conditional.” This is viewed as a “slight” shift from the government’s previous stance. The Park Geun-hye administration has been sticking to the position that the ban will not be lifted unless the North accepts responsibility for the sinking of the warship and pledges not to engage in such provocations in the future. (Chung Min-uck, “Seoul Considering Lifting N.K. Sanctions,” Korea Times, November 1, 2013)

11/2/13 Pro wrestler-turned-lawmaker Antonio Inoki left China bound for North Korea without the required authorization of the Diet, saying he wants to keep dialogue with Pyongyang open to resolve bilateral problems. “I’d like to continue and hope that I will be able to discuss a range of issues face-to-face at an early date,” Inoki told reporters at Beijing international airport before boarding a flight to Pyongyang. Inoki, 70, an Upper House member of opposition group Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Restoration Party), will attend sports events in the North Korean capital and is also planning to meet with Kim Yong Il, director of the International Department of the Korean Workers’ Party, and other senior party members. The Upper House Steering Committee did not authorize Inoki, whose real name is Inoki Kanji, to make the planned six-day trip to the North, saying the purpose of his trip is unclear and that he may now be disciplined. Lawmakers need to get Diet approval before traveling overseas when the legislature is in session. “I will just do what I have to do . . . and have strong resolve,” Inoki said, noting that improving relations between Japan and North Korea was one of his campaign pledges during this summer’s House of Councilors election. Inoki has close ties with North Korea, and this is his 27th visit to the country. He last visited the North in late July, before formally becoming a Diet lawmaker, to attend an official event in Pyongyang commemorating the 60th anniversary of the armistice of the 1950-1953 Korean War. During that trip, he made a courtesy call on North Korea’s de facto head of state, Kim Yong Nam, and met with Jang Song Thaek, uncle of and a top aide to the country’s leader, Kim Jong Un. In August, Inoki told a news conference that he wants to create an environment for a summit meeting between Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and Kim Jong Un. (Kyodo, “‘I Will Just Do What I Have to Do’: Lawmaker Inoki Makes Unauthorized Trip to N. Korea,” Japan Times, November 2, 2013)

Climate organizations of the two Koreas and China have agreed to cooperate for the forestation of North Korea and other parts of Asia. The Climate Change Center of Korea said Friday it signed a pact with Korea University and the Northeast Asia Foundation for Education & Culture and North Korea’s Pyongyang University of
Science and Technology to set up the Green Asia Organization (GAO). Three South Korean non-governmental organizations for forestation also participated in the pact. In August, China’s Yanbian University agreed to participate in the launch of the GAO at a joint workshop with the Climate Change Center, which is scheduled to be established next year involving government organizations, civic groups, corporations and scholars. “South Korea is the only country in the world that has succeeded in artificial forestation since the World War II,” said Goh Kun, honorary president of the Climate Change Center and former South Korean prime minister, at a pact-signing ceremony. “Tapping our experiences to make North Korea’s barren mountains green again is a meaningful project to restore the ecology of Korean mountains and complete a ‘green Korea.’” Kim Chin-kyung, president of Pyongyang University of Science and Technology who has a U.S. citizenship, stressed that it was imperative to plant trees in North Korea, where mountains are becoming barren across the country. Kwon Byong-hyun, former South Korean ambassador to China, expressed concern that North Korea’s ongoing desertification is “more threatening than nuclear weapons or missiles.” Yoon Young-kyoon, head of the state-funded Korea Forest Research Institute, stressed the urgency of the reforestation of North Korea, noting that if delayed, the cost for the reforestation would increase exponentially. Kim So-hee, a secretary-general of the Climate Change Center who recently met with North Korea officials in Beijing, said the North expressed a strong will to cooperate, adding Pyongyang revised its law governing forests and set up a bureau for forests and agriculture. (Dong-A Ilbo, “2 Koreas, China to Cooperate in Reforestation of N. Korea,” November 2, 2013)

South Korean President Park Geun-hye said she is willing to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at any time if it is necessary for moving inter-Korean relations forward and promoting peace on the divided Korean Peninsula. In an interview published in Le Figaro, Park stressed, however, that she is against holding an inter-Korean summit simply for the sake of talks and that such a meeting should be based on sincerity and not be a one-off event. “We are ready to help North Korea. My position is that I can hold a meeting at any time if it is necessary for development in the South-North relations or peace on the Korean Peninsula,” Park said in the interview held in Seoul. “However, I am going to refrain from holding talks simply for talks’ sake or holding talks as a one-off event. What is the most important is sincerity,” she said. France is the first leg of Park’s three-nation trip that will also bring her to Britain and Belgium. Park has urged North Korea to give up its nuclear program, saying the communist nation is “pursuing an impossible illusion” by trying to rebuild its broken economy while concurrently seeking missile and nuclear weapons development. “North Korea is ignoring the hunger and livelihoods of its people in order to maintain its regime,” she said during the interview. “If North Korea continues to act like this, I think it will face difficulties from both inside and outside, and collapse on its own.” (Yonhap, “Park Willing to Meet with N. Korean Leader Anytime,” November 3, 2013)

Cho Tae-yong, South Korea’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, made waves by saying that South Korea will hold discussions with other countries about North Korea since it is in a position of ownership on the issue. While Cho’s remark may sound obvious, it is unusual for South Korea’s representative to the six-party talks to emphasize “ownership” even as the US and China pursue detailed
discussions about how to restart the talks. “Recently, a lot of diplomatic deliberation has been taking place between the countries involved in the six-party talks,” Cho told reporters immediately after arriving at Dulles International Airport. “It is true that the North Korean nuclear weapons program is the greatest challenge facing global efforts to stop nuclear proliferation. However, from the point of South Korea, the North Korean nuclear issue is only one of the challenges posed by North Korea,” Cho said. “For this reason, it is the opinion of the South Korean government and the expectation of the South Korean people that South Korea should take ownership of the nuclear issue and take a central role in resolving it.” Based on Cho’s remarks alone, it is unclear whether South Korea means to put the brakes on US and Chinese deliberation about how to resume the six-party talks, or whether it is trying to facilitate the resumption of the talks. (Park Hyun, “Diplomat Emphasizes S. Korean ‘Ownership’ of N. Korean Nuclear Issue,” Hankyore, November 5, 2013)

Japan and Russia agreed to cooperate in measures to address piracy and cyber-attacks at their first “two-plus-two” meeting of foreign and defense ministers on Saturday. At the two-hour meeting, held at the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Ikikura Guesthouse in central Tokyo, the two sides agreed to conduct joint antipiracy exercises between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Russian military, and to launch cybersecurity talks. They also agreed on defense minister meetings on a regular basis. Russia proposed that the second two-plus-two meeting be held in Moscow in 2014. By deepening relations with Russia not only on the economic front but also in the field of security, Japan apparently aims to increase momentum toward a solution to the two nations’ longstanding territorial dispute over the Russian-held northern territories. The meeting brought together Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio, his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, Japanese Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori, and his counterpart, Sergei Shoigu. Japan now has a two-plus-two framework with three countries—Australia, Russia and the United States. For Russia, Japan is the fifth country with such a framework, following Britain, France, Italy and the United States. “The Japan-U.S. alliance remains the linchpin for Tokyo, but deepening security cooperation between Japan and Russia will also contribute to peace and stability of East Asia,” Kishida told a joint news conference after the meeting, stressing the importance of the newly launched two-plus-two forum. At the meeting, Shoigu expressed concern about a missile defense system being codeveloped by Japan and the United States, pointing out that the system could disrupt the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region. Onodera sought Russia’s understanding on the project, saying that the system is purely intended for self-defense. He also said there is no change in Japan’s position to remain a peaceful state, he said. (Jiji Press, “Japan, Russia Boost Defense Ties in First 2+2 Talks,” November 3, 2013)

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) said in a report to parliament that the North had purchased Russian electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weaponry to develop its own versions. EMP weapons are used to damage to electronic equipment. At higher energy levels, an EMP event can cause more widespread damage including to aircraft structures and other objects. The spy agency also said the North’s leader Kim Jong-Un sees cyberattacks as an all-purpose weapon along with nuclear weapons and missiles, according to lawmakers briefed by the NIS. The North is trying to hack into
smartphones and lure South Koreans into becoming informants, it said. It has collected information on where South Korea stores chemical substances and oil reserves as well as details about subways, tunnels and train networks in major cities, it said. The spy agency also said North Korean spies were operating in China and Japan to distribute pro-Pyongyang propaganda. North Korea is believed to run an elite cyber warfare unit of 3,000 personnel. (AFP, “North Korea Developing ‘Electromagnetic Pulse Weapons,’” November 4, 2013)

Mockups or simulators provide important indications of future developments in foreign ballistic missile programs. The United States saw mockups of two new missiles near Taepo-dong in North Korean in early 1994, long before North Korea flight-tested the Taepodong in 1998 and the Taepodong-2 in 2006. (The name of both missiles comes from this early sighting of mockups.) It is important to keep in mind the value of assessing mockups when one hears that the six Hwaseong-13 road-mobile, intercontinental ballistic missiles paraded in North Korea in April 2012 and July 2013 were “fakes.” Real fakes, perhaps. It is true that at least some of the missiles are mockups. Our colleagues, Robert Schmucker and Markus Schiller, noted many of the discrepancies among various missiles in 2012 parade. The missiles had features, such as fuel ports, in different places, were not secured to the transport-erector-launcher and sported warheads that appeared to be quite shoddily made. Although small discrepancies still exist among the six missiles seen in 2013, the major differences in 2012 are no longer evident. The fuel ports are in the same, place, the missiles are properly secured and the pointy end is smooth and shiny. These are not simply the same missiles from 2012 repainted, despite some press reporting to that effect. A close look at the airframes reveals that the missiles in 2013 have many more rivets than those in 2012. And while such details are not, er, riveting, they are an important indicator that these are different from those displayed a year ago. (The missiles also have different serial numbers from those in 2012, although those could be changed easily.) The presence of rivets suggests that the design has stabilized. Last year’s mock-ups were crude; the sorts of things engineers put together when they aren’t sure exactly how all the parts will fit together in three dimensions and want to try out various possibilities. No one in his right mind would rivet panels over the access ports when he is still working inside the missile mockup every day. Most of the differences we saw last year, however, have disappeared and the designs have largely converged. The arrangement of welds and rivets is quite similar to what we can see on debris from the December 2013 Unha launch recovered by the South Korean Navy, with double rows of closely-spaced rivets running horizontally and vertically in the regions between the rocket’s stages. The access panels are now securely riveted in place. These are more like the sort of mock-ups engineers build when they are confident in their design, ready to start testing on the ground before committing to flight. Schmucker and Schiller believe that these missiles are not merely mockups— but that they are technically preposterous. They do not believe that these missiles represent a plausible path forward for North Korea. We disagree. We believe the missile mockups that North Korea displayed in 2012 and 2013 are consistent with an ongoing development program for a missile with limited intercontinental capability using only existing North Korean technology. There are a number of plausible configurations of missile engines that North Korea might use to cobble together a missile that would look like the KN-08.
One of us—John Schilling—has written a lengthy technical analysis in *Science and Global Security* that considered six different ways that North Korea could assemble components and technologies it possesses into a missile that matches the appearance of the parade mock-ups. Not all of these solutions are elegant. For all we know, Werner von Braun is rolling in his grave. But elegant or not, these options are good enough to produce missiles with *theoretical* ranges from 5,500 kilometers to over 11,000 kilometers. The latter would allow virtually the entire United States of America to be reached from North Korean launch sites, making good on the threat implied by the Map of Death. Almost all of the configurations examined would be able to deliver a light first-generation nuclear warhead at least as far as Seattle. Of course, actual mileage may vary. The most likely configuration, in our judgment, is a cluster of two Nodong engines for the first stage, with engines from the smaller R-27 for the upper stages. Such a missile might travel as far as Los Angeles or Denver—close enough to North Korea’s stated goals if we presume the DPRK’s missileers are perhaps too confident. We can imagine other plausible configurations if North Korea has received more assistance from Russia than previously known. Norbert Brugge, a German rocket enthusiast, believes the Hwaseong-13 is based on a Soviet-era missile called the R-29 SLBM (SS-N-8 in the West). There is no specific evidence that R-29 hardware or technology has reached North Korea, but the North Koreans seem to have obtained other old Russian missile technologies and components from the same design bureaus. That North Korea has paraded a missile that appears to be the right size to use an R-29 engine may be a coincidence, or it could be something more. The precise configuration of the missile is less important at the moment than the fact that North Korea appears to be moving to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile. It is strange that we are still discussing whether the North Koreans can build an intercontinental range ballistic missile—they’ve already done it. Last December’s successful satellite launch was about as technically challenging as an ICBM launch. As with Sputnik in 1957, North Korea was able to demonstrate the capability to build an ICBM while asserting that the launch was intended to further “peaceful use of outer space.” And as with Sputnik, North Korea’s Unha-3 space rocket is powerful but clumsy. For day-to-day military use, North Korean missileers will likely seek to use the same technology to build a missile that is a bit easier to move and hide than the Unha, but still able to reach the main enemy. Something like the Hwaseong-13. The Hwaseong-13 is almost certainly is a missile under development, not an operational weapon. Some of the units in the last parade could have been flight prototypes, but North Korea has yet to fly them. While the North has been fairly aggressive in deploying new missiles with few flight tests, a system this complex needs to be tested at least once. It took four tries to get the Unha-3 to launch as satellite into orbit, and those were carefully choreographed peacetime launches. If Pyongyang tries to fire the Hwaseong-13 for the first time in combat, the result would probably be an embarrassing failure. We can all certainly hope for an embarrassing failure out of North Korea’s nuclear arms program; it wouldn’t be unprecedented. But we ought to be prepared for a test of the Hwaseong-13 as well. Or a series of tests, starting with a failure or two before the North’s missileers eventually get it right. Given the advanced state of the mock-up hardware, the success of the Unha-3, and the reports of engine ground testing, the first flight test could occur at any time. If, on the other hand, the whole thing is just a hoax, then why all the changes? Maybe North Korea’s engineers
were so shamed by Schmucker and Schiller’s assessment of their work that they
decided to put together a better set of mock-ups for this year’s parade. Maybe Kim
Jong Un decided that three-tone camouflage is “so 2012.” The discrepancies among
the missiles in 2012 were a source of embarrassment for North Korea. But if the parade
models are repurposed engineering mock-ups, then we might expect each to
represent slightly different configurations that converge over time. Another question is
raised by the “hoax” theory: Who are they trying to fool? Civilian wonks like ourselves
may be puzzling over parade photos, but national intelligence services have satellites
that can detect and measure rocket-engine testing. The United States intelligence
community should know what kind of engines the North Koreans have tested and how
powerful those engines are. And the Russians can do the US one better. The North has
apparently been pilfering Russia’s storehouses for their own program. Presumably
someone in Moscow has made arrangements for an inventory, as well as private chats
with the Russian rocket engineers who’ve “vacationed” in North Korea. The Kremlin
surely knows whether the Hwaseong-13 is real, despite public statements to the
contrary. The simplest explanation is usually the right explanation, and the simplest
explanation here is that the Hwaseong-13 is exactly what it appears to be: A
developmental road-mobile ICBM of limited capability but still able to threaten the
continental United States. North Korea is parading mockups through the streets of
Pyongyang because, like every other country, it built mockups first. (Jeffrey Lewis and
John Schilling, “Real Fake Missiles: North Korea’s ICBM Mockups Are Getting Scary
Good,” 38North, November 4, 2013)

China’s foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei called on nations involving the long-
stalled nuclear talks aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions to
jointly make a “push for progress” to reopen the talks, confirming that its chief nuclear
envoy, Wu Dawei, is now on a visit to Pyongyang. “We should press ahead with the
implementation of the Sept. 19th Joint Statement, accommodate each other’s
concerns and push for progress in a step-by-step manner,” Hong replied when asked
about whether there are any signs of progress in recent diplomatic efforts to resume
the six-nation talks. “With regard to the preconditions of the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, all parties should come back to the principle of the September
19th Joint Statement, set a reasonable threshold for the dialogue and resume the
six-party talks at an early date so as to resolve the Korean nuclear issue in a sustainable
and irreversible way,” Hong said. (Yonhap, “China Urges ‘Push for Progress’ to Resume
N. Korea Nuclear Talks,” November 5, 2013)

China’s new offer for conditions to restart the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear
program is “forward-looking” but it still falls far short of South Korean and U.S.
expectations, a senior South Korean official said. As it stands, chances are low that the
negotiations will resume at an early date, as relevant parties will have to continue
consultations, the official told reporters on background. “We take a positive view of
China’s efforts to create conditions for dialogue that would lead to the
denuclearization [of North Korea]. In terms of contents, however, there is a significant
need for consultations. I think it’s hard to expect a rapid process of resuming
dialogue,” he said.

During a visit to Washington last week for talks with his American counterpart Glyn
Davies, Wu Dawei laid out Beijing’s “idea” on how to reconvene the six-party talks last held in December 2008. “I think China’s idea can be said to be forward-looking, compared with its previous stance, but it is not enough yet to meet what we want,” he said, refusing to name the specifics of the proposal. As to pre-conditions for returning to dialogue with Pyongyang, the South Korean official said, “There is no change in our position that (in order to show its seriousness on dialogue) North Korea should do more than just implementing the February 29 deal,” the official said. (Yonhap, “China’s Offer Not Enough to Resume Nuke Talks: Seoul Official,” November 6, 2013)

South Korea’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) briefed the parliamentary intelligence committee military intelligence agency that North Korea has conducted five missile engine tests at the country’s northwest site in Dongchang-ri this year and has been renovating the test facility since spring. “North Korea has continued its missile development following its successful long-range rocket launch in December and conducted five engine tests at Dongchang-ri site this year alone,” Rep. Cho Won-jin of the ruling Saenuri Party said in a briefing after a closed-door audit of the DIA. (Kim Eun-jung, “North Korea Conducts 5 Missile Engine Tests This Year: Report,” Yonhap, November 5, 2013)

The National Security Agency classified South Korea as a “focus area,” regarded as a critically important target for its intelligence gathering, the New York Times reported. The report claimed Washington routinely spies on friends as well as foes, citing 2007 documents obtained by Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor who shocked the world by revealing U.S. intelligence-gathering activities. South Korea was mentioned in the leaked documents, entitled “January 2007 Strategic Mission List,” of the U.S. SIGINT System, America’s key intelligence collection program. The list spells out mission priorities and risks associated with them. “After the report came out, we expressed deep concerns to the U.S. government over the document and requested that it provide to us understandable explanations and measures promptly,” foreign ministry spokesperson Cho Tai-young told reporters. “When we have these allegations, the first measure we can take is to verify the facts. After that, we will take proper measures to handle this.” (Song Sang-ho, “S. Korea Demands Explanation for U.S. Eavesdropping,” Korea Herald, November 5, 2013)

When North Korean leader Kim Jong-un studied at the prestigious International School of Berne from 1996-01, his maternal aunt, Ko Yong-suk, was charged with looking after him in the foreign locale for several years. Then, 15 years ago, Ko vanished. JoongAng Ilbo has learned that Ko, 55, sought political asylum in the United States in 1998. She is receiving protection from U.S. authorities, according to a source who was a high-level official in the National Intelligence Service at the time, which was during the Kim Dae-jung administration. Both Ko and her husband had cosmetic surgery to conceal their identities, the source said. Ko is the younger sister of Ko Yong-hui, Kim Jong-un’s mother, who was born in Japan and was a member of Pyongyang’s Mansudae Art Troupe. Kim’s mother died in 2004 from breast cancer at the age of 51. Combining memories of the intelligence source and that of a high-level diplomat who worked at the Embassy of Korea in Switzerland in 1998, JoongAng Ilbo has learned that Ko Yong-
suk and her husband sought asylum from the United States in early May 1998 from the U.S. Embassy in Geneva, which granted it after confirming their identities. Following instructions by her brother-in-law, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, Ko had spent two years in Switzerland looking after Jong-un and hiding her identity from North Korean diplomats. “U.S. authorities spirited away Ko and her husband without even informing us,” the NIS source told JoongAng Ilbo, “sending them to the U.S. through a base in Frankfurt.” (Chang Se-jeong and Sarah Kim, “Kim Jong-un’s Aunt Fled to U.S.,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 5, 2013)

11/6/13  

_Rodong Sinmun_: “The U.S. is entirely to blame for the dangerous situation on the Korean Peninsula in which the peace is threatened and a nuclear war is possible. …The spokesman for the U.S. State Department recently claimed the U.S. remains unchanged in its stand that North Korea should take the denuclearization measure beforehand in order to have the talks resumed, adding the U.S. will keep putting pressure upon the DPRK to live up to the international commitments. The U.S. secretary of State earlier said that the U.S. has the intent to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the DPRK if the U.S. preconditions are resolved while speaking loudly of ensuring peace on the peninsula. The U.S. is the chief culprit threatening the DPRK with the use of military force and escalating the tensions on the peninsula with war drills. The war drills waged by the hostile forces fell short of developing into a real war the credit of which entirely goes to the persevering efforts made by the DPRK exercising every possible restraint in order to protect peace and stability in the region.

**The true intention of hostile forces is to raise unacceptable issues as preconditions for dialogue**, render the situation on the peninsula tense at any cost and ignite a war under the pretext of the DPRK’s counteraction against it. Clear is the U.S. aim in calling on the DPRK to take “advanced step” and “fulfill international commitment” while raising the non-aggression issue against its will. Its demand is the DPRK abandonment of “nuclear program” first. To urge the DPRK to scrap “nuclear program” first is to urge it lay down arms. It is the consistent stand of the DPRK to realize the peace on the peninsula through dialogue and negotiations, but the DPRK will never beg for this. It is foolish for the U.S. to hope for the DPRK’s scrapping of “nuclear program” first. As long as the U.S. nuclear blackmail is continued, the DPRK’s war deterrence will be increased in every way.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun Denounces U.S. as Chief Culprit Threatening Peace on Korean Peninsula,” November 6, 2013)

Intelligence gathered from North Korean defectors—a key source of information about the North—has deteriorated in recent years. The decline in both the quality and quantity of information, based on payments made by the South Korean government for the intelligence, comes amid an ongoing crackdown on escapees. Since 2008, the South Korean government has paid 166 defectors a total of 1.9 billion won, or $1.79 million, in return for intelligence that is “deemed to be valuable to national security,” according to data submitted by the Unification Ministry to the National Assembly. In two cases, payments were made for goods—a wooden vessel used to flee the North and pieces of a grenade. Payment-for-intelligence totaled 773 million won, or $728,000, in 2009, but has trickled down since to 350 million won in 2010; 312 million in 2011; and 191 million won in 2012. As of September this year, the total was 135
North Korea is focusing more on diversified development of its economy and pushing regional industries to play a greater role in earning foreign capital, Pyongyang watchers in Seoul said. The October 31 issue of "economic research" published in the North highlighted the need for regional governments to generate more revenue, bolster industrial output and earn more foreign capital. According to papers in the research journal that offer a glimpse into how Pyongyang wants to run the country, factories in the provinces must strive to modernize and form close knit alliances with industries located in the capital city and with laboratories. This call is similar to a speech given by Vice Premier Ro Du-chol on November 6 at a ceremony marking the 40th anniversary of regional governments being given authority to generate profits and manage their respective budgets. The senior official stressed that all cities and counties need to do their utmost to improve their economies and come up with necessary policy plans. Such a move calls for redoubled efforts to attract overseas investments in mineral mines and other manufacturing facilities. Ro's remarks have been interpreted as Pyongyang paying more attention to regional economies and getting local authorities to take charge of providing for its citizens, instead of relying on the central government. Related to such calls, the North recently announced that it will set up a total of 14 special economic zones across the country to pursue economic growth and bring in more investments. At present the communist country only has four such special zones, including Kaesong and Mount Kumgang. "There has been a trend coming into this year of the North paying closer attention to building up its regional economy," said Cho Bong-hyun, an analyst at the IBK Economic Research Institute. The North Korean expert said that this may be a move by the North to bring about results on the economic front under the Kim Jong-un leadership. This move is seen as a departure from the "songun," or military-first politics, pursued by his late father, Kim Jong-il. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Focusing More on Regional Development: Research Journal," November 10, 2013)

A senior North Korean official on threatened the United States, South Korea and Japan with a "nuclear catastrophe," accusing them of demanding Pyongyang first take concrete steps to reopen stalled multilateral nuclear talks. Kim Tae-gil, a senior researcher at the North's foreign ministry-affiliated Disarmament and Peace Institute, made the outburst at an international conference in Tianjin, organized by the China Foundation for International Studies (CFIS) and the China International Institute for Strategic Society. "There is neither confidence nor dialogue on the Korean Peninsula. What you see on the Korean Peninsula are hostile relations between the DPRK (North Korea) and the United States, together with distrust and confrontation between the North and the South of Korea," Kim said in his speech at the conference. "If a crisis erupts on the Korean Peninsula, it would result (in) a nuclear catastrophe and this catastrophe would engulf the United States, South Korea and Japan," Kim said in the English-language speech. "The key principle of resolving the denuclearization issue on the Korean Peninsula is to set up a peace mechanism and deal with nuclear issues on the basis of the principle of action-for-action," Kim said. "That is why the DPRK insists on resuming the six-party talks without any preconditions, rather than a resumption of
talks with conditions that we make the first move unilaterally,” Kim said. “However, the U.S. refused to resume the talks and continued to step up its military threats against the DPRK,” he said. “Thus, the DPRK is compelled to strengthen its nuclear deterrent in order to safeguard its sovereignty. It is an inevitable choice,” Kim said. During the conference, Kim made no mention of the restart of the plutonium reactor, but renewed calls for a peace treaty with the U.S. to eventually resolve a nuclear standoff. “The frustration over the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is attributable to a lack of progress in efforts to set up a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula,” Kim said. “The peace mechanism should either precede or at least be parallel with the denuclearization process,” he said. “That has been not the case so far.” (Kim Deok-hyun, “N. Korea Warns U.S., S. Korea, Japan of ‘Nuclear Catastrophe,’” Yonhap, November 12, 2013)

Korean companies will participate in a railway project jointly led by Russia and North Korea, according to a memorandum of understanding signed by President Park Geun-hye and Russian President Vladimir Putin after a summit. The MOU, among a slew of others signed on the sidelines of Putin’s visit to Seoul, will allow a consortium formed by Posco, Hyundai Merchant Marine and Korail to acquire nearly half of the 70 percent stake that Russia owns in a five-year-old joint venture called RasonKonTrans. North Korea holds 30 percent. The Blue House did not disclose the exact size of the stake Korea will obtain. The joint venture is supposed to develop the Rajin-Khasan railroad project that dates back to 2000, when Putin agreed with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to jointly develop a 54-kilometer (33.5-mile) line linking the Russian eastern town of Khasan to the North’s port of Rajin. Russia hoped to facilitate shipping of its freight via Siberia to Europe using the railroad. The deal will enable the South Korean companies to take part in not only the railroad operation but also the construction of ports in Rajin. The budget for the project is $340 million, and the joint venture was set to begin operation of the railroad in 2008 and run for the next year 49 years. Its launch had been stalled for five years, largely due to North Korea’s provocations such as its nuclear and missile tests. Russia finally reopened the track in September after a five-year renovation. What makes the deal significant is that it may signal South Korea is easing the “May 24 sanctions” on North Korea that were imposed in the wake of North Korea’s sinking of a South Korean warship in 2010. The restrictions ban all trade and investment with the North. Although Ministry of Unification spokeswoman Park Soo-jin said in a briefing that the South Korean government’s stance on the May 24 sanctions “remain unchanged,” analysts said the deal has opened up the potential for flexible application of the restrictions, making it possible for South Korean companies to use a roundabout method of investing in North Korea under the names of Russian or Chinese corporations. The project also coincides with the “Eurasia Initiative,” a vision President Park came up with on October 18 for regional and economic cooperation between Europe and Asia. It has a complex economic and diplomatic agenda that aims to achieve two major tenets of the new administration: economic revitalization and building a foundation for peaceful unification. Putin expressed his sympathy with the initiative during the summit. “We have agreed to combine Korea’s policy to step up Eurasia cooperation and Russia’s policy to emphasize the Asia-Pacific region, thus realizing each other’s potential to a maximum level and developing our bilateral relationship on a future-oriented basis,” said Park. In regard to security issues, the two
leaders stressed that North Korea should not possess nuclear weapon status under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while confirming that they would not allow Pyongyang to build its nuclear and missile capacity. “North Korea should observe the international duties and promises under the United Nations Security Council resolution and denuclearization,” the joint statement said. “We will make efforts to create circumstances for resuming six-party talks with the participating members.” “Russia supports resumption of six-party talks as soon as possible,” said Putin in a press conference, adding that Russia and South Korea share common goals when it comes to the Korean Peninsula. Park and Putin also vowed to cooperate on the energy businesses. They agreed to continue talks over Russia sending natural gas from Sakhalin or East Siberia to South Korea via a pipeline. “Issues surrounding Russia’s long-term supply of natural gas to Korea will take into account various conditions including the pool of resources and economic feasibility,” said the statement. The pipeline is supposed to start at Vladivostok and go through North Korea before terminating in South Korea, a 2,700-kilometer route. Should the energy deal be realized, Korea could diversify the source of its fuel although the project would require the participation of a stable North Korea. In the longer term, Korea will ask for Russia’s support in using the North Pole shipping route. The North Pole route has recently emerged as an alternative to the Suez Canal after the melting of ice. Using the route can shorten shipping times by an average of 10 days compared to the Suez route, according to studies. The two leaders also agreed on a visa-free travel policy between the two nations - allowing ordinary passport holders to stay 60 days without visas - and designating 2014 and 2015 as special tourism years to boost bilateral tourism. (Seo Ji-eun, “Park, Putin Sign Rail Project MOU,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 14, 2013)

Toloraya: “Two investment platforms (joint funds), each worth US$1 billion, were agreed upon, as well as a joint innovation project in the Skolkovo Technopolis (a high-tech enclave near Moscow). Other opportunities that were discussed included cooperation in liquified natural gas (LNG) production, South Korean participation in the creation of shipbuilding industries in the Russian Far East, and cooperation in using Arctic routes for transportation. However, the true significance of the visit lies in the fact that for the first time the two countries found common ground in their respective concepts of promoting Eurasian integration and Northeast Asian security. Russia welcomes President Park Geun-hye’s “trustpolitik” principles, although it remains to be seen how they can be practically implemented. Seoul’s new strategy is important to Russia since it corresponds with Moscow’s goals in its recent efforts to “turn to the East”—that is, to “rebalance” its ties to Asia and the Pacific. The newly-found understanding is also important for South Korea in order to become a more meaningful middle power. It seems Seoul has “suddenly” discovered Russia can be useful for that. This shared strategy may become a new beginning in the Russian-South Korean bilateral relationship. The honeymoon between the two countries, if ever it existed, is long passé. Although the countries have no history of direct conflict (USSR took no major part in the Korean War; it supported but did not encourage Kim Il Sung) and no bilateral problems of any significance, Russia is still mistrusted by the South. In recent years, due to growing US-Russia polarization, South Korea has been in no position to challenge its suzerain (the US) by being receptive to Russian policy initiatives on Korean issues or demonstrating enthusiasm for Moscow’s efforts to
strengthen its position in Asia and the Pacific. While Moscow and Seoul declared a “strategic partnership” during the administration of President Lee Myung-bak, little was done following this declaration to make the two countries become true strategic partners. No major agreements were concluded during the half a dozen summit meetings while Lee was in office, nor were there any breakthroughs in economic relations. The two countries differed on most international issues as Russian policy grew more assertive vis-à-vis the West (the analysis of the voting pattern of the two countries in the UN explicitly shows that on most resolutions Russia and South Korea did not vote together). Moreover, Russia opposed Seoul’s efforts to increase its capabilities to produce longer-range missiles, which could reach Russian territory. Moscow watched with concern the strengthening of the US-ROK alliance, in which Korea was seemingly becoming an arm of US military might; an arm aimed at, among others, Russia’s strategic partner, China. In South Korea, Russia’s role in Korean affairs and its eagerness to be a positive actor are sometimes underestimated: among the four big powers involved in Korean affairs, Russia’s positions and interests are, in general, least appreciated and sometimes ignored. At the same time, South Korea has long been the third most important economic partner of Russia in Asia and this is something to capitalize on. Bilateral economic cooperation is progressing probably faster than any other relationship with an Asian country (except China) and this cooperation is vital for Russia’s Far East. However, Moscow is concerned that it is perceived by Seoul only as a raw material source and manufactured goods market. Whereas, in fact, Russia supplies not only raw materials, but also high-tech commodities like nuclear fuel, helicopters and space technologies (more than half of the first South Korean space rocket was Russian produced). Russia is also interested in increasing ROK investment, especially in the manufacturing sector in the Far East. The growing transcontinental and regional agenda might give a new lease on life to Russian-South Korean relations. To overcome existing bilateral limitations and to advance in both the economic and political realms Russian policymakers have, as long ago as the early 1990s, suggested the concept of trilateral cooperation, linking North and South Korea together. Moscow sees this goal as the most promising strategy—both geopolitically and geoeconomically—to promote regional peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia. Such projects are seen both as a source of mutual prosperity and as a tool to help the North Korean economy modernize, as well as a way to build mutual trust and improve the political atmosphere. Soliciting the support of the Park government—viewed in Russia as more pragmatic and less extremist than the previous administration—is arguably the most important overall aim of Russia’s Korea policy. From this perspective, the latest summit was a milestone. In recent discussions in Seoul, I found that such a breakthrough in trilateral cooperation including North Korea was the most exciting and promising result for South Koreans, who have finally come to realize that Russia could play a leading role in transforming South Korea from an “island” to a continental power and into a major Eurasian player. However, the long-standing prejudice against North Korea limits these expectations. It was news for some of my Seoul interlocutors to hear that North Korea has unequivocally supported trilateral projects for many years and has expressed its desire to participate in them, including construction of a gas pipeline, the building of an electricity grid and the reconnecting of the Trans-Korean Railway to the Trans-Siberian Railway. Pyongyang also has no reservations about receiving South Korean capital via Russia. Especially
now, when a new course for establishing free economic zones has been declared by the North with great fanfare, North Koreans are more than eager to use Russian offices to get South Korean investments. Therefore, agreement on South Korean participation in the Rajin-Khasan Railroad project is widely seen as a milestone. It is worth remembering that Russia initiated this project intended to connect the Trans-Korean Railway with the Trans-Siberian Railway to transit cargoes from Korea and the Pacific to Russia and Europe in late 1990s. The project was given a big boost after Kim Jong-Il’s 2001 visit to Russia. However, since the project did not move forward at that time for political reasons, Moscow acted unilaterally at its own expense. The Russia-DPRK joint venture “Rasoncontrans” undertook a pilot project reconstructing the Khasan-Rajin railroad tracks and building piers at Rajin, costing US$ 340 million. The railroad was officially opened in September 2013, but the actual commercial operation encountered difficulties due to a lack of desire on the part of South Korea to participate. Now, a little unexpectedly (the decisions were made within few days), a Memorandum of Understanding has been signed that allows Korean companies—such as Posco, Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. and Korea Railroad Corporation—to participate in the construction of railways, ports and harbors associated with this project. President Putin underlined in Seoul that the implementation of the work would reap not only immediate economic benefits, but also that this comparatively modest project could be the start of a large-scale undertaking, creating a land bridge across Eurasia. The Russian leader also welcomed the participation of South Korean companies in creating the transport corridor between Asia and the Pacific, Central Asian countries and Europe. He also stressed that the Russian government had allocated considerable investment for modernizing the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Baikal-Amour route using the Russian Reserve (sovereign) Fund. Other trilateral projects not in the limelight are also important. Of significance is the fate of the gas pipeline project, which was agreed to at the summit level between Russia and North Korea in 2011. It was to become a real game-changer since the pipeline enhances the energy security of South Korea and brings North Korea benefits without any concessions, or dangers associated with “opening.” The project has been pursued since 2003 (when the Russian “Gazprom” state company and South Korean KOGAS signed a cooperation agreement). In September 2011, the “roadmap” was signed for construction (an investment of US$2.5 billion will be needed, supplying a volume of 12 billion cubic meters per year). The gas pipeline in Korea, due to external (the need to get a connection to the Asian gas market) and internal factors (the need to diversify production and exports as well as to use Gazprom’s existing capacity to build pipelines), was one of the most important Russian economic undertakings in Asia and the Pacific. The project was also critical for Russia’s Korea policy, as it fully corresponded with Moscow’s desire to establish itself as a player on the peninsula. It would help promote inter-Korean cooperation, guarantee stability and assist the DPRK in improving its economic situation, as well as increase the North’s chances for economic modernization. However, the project became a political hostage, involving not only South and North Korea, but also the US and China. A political decision by the South Korean government (Russia and the DPRK have already explicitly confirmed their readiness to implement this project) to approve the project was never made. Moreover, South Korean importers had insisted on “special terms” that were far from realistic (as if it was only Russia who needed the pipeline). Therefore, “Gazprom” is now
building an LNG plant in the Far East, and has been losing interest in the overland pipeline. It is considering supplying the more expensive LNG to South Korea by sea rather than continue to engage in this tug-of-war over the pipeline. Hopefully the summit will now give a boost to this politically and strategically important undertaking. A similar project, started in 2009, is a power line from Russia’s Far East to South Korea via North Korea. Similarly, due to the deterioration of relations between North and South, this effort was also shelved, although Russia continues to show its commitment to the project. If the shift in the South Korean approach lasts, other trilateral and multilateral projects could be initiated. For example, South Korean investment could be used for modernizing—with the use of Russian technology—industries in the North once built with Soviet assistance such as metallurgy, building materials and mineral excavation. South Korean companies might also be interested in hiring North Korean workers at their assembly and other plants in Russia. Such a practice would be a valuable example of North-South cooperation in third countries without the limitations of the political realities on the Korean peninsula, in addition to being commercially profitable. Increased trilateral cooperation could also help promote Northeast Asian security. (The fact that Russia chairs the relevant Six Party Talks working group was also discussed at the summit.) Such cooperation could be a starter for a broader discussion of Eurasian integration, particularly since Russia has now joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Russian experts even consider Korea as a bridge to getting access to the burgeoning East Asian Korea-Lapan-China “troika” future free trade agreement. Besides bringing economic benefits that would reduce security risks in the region by increasing economic interdependence, Korea might also be interested in considering Russia as a gateway to the new Russia-initiated Custom and Eurasian Union, seen by President Putin as a major strategic political goal. During the summit in Seoul, the two presidents not only issued a joint statement aimed at linking the Park-proposed “Eurasian Initiative” and Putin’s “New East Policy,” President Putin also opened in Seoul a monument to the great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin. In Russia, Pushkin is seen as a symbol of Russian spirit and a national treasure. This monument in Seoul, therefore, emphasizes the new spiritual connection between the two nations, as they strive for a more significant place in modern civilization. South Korea has also become the first among Asian countries in the Pacific to establish a visa-waiver agreement with Russia. So both countries now seem to fit well into each other strategies to make the world a safer and more prosperous place.” (Georgy Toloraya, “A Eurasian Bridge across North Korea?” 38North, November 22, 2013)

In her congratulatory speech at an international symposium commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy held at the academy in Seocho-dong, Seoul, President Park Geun-hye said, “In order to realize peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia, the countries in this region must share a common awareness on the future of Northeast Asia," and suggested publishing a common history textbook for South Korea, China and Japan. Park said, “Just like Germany and France, Germany and Poland, we can publish a common history textbook for Northeast Asia and establish a practice of cooperation and dialogue as they once did in East-West Europe. A day may come when the walls of history issues, the source of conflict and distrust, will crumble.” (Ahn Hong-wuk and Seo Ui-dong, “‘Let’s Publish a Joint History Textbook for South Korea, China and Japan,’” Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 15, 2013)

11/14/13
North Korea is ready to conduct another nuclear test, but no imminent sign has been detected at its main site in the northeastern tip. South Korea's vice defense minister Baek Seung-joo briefed lawmakers of the ruling Saenuri Party on the condition of the Punggye-ri test site in its northeastern region during a meeting of the special security committee on North Korea's nuclear weapons amid rising speculation over another test. The southern tunnel of the underground test site can be used for another explosion at any time, but currently there are no imminent signs for such action, Baek was quoted as saying by participants. The western tunnel, where the third explosion took place in February, is currently under construction, Baek said. Pyongyang is expected to acquire 6 km of weapons-grade plutonium [?] by the end of next year if the Yongbyon nuclear reactor continues to operate in the current phase, he noted. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea Ready for 4th Nuclear Test, Yet No Imminent Sign: Seoul,” Yonhap, November 15, 2013)

The inter-Korean factory park in Kaesong that reopened two months ago is still struggling with a lack of orders and uncertainty caused by the failure of the two Koreas to make headway on reforming key operating rules, sources said. Companies that returned to the Kaesong Industrial Complex on September 16 after a hiatus of over five months complained they were operating at 50-60 percent capacity and facing serious challenges. "The loss of orders from buyers is effectively hindering normal operations," said a businessman, who requested anonymity. He said smaller companies were harder hit than larger ones. Of the 123 South Korean companies with factories in the border town, three have indicated they want to pull out or sell off operations. The businessman added that failure to make headway on changing rules that can facilitate travel, communication and customs is fueling uncertainties about the future and further scaring potential buyers and corporate partners. Easing travel restrictions into Kaesong, setting up Internet access and changing customs rules are critical for the “progressive development” of the special economic zone that first began making goods in late 2004. After no meeting on rules reform took place in October, Seoul and Pyongyang held three sub-panel talks to discuss investment protection, internationalization and legal rights of South Korean workers in Kaesong earlier in the week. The North, however, has not given a date for holding sub-panel talks on travel and communication. "At this pace, it will be physically impossible for infrastructure to be built to facilitate movement of personnel, and ease rules governing Internet access and mobile phone use in Kaesong," a government insider said. (Yonhap, “Kaesong Complex Normalization Affected by Lack of Rules Reform,” November 15, 2013)

Two years after Kim Jong-un took power, North Korea’s official economy shows no signs of improving, but the informal economy is thriving. Cho Bong-hyun of the IBK Economic Research Institute says the North’s informal economy is worth between US$1 billion and $3 billion and almost equal in size to the official economy. The belief that money can buy anything is rife in North Korea. Farmers can buy membership of the Workers Party, the gateway to the elite, from a senior party official for about $300. Factory or company workers or soldiers have to pay about $500 for party membership. College admission can also be bought with a bribe. "Anybody can buy admission to Pyongyang Medical University for $10,000 and to the law or economics departments of Kim Il-sung University for between $5,000 and $10,000," said a South Korean
government source. The opportunity to work overseas costs $3,000, plus an extra $1,000 if workers want their stay extended another year. Problems with the law can also be made to go away with bribes. “Two people in Cheongjin, North Hamgyong Province were sentenced to two years in prison for watching a South Korean film. They were put in prison in Kangwon Province but paid some money and were released three days later,” a defector testified. "Rumor has it that prison guards are getting rich." A source said, "There’s a widespread sense that everything from cradle to grave can be solved with money." In border regions, guards earn money by turning a blind eye to or even helping would-be defectors. Currently, a U.S. dollar is worth about 7,000 North Korean won. Would-be defectors pay border guards $40 to cross the Apnok or Duman rivers, and $60 to carry old or feeble people on their back. Seoul National University's Institute for Peace and Unification Studies interviewed 261 defectors over the past two years. Most respondents -- 92.3 percent of those in their 30s, 88.2 percent of those in their 40s, and 71.9 percent of those in their 50s -- said they had experience selling goods in North Korean markets. That was even true for 68.4 percent of former party members. This suggests that all classes engage in trading goods. Asked about the monthly average household income, 31.7 percent said they earned up to 300,000 North Korean won. Next came up to 100,000 won for 16.6 percent, up to 500,000 won for 13.7 percent, and up to 1 million won for 13.2 percent. But their official salary for their work is a mere 3,000 to 5,000 won, meaning they earned the rest of their income chiefly in the informal economy.

The most popular means of earning money are small shops or restaurants, cottage industries like making clothes and shoes, and private tutoring and private medical services. Farmers can earn 60,000 to 80,000 won a month by harvesting 700 kg of beans and corn annually from their allocated field and raising five chickens and a dog. Recently, a growing number of people are getting into the transportation business by illegally registering vehicles or boats, which are banned from private ownership, in the name of agencies or companies and appropriating their profits. They also make money from smuggling. Repairing computers or mobile phones has become a popular job as well as repairmen can earn $5 to $10 per job. (Chosun Ilbo, "N. Korea's Informal Economy Thrives," November 16, 2013)

11/17/13 South Korean humanitarian aid to North Korea, including money given to international groups, has totaled $16.7 million so far this year, up 26 percent from last year, said the South Korean Unification Ministry. "Despite criticisms that Seoul has not done enough to help the disadvantaged in the North, the incumbent Park Geun-hye administration has sent more aid to Pyongyang than what was shipped last year when President Lee Myung-bak was in office," said a government official. Fifteen local charity groups including the Eugene Bell Foundation and Korea Sharing Net provided 4.3 billion won, or a little over 24.1 percent of all aid to the North, with the rest coming from the South Korean government. Seoul donated 13.5 billion won to the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund since President Park took office. (Yonhap, “S. Korean Aid to N. Korea Grows 26 Pct. In 2013 On-Year,” November 17, 2013)

11/18/13 South Korea’s National Security Office chief Kim Jang-soo and China’s State Councilor Yang Jiechi met at Cheong Wa Dae for their first strategic security dialogue designed to enhance bilateral high-level communication on security and diplomacy. Their
meeting was arranged after Presidents Park Geun-hye of South Korea and Xi Jinping of China agreed during their summit in June to institute strategic dialogue between their senior officials. Before the talks between Kim and Yang, the Chinese official was greeted by President Park at Cheong Wa Dae. “I believe your talks with South Korean officials will serve as a good chance to strengthen mutual trust and our friendship,” said Park. Park also expressed her expectation for Chinese leaders’ promise to reform the economy made during the recent plenary meeting of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party. “(Through the meeting), a blueprint for a reform process was put forward, which bears great significance for Chinese people as well. I hope Chinese dreams, through reform, can quickly be realized.” Expressing gratitude for Park’s remarks, Yang said the bilateral relationship would enter a new phase of evolution through shared efforts. Yang also delivered Xi’s messages to Park, in which he wished to visit Seoul in the near future and hoped that Park would attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit slated to take place in Beijing next year. Xi also positively evaluated Park’s trust-building diplomacy to promote peace on the peninsula and beyond. Touching on the ongoing negotiations over a bilateral free trade pact, Yang expressed his expectations that the two countries could speed up the process and conclude a deal that would keep a balance of interests for both sides. Topping the agenda between Kim and Yang was the resumption of talks with Pyongyang, including the multilateral denuclearization dialogue, which has been stalled since December 2008 amid the North’s provocative acts and breach of international commitments. Reaffirming their shared stance against the North’s possession of nuclear arms, Kim and Yang agreed to make all diplomatic efforts for “effective progress” toward denuclearization and for peace on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia. China has pushed for the resumption of the long-stalled six-party talks, but South Korea and the U.S. have remained cautious, arguing that Pyongyang should first make “sincere” action toward denuclearization. (Song Sang-ho, “Seoul, Beijing Hold First Strategic Security Dialogue,” Korea Herald, November 18, 2013)

Diplomatic tensions with South Korea have flared anew after Japan’s top government spokesman called anti-Japanese independence activist An Jung-geun, a national hero in his homeland, a criminal. “It is extremely regrettable that he used the expression ‘criminal,’ ” South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Cho Tai-young told a regular news conference. An assassinated Japan’s first prime minister, Ito Hirobumi, at Harbin station in northeastern China in 1909. The Korean Peninsula was a Japanese protectorate at the time, and about to be annexed by Japan. Ito had served as Japan’s top official in Korea. An is also revered by China. The two countries are considering building a memorial to An at the site where Ito was gunned down. An was executed by Japanese colonial authorities in 1910. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide angered South Korea when he took issue with the plan for the memorial. Suga accused South Korea of harming bilateral relations by moving ahead with the project. “We have told South Korea that An is a criminal,” Suga said at a news conference. “Erecting a memorial to An will not help the Japan-South Korea relationship.” Cho took umbrage at Suga labeling An a criminal, explaining that his action was justified in light of what Ito did while he governed the Korean Peninsula, a Japanese colony until 1945. “If he looks back on what kind of a person Ito was in the era of Japan’s imperialism, the chief Cabinet secretary could not have made such a remark,” he said. “An, an upright
person, sacrificed his life for independence of our country and peace in the Orient.” The Korean activist has national hero status in South Korea because he symbolizes the resistance to Japan’s colonial rule. In Japan, Ito is highly regarded for his role in the nation’s modernization. In July, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said Japan and South Korea should respect the views of each other, emphasizing that Ito was Japan’s first prime minister. After hearing of the backlash from Seoul, Suga insisted that his remark was not intended to be offensive and said South Korea should not react so harshly. “I think that is an overreaction,” he said. “I just calmly reiterated our traditional stance.” China said it intends to proceed with erecting the memorial in line with a request from South Korea in June. “An is a famous anti-Japanese martyr in history, who is also respected by the Chinese,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a regular news conference. “China will press ahead with relevant work in accordance with regulations on building foreign-related memorial facilities.” (Konno Shinobu and Kaise Akihiko, “Seoul Angered after Japan Labels ‘National Hero’ a Criminal,” Asahi Shimbun, November 20, 2013)

11/20/13 NSA Susan Rice: “Let me begin with security, which is the underpinning of all progress in every region. We are making the Asia Pacific more secure with American alliances—and an American force posture—that are being modernized to meet the challenges of our time. By 2020, 60 percent of our fleet will be based in the Pacific, and our Pacific Command will gain more of our most cutting-edge capabilities. As we are seeing in the Philippines today, our military presence in the region is vital, not only to deter threats and defend allies, but also to provide speedy humanitarian assistance and unmatched disaster response. We are updating and diversifying our security relationships in the region to address emerging challenges as effectively as we deter conventional threats. We are urging our allies and partners to take greater responsibility for defending our common interests and values. By next year, we will complete the first fundamental revision of our bilateral defense guidelines with Japan in more than 15 years. Japan is also creating its first-ever National Security Council, and I look forward to working closely with my Japanese counterpart on regional and global challenges. In South Korea, we’re enhancing the alliance’s military capabilities to ensure that our combined forces can deter and fully answer North Korea’s provocations. With Australia, we are bringing our militaries closer by rotating Marines through Darwin and deepening cooperation in newer areas like missile defense and space and cyber security. And, we’re doing more with Thailand and the Philippines to address maritime security and disaster response. To diversify the network of security relationships in the region, we are strengthening trilateral cooperation with our allies and our security partners and encouraging them to cooperate more closely among themselves. When it comes to China, we seek to operationalize a new model of major power relations. That means managing inevitable competition while forging deeper cooperation on issues where our interests converge—in Asia and beyond. We both seek the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue, a stable and secure Afghanistan, and an end to conflict in Sudan. There are opportunities for us to take concerted action to bolster peace and development in places like sub-Saharan Africa, where sustainable growth would deliver lasting benefit to the peoples of Africa as well as to both our countries. We’re improving the quality of our military-to-
military relationship with China, as we enhance our strategic security dialogues and cooperate on issues like counter-piracy and maritime security. Greater military engagement and transparency can help us manage the realities of mistrust and competition, while augmenting the high-level communication that has been a hallmark of this Administration’s approach to China. As we diversify the ways in which we do business with China, we will continue to champion respect for the rule of law, human rights, religious freedom and democratic principles. These are the common aspirations that all people share. We will do this, even and especially when it is not the easy or expedient thing to do. I sat on the Security Council with China for four and a half years working on many of these issues. I know all too well that we have some fundamental differences that cannot be minimized. But, I also know that our interests on many of the major challenges of our time can and should be more closely aligned. Nowhere is this more evident than in confronting the threat that North Korea poses to international peace and security. The regime threatens its neighbors. Pyongyang proliferates dangerous goods and technologies. It seeks to expand its nuclear weapons arsenal and its long-range missile program in flagrant violation of international law. Consequently, one of our most pressing security goals is to roll back the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and other WMD programs. To that end, we are prepared for negotiations, provided that they are authentic and credible, get at the entirety of the North’s nuclear program, and result in concrete and irreversible steps toward denuclearization. Pyongyang’s attempts to engage in dialogue while keeping critical elements of its weapons programs running are unacceptable, and they will not succeed. We will continue to join with international partners, especially China, to increase pressure on North Korea to denuclearize. We will do what is necessary to defend ourselves and our allies against any threat from North Korea, and we will maintain and expand, as necessary, both national and multilateral sanctions against North Korea. There will continue to be significant costs to future provocations. Pyongyang has a choice: on the one hand lies greater isolation and crippling economic privation; on the other, a true chance for peace, development and global integration. Another growing threat to regional peace and security—and to U.S. interests—is the rise of maritime disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea. We aim to help governments in the region to communicate better with one another, so that incidents at sea do not unintentionally spark wider conflicts. We encourage all parties to reject coercion and aggression and to pursue their claims in accordance with international law and norms through the establishment of peaceful, diplomatic processes for preventing maritime conflicts. A good first step would be progress on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. How the nations and institutions of the Asia Pacific manage these disputes will be a harbinger of their ability to shape their shared security future. …These security goals constitute one key element of our Asia Pacific strategy. Yet, we have an equally essential economic agenda in the region. By the end of 2016, we aim to transform our economic relations with the region through: dramatically increased U.S. exports; the implementation of the most ambitious American free trade agreement in decades; and closer cooperation with China, India and other emerging economies in pursuit of sustained global growth. …Asia needs open and transparent economies and regional support for international economic norms, if it is to remain a world-wide engine of economic growth. Driving a global
economic recovery that creates jobs here in the United States and addresses the kinds of trade imbalances that contributed to the economic meltdown in the first place will require hard work on both sides of the Pacific. For the United States, that means boosting our exports and continuing to bring down our budget deficit. For countries in Asia, it means shifting the focus from overseas markets to strengthening their domestic sources of demand. Our foremost economic goal in the region is concluding negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership and achieving Congressional approval. The 12 nations that are part of the TPP negotiations represent more than 40 percent of global trade. So, the rules we establish through this agreement will set the standard for future trade agreements. It will take on unfair practices by state-owned enterprises and the regulatory barriers goods encounter at and behind borders. This will help level the playing field for everyone. The TPP will promote workers’ rights, environmental protections, and build stronger safeguards for intellectual property, improving economic conditions for everyone, not just the few. **We welcome any nation that is willing to live up to the high-standards of this agreement to join and share in the benefits of the TPP, and that includes China.** The TPP can be the core of a far broader agreement expanding to countries across the Asia Pacific. To help realize that vision, we are working to negotiate a series of agreements with ASEAN that will put those countries in a better position to join high-standard trade agreements like the TPP. ASEAN represents a $2.5 trillion economic block that contains some of the fastest growing countries in Asia, as well as some of its poorest. … The United States also seeks to elevate our economic relationship with China in the years ahead. Last week, China’s leaders announced plans for sweeping reforms that, if realized, could go a long way towards leveling the playing field for private and foreign investors and moving China’s economy towards market principles. That’s an opportunity we must seize. But even as we increase trade and pursue a bilateral investment treaty, we will continue insisting on tangible progress in areas that matter to U.S. businesses and workers. These include: China continuing to move towards a market-determined exchange rate; increasing U.S. access to Chinese markets; and bolstering protections for U.S. companies’ intellectual property rights and trade secrets, especially against state-sponsored cyber theft. Cyber-enabled economic espionage hurts China as well as the U.S., because American businesses are increasingly concerned about the costs of doing business in China. If meaningful action is not taken now, this behavior will undermine the economic relationship that benefits both our nations. As the world’s two largest energy consumers, energy producers, and greenhouse gas emitters, the U.S. and China also have a duty to lead together to tackle climate change and spur the global transition to a low-carbon energy future. Last June, Presidents Obama and Xi reached an historic agreement to phase out certain potent greenhouse gases. … Strengthening our shared security and promoting our shared prosperity are vital elements of America’s commitment to the Asia Pacific region. So too is advancing respect for the rights and values we hold dear. Since World War II, the United States has played a key role in fostering one of the most significant developments of the past century – the advance of democracy in Asia. In the early years of this new century, we must help to consolidate and expand democracy across Asia to enable more and more people to participate fully in the political life of their countries. The rapid change we have seen in Burma in just the past two years is a portent of the possible. **Not unlike North Korea, Burma was a pariah state, ruled by a military junta and responsible**
for egregious violations of human rights. When President Obama took office, Aung San Suu Kyi was in her fourteenth year of house arrest, and hundreds of Burmese citizens were imprisoned merely for exercising their right to free speech. Burma’s leaders faced enormous economic pressure and intense international isolation—until they chose another path. Over the last several years, we have worked closely with both President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi, and with the government and people of Burma as they’ve made historic changes.” (National Security Adviser Susan Rice, “America’s Future in Asia, Address at Georgetown University, November 20, 2013)

The execution of Jang Song-thaek - the uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and the second-most powerful man in the country - unveiled the rise of a new powerful and elite group behind the Communist state’s young ruler. A senior South Korean intelligence source told JoongAng Ilbo December 13 that six people were critical in influencing Kim to dismiss and subsequently execute his uncle. A handful of senior intelligence officials in the military and leaders of the Workers’ Party emerged as the prime initiators of Jang’s dramatic downfall over recent weeks. “The meeting of security personnel of the [North] Korean People’s Army in Pyongyang last month, attended by Kim, was the prelude to Jang’s purge,” said the intelligence source. North Korean media covered the meeting, devoting the entire front and second pages of the Rodong Sinmun’s November 21 issue to it. The meeting, hosted at the April 25 House of Culture on November 20, was the second of its kind. The first meeting took place in 1993. The reports stated that Kim had emphasized the importance of strengthening the military’s security operations, but the North did not elaborate further. The meeting of the military intelligence officials was hosted abruptly for the first time in two decades, and the intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States paid special attention to possible changes in the North Korean leadership. North Korea specialists in the National Intelligence Service concluded that the meeting took place shortly after Jang and his confidantes were purged. In a briefing to the National Assembly on December 3, the South Korean spy agency reported that Jang’s two closest aides, Ri Ryong-ha and Jang Su-ki, were publicly executed in late November. South Korean intelligence officials believe the young Kim received an oath of fealty from the top military intelligence officials at the November 20 meeting in Pyongyang following the purges. There, the six key men sat next to Kim on the leadership podium. The young ruler sat in the middle, with three men on his left and three on his right. Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, the director of the Korean People’s Army Politburo, sat to the right of Kim. Choe was considered one of two guardians to Kim, along with Jang. Gen. Kim Won-hong, head of the Ministry of State Security, the highest North Korean intelligence authority, and Lt. Gen. of the Korean People’s Army Ryom Chol-song sat in the next seats. Left of Kim sat Lt. Gen. Jo Kyong-chol; Maj. Gen. Kim Su-gil; and Hwang Pyong-so, deputy director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers’ Party, in charge of military appointments and organization. According to North Korean news reports, Choe gave the opening remarks, and Jo gave a briefing to the North Korean leader. Following the meeting of the security personnel of the North Korean military on November 20, Kim visited Samjiyon near Mount Paektu. Although the North said the trip was to inspect the winter sports facilities and military units, South Korean intelligence officials believe Kim discussed follow-up measures for Jang’s case at a special retreat there. Photos of Kim’s trip to
Samjiyon show that Kim Won-hong and Hwang Pyong-so accompanied him with other top Workers’ Party officials. Kim Yang-gon, a secretary of the Central Committee and head of the United Front Department of the North’s ruling party, was also seen in the photos. Han Kwang-sang, director of the party’s Finance and Accounting Department, and deputy directors Pak Tae-song, Kim Byong-ho and Ma Won-chun, also accompanied Kim, indicating that they have risen to power under the young leader’s rule. South Korean intelligence officials concluded that the six men highlighted at the meeting of North Korean military security personnel and the officials who participated in the Samjiyon trip will be the core of the new elite group following Jang’s death. (Lee Young-jong and Ser Myo-ja, “Six Men Appear to Climb Ranks in Regime,” JoongAng Ilbo, December 14, 2013)

North Korea has made progress in its nuclear weapons program to a level that it can produce weapons-grade uranium to make a bomb on its own, South Korea’s defense chief said. [?] “We evaluate that North Korea can build a nuclear weapon using uranium,” Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin said during an interpellation session at the National Assembly, giving a rare assessment on the reclusive nation’s nuclear program. In regard to North Korea’s 5-megawatt reactor that was reactivated in April, Kim said Seoul is closely monitoring activities at the Yongbyon complex where a uranium enrichment plant and a reactor are located. “We consider (the North) is in the test phase, keeping a close eye on the full-scale operation (of the reactor),” Kim said. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea Can Produce Uranium-Based Nuclear Bomb: Seoul’s Defense Chief,” Yonhap, November 20, 2013)

North Korea may have detained an elderly U.S. man last month who entered the country on a tourist visa, Kyodo said, citing an unnamed diplomatic source. Kyodo, in a report from Beijing, said the possible detention could become another diplomatic bargaining chip for North Korea, which has held Kenneth Bae, a Korean-American Christian missionary, since November 2012. The U.S. State Department echoed U.S. embassy officials in Beijing and Seoul who said they were aware of the reports but could not confirm them. North Korea claims the man, who apparently is not of Korean descent, has broken the law, according to Kyodo. The man entered North Korea for sightseeing last month with a valid visa, Kyodo quoted the diplomatic source as saying. Nolan Barkhouse, a spokesman for the U.S. embassy in Beijing, said: "We are aware of reports that a U.S. citizen was detained in North Korea, but we have no additional information to share at this time." He urged Americans to read a State Department warning that "recommends against all travel by U.S. citizens to North Korea." That warning says that "U.S. citizens crossing into North Korea, even accidentally, have been subject to arbitrary arrest and long-term detention." U.S. State Department spokeswoman Pooja Jhunjhunwala said the department is "in regular, close coordination with representatives of the Embassy of Sweden," in Pyongyang, which "acts as our protecting power for issues involving U.S. citizens in North Korea." North Korea said on November 7 that it had arrested a South Korean spy, but has not provided any more details. It has not made any statement about the apparent new arrest. In Seoul, local media said the South Korean man arrested in North Korea as a "spy" was an elderly missionary. "The South Korean that North Korea claims to be a South Korean spy turned out to be 50-year-old missionary named Kim Jeong-wook,"
the Donga Ilbo newspaper said on its website, citing Kim’s family in South Korea and
unnamed sources in China. A U.S. embassy official in Seoul, who spoke on condition of
anonymity said he believed the two cases were separate. (Reuters, “North Korea May
Have Detained Elderly U.S. Citizen,” November 20, 2013) A South Korean detained in
North Korea for alleged espionage is a missionary who had been helping North
Korean refugees hiding out in China, a fellow Christian activist said. The North earlier
this month announced it had arrested a South Korean spy engaged in "plot-breeding"
activities, but did not give his name. The detainee is Kim Jeong-Wook, 50, a Baptist
evangelist who for seven years had been providing shelter and food to North Koreans
living in China’s northeastern border city of Dandong, according to activist Ju Dong-
Shik. Kim crossed the Yalu border river early last month to establish the whereabouts
of some North Korean refugees who had been arrested in Dandong by Chinese
authorities and repatriated, Ju said. "We’ve confirmed he was arrested in Pyongyang
but we don’t know exactly when and how," Ju told AFP. "Mr Kim wanted to find out
what happened to the repatriated North Koreans and take a first-hand look at the
reality in North Korea." DongA Ilbo quoted a source in Dandong as saying that after
Kim’s arrest, three North Korean guards were also arrested for turning a blind eye as
Kim crossed the border. "I tried hard but failed to talk him out of his plan to enter the
North", said Ju, also a Baptist. Early this year Kim used his own money and donations
to open a small noodle factory to help feed hungry North Koreans in China. "He is not
a spy. All the work he did was humanitarian in nature," Ju said. (AFP, “S. Korean ‘Spy’
Detained in N. Korea Is a Missionary: Colleague,” November 20, 2013) North Korea
has confirmed to Swedish diplomats that it is holding an American citizen, the U.S.
State Department said November 22. (Chelsea J. Carter, “State Department: North
Korea Confirms Detention of American,” CNN, November 22, 2013) Merrill Newman is
85 and suffers from a heart ailment, but that did not deter him from fulfilling his wish to
return to North Korea, where he fought as a young man, his family and friends say.
With a companion from his California retirement village, Newman booked a nine-day
trip to the most closed society in the world, a nuclear-armed state that keeps its people
in poverty and is an enemy of the United States. Some call the country the last frontier
of travel. “Why do World War II veterans go back to Normandy?” Newman’s son, Jeff,
asked this week as he dealt with the reality that his father has been detained in North
Korea for nearly a month and that his whereabouts remained unclear. “The war had a
powerful impact on him.” Newman and his friend had completed their tour and were
on board an Air Koryo plane in Pyongyang ready to leave for Beijing on October 26
when uniformed North Korean officers escorted Newman off, his son said. He has not
been heard from since. The day before they were scheduled to leave North Korea,
Newman had a conversation about the Korean War and his service as a soldier with
one of his tour guides and another Korean whose identity is not known, his son said.
According to the son, Newman was upset afterward and indicated to his friend, Bob
Hamrdla, that the talk had not gone well. Newman is part of a small but growing
number of Americans, Europeans and Chinese who have signed up in recent years to
visit the North on state-approved tours, despite the difficulties inherent in traveling to
an impoverished police state. Tourists must be accompanied at all times by state-
authorized guides who prevent much interaction with ordinary people, itineraries are
set in advance and creature comforts are limited. “It tends to be for curiosity seekers
who have been everywhere and want to see the place,” said Tony Namkung, a North
Korea expert. Newman, who has visited Cuba, according to his son, traveled to North Korea with Juche Travel Services, an agency that advertises offices in Beijing, London and Berlin. The group was founded in 2011, according to its website. Reached by telephone, the head of the London office, David Thompson, said that because of Newman’s detention he could not talk. In the last several years, and particularly under Kim Jong-un, who became the country’s leader in 2011, North Korea has tried to attract Western tourists. The government opened a dolphin aquarium in Pyongyang last year, and despite a lack of money that keeps many of its people hungry, it has started to build a ski resort at Masikryong on the east coast. The Swiss government recently refused to sell ski equipment for the project, saying the country should not be able to afford such a luxury. A wealthy European businessman who visited last year said he and his family were drawn by the desire to see a Communist country where a three-generation family dynasty has ruled with an iron hand. “You don’t even see that in Cuba,” said the businessman, who declined to be named for fear of publicity. During the visit, the family paid 200 euros a person for a seat at the main stadium to see a synchronized dancing show, visited a farm and was taken to a power plant. “As a tourist there is no freedom,” the businessman said. “After two days I was ready to leave.” For the last decade or so, two travel agencies, Young Pioneer Tours and Koryo Tours, have been the main conduits for Western tourists, North Korea experts said. Juche Travel Services, which bills itself as tailored for the “modern independent traveler,” was a relative newcomer, they said. Named after the state ideology of “self-reliance,” Juche Travel Services advertises offbeat tours, including a bird watching tour for October, and suggests an arms and equipment exhibition run by the Korean People’s Army as an attraction. All travel agencies outside North Korea must make their arrangements through the state-run Korea International Travel Company, which provides the guides, said Mr. Namkung, who has arranged trips for Bill Richardson, the former United Nations ambassador, and Eric E. Schmidt, the executive chairman of Google. Mr. Newman and his traveling companion, Mr. Hamrdla, stayed at the Yanggakdo Hotel in Pyongyang, a 47-floor building located on an island. The hotel is one of the two main Western-style hotels in the capital, and it is increasingly favored by the North Koreans for tourists because its location makes it difficult for visitors to wander very far without being seen. The itinerary for Newman and Hamrdla, who has since returned to the United States, took them to standard places. They visited Wonsan, on the east coast, and Nampho, a city southwest of Pyongyang, where dams that hold back the tide are considered a tourist attraction. Like most visitors, they also went to Kaesong, the industrial zone on the border with South Korea that the two countries jointly operate despite hostile relations. A person familiar with the situation surrounding Newman’s disappearance, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that inquiries about Mr. Newman by Swedish officials in Pyongyang who represent American interests in the North had been “stonewalled.” On November 21, Richardson – who has visited North Korea at least eight times, including a number of delicate diplomatic missions to secure the release of other detained Americans – also got involved in the effort to determine why Newman had been taken into custody. In a telephone interview, Richardson said that he had communicated with his North Korean contacts to express his concern, but that he had received no new information. “I’m flabbergasted at this action by the North Koreans,” he said. “It means that possibly there’s no one in charge, and that the relationship with the United States,
unfortunately, is not going to be helped by this incident." Several months ago, the country allowed a Korean War veteran who was searching for the body of a friend to visit, and invited him back to keep trying. But the country continues to hold an American missionary, a Christian who was sentenced to 15 years of hard labor for "hostile acts" against the Communist North. Newman’s family members and those trying to help them are mainly concerned about his health. He was on a regimen of nine different medications for his heart ailment, according to an American official. The family sent a package with a 30-day supply of the medicines to the American Embassy in Beijing, his son said, and the package was forwarded to the Swedes in Pyongyang. The Swedes reported back that they had delivered the medicine to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but there was no word on whether Newman had received them, his son said. While Newman’s family worried about how and when they would hear of his condition, the postcards he wrote while on the trip, adorned with the elaborate postage stamps produced by the North Korean government, have started to arrive for family and friends. “They said he was having an excellent time,” the younger Mr. Newman said. (Jane Perlez, “American, Now Held, Part of Rising Number Visting North Korea,” New York Times, November 22, 2013, p. A-6)

U.S. drug agents in Thailand took custody of five men wanted in the United States on allegations of being part of a drug ring that sought to traffic in North Korean methamphetamine and other drugs, CNN has learned. The men, who have British, Filipino, Taiwanese and Slovak citizenship, were being flown to New York to face charges, according to a source. Thai authorities announced the arrests after the men were turned over to U.S. authorities. A U.S. law enforcement official said the charges would be made public soon. The men are part of a broader investigation that federal prosecutors made public in September, filing charges against a group of former U.S. and European ex-military men in a murder-for-hire and drug-importation plot. The Drug Enforcement Administration concocted a sting operation and arrested Joseph Hunter, a former U.S. Army sniper trainer nicknamed Rambo, and four others in the sting case. The five more recently arrested were expelled by Thai authorities and put on a DEA plane to New York. Additional details of the charges couldn’t be learned because they remain under seal. There isn’t enough information to determine whether the North Korean government is currently involved in drug trafficking, according to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report issued by the U.S. State Department. "There have been no confirmed reports of large-scale drug trafficking involving DPRK state entities since 2004," it stated. "This suggests that state-sponsored drug trafficking may have ceased or been sharply reduced, or that the DPRK regime has become more adept at concealing state-sponsored trafficking of illicit drugs." The report also highlighted that the "proximity and availability of precursor chemicals in China likely contribute to the production of methamphetamine within North Korea." It alluded to reported transactions between North Korean traffickers and organized crime groups. Corrupt security agents and government officials are likely responsible for transnational drug operations, according to a different report published in North Korean Review in 2010. There is great difficulty in collecting data or accurate information regarding drug trafficking because of the secrecy in North Korea. So the report’s authors, Minwoo Yun and Eunyoung Kim relied on interviews with 28 North Korean defectors living in China and Thailand as well as various documents. (Evan
A study group is calling on US officials and lawmakers to dramatically increase America's naval footprint in the Pacific to “offset China’s growing military capabilities.” In its annual report, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission calls for an American “surge [of] naval assets in the event of a contingency.” The commission, created by Congress in 2000, calls on lawmakers to “fund the US Navy’s shipbuilding and operations efforts to increase its presence in the Asia Pacific to at least 60 ships and rebalance homeports to 60 percent in the region by 2020 so that the United States will have the capacity to maintain readiness and presence in the Western Pacific.” Such an increase in shipbuilding would “offset China’s growing military capabilities, and surge naval assets in the event of a contingency,” according to the commission. In a somewhat contradictory recommendation, the study group also urged Congress to urge the Pentagon “to continue to develop the US-China maritime security relationship in order to strengthen strategic trust.” (John T. Bennett, “U.S. Commission Wants American ‘Surge’ to Confront China,” Defense News, November 20, 2013)

The U.S. point man on North Korea on Thursday reported “good progress” in talks with his Chinese counterpart, but called on North Korea to halt nuclear activities before any resumption of stalled six-party talks can take place. Glyn Davies made the remarks at the end of his three-day visit to China where he met with his counterpart Wu Dawei and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. “We made some good progress,” Davies told reporters, but added that North Korea must stop all nuclear activities for nations to reopen the six-nation talks. Davies, who will travel to South Korea and Japan this week, described his meetings with Wu as “constructive and tense.” (Yonhap, “U.S. Envoy Cites ‘Good Progress’ But Urges N. Korea to Halt Nuclear Activities,” November 21, 2013)

Davies: “I arrived here a couple days ago, and I have had many hours of discussions with my good friend and counterpart Ambassador Wu Dawei. Our talks were constructive and intense and we made some good progress. I also had an opportunity, just a few minutes ago, to sit down for about 45 minutes with the Chinese Foreign
Minister to talk about North Korea as well. I go on from here to Seoul, South Korea, to hold discussions with my counterpart, Ambassador Cho Tae-yong, and then right after that to Tokyo for discussions with Director General Ihara. Many of you, I think, have seen in recent weeks and months the kinds of statements that North Korea has been making and the kind of actions that they have been taking. One thing in particular I would cite, is their continued reaffirmation of what they call their byungjin policy. This is the simultaneous pursuit of economic development and the strengthening of their nuclear weapons program. As far as we’re concerned, byungjin is a dead-end for North Korea. They cannot hope to develop the prosperity that they seek for their people while at the same time investing tremendous resources in their nuclear program. Q: Ambassador Davies: can you confirm that an American citizen has been detained in North Korea and ...(inaudible)? DAVIES: Well we’ve seen those reports. I have to say at the outset, what I can’t do is comment in any specificity about them, because we do not have a Privacy Act waiver that permits us to do that. So by law we’re constrained. But I can say a couple things. First of all there is no greater, more important responsibility for the United States of America than to do everything we can to protect and seek the welfare of American citizens abroad. So we are working very hard, in particular through our Swedish protective power in Pyongyang, to try to move this issue along. And we of course are calling on North Korea, as in the case of Mr. Kenneth Bae, who has now been there for over a year, to resolve the issue and to allow our citizens to go free. Q: How do you think this detainment will impact your ability to restart nuclear talks? DAVIES: I don’t know that I would draw a solid line, but I think it is an indication that North Korea seems not to be seeking a better relationship with the United States, that they are not taking actions to address our concerns on American citizens being held in North Korea. In the case of Kenneth Bae, we have repeatedly made specific proposals to the North Koreans to dispatch my colleague and friend, Ambassador Robert King, to Pyongyang to hold talks with the North Koreans on humanitarian issues, with a view to securing the release of Kenneth Bae. You all know that not so many months ago, the North Koreans, in fact, allowed, Ambassador King, invited him, to come to North Korea, and then at the eleventh hour decided to pull the plug on that mission. And that was, I think, a mistake on their part. So we continue to reach out to them to find a way for Ambassador King to go back in to North Korea, as he did in a previous case, to bring Kenneth Bae and our other American out. …Q: Are these individual cases a stumbling block to progress between the U.S. and …? DAVIES: Look, again these are separate matters, but we certainly think that North Korea should think long and hard about these cases and understand that, for the United States, these are matters of core concern to us, the fate of Americans who are in North Korea being held by North Koreans. But I don’t want to make any solid line link between these cases and broader issues. …Q: What’s your prospect of restarting the Six-Party Talks after your meetings in Beijing? DAVIES: This is really a question I think you ought to put to Pyongyang. Because you know this question of getting back to Six-Party Talks -- talks are a means to an end. The end is to fulfill the mandate of the Six-Party Talks -- the Six-Party process and the September 2005 Joint Statement. And remember that the core issue in the September ’05 statement is the question of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which means, in effect, the denuclearization of North Korea. So what we’re looking for from North Korea are signs of sincerity that they are prepared to take meaningful steps to address the concerns of the
international community that relate to their unrelenting pursuit of nuclear weapons. Instead what they are doing as news reports have indicated is they’re beginning now to restart some of their nuclear facilities. They are talking about the *byungjin* policy repeatedly, that this is for them a core strategic pursuit of the North Korean nation’s nuclear weapons. And this to us is completely inconsistent with the notion of successful Six-Party Talks, so we’re calling on North Korea to take seriously its obligations and its commitments and to come back in the direction of the international community. And I think until and unless they do that it’s difficult to imagine how we can get back any time soon to Six-Party Talks. … *Q:* Did North Korea change its attitude toward the resumption of Six-Party Talks…? **DAVIES:** What North Korea has said, and I think this is very interesting, is they’ve said that they would like to get back to Six-Party Talks, they’ve said that all issues, “quote-unquote,” will be on the table. But you have to understand what that means. **When they say the all issues are “on the table,”** it means they want to talk about every other issue except their own nuclear establishment, their own nuclear devices, and this concerns us, because, of course, if there are to be Six-Party Talks, what they should do is rapidly lead to the elimination, as North Korea has promised they will, of their nuclear establishment of uranium and plutonium. So, *we do not take much comfort from North Korea when it talks about its interest in returning to Six-Party Talks and its commitment to place all issues on the table.* A key issue that has to be not simply “on the table,” but addressed in a meaningful fashion, is their nuclear establishment, and we see no signs of the seriousness of purpose on the part of the North Koreans to address that core concern of not just the five parties, but the international community. **Q:** Ambassador, the National Security Advisor Susan Rice made some comments on North Korea yesterday, and she said the U.S. government will continue to join with China to increase pressure on North Korea… and she also said the U.S. government will expand sanctions against North Korea if necessary… have you shared policy with the Chinese government? **DAVIES:** Well, I had hours and hours of discussions with Ambassador Wu Dawei and his colleagues so, yes, we’ve been quite transparent and up-front with the Chinese government about plans, about the need for continued pressure on North Korea in order to sharpen its choices because it’s clear that North Korea has no interest in meaningfully addressing its nuclear program. They have made clear in statement after statement over many months that they don’t wish to give up their nuclear weapons, they don’t wish to address this issues, you know, they’ve changed their constitution to declare themselves more formally a nuclear weapons state. They’ve also, in recent months, declared the Six-Party process dead, said that they do not wish to negotiate on the basis any longer of the September 2005 Joint Statement. Now, they’ve gone quiet on a couple of those points in recent months, but that, to our way of thinking, does not amount to any true change of heart or real indication that they mean to meaningfully address what the international community has called on them to address, which is this issue of their nuclear establishment…. *Q:* Did the issue of (inaudible) come up in your talks with the Chinese today, and is there anything that you’re…? **DAVIES:** When I say that we’ve talked to the Chinese about all issues, I mean all issues that relate to North Korea. We’ve talked about everything from the nuclear issue to these consular issues. We’ve also talked about humanitarian issues, we’ve talked about refugees and the need for China to take seriously their obligations under the Refugee Convention, so yes, we’ve talked about
all these issues with China. ... Q: Ambassador, how far do you think is the present situation to the resumption of the talks? DAVIES: How far is the present situation...? I understand why this is of great interest to you, to plan your lives on whether or not the Six-Party is going to happen next week, or six months from now and all the rest of it. I have to say that’s not something I’m concentrating on, what I’m concentrating on is trying to establish an appropriate threshold for Six-Party so that Six-Party can make meaningful progress if and when we’re able to get back to the negotiating table. And again, this really is up to North Korea. It’s North Korea that seems not to be seriously interested in making meaningful progress on the nuclear issue, and until we see a manifestation of North Korean seriousness, it’s very difficult for me to know what the prospects are for getting back to Six-Party, and I’ll say one other quick thing which is that is National Security Advisor Rice in her speech made the point very explicitly that for us to go back to multilateral negotiations, Six-Party Talks, at a time when North Korea continues to produce nuclear materials - to enrich uranium, to produce plutonium – this makes no sense. And this been often been the problem in years past because North Korea uses negotiations as really diplomatic cover to continue its nuclear program, certainly its covert nuclear program. And we’re not interested in going back to a diplomatic process that provides that cover for North Korea. So if we are to get back to talks, North Korea is going to have to cease its nuclear activities. Otherwise, I think talks would ultimately be meaningless. ... Q: China has played a very critical role trying to (inaudible) push for a resumption of talks here. What has Mr. Wu’s response to your stance? DAVIES: ... All I can say is the quality of our conversations is excellent. And this is what for me is really quite interesting and notable about the evolution of our diplomacy on this question with our partners in the Six-Party process, our four partners among the five, is that we are more than ever of one mind, we’re more than ever agreed, that denuclearization must be addressed. And all of us agree, for instance, I mentioned this byungjin policy. All of us agree that it’s untenable, going forward, that it can’t work, and as Ambassador Rice put it in her speech, North Korea faces a choice here: either they can continue to go down the road of further isolation and development of their nuclear and missile program, or they can come back in the direction of the international community, fulfill their obligations and their commitments, abide by the terms of, now, multiple UN Security Council Resolutions that address this, and the future for North Korea can be very, very different. And we’ve made this point to the North Koreans directly, and I certainly did it in this very city in February of last year, so it’s not as if they don’t understand this, that this choice that they face is real. And we’ve demonstrated in other cases, most recently Burma, how quickly the United States can move, how quickly relationships can change and develop in a positive direction if a strategic choice is made to come back in the direction of the international community and their obligations. So that’s really, I think, the message that I’d like to leave with you - that’s what American diplomacy today is all about, is trying to find a way forward to credible and authentic talks, try to find a way to address North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. And we face a choice, too, which is that if we’re unable to get this process started on a credible basis, we will have to take steps, obviously, to protect ourselves and our allies as well, and others will have to take decisions about how they develop their strategic response to this. So, that wouldn’t be good for the Korean Peninsula, that wouldn’t be good for North Asia, that wouldn’t be good for the world. That’s why diplomacy is so important, and
there really is no other solution to this, ultimately, than a diplomatic solution and that’s why our efforts will continue, and we’ll see if we can’t continue to make progress. Maybe someday I’ll be able to answer this very big question about when and if there will be Six-Party Talks, but I can’t do that today. …Q: Ambassador, you said the U.S. is not linking this issue (inaudible…)? **DAVIES:** Well, because we’re talking about apples and oranges here. The first responsibility of the United States is to protect American citizens abroad, that’s why all Foreign Service Officers, including me 33 years ago when I joined, spent my first couple of years in the Foreign Service doing consular work to train us to understand that that is Job #1 for all of us. And I think it’s very important that, as a matter of principle, we always keep consular problems and issues set aside from political issues, that’s very, very important. But it is true that **North Korea could send a very different signal about its interest in having a different sort of relationship with the United States were it to take that step of releasing our citizens and it’s a matter of some wonderment to me that they’ve haven’t yet moved on that.** Kenneth Bae has now been in North Korean custody for longer than any American in a generation, and it’s a matter of ever-increasing concern to us, and it’s something we raise with the North Koreans frequently through the New York channel, and I really regret that they chose not to go forward with their invitation to Ambassador King to come to Pyongyang. I hope they renew that invitation, because Bob King, who is intrepid, is ready to go out in moment’s notice to try to resolve it.” (Ambassador Glyn Davies, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, Press Briefing, Beijing, November 21, 2013)

Secretary of State John Kerry said North Korea keeps making “very disturbing choices,” apparently referring to its detention of another American citizen. “This is obviously one of those moments when North Korea needs to figure out where it’s heading and recognize that the United States of America is not engaging in belligerent and threatening behavior,” he said, emerging from a Senate hearing, according to MSNBC television.

“These are all very, very disturbing choices by the North Koreans,” he added. Former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, meanwhile, is in touch with his North Korean contacts over the reported detention of Newman. “Governor Richardson is involved in that he is in touch with his North Korean contacts,” his spokeswoman Caitlin Kelleher said. (Yonhap, “Kerry Says N. Korea Continues Making ‘Very Disturbing’ Choices,” Korea Herald, November 22, 2013)

Japan has made clear its intention to not exercise its right to so-called collective self-defense on the Korea Peninsula without consent from Seoul, the foreign ministry here said. “A ranking security official from the Japanese government has informed us of (Japan’s) position that Japanese military forces cannot be deployed to the Korean Peninsula by invoking the collective self-defense rule,” South Korea’s foreign ministry spokesman Cho Tai-young said in a briefing. Japan’s position is in accordance with international law in that military forces cannot be deployed to a foreign country without the consent of the host country, Cho said, quoting the Japanese official believed to be from the defense ministry. “Our government’s clear and consistent position in regard to Japan’s exercise of the collective self-defense right is that (it) cannot be tolerated when exercised without a request from our side in matters that affect our national

South Korea successfully fired off an Israeli precision-guided missile capable of striking North Korean coastal artillery on its Yellow Sea border islands last month, the Marine Corps said, the first test-firing since their deployment on northwestern islands in May. The satellite-guided Spike missiles, which have a range of about 20 kilometers and weigh 70 kilograms, have been forward deployed in Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong Islands to deter provocations by North Korea. They are designed to destroy North Korea’s underground facilities and strike moving targets. The missile deployment is part of Seoul’s efforts to bolster its capabilities near the border after the North fired off artillery at Yeonpyeong. “The missile accurately hit a sea-based target located 20 kilometers southwest of Baengnyeong Island,” the Marine Corps said. It is the first time that the missile hit a sea-based target, following its test firing in Israel in March. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Successfully Fires off Spike Missile,” November 22, 2013)

South Korea decided to buy 40 F-35 conventional take-off joint strike fighters in a bid to better respond to North Korea’s increasing nuclear and missile threats, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced. The competition was initially for 60 jets. Government officials say it’s possible the remaining order of 20 jets will not be F-35s. The JCS held a top decision-making committee presided over by JCS Chairman Adm. Choi Yoon-hee to modify the operational requirements for the F-X III fighter jet acquisition plan. The jet contest was nullified in September when the country’s arms procurement agency voted down a bid by Boeing to supply 60 F-15 Silent Eagle aircraft, citing the “4.5-generation” jet’s lack of radar-evading stealth capability. “The next-generation fighter is a key asset of the ‘kill chain’ system to respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat that has become a reality,” JCS spokesman Eom Hyo-shik said in a briefing. The kill chain refers to a proactive defense system being developed by the South Korea military. It is to be used in preemptively detecting and striking North Korean main targets by using various tools, such as strike fighters and missiles, should the North show signs of attacks. “We need fighter aircraft fitted with the state-of-the-art stealth technology and electronic warfare capability in order to secretly penetrate into the North’s airspace and strike key targets,” the spokesman said. “By securing those aircraft, we can deter North Korea’s provocation more effectively.” The number of jets to be bought fell to 40 from the initial F-X III plan of 60 in order to meet the budget requirements as well as help fill the projected fighter jet vacuum over the next decade. The aircraft are expected to be delivered to the South Korean Air Force from 2018 to 2021 if a contract is signed next year, officials said. Based on the renewed requirements, the military and the budget authorities are expected to redesign the budget size, said Oh Tae-shik, head of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration’s program management bureau. “We expect to firm up the total budget size for 40 F-35s after discussing with related government agencies,” he said. Brig. Gen. Shin Ik-hyun, of the JCS’ strategic planning bureau said, “The remaining 20 aircraft will be bought after reviewing the required operational capability in tandem with changing security situations and aviation tech development trends.” Asked to clarify if the remainder will also be F-35s, Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok
said other aircraft could be invited for the competition. “The remaining aircraft will be purchased by 2023,” the spokesman said. “If there are changes in the security environment, we could buy either more advanced jets or aircraft with lower radar cross section.” The statement leaves the door open for Boeing and Eurofighter to make fresh bids. (Jung Sung-ki, “S. Korea to Buy 40 F-35s; 20 More Jets Still Open,” Defense News, November 22, 2013)

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North Korea’s Kim Jong Un has rattled the United States with his nuclear threats and bemused the world with his penchant for funfairs, Disney and Dennis Rodman. Partly out of the public eye, however, the young leader has presided over a construction boom since he took office two years ago with the aid of funds from China, the North’s major backer, and Russia, a former Cold War ally. Based on satellite imagery, first-hand accounts and photographs obtained from people who travel regularly to North Korea, the building activity goes far beyond the ski resort, pleasure parks and apartment blocks reported by state media. A stronger focus on the economy is a major change in policy for the third Kim to rule North Korea. "He (Kim Jong Un) understands there is urgency on the economic front more so than with nuclear weapons," said Park Sang-kwon, the chief executive of Pyeonghwa Motors, an inter-Korean automobile joint venture that makes cars in North Korea and who spoke with Kim in July. North Korea not only has a highly opaque budget process pushed through a rubberstamp assembly, some projects appear to have no links to formal government expenditure, making it impossible to determine how Kim can pay for his building blueprint in an economy one fortieth the size of South Korea’s. But thanks to years of ‘military first’ policy, which prioritized investment in the armed forces, the young Kim can draw on a 1.2 million strong army to realize his goals. These "soldier-builders" are often seen constructing apartment blocks and laying roads. Although private property is sometimes tolerated by the government, much of the land belongs to the state, removing another major cost from projects. Chinese money paid for a $300 million suspension bridge across a one kilometre-wide stretch of the Yalu River, according to Chinese media reports, linking China’s port city of Dandong and its North Korean equivalent, Sinuiju. "A lot of projects in North Korea are Chinese funded, that’s certain," said Wang Yizhou, from the School of International Studies at Peking University. Russia in September reopened a 54-km (34-mile) railway track from its eastern border town of Khasan to the North’s port of Rajin. And satellite imagery shows work is under way on a 100-km (60-mile) highway along North Korea’s east coast linking Hamhung to a tourist zone planned for the port city of Wonsan. "The DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) appears to be increasing the quantity and quality of paved roads," said Curtis Melvin, a researcher at the U.S.-Korea Institute at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "It appears one goal is to link all the provincial capitals to Pyongyang by paved highway (and) increase road transport integration with the Chinese economy," said Melvin, who spotted foundations for the Wonsan-Hamhung road using satellite imagery. Improving roads will also underpin plans to turn North Korea into a tourist attraction - a move with potential economic gains in the short term that avoids restructuring ailing industrial plants that are starved of cash and electricity. One widely publicised public project is the Masik Ski Resort in the mountains to the west of Wonsan. North Korea aims to make $43.75 million in annual profit from the resort, documents prepared for potential
foreign investors and obtained by Reuters show. It expects up to 5,000 skiers to visit a
day when it opens next year. Kim Jong Un also made multiple trips to a new water park
that opened on October 15, which covers 110,000 square metres (27 acres) on the
bank of the Taedong River that runs through the capital Pyongyang. His frequent
appearances at fun parks and equestrian centres have been mocked in foreign media,
but they tie into the other development projects by targeting Chinese tourists, for
whom the North is a cheap destination. While many Chinese flock to Paris, London or
New York, some visit North Korea for a slice of nostalgia from the days before their
own country opened up to the outside world in the 1980s, according to regular
western visitors to Pyongyang. “Sports and leisure are being promoted as the next
major revolutionary industry,” said Kim Kyu-chol, who heads an alliance of businesses
mostly in the tourism industry in the South that has sought opportunities in the North.
While it is impossible to determine how the North is paying for many of its
infrastructure developments, beyond Chinese money and a recent debt restructuring
with Russia, it is clear there has been a major shift in its propaganda. While state news
agency KCNA still runs pictures of Kim Jong Un at military exercises, a new figure has
appeared alongside the "Dear Marshal" at opening ceremonies for construction
projects. Ma Won Chun, vice director of the secretive Finance and Accounting
Department in the ruling Workers' Party, has long managed the country’s cash,
according to experts in South Korea. In North Korean news reports and photos, Ma is
featured prominently next to Kim as he tours the work sites of apartment buildings,
new hospitals and stadiums. "It's likely Ma is the main money man, and he can give Kim
Jong Un an estimate of how much money something will cost off the top of his head," said Cho Min of the Korea Institute for National Unification, a state-run think tank in
Seoul. Ma’s regular appearances started after a party meeting in March when Kim Jong
Un set forth his “joint economic development and nuclear powe
r state” policy
directive. That followed an announcement by Kim in April 2012 that the time had come
to "enable our people... to live without tightening their belts any longer". Another
speech this year stressing the importance of economic development was followed by
the appointment of former premier Pak Pong Ju, a career technocrat, to a top cabinet
post. Still, the North faces a huge task to convince investors to come. Previous attempts
to set up special enterprise zones to woo Chinese and other foreign investors have
largely failed. Spats with Seoul and the shooting of a South Korean tourist prompted
South Korea in 2008 to pull out of the Mount Kumgang tourist park. Earlier this year,
the North shuttered a business park on the border with South Korea as tensions
between the two countries rose. It later reopened in September. Major Chinese
investor Xiyang Group staged a rare public attack on a country it described as a
"nightmare" to do business in after its assets were confiscated in 2012. Despite all the
negatives, Kim, the South Korean businessman, said his group would invest if there
were opportunities. He cited plans to lay a new highway and a modern rail link
between Kaesong, the North-South industrial park and the North Korean city of Sinuiju
on the Chinese border, funded by China in return for mining rights in the North. Such
plans could not be independently confirmed. “There are fairly clear indications that the
focus has shifted from the military to the party. And the new policy inevitably means
more openness, which has to be an expression of confidence by Kim Jong Un,” said Kim.
Meanwhile construction proceeds apace. Recent visitors to the North have seen
cranes and steel girders jutting out from freshly poured concrete on the site of a new
terminal building at the main airstrip that serves Pyongyang. For decades, ageing airport infrastructure had trouble keeping the luggage pickups moving, the visitors said. Beyond the capital, small villages and towns are also getting a facelift, much of it outside state media coverage. “In addition to the ongoing construction work in Pyongyang, new buildings are also appearing here and there in the countryside, though on a less monumental scale than the capital,” a diplomat who recently visited North Korea told Reuters. Kim himself has sharply increased public activities related to economics and sport in the first nine months of the year, relative to visits to military units, according to data compiled by the South’s Unification Ministry, which is in charge of inter-Korean relations. Some things, however, don’t change. North Korea’s KCNA news agency still hurls abuse at South Korean President Park Geun-hye on a daily basis. Satellite imagery also appears to show the North is pushing ahead with preparations for a fourth nuclear test and a new missile launch, indicating Kim may still need to bolster his legitimacy as a military leader. (Jack Kim and James Pearson, “Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s Master Builder,” Reuters, November 23, 2013)

China announced it had set up an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) that encompasses not only leio Island, which is administered by South Korea, but also the Diaoju Islands (called the Senkaku Islands in Japan). The Diaoju Islands are the subject of an ongoing territorial dispute with Japan. The South Korean government expressed its regret about the Chinese government’s decision 24 hours after the announcement. Japan and the US on the other hand responded with immediate criticism, referring to the move as one that threatens the stability of East Asia. The Chinese Defense Ministry announced that it had established an air defense identification zone to preserve its national sovereignty and the safety of its territory and to maintain order in its air space according to current international law. The ADIZ took effect at 10 am on November 23, the ministry said. Aircraft that are passing through this airspace must provide China with prior notification of their nationality and their flight plan, the ministry explained, and they must remain in periodic radio contact with the Chinese Defense Ministry. The ministry also said that it would take measures to monitor and control any aircraft that disregarded these instructions. The ADIZ that China announced covers the air space from south of the Korean peninsula to north of Taiwan, including leio Island and the Diaoju Islands, along with the oil field area in the East China Sea. This area overlaps a portion of Korea’s ADIZ and a large segment of Japan’s ADIZ. China also indicated its intention to expand its ADIZ into South Korea’s West (Yellow) Sea and the South China Sea, saying that it would set up an ADIZ in other areas as well at an appropriate time. An air defense identification zone is an area outside countries’ territorial airspace that they define in an attempt to protect their airspace. While the concept is not recognized under international law, countries often claim the right to take military measures within these zones. China’s move met a backlash from South Korea, Japan, and the US, the countries affected by the decision. “China’s arbitrary declaration of its air defense identification zone is regrettable,” said Kim Min-seok, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense. “We will deliberate with China to ensure that this does not harm our national interests.” The ADIZ announced by China encompasses parts of leio Island and Jeju Island and overlaps with a section of the Korean ADIZ that is 20km wide and 115km long. Consequently, China’s ADIZ includes not only the air space above leio Island but also the air space to
the north of the island. While the airspace over Ieo Island is not currently included in South Korea’s ADIZ, South Korea exercises effective administrative control over the air and waters around Ieo Island and has built a maritime science base there. Japan expressed strong opposition to the ADIZ announced by China, as it includes the airspace over the Senkaku Islands. Japanese TV station NHK quoted Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo as saying that he would protect Japanese land, air, and water and directed each government agency to respond thoroughly. “We are very concerned about this escalatory development which increases regional tensions and affects US interests and those of our allies. We have conveyed our strong concerns to China and are coordinating closely with allies and partners in the region,” said Caitlin Hayden, spokesperson for the White House’s National Security Council. (Seong Yeon-cheol, “China Claims Airspace Administered by South Korea and Japan,” Hankyore, November 25, 2013)

Agreement reached on Six Powers-Iran Plan of Action: “This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by-step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.”

The top U.S. general in Korea said that a plan to leave some American soldiers north of Seoul is under consideration. The main components of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) including the 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) are scheduled to be relocated to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, by 2016, under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) signed in 2002. However, some experts have said that the relocation may weaken deterrence against North Korea. “In terms of the residual in what we call Area I, there may be a need operationally to leave some residual in those areas just for proper defense and response,” Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), said in a press conference at its headquarters in Seoul. Area I includes Uijeongbu and Dongducheon, where 2ID is stationed. “Again those are under consideration and there has been no decision in that area, either. It is a sensitive issue and we will work all way through it and do what is best for Korea and the defense of Korea,” he said. In July’s interview with Korea Times, 2ID Commander Maj. Gen. Thomas Vandal said moving the U.S. bases further southward could compromise deterrence against North Korea. “So, would you assess that location and movement down to Camp Humphreys has a mission impact? Yes, our understanding is it would and so we conveyed to our headquarters those concerns,” Gen Vandal said at that time. “But I fully support any decision made by our higher headquarters regarding the relocation plan.” As part of leaving some troops there, Scaparrotti said that a Korean-U.S. combined division is seen as one possible option. “The combined division is in fact still under consideration,” said the commanding general, who took command of USFK in August. “There has been no decision, but we discussed it and I think it is a strong possibility and will be a strong additive to our alliance.” He added that he will talk about the issue with the Korean side. “It is something that I will look into and talk to
the ROK leadership about. It is a very preliminary view. I actually haven’t talked to Adm. Choi (Yoon-hee) about this at this point and we didn’t have this conversation and I will leave it at that,” he said. Choi is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Meanwhile, Scaparrotti said that the scheduled transfer of wartime operational control to Seoul should be conditions-driven. “With my experience here now, I am still firm in my focus as a military commander and on the ROK leadership that we focus on those capabilities that we need to build both through future transition, but importantly to be as ready as we can be every day,” he said. “The bilateral working group (formed at the Security Consultative Meeting in October) will make recommendations to our senior leaders, both the U.S. and the ROK, and they will make the decision.” (Kang Seung-woo, “USFK to Remain North of Seoul,” Korea Times, November 25, 2013)

A left-wing Catholic group is facing criticism over defiant remarks made by a senior priest who denounced President Park Geun-hye and made seemingly supportive comments about North Korea’s deadly shelling on a western South Korean island three years ago. The Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice, a South Korean religious group formed by leftist and liberal Catholic priests, held an “emergency Mass” on November 22 evening at a cathedral in Gunsan, North Jeolla, with some 300 people attending. At a Mass aimed at condemning President Park and former President Lee Myung-bak over the National Intelligence Service’s alleged online smear campaign during last fall’s presidential campaign, Park Chang-shin, a senior priest of the group, delivered the controversial sermon that touched on several political issues, including North Korea’s deadly shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on Nov. 23, 2010. “You know, the Northern Limit Line was temporarily drawn by the UN Command to prevent our military from invading North Korean territory,” Park said. “The line is not related to North Korea, and it was not mentioned in the armistice treaty. It is not a military demarcation line at all.” Refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the de facto maritime border, Park said it was not wrong for North Korea to attack the South Korean island. “What if Japan carries out a military exercise on Dokdo, which is our territory?” he said. “What should our president do in that case? We should shoot them.” “What if the Korea-U.S. joint military drills continue on an island near the controversial NLL?” he said. “What should North Korea do in that case? North Korea also should shoot them, and that was the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island.” When it came to the NIS’s alleged interference with the December 2012 presidential election, he concluded that the two presidents - Lee and Park - were ultimately at fault. “President Lee Myung-bak should take responsibility for it,” he said. “President Park Geun-hye is not a [legitimate] president. She should take her responsibility for it as well.” He also mentioned the sinking of the naval ship Cheonan in March 2010, which is generally agreed to be the result of a North Korean torpedo. But the priest said the result of the investigation was distorted by the Lee administration.

“Can you believe the allegation that a North Korean warship torpedoed our ship while there were three Aegis destroyers participating in the Korea-U.S. drills?” he said. “If that is true, we say, ‘Wow, North Korea has such cutting-edge technology!’ “President Lee Myung-bak set up this scandal blaming North Korea,” he said. “Do you know why? It’s because if he makes North Korea an enemy, he could punish people for being pro-North Korea.” After his speech, a group of priests of the association issued a joint declaration, demanding the arrest of former President Lee and the resignation of Park.
“If the government does not accept this demand, we will continue our Mass and prayer services and say that [Park] is not the president of the Republic of Korea anymore,” they said in the declaration. The Blue House expressed displeasure at the defiant speech. “I doubt which country is their homeland,” Lee Jung-hyun, the senior presidential secretary for public affairs, told reporters on Saturday. “It is not praying, but cursing,” another Blue House official told the JoongAng Ilbo. “Public opinion will judge him.” The ruling Saenuri Party said the Catholic group denied the legitimacy of the president. “We can’t believe that this is a comment by a priest of the Republic of Korea,” Min Hyun-jo, a spokeswoman of the Saenuri Party, said in a statement on Saturday. “It was an inappropriate comment ahead of the third anniversary of the Yeonpyeong shelling.”

Representative Yoon Sang-hyun, a senior member of the Saenuri Party, pointed out that some members of the Catholic group had an alliance with the opposition Democratic Party, participating in the DP’s campaign on the NIS scandal, along with other liberal politicians, including independent lawmaker Ahn Cheol-soo. “Now we understand why the alliance of the opposition parties, in which these people are participating, is under fire, because they are actually aiming at protesting the outcome of the presidential election,” Yoon said. The Ministry of National Defense also issued a statement yesterday, calling the comment “irrational” and that it “insulted the bereaved families” of the Cheonan case and the Yeonpyeong shelling. The DP kept its distance from the religious group, saying the comments were just the personal opinions of the priest. “We don’t have any reason to respond to it,” Park Yong-jin, a DP spokesman, said on Friday in a statement. “You can’t ask us to take responsibility for a thing done by a religious group. Although several priests from the group joined the alliance, this is a matter of personal opinion.” Upset by the priest’s comments, a man in his 60s called the police emergency hotline yesterday and said he had set up two 3-kilogram (6-pound) explosives in Myeong-dong Cathedral, central Seoul. All the people in the cathedral were evacuated for an hour until police found there was no bomb or weapon in the cathedral. The man was soon arrested in Asan, Gyeonggi, yesterday afternoon for the false report. Formed in 1974 by several young priests protesting the dictatorship of then-President Park Chung Hee, the Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice participated in the democratic movement of the 1970s and 1980s. More recently, the group has taken part in a series of anti-government demonstrations and rallies, including protests against the government’s decision to send troops to the Iraq War in 2003; a Mass calling for the abolishment of the National Security Law in 2004; a Mass against the government’s plan to relocate a U.S. military base to Pyeongtaek; nationwide rallies against allowing the import of U.S. beef for fear of mad cow disease in 2008; and a rally against a local court ruling that convicted the protesters involved in the deadly Yongsan fire in 2009. The group is also holding daily Masses to protest the Lee administration’s four-river restoration project, urging the Park government to stop the ongoing construction. (Kim Hee-jin, “Catholic Group Denounces Park,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 25, 2013)

Inter-Korean trade has gradually been returning to normal levels following the reopening of a joint industrial park in North Korea’s border city of Kaesong in September, government data showed. According to data from the Ministry of Unification and the Korea Customs Service, two-way trade between South and North
Korea amounted to US$152.15 million last month. The amount is equivalent to 80.9 percent of total bilateral trade in the same month last year. “Exports have grown with the entry of large amounts of raw materials, production facilities and food supplies as (the Kaesong complex) prepares to resume operations in earnest,” a ministry official said. (Yonhap, “Inter-Korean Trade Recovers Following Reopening of Kaesong Complex,” November 24, 2013)

In the courtly world of diplomacy, the meeting between Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and President Park Geun-hye of South Korea was something of a shock. Hagel was in the region to try to revitalize America’s faltering “pivot” to Asia and had one especially pressing request for Ms. Park: to try to get along better with Japan. The steely Ms. Park instead delivered a lecture about Japan’s “total absence of sincerity” over the suffering that imperial Japan caused Korea in the last century and finished with a request of her own: that Washington force Tokyo to behave. “If Germany had continued to say things that inflicted pain, while acting as if all was well, would European integration have been possible?” she asked Hagel. “I think the answer is no.” Ms. Park’s refusal to budge during that September meeting was one of many recent reminders that the leaders of Japan and South Korea, the United States’ closest military partners in Asia, seem to be barely on speaking terms. Analysts say the current tensions are among the worst in recent years, an increasingly vexing problem for the Obama administration as it struggles to present a united front in dealing with a rising China and a nuclear North Korea. This month, a rare meeting of Japan’s and South Korea’s top defense officials ended in an impasse, with harsh words and no progress on an intelligence-sharing deal the United States had been pushing for years. Ms. Park went so far as bringing China into the fracas, even as the Japanese and Chinese feuded over disputed islands. She asked China’s leader during a summit meeting to erect a monument to a Korean national hero who assassinated the first prime minister of Japan for his role in the Japanese colonization of Korea. The Chinese complied. It has also not been lost on the Japanese that Ms. Park held the summit meeting with China’s leader while she continued to refuse to do the same with Japan’s prime minister, breaking a longstanding tradition of Korean and Japanese leaders meeting soon after taking office. “History issues are having impacts on us and our alliances in Asia in ways that we never anticipated,” said Thomas Berger, an associate professor of international relations at Boston University. While history has long haunted relations between Japan and South Korea, the recent chill is being driven partly by the very pivot to Asia that increasingly makes the administration anxious that its allies get along. To bolster its attempts to contain China’s territorial ambitions, the United States has supported Japan’s moves to strengthen its armed forces despite South Korea’s fear that Japan is reverting to militarism. But beyond the policy irritants, the frustrations in the two countries seem very much rooted in the personal history of their new, and conservative, leaders. The Japanese prime minister, Abe Shinzo, is a rightist who has long sought to have his country’s World War II-era history portrayed in a more positive light. He is driven, analysts say, by a deep desire to exonerate his grandfather, an architect of Japanese empire-building in the 1930s who was eventually arrested as a war criminal by Japan’s American occupiers, before becoming prime minister. Ms. Park carries her own historical baggage. As the daughter of Park Chung-hee, a military ruler who served as an officer in the Imperial Japanese Army while Korea was still a colony,
she is under constant pressure to distance herself from her father’s ties to Japan. “Neither Park nor Abe can come together for personal reasons that run across generations,” said Haruna Mikio, a politics professor at Waseda University in Tokyo. “And this fact is driving Washington up a wall.” The lack of communication, analysts and American officials say, has practical ramifications, including a setback of American efforts to nudge the two countries’ militaries to work together. Such cooperation, which is very limited, would be crucial during any regional conflict. “The headwind created by these tensions over history raise the political cost of Japan-Korea cooperation that should be a given,” said Daniel R. Russel, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. For its part, South Korea wants to avoid any regional conflict and is reluctant to take sides in the rising tensions between China, its largest trading partner, and Japan, its third largest. Initially, American analysts say, much of the blame in Washington for the troubled Japan-South Korea relationship fell on Abe, viewed by some as a dangerous nationalist. But the analysts say that has been changing, especially since the Hagel meeting. Analysts say that there is no personal bad blood between Park and Abe, that any Korean leader would feel pressure to take a hard line with Abe, who has long denied that the Japanese military had a direct role in coercing so-called Korean comfort women to provide sex to soldiers during World War II – a particularly fraught issue for South Koreans. And relations began on difficult footing. According to South Korean officials, Park – who had called for stabilizing South Korea-Japan relations during her presidential campaign – became deeply upset when Aso Taro, the No. 2 man in the Abe cabinet, visited Seoul for her inauguration and, they said, told her that there was no big difference between the Yasukuni Shrine, where some convicted war criminals are honored, and Arlington National Cemetery. Abe has not visited the shrine since taking office but has sent offerings on special days, feeding South Korean suspicions that although he has toned down his rhetoric, his hawkish stances have not changed. But the legacy of the collaboration by Park’s father makes it even tougher for her to compromise, experts say. “For President Park, the negative legacy carries a huge domestic political risk,” said Park Cheol-hee, director of the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University. Korean leaders have made it clear that ties can be improved only if the Japanese prime minister admits to greater government responsibility for past offenses and agrees to pay compensation to the surviving “comfort women.” That may be the one thing Abe cannot do. This is also a highly emotional issue for the Japanese ultraconservatives who form his political base; the nationalists see it as a fabrication used to help paint their nation as the villain in World War II. (Their take is that Japan was fighting to liberate Asia from European and American imperialism.) Referring to the historical entanglements, Berger said, “These are chronic problems that only seem to be getting worse.” (Martin Fackler and Choe Sang-hun, “A Growing Chill between South Korea and Japan Create Problems for the U.S.,” New York Times, November 24, 2013, p. 8)
Ambassador Wu Dawei was just in Washington, some weeks ago, and we had the opportunity there to talk about it, and of course I followed up in Beijing on that same subject. And of course the discussions we had in Washington with separately the ROK and Japan, and then we had a trilateral session, and then again out here in the region—all are meant to define to our collective satisfaction what the threshold for talks should look like. So with your permission I do not plan at this stage to go into a great deal of detail about it. The North Koreans know full well the kinds of things that we are looking for and talking about. We’ve been at this diplomacy now for a generation, through bilateral talks, trilateral talks, quadrilateral talks and Six-Party Talks, and we’ll keep it up. … Q: There have been many rumors that the two countries, Iran and North Korea, have been cooperating on nuclear programs. How do you address these concerns? DAVIES: Well, proliferation is a concern. It’s a big concern, and it’s something that we work on every day and about which we have conversations with our partners. I’m not going to get into what we do or don’t know about the state of affairs between North Korea and Iran. That would dip into intelligence matters which I can’t comment on, but this issue of proliferation of the spread of nuclear technologies, in particular from North Korea, remains an area of key concern to us, and of vigorous action.” (Glyn Davies, Special Representative for North Korea Policy, Remarks to the Press at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, November 25, 2013)

Rodong Sinmun: "A world without nuclear weapons" touted by the U.S. is, in essence, the world which allows U.S. nuclear weapons only and it is a jargon let loose by it to realize its ambition for domination with its nukes. With no rhetoric can the U.S. cover up the hypocritical idea of building “a world without nuclear weapons.” A non-governmental organization of the U.S. disclosed this year that the U.S. administration is contemplating modernizing its nuclear arsenal by investing 60 billion U.S. dollars for 25 years to come. As a matter of fact, the U.S. is pressing forward the modernization of B-61 nuclear bombs. It was reported that bombs can be equipped with guided devices in the course of updating. The U.S. plans to spend 8.1 billion U.S. dollars for modernizing B-61 nuclear bombs till 2024. The U.S. conducted a series of sub-critical nuclear tests in September and December 2010, February 2011 and December 2012. It also conducted several tests for examining the capacity of nuclear weapons using plutonium this year, too. It is as clear as noonday why the U.S. is becoming so talkative about “a world without nuclear weapons.” The ulterior motive of Washington is to monopolize nukes or hold a decisive and unchallenged edge. The U.S. is seeking to pass the buck for the tense situation created by the nuclear confrontation under the hypocritical slogan of “a world without nuclear weapons.” By doing so, it seeks to deter various nuclear powers from bolstering up nuclear forces, disallow other countries to have access to nukes and thus dominate the world at any cost.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun Dismisses U.S. Talk about ‘World without Nuclear Weapons’ as Hypocritical,” November 25, 2013)

Facing the threat of North Korea and feeling squeezed by China and Japan on its flanks, South Korea has always dreamed of a “self-reliant” defense force. The catchphrase dates to the days of President Park Geun-hye’s father, the military strongman Park Chung-hee, who ruled the country from 1961 to 1979. But in the 21st century, the country faces a crucial hurdle on its road to that goal, as it contemplates its
most ambitious and risky defense acquisition project ever: developing an advanced jet fighter and producing 120 units for its air force in addition to many more for export, possibly to the Middle East, Latin America and Southeast Asian countries that want to bolster their air defense against China’s growing military power and territorial claims but cannot afford high-end American jets for cost and other reasons. The Korea Fighter Experimental program, or KFX, has been delayed several times in the last decade, and time is running out for a decision. “President Park must make up her mind,” said Cho Jin-soo, president of the Korean Society for Aeronautical and Space Sciences. “South Korea must choose between building its own skills by developing an indigenous model for the first time or settling for a more economic jet by copying the model of an American partner. It can’t have both at the first try.” South Korea was the world’s fourth-largest arms importer from 2008 to 2012, consuming 5 percent of imports in the global arms market, which was estimated to be at least $43 billion in 2011, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. With the KFX project, it hopes to leap into the ranks of major arms exporters. “The KFX may prove that smaller nations, when combining funds and resources, can produce a near fifth-generation aircraft that approaches the capability of a fighter produced by countries with far greater resources, such as the U.S., Russia and China. But this is unlikely,” Richard Weitz, director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, said in an email. “The KFX, if completed, may be appealing to less wealthy nations who cannot afford the F-35.” The KFX was born of an urgent need: The country’s Air Force is aging rapidly. It will start retiring 300 F-4s, F-5s and other jets—all designed more than 50 years ago—in a few years and must replace them fast. Under its separate FX-III program, the country announced on Friday that it would buy 40 fifth-generation fighters with “high-capability stealth” radar-evading features, hoping for the first deliveries in 2018. That left Lockheed Martin’s F-35 the only viable contender for the project, which is worth at least 8.3 trillion won, or $7.8 billion, military officials in South Korea said. In September, South Korea ruled that Boeing’s F-15 Silent Eagle, an upgraded version of F-15Ks South Korea already owns, was not sophisticated enough. The Eurofighter Typhoon had also vied for the project. The nation’s air force also began receiving 60 FA-50 fighters this year. They are basic, light attack jets based on the T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer that Korea Aerospace Industries, the country’s sole maker of military aircraft, developed with Lockheed. But South Korea must fill the rest of the fighter jet gap through its KFX program. It envisions a fleet of higher-technology fighters with partial stealth functions, something comparable to “an F-16 designed in the 21st century,” that will fly alongside the country’s F-16s and F-15Ks, plus top-of-the-line fighters purchased under the FX-III program. Just how it will do that is a question that has divided the government for more than 10 years. Budget planners and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, the country’s main defense research organization, cautioned against developing a brand-new airplane. Instead, it suggested a cheaper, faster and safer alternative: selecting as a partner a “technically advanced country” with a proven model, like the F-16, F-18 or Eurofighter Typhoon, and building a KFX version based on that. Boeing, Lockheed and the Eurofighter consortium have offered updates of those planes as a KFX platform as part of their bidding for the FX-III program. The Air Force and the Agency for Defense Development, the country’s main defense technology research center, meanwhile, said it was time to develop an indigenous model. South Korea will require whoever wins the
FX-III contract to transfer, as part of the deal, some of the technology to the KFX program. In January, the agency unveiled a twin-engine conceptual model for the KFX named C103. It estimated that 6 trillion won, or $5.6 billion, would be needed to develop such a plane and an additional 8 trillion won, or $7.5 billion, to build 120 units, while the government’s Korea Institute of Science and Technology Evaluation and Planning estimated that the development alone would cost 9.3 trillion won, or $8.8 billion. To disperse the financial risk and lower the unit cost, it invited Indonesia to join the program as a 20 percent partner last year. If South Korea goes ahead with the model, Indonesia will buy 50 planes. Korea Aerospace Industries proposed the KFX-Economy, a cheaper, single-engine option that draws upon technology developed for its FA-50 light fighter, while retaining certain stealth features from the C103. It remains unclear how indigenous the plane will be, given Lockheed’s involvement. “The challenges are finding a technology partner that will share enough of the high-end tech that South Korea will want – and that is a key part of the relationship between FX-III and KFX,” said James Hardy, Asia-Pacific editor at IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly. “South Korea is a very good example of a country that has done a good job of turning transfer of technology into viable defense products.” South Korea wants to accelerate its defense industry the same way it built its export industries in shipbuilding, car manufacturing and electronics: by first acquiring technological know-how from foreign exporters, then rejiggering or improving upon it. The T-50 and FA-50 are the most recent examples. The country is delivering 16 T-50s to Indonesia this year. The Philippines, one of the countries seeking to bolster itself in the face of any perceived threats from China, is close to a deal to buy 12 FA-50s. The global fighter jet industry abounds with failed national jet fighter programs, like Israel’s Lavi, Japan’s F-2 and Taiwan’s Ching Kuo. But Richard Aboulafia, vice president for analysis at the Teal Group, an aviation industry consulting firm, said the KFX could take aim at the global export market for midprice jets in which current models, like the F-16, were leaving production. “Everyone is designing expensive, top-end models for a relatively limited pool of customers,” he said. “The world fighter market needs a modern, F-16-class mid-market fighter.” If it lands the FX-III contract, Lockheed Martin “will provide over several hundred man-years of engineering expertise to assist Korea in the KFX design and development,” said Randy Howard, who is managing the F-35’s campaign for FX-III. Traditionally, South Korea has bought most of its military aircraft, and all of its fighter jets, from the United States, which keeps 28,500 troops in the country. But it has recently tried to diversify beyond American suppliers and encourage domestic production. “They are frustrated with the restrictions and terms typically associated with U.S. defense imports, especially limitations on the transfer and resale of U.S. technologies,” Weitz said in a paper presented at the Korea Economic Institute, based in Washington, this month. For many South Koreans, the KFX is an object of pride. “We have been too dependent on the United States,” Cho said. “The top priority in the KFX program should be gaining independence in fighter jet technology from the United States.” (Choe Sang-hun, “In South Korea, Delays Drag a Project to Build Homegrown Fighter Jets,” New York Times, November 25, 2013, p. B-2)

Mansourov: “When Kim Jong Un assumed power two years ago, foreign observers predicted North Korea would cut its losses short and disengage from Syria in the wake of the overthrow of friendly regimes in Algeria, Egypt and Libya. But this proved to be
wishful thinking. On the contrary, Kim Jong Un got off the fence and has joined the Assad government to actively fight against the anti-government rebels in Syria, many of whom are affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Indeed, the DPRK says it is its duty to help a legitimate sovereign government in the fight against international terrorism in Syria. Careful reading of the DPRK Foreign Ministry’s latest tepid and contorted denial of the persistent rumors that Pyongyang supplies weapons to Syria or flies pilots in anti-rebel air raids suggests that North Korean arms and military advisors may indeed be engaged on the battlefields of the Syrian civil war but not necessarily in the exact manner alleged by the rebels and Western media. Pyongyang is known for its penchant to split hairs: it knows the facts, and even if the rumors come close to the reality, but do not exactly match it, Pyongyang will hit back hard. The fact that it hasn’t suggests that indeed there is fire where there is smoke. In 2013, North Korea’s young leader stepped up military support for his country’s long-time strategic partner, the Assad regime, in the nationwide civil war against the radical Sunni rebels backed by the Western liberal democracies in alliance with conservative Gulf monarchies. Why is North Korea fighting for Assad? The well-entrenched Kim family came to the rescue of the faltering Assad family, exporting its trademark anti-American “revolutionary spirit of the offensive,” for four reasons. First, birds of a feather flock together. Both countries are former Soviet client states that lost their patron after the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s. The collapse resulted in the loss of the strategic support that the Soviets had provided them, forcing Pyongyang and Damascus to abandon the dream of “strategic parity” with Seoul and Tel Aviv, respectively, and to adopt a new formula of “strategic deterrence,” vis-a-vis the ROK and Israel, as well as their allies and like-minded countries. In that context, both face an acute security dilemma in their respective neighborhood since they are also divided countries fighting to force out foreign troops that occupy what they believe are their homelands, namely the U.S. forces in the southern half of the Korean peninsula and Israeli troops in the Golan Heights. Finally, both have also been branded as “rogue states” and are isolated in the international community. The United States considers them as “states sponsoring international terrorism” and engaged in “nuclear proliferation” and, therefore, has imposed broad-ranging political and economic sanctions on both countries. In that context, Pyongyang and Damascus have similar worldviews as part of the anti-US, anti-imperialist united front. Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) Chairman Choe Tae Bok once said: “The unity of our two peoples fighting in the same trench against the common enemy is everlasting, though Syria and Korea are geographically far away from each other. Our bilateral relations of friendship and cooperation will grow stronger and stronger.” When the DPRK’s nominal head of state Kim Yong Nam met with the Syrian Prime Minister Wael Nader Al Halqi in Tehran in August 2013, the latter said that “Syria regards the DPRK as a military power with tremendous military force and a country of comrades-in-arms struggling against the common enemy.” This close political relationship is reflected in a number of ways. Neither country has been willing to normalize relations with the other’s enemies. The DPRK rejected Israeli overtures in the early 1990s seeking to establish diplomatic relations, despite Israeli promises to pay considerable compensation (up to USD 500 million) if Pyongyang were to abandon Syria and terminate its missile sales to the Middle East. [?] Similarly, Syria rejected past ROK attempts to normalize relations, unlike the former Soviet Union and China, despite its growing trade and investment links with Seoul. Pyongyang and
Damascus also support each other in the United Nations and other international organizations. For example, upon cues from Damascus, Pyongyang denounces US proposals for the Middle East peace process, Lebanon situation, Palestinian problem, and Arab-Israeli settlement. In turn, Syria supports the DPRK’s positions in various talks on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and inter-Korea reconciliation. State-to-state and party-to-party ties are well developed and based on extensive institutional links and personal affinities. Since the beginning of this year alone, Kim Jong Un has exchanged personal letters with Bashar Al-Assad on ten different occasions—more than with any other foreign leader, including Chinese. Many senior DPRK leaders have either visited Syria over the past two decades or worked closely with its government. For instance, Kim Yong Nam traveled to Syria as President of the SPA Presidium in July 2002 and June 2000, and as Foreign Minister in July 1992. Former KPA Chief of General Staff hardline general Kim Kyok Sik served as North Korea’s military liaison to Syria in the tumultuous 1970s, coordinating the North’s military assistance to the Assad regime during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and post-war rehabilitation of Syrian armed forces in the mid-1970s. He also managed North Korean military sales and military construction projects there for almost a decade. As a result, many North Korean leaders have some personal knowledge of Syria and its leaders, as well as a good understanding of Pyongyang’s stakes in its relationship with Damascus. Second, in addition to being birds of a feather, geopolitical considerations also push Pyongyang to assist Damascus. As a strategic partner of both Syria and Iran, North Korea may have been contracted by Iran to defend their mutual ally in Damascus. It is also plausible that there may be some DPRK-Syria-Russia connections in the area of military-technical cooperation, probably, in the development of Syrian air defense capabilities. Pyongyang takes full advantage of all-out Russian and Iranian support for Damascus “to defend the frontline of the joint anti-American and anti-imperialist struggle” on the Syrian battlefield without fear of being depicted as a pariah or having to pay diplomatic or political price for its actions. Third, North Korea's intervention in Syria's civil war is aimed at stopping the “hostile forces” and “colored revolutions” they export at the far-flung gates to ensure they will never reach North Korea's shores. Kim Jong Un allegedly discussed how his government might be able to help the Assad regime fight back against the rebels with a visiting Syrian government delegation on July 24, 2013, when he was accompanied by party secretaries Kim Ki Nam (ideology) and Kim Yang Gon (South Korea), and first vice-foreign minister Kim Gye Gwan, the regime's heavyweights known for their concern about the possible impact of the Arab Spring on the North. The North’s official mouthpiece, Rodong Sinmun, often discusses “the reactionary ideology and culture of imperialists that can be as effective as military capability in realizing their hegemonic ambition,” stressing that “the youth is the main target of the imperialists’ offensive” because “young people played a large role in bringing about “Egyptian-style change,” “Libyan-style victory,” and “Syrian calamity.” Pyongyang may also seek to divert Washington's attention and resources away from the Korean peninsula by waging a proxy war against the United States and its allies in Syria. The North Korean leadership is not ignorant or naive. It does understand that if the US gets sucked into another war in the Middle East during “sequestration,” not only will it undermine the short-to-mid-term credibility of its defense commitment to South Korea, but it will also buy time for Pyongyang to further build up its own nuclear arsenal and advance its war preparations against the South. Fourth, while not a military
alliance based on legally binding mutual defense obligations, North Korea and Syria have a long history of extensive bilateral military-to-military ties based on their close political relationship. These ties include: (1) Fraternal assistance in several Middle Eastern wars: Since Israel joined the UN coalition troops fighting in the Korean War, the DPRK government has never considered it inappropriate or unwise to send troops to aid the Syrian government in the Arab-Israeli wars in the Middle East. For instance, the DPRK sent 25 pilots to Syria to defend the air space over Damascus during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.[12] In 1970, the DPRK dispatched 200 tank crewmen, 53 pilots, and 140 missile technicians to Syria. During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the DPRK dispatched 30 pilots to Egypt and Syria, who provided training for Syrian pilots to fight against Israel.[13] Moreover, the North Korean Air Force pilots themselves flew the Soviet-made Egyptian and Syrian airplanes during some key air battles. In 1975 and 1976, Pyongyang sent 75 Air Force instructors and 40 MIG pilots to Damascus, respectively. In 1982, during the Lebanese civil war, the DPRK government dispatched SOF (special operations forces) servicemen to Syria to provide training for guerrilla operations, some killed by the Israeli military. In 1984-1986 and 1990, 50 and 30 North Korean military instructors were sent to Syria, respectively. (2) Military Education and Training: In the mid-1980s, Kim Jong Il approved the request of the Syrian government for its military officers' to be educated and trained at DPRK military educational institutions at the expense of North Korea. Since then, the North Korean military has been training Syrian military officers at the Kim Il Sung Military University (an analogue of US National Defense University). Officers at the colonel rank usually participate in the one-year high-level officers’ course. Syrian officers at the captain rank are also admitted to the four-year course. They are taught military strategy, operational art, and military tactics, including guerrilla operations. Kim Jong Il is said to have followed with interest the successful careers of the Syrian general officers who graduated from the university. (3) Foreign military sales: Beginning in the late 1970s through the 1980s, the DPRK supplied Syria with various conventional weapons such as rifles, guns, mortars, ammunition, bombs, armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, radars, and even military uniforms. In particular, in 1978, the DPRK sold 300 recoilless guns to Syria. In 1982, when the civil war broke out in Syria, the Syrian military killed 20,000 civilians by firing “BM-11, 122mm MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System),” the weapon system imported from the DPRK. The Israel military snatched the notorious “BM-11” from Syria during the Lebanon war in 1982, killing 25 KPA soldiers who serviced it. In 1992, Pyongyang shipped 20 tons of bombs to Damascus. (4) Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems: There is evidence to suggest that North Korea provided technical assistance to Syria in acquiring key nuclear-related technologies in China and Europe as well as in constructing a covert nuclear reactor at Al Kibar that was bombed by the Israeli Air Force in 2007. On ballistic missiles, cooperation began in the late 1980s, with the North selling Scud-C transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and cluster warheads to Syria, helping to construct two missile assembly plants in Hama and an electronic missile launch control facility near Aleppo and providing special training for Syrian missile technicians in North Korea. Aside from strengthening the self-defense potential of one of its anti-imperialist, anti-US allies, the North has earned good money doing it. On chemical weapons, there is only limited evidence of cooperation, including the interception of DPRK ships heading for Syria carrying cargos that might be useful in defending against chemical attacks. There has
also been speculation that the explosion on July 20, 2007, at a facility near the city of Halab was the result of an attempt by North Korean scientists working with Syrian officials to load a chemical warhead onto one of the North Korean missiles, likely the No-dong 1 model. On biological weapons, there is information about bilateral cooperation between the Ministries of Public Health, pharmaceutical companies, and university biotech research labs but little on weapons cooperation. Still, some observers have asserted that “Syria has a biological weapons research and development program, and it is seeking professional assistance from China and North Korea in this area.” The Syrian conflict provides the North Korean military with an opportunity to gain valuable “real world” experience. Reportedly, North Korean advisors provide technical assistance to Syria's defense industry, especially factories southeast of Aleppo, in addition to engineering and construction assistance in repairing and rehabilitating destroyed military infrastructure. The KPA is also involved in operational planning and supervision of artillery warfare as demonstrated by the battle for Qusair. The North Korean military advisors are probably involved in planning and execution of the air and air defense operations of the Syrian army as well as collecting battlefield intelligence on the combat use and performance of Western arms, especially those that can potentially be used in the Korean battlefield. Finally, the Syrian civil war offers the North Korean military planners the first-hand look at the combat tactics of anti-regime rebels trained and guided by the US and its allies. And for good measure, there is no doubt that North Korean military advisors are also tasked with erasing any traces of Pyongyang’s past assistance to Assad’s programs to build weapons of mass destruction just in case he does lose power. Given the history of DPRK-Syrian relations, despite what the North might say in public, it would be surprising if the North had not dispatched a small contingent of military advisors and instructors to aid the brotherly Assad regime in its fight against the anti-government rebels. Although that assistance is probably limited and does not have the potential to fundamentally change the course of the civil war, North Korean military expertise can affect the outcomes of local tactical battles, adding to the winning momentum of the Assad forces. Moreover, North Korea’s involvement in Syria may be an indicator that the Kim regime discounts the likelihood of any possible breakthrough in relations with either Washington or Seoul in the near future and views the risk that its national policy goals will be adversely affected by increasing support for the Assad regime as manageable. Pyongyang’s involvement in Syria characterizes Kim Jong Un more as a steady hand and traditional alliance manager than an erratic wanderer and opportunistic risk-taker. Although he is playing with fire in the shifting sands of far-flung lands like Syria, but he is simply staying the course set forth by his grandfather and upheld by his father, demonstrating continuity in North Korea’s foreign policy. Moreover, potential material and reputational rewards far outweigh possible security or diplomatic risks, especially if Kim’s bet on Assad’s eventual victory proves to be correct. The DPRK’s decision to cast its lot with Damascus may upset wealthy Gulf monarchies—like Kuwait and Qatar—sponsoring the anti-Assad rebel groups and cause them to rethink their employment of North Korean labor and services in construction and irrigation system development projects and their provision of low-interest funds for some of Pyongyang’s infrastructure projects. On the other hand, it may help Pyongyang earn much greater financial or in-kind compensation from other states concerned, including Iran, Russia, and others, and develop new diplomatic clout in the
Middle East if Assad eventually wins. Pyongyang’s support for Syria may provoke Jihadist elements to strike back, but it is more likely that the KPA will gain valuable combat experience against the new age enemy—irregular anti-government militia fighting in a suburban setting. Finally, North Korea’s support for Syria may provide new fodder for others to further demonize Pyongyang but it also offers the North a chance to stand by a long-time ally in need, to show its resolve to fight for state sovereignty and territorial integrity on the world stage, and to prove with deeds it is fighting against Al Qaeda and international terrorism, even when it might be more expedient to do otherwise.” (Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korea: Entering Syria’s Civil War,” 38North, November 25, 2013)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “What the special representative [for North Korea policy] said and did while touring countries around the DPRK proved that the U.S. remains unchanged in its attitude set to check the resumption of the six-party talks while persisting in absurd preconditions. This clearly proved once again that the U.S. has had no interest in the resumption of the six-party talks from the beginning. The six-party talks aim at removing the root cause of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and denuclearizing the whole of the peninsula in the spirit of respect for sovereignty and equality. But the U.S. has not fulfilled the commitments it made at the six-party talks in the past and now rejects the talks by raising the brigandish demand for the DPRK’s unilateral concession first. It is also resorting to a trick to shift the blame for the stalled six-party talks on to the DPRK in a bid to evade increasing denunciation and pressure from the public inside and outside. But with no sleight of hand can it evade its responsibilities for the nuclear issue on the peninsula. It also has to withdraw its hostile policy toward the DPRK and create an atmosphere for denuclearization of the peninsula. We want a negotiated settlement of the issue but will never accede to unreasonable preconditions raised by the U.S. The U.S. improper behavior of deliberately creating obstacles in the way of resuming the talks under absurd preconditions will always be blamed and the U.S. will have to own full responsibilities for ensuing consequences. The DPRK remains unchanged in its goal for the denuclearization of the whole of the Korean Peninsula but it will be compelled to steadily bolster deterrence as long as the U.S. becomes all the more undisguised in pursuing hostile moves and increasing nuclear threats.” (KCNA, “U.S. Slammed for Blocking Resumption of Six-Party Talks with Unreasonable Preconditions: Spokesman,” November 26, 2013)

Defying China, two long-range American bombers flew through contested airspace over the East China Sea, days after the Chinese announced they were claiming the right to police the sky above a vast area that includes islands at the center of a simmering dispute with Japan. Pentagon officials said that the B-52s were on a routine training mission planned long in advance of the Chinese announcement on Saturday that it was establishing an “air defense identification zone” over the area. But the message was clear. A senior Pentagon official said that the mission overnight yesterday from Guam “was a demonstration of long-established international rights to freedom of navigation and transit through international airspace.” The official said the unilateral Chinese declaration of expanded control “was provocative,” and “only increases the risk of miscalculation in the region.” There was no immediate Chinese response to the
flights conducted without prior notification as demanded under the new declaration from Beijing, which asserted the right to identify, monitor and possibly take military action against any aircraft that enter the area. The unexpected announcement by China was among its boldest moves yet in a struggle for power in Asia with the United States, and by extension its regional allies including Japan. The United States, long the dominant power in the region, has been scrambling to shore up its influence there, promising, in what it called a “pivot” to Asia in 2011, to refocus its energies after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan diverted its time and resources. Under its conservative leader, Shinzo Abe, Japan has refused to back down in the dispute with China over the uninhabited islands, which Japan has long controlled. For the White House, the flare-up could prove a major distraction for Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. as he embarks on a weeklong tour of China, Japan and South Korea. Administration officials are eager to focus on issues like North Korea and an American-led trans-Pacific trade deal meant to bolster economic ties in the region even as China woos its neighbors with aid and investment. But both China and America’s Asian allies know that Washington’s focus has been elsewhere, a reality that became evident when President Obama had to cancel a trip to an Asian summit meeting during the recent American government shutdown. Pressed on whether the Chinese move represents an overt attempt to fill an American security void in the region, Pentagon officials responded by pointing to the American response to the catastrophic typhoon that struck the Philippines this month. The United States quickly moved in hundreds of Marines, dozens of transport aircraft and an entire aircraft carrier strike group. China’s offer of military assistance was feeble by comparison. However, Obama is fielding a new national security team with views on Asia that are still coalescing and with relatively little experience in the region. In her first major speech on Asia policy last week, Obama’s national security adviser, Susan E. Rice, did not mention the mutual defense clause in the treaty between the United States and Japan – an omission her colleagues dismissed as irrelevant, since American officials reiterate it religiously, but which troubled some in Japan. But Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel wasted no time in responding to the initial Chinese declaration, issuing a statement on November 23 reiterating that the United States was “steadfast in our commitments to our allies and partners.” He also repeated that the mutual defense treaty with Japan applies to the disputed islands. American officials said that the United States military would continue to stage a standard cycle of training flights over the East China Sea. The flight by the bombers was first reported by The Wall Street Journal. The move by China appeared to be another step in its efforts to intensify pressure on Japan over the contested islands. In the past year, Chinese paramilitary ships have made almost daily incursions into the waters around the islands, including waters claimed by Japan. The incursions have led to a constant game of cat-and-mouse on the high seas in which the Japanese Coast Guard pursues the Chinese ships, with both sides using bullhorns and electronic sign boards to tell the other to stay out of its territorial waters. The Chinese began to take the stronger actions last year after Japan purchased some of the islands from a Japanese citizen. Japan’s leaders said they did so to keep the islands away from a Japanese ultranationalist who might worsen relations over them with China, but the Chinese saw the purchase as a way for Japan to strengthen its control. Chinese officials say the islands are rightly theirs because they say Japan grabbed the islands during the start of its imperial expansion in the late 1800s; the Japanese say they peacefully
annexed the islands, which they say were empty and unclaimed. In its announcement of the new air defense zone, the Chinese Defense Ministry said the country would require flight plans, as well as radio and logo identification, of all aircraft operating in the zone. The state-run news agency, Xinhua, said if an aircraft did not supply its flight plan, “China’s armed forces will adopt emergency defensive measures.” After the announcement, several Japanese commercial airlines, including Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways, began filing flight plans to China, according to the Japanese government. Today, the government asked the airlines to stop doing so, and officials said the airlines had agreed to heed their request. “I believe it is important for the public and private sectors to cooperate in showing our firm resolve to China,” said Japan’s foreign minister, Kishida Fumio. A Japanese government official who spoke on the condition of anonymity following standard practice there said Japan welcomed the United States’ action. Just how China would enforce its new rules may not be clear for a while, experts said. But the severe language that accompanied the announcement, and the fact that the new Chinese air defense zone overlaps with Japan’s air defense zone dating from 1969 were alarming, they said. In describing China’s operation of the new zone, a senior colonel at the National Defense University, Meng Xiangqin, told China’s main television broadcaster, CCTV, that once foreign aircraft enter the area, ground missile forces, including antiaircraft missiles, should be on a state of alert.


Iranian collaboration with North Korea on a new rocket booster for long-range missiles undermines the deal with Tehran on its nuclear program, key Senate and House Republicans said. “While the president was undertaking his secret negotiations—which Congress wasn’t informed of—he had to know Iran and North Korea were testing new engines for ballistic missiles to target the United States,” said Rep. Mike Rogers (R., Ala.) chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces. Rogers said in a statement that despite sharp budget cuts, U.S. space monitoring systems would not miss the development of the new booster engine. “Every day the president’s deal looks worse and worse,” Rogers said when asked about the Tehran-Pyongyang missile collaboration. The chairman, whose subcommittee is in charge of overseeing U.S. strategic weapons, ballistic missile defenses, and space programs, made the comments in response to a report Tuesday revealing that Iran is covertly working with North Korea on a new 80-ton rocket booster that can be used in both nations’ long-range missile programs. In the Senate, Sen. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) also criticized the Iran nuclear deal for not addressing the threat of Iran’s ICBM program. Reports of Iran-North Korea ICBM collaboration follow new anti-America and anti-Israel outbursts from the Islamist regime in Tehran, Cruz said. “The Iranian regime is clearly demonstrating through word and deed that they have no intention of moderating the behavior that earned them one of the harshest international programs of economic sanctions on record,” Cruz told the Washington Free Beacon. “Relaxing the sanctions now only encourages them to continue their pursuit of nuclear weapons—and the means to deliver them to Israel, Europe and even the United States. I hope President Obama and Secretary [of State John] Kerry will reconsider this dangerous policy and add the immediate cessation of their ICBM program to the list of prerequisites placed on Iran before any additional negotiations take place.” Claude Chafin, a spokesman for House
Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, also voiced concern over reports of Iran-North Korea missile cooperation. “Without a comprehensive deal to limit the Iranian ballistic missile program, and eliminate their ability to enrich uranium, the pieces are falling into place for both the Iranians and the North Koreans to threaten the United States with nuclear-tipped ICBMs,” Chafin said in an email.

Chafin said the cooperation increases the threat to the United States because both Pyongyang and Tehran share missile technology. “It is reasonable to assume that North Korean missile capabilities are peer to Iranian missile capabilities,” he said. Intelligence reports indicated that as recently as late October Iranian technicians from the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), a defense organization that builds liquid-fueled missiles, were in Pyongyang collaborating on the booster development. SHIG has been sanctioned in the past by both the U.S. government and the United Nations for illicit missile transfers. U.S. officials said the new booster could be used on both a space launcher and a long-range missile. Iran and North Korea are believed by U.S. intelligence agencies to be using their space programs to mask long-range missile development. Officials said the covert missile cooperation indicates the Iranians are continuing to build long-range strategic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear warheads at the same time they are negotiating limits on illicit uranium enrichment. Intelligence assessments have said that both countries could test a missile capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear warhead within the next two years. Henry Sokolski, head of the private Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said he agrees with U.S. special envoy on North Korea Glyn Davies that more pressure should be applied on North Korea to give up its nuclear arms. “As Glyn Davies put it, if the North Koreans don’t demonstrate that they understand they must fulfill their obligations, then more sanctions pressure will be brought to bear on them,” he said. “He was speaking of the North Koreans but what’s good for the goose should also be good for the gander—in this case, Iran,” Sokolski said. (Bill Gertz, “Iran-North Korea Recent Missile Cooperation Undermines Geneva Deal,” Washington Free Beacon, November 27, 2013)

The North Korean mobile telecommunications market has seen dramatic subscriber growth over the past five years contrary to initial speculations that mobile service would be limited to the elite. The 3G service, Koryolink, was launched in December 2008 by CHEO Technology JV Company, a joint venture between the Egyptian telecommunications firm Orascom (75 percent) and the North Korean Korea Post and Telecommunications Corporation (25 percent). In just over three years, Koryolink reached one million subscribers by February 2012, and then doubled that rate in 15 months, reaching two million subscribers in May 2013. As of the end of the third quarter of 2011, Koryolink’s network consisted of 453 base stations covering the capital, Pyongyang, as well as 14 main cities and 86 smaller cities. An extremely restrictive regime was adopted when Koryolink launched 3G service in late 2008. In the beginning, according to a former Korean Workers’ Party official from Pyongyang, the service was available only to senior officials at security agencies and their families, and officially recognized traders involved in the business of earning hard currency, while Party cadres and workers at military factories were excluded from this service for security reasons. Even in the first one or two years after the launch, only powerful people or those who were rich enough to bribe distributors could acquire handsets.
due to limited supply. As the government adopted a more permissive regime, ownership of cell phones is now determined by one’s financial capacity unless the applicant has serious security clearance problems. Of course, senior Party, government, and military officials and wealthy traders were the initial customer groups. These officials are able to accumulate wealth by accepting bribes or engaging in business through their public offices. It is no wonder that “Pyongyang’s ‘golden couples’ consist of a government-official husband and an entrepreneur wife.” However, the rise of informal markets has contributed to the development of a proto-middle class or the new rich who can now also afford cell phones.[4][6] For the new rich, cell phones are not only a symbol of wealth but also a means of survival. They provide traders with greater mobility and efficient ways to exchange market information, including information on prices and exchange rates. The wholesale and retail traders at the informal markets are now able to collect market information at an unprecedented speed and respond to changing market conditions promptly. Buyers and sellers often complete their bargaining over the phone even before the goods are taken to market. Cell phones have become popular not only in major cities but also in some towns and villages where residents are actively involved in trade with partners in the bigger cities. For example, residents of rural areas where gold mining or farm produce trade are booming can no longer imagine conducting businesses without cell phones. Another popular financial source for obtaining cell phones is the remittances from defectors (mostly from those settled in South Korea) to their families left in North Korea. The annual amount of remittances is estimated at around US$ 10 million. Incoming funds from South Korea have become so significant that they have been dubbed the “Mount Halla Stream,” named after the tallest mountain in South Korea. Prestige is another important driver for the popularity of cell phones among North Koreans. A man from Chongjin who defected in December 2012 said that cell phones had become so popular that a young man without a cell phone was not treated well and could not even find a girlfriend. “Considering the high prices of handsets, it is obvious that only those who ‘regularly eat meat’ can afford to buy one,” he said. Even those without significant income are selling their assets or hard-earned crops to buy the handsets for themselves to show off their ‘wealth’ or for their demanding children who also want to bond with their cell-phone-using friends. As in other countries, cell phones have become status symbols, signs of prosperity, and one of the most noticeable examples of conspicuous consumption in North Korea. Initially, potential buyers of cell phones must get approval from the State Security Department or the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of People’s Security by explaining the purpose and financial source of their purchase. After that, applicants must wait for up to one month until the application is processed. However, for those who want to own a cell phone without having to go through this lengthy, bothersome application process, they can register with fake names for extra fees. Intermediaries loitering around the Communications Technology Management Office or its branches can shorten the processing period down to one or two days. They register tens of phones in bogus names before selling them at higher prices than what the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications offers. Although illegal, the practice has become increasingly common as the demand for cell phones has risen quickly. The authorities have responded to these widespread illegal phones by removing the long-winded, restrictive regulations, at least in the border cities with China. According to defectors who continue to contact their relatives in
Chongjin and Hyesan, since early 2012, applicants can now obtain both cell phones and phone numbers on the same day they register with the Communications Technology Management Office. Another defector who maintains contacts with his sources in North Korea also reported the same deregulations in Sinuiju, Hyesan, Chongjin, and even Pyongyang. Pre-approvals from the security agencies are no longer required. These days, the office passes on all the information after the sale to the security agencies for the security check. Although there are a growing number of testimonies by defectors and foreign visitors about the boom in cell phone use in North Korea, the two million subscribers that Koryolink has allegedly reached is still controversial among experts. Some argue that two million is not a realistic number considering North Korea’s demographics—a population of 24 million people. There are at least one million soldiers who are not allowed to use cell phones for security reasons and three million children under 10 years old who may not be old enough to legitimately use cell phones. If this two-million figure is correct, Orascom is essentially reporting that one out of ten North Koreans are using cell phones. Skeptical experts point out that this simply does not make sense for a country where per capita GDP is as low as US$ 1,800. Some North Korea economy experts agree with the skeptics, attributing the potentially overstated users to Koryolink’s complicated rate plans. Experts who have sources in North Korea argue that a growing number of heavy users, such as traders, have started to use more than one phone to save money. Subscribers get 200 ‘free’ minutes per month for a basic quarterly service charge of around 3,000 won (less than 40 cents at black market exchange rates). After using up those minutes, they have to purchase ‘top-up cards’ in foreign currency that cost as high as 10 to 20 times more than the basic charge. Some people have determined that using more than one phone, thereby getting additional blocks of 200 minutes free, is more economical than using only one phone and paying for a multiple top-up cards. Of course, this requires extra handsets but the extra upfront expenditures can be recovered as this practice continues. There may also be a significant number of cell phones distributed by the Party, government and military organs for official use. Heung Kwang Kim, Executive Director of North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity and a former professor at Hamheung Computer Technology University in North Korea, argued that up to one quarter of registered cell phones were for official use for the Central Party, state administrative agencies, state agencies with special missions, the police, the military, courts and so forth. He said the call time was very limited for these phones. A defector who worked for a trading company in Musan until early 2011 said some trading companies, including Green Pine Association Corporation or Chongsong Yonhap which is on the UN blacklist, purchased cell phones with their own official funds and provided them to their employees on business trips to Pyongyang and Chongjin. A former Central Party official from Pyongyang said senior Party officials were provided with cell phones for official use. These testimonies suggest that a certain number of Koryolink customers would use multiple cell phones for private and official uses. North Korea experts note that high-ranking officials rarely use their cell phones for fear of being eavesdropped on by foreign intelligence agencies. One North Korea IT specialist said that there were many inactive cell phone numbers presumably allocated to the power elite in North Korea. For example, only 800,000 numbers showed active traffic in February 2012 when the Koryolink subscribers rose to one million. This specialist suspected that part of the 200,000 inactive numbers was reserved for fast-
track communication lines going directly to the leadership. (Kim Yonho, “A Closer Look at the ‘Explosion of Cell Phone Subscribers’ in North Korea,” 38North, November 26, 2013)

**Verification of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program and the state of its missile development were key preconditions** Seoul and Washington called for in last month’s talks aimed at restarting six-party negotiations, a diplomatic source said. The source said while South Korea and the United States had set other preconditions on which they were willing to be flexible, they remained steadfast on the two critical issues. He said that the so-called compromise proposals made by China centered on what should be touched on once negotiations resumed and not necessarily on the preconditions. The official then said that because the North already agreed to the September 19 joint declaration of 2005 and the February 29, 2012 pact, Beijing too understood that the preconditions were reasonable and something the North should accept. (Yonhap, “Verification of Uranium Program Key Condition for 6-Party Talks,” November 27, 2013)

Senior lawmakers and officials of the ruling Saenuri Party called on the government to renegotiate the purchase of 40 Lockheed Martin F-35A stealth fighters from the United States, saying the deal would be unfair. “The government made the right decision in choosing the F-35A for its stealth capabilities, but compared to Japan, the conditions (for the purchase) are strikingly unfair,” Rep. Rhee In-je, a six-term lawmaker of the ruling party, said during a meeting of senior party lawmakers and Supreme Council members. He pointed out that unlike South Korea, which plans to buy all 40 jets as finished products, Japan plans to buy only four as finished products and assemble the remaining 38. “This isn’t an issue that can be glossed over. We must try to (buy the jets) on the condition of technology transfer, on the same terms as Japan, even if that means through further negotiations,” Rhee said. (Yonhap, “Ruling Party Lawmakers Demand Renegotiation of Jet Fighter Deal,” November 27, 2013)

"Activities have been observed at the site that are consistent with an effort to restart the 5MW(e) reactor," International Atomic Energy Agency chief, Amano Yukiya told the IAEA’s 35-nation board. “However, as the agency has no access to the site, it is not possible for us to conclusively determine whether the reactor has been restarted,” he said, according to a copy of his speech. (Reuters, “North Korea ‘Restarts’ Nuclear Reactor, Atomic Watchdog Warns,” The Guardian, November 28, 2013)

North Korea is offering incentives to farmers who are productive, while cutting food rations for those who under-perform, the World Food Program said. According to the 2013 North Korea food production report by WFP, many cooperative farms across the country are giving incentives to members in the form of extra rations. It said the move seems to be aimed at getting people to produce more and inject some spirit of competitiveness into the farming sector. The findings are based on interviews carried by the WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, which sent a fact-finding team to the communist country from late September through mid-October, that talked to people from 77 households from 51 cooperative farms. It said productive farmers have been known to take home 65 kilograms worth of extra rations
for a three month period from the cooperative he or she works for, depending on output. The WFP findings, on the other hand, showed some people have not received food rations from the state for up to four months. The food program, meanwhile, said that North Korea's rice production is expected to reach a little over 2.90 million tons this fall, up 8.2 percent compared to 2.68 million tons tallied in 2012. It said output per hectare of rice paddy reached 5.3 tons on average, up from 4.8 tons the year before. The WFP said of the total population, 16 percent are not suffering from food shortages, although conditions for the rest are not as good. It said from November of this year to October 2014, the communist country will need an extra 340,000 tons of food to sufficiently feed its people. (Yonhap, “North Korea Offering Incentives to Farmers: WFP,” November 29, 2013)

Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates that construction of new facilities at the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground in North Korea has resumed after a hiatus of nearly a year. Those facilities—a launch pad, missile assembly building and launch control center—appear to be designed to test future generations of larger, more capable rockets. In the short span of eight weeks—from September 16 until November 18—work resumed on the new launch control center, now nearly externally complete, and the assembly building, which is still in an early stage of construction. There was no construction at the new launch pad or on the road necessary to support these facilities. There had been previous speculation that the construction hiatus at Tonghae and the start of major new projects at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station this past summer may have meant Pyongyang was gradually abandoning the older site. However, the restart of work at the new Tonghae facilities indicates that North Korea is still committed to maintaining two launch sites for a larger space launch vehicle (SLV) reported to be under development. The one-year hiatus will, however, certainly delay completion of the new facilities. While it is difficult to predict given the up-until-now haphazard pace of construction, the new Tonghae facilities may not be completed until 2017. Imagery also shows no signs that North Korea is planning another long-range rocket launch in 2013. There is little to no activity at either the old Tonghae launch pad, which was used to test the Unha space launch vehicle in 2006 and 2009, or at other key installations critical for a launch. Moreover, recent imagery of the Sohae pad used to conduct Pyongyang’s recent Unha tests, indicates that construction is still ongoing, which would prevent launches in the near future. (38North, “Construction at Tonghae Resumes: No Tests Likely in 2013,” November 29, 2013)

KCNA: “A relevant institution of the DPRK recently put in custody U.S. citizen Merrill Edward Newman who committed hostile acts against the DPRK after entering the country under the guise of a tourist. After entering the DPRK as a member of tourists' group in October he perpetrated acts of infringing upon the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK and slandering its socialist system, quite contrary to the purpose of tour. He also committed such crime as trying to look for spies and terrorists who conducted espionage and subversive activities against the DPRK in the area of Mt. Kuwol during the last Fatherland Liberation War as well as their families and descendants and connect them with the “Kuwol Partisan Comrades-in-Arms Association,” an anti-DPRK plot-breeding organization of south Korea. According to the results of the investigation, he was active as adviser of "Kuwol Unit" of the UN Korea 6th Partisan
Regiment part of the Intelligence Bureau of the Command of the U.S. Forces in the Far East since early in 1953. He is a criminal as he masterminded espionage and subversive activities against the DPRK and in this course he was involved in killings of service personnel of the Korean People’s Army and innocent civilians. The investigation clearly proved Newman’s hostile acts against the DPRK and they were backed by evidence. He admitted all his crimes and made an apology for them.” (KCNA, “Report on Arrest of U.S. Citizen for Hostile Acts in DPRK,” November 30, 2013)

The following is an apology U.S. citizen Merrill Newman presented to a relevant institution after his detention in the DPRK: “I am Merrill Newman living in California, USA. During the Korean War, I have been guilty of a long list of indelible crimes against DPRK government and Korean people as advisor of the Kuwol Unit of the UN Korea 6th Partisan Regiment part of the Intelligence Bureau of the Far East Command. As I gave 300 people with barbarity gone to the South who had ill feelings toward the DPRK from Chodo military education and guerilla training they later did attack against the DPRK although the armistice was signed. I also gave 200 soldiers under my command in Mt. Kuwol the task to harass the rear base such as collecting information on the movement and the arm equipment in KPA, attacking and destruction on the communication system, the rice storage, railroad and munitions train by dispatching the several elements to Hwanghae Province Area. According to my order they collected information of the KPA and attacked the communication system and killed 3 innocent operators, delayed the munitions supply using explosives obtained from attacking the mine and they attacked the KPA and harassing operations of the rear base 10 times in the Hwanghae Province Area. They killed about 50 soldiers in the process of the operation. In the process of following tasks given by me I believe they would kill more innocent people. As I killed so many civilians and KPA soldiers and destroyed strategic objects in the DPRK during the Korean War, I committed indelible offensive acts against the DPRK government and Korean people. Although 60 years have gone by, I came to DPRK on the excuse of the tour as a member of 33 Tour Group from U.S. on October 17, 2013. Shamelessly I had a plan to meet any surviving soldiers and pray for the souls of the dead soldiers in Kuwol Mt. during the Korean war. Following the itinerary I asked my guide to help me look for the surviving soldiers and their families and descendents because it was too hard for me to do myself. If I had the opportunity to visit Kuwol Mt. I was going to pray for the souls of dead soldiers. If I saw surviving soldiers in Mt. Kuwol, I was going to connect them with the members of the Kuwol Partisan Comrades-in-Arms Association which I had already connected with, anti-Communist strategic plot organization. All the members of the Kuwol Partisan Comrades-in-Arms Association escaped from the DPRK to South Korea. So I asked the guide to help me to look for their families and relatives living in DPRK and I gave the document written with their address and e-mail address to the guide in the Yanggakdo Hotel. I also brought the e-book criticizing the Socialist DPRK on this trip and criticizing DPRK. Although I committed the indelible offensive acts against the Korean people in the period of the Korean War, I have been guilty of big crimes against the DPRK government and Korean People again. I realize that I cannot be forgiven for my offensives but I beg for pardon on my knees by apologizing for my offensives sincerely toward the DPRK government and the Korean people and I want not punish me. Please forgive me. I will never commit the offensive act against the DPRK Government and the Korean People again. On this trip I can understand that in US and western countries
there is misleading information and propaganda about DPRK. If I go back to USA, I will tell the true features of the DPRK and the life the Korean people are leading. Merrill Newman Nov 9, 2013” (KCNA, “Apology of U.S. Citizen for Hostile Acts in DPRK,” November 30, 2103)

Japanese and South Korean lawmakers working to promote bilateral exchanges issued a statement in Tokyo urging their governments and China to produce joint Northeast Asian history textbooks. The Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union, together with its South Korean counterpart, the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union, pushed for the books to cover the history of their two nations and China’s at a combined general meeting at the Diet. The joint statement also included a promise by the Diet members to “work even harder” to extend suffrage in regional elections to permanent residents, responding to South Korea’s request for a bill to be drawn up. The statement left out the possibility of a resumption of bilateral talks between Prime Minister Abe and Park. Abe has called for direct talks with Park but none have been arranged since the two leaders came to power. The lawmakers also agreed to cooperate on the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement under negotiation between Japan and 11 other states, and on decontamination efforts following the Fukushima nuclear disaster. The two groups expressed shared concerns about North Korea’s nuclear threat, calling it “the gravest issue affecting peace and security in Northeast Asia,” while touching upon their cooperation in tackling the issue of Pyongyang’s past abductions of Japanese nationals. The Diet members are led by former Finance Minister Nukaga Fukushiro, a lawmaker of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The South Korean side was headed by Huang Woo-yea of Park’s conservative Saenuri Party. (Kyodo, “Japan, S. Korea Lawmakers Call for Joint History Books with China,” Japan Times, November 30, 2013)

On her way to brief highly skeptical members of Congress about the deal she was still negotiating in secretive talks with the Iranians, Wendy Sherman, the State Department’s No. 3 official and its lead negotiator with Tehran, fell and ruptured a tendon in her finger. She packed it in ice, went to a secure room, and continued her briefing on uranium enrichment levels and current intelligence about the intentions of America’s longtime adversary. Only then did she head to the emergency room. Sherman was the State Department’s chief strategist in dealing with the North Korean nuclear program. It was a searing experience, in both its temporary successes and long-term failure, that prepared her for the complexity of the Iranian negotiations, and has made her a target for those on Capitol Hill who argue that history is about to repeat itself. “The American people need an insurance policy to prevent a rerun of North Korea,” said Senator Mark Kirk, Republican of Illinois, who said that Iran could blindside the United States with a secret nuclear fuel program, much as North Korea did more than a decade ago. The Israelis constantly raise North Korea comparisons, as do some Democrats. Sherman has learned to push back – hard – with the argument that comparisons to North Korea are tempting, but overly simplistic sound bites. “There was a lot to learn from that experience, but the two situations are quite different,” Sherman said last week before leaving Geneva. “It’s a different time, a different culture, a different system,” she said. By the time the Clinton administration began negotiating with North Korea, American intelligence agencies had assessed that the country already had weapons-grade fuel for one or two bombs; in Iran’s case,
Sherman argues, “No one believes they are there yet.” There are other differences, too, she said. “Iran has a middle class” that the United States is trying to appeal to by giving it a taste of sanctions relief. “It’s people who travel, within limits, and see the world.” Those factors, she believes, create the kind of leverage that was missing in talks with North Korea, whose citizens are almost completely isolated from the rest of the world. It is an argument that she will be repeating over the next six months, as she tries to buy time in Congress while secreting herself away with intelligence analysts looking for any signs that Iran may be cheating. “She understands the fragility of what she’s just negotiated,” an administration colleague said. “If there’s any evidence of some secret nuclear site the Iranians forgot to tell her about, this is over.” Sherman was not the negotiator for President Clinton’s 1994 “freeze agreement” with North Korea, but as the assistant secretary for legislative affairs at the State Department, she had to sell that deal. She defends it to this day, noting that “during the Clinton administration not one ounce of plutonium was added to the North Korean stockpile.” In 2000, she was in a different job, as counselor to Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, and the two women, now friends, traveled to Pyongyang together to deal directly with Kim Jong-il, the country’s dictator, in an effort to curb his missile program. When President George W. Bush was in office, it became clear Kim had ordered creation of another pathway to a bomb – enriching uranium, in facilities similar to those in Iran – that was not explicitly covered by the freeze accord. “It’s clear that they all recognize how they got played before,” said George Perkovich, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Thomas Pickering, who under Mr. Clinton held the job Sherman holds now, said it also seemed clear “they have tried to sew up the loopholes, remembering the history.” For example, in the negotiating sessions in Geneva, Sherman insisted on the daily inspections of the most worrisome Iranian sites, far more frequent than the inspections called for in North Korea’s case. She pressed for a full halt on construction at the heavy water reactor at Arak that resembles facilities that the North Koreans used for their weapons development. This time, unlike the North Korea negotiations, Ms. Sherman is not talking directly with the man who she says “holds the nuclear file,” Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Instead, in a series of covert and public meetings, she has been dealing with Iran’s American-educated foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, while American intelligence officials try to figure out how much real authority he possesses. “We are only going to find out by testing him,” said Sherman. “He’s very charming, but I’m not naïve. The president has said we must give diplomacy a chance, and I agree.” (David E. Sanger, “Politics and a Ruptured Tendon Don’t Faze Lead Iran Negotiator,” New Yoprk Times, December 1, 2013, p. 12)
South Korean parliament’s Intelligence Committee told separate news briefings that the NIS had confirmed the public execution of two close aides to Jang in the North’s ruling Workers’ Party for corruption. "The briefing by an NIS senior official was that they believe Jang Song Thaek has lost his posts," Jung, who is the ranking opposition member of the intelligence committee, said. "Following (the executions), the NIS said it believes Jang Song Thaek has not been seen and has lost his posts," Jung told the briefing. A ruling party member of the committee held a separate news briefing and delivered a similar report. The removal of Jang, a key figure in the power transition following the 2011 death of Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, could tip the balance in the fiercely competitive group of confidants surrounding the current leader but was unlikely to impact on Kim Jong Un’s hold on power, experts said. (Jack Kim and Ju-min Park, "North Korea’s Kim Seen behind Sacking of Powerful Uncle," Reuters, December 3, 2013) Kim Jong-un, the 30-year-old leader of North Korea, came to power two years ago so inexperienced and untested that the reclusive government named his uncle as the North Korean equivalent of a regent to watch over him. The National Intelligence Service of South Korea reported that the uncle, Jang Song-thaek, had been stripped of his powers, apparently by the young leader he was supposed to supervise. It was the biggest in a series of purges, promotions and reshufflings of elites that seem to have remade the government in the image of Kim, who inherited his title, and apparently techniques for keeping the government in control, from his father and grandfather. The political changes, which were not announced by North Korea and could not be independently confirmed, follow a series of upheavals, especially within the military. American intelligence officials and some outside analysts speculate that Kim is sidelining the stalwarts of his father, Kim Jong-il, and elevating a new set of generals and party officials who owe their loyalty only to him. But there are also hints, one American intelligence official said, that “there was some kind of broader contest for control, which Jang lost, at least for now.” Early in the young Kim’s tenure, American intelligence assessments questioned whether he would have the staying power to remain in office, and said he was regarded by the North Korean military as spoiled and naïve. Two years later those assessments are reversing. He is now seen as fully in charge. Kim has already begun testing the loyalty of top officials by dismissing or demoting them and letting them try to win his favor again – often by spying against others, another technique of leadership inherited from his father, according to South Korean officials and analysts. Jang’s apparent fall from power came after his two deputies at the administrative department of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea were executed last month on charges of “corruption and anti-party activities,” according to South Korean lawmakers who were briefed by intelligence officials in a hurriedly scheduled meeting at the National Assembly in Seoul. The intelligence agency did not reveal how it learned of the executions, the lawmakers said. “I don’t think Jang’s deputies were executed for mere corruption. Rather, they were executed because they established a ‘power,’ ” said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at Sejong Institute in South Korea. Despite initial hints that Mr. Kim might seek a more cooperative relationship with the country’s neighbors and the United States, he has accompanied political changes at home with a hard-line nationalistic policy of accelerating the country’s nuclear program, the main card it has to play in international negotiations. In the past, North Korean officials reported to have been purged in South Korean media have resurfaced. Jang himself had disappeared twice in the past but later staged a
comeback. Still, even before the South Korea intelligence report, his unusually long absence from North Korean media was viewed by the news media in the South as a sign that he was in trouble. (Choe Sang-hun and David E. Sanger, “North Korea’s Leader Is Said to Oust Uncle in Power Play,” New York Times, December 4, 2013, p. A-1) The National Intelligence Service (NIS) in Seoul said in a report to Rep. Jung Cheong-rae of the main opposition Democratic Party that Jang has been removed from the public eye since two of his closest confidants were executed in mid-November for corruption and activities that countered the stance of the ruling Workers’ Party of (North) Korea (WPK). The two executed officials are reported to be Ri Ryong-ha, the first-deputy director of the WPK’s administrative department, and Jang Su-gil, a deputy director of the same department. An intelligence official indicated the North’s military establishment has been informed of the executions and that the North Korean leader likely gave consent to such a move. “It is highly plausible that the North’s security agencies and the WPK’s leadership are deeply involved, which means the leader gave consent,” he said. North Korea is also launching a full-scale ideological campaign to rally support from ordinary North Koreans and block any internal resistance to Jang’s dismissal, the agency said, adding that it took additional measures against several departments that Jang is in charge of and other people close to him. China, the North’s closest ally, said it has no information on the possible sacking of Jang. The U.S. government has not yet given any formal comment on Jang’s reported fall from the North Korean power echelon. In the report to the National Assembly, the NIS said Jang has not been seen since the executions. He was last seen on November 6 at a meeting with a Japanese delegation led by Kanji Inoki, a lawmaker from the House of Councilors, Japan’s upper house in the Diet. “Such signs are an indication that Jang has probably been dismissed from all posts he held, although it is not known why he fell out of favor,” said a senior government source, who declined to be identified. (Yonhap, “North Korean Leader’s Uncle Jang Song-thaek Likely Removed from Power,” North Korea Newsletter, No. 290 (December 5, 2013) The North has had four army chiefs in the past 18 months and NIS estimates that about 100 of the top 218 officials have been replaced under Kim. (Simon Mundy and Song Jun-a, “Kim Ousts Uncle in Purge, Say Spies,” Financial Times, December 4, 2013, p. 2) The uncle of Kim Jong-un has not been personally affected by the execution of his confidants and his likely dismissal from power, Seoul’s unification minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said at the National Assembly December 4. “There seems to be no personal change to Jang and his wife Kim Kyong-hui,” the policymaker said. (Yonhap, “N. Korean Leader’s Uncle Not Personally Affected by Dismissal: Policymaker,” December 4, 2013) Analysts are now saying that if he did lose his position, possible reasons may include a reshaping of Kim’s inner circle, a power battle with People’s Army politburo chief Choi Ryong-hae, or objections to economic reforms. According to the NIS, Jang’s ouster likely came some time in late November. Jang has not been seen in public since joining Kim at an Oct. 10 recital for the 68th anniversary of the WPK and meeting a delegation led by Japanese House of Councilors member Kanji Inoki on Nov. 6. The NIS believes that Jang’s ouster would have come not long afterwards. “We are not aware of any reports in the North Korean media since November 6 that would lead us to surmise something had happened to Jang,” said a senior official from the Ministry of Unification. No specifics are available on why Jang would have fallen from power, but one of the leading theories is that it had to do with recent frictions between him and Choi,
considered the two main regime heavyweights after Kim Jong-un. Observers are speculating that Jang may have lost out in a power struggle between the two. The two men are known to have been quite close, with some sources reporting them as “blood brothers.” But things reportedly soured during the lead up to and execution of last year’s long-range rocket launch and this February’s third nuclear test, where Jang represented the moderates and Choi the hardliners. Cheong Seong-chang, a senior fellow at the Sejong Institute, said Choi and State Security Department (SSD) chief Kim Won-hong appear to have been behind the arrest and execution of some of Jang’s close associates on corruption charges. “With that move, Choi effectively cemented himself as second-in-command,” Cheong said. Another analysis was that Jang’s ouster may have come as part of a move from a group-led “guardian system” to one of single-person leadership. Indeed, a number of “father figures” were crowded out of the power structure as the Kim regime established itself: People’s Army chief of general staff Ri Yong-ho, first politburo deputy director Kim Jong-gak, and first SSD deputy chief U Dong-chuk. According to some analysts, Jang’s removal should be interpreted along similar lines. Adding to the speculation is a December 1 report in Rodong Sinmun declaring the establishment of a “system of single command by Kim Jong-un, whose destiny we shall share until the end of the world.” Another possibility that has been suggested is that Jang was punished for failure to improve the economy and relations with China, which he was responsible for. Jang was North Korean chairman of a joint North Korean-Chinese leadership committee for co-development and co-administration of the Rason Special Economic Zone and the Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Island Economic Zone. He also played a central role in relations with Beijing, visiting then-Chinese president Hu Jintao there in August 2012. But relations with China have been floundering. Kim, who has been in power for nearly two years, has yet to visit the country, and little progress has been made in the development push in the Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Economic Zone. “The lack of any clear results to point to in the economy and relations with China, which were two of Kim Jong-un’s key interests, may have given the hardliners the excuse they needed to go after Jang,” said Kim Yeon-soo, a professor at Korea National Defense University. (Park Byong-su, “Why Could Powerful Figure in N. Korea Have Been Ousted?” Hankyore, December 4, 2013) Government bodies have stated uncoordinated positions over an announcement made by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) earlier this week that Jang Song-thaek, a powerful uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, has been stripped of all his official titles, with some even dismissing the report as mere speculation. It has led many opposition lawmakers to think that the NIS intentionally distributed the sensitive information to sidestep ongoing talks in the National Assembly regarding reform of the spy agency. Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin said at a parliamentary defense committee meeting on December 5 that Jang being removed is “only a possibility” and that associated facts have yet to be verified. Kim also added that the ministry was also unable to establish any evidence of military provocations by the North Korea lately. The Ministry of Unification, which handles all inter-Korean affairs, took a similar stance. Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae told lawmakers belonging to the foreign affairs and unification committee, that it is “probable” that Jang has been stripped of his official posts but that he is not 100 percent certain Jang has been stripped of all titles. He comments came after the spy agency reported December 3 that Jang may have been sacked, citing as evidence the execution of his close confidants last month
and the scaling back of Jang’s appearances this year compared to last year as the most reliable evidence. “I believe that the NIS tried to water down parliamentary efforts to remodel the agency by disclosing unverified information,” said Rep. Park Jie-won, a political heavyweight of the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) who previously visited the North as a delegation head. At the time the spy agency released the report, the ruling Saenuri Party and the DP were on the verge of agreeing to set up a special parliamentary committee aimed at proposing NIS reforms, including reduction of its domestic intelligence activities. “The NIS has recently been disclosing sensitive information on whenever it or President Park Geun-hye got into trouble,” said Rep. Moon Byeong-ho of the DP. “The move is politically-motivated.” In October, the spy agency was criticized in a similar fashion because the NIS Director Nam Jae-joon leaked sensitive information on North Korea that Kim Jong-un vowed to communize the South within three years. The agency was then accused of interfering in last year’s presidential election. (Chung Min-uck, “New Analyses Presented on Jang’s Purge,” Korea Times, December 5, 2013) North Korea aired a rerun of a TV documentary on December 7 about its leader Kim Jong Un that cut out appearances by his uncle who had been considered the second most powerful man in the country, reinforcing reports that he has been ousted. North Korea's official TV broadcast the documentary, which had already been aired nine times. But this time, Kim’s uncle, Jang Song Thaek, appeared in different positions to make his face invisible or entire scenes were re-edited to remove him, Yonhap reported. (Reuters, “North Korea Airs Film about Leader with His Ousted Uncle Cut out: Report,” December 7, 2013) North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s powerful uncle has been dismissed from all posts for trying to form his own faction within the ruling party, Pyongyang’s state media reported on December 9, in the latest purge that could be designed to consolidate Kim’s power. Jang Song-thaek is also accused of irregularities and corruption, as well as disobeying Kim’s orders. "Jang desperately worked to form a faction within the party," the political bureau of the ruling Workers’ Party said in today’s decision carried by the country's official Korean Central News Agency. "Prompted by his politically motivated ambition, he tried to increase his force and build his base." The party’s political bureau also alleged that Jang, who had held several senior positions in the government, abused his power and had improper relations with several women, abused drugs and squandered foreign currency at casinos while receiving medical treatment abroad. Footage from North Korea’s state television showed Jang being arrested at the party’s political bureau meeting in Pyongyang on Sunday and whisked away by two uniformed military officers. It is the first time for North Korea to release footage of the arrest of a senior official on the spot since the 1970s. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Confirms Purge of Leader’s Powerful Uncle,” December 9, 2013)

Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. delivered a carefully calibrated show of support for Japan, expressing deep concerns about China’s move to control airspace over islands in the East China Sea, but stopping short of a demand that Beijing reverse itself. Instead, he urged the feuding neighbors to talk to each other. Biden’s statement, at the start of an unexpectedly challenging trip to Asia that is next taking him to Beijing, captured the complexities for the United States as it navigates a bitter standoff between Japan and China over the territorial claims – a dispute it wishes neither to mediate nor to see escalate. China’s air defense identification zone, Biden said after
meeting with Japanese leaders, is an effort to “unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea” that raises “the risk of accidents and miscalculation.” He said he would bring up these concerns in detail when he met with the Chinese leadership. But with China unlikely to rescind a move so laden with nationalistic overtones, the vice president’s focus appeared to be less on rolling back the defense zone than on neutralizing its impact by persuading the Chinese authorities to stop scrambling fighter jets or otherwise disrupting the busy air corridors between Japan and China. China also seemed eager to defuse tensions. On the eve of Biden’s visit, the Defense Ministry issued an unusual clarification, saying the zone “will not affect the freedom of overflight, based on international laws, of other countries’ aircraft.” The statement said that the Chinese military was “fully capable” of exercising control over the zone, a wide swath of the East China Sea, but it added that such deterrence would not always be needed. “Fighter planes are unnecessary,” it said, “when an entering aircraft is found to pose no threat to us, but necessary surveillance is needed.” In Tokyo, Biden said that China and Japan needed “crisis management mechanisms and effective channels of communication” to avoid the risk of miscalculation. The countries have discussed a hotline, but the talks have gone nowhere. “The only conflict that is worse than one that is intended is one that is unintended,” the vice president said as Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, looking grave, stood next to him. The Japanese government has called for China to roll back the zone. But Abe, perhaps seeking to project unity with Biden, did not repeat that demand today. He said the United States and Japan had reaffirmed that they would not alter any joint military operations in the area. “We will not condone any action that will threaten the safety of civilian aircraft,” he added. That appeared to be an attempt to smooth over a disconnect between the United States and Japan over the Federal Aviation Administration’s guidance to American carriers that they identify themselves before entering the restricted zone. Officials in Tokyo have instructed Japanese carriers to ignore the Chinese demand. Obama administration officials insisted that there was no discord between the United States and Japan on how to respond to the Chinese zone. The aviation administration, they said, routinely gives guidance whenever a country issues a warning to ships and planes. “Nothing that the F.A.A. has done constitutes any acceptance or recognition of this,” said a senior administration official traveling with Biden. “The U.S. has clearly set forth that our military aircraft will continue to operate normally.” Administration officials said that Biden would urge China not to create any other such zones and to show restraint in policing this one. By treating the zone as irrelevant, American officials hope to reduce the Chinese government’s incentive to declare zones in the South China Sea or the Yellow Sea, where it has other territorial disputes. The Japanese government perceives the zone as an attempt by the Chinese to assert control over disputed islands, known in Japan as the Senkaku and in China as the Diaoyu. Japan has a long-established air defense identification zone that covers much of the East China Sea, including those islands. Pointedly taking note of that, the Chinese Defense Ministry statement said that Japan’s actions, including “playing up the so-called China threat” and threatening to shoot down Chinese drones, had forced China to make “necessary reactions.” The dispute has raised tensions in the region to their highest level in nearly two decades. Some analysts said they believed that the Chinese government was caught off guard by the ferocity of the opposition from the United States, the European Union and Australia, on top of a predictably angry response by Japan and South Korea. But in
Beijing, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, rejected suggestions that China rescind the defense zone, saying it was fully in compliance with international law. He suggested that China was open to the idea of establishing crisis management mechanisms. Hong contended, however, that Japan was not. “The Japanese side unilaterally, on one hand, declares they want dialogue, but then they close the door to dialogue,” he said. (Mark Landler and Jane Perlez, “Biden Backs Ally Japan But Avoids Roiling China,” *New York Times*, December 4, 2013, p. A-6)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL [Sullivan, Medeiros]: “The Vice President spent a combined total of **five and a half hours with President Xi today in three formats.** He spent about two hours in a restricted meeting with a small handful of aides on each side. He spent an hour and a half in a larger expanded meeting and they had a substantial delegation on each side, and about two hours at a small working dinner, again, with just a few aides on each side. The conversations ranged from the strategic to the detailed, and covered every significant topic in the U.S.-China relationship. And sometimes topics were covered two or three times over the course of an evolving five-and-a-half-hour conversation. The conversation was very much a back-and-forth. It reflected the **casual candor** that these two leaders have developed over the course of their relationship. And it was firmly punctuated by references to previous conversations where the two of them were picking up on threads that had started back in Chengdu or in Los Angeles or wherever it might be. ...B both President Xi and Vice President Biden remarked to one another that the strength of their personal relationship lies in the fact that they can be very direct about difficult issues. And obviously, also with respect to the bilateral relationship, the need for a consistent and sustained high-level engagement at the leadership level, and the view that they share that there’s really no substitute for these extended personal conversations between the leaders of each country. **They spent a substantial amount of time on North Korea, and they reviewed the internal situation in North Korea in light of some of the news reports in recent days.** And they talked at some length about what the Iran example suggests for North Korea, and that is to say a combination of pressure plus dialogue plus international community unity -- and especially unity among the significant global power -- is what brought Iran to the table to deal constructively, and the same recipe can apply for North Korea. So they talked about all of the elements of that, about the U.S. and China and the other five-party partners being on the same page about dialogue not being for dialogue’s sake, but being for a serious purpose and actually producing results, and about the need for pressure in order to sharpen the choice for North Korea and our common quest to have them denuclearize. So there was quite a bit of discussion about the work that our respective teams have been doing to think about how to create the conditions for negotiations that could actually be fruitful and not just a repeat of the same old North Korean game. And they went and forth on that at some length. They obviously spoke about the air defense and interdiction zone -- identification zone, excuse me -- and about the broader regional issues that are implicated in that in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea. **And the Vice President laid out our position in detail. He indicated, as we’ve said, that we don’t recognize the zone, that we have deep concerns about it. And he indicated to Xi that we are looking to China to take steps as we move forward to**
lower tensions, to avoid enforcement actions that could lead to crisis, and to establish channels of communication with Japan, but also with their other neighbors to avoid the risk of mistake, miscalculation, accident or escalation. President Xi was equally comprehensive in laying out China’s perspective on the zone, on their view of territorial disputes in the region and broader regional tensions. And he explained China’s thinking on these issues at some length in two different portions of the five-and-a-half-hour session. Both near the beginning and near they came to this issue. But ultimately President Xi took on board what the Vice President laid out, and now, from our perspective, it’s up to China. And we’ll see how things unfold in the coming days and weeks. ... Q. On the air defense zone then, are we just sort of in a kind of wait-and-see mode on China, and sort of a stance -- agree to disagree, but we hope they behave responsibly? I mean, that sort of sounds like the deal. SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: Well, I wouldn’t say there’s a -- I wouldn’t characterize it as a deal. What I would say is that we indicated to the Chinese not only our deep concerns in sort of how we look at the air defense identification zone, but we also made clear that not just the United States, but other countries as well are looking at them to take steps to lower tensions, and the includes avoiding enforcement actions that really could lead to a crisis. So I think where we are on that is the Chinese have taken on board what the Vice President had to lay down, and now it's a question of behavior and action as we go forward. And what the Vice President’s goal is in all of this is to ensure that we see the lowering of tensions in a way that reduces the possibility of crisis or mistake or miscalculation. And that's how he's going to judge the outcome of this. He'll also have the opportunity, of course, to speak with President Park on Friday. The Koreans have -- it's not as much in the news as the Japanese concerns, but the Koreans have their own substantial concerns about this. And he'll look forward to the opportunity consult. Obviously the Chinese have a different perspective; they took this action. But I think President Xi listened carefully to the Vice President’s arguments about the need to create a more conducive environment too. ... Q  And I just wondered, do you think in your -- in all of your analysis of Xi, the third plenum, all the positive kind of global news, do you think that the zone was connected to a deeply thought sort of strategic plan the Chinese had? Or was this a political ploy by him to try to satisfy a certain wing of his establishment? In other words, was this sort of a knee-jerk thing, or did he lay it down into some sort of long systemic incrementalism that this is part of the Chinese regional logic? SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: I'll ask my colleagues [for] a response on that. SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: Yes, I would say -- I mean, our assessment is that this was not a recent knee-jerk thing; it's part of a longstanding effort by China to protect its sovereignty and its territorial integrity, which is a well-known, self-described core interest that Xi Jinping himself feels very strongly about. Q  So does that make it harder for you guys or less hard for them than -- the benefit was more like a political move to temporarily satisfy some wing of conservatives? It sounds like it might be harder if it’s a deeply held belief, and he believes this is the right path for the Chinese to take. SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: Well, one factor -- not an answer -- is that what's different today than yesterday is that the President of China heard literally firsthand, directly from someone he knows, what our concerns are and what our expectations are in terms of a responsible way forward. It’s reasonable to expect the
impact of that conversation to take some time to manifest itself, but it is not at all trivial. Q. Was the U.S. opinion in the assessment of this welcome by Xi? Or did he express any misgivings about the U.S. butting into a dispute that previously had been characterized as being between themselves and their neighbors? SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: Without quoting a foreign official, one thing that came across loud and clear was the conviction that understanding the other side’s perspective and view of the implication of actions on the region and on the relationship is a prerequisite to finding solutions to problems. One of the consistent themes from both the Vice President and President Xi was we need to be clear how we see a problem, what we think, and what we’re looking for. It’s fine to be candid, and that sets the stage for each of us, independently or together, to think through how we’re going to address a problem or ameliorate a situation. So the short answer, therefore, is that I didn’t sense a pushback or objection to the straightforward presentation of the U.S. perspective by the Vice President. … Q. The first session of the two leaders’ meeting along with a small amount of staff that you mentioned lasted for two hours when on the schedule that we had, which may have been an estimate, was 45 minutes. Does that -- I know you talked about a wide-ranging set of issues, principles, but you also said at the beginning and the end they talked about the -- in China, the South -- East China Sea. Why did that run so long? Were they hashing out that one particular issue or a particular issue? Do the leaders just go as long as they feel comfortable and then call it quits, and that’s -- is that unusual? SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: In the U.S.-China relationship, that’s a pretty common occurrence, because the restricted meeting is the one where there’s a small group of advisors right around the principal, and they get into generally the most complex potentially contentious issues in the relationship. SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: And they go as long as they need to. And I would say that a substantial portion of that conversation was actually about North Korea. … Q. Did you sense that the recent success in the sort of temporary deal with Iran has prompted new thinking on the part of the Chinese about possibilities with North Korea? I mean, I know you talked in general about the pressure and the unity of the partners, but did you sense that he felt there was an opening there may not have been before or an incentive to try to pursue an opening? SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: I think the credibility of our argument about the impact of pressure on diplomatic solutions has been enhanced in the eyes of a number of countries, including China, by what’s happened with Iran. SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: Also, just to build on that, I think that the credibility of our openness to dialogue as long as it sort of meets what we consider to be the credible and authentic conditions for that dialogue is enhanced because we did something similar with Iran. Q. But you didn’t present this deal and the process that led to it as a template for North Korea in the sense of North Korea is in a different place and different cycle, different leadership? SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: Not a strict template because of the obvious differences, but the same logic, and the same logic at a level of some specificity. You’ve got to get the relevant group of countries together -- in the Iranian case, the P5-plus-1; in this case, the five parties. They have to be on the same page, and they have to back both pressure and dialogue. And the pressure has to be real, and the dialogue has to be designed as something other than just either a dead-end or talking for the sake of talking. That logic, which produced the interim deal in the Iran case, we are laying
out as being what should apply in the North Korea case as well, and we’ve got a strong argument to make in that respect. And as he said, it enhances our credibility to be able to say the United States of America is willing to deal reasonably at the diplomatic table if the other party is willing to deal reasonably. So now it’s our collective job -- us, China, and the rest of the five parties -- to push the North Koreans towards greater reasonableness.

Q Did you get any insight on the recent reports out of North Korea from the Chinese perspective -- that kind of thing? SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIAL: There was a discussion of the internal situation but I think it wouldn’t be appropriate to go into more detail about it here.

(Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Vice President Biden’s Asia Trip, “Beijing, December 4, 2013)

After five and a half hours of meetings, in which Biden laid out the American case against China’s action and Xi made a forceful counterargument, senior administration officials said: “President Xi took on board what the vice president said. It’s up to China, and we’ll see how things will unfold in the coming days and weeks.” Xi’s response suggested that China and Japan may be able to manage a standoff that had threatened to escalate dangerously, with China scrambling fighter jets over islands that are claimed by both countries. “I was very direct about our firm position and our expectations in my conversation with President Xi,” the vice president said in a speech to business people this morning. He urged China to refrain from “taking steps that will increase tension” and to communicate better with its neighbors. Xi, who cultivated personal ties to Biden when he was China’s vice president, sounded a more upbeat note about the broader relationship, though he conceded “regional hot-spot issues keep cropping up.” He welcomed a somber-looking Biden as “my old friend” and said nothing directly about the air defense identification zone. Biden stopped short of calling on China to rescind the zone, something it is highly unlikely to do, given the nationalist sentiments that have been animated by its standoff with Japan. The American military has ignored the zone, sending B-52 bombers last week to fly through it. Shortly after Mr. Biden arrived, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said the new air defense identification zone was a fact of life that the world needed to accept. The spokesman at the ministry, Hong Lei, described it as a “zone of cooperation, and not confrontation.” Since the zone was announced on Nov. 23, 55 airlines from 19 countries had provided China with flight information, he said. The Federal Aviation Administration has advised civilian aircraft to comply with China’s request. But Biden’s strong words, combined with his appeal to China’s top leader, appear to have smoothed over that flap. “The vice president seems to have put them back on track,” said Michael J. Green, an adviser on Asia in the George W. Bush administration. “Beijing may not like it, and he probably did not want his trip to be all about this, but he had to send a strong message of dissuasion.” Xi’s sanguine words were calculated to send a different message, according to China experts. “A reason for Xi’s tone is a desire to make U.S. allies, especially Japan, uneasy about U.S. support by suggesting subliminally that the U.S.-China relationship is more important than other relationships, and the U.S. is keeping it sound despite China-Japan relations,” said Jeffrey A. Bader, a former China adviser to President Obama. Xi, repeating a phrase he used at a meeting with Mr. Obama in Southern California in June, said China wanted to build a “new model of major-country relations,” based on respecting each other’s core interests,
collaborating on global problems and devising ways to “appropriately handle sensitive issues and differences between us.” Biden, while embracing that formulation, said the relationship between China and the United States needed candor and trust. He said Xi had been candid in their previous meetings, and Biden’s aides said their exchanges were similarly uninhibited yesterday. Another major area of focus, American officials said, was North Korea, which has entered another period of uncertainty with reports that a powerful uncle of the country’s supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, had been purged from his positions. Officials declined to say whether China had intelligence on the ouster of the uncle, Jang Song-thaek. But they said Xi displayed renewed interest in pursuing a dual-track strategy of economic pressure and diplomacy to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, prompted in part by the negotiations that recently led to an interim nuclear deal with Iran. “They talked at some length about what the Iran example means for North Korea,” said a senior official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the contents of the meeting. As Biden was meeting with Xi, a senior White House official issued blunt criticism of China’s broader human rights record, saying that even Americans doing business here were not secure. “The Chinese people are facing increasing restrictions on their freedoms of expression, assembly and association,” said the national security adviser, Susan E. Rice, speaking at a human rights meeting in Washington. “This is shortsighted.” (Mark Landler, “Biden Urges Restrain by China in Airspace Dispute,” New York Times, December 5, 2013, p. A-4)

A Chinese naval vessel came dangerously close to a U.S. warship during a tense incident in the South China Sea, U.S. military officials said December 13. The USS Cowpens, a guided missile cruiser, was forced to maneuver to avoid a collision with the Chinese ship, which had crossed directly in front of it and halted, according to naval officers and defense officials. The amphibious dock ship came less than 500 meters from the American warship, a defense official said. “This encounter happened in international waters in the South China Sea on December 5,” the defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said in an email message. “Eventually, effective bridge-to-bridge communication occurred between the U.S. and Chinese crews, and both vessels maneuvered to ensure safe passage,” the official said. The official said the Cowpens had been “in the vicinity” of China’s new aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, when the incident occurred. China was probably angry the Cowpens may have been trying to spy on its only aircraft carrier, said Dean Cheng, an analyst at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center in Washington. “This was not an accident,” Cheng said in an interview. “It was deliberate. The Chinese are raising the ante.” The stand-off ended peacefully but underscored tensions between the United States and China, which escalated after Beijing last month declared an expanded air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. (AFP, Jiji, Bloomberg News, “U.S., Chinese Warships Nearly Collide in the South China Sea,” Asahi Shimbun, December 16, 2013)

South Korea, the United States and Britain will jointly carry out previously planned naval drills in southern waters off the Korean Peninsula, military officials here said, amid an air defense zone dispute near the area. The two-day exercise, which is slated for Dec. 8-9, will mobilize South Korea’s 7,600-ton Aegis destroyer, America’s 9,800-ton Aegis cruiser Shiloh and the Royal Navy’s Daring-class 8,000-ton stealth destroyer.
military authorities here said. Ahead of the drill, American and British naval ships arrived at the southern port city of Busan earlier in the day. Upon arrival, Adm. George Zambellas, the British Royal Navy’s chief, visited the Busan Naval Operations Base to participate in a welcoming event hosted by the South Korean Navy chief Hwang Ki-chul, the Navy said. Seoul’s defense ministry said the drill is not targeted at China, noting it had been timed to coincide with the British naval ship’s port call at the South Korean port. “This drill has been scheduled well in advance, and it was not arranged to protest China’s recent declaration of the air defense zone,” ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said in a briefing. “The joint exercise is aimed at capitalizing on the British naval ship’s visit.” (Yonhap, “Korea, U.S., Britain to Hold Drills in Waters off Korean Peninsula,” Korea Herald, December 5, 2013)

Delury: “Often overlooked in the flurry of Asia’s maritime disputes and history wars is one of the most important developments of 2013: the blossoming “friendship” between Seoul and Beijing. It began in January, when President-elect Park Geun-hye and President-select Xi Jinping wasted no time exchanging envoys to affirm their intentions to rebuild the relationship after the nadir reached by the end of their predecessors’ terms. Next, then-ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff General Jung Seung-jo landed at Beijing airport in a C-130 transport plane to meet his counterpart, General Fang Fenghui—the first such meeting in over five years. But the real splash came in late June when President Park held a summit with President Xi, delivered a speech in her self-taught Mandarin Chinese at Tsinghua University, and promoted South Korean investment at the new business hub in the ancient central China city of Xi’an. Park struck a deep chord with the Chinese public as her autobiography became a national bestseller, and Beijing accepted her proposal to build a statue of Korean patriot Ahn Jung-geun at the site where he assassinated Japanese official Ito Hirobumi in 1909. Her summit also blew still stronger winds behind the sails of negotiations on a China-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, which are on track to reach completion next year. The blossoming friendship between South Korea and China, in other words, is taking place across political, economic, military and cultural dimensions. Not since before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 has the relationship been this strong, and the kerfuffle over the overlap between China’s new ADIZ and Korea’s old ADIZ should not distract too much attention from the deeper strategic shift taking shape. It is equally important not to assume Beijing applies zero-sum thinking to the Korean peninsula—quite the contrary. The improved ties with Seoul do not demonstrate a shift in policy toward Pyongyang. If the Obama administration misreads these developments, and fails to develop a proactive response, the situation in Korea will continue to drift away from US influence and in directions divergent to its interests. …The warming ties with Seoul are part of a broader initiative in Chinese foreign policy, one easily lost in the fog of stories about rising tensions in East Asia—namely, the return of friendship. We can get a better sense of this new approach through the writings of Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University and one of China’s most influential strategic thinkers. Yan writes in his new book, Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten Years, that the time has come for Beijing to abandon its policy of avoiding alliances. A realist in his view of international relations, Yan sees China and the United States locked in a struggle for hegemony as a new “great power” emerges to challenge the predominance, at least in East Asia, of the world’s sole
superpower. He has warned that it is more prudent for the two countries to strive for “peaceful competition,” rather than “fake friendship.” But whereas it is unrealistic for Beijing to seek a friendly relationship with Washington, it is incumbent on China to start thinking about building friendships—a euphemism for allies—elsewhere. Yan points out that the US has security alliances with 42 countries, whereas China only has one mutual defense treaty ally (the DPRK) and argues that it is time for Beijing to start catching up. In his book, Yan asserts that China could add about 20 allies in the next ten years. One of the targets in Yan’s sites for a new “friend” to Beijing is South Korea. He writes: “Japan and South Korea are two countries with a security conflict between them, yet they both have alliances with the US. China can learn from this model by developing relations with South Korea, as well as Thailand, into allies that we share with the US. Although South Korea and Thailand are both US allies, these two countries have significant political needs from China. If China and South Korea become allies, China can maintain neutrality in the conflict between North and South Korea—in the same way that the US neutral policy between Korea and Japan is based on the US military alliances with both countries.” Yan is a bold thinker, but these should not be mistaken as the idle thoughts of a scholar locked in an ivory tower. On the very same day in late October that Yan explained his idea of China-South Korea “friendship” to a group of experts brought over from Seoul by the East Asia Foundation, President Xi was explaining his ideas about “diplomatic work on neighboring countries” at a conference attended by the full Politburo Standing Committee. The repeated phrase of Xi’s speech was the need for “friendly relations”: “The strategic goal of China’s diplomacy with neighboring countries is to serve the cause of national rejuvenation, for which China must consolidate its friendly relations with neighboring countries… We must strive to make our neighbors more friendly in politics, economically more closely tied to us, and we must have deeper security cooperation and closer people-to-people ties.” Xi emphasized that “the basic tenet of diplomacy with neighbors is to treat them as friends and partners, to make them feel safe and to help them develop.” Talking about “friendship” in a diplomatic context might seem innocuous—if not hypocritical given Beijing’s recent challenge to the status quo by announcing its ADIZ. But Xi’s speech, like Yan Xuetong’s strategy, takes on a different aspect in light of modern Chinese history. Ever since British ships arrived in 1839 to crush China in the first Opium War, leaders in Beijing have framed foreign relations as the struggle against an enemy—first the British and the West, then the Japanese, and then the Americans. Mao Zedong took this fixation on an enemy to its extreme in the 1960s when Beijing pitted itself against both of the world’s superpowers: the US and USSR. But then along came Deng Xiaoping, who dramatically reversed China’s grand strategy. The essence of Deng’s new approach was to transcend the friend/enemy dichotomy. In a sense, he depoliticized international politics. Instead of courting allies and deterring adversaries, Deng made economic development the basis of foreign policy. He and his successors steadily patched up China’s hostile relationships, but at the same time avoided forming alliances. Instead, they created a vast network of “business-like” partnerships around the world that has been conducive to China’s extraordinary economic rise. The strategy has served China well for the last 30 years as has found its footing in the modern world system. But now, Yan argues, President Xi might be ushering in a new era—the return of friendship. And one of the more ambitious objects of Beijing’s new friend offensive would appear to be Seoul. The strengthening of Chinese ties to South
Korea takes on added significance in light of what has been widely perceived as a downgrading in the PRC-DPRK relationship. As Beijing and Seoul have been drawing closer, Beijing and Pyongyang seem to be drifting further apart. Indeed, Xi’s embrace of Park on her visit is one data point in a series of developments that have led many observers to imagine a policy shift in Beijing, that Beijing had lost its patience with its errant North Korean neighbor, that Xi would not coddle Kim Jong Un the way Hu Jintao put up with Kim’s father. Indeed, almost every month this year, there seemed to appear a new sign that Chinese “teeth” were biting the North Korean “lips.” It is understandable in light of this calendar of Sino-North Korean tensions that President Obama and his advisors might come to believe a policy shift was underway in Beijing.

But Xi’s more aggressive moves toward Pyongyang were as much a response to Kim Jong Un’s lack of fealty as anything else—understandable given Kim’s need to establish himself as new supreme leader and project a strong, independent image both domestically and internationally. President Xi’s annoyance with Marshal Kim should not be mistaken for a change in China’s strategic calculus. In the same speech this spring where Xi obliquely chastised Pyongyang for heightening tensions, for example, he came back to the importance of dialogue and negotiation—not pressure and sanctions—as the means to resolve disputes. As for all the signs of enhanced sanctions enforcement, except for the case of closing the North Korean Foreign Trade Bank account, China appears to be continuing its established policy of implementing the minimal set of sanctions based on UN Security Council guidelines. Meanwhile, cross-border commerce, investment, and capacity building between the PRC and DPRK steam ahead. Officially reported trade volume through September reached $4.49 billion, 4.4 percent higher than in 2012. China is helping North Korea develop its basic energy and transportation infrastructure, and investment in the North’s “highly risky, but also highly profitable” economy—especially mining—continues unabated. It was of course significant that Xi met Park before Kim, but the sequencing might owe more to the fact that Kim was in no rush to pay respects to Beijing while Park was.

Notably, the North Korean leader did dispatch his personal envoy, Choe Ryong Hae, at the eleventh hour to make the rounds in Beijing and get a photo shaking hands with Xi prior to Park’s visit. That trip was a kind of turning point, marking the resumption of regular high-level dialogue, with chief nuclear envoys making a pair of reciprocal visits to each other’s capitals. The most symbolically loaded visit was by Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao, who met with Kim Jong Un on his trip to Pyongyang to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Korean War Armistice. Li was born in 1950, and his first name, Yuanchao, is a homophone for “Defend Korea,” in honor of the “just war” being fought at the time. In short, it would be rash to exaggerate the tensions between Beijing and Pyongyang, contrast them with the improvements between Beijing and Seoul, and conclude China has made a policy shift from North to South, from stability to denuclearization, and from the Six Party Talks to sanctions. As Chinese officials and foreign policy experts explain ad nauseam, Beijing’s approach to the DPRK is unchanged. The policy is to pursue denuclearization and peace and stability of the Korean peninsula through dialogue and negotiations. Beijing still sees non-coercive diplomacy as the only way to solve the nuclear problem and would not do anything to threaten North Korea’s stability in efforts to encourage denuclearization. On the North-South question, what China wants is “friendship” with both Koreas. The “great friendship with North Korea,” as Xi referred to it in a 2010
speech to Chinese Korean War veterans, is likely to continue into the Xi-Kim era, although it has gotten off to a bumpy start. At the same time, a new friendship with South Korea is a priority, and despite the recent turbulence over the ADIZ issue, political will appears to be strong in both Beijing and Seoul to continue improving the relationship. Considering that Xi has added a measure of toughness to what remains at its core an engagement strategy towards the DPRK, and given that Park is pivoting from her predecessor’s hardline policy back toward inter-Korean engagement, Beijing and Seoul may be coming into alignment in their North Korea policies as well, making cooperation easier. So what can we expect from the year to come, and what are the implications for the United States? A defining feature of the Obama administration’s North Korea policy is its reliance on China to be the enforcement mechanism. If only China would toughen its posture toward Pyongyang, then North Korea could be forced back down the road to denuclearization—so the logic goes. Although the administration had one go at preliminary bilateral negotiations in the second half of 2011, the implosion of the resulting “Leap Day Deal” just weeks after its announcement reinforced its preference to stay as disengaged as possible. The language of US government officials defines talking to Pyongyang as appeasement ("no reward for bad behavior"), a waste of resources ("no buying the same horse twice"), and a waste of time ("no talks for talks' sake"). Contrary to wishful thinking that Beijing has undergone a sea change and is now putting the squeeze on Pyongyang, in fact, the gap between China’s approach and that of the United States remains a chasm. After almost every seemingly “tougher” measure taken this year, Beijing has insisted that sanctions are not a solution, or has called on the United States in particular to return to talks with Pyongyang. Yet these persistent calls for resuming dialogue have fallen on deaf ears. The gap between China and the US is not just about the means—sanctions versus engagement. At a more fundamental level, most Chinese see validity in North Korea’s claim that it is threatened by the US, and do not think denuclearization can occur until Washington addresses Pyongyang’s security concerns. But the Chinese are also aware of the mainstream American view that the North manufactures a sense of external threat in order to maintain power over an isolated populace, and that the claim of a “hostile policy” by the US is a figment of paranoid Korean imagination. Chinese diplomacy, however, is proving unable to bridge that gap. In the absence of a resumption of dialogue—whether bilaterally with the US or multilaterally in the Six Party Talks—it seems only a matter of time before North Korea conducts further tests of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Beijing has been bracing for the “possibility” of a fourth nuclear test since at least July, when none other than General Fang Fenghui brought the subject up at a press conference held jointly with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey in Beijing. On the assumption that diplomacy will continue to go nowhere, the question then becomes how is Beijing likely to respond to further “provocations” by Pyongyang such as another round of rocket and nuclear tests. The answer will likely depend on three factors. First, if the leadership in Pyongyang continues to seek improved ties with China, as it has since the spring, then President Xi will be less likely to use the test as an opportunity to express his displeasure with Kim. A key metric to watch for is whether there is progress in arranging a Kim Jong Un visit to Beijing next year, which would symbolize the continuation of a close relationship under the two new leaders. In addition, if North Korea continues to show signs of a gradual “reform and opening-up” of its economy,
China will not want to jeopardize that positive development by overdoing financial or economic sanctions. Second, if China determines that the Obama administration was never serious about sitting down with the North Koreans, Beijing’s outrage at more North Korean tests will be less pronounced. At some point Xi will give up trying to convince President Obama to put some political capital into going back to the table with Pyongyang. Everyone will start looking past this administration and start planning for the next occupant of the Oval Office. Finally, coming back to the original topic, if Sino-South Korean relations stabilize after the ADIZ controversy passes and then continue to strengthen, while inter-Korean relations gradually improve, then Beijing would be even less inclined to meet US demands for a tough reaction to another round of tests. Instead, China is likely to keep the focus on enhanced economic development cooperation on the peninsula, as it works toward the ultimate goal of having “friends” on both sides of the 38th parallel. The real challenge to the budding PRC-ROK “friendship” would arise in the case of renewed direct hostilities between the two Koreas of the kind witnessed in 2010. President Park will look to Beijing for a new sense of solidarity, Pyongyang will have the usual expectations of its great power ally, and Xi Jinping will find himself in the middle. But if Yan Xuetong’s ideas are any guide, that’s where China is headed as it regains its place of centrality in East Asia.” (John Delury, “Let’s Be Friends,” *38North*, December 5, 2013)

North Korea could be facing its most serious defection in 15 years as South Korean media said that a man who managed funds for the ousted uncle of leader Kim Jong Un had fled the isolated country and sought asylum in South Korea. The aide, who was not named, was being protected by South Korean officials in a secret location in China, cable news network YTN and Kyunghyang Shinmun newspaper said, citing sources familiar with the matter. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) had no knowledge of the defection, lawmakers said in Seoul after they were briefed by the head of the spy agency. YTN said the man managed funds for Jang Song Thaek, whose marriage to Kim’s aunt and proximity to the young leader made him one of the most powerful men in North Korea. YTN said the aide also had knowledge of funds belonging to Kim and his father, former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. If true, the defection would likely be the first time in 15 years a significant insider from the Pyongyang regime has switched sides. A spokesman for South Korea’s Unification Ministry, Kim Eui-do, and officials at the Foreign Ministry said the defection report could not be confirmed. Jung Chung-rae, a member of the South Korean parliament’s Intelligence Committee, told reporters the intelligence service had said it did not know about the defection, but that two of Jang’s relatives who were serving in embassies overseas had been recalled. “It is true that Jang’s brother-in-law and nephew have been called back to North Korea,” Jung cited the NIS as saying. Asked about the South Korean media reports, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said: “We have noted the reports, but do not understand the situation.” (Reuters, “Aide to N. Korean Leader’s Ousted Uncle Seeks Asylum in South: Media,” December 6, 2013)

North Korea has deployed more attack helicopters and rockets near a disputed western sea border with South Korea, the South’s intelligence chief told the National Assembly, raising fears that the North might be planning a provocation to deflect
attention from reports of a brutal internal power struggle. (Choe Sang-hun, “Rising Tension Seen in North Korea and at Sea Border,” New York Times, December 6, 2013)

The two Koreas were unable to find middle ground in working-level talks to set up Internet connectivity at the inter-Korean factory park in Kaesong. The Ministry of Unification said representatives from the two sides met at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the North Korean border city of the same name and discussed various technical issues that must be resolved to make the special economic zone more accessible to businesses. “The two sides touched on technical details but could not reach an agreement,” a ministry source said. While no headway was made, he said, the sub-panel meeting marked the first time that Seoul and Pyongyang touched on details to link Kaesong with the outside world via the Internet. Past meetings on the issue have only touched on the administrative matters and never reached this far. “The two sides concurred on the need to hold more talks,” the insider, who declined to be identified, said.
On the establishment of building a new data transfer system that uses radio frequency identification system to facilitate travel in and out of the park, the ministry said talks are planned for Saturday. Talks held in the past few days have yielded little progress. The ministry in charge of managing all cross-border relations said details on construction, materials needed to be resolved at the upcoming meeting. If an agreement is reached, work can start next week, with the goal of having the RFID system to be operation by early next year. (Yonhap, “Koreas Unable to Find Middle Ground on Kaesong Internet Connectivity,” December 6, 2013)

Korea has emerged as the largest exporter to China this year, surpassing Japan for the first time in 18 years. Korea is expected to claim “triple crowns” in trade by marking the largest exports, the largest trade surpluses and over 1 trillion dollars in trade volume for three consecutive years. Korea’s exports to China reached $150 billion during the period between January and October this year, surpassing Japan’s $133.2 billion. According to the analysis by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy in celebration of the 50th anniversary of Trade Day Thursday, Korea is estimated to achieve $560 billion in exports and $43 billion in trade surplus this year, which broke its own records of $555.2 billion in exports in 2011 and $41.17 billion in 2010. Despite anxieties in the global financial market caused by the weak yen and the potential withdrawal of quantitative easing in the U.S., Korea’s export has continued to show good performances. (Dong-A Ilbo, “Korea Surpasses Japan in Exports to China,” December 6, 2013)

President Park Geun-hye talked about the expansion of the nation’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in a meeting with visiting U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. Biden neither showed support or made objections to Park’s plan. “President Park explained our stance regarding the zone and Vice President Biden appreciated the explanation and our efforts. The two agreed to continue close cooperation on the matter,” Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se told a press conference. Asked whether or not Biden was positive about Korea’s expansion plan, Yun said, “It is significant that the U.S. side appreciated our detailed explanation and efforts.” The tone of his remarks may indicate that the United States will not actively object to the expansion, Biden
choosing to be strategically vague about the U.S. position so as to leave it to Korea’s discretion. Seoul’s follow-up measure appears to underpin such an interpretation. After the Park-Biden meeting, Park’s national security chief Kim Jang-soo convened related ministers. They are known to have decided on the country’s new ADIZ and plan to announce it soon. The new boundaries were not available but they may be contiguous with its Flight Information Region to cover the submerged “Ieodo” rock as well as islets close to Japan that are not inside the existing Korean ADIZ. China’s new air zone covers Ieodo. The meeting, including a luncheon, lasted almost two and a half hours, 30 minutes longer than planned. “Biden hoped for improved relations between Seoul and Tokyo, which he expects will stabilize the region more. Park agreed that the two should be good partners, while asking for sincere measures from Japan,” Yun said. (Kim Tae-gyu, “Biden Vague on Korea’s ADIZ Plan,” Korea Times, December 6, 2013)

North Korea has increased the size of a labor camp where prisoners have been beaten to death with hammers and forced to dig their own graves, according to a report by a rights group published Thursday. Amnesty International commissioned satellite analysis of the country’s largest prison camp -- which is known as kwanliso 16. It shows new buildings have been constructed inside the compound -- which is three times the size of Washington, D.C.-- since North Korean leader Kim Jong Un replaced his late father. Amnesty International also interviewed guards and inmates who have first-hand experience of life in the camps. They said women are often raped and then executed in secret by officials, and those who try to escape are beaten before being publicly shot or hanged. Inmates -- including children -- are made to work long hours in dangerous logging and mining jobs in which many of them die. "The prisoners are only humans insofar as they can speak," said a former prison official who was not named in the report. "In reality though, they are worse off than animals. The purpose of prison camps is to oppress, degrade, and violate the inmates for as long as they are alive." According to report, more than 100,000 people are imprisoned in labor camps for alleged crimes against the state, which can include "gossiping" about Kim or his predecessors. The North Korean government denies the existence of the camps, including those repeatedly observed by satellites. Amnesty International commissioned the satellite analysis in October. As well as the expansion of the 348 square mile kwanliso 16, near Hwaseong in North Hamgyong province, the report said houses had been demolished at the smaller kwanliso 15, known as "Yodok." Amnesty International said the decrease in housing could indicate a slight reduction in the camp’s population. But the group was not able to verify the prisoner population or the fate of its detainees. A guard referred to in the report as only "Mr. Lee" worked at kwanliso 16 in the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s. He told Amnesty International in an interview in November that he had witnessed inmates being forced to dig their own graves before being killed by hammer blows to the neck. Women were raped by officials and then never seen again, he alleged. Kim Young-soon said he was imprisoned in Yodok between 1980 and 1989. He was accused of gossiping about former leader Kim Jong Il, and like all North Korean prisoners was given no trial. Family members were also sent there, deemed guilty by association. "Upon arriving in Yodok, it felt like the sky was collapsing," he told Amnesty International. "I couldn’t understand how this could happen to me. How can I be taken to such a deplorable place? It was heartbreaking." He described the scene of one of the executions: "The prisoner is first
beaten half to death. He is tied to a pole up on a platform, with his hands tied behind his back. His feet are also tied, another rope is tied around his waist, and he is blindfolded. "Then one guard shouts to the firing squad, 'In the name of the people, shoot the enemy of the revolution!' They shoot three shots to the head, three shots to the chest and three to the legs. By then, the head drops and the body is dragged away." Inmates are forced to work by guards who withhold their meager food rations, the report said. One couple detained in kwanliso 15 between 1999 and 2001 described the brutal labor conditions at their camp. "During the course of our three-year detention, often we did not meet our targets because we were always hungry and weak," Lee and Kim -- whose full names were withheld -- told Amnesty International. "We were punished with beatings and also reductions in our food quota." Amnesty International's East Asia researcher Rajiv Narayan said North Korea's human rights violations were "systematic, widespread and very grave." The group has urged the North Korean government to recognize and decommission the labor camps. (Alexander Smith, “North Korea Expands Prison Camp Where Inmates Dig Own Graves: Amnesty International,” NBC News, December 6, 2013)

Barbara Slaven: “In the aftermath of the Geneva accords constraining Iran’s nuclear program, some critics of the deal have compared it to the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea that fell apart in 2002 and ended with the North building and testing nuclear weapons. The criticism ignores major differences between Iran - a large, influential country that relies on exporting oil and pays at least some attention to popular sentiment - and North Korea - a small, hereditary totalitarian dictatorship kept afloat by neighboring China. It also ignores key differences in how various U.S. administrations have crafted foreign policy. While the Barack Obama, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations have all had to deal with an at times obstreperous Congress, the Agreed Framework collapsed in large part because of internecine warfare within the executive branch of the Bush administration. Under Bush “I never felt as though there was a coherent plan to solve the problem,” Charles “Jack” Pritchard, a former senior official dealing with North Korea in both the Clinton and Bush administrations, said in a recent interview. Infighting between professional diplomats in the State Department and hawkish political appointees in the department, as well as in the vice president’s office, National Security Council (NSC) and Pentagon, complicated the U.S. response to reports that North Korea was importing components for a uranium enrichment program - a potential second path to a bomb - while keeping a plutonium reactor mothballed under the terms of the Agreed Framework. When an inter-agency U.S. delegation confronted the North Koreans with this information in October 2002 and the North Koreans admitted it, the Bush administration had not gamed how North Korea would react or what to do. U.S. diplomats wanted to keep negotiating, but among the hawks - many of whom had opposed the Agreed Framework before they came into office - “there was a desire to punish North Korea and publicize how bad it was and that it couldn’t be trusted,” Pritchard said. The White House decided to stop supplying North Korea with heavy fuel oil - a significant carrot in the Agreed Framework - and refused North Korean overtures to continue to talk, arguing that to do so would “reward bad behavior.” The Pyongyang government responded by throwing out international arms inspectors and quitting the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 2006, months after the
U.S. blacklisted a Macau bank where North Korea had $24 million in deposits, North Korea staged the first of three nuclear tests, using plutonium reprocessed from its reactor at Yongbyon. Bush administration officials such as Vice President Dick Cheney and Undersecretary of State and later UN Ambassador John Bolton argued that there was no option but to confront North Korea with evidence of its cheating. Both men and their supporters also doubted that North Korea could be trusted to keep any nonproliferation agreement. According to Washington Post reporter Glenn Kessler, Cheney in late 2003 is said to have told participants in a high-level White House meeting on North Korea that “We don’t negotiate with evil. We defeat it.” Bolton focused on creating a proliferation security initiative to interdict North Korean contraband and decried the Pyongyang regime for its infamous abuses of human rights - a view that Bush shared. In the Bush administration, particularly its first term, “there was a lack of trust and collegiality” in the foreign policy apparatus, Pritchard said. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s opponents in the bureaucracy used backdoor channels to undermine him, reduce flexibility and leak negative information when multilateral negotiations finally took place. In the Obama administration, in contrast, the NSC, State Department, Treasury Department and Pentagon, as well as the vice president’s office, appear to have worked harmoniously to produce the November 24 agreement with Iran. The Treasury Department has been particularly important as the agency responsible for implementing sanctions against Iran and crafting sanctions relief in return for a deal. President Obama set the tone from the start, beginning his first term in office by reaching out to Iran - a step that helped unify the international community behind unprecedented sanctions when Iran backed out of a 2009 confidence-building deal. In the second term, says Trita Parsi, head of the National Iranian American Council and author of two books on Iran, “personnel changes in the last year have made the ideological cohesion in the administration even greater.” There have been no reports of dissension about Iran policy from the NSC, Pentagon or Treasury Department. To the extent that the comparisons between the North Korea and Iran cases have merit, it mostly has to do with Congress. A Republican-led House of Representatives was repeatedly late in appropriating money in the mid-late 1990s to pay for the fuel oil shipments to North Korea. The U.S. and its partners also lagged in constructing two light-water nuclear reactors that were supposed to replace the more proliferation-prone facility at Yongbyon. “The implementation was messed up,” said Joel Wit, a former U.S. official dealing with North Korea. Congress could now try to blow up the Geneva agreement with Iran by imposing new sanctions, which would violate the accords. The Obama administration is trying to convince Congress to hold off on any new sanctions, at least until the interim agreement runs its course in six months. It remains unclear whether the Iran deal will have any impact on North Korea, which seems to have become even more unpredictable since the death two years ago of leader Kim Jong-il and the succession of his son, Kim Jong-un. Kim’s uncle, Jang Song-thaek, the apparent power behind the throne, has reportedly just been deposed. “Now I don’t know who’s running the show,” Pritchard said. Pritchard complained that the Obama administration has put North Korea on the back burner, perhaps because “the toothpaste is out of the tube” and North Korea already has nuclear weapons. Plus China is there to prevent the North Koreans from going too far “across the line,” he said. Still, a nuclear deal that sticks with Iran might give even the North Koreans reason to recalculate. As Joe Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, has noted: “Iran
and North Korea are the last ripples of the nuclear wave that began with Hiroshima.” If Iran can be persuaded not to build nuclear weapons and North Korea to give them up, there are no other countries likely to take their place in the nuclear wannabe line anytime soon.” (Barbara Slaven, “Iran Deal Won’t Be a Repeat of North Korea,” *Voice of America*, December 6, 2013)

“I am very glad to be on my way home,” Merrill Newman told reporters at the airport in Beijing, his stopping point for a flight to San Francisco. Newman added that he felt “good” and wanted to see his wife. Vice President Biden, laying a wreath at a war memorial in Seoul, said he had spoken briefly with Newman by phone. “There is a piece of good news. The DPRK today released someone they should never have had in the first place: Mr. Newman,” Biden said. “I’m told we tried to get in contact with him but he’s on his way or in China right now. I offered him a ride home on Air Force Two, but as he pointed out, there’s a direct flight to San Francisco, his home. I don’t blame him. I’d be on that flight too. It’s a positive thing they’ve done.” Biden said the United States would continue to demand the release of another American, Kenneth Bae, who has been held for more than a year. Including Newman, North Korea has detained at least seven Americans since 2009, six of whom have been released. “At least there’s one ray of sunshine today. Mr. Newman will be reunited with his family,” he said. Biden, in aviator sunglasses and a brown leather bomber jacket, arrived by helicopter to a landing zone near the DMZ and was escorted by military officials to a lookout post at Observation Post Ouellette. The observatory is about 25 meters from the border. His granddaughter Finnegan accompanied him. “Welcome to the end of the world,” a U.S. soldier said. A Korean soldier told the Vice President about the post and Biden was handed binoculars to peer into North Korea. He later addressed U.S. and Korean troops briefly. (David Nakamura and Chico Harlan, “North Korea Releases 85-Year-Old American,” *Washington Post*, December 8, 2013)

KCNA: “As already reported, a relevant institution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) detained and investigated U.S. citizen Merrill Edward Newman who entered the DPRK under the guise of a tourist to confirm the whereabouts of the spies and terrorists who had been trained and dispatched by him, an intelligence officer, during the last Korean War. According to the investigation, Newman entered the DPRK with a wrong understanding of it and perpetrated a hostile act against it. Taking into consideration his admittance of the act committed by him on the basis of his wrong understanding, apology made by him for it, his sincere repentance of it and his advanced age and health condition, the above-said institution deported him from the country from a humanitarian viewpoint.” (KCNA, “U.S. Citizen Deported from DPRK,” December 7, 2013)

The House of Councillors has passed into law a divisive bill to protect specially designated state secrets with a majority of support from the ruling bloc, despite fierce resistance from the opposition camp. The bill, which seeks to impose stiffer penalties on civil servants and other parties who leak national security information, was approved by a vote of 130 to 82 during the upper chamber’s plenary session Friday night. Calling for further deliberations on the bill, Your Party and Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Restoration Party) boycotted the vote to protest the ruling bloc’s “heavy-
handed” handling of the legislation, though both opposition parties backed the bill after the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito modified it. The largest opposition party, Democratic Party of Japan, also resisted the vote by submitting a series of motions, including a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet to the House of Representatives and a censure motion against state minister in charge of consumer affairs Mori Masako, who was in charge of the secrecy protection bill. However, all the motions were voted down. Under the law, which will take effect a year after its promulgation, Cabinet members and others concerned will designate highly sensitive information in four areas, including defense and foreign affairs, as state secrets. Parties who leak such information will face a prison term of up to 10 years, far harsher than the maximum penalty set under the National Civil Service Law. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Secrecy Law Enacted,” December 7, 2013)

Peace and security should be ensured on the Korean Peninsula as it is a prerequisite and an important link in ensuring the global peace. …Humankind has faced a pressing task of preventing a nuclear war and protecting peace on the peninsula. The tense situation and danger of a nuclear war on the peninsula are direct products of the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK and its pivot to Asia-Pacific strategy. …Given that south Korea has become the biggest advanced nuclear base in the world and an acute situation has lasted on the peninsula, a war can break out at any time which may spill over into neighboring countries and lead to a world nuclear war. The grave situation on the peninsula poses a great threat to the countries around the peninsula and all other countries around the world. To defend the global peace, a danger of war has to be removed from the peninsula, a land beset with the danger of a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons and the U.S. troops have to be withdrawn from south Korea to have the tension reduced and the danger of war removed from the peninsula. This is a prerequisite to the peace on the peninsula and the rest of the world and is also consistent with the U.S. interests. If Washington withdraws its troops and nuclear weapons from south Korea, the most dangerous hotbed of a nuclear war will disappear. The U.S. should give up its hostile policy towards the DPRK. It should retract the hostile policy that caused the issues of war and peace on the peninsula and take practical step to build trust.” (Rodong Sinmun, “Peace on Korean Peninsula Is Prerequisite to Global Peace,” December 8, 2013)

South Korea announced a new air defense zone on Sunday to counter China’s unilateral decision to expand its own, bolstering its sovereignty over a reef off the south coast and other islands around the Korean Peninsula. The new air defense and identification zone was designed to have its southern boundary match the country’s broader flight information region (FIR), and includes airspace over the South-controlled reef of Ieodo and the islands of Marado and Hongdo, the defense ministry said. Its eastern and western boundaries remain the same as before, it said. The ministry said the new zone will take effect beginning December 15. The announcement came in response to China’s November 23 decision to create a new air zone that overlaps those of South Korea and Japan, and includes Ieodo and a set of islands at the center of a territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing. The Chinese decision sparked outrage from Seoul and Tokyo. South Korea has said it won’t recognize the Chinese zone and has flown aircraft through it. Seoul has also prepared
to expand its own air zone after Beijing refused to reconsider its decision when the two sides held high-level defense talks last week. “The air defense and identification zone adjustment is in line with the international aviation order and international regulations,” the ministry said. “It does not put restrictions on civilian flight operations or infringe upon the airspace and interests of neighboring countries.” “Ahead of today’s announcement, we have offered sufficient explanations to related countries,” it said. “The government will discuss with related countries measures necessary to prevent accidental military clashes within the newly adjusted air defense and identification zone.” Reactions from the United States, China and Japan varied, but all shared an understanding that the South’s decision conforms to international norms and is not excessive, a government official said. “I don’t think the relations between South Korea and China will deteriorate seriously because of this,” the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity. (Yonhap, South Korea Announces Air Zone Expansion to Counter Chinese Claims,” December 8, 2013)

Vice President Biden urged Japan and China last week to set up “effective channels of communication” to avoid a dangerous escalation in their increasingly fraught dispute over maritime territory. But the estrangement between the Asian powers is so deep they are barely talking. Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and Chinese President Xi Jinping, both in office for roughly a year, have spoken just once – for a matter of minutes. The Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers haven’t held formal talks in 14 months. There is zero contact between their coast guards and militaries. “There used to be so many channels” of communication, said a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information. “But that has all but stopped.” The decline in high-level contact, the most pronounced since Japan and China normalized relations 41 years ago, points to fundamental shifts in both countries that have made it harder for diplomats to control and solve problems.

In particular, hardening nationalism in China and Japan has reduced the ability of officials to appear conciliatory. Japanese Foreign Ministry officers who appear to be sympathetic to China have been largely sidelined over the last 12 years, according to two former senior-level officials who handled Asian affairs. Several current and former Japanese diplomats emphasized that both sides are responsible for the current freeze. China, they say, appears to increasingly value demonstrating its military strength, even at the risk of causing discord. The Chinese Foreign Ministry – the one official channel open to Japan – has little sway with members of China’s more powerful military and Politburo. Japanese officials say it is increasingly difficult to talk to the Chinese decision-makers, even through the secretive back channels that were once a staple of relations. The last such channel, between Zeng Qinghong, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Nonaka Hiromu, a powerful figure in Japan’s largest political party, disappeared when Zeng retired in 2008, according to an April report on Japan-China relations by the International Crisis Group. In recent months, even the most basic attempts at agreement have fallen apart. Officials on both sides say they’re interested in dialogue, but China says it should only happen after Japan acknowledges that the uninhabited rocks it controls in the East China Sea are indeed disputed. Japanese officials say their claim on the rocks is so incontrovertible that no dispute exists. The feud over the rocky islands – known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands and in China as the Diaoyu Islands – escalated after China declared an “air defense
identification zone” over them last month. “The situation now is that both sides are embroiled in conflicts, and they pretty much insist on doing things their own way,” said Liang Yunxiang, a specialist in China-Japan relations at Peking University’s School of International Studies. Within Japan’s Foreign Ministry, relations were largely managed by a group known as the “China School” – officers trained for years in the Chinese language, who also gained vast knowledge of Chinese political history. One of their biggest jobs was crisis prevention, said Makita Kunihiko, one of the China School members and a retired high-ranking official. They worked quietly to prevent activist landings on disputed islands and revisions of history textbooks that would have downplayed Japan’s responsibility for World War II atrocities. They also opposed the idea of Japanese prime ministers visiting Yasukuni Shrine, a controversial Shinto site that honors 14 war criminals among its war dead. “I regard the relationship as a minefield,” Makita said. “If you are careless, you hit a mine and it explodes. The responsibility for Japanese Foreign Ministry officers is to make sure mines don’t explode.” But over the past two decades, Makita said, officers who were considered China specialists have increasingly been attacked by Japan’s right wing. Much of that, he said, is a result of China’s behavior: Its increased military spending and patrolling of the waters around it has swung public sentiment. Nine in 10 Japanese people now view China negatively. Since the early 2000s, Makita and another former senior official said, China School officers have been less likely to get top positions, leading to a more hard-line policy toward Beijing. Since 2001, Japan’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau has been run by non-China specialists. Some of Japan’s ambassadors to China have also been non-China specialists, including the current one, Kitera Masato, a member of the Foreign Ministry’s French School. “Gradually, the China School has started to have a bad connotation, as making too many compromises,” said the other former senior Foreign Ministry official, who is not a China School member and requested anonymity in order to speak about a sensitive topic. “I think there was an effort to exclude them from decision-making on China. The background is clearly [that] China rises rapidly, and there’s a growing anti-China feeling. Politicians figure the China School is not appropriate to represent Japan.” A current high-level official in the Foreign Ministry says it is “too simplified” to suggest that China School officers have been phased out. Rather, China’s power has grown so much that it can no longer be handled with just “one taste” or opinion, he said. Japan’s Foreign Ministry, he noted, has always shuffled its officers from region to region, no matter their original area of expertise. Japan purchased several of the contested East China Sea islands from a private landowner. The purchase was an attempt to prevent the islands from falling into the hands of former Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro, a nationalist, but Japan’s central government again underestimated the Chinese backlash. While considering the purchase, Japan ignored the advice of its then-ambassador to China, Niwa Uichiro, who warned it could spark a crisis. At the time, Niwa faced broad criticism for the comments, and some Japanese parliament members called for his firing. Niwa was replaced months later. In remarks earlier this year at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, Niwa said Japan had “misread” the Chinese response, and added that Beijing viewed the purchase as an “insult.” “If we were a married couple, we could have divorced. But that isn’t an option,” Niwa said. “We will be neighbors [for good] and whether we like it or not.” (Chico Harlan, “As Japan and China Clash, Their Diplomats See Little Chance to Talk It out,” Washington Post, December 8, 2013, p. A-8)
KCNA: “A report on the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was released on December 8. The following is the full text of the report: An enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK was held in Pyongyang, the capital of the revolution, on December 8. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the WPK, guided the meeting. Present there were members and alternate members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK. Leading officials of the Central Committee of the WPK, provincial party committees and armed forces organs attended it as observers. Our party members, service personnel and all other people have made energetic efforts to implement the behests of leader Kim Jong Il, entrusting their destiny entirely to Kim Jong Un and getting united close around the Central Committee of the WPK since the demise of Kim Jong Il, the greatest loss to the nation. In this historic period for carrying forward the revolutionary cause of Juche the chance elements and alien elements who had made their ways into the party committed such anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts as expanding their forces through factional moves and daring challenge the party, while attempting to undermine the unitary leadership of the party. In this connection, the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK convened its enlarged meeting and discussed the issue related to the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts committed by Jang Song Thaek. The meeting, to begin with, fully laid bare the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts of Jang Song Thaek and their harmfulness and reactionary nature. It is the immutable truth proved by the nearly 70-year-long history of the WPK that the party can preserve its revolutionary nature as the party of the leader and fulfill its historic mission only when it firmly ensures its unity and cohesion based on the monolithic idea and the unitary center of leadership. The entire party, whole army and all people are dynamically advancing toward the final victory in the drive for the building of a thriving nation, meeting all challenges of history and resolutely foiling the desperate moves of the enemies of the revolution under the leadership of Kim Jong Un. Such situation urgently calls for consolidating as firm as a rock the single-minded unity of the party and the revolutionary ranks with Kim Jong Un as its unitary centre and more thoroughly establishing the monolithic leadership system of the party throughout the party and society. The Jang Song Thaek group, however, committed such anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts as gnawing at the unity and cohesion of the party and disturbing the work for establishing the party unitary leadership system and perpetrated such ant-state, unpopular crimes as doing enormous harm to the efforts to build a thriving nation and improve the standard of people’s living. Jang pretended to uphold the party and leader but was engrossed in such factional acts as dreaming different dreams and involving himself in double-dealing behind the scene. Though he held responsible posts of the party and state thanks to the deep political trust of the party and leader, he committed such perfidious acts as shunning and obstructing in every way the work for holding President Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in high esteem for all ages, behaving against the elementary sense of moral obligation and conscience as a human being. Jang desperately worked to form a faction within the party by creating illusion about him and winning those weak in faith and flatterers to his side. Prompted by his politically-motivated ambition, he tried to increase his force and build his base for realizing it by implanting those who had been punished for their serious wrongs in the past period into ranks of officials of
departments of the party central committee and units under them. Jang and his followers did not sincerely accept the line and policies of the party, the organizational will of the WPK, but deliberately neglected their implementation, distorted them and openly played down the policies of the party. In the end, they made no scruple of perpetrating such **counter-revolutionary acts as disobeying the order issued by the supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army**. The Jang group **weakened the party’s guidance over judicial, prosecution and people’s security bodies**, bringing very harmful consequences to the work for protecting the social system, policies and people. Such acts are **nothing but counter-revolutionary, unpopular criminal acts of giving up the class struggle and paralyzing the function of popular democratic dictatorship**, yielding to the offensive of the hostile forces to stifle the DPRK. Jang seriously obstructed the nation’s economic affairs and the improvement of the standard of people’s living in violation of the pivot-to-the-Cabinet principle and the Cabinet responsibility principle laid down by the WPK. The Jang group put under its control the fields and units which play an important role in the nation’s economic development and the improvement of people’s living in a crafty manner, making it impossible for the economic guidance organs including the Cabinet to perform their roles. By **throwing the state financial management system into confusion** and **committing such act of treachery as selling off precious resources of the country at cheap prices**, the group made it impossible to carry out the behests of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on developing the industries of Juche iron, Juche fertilizer and Juche vinalon. **Affected by the capitalist way of living**, Jang committed irregularities and corruption and **led a dissolute and depraved life**. By abusing his power, he was engrossed in irregularities and corruption, had improper relations with several women and was wined and dined at back parlors of deluxe restaurants. **Ideologically sick and extremely idle and easy-going**, he **used drugs** and **squandered foreign currency at casinos while he was receiving medical treatment in a foreign country** under the care of the party. Jang and his followers committed criminal acts baffling imagination and they did tremendous harm to our party and revolution. The ungrateful criminal acts perpetrated by the group of Jang Song Thaek are lashing our party members, service personnel of the People’s Army and people into great fury as it committed such crimes before they observed two-year mourning for Kim Jong Il, eternal general secretary of the WPK. Speakers were made at the enlarged meeting. Speakers bitterly criticized in unison the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts committed by the Jang group and expressed their firm resolution to remain true to the idea and leadership of Kim Jong Un and devotedly defend the Party Central Committee politically and ideologically and with lives. The meeting adopted a decision of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee on relieving Jang of all posts, depriving him of all titles and expelling him and removing his name from the WPK. The party served warning to Jang several times and dealt blows at him, watching his group’s anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts as it has been aware of them from long ago. But it did not pay heed to it but went beyond tolerance limit. That was why the party eliminated Jang and purged his group, unable to remain an onlooker to its acts any longer, dealing telling blows at sectarian acts manifested within the party. Our party will never pardon anyone challenging its leadership and infringing upon the interests of the state and people in violation of the principle of the revolution, regardless of his or her position and merits. No matter how mischievously a tiny
handful of anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional elements may work, they can never shake the revolutionary faith of all party members, service personnel and people holding Kim Jong Un in high esteem as the unitary centre of unity and unitary centre of leadership. **The discovery and purge of the Jang group,** a modern day faction and undesirable elements who happened to worm their ways into our party ranks, made our party and revolutionary ranks purer and helped consolidate our single-minded unity remarkably and advance more dynamically the revolutionary cause of Juche along the road of victory. No force on earth can deter our party, army and people from dynamically advancing toward a final victory, single-mindedly united around Kim Jong Un under the uplifted banner of great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.” (KCNA, “Report on Enlarged Meeting of Political Bureau of Central Committee of WPK,” December 9, 2013)

Mansourov: “Reportedly, Korean People’s Army (KPA) Defense Security Command arrested and executed Jang’s deputies Ri Ryong Ha and Chang Su Kil on November 12, probably put Jang under house arrest on November 18 and moved him to a special detention facility on November 30. Then the regime staged a show of publicly arresting him again in front of all senior party officials at the Politburo meeting on December 8. The footage of Jang’s public arrest aired on Korean central television the next day was probably meant to show that Jang had no support in the party and that Kim Jong Un fully controlled the situation without fear of any resistance from the senior cadres in attendance. In early December, Jang’s name was deleted from DPRK official media websites and his images were redacted from numerous documentaries about Kim Jong Un’s activities. The evidence indicating that Jang was losing his grip on power has been accumulating since late last year, but foreign observers simply did not pay attention because of the dominant belief that he was the *éminence grise* behind Kim Jong Un’s throne. In hindsight, some of the unusual developments around Jang which seemed odd at the time but were discounted because of his presumed omni-powerful status now reflect on the grey cardinal in a new less flattering light and may offer clues to his mounting troubles. Three abnormal events stand out. First, in November 2012, the enlarged meeting of the WPK CC Politburo decided to establish the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission to spearhead the development of North Korea into a sports power, appointing Jang as its inaugural chairman. This may have been the beginning of his demise. Although sports can bring quick popularity, earn foreign exchange, raise patriotic fever, and help burn the energies of the youth and distract the masses from their daily hardships, it can never beat national security and socio-economic development in terms of its political significance. By asking Jang to chair the National Sports Commission, the young North Korean leader, less than a year into power, might have begun to nudge his uncle out of important policy deliberations. Second, in January 2013, Jang, vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission, was not invited to the meeting of top officials handling security and foreign affairs—viewed as the North’s equivalent of the US National Security Council—in which Kim Jong Un made “an important decision to take substantial and high-profile important state measures” after discussing the impact of new UN sanctions imposed on Pyongyang for the December 2012 rocket launch. Jang’s glaring absence signaled the emergence of a possible crack in the senior leadership, especially in the relationship between Kim and his all-powerful uncle,
raising the possibility of divergent approaches between Kim and Jang to the North’s foreign policy strategy, especially on the issue of conducting a nuclear test and ways to cope with sanctions. Third, when Choe Ryong Hae, vice-chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC) and Director of the KPA General Political Department, visited China as Kim’s special envoy in late May 2013, it was striking that Kim had chosen Choe, not his uncle, as his first special envoy overseas. In hindsight, it appears that as the perceived “China man in Pyongyang,” Jang may have been foregone by Kim Jong Un, who may have wanted to send a strong signal to China on the controversial issue of escalation of nuclear tensions and DPRK nuclear deterrence, because of Jang’s known partiality with respect to China and his interest in preserving his own good standing in Beijing. His perceived close ties with China may have done a disservice to his standing in the eyes of Kim, exposed him to criticism of being too subservient to China, and made him vulnerable to any anti-China backlash in Pyongyang. On December 8, the Politburo said: “Jang pretended to uphold the party and leader but was engrossed in such factional acts as dreaming different dreams and involving himself in double-dealing behind the scene.” What must have been particularly unsettling to Kim Jong Un was Jang’s continued expression of sympathy towards Kim Jong Il’s eldest son Kim Jong Nam, who is hiding in exile under the protection of Chinese government. Four alternative hypotheses emerged to explain Jang’s downfall: 1) Jang’s attempt to form his own center of power and challenge Kim Jong Un; 2) a power struggle between two regents (Jang and Choe); 3) policy disagreements within the top leadership on such principal issues as the main party line on parallel economic construction and nuclear development (the “byungjin line”); and 4) Kim Kyong Hui’s decision to punish or get rid of Jang. I believe that Jang has only himself and his political ambitions to blame for his downfall. His hubris blindsided him. He became too arrogant and hungry for power. Jang became an uber-general, who began to build his own inner fortress, forming a significant political clique of his own within the party central committee, and ignoring Kim Jong II’s dictum against intra-party factionalism. In the end, he overreached and crashed down. Several analysts speculate that co-regent Vice-Marshal Choe Ryong Hae has been the driving force in eliminating Jang, and his ousting may be the culmination of a war of regents that has been raging in Pyongyang ever since they joined together to remove Kim’s foremost guardian—Vice-Marshal Ri Yong Ho in July 2012. From this perspective, Jang lost out in a power struggle with Choe, who was able to persuade the military that Jang was their enemy number one who arbitrarily prosecuted their colleagues. It is noteworthy that the photo of Jang’s arrest released by North Korea prominently features the former Chief of General Staff General Kim Kyong Sik, who was rumored to have been one of the victims of Jang-instigated purge last August; he looks with approval, ready to help the guards to restrain Jang. It has been evident that Jang and Choe did not like each other and sought to develop personal followings, build their own power bases and support networks at the expense of one another. For instance, Jang made a significant bridgehead within the military as approximately 200,000 troops fell under the control of the WPK CC Administration Department he headed. Both sought to accumulate independent financial resources to buy loyalties and promote their own policy priorities, while scheming against each other until Choe prevailed. If the North Korean military was convinced that it was Jang who orchestrated ceaseless purges within the KPA over the past two years as the guy in charge of North Korean gulag, it was
probably relatively easy for Choe to get the KPA top brass onboard behind his campaign to undermine and oust Jang. This is how, after the death of Stalin, the then-Soviet collective leadership was able to remove his notorious henchman Beria from power in December 1953. The Politburo accused Jang and his group of weakening the party's guidance over judicial, prosecution and people's security bodies, which brought “very harmful consequences” to the work for protecting the social system, policies and people. Jang’s departure from the political scene may turn out to be a double-edged sword for his chief political opponent. On the one hand, Jang’s disappearance will clear the space for Choe to expand his own political influence, especially in the power bloc previously controlled by Jang. But, on the other hand, it may also expose Choe to accusations and suspicions that he is harboring his own ambitions for supreme power and may make Kim Jong Un increasingly uneasy about Choe’s growing political influence. Some ROK analysts have attributed Jang’s disappearance to his deepening policy disagreements with Kim Jong Un and other senior officials, especially in the Politburo and the Cabinet. They assert that Jang advocated a forceful push for a broad and deep Chinese-style economic reform and wide opening, while moderating the country’s nuclear and space ambitions. This position put him at odds with Kim Jong Un’s “byungjin line” and traditionalist hardliners seeking to limit any reform while prioritizing a strong defense. Of particular concern to the new leadership, which chose to emphasize Kim Jong Il-style patriotism and the DPRK’s unique national identity, must have been Jang’s insistence on further expanding relations with Beijing—to placate and embrace China, to live the “China dream” and emulate everything Chinese—as well as his intimate connections in Beijing, which were beyond Kim Jong Un’s reach. According to North Korean defectors in Seoul, “the North Korean people see Jang as the economically savvy manager who knows a lot about China; and for Kim Jong Un, the fact that people view Jang this way must have been fairly unsettling.” By removing Jang, Kim Jong Un eliminated a possible rival who could have become a popular elderly leader riding the wave of Chinese-style economic liberalization one day. Indeed, over the past two years, Jang dramatically increased his role in economic policymaking, especially by commandeering the KPA-controlled enterprises that earned foreign currency from overseas trade. This caused considerable tensions in his relations with the Cabinet of Ministers and convinced the state economic bureaucracy that Jang was looking only after himself and his cronies at the expense of the state economic interests. In the short term, one can expect greater uncertainty as to the future of economic reform. Some analysts regard Jang as “a reformer” and now expect considerable backtracking on economic reform measures or, at the very least, a certain deceleration of the pace of changes promoted by the North Korean government. Alternatively, others regard Jang as a proponent of cautious “half measures” and a stumbling block in the way of genuine reforms and consider his dismissal as a very big step in taking the power away from the old guard inherited from Kim Jong Il’s era. They argue that it might help Kim Jong Un unleash new political forces advocating much more ambitious reforms, which could be really transformational in nature and produce “quite literally a Deng Xiaoping like moment” in North Korea in the next 1-2 years. Ultimately, whoever will fill the power vacuum left by Jang—more ardent advocates of reform and change or more staunch defenders of the status-quo ante—will tell us who exactly won the current round of power struggle in Pyongyang, the future of economic reforms, and how
stable the Kim regime may be in the future. Finally, Jang’s relationship with his wife Kim Kyong Hui, who was reportedly the executor of her brother Kim Jong Il’s last wishes, was traditionally tense, despite the fact that he derived his status and power primarily from his marriage. As her health deteriorated throughout the year, she was reportedly less and less inclined to put up with his shenanigans or to defend him against his critics. Probably with Kim Kyong Hui’s acquiescence, the Politburo accused Jang of all sorts of moral indiscretions and criminal acts committed because of his infatuation with the capitalist way of living. Specifically, “in his dissolute and depraved life,” Jang was said to “abuse his power, was engrossed in irregularities and corruption, had improper relations with several women and was wined and dined at back parlors of deluxe restaurants.” He was “ideologically sick and extremely idle and easy-going, he used drugs and squandered foreign currency at casinos while he was receiving medical treatment in a foreign country under the care of the party.” Some people say Jang’s ouster may be temporary and he could return to power soon, citing his previous comebacks. Yes, indeed, quick-witted and politically ambitious Jang is a survivor, and he did come back several times before. But, I believe he will not come back this time. The Politburo indictment of “Jang and his faction” is so unprecedented in its severity and its open and scathing repudiation of Jang that it probably means that he is gone forever, and that Kim Kyong Hui either acquiesced to it or could not do anything to stop Kim Jong Un. In the past, Kim Jong Il loved his sister (Jang’s wife) and did anything to please her; so when she asked him to teach a lesson to her philandering and arrogant husband, Kim Jong Il restrained or demoted him, then forgave Jang because she pleaded with her brother to bring him back from exile. Now, it is Kim Jong Un’s reign. He probably believes that he owes nothing to his aunt and uncle-in-law. Moreover, Kim probably wants to get out of their shadow as soon as possible, like any other 30-year old man. Under present circumstances, such a dramatic and irreversible downfall of Jang Song Thaek means that Kim Kyong Hui probably exhausted her patience with Jang for whatever reason and decided to sever their tortuous relationship at last. By eliminating Jang, Kim Jong Un has proven that he reigns supreme and is a formidable presence to be discounted only at one’s own peril. He knows his way around the dog eat dog world of North Korea, and will not hesitate to dance on his rival’s grave. In short, Kim is demonstrating swift ruthlessness in eliminating his potential enemies inside the royal palace and military barracks. Clearly, Kim Jong Un outwitted Jang, who must have known very well what could happen to the mentor of supreme leader when his apprentice outgrows him, and, therefore, schemed tirelessly to secure his long-term position, but to no avail. By dumping Jang, Kim Jong Un dismissed or demoted five (U Dong Chuk, Ri Yong Ho, Kim Jong Gak, Kim Yong Chun, and Jang Song Thaek) out of seven guardians appointed by Kim Jong Il to help him solidify his grip on power. Only party secretaries Kim Ki Nam (87) and Choe Thae Bok (83) are still standing, though probably not for long, given their very advanced age; however, they really are no longer part of Kim Jong Un’s inner circle. This trend suggests that Kim feels increasingly self-confident and is no longer willing to delegate his authority to his presumed patrons. The purge of Jang Song Thaek and his faction reflects Kim Jong Un’s recognition of the threat of factionalism and the importance of nipping it in the bud before it got out of hand. It may also indicate that Kim Jong Un is having doubts about relying on his family members to rule. Instead, he seems to prefer to rely on the descendants of other revolutionary families, who can be
controlled and manipulated without hesitation and doubt. Kim may feel that he no longer needs the issue-area policy czars and can now make major policy decisions on his own. Jang’s purge, far from undermining the stability of the regime, may open a period of cleansing with big and small purges as well as loyalty competitions among the elites, further cementing Kim’s firm grip on absolute power and establishing him as the “sole center of unity” and “unified leadership system” in the DPRK. The war of regents may be over, but it is a Pyrrhic victory for Choe Ryong Hae, because Kim Jong Un is no longer inclined to allow others to concentrate power in their hands at his expense, especially as far as the number two person is concerned. Hence, Choe beware, you may be next! Kim keeps biting the hand that feeds him. Finally, to avoid a similar fate, Kim Jong Un must outwit and outplay his enemies, by being more ruthless and determined than all of them combined. In other words, Kim “the Charmer” must become Kim “the Decider” like his father was and follow Kim Jong Il’s playbook, if he wants to survive the increasingly rough waters of North Korean politics.” (Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korea: The Dramatic Fall of Jang Song Thaek,” 38North, December 9, 2013)

12/9/13 Crisis Group: “President Xi Jinping’s messages from summits with his U.S. and South Korean counterparts signalled rising discontent with the regime. However, these actions were designed to manage the North’s behavior and defuse mounting regional tensions, rather than to achieve denuclearization. They were short-term, tactical and easily reversible, not indications of a strategic change in policy. Beijing likely considers Washington a bigger threat to its geostrategic interests than Pyongyang and its North Korea policy contingent on Sino-U.S. relations. Though China’s leadership intends to build what it calls a “new type of major power relationship” with the U.S., Washington’s rebalancing toward Asia has deepened suspicion. A popular view in China is that the Obama administration has been taking advantage of tensions on the Korean peninsula (as well as in the East and South China Seas) to strengthen its strategic position in East Asia. Deep-seated mistrust of the U.S. impedes cooperation on denuclearisation and enhances Pyongyang’s value to Beijing, even though the North is no longer seen as the military bulwark it once was. China-ROK relations have warmed significantly but not sufficiently to alter either’s strategic calculation on the Korean peninsula. … The North’s actions galled Beijing in multiple ways. There was little advance notice before the December 2012 satellite launch or the third nuclear test, which took place against China’s repeated advice. Pyongyang’s defiance, seen as “one slap after another,” was especially grating in Chinese eyes as President Xi Jinping’s father belonged to the same revolutionary generation as Kim Jong-un’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung. Many in Beijing perceived young Kim’s behavior as open disrespect for the elder Xi. The Pyongyang political elites were viewed in China as ingrates: “They just come to us and ask for stuff when they need us.” The nuclear test interrupted the most important Chinese holiday, the spring festival (Lunar New Year), when most workers and government officials take a week’s leave for family gatherings, and set off a minor public relations crisis that Beijing scrambled to manage. The Punggye-ri nuclear test site (Mt. Mantap) is only about 70km from the border, and a tremor was felt on the Chinese side during the test. Such proximity sparked concerns among nearby residents for radioactive fallout [post-Fukushima]. Even the state-owned Xinhua News Agency noted: “In theory, radioactive material cannot easily escape to the Chinese
side. Were there to be any error during the test process, however, underground water, nearby sea and even the atmosphere could face the threat of contamination.” The environmental protection ministry issued a statement on 13 February to allay fears and assure the public it was ready to respond to any emergency, but Chinese netizens were not comforted. In the days following the test, posts on Weibo, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter, questioned the ministry’s credibility and mocked its record of protecting air, water and food safety. Many also commented that assisting and accommodating the North was a bad deal for China. Both Pyongyang’s bellicose behavior and the efforts of Washington and Seoul to bolster deterrence appeared to rattle Beijing and pressure the leadership to rein in the DPRK. Beijing viewed the turbulence as an extremely inopportune distraction. The satellite launch came on the heels of China’s once-in-a-decade leadership transition. The nuclear test occurred when the new party leaders were forming a government. Beijing also faced deteriorating relations with Japan and on-going tensions in the South China Sea. Pyongyang became “another headache” for the new leader, Xi, just as China was talking about forging “a new type of major power relationship” with the Americans. Some Chinese analysts feared that “North Korea’s behavior could add friction between China and the U.S.” Reflecting growing frustration with its neighbor, China took a tougher line. Beginning in April and through early summer, it used stronger rhetoric, reportedly slowed bilateral economic projects and sent other signals of displeasure through diplomatic channels. Many in the West, which had long been frustrated by Beijing’s reluctance to apply pressure on the North, thought its patience might finally be exhausted. However, hopes that China might become a more willing participant in the Western approach to denuclearize North Korea proved too optimistic. The initial protests after the third nuclear test were largely routine. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi summoned Ambassador Chi Jae-ryong - a step not taken after the first two - to say China was “strongly dissatisfied with” and “firmly opposed to” the test. But the content of the verbal protest and the text of the ministry’s official statement were nearly identical to what was said after the previous tests. It took until early April, after the North’s bellicose threats had been met with robust U.S. responses, for Chinese leaders to issue unusually stern warnings. President Xi Jinping said “no one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains”, and his message was reinforced by other leaders. Many Western media assumed that Pyongyang, though not named, was the intended recipient of the warnings and speculated that Beijing was finally ready to change its DPRK policy. Domestic interpretation was more nuanced. Analysts said Xi’s remark was also directed at the U.S. and South Korea. “China was unhappy with North Korea, but also unhappy with the U.S. and the ROK boosting military deployments and conducting combined military exercises.” Such sentiments were echoed in state media. Just three days after Xi spoke, the People’s Daily, the official publication of the Communist Party Central Committee, published an editorial warning the DPRK “not to misjudge the situation” but also admonishing the U.S. “not to add oil to the fire”, the ROK “not to miss the focus” and Japan “not to loot a burning house.” This reflected mainstream belief that Pyongyang was not the only party responsible for tensions and that the U.S. and its allies were overreacting and taking advantage of the situation to advance their own agendas. China apparently cooperated closely with Washington in drafting Security Council Resolution 2094. After joining the unanimous vote in favor, it appears to be
implementing sanctions against the DPRK more vigorously. The authorities have reportedly stepped up border inspections of North Korea-bound cargo. The transportation ministry issued a directive in April ordering “relevant agencies to take measures to strictly enforce” sanctions on additional items, North Korean individuals and entities, as specified in the resolution. In September, several ministries and agencies published a long list of dual-use items and technology banned from export to the North because it could be used for nuclear, missile, chemical or biological weapons. Chinese diplomats privately confirmed that Beijing for the first time was strictly enforcing the sanctions. The export control list generated international media speculation of a significant policy shift, but publication on government websites more likely reflected greater awareness of need for robust export controls and wider dissemination following updating of the Nuclear Supplier Group’s own list.

Establishing an effective export control system is difficult, especially in a large, populous country with a complex economy. China’s economy has grown greatly over two decades, and its firms have moved up the technology ladder. Even with strong political will, capacity and resource constraints make enforcement difficult. Though Beijing began to build the legal and institutional framework for export controls in the 1990s, the results have been mixed, with cases of sensitive exports to Iran, Pakistan and the DPRK. The government probably was influenced to publish its list also by discovery that the transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) for the DPRK mobile missile displayed in April 2012 were imported from a Chinese firm and that many components in the Ţnha-3 space launch vehicle (SLV) were imported. Likely reflecting discomfort with the DPRK’s increasing nuclear capability, Chinese cooperation on drafting and implementing Resolution 2094 probably was intended to signal disapproval of DPRK actions more than the concern for proliferation that some Chinese analysts describe as a top U.S. priority but less important for China. Western analysts also pointed out that, despite improvement, enforcement remains deficient. For example, Beijing has yet to establish a list of prohibited luxury goods, despite agreeing to ban such exports. The Bank of China announced on 7 May 2013 it had closed the account of the North Korea Foreign Trade bank (FTB) and cut off all dealings. This incurred protest from Pyongyang and praise from Washington, but other state-owned financial institutions did not act similarly, nor was the closure ordered directly by the government. “The government informed them about the new sanctions and reminded them of the risk of doing business with North Korea entities. The Bank of China made the decision based on its own risk assessment.” Beijing does not interpret the FTB as a target under Resolution 2094, but the U.S. Treasury formally sanctioned it in March via Executive Order 13382, which froze any assets in the U.S. and prohibited U.S.-based entities from doing transactions with it. The Bank of China operates in the U.S. and could have been vulnerable had it continued dealings with the FTB. Although state-owned, its decision appears motivated by self-preservation, not a broader push by the Chinese government to cut off financial transactions with the DPRK. In the weeks following the third nuclear test, officials in China’s Jilin province, one of two bordering the DPRK, reported a slight decline in North Korea-bound goods and investment. Officials explained this as a sign firms were adjusting their operations because of perceived political and security risks. Chinese businessmen said they noticed no changes in central or local government policies but cited uncertainty regarding Pyongyang policies and politics, as well as their concerns for possible instability on the Korean
peninsula, as reasons for limiting the expansion of their business activities. Jilin provincial officials and analysts also reported a slowing of China-funded infrastructure upgrades for the Rason Special Economic Zone, in the DPRK’s far northeast. A project that connects Rason to the Chinese power grid, scheduled for completion in June, was delayed, reportedly because Beijing wished to send a signal to Pyongyang. Chinese analysts explained, however, that the commitment to make Rason a demonstration project for bilateral economic cooperation is unchanged. The institutional structure for joint management and coordination there was implemented in November 2012, when a committee opened for operations in a Rason office building constructed by China. China’s participation in the Rason SEZ has been aimed at drawing the DPRK closer into its economic orbit, seemingly to expose it to economic reforms in the hope that Pyongyang would change its thinking and policy orientation. Such intentions almost certainly would endure, even if the DPRK holds another nuclear test, though China likely would slow economic cooperation projects in the case of a serious transgression. It might seek to calibrate the pace of such cooperation so as to persuade Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party process, or to “blunt the momentum of the DPRK’s growing nuclear capability”, Chinese analysts said. Another telling sign of Beijing’s intention was that it did not reduce the supply of fuel, mainly through a pipeline across the Yalu River, after the third nuclear test and throughout the DPRK’s provocative behavior in March-April 2013. Fuel is Beijing’s most potent leverage: the DPRK imports nearly 90 per cent of its energy from China. While some Chinese analysts assess that the North would have collapsed in weeks if the flow had been cut, they stress that such a drastic measure would be unlikely, even with further nuclear tests, unless the North turned openly hostile to China. Nevertheless, Pyongyang appears to be seeking to reduce its dependence slightly by signing a deal for a Mongolian firm to invest in a 20 per cent share of a North Korean oil refinery. Beijing has calibrated its economic sanctions to “punish but not to strangle” Pyongyang and underline its influence. Chinese officials repeatedly emphasized that sanctions must be proportionate, moderate and aimed only at bringing the North back to talks, not at weakening the regime. There is no intention to use economic leverage to achieve denuclearization. “We can’t cut off connections with the DPRK because of its nuclear program. We have to stay with them, even if they conduct a fourth or fifth nuclear test,” a Chinese analyst said. ...The display of sternness toward Pyongyang was underlined by a convergence of opinion in China’s foreign policy circles that some policy adjustment on the North was desirable. Such open debate is no longer unusual; every time in recent years the DPRK has done something wrong it has sparked an internal debate. However, the early 2013 variant was more serious, a Chinese scholar said, as “more and more people think North Korea does not consider China’s interests.” Another novelty was emergence of the “centrists”. Past debates featured “strategists”, who argued for outright abandonment of Pyongyang, against “traditionalists,” who advocated keeping the special bond between communist countries. The latter, disillusioned by repeated DPRK disregard for China’s interests, and the former, willing to settle for gradual change, converged in the center, concluding that “a middle road” had to be found. “Abandoning North Korea is not a realistic choice for China, but we don’t need to cover up our displeasure like we did in the past.” The middle road also is an effort to balance relations with all parties. “If North Korea undermines North-East Asian stability and hurts Chinese interests, we have to respond [with punishment]. But this does not mean China is
siding with the U.S. and Japan against North Korea.” The emerging domestic consensus on the necessity for adjustment reflects the prevailing view that the previous, Hu Jintao, administration had been too tolerant, resulting in the DPRK undermining China’s interests. The Xi administration is attempting to lay down boundaries so that the Kim regime will seriously consider those interests before acting. Beijing is unlikely to continue unconditional support for the North, but it is unclear precisely what adjustments are probable. The most often heard view is that China would “mete out rewards and punishment accordingly. This seeming ambiguity and flexibility means there is room for cooperation with the West but also that Chinese measures will be reactive to Pyongyang’s behavior. In addition, Beijing will respond to Washington’s DPRK policy. According to a Chinese analyst, “if the U.S., like it was under the Bush administration, wants regime change [in the DPRK], of course we have to side with North Korea.” Beijing’s actions and the trajectory of domestic debate have made it clear that China under Xi Jinping will be much less tolerant of errant North Korean behavior than previously, but this is far from a wholesale policy change. Chinese actions will likely continue to be tactical, designed to manage and control Pyongyang’s behavior but not have a denuclearized North as their goal. The adjustments are “tactical but not strategic” and “changes in attitude and implementation but not policy.” They enable cooperation with Washington and Seoul, but “the expectations should not be too high,” a Chinese scholar said. Beijing’s calculation will be guided by its own interests, which both overlap with those of others and diverge from them in some fundamental ways. The role Beijing chooses to play on the nuclear issue reflects its geopolitical positioning and perception of strategic advantages and constraints. The U.S. relationship dominates calculations: China’s North Korea policy eventually will be decided by Sino-U.S. relations. If the U.S. tries to contain or encircle China, then more people will think we should help North Korea. If... relations get better, there will be more cooperation [on North Korea].” The ambiguous role Beijing plays is defined by the hedging strategy toward Washington: “Externally, we say we want to establish a new type of major power relationship with the U.S. and that we want it to be win-win. Internally, we say the U.S. wants to contain China and wants to subvert the Chinese government.” Establishing “a new type of major power relationship” with the U.S. is a signature Xi Jinping foreign policy initiative. At his June meeting with Obama, he said it ought to be characterised by “no conflict; no confrontation; mutual respect; and win-win cooperation.” The U.S. has not fully adopted the concept but endorsed building “a new model of relations between an existing power and an emerging one.” The summit led to mutual expression of desire to cooperate on the nuclear issue. That offers promise to expand common ground but does not bridge the gap in positions. China falls far short of U.S. expectations that it put more pressure on the North; it wants the U.S. to return to the Six-Party Talks, but Washington is reluctant without a clear DPRK commitment to previous agreements. This difference resulted in diverging scripts on the nature of cooperation. The U.S. reported that the leaders “stressed the importance of continuing to apply pressure ... to halt North Korea’s ability to proliferate”. China reiterated “solving the North Korea nuclear issue ... through dialogue and negotiation.” Sino-U.S. cooperation on the nuclear issue is likely to remain superficial due to non-alignment of priorities. High-level visiting U.S. officials consistently send the message that such cooperation “could be a test” for the new type of relationship China wants to forge. To Beijing, the
cooperation is contingent on Washington’s attitude and actions, as well as its own other geopolitical concerns. “If we have the U.S. selling weapons to Taiwan, if we have issues with the U.S. interfering in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, then there will not be smooth cooperation on the North Korea issue,” a Chinese analyst said. Many in China consider the U.S. and its allies pose a larger challenge to China’s regional strategic interests than North Korea. They see Korean peninsula issues through the lens of Sino-U.S. rivalry. “The U.S. is concerned about the Chinese dragon behind North Korea. We are concerned about the U.S. eagle behind South Korea.”

Washington’s rebalancing to Asia reinforced suspicion, called by hardliners an attempt to contain China and by moderates a hedge against its rise. Many suspect the U.S. uses the DPRK nuclear program as an excuse to strengthen regional alliances and advance its overall Asia-Pacific strategy. Officials repeatedly stress to U.S. counterparts that “Beijing was not convinced that the deployment of U.S. missile defence assets are only in response to North Korea and [considers that they] are not in China’s strategic interest.” Beijing’s deep mistrust presents a dilemma for cooperation on denuclearization. Robust responses to Pyongyang by the U.S. and its allies, including combined military exercises, missile defence system upgrades and military deployments, can have the consequence of convincing Beijing more than the North’s belligerence – that its strategic interests are in jeopardy. They motivate Beijing to try to defuse tensions on the peninsula but also deepen its suspicion and undercut its willingness for meaningful cooperation. Chinese analysts point out that the UN Command (UNC) was formed “against China and the DPRK” during the Korean War. “With such large-scale military exercises in the Yellow Sea, how do you think we Chinese feel? It’s hard for us even to convince ourselves that such actions were not carried out partially with China in mind.” As a result, Beijing can be expected to do the necessary to manage Pyongyang’s behavior, so as to tamp down tensions and prevent what it considers overreaction from Washington. Though denuclearisation is stated as a long-term Chinese goal, it appears subordinate to countering U.S. influence and hedging against U.S. advances in the region. China is unlikely to sacrifice North Korea to serve the interests of what it perceives to be a rival and potential foe. Each time a crisis flares on the Korean peninsula, it sparks debates in China on the costs and benefits of sheltering the North, whose strategic value to China continues to evolve. The cost of sustaining the Kim regime may have increased, and the benefits may have declined, but the calculation remains that the potential consequences of cutting Pyongyang loose are unacceptable. China has traditionally considered North Korea a military buffer for its north east, countering U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and Japan. The geography of the Korean peninsula provides few barriers to rapid military manoeuvres from south to north or vice versa. It could also facilitate an invasion of China by Japan or vice versa, as has happened several times in history. Mao Zedong described the China-North Korea relationship as that of “the lips and teeth,” a phrase derived from the Chinese idiom that “if the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold.” The military buffer value of the DPRK has lessened in the age of long-range missiles and cyber warfare and in the face of continued U.S. naval dominance in the region. According to a Chinese analyst, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a keen understanding of such shifts: “Military conflicts have changed so much. There are no longer any land wars.” Nevertheless, North Korea is likely to remain a valuable geopolitical buffer for the foreseeable future. A shift away from China’s sphere of
influence would threaten one of two unpalatable outcomes for Beijing: a spurned Pyongyang turning to Washington; or a unified Korea strategically aligned with the U.S. Instead, as Asian coastal states, rattled by China’s assertiveness in maritime disputes, welcome a growing U.S. presence, and Myanmar, which not long ago counted China as one of its only friends, moves toward Western political values, the loss of a nuclear but allied North Korea becomes more unthinkable. Beijing’s fears make it hesitant to use its leverage over the DPRK; Pyongyang understands this and exploits it. Chinese analysts commonly believe that “when China uses its leverage, the leverage disappears.” The complexity of the DPRK-China security relationship has increased its ambiguity. The bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance stipulates that if one party is attacked, the other is to provide military help, but China has repeatedly avoided clarification on implementation. “The alliance relationship ... is kept ambiguous in the interest of both [signatories].” The treaty helps China maintain influence on the North, manage potential instability and discourage the U.S. and South Korea from military action against the DPRK. Beijing is aware, however, that the obligation stated in it could produce entanglement in an unwanted war triggered by the North. Pyongyang nominally relies on the treaty to counter the direct threat of the ROK-U.S. alliance but is suspicious of Chinese influence. In reality, its leadership, inspired by songun ideology (“military first”), considers no outside security guarantee credible. State ideology proclaims that security can only be assured by self-help and that military power, including nuclear weapons, is the best guarantee. The political relationship has also gone through transition, and the ideological bond has been frayed. “North Korea ... does not recognise China as a socialist country.” Once China began economic reform and opened up in the 1980s, North Koreans “grew suspicious, because they thought China has gone capitalist.” They also resent their dependence, due to national pride and the influence of Kim Il-sung’s chuch’e ideology, which emphasises self-reliance, ethnic nationalism and resistance to external influence. China considers the DPRK “a family dynasty.” Many Chinese, especially the younger generations to whom “blood alliance” is an abstract, anachronistic concept, view it with pity and contempt. Satirical jokes about Kim Jong-un populate the internet. In recent years, China has been de-emphasizing ideological affinity with the DPRK, instead stressing that the ties are “normal state-to-state relations.” The exact date when the shift began is hard to pinpoint, but Chinese scholars place it in the 1990s, when Deng Xiaoping started to balance relations with the two Koreas. There is no official explanation of what “normal” ties entail, compared to the old blood alliance, but Chinese analysts say China should fit its DPRK policy to national interests, not ideological and historical bonds. “We should make it clear to the DPRK that we can work together when our interests are aligned, but when we differ, the DPRK has to take China’s interests into consideration.” The “state-to-state” phrase also provides a cover for deflecting calls to do more to rein in Pyongyang. After each satellite launch or nuclear test since March 2009, the foreign ministry has repeated that “China and North Korea have normal state-to-state ties,” no more special than with other nations. Commenting on limited responsibility after the third nuclear test, Ai Ping, vice minister of the party’s international liaison department (ILD), said China “can’t wag its finger and impose its will .....” Despite the “normal relations” refrain, special political ties still at times define the relationship. Kim Jong-il in May 2010 was received by all nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee. “That’s abnormal, as no other country
gets such a reception,” a Chinese analyst said. Kim Jong-un’s envoy, Choe Ryong-hae, in May 2013 was first received by ILD Minister Wang Jiarui. “That means our relations are led by party-to-party political ties.” Compared with the ILD, “the foreign ministry doesn’t play much of a role” in shaping and implementing DPRK policy, a Chinese scholar said. The ambassador to North Korea, Liu Hongcai, is an ex-ILD vice minister in charge of North Korea affairs. The recent crisis on the Korean peninsula appeared to prompt Beijing to take institutional steps toward normal bilateral ties. In June 2013, it hosted the first strategic dialogue between the foreign ministries. Sending Li Yuanchao, the vice premier, rather than a Politburo Standing Committee member to Pyongyang for the Korean War armistice ceremony was also a “high-profile display that China and North Korea have normal state-to-state relations rather than a ‘blood alliance’”, according to a PLA scholar. The thinning ideological kinship does not suggest reluctance to sustain the Kim regime. Chinese often refer to North Korea, with a mixture of condescension, exasperation and affinity, as their errant little brother. The hidden message is that Beijing still sees Pyongyang as a member of the communist family and will continue to succor it, though it may at times enforce discipline. Meanwhile, the leadership under Xi Jinping, having concluded that a main cause of the Soviet Union’s collapse was that “their ideals and beliefs had been shaken”, has launched a Maoist-style campaign to forge ideological purity in the party, rebuild its legitimacy and tighten ideological control domestically. The failure of a China-friendly communist regime next door would run counter to these efforts. Mid-2013 brought China and South Korea dramatically closer. Under the slogan “a trip of heart and trust,” President Park visited in late June and was received warmly. Her personal charm, proficiency in Mandarin and professed love for Chinese culture and history delighted her hosts. Domestic commentators proclaimed that the visit ushered in “an era of high-speed development” or “a new starting point” for relations. Beijing likely sensed geopolitical profit. Understanding that the U.S. alliance remains the bedrock of South Korea’s security policy, strategists nevertheless saw potential in bringing Seoul closer. Nudging its neighbour toward a midpoint between the U.S. and China “will have a completely different geopolitical effect than leaving it entirely in the arms of the U.S.,” a newspaper editorialised, and the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations has also enhanced the value of Seoul’s friendship. Chinese media played up that Park departed from tradition, visiting Beijing before Tokyo. Headlines portrayed a Japan “nervous” at a China-ROK honeymoon. In a not-so-subtle reference to the enmity China and South Korea share toward Japan due to World War II and modern nationalism, the joint statement signed during Park’s visit expressed “special concerns” toward regional instability caused by historical issues. The appearance of rapport raised mutual hopes for more cooperation over North Korea. Park’s “trust-building process” for managing inter-Korean relations won support, as it is considered a more flexible alternative to Washington’s policy. Chinese analysts “perceive nuanced differences” between Seoul and Washington and say “Park’s approach toward the DPRK emphasises a correlation between security and the economy” that China sees as closer to its approach of engagement and dialogue. Seoul is also believed to place a higher premium on peace on the Korean peninsula compared to Washington’s denuclearization and non-proliferation priority. Many in China are convinced the Park administration is shifting away from the U.S. alliance-based framework for managing the North Korea issue in favor of U.S-China-ROK trilateral coordination. Seoul equally has raised its expectations
regarding China’s cooperation on the DPRK problem, and some South Koreans also seem convinced of a gradual convergence in views. “China is seeing the uncertainty with Kim Jong-un as well. China is reassessing the implications of a nuclear North Korea.” Heartened by subtle changes in China’s attitude – “at least debates are taking place on whether North Korea is a liability or asset” – Seoul intends to encourage such a shift. The aspiration for closer cooperation and coordination is tempered in both countries, however, by realistic understanding of divergent interests and objectives. “For Washington, the end goal for North Korea is denuclearisation and regime change. For the ROK, it’s reunification. China’s end goal is denuclearisation and peace. You can’t expect China to follow Washington and Seoul,” said a Chinese analyst. South Koreans acknowledge that their U.S. alliance and China-DPRK affinity remain hurdles to tightening ties with Beijing. Even during Park’s visit, differences emerged. Although she claimed she and President Xi “shared a common understanding that Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons is unacceptable under any circumstances”, the joint statement attributed this position to the ROK alone. When describing a shared position, the statement spoke of “relevant nuclear weapons development” and “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”, without naming the North. Beijing’s choice of words was a tacit nod to Pyongyang’s insistence that denuclearization must apply to the entire peninsula, including Washington’s nuclear umbrella. Walking a delicate balance between the two Koreas has been Beijing’s policy since it established diplomatic ties with the ROK in 1992. Those ties have not led to growing distance from the North. “We want to do business with both”, said a Chinese analyst. This policy is seen as advancing China’s primary goal of maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula, as it provides leverage over both. “If we stood on only one side, the situation would have been more tense than today”, a retired general said. Despite the appearance of convergence with the West on the denuclearisation goal, Beijing’s approach and timeline remain fundamentally different. Following Pyongyang’s third nuclear test, statements by Chinese leaders sparked speculation that Beijing had reordered its objectives and that denuclearization has risen to the top of its priorities. When meeting North Korean Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae in May, Xi Jinping stated China’s position as “insisting on the objective of denuclearizing the peninsula, insisting on maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and insisting on solving relevant issues through dialogues and consultation.” These “three insists” were repeated by Xi and other leaders and appeared to alter the traditional order of priorities: “no war, no instability, no nukes,” in descending order. But analysts explained that the “three insists” only clarify long-existing policy and do not mean denuclearisation now outranks stability. China’s “basic approach” remains “stabilising the region first – then, in a stable region, try to denuclearize.” China’s overall priorities remain economic development and domestic stability. Instability in North Korea would be disruptive. Though some Chinese analysts acknowledge that DPRK nuclear ambition is a major destabilising element, Beijing appears more concerned that Western style denuclearisation would lead to regime collapse or war, undermining Chinese national interests. It believes denuclearization can only be achieved in the long-term, while “peace and stability of the peninsula have to be guaranteed first.” Within this framework, most in China seem resigned that no credible pressure or deterrence could dissuade Pyongyang from its nuclear capability. Though Beijing has sent “lots of démarches, diplomatically and politically it’s impossible for China to take actions to
prevent a fourth nuclear test." Nor would that test impel China to increase pressure on
Pyongyang, beyond expressing “more frankly and toughly our dissatisfaction.” Beijing
does not see it as possible in the near term to stop the North from further tests and
satellite launches without jeopardizing its own basic interests. It is a mainstream view in
China that the nuclear issue’s root cause is the regime’s concern for survival. Analysts
see this concern as understandable, even if it is unjustifiable for Pyongyang to seek
security via nuclear weapons. Western countries believe developing nuclear weapons
for security is illegitimate, and other paths to national security are available. The widely
held view in China is that Pyongyang’s insecurity results from Washington’s refusal to
give a credible security guarantee. Some suggest a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty as
denuclearisation’s starting point. Many Chinese also believe Washington has
exacerbated the problem by “ignoring” it when things are calm and “overreacting”
when tensions rise. The U.S. view is that the DPRK repeatedly reneged on
denuclearization, so it will not negotiate further unless Pyongyang takes concrete steps
to dismantle its program. Chinese analysts blame the U.S. for “lost opportunities to
reach a peaceful solution” by ignoring Pyongyang’s desire for direct talks. One of them
said, “the Obama administration’s strategic patience is seen by analysts here as
strategic ignorance. It allowed North Korea to develop nuclear weapons.” Sanctions
are said to have inflicted pain on people, while “they sped up the nuclear programs.”
Chinese tend to believe deterrence and military exercises and deployments by the U.S.
and allies have deepened DPRK insecurity. “The U.S. made such big moves at North
Korea’s doorstep. It’s terrifying to North Korea.”
Beijing thus believes it is on
Washington to address the root cause and repair the damage of its policy. While the
U.S. and its allies see themselves as potential targets of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons,
Beijing does not believe its dependent neighbour would turn on it. China and the West
also differ on their assessments of the DPRK’s capabilities. The North’s three tests
indicate it has nuclear devices, but its ability to miniaturise a weapon to fit inside a
ballistic missile warhead is unknown. It has deployed mobile short-range missiles
capable of reaching targets throughout the ROK and mobile medium-range missiles
capable of striking Japan. It also is developing mobile intermediate-range and mobile
long-range missiles that could potentially strike the East Asian region and the U.S. In
Washington’s assessment, North Korea is thus “a direct threat” to its allies and “is
becoming more and more an issue of a direct threat to the homeland.” China has not
made its assessment public, but some Western diplomats have the impression “China
loves to look at North Korea condescendingly and sees North Koreans as a bunch of
bumbling idiots, and does not take North Korea’s nuclear capability seriously.” The
threat of proliferation by the North, one of Washington’s “gravest concerns,” is seen as
distant in China, whose primary concerns are the side effects of the nuclear program.
Its “ultimate nightmare scenario,” a Chinese scholar said, is the domino effect of the
ROK and/or Japan developing nuclear weapons in response to Pyongyang’s threat. A
close second is the North’s growing nuclear capability triggering military strikes by
Washington, destabilizing China’s periphery, sending millions of DPRK refugees across
the border into China, toppling the Kim regime or, worse still, forcing China into a war.
China fears that “a fire on the city gate could bring disaster to the fish in the moat.”
Pyongyang’s threat to the international non-proliferation regime is at times cited as a
Chinese concern. “As a member ..., China has its own interest in safeguarding the NPT
(Non-proliferation Treaty), especially if China wants to be a great power.” But such
protection of the "global commons" is secondary to other national interests. Instead, Chinese analysts see non-proliferation as much more a U.S. priority and argue that the burden is on Washington to win China’s cooperation for it: “If China feels comfortable and confident with the U.S., it will behave as a responsible big power, safeguarding the non-proliferation regime.” (International Crisis Group, *Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close*, December 9, 2013)

North Koreans had long known Jang Song-thaek as the No. 2 figure in their country, the revered uncle and mentor of Kim Jong-un, the paramount leader. Then on Monday state-run television showed two green-uniformed guards clutching a glum-looking Jang by the armpits and pulling him from a meeting of the ruling party after he was denounced for faction-building, womanizing, gambling and other acts as dozens of former comrades watched. The spectacle of Jang’s humiliating dismissal and arrest was a highly unusual glimpse of a power struggle unfolding inside the nuclear-armed country. But the major impact may be outside, and nowhere is the downfall more unnerving than in China. While there is no indication that the Chinese intend to change their view, it seemed clear that even Beijing’s top leaders were surprised by Jang’s abrupt downfall, and even more by the North Korean state television broadcast. “Jang was a very iconic figure in North Korea, particularly with economic reform and innovation,” said Zhu Feng, professor of international relations at Peking University, and a specialist in North Korea. “He is the man China counted on to move the economy in North Korea. This is a very ominous signal.” The way that Jang was dismissed also was considered extraordinary, as the North Korea government has almost always maintained secrecy over its inner workings, power struggles and skullduggery during the more than six decades of rule by the Kim family. “Kim Jong-un was declaring at home and abroad that he is now the truly one and only leader in the North, that he will not tolerate a No. 2,” said Yang Moo-jin, an analyst at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, South Korea. Jang had visited China on a number of occasions and had been considered the most important advocate of the Chinese style of economic overhaul that the government in Beijing has been urging North Korea to embrace. Jang went to Beijing in August 2012 for a six-day visit and met with President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Special economic zones, where Chinese and other foreign investors would get preferential treatment in North Korea, were high on the agenda. Just last month, North Korea’s official media announced that 14 new special economic zones would be opened, and although they were relatively small, they were seen as a sign of fruition of some of the reforms China has advocated. “Those zones were a consequence of Jang’s efforts,” Dr. Zhu said. “It’s possible Jang went too far on decentralizing and that threatened Kim Jong-un’s position.” China’s official media gave prominent attention to the accusations against Jang, including selling resources cheaply, an accusation that appears to have been aimed directly at China, the biggest buyer of North Korea’s iron ore and minerals. Soon after assuming power, Kim complained that North Korea’s resources, one of its few sources of outside income, were being sold too cheaply. He demanded higher prices for minerals, rare earths and coal, exported by the growing number of joint ventures between China and North Korea. Kim’s complaints were widely reported in China and angered bargain-conscious Chinese mine operators, several of whom abandoned their North Korean operations. Now, the climate for Chinese investment in North Korea, which was not
particularly good, is likely to worsen, said Andrei Lankov, author of “The Real North Korea” and professor of history at Kookmin University in Seoul. China’s Foreign Ministry offered restrained comments yesterday regarding Jang’s dismissal, calling it an internal affair of North Korea. “We will stay committed to promoting the traditional friendly, cooperative relationship” between China and North Korea, said the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei. “China worries about instability which might be provoked by such acts” as Mr. Jang’s dismissal, Mr. Lankov said.Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute in South Korea, said the dismissal could signal more internal strife. “Given the extremely harsh stance against Jang and his followers,” he said, “a round of bloody purges will be inevitable as the regime roots out poisonous weeds from its leadership ranks.” Another concern for China is the question of whether Kim will conduct a new nuclear test, said Roger Cavazos, an American expert on North Korea who is currently visiting Shanghai. “Every Chinese I have spoken with were worried that Kim Jong-un would test soon,” said Cavazos, a former United States Army intelligence officer who is now at the Nautilus Institute, a group that studies international security. Cavazos said Chinese academics were concerned that Mr. Kim was “more and more out of control.” He added, “Every nuclear test by North Korea puts China in a bad position.” That is in large part because as North Korea gets closer to demonstrating that it can miniaturize a nuclear weapon to fit atop a missile, the more the United States will increase its missile defenses in Northeast Asia. As Kim rearranges the top echelons of the government, it is possible that the military will emerge the winner, said Cai Jian, deputy director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. It is most likely that “the military forces will become stronger” and that the “hard-liners will become more hard-line.” Cavazos agreed. “The military was demonstrating its loyalty to Kim Jong-un, and Kim Jong-un was demonstrating his loyalty to the military.” (Jane Perlez, “Public Ouster in North Korea Unsettles China,” New York Times, December 10, 2013, p. A-1)

President Park Geun-hye said that South Korea’s relations with North Korea could become shakier as leader Kim Jong-un is imposing a “reign of terror” in the communist nation while carrying out a massive purge campaign. “I think we are at a very important point in history. Situations on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia are changing rapidly, and we are in a situation where we can’t lower our guard against North Korean threats and changes in its situation,” Park said during a Cabinet meeting. “North Korea is currently engaged in a reign of terror while carrying out massive purges in order to consolidate Kim Jong-un’s power. The South-North relations could become more unstable in the future, she said. (Yonhap, “Park Says Relations with N. Korea Could Become Shakier amid Pyongyang’s Purge Campaign,” December 10, 2013)

KCNA: “Upon hearing the report on the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the service personnel and people throughout the country broke into angry shouts that a stern judgment of the revolution should be meted out to the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional elements. Against the backdrop of these shouts rocking the country, a special military tribunal of the DPRK Ministry of State Security was held on December 12 against traitor for all ages Jang Song Thaek.

The accused Jang brought together undesirable forces and formed a faction as the
boss of a modern day factional group for a long time and thus committed such hideous crime as attempting to overthrow the state by all sorts of intrigues and despicable methods with a wild ambition to grab the supreme power of our party and state. The tribunal examined Jang’s crimes.

All the crimes committed by the accused were proved in the course of hearing and were admitted by him.

A decision of the special military tribunal of the Ministry of State Security of the DPRK was read out at the trial.

Every sentence of the decision served as sledge-hammer blow brought down by our angry service personnel and people on the head of Jang, an anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional element and despicable political careerist and trickster.

The accused is a traitor to the nation for all ages who perpetrated anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts in a bid to overthrow the leadership of our party and state and the socialist system.

Jang was appointed to responsible posts of the party and state thanks to the deep political trust of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il and received benevolence from them more than any others from long ago.

He held higher posts than before and received deeper trust from supreme leader Kim Jong Un, in particular.

The political trust and benevolence shown by the peerlessly great men of Mt. Paektu were something he hardly deserved.

It is an elementary obligation of a human being to repay trust with sense of obligation and benevolence with loyalty. However, despicable human scum Jang, who was worse than a dog, perpetrated thrice-cursed acts of treachery in betrayal of such profound trust and warmest paternal love shown by the party and the leader for him.

From long ago, Jang had a dirty political ambition. He dared not raise his head when Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il were alive. But, reading their faces, Jang had an axe to grind and involved himself in double-dealing. He began revealing his true colors in the period of historic turn when the generation of the revolution was replaced, thinking that it was just the time for him to realize his wild ambition.

Jang committed such an unpardonable thrice-cursed treason as overtly and covertly standing in the way of settling the issue of succession to the leadership with an axe to grind when a very important issue was under discussion to hold respected Kim Jong Un in high esteem as the only successor to Kim Jong Il in reflection of the unanimous desire and will of the entire party and army and all people.

When his cunning move proved futile and the decision that Kim Jong Un was elected vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea in reflection of the unanimous will of all party members, service personnel and people was proclaimed at the historic Third Conference of the WPK, making all participants break into enthusiastic cheers that shook the conference hall, he behaved so arrogantly and insolently as unwillingly standing up from his seat and half-heartedly clapping, touching off towering resentment of our service personnel and people.

Jang confessed that he behaved so at that time as a knee-jerk reaction as he thought that if Kim Jong Un’s base and system for leading the army were consolidated, this would lay a stumbling block in his way of grabbing the power of the party and state.

When Kim Jong Il passed away so suddenly and untimely to our sorrow, Jang began working in real earnest to realize his long-cherished greed for power.
Abusing the honor of often accompanying Kim Jong Un during his field guidance, Jang tried hard to create illusion about him by projecting himself internally and externally as a special being on a par with the headquarters of the revolution.

In a bid to rally a group of reactionaries to be used by him for toppling the leadership of the party and state, he let the undesirable and alien elements including those who had been dismissed and relieved of their posts after being severely punished for disobeying the instructions of Kim Jong Il and kowtowing to Jang work in a department of the Central Committee of the WPK and organs under it in a crafty manner.

**Jang did serious harm to the youth movement in our country**, being part of the group of renegades and betrayers in the field of youth work bribed by enemies. Even after they were disclosed and purged by the resolute measure of the party, he patronized those cat’s paws and let them hold important posts of the party and state.

He let **Ri Ryong Ha, flatterer, work with him since the 1980s whenever he was transferred to other posts and systematically promoted Ri up to the post of first vice department director of the Party Central Committee though he had been purged for his factional act of denying the unitary leadership of the party.** Jang thus made Ri his trusted stooge.

Jang let his confidants and flatterers who had been fired for causing an important case of denying the unitary leadership of the party work in his department and organs under it in a crafty manner in a few years. He systematically rallied ex-convicts, those problematic in their past careers and discontented elements around him and ruled over them as sacred and inviolable being.

He worked hard to put all affairs of the country under his control, massively increasing the staff of his department and organs under it, and stretch his tentacles to ministries and national institutions. He converted his department into a “little kingdom” which no one dares touch.

He was so impudent as to prevent the Taedonggang Tile Factory from erecting a mosaic depicting Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and a monument to field guidance given by them. Moreover, Jang turned down the unanimous request of the service personnel of a unit of the Korean People’s Internal Security Forces to have the autograph letter sent by Kim Jong Un to the unit carved on a natural granite and erected with good care in front of the building of its command. He was so reckless as to instruct the unit to erect it in a shaded corner.

He committed such anti-party acts as systematically denying the party’s line and policies, its organizational will, in the past period. These acts were a revelation of deliberate and sinister attempt to create extreme illusion and idolization of him by making him appear as a special being who can overrule either issues decided by the party or its line.

He went so rude as to take in the middle even those things associated with intense loyalty and sincerity of our army and people towards the party and the leader and distribute them among his confidants in an effort to take credit to himself for doing so. This behavior was to create illusion about him.

Due to his persistent moves to create illusion and idolization of him his flatterers and followers in his department and organs under it praised him as “comrade No. 1.” They went the lengths of denying even the party’s instructions to please him at any cost.

Jang established such a heterogeneous work system in his department and the
relevant organs as considering what he said as more important than the party’s policies. Consequently, his trusted henchmen and followers made no scruple of perpetrating such counter-revolutionary act as disobeying the order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army.

The revolutionary army will never pardon all those who disobey the order of the Supreme Commander and there will be no place for them to be buried even after their death.

Dreaming a fantastic dream to become premier at an initial stage to grab the supreme power of the party and state, Jang made his department put major economic fields of the country under its control in a bid to disable the Cabinet. In this way he schemed to drive the economy of the country and people’s living into an uncontrollable catastrophe.

He put inspection and supervision organs belonging to the Cabinet under his control in defiance of the new state machinery established by Kim Jong Il at the First Session of the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly. Jang put all issues related to all structural works handled by the Cabinet under his control and had the final say on them, making it impossible for the Cabinet to properly perform its function and role as the economic command. They included the issues of setting up and disorganizing committees, ministries and national institutions and provincial, city and county-level organs, organizing units for foreign trade and for earning foreign money and structures overseas and fixing living allowances.

When he attempted to make a false report to the party without having agreement with the Cabinet and the relevant ministry on the issue related to the state construction supervision organization, officials concerned expressed just opinion that his behavior was contrary to the construction law worked out by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Hearing this, he made the reckless remark that “the rewriting of the construction law would solve the problem.”

Abusing his authority, he undermined the work system related to the construction of the capital city established by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, reducing the construction and building-materials bases to such bad shape little short of debris in a few years. He weakened the ranks of technicians and skilled workers at the units for the construction of the capital city in a crafty manner and transferred major construction units to his confidants so that they might make money. In this way he deliberately disturbed the construction in Pyongyang.

He instructed his confidants to sell coal and other precious underground resources at random. Consequently, they were saddled with huge debts, deceived by brokers. Jang made no scruple of committing such act of treachery in May last as selling off the land of the Rason economic and trade zone to a foreign country for a period of five decades under the pretext of paying those debts.

It was none other than Jang who wirepulled behind scene Pak Nam Gi, traitor for all ages, to recklessly issue hundreds of billions of won in 2009, sparking off serious economic chaos and disturbing the people’s mind-set.

Jang encouraged money-making under various pretexts to secure funds necessary for gratifying his political greed and was engrossed in irregularities and corruption. He thus took the lead in spreading indolent, careless and undisciplined virus in our society.

After collecting precious metals since the construction of Kwangbok Street in the
1980s, he set up a secret organ under his control and took a fabulous amount of funds from a bank and purchased precious metals in disregard of the state law. He thus committed such anti-state criminal acts as creating a great confusion in financial management system of the state.

He let the decadent capitalist lifestyle find its way to our society by distributing all sorts of pornographic pictures among his confidants since 2009. He led a dissolute and depraved life, squandering money wherever he went.

**He took at least 4.6 million Euro from his secret coffers and squandered it in 2009 alone and enjoyed himself in casino in a foreign country.** These facts alone clearly show how corrupt and degenerate he was.

Jang was so reckless with his greed for power that he persistently worked to stretch his tentacles even to the People's Army with a foolish calculation that he would succeed in staging a coup if he mobilized the army.

He fully revealed his despicable true colors as a traitor for all ages in the course of questioning by uttering as follows: "I attempted to trigger off discontent among service personnel and people that the present regime does not take any measure despite the fact that the economy of the country and people's living are driven into catastrophe. Comrade supreme leader is the target of the coup."

As regards the means and methods for staging the coup, Jang said: "I was going to stage the coup by using high-ranking army officers who had close ties with me or by mobilizing armed forces under the control of my confidants. I don't know well about recently appointed high-ranking army officers but have some acquaintances with those appointed in the past period. I thought the army might join in the coup if the living of the people and service personnel further deteriorate in the future. And I calculated that my confidants in my department including Ri Ryong Ha and Jang Su Gil would surely follow me and had a plan to use the one in charge of the people’s security organ as my confidant. It was my calculation that I might use several others beside them."

As regards the timing of the coup and his plan to do after staging the coup, Jang answered: "I didn't fix the definite time for the coup. But it was my intention to concentrate my department and all economic organs on the Cabinet and become premier when the economy goes totally bankrupt and the state is on the verge of collapse in a certain period. I thought that if I solve the problem of people's living to a certain measure by spending an enormous amount of funds I have accumulated under various names after becoming premier, the people and service personnel will shout "hurrah" for me and I will succeed in the coup in a smooth way."

Jang dreamed such a foolish dream that once he seizes power by a base method, his despicable true colors as "reformist" known to the outside world would help his "new government" get "recognized" by foreign countries in a short span of time.

All facts go to clearly prove that Jang is a thrice-cursed traitor without an equal in the world as he had desperately worked for years to destabilize and bring down the DPRK and grab the supreme power of the party and state by employing all the most cunning and sinister means and methods, pursuant to the "strategic patience" policy and "waiting strategy" of the U.S. and the south Korean puppet group of traitors.

The hateful and despicable nature of the anti-party, anti-state and unpopular crimes committed by Jang was fully disclosed in the course of the trial conducted at the special military tribunal of the DPRK Ministry of State Security.

The era and history will eternally record and never forget the shuddering crimes
committed by Jang Song Thaek, the enemy of the party, revolution and people and heinous traitor to the nation.

No matter how much water flows under the bridge and no matter how frequently a generation is replaced by new one, the lineage of Paektu will remain unchanged and irreplaceable.

Our party, state, army and people do not know anyone except Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un.

Our service personnel and people will never pardon all those who dare disobey the unitary leadership of Kim Jong Un, challenge his absolute authority and oppose the lineage of Mt. Paektu to an individual but bring them to the stern court of history without fail and mercilessly punish them on behalf of the party and revolution, the country and its people, no matter where they are in hiding.

The special military tribunal of the Ministry of State Security of the DPRK confirmed that the state subversion attempted by the accused Jang with an aim to overthrow the people’s power of the DPRK by ideologically aligning himself with enemies is a crime punishable by Article 60 of the DPRK Criminal Code, vehemently condemned him as a wicked political careerist, trickster and traitor for all ages in the name of the revolution and the people and ruled that he would be sentenced to death according to it.

The decision was immediately executed.” (KCNA, “Traitor Jang Song Thaek Executed,” December 13, 2013)

Perhaps one of the most intriguing details in North Korea's announcement of the execution of Jang Song-thaek, the uncle and presumed mentor of the leader Kim Jong-un, was what its state-run media reported that Jang said while confessing to plotting to overthrow Kim’s government. “I was going to stage the coup by using army officers who had close ties with me or by mobilizing armed forces under the control of my confidants,” KCNA quoted Jang as having said during his court-martial. “I thought the army might join in the coup if the living of the people and service personnel further deteriorate in the future.” It could not be independently confirmed whether Jang, long considered a champion of a Chinese-style economic reform in North Korea, actually made such a statement or whether the regime cooked up the assertion to justify his execution. But the long list of crimes that Jang and his followers were accused of having committed was tantamount to a highly unusual admission of what analysts said could be a serious and bloody power struggle over economic and other policies inside the impoverished but nuclear-armed country. The speed with which Kim—or whoever else was engineering Jang's downfall—hurried to execute him and make it public was a sign of instability and a lack of confidence in Kim’s grip on power, the analysts said. Normally, North Korea hides any signs of disloyalty to the Kim dynasty. “If Kim Jong-un was sure of his control of power, he would not have needed to execute his uncle,” said Lee Byong-chul, senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Cooperation in Seoul. “There will be big and small bloody purges, and at a time like this, desperate extremists may lash out. Pyongyang is no longer safe.” Suh Sang-kee, a senior governing party lawmaker in Seoul, quoted South Korean intelligence officials as saying that Jang was executed by a machine-gun firing squad. “The way they dealt with Jang Song-thaek was highly unusual and unprecedented in North Korean history,” said the Unification Minister Ryoo Kil-jae, South Korea’s top North Korea policy maker. “We are watching the recent series of developments in the North with a deep concern.”
State Department said Thursday that it could not verify the execution, but a deputy spokeswoman, Marie Harf, said if it did happen, “this is another example of the extreme brutality of the North Korean regime.” Kim Kwan-jin, the South’s defense minister, said that the South Korean military was being extra vigilant as it feared that the North might attempt a military provocation against the South to defuse what might be a domestic political crisis. “The North Korean military may make a wrong decision for various reasons,” he said. “There may be a competition within the military to show loyalty to Kim.” Jang’s case marked the first time in recent decades that the North revealed what it purported was an attempt to overthrow its leadership and the first publicly announced execution of a member of the ruling family. “Although high-ranking leaders, including members of the Kim family, have been deposed before, we haven’t seen anything this public or dramatic since Kim Jong-un’s grandfather Kim Il-sung purged his last major rivals in the late 1950s,” said Prof. Charles K. Armstrong, a North Korea expert at Columbia University in New York and the author of “Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992.” “This seems to indicate the divisions within the Kim regime were more serious than previously thought,” Armstrong said. “Jang was particularly close to China and was pushing North Korea toward a more Chinese-style economic reform. His ouster could reflect the reassertion of control by hard-liners who want to distance North Korea from China and slow down the reform process.” Since Kim took power following his father’s death in December 2011, he has been enforcing a generational change in the party, government and military leadership, retiring figures from his father’s days and replacing them with people loyal to him. “With Jang’s execution, Kim Jong-un is declaring an end to his father’s era,” said Kim Yong-hyun, a North Korea expert at Dongguk University in Seoul. “And he did it with a bang, sort of a shock therapy against anyone who still might have doubts about his authority. The speedy way he did it actually shows his daring and confidence.” But analysts had lingering questions about who was running the country behind Kim. “If it has been another group – most likely, conservatives within the North Korean regime – that has engineered Jang’s removal, then they could now control what Kim Jong-un sees, hears and says,” said Chang Yong-seok, a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. With Jang, who was something of a moderate, gone, Kim could find it hard to control the hard-liners, Chang added. Jang’s execution means the demise of an influential voice for economic reform in North Korea, analysts said. “He has been the only one in the North who could talk about economic change,” Chang said. “So, when I heard of Mr. Jang’s execution, my first thought was that it was a death notice for those of us who have hoped for economic reform in the North.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Leader’s Uncle Executed As Traitor, North Says,” New York Times, December 13, 2013, p. A-14) The execution of North Korea’s former eminence grise Jang Song-taek was not the result of a power struggle between hardliners and moderates but of jockeying for control of the feeding troughs, National Intelligence Service chief Nam Jae-joon told the National Assembly Intelligence Committee. Nam also dismissed rumors that a leading associate of Jang’s has defected to China or that Jang’s widow Kim Kyong-hui is on her deathbed. Nam said mounting dissatisfaction in the military and other agencies of the regime because Jang abused his position to dole out favors like business concessions prompted Kim Jong-un “began to distrust Jang after reports about his corruption and irregularities,” Nam told the committee. "Jang was involved
through Department 54 under the Workers Party in awarding concessions for lucrative projects like coal mining." Originally, Department 54 was an army agency that supplied electricity, coal, fuel and clothes to military units but also acquired an octopus of business interests. But when Jang became chairman of the National Defense Commission, he put a close aide called Jang Su-gil in charge. A kangaroo court ruling made public on December 13 accused Jang Song-taek of selling concessions for coal and other mining licenses. Kim Jong-un ordered Jang and his associates to settle the growing inter-agency conflicts and stop abusing their power, "but the order wasn't carried out, and he concluded that this was a direct challenge to his sole authority and decided to purge them," Nam added. On December 9, the regime released photos of Jang being hauled out of a Politburo meeting, and on December 13, it published pictures of Jang in a kangaroo court, slumping and his hands tied with rope. But the NIS believes he was already put in jail in mid-November. He was stripped of all posts and ousted from the party on December 8 and executed on December 12. "In fact, he had been put in custody first, was taken out of jail for the meeting and put into jail again. It was all a show aimed at demonstrating the stability of the dictatorship," Nam said. Nam also denied on reports that Jang's cronies or even Kim Jong-un's elder half-brother Kim Jong-nam have defected. But he admitted he "can't confirm" Kim Jong-nam's whereabouts. Nam also discussed developments in the upper echelons of the regime since Jang's ouster. "We believe that Kim Jong-un is having no big trouble tightening his grip on power, given that the purge didn't occur as a result of power struggle," he said. "But internal disunity could grow quickly if the regime bungles any more policies." Nam pointed to Kim Won-hong at the State Security Department, as one of the "closest aides" to Kim Jong-un, alongside military Politburo chief Choe Ryong-hae. "Kim Won-hong has recently emerged as an influential official as the regime is tightening controls through his department," he said. He warned that it is "highly likely" that the North will launch a provocation against South Korea between January and March next year, aimed at diverting attention from internal dissatisfaction." (Chosun Ilbo, "NIS Claims New Insight into Jang Gong-thaek's Ouster," December 24, 2013) The execution of the uncle of Kim Jong-un, North Korea's leader, had its roots in a firefight between forces loyal to Mr. Kim and those supporting the man who was supposed to be his regent, according to accounts that are being pieced together by South Korean and American officials. The clash was over who would profit from North Korea's most lucrative exports: coal, clams and crabs. North Korean military forces were deployed to retake control of one of the sources of those exports, the rich crab and clam fishing grounds that Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of the country's untested, 30-year-old leader, had seized from the military. In the battle for control of the fishing grounds, the emaciated, poorly trained North Korean forces "were beaten – very badly – by Uncle Jang's loyalists," according to one official. The rout of his forces appears to have been the final straw for Kim, who saw his 67-year-old uncle as a threat to his authority over the military and, just as important, to his own family's dwindling sources of revenue. Eventually, at Kim's order, the North Korean military came back with a larger force and prevailed. Soon, Mr. Jang's two top lieutenants were executed. The two men died in front of a firing squad. But instead of rifles, the squad used antiaircraft machine guns, a form of execution that according to South Korean intelligence officials and news media was similar to the one used against some North Korean artists in August. Days later, Mr. Jang himself was publicly denounced, tried
and executed, by more traditional means. Given the opaqueness of North Korea’s inner circle, many details of the struggle between Kim and his uncle remain murky. But what is known suggests that while Mr. Kim has consolidated control and eliminated a potential rival, it has been at a huge cost: The open warfare between the two factions has revealed a huge fracture inside the country’s elite over who pockets the foreign currency – mostly Chinese renminbi – the country earns from the few nonnuclear exports its trading partners desire. American intelligence agencies had reported to the White House and the State Department in late 2011 that Jang could well be running the country behind the scenes – and might edge out his inexperienced nephew for control. In part that was based on his deep relationship with top officials in China, as well as his extensive business connections there. “There had been friction building up among the agencies of power in North Korea over privileges and over the abuse of power by Jang Song-thaek and his associates,” Nam was quoted by Jeong Cheong-rae and Cho Won-jin, two lawmakers designated as spokesmen for the parliamentary committee. In interviews, officials have said that the friction described in general terms to the South Korean Parliament played out in a violent confrontation in late September or early October, just north of the western sea border between the Koreas where the North harvests one of its major exports: crabs and clams, delicacies that are also highly valued by the Chinese. For years the profits from those fishing grounds, along with the output from munitions factories and trading companies, went directly to the North Korean military, helping it feed its troops, and enabling its top officers to send cash gifts to the Kim family. South Korea was a major market for the North’s mushrooms, clams, crabs, abalones and sea cucumbers until the South cut off trade with the North forcing the military to rely on the Chinese market. But when Kim succeeded his father two years ago, he took away some of the military’s fishing and trading rights and handed them to his cabinet, which he designated as the main agency to revive the economy. Jang was believed to have been a leading proponent of curtailing the military’s economic power. Jang appears to have consolidated many of those trading rights under his own control – meaning that profits from the coal, crabs and clams went into his accounts, or those of state institutions under his control, including the administrative department of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, which he headed. But this fall, the long-brewing tensions that arrangement created broke into the open. Radio Free Asia, in a report last week that cited anonymous North Korean sources, reported that Kim saw North Korean soldiers malnourished during his recent visits to islands near the disputed western sea border. They say he ordered Jang to hand over the operation of nearby fishing grounds back to the military. According to accounts put together by South Korean and American officials, Jang and his associates resisted. When a company of about 150 North Korean soldiers showed up at the farm, Mr. Jang’s loyalists refused to hand over the operation, insisting that Mr. Jang himself would have to approve. The confrontation escalated into a gun battle, and Radio Free Asia reports that two soldiers were killed and that the army backed off. Officials say the number of casualties is unknown, but they have received similar accounts. It is hard to know exactly how large a role the episode played in Jang’s downfall – there is more money in coal than in seafood – but Kim was reportedly enraged when he heard of the clash. Nam said that by mid-November his agents were already reporting that Mr. Jang had been detained. The December 12 verdict noted that Jang “instructed his stooges to sell coal and other precious underground resources at random.” Nam said the fact
that such behind-the-scenes tensions had spun so far out of control that Kim had to order his own uncle’s execution raised questions about the government’s internal unity. “The fissure within the regime could accelerate if it further loses popular support,” the lawmakers quoted Nam as saying. Nam pointed to Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, the top political officer in the North Korean People’s Army, and Kim Won-hong, the head of the North’s secret police and its intelligence chief, as the government’s new rising figures since Jang’s execution, the two lawmakers said. (Choe Sang-hun and David E. Sanger, “Korea Execution Is Tied to Dispute over Businesses,” New York Times, December 24, 2013) Jung Chang-hyun: “Kim Jong Un established “institutional leadership” by succeeding to the highest positions in the WPK, administration and military in April 2012, and has started the process of building his “personality leadership.” That process took place alongside his consolidation of the party’s “monolithic leadership” and came into full swing on the occasion of the fourth Conference of Party Representatives held in April 2012. Kim Jong Un revised the supreme role of the party as “unifying the entire society under the flag of Kim Il Sung-ism and Kim Jong Il-ism” and suggested “further strengthening the monolithic leadership regime of the party” as the most important task. This means firmly setting “revolutionary rules and orders in the entire party where all party members act as one under the monolithic leadership of the party center.” As a first step, Kim Jong Un began to restructure the bloated military during the Kim Jong Il era. To achieve this, he strengthened the WPK’s guidance over the military and transferred the right to engage in trade from the military to the cabinet. On June 2, 2012, the official newspaper of the WPK, Rodong Shinmun, warned of any moves against reforming the military, saying, “Now the problem is not the threat from outside enemies but bureaucratization of, and becoming an aristocrat by the cadre who had grown up in [a] socialist cradle.” Because resistance from the military continued, Kim Jong Un dismissed Ri Young Ho, Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), in July 2012 and replaced a generation of officers to seize control of the military. The next step was to strengthen control of the WPK. To that end, North Korea held the Fourth Conference of Cell Secretaries of the Workers’ Party on Jan. 29, 2013. Its purpose was to establish the “monolithic leadership regime” within the WPK by strengthening the party’s basic organizations and collecting bottom-to-top criticisms. In this process, the most prominent criticisms were “Sedo” (wielding one’s power) and “bureaucratism.” At the conference, Kim Jong Un mentioned the word “Sedo” for the first time, saying “Sedogun [groups wielding power] and bureaucrats are the main target to fight against by the party.” ... “Sedo” targeted Jang Song Thaek and his confidants from the beginning. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that “Sedo” and “bureaucratism” were mentioned when Jang Song Thaek was criticized for “factional acts according to his desire for power” early in 2003 under the regime of Kim Jong Il. In the mid-1990s, Jang was the first vice director of the WPK’s organization and guidance department and was seen by those outside the country as being the de facto No. 2 leader. However, at the end of 2003, he was dismissed and had to go through self-criticism and a “revolutionization” course at the Kim Il Sung High Party School. Given that past, when Kim Jong Un used the term “Sedogun,” it referred to Jang Song Thaek and his confidants, representing a warning about excessive acts of power wielded by the administration department of the WPK. The decision adopted at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee on Dec. 8, 2013, in fact said, “Jang
Song Thaek and his faction committed anti-party and counter-revolutionary factional acts, undermining the unity of the party and hindering the task of building up the party's monolithic leadership regime. Ultimately, the most significant reason for Jang's purge was his "factional acts" that undermined "the monolithic leadership regime" built around Kim Jong Un, although various other charges were mentioned at his trial. In April 2012, when Kim Jong Un was officially inaugurated as the WPK's First Secretary following the death of his father in December 2011, Jang Song Thaek became a member of the Party Political Department. In 2012 alone, Jang accompanied Kim Jong Un on his on-the-spot guidance tours 106 times, demonstrating he was the leader's closest confidant. In November 2012, Jang was appointed chairman of the National Sports Commission, giving him a total of eight posts including vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, member of the Party Political Department, member of the Central Military Commission of the WPK, marshal of the Korean People’s Army, chief of the Central Administrative Department of the WPK, presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly and chairman of the National Sports Commission. No one doubted that Jang Song Thaek was the No. 2 man in North Korea. The judgment of the Special Military Tribunal of the Ministry of State Security also stated, “Jang Song Thaek received higher offices and more trust than before from comrade Kim Jong Un.” However, Jang’s heyday was about to run out. After he was appointed chairman of the National Sports Commission, the political status of the Party Administrative Department began to decline. Jang’s influence suddenly fell in 2013. The number of times when he accompanied Kim Jong Un sharply dropped. The rare occasions when he accompanied Kim were limited to sports events or art performances. It was the beginning of his exclusion from the major decision-making processes of the state. When Kim Jong Un convened the “leaders’ council on national security and foreign affairs” to discuss key policy decisions relating to nuclear tests on Jan. 26, 2013, Jang was not invited. When military tension between the two Koreas spiked in early 2013, it was hard to see Jang at any public meetings. Prevailing analysis aimed at explaining his rare public appearances argued that he was excluded because he held an opposing view on the launch of the Eunha-3 long-range rocket in December 2012 and the third nuclear test in February 2013. When the General Meeting of the Party Central Committee in March that year officially adopted the policy line of “parallel tracks of economic development and nuclear power development,” Jang Song Thaek could not oppose it outright, but he was regarded as disagreeing with the new policy line. The fateful decision of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee on Dec. 8, 2013 read “Jang Song Thaek and his followers” did not obey the orders of Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un and neglected or perverted the execution of the party's lines and policies. This implies that it was possible for Jang Song Thaek to either express an “opposite opinion” or fail to execute policies decided at meetings of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee or the National Defense Commission. This can never be accepted in North Korea. The first crisis to befall Jang came in May 2013. Between May 13, when he was seen accompanying Kim Jong Un to a Korean People’s Army orchestra concert, and June 10, when he made a field visit to the Pyongyang International Soccer Academy, Jang was not seen at any public event. The judgment against Jang sheds some light on the timing of this development: “Jang Song Thaek instructed his stooges to sell coal and other precious underground resources at random, which fell into brokers’ tricks and great debt. Jang
had no scruples about committing such acts of treachery as selling off the land of the Rason economic and trade zone to a foreign country in May [2013] by lending it for a period of five decades under the pretext of paying debts.” It was clear that there were problems in Party Administrative Department 54, under the control of Jang Su Gil, a close confident of Jang Song Thaek. In fact, those who were in charge of international business engaged in by Department 54 were summoned to Pyongyang in September 2013. Three months later, in August, another major negative incident took place. On Aug. 28, 2013, Kim Jong Un watched the final match of the “Hwaetbul” (Torchlight) Cup men’s soccer match at Kim Il Sung Stadium. Then, after the game was over, the winning team was changed suddenly on charges that some players participated illegally. North Korea immediately released the news, although it did not need to. Given the nature of the North Korean system, it was the kind of thing that could become a “political problem.” It was disturbing news for Jang Song Thaek, because he was chairman of the National Sports Commission. Still, no significant change was yet detected in his status at that time. A very serious incident occurred in early November when the Party’s first vice director Ri Ryong Ha and vice director Jang Su Gil were arrested. The decision of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee said: “The party has recognized and closely followed Jang Song Thaek and his followers’ anti-party and counter-revolutionary factional acts for a long time. The party warned several times, but they didn’t accede to the party’s demand and clearly overreached themselves. Therefore, the party could no more look on with folded arms and had to make a decisive blow at extremely dangerous factional acts emerging within the party by eliminating Jang Song Thaek and purging his faction.” The “overreaching acts” of Jang Song Thaek’s group referred to an “armed conflict” over the jurisdiction of the Nampo Fishery Trading Company in early November 2013. The trading company in Nampo Special City was originally controlled by the military, but after Jang Song Thaek became vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, he handed the fishing and trading rights to the Party Administrative Department (Department 54). At the request of the military in 2013, Kim Jong Un ordered that the rights be returned to the military in the name of “the Supreme Commander’s order.” However, when the military went to retake the company, vice director Jang Su Gil resisted, saying the permission of Jang Song Thaek was necessary. During the conflict, a gunfight broke out between the company’s security guards and the military. It was a material incident where the order of the Supreme Commander was resisted by force. This provided “decisive momentum” leading to the arrest and execution of Ri Ryong Ha and Jang Su Gil, and the subsequent arrest of Jang Song Thaek. Because the money that Jang’s department earned was also used in national economic development, acts such as selling off natural resources at giveaway prices, offering mine development rights in return for investments, lending land in the Rason special economic zone for a long period in order to raise funds and other past acts of corruption by Jang Song Thaek could be considered just extra accusations. Maybe Jang could have gone through another “revolutionization” course to clean up the mess. However, from the moment when a “joint investigation” of the WPK’s organization and guidance department and the Ministry of State Security revealed “counter-revolutionary acts disobeying the orders of the Supreme Commander,” including instances where Jang was called “No. 1 comrade,” there was no way out for him. On Nov. 18, 2013, Jang Song Thaek was put under house arrest while Ri Ryong Ha and Jang Su Gil were formally arrested. Jang
Song Thaek’s last public activity was a meeting with Japanese Councilor Antonio Inoki on November 6. Ri Ryong Ha and Jang Su Gil were interrogated on charges of “arrogations,” “factional acts,” and “disobedience of the party’s monolithic leadership regime.” They were also criticized for “attempting to rule as a party over the party and a cabinet over the cabinet hidden behind Jang Song Thaek’s back.” The two confidants were executed in front of the party’s high-ranking officials around November 27, after their interrogation. On December 8, the Workers’ Party held an extended meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee and criticized Jang for his “anti-party and counter-revolutionary factional acts.” The meeting condemned him on charges of hindering the party’s monolithic leadership regime, distorting the party’s lines and policies, corruption and illegality and moral hazards. He was arrested on the spot. Four days later, on December 12, Jang Song Thaek was sentenced to death at the Special Military Tribunal of the Ministry of State Security for conspiring to overthrow the state and was shot to death along with seven confidants in front of about 300 party cadres. It took less than a month from his house arrest to execution. One interpretation is that North Korea tried to minimize the political ripple effects of the incident by handling the process openly and swiftly, from the party’s criticism of Jang Song Thaek to the final judgment.” (Jung Chang-hyun, “The Execution of Jang Son Thaek: Consolidating Power Pyongyang-Style,” Global Asia, 9, 1 (Spring 2014), 14-12)

12/13/13

South and North Korea agreed to hold the fourth meeting of the Seoul-Pyongyang joint management committee on the Kaesong Industrial Complex inside the complex on December 19 to discuss ways to upgrade their joint factory park, Seoul’s unification ministry spokesman Kim Eyi-do said in a briefing. The agreement was made after the North proposed the date and the South accepted it, he said. On the same day next week, a group of about 30 foreign representatives from the so-called G-20 nations and international finance organizations will take a tour of the Kaesong factory park, the spokesman said, citing Pyongyang’s approval of the Seoul-proposed plan. The foreign delegations include vice ministers from the world’s 20 leading economies as well as officials from the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank, who will be visiting Seoul for a conference to be held in the same week, according to the official. “It’s a good opportunity in which foreign figures, who have influence to help (North Korea’s) foreign investment attraction, raise their understanding of the Kaesong Industrial Park. It will also contribute to the Kaesong park’s globalization,” Kim said. (Yonhap, “Koreas to Hold Talks on Upgrading Joint Factory Park Next Week,” December 13, 2013)

A senior North Korean official says the execution of leader Kim Jong-un’s once-powerful uncle won’t lead to changes in economic policies and the nation will push ahead with plans for new economic zones to attract foreign investment. Yun Yong-sok, a senior official in the State Economic Development Committee, said in an interview with the Associated Press in Pyongyang that Friday’s execution of Jang Song-thaek shouldn’t be taken as a sign that the North will change economic course or efforts to lure foreign investment. (Associated Press, “Purge Won’t Hurt Economic Policy,” Korea Herald, December 15, 2013)
The execution of Jang Song-thaek - the uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and the second-most powerful man in the country - unveiled the rise of a new powerful and elite group behind the Communist state’s young ruler. A senior South Korean intelligence source told JoongAng Ilbo that six people were critical in influencing Kim to dismiss and subsequently execute his uncle. A handful of senior intelligence officials in the military and leaders of the Workers’ Party emerged as the prime initiators of Jang’s dramatic downfall over recent weeks. “The meeting of security personnel of the [North] Korean People’s Army in Pyongyang last month, attended by Kim, was the prelude to Jang’s purge,” said the intelligence source. North Korean media covered the meeting, devoting the entire front and second pages of the Rodong Sinmun’s November 21 issue to it. The meeting, hosted at the April 25 House of Culture on November 20, was the second of its kind. The first meeting took place in 1993. The reports stated that Kim had emphasized the importance of strengthening the military’s security operations, but the North did not elaborate further. The meeting of the military intelligence officials was hosted abruptly for the first time in two decades, and the intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States paid special attention to possible changes in the North Korean leadership.

North Korea specialists in the National Intelligence Service concluded that the meeting took place shortly after Jang and his confidantes were purged. In a briefing to the National Assembly on December 3, the South Korean spy agency reported that Jang’s two closest aides, Ri Ryong-ha and Jang Su-kil, were publicly executed in late November. South Korean intelligence officials believe the young Kim received an oath of fealty from the top military intelligence officials at the November 20 meeting in Pyongyang following the purges. There, the six key men sat next to Kim on the leadership podium. The young ruler sat in the middle, with three men on his left and three on his right. Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, the director of the Korean People’s Army Politburo, sat to the right of Kim. Choe was considered one of two guardians to Kim, along with Jang. Gen. Kim Won-hong, head of the Ministry of State Security, the highest North Korean intelligence authority, and Lt. Gen. of the Korean People’s Army Ryom Chol-song sat in the next seats. Left of Kim sat Lt. Gen. Jo Kyong-chol; Maj. Gen. Kim Su-gil; and Hwang Pyong-so, deputy director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers’ Party, in charge of military appointments and organization. According to North Korean news reports, Choe gave the opening remarks, and Jo gave a briefing to the North Korean leader. Ryom made a conspicuous contribution to Rodong Sinmun on December 11, asking Kim to allow the military to be in charge of punishing Jang and his faction for their wrongdoings. As he proposed, Jang was executed the following day after a special court martial. The court martial was also hosted by the Ministry of State Security, led by Kim Won-hong. Following the meeting of the security personnel of the North Korean military on November 20, Kim visited Samjiyon near Mount Paektu. Although the North said the trip was to inspect the winter sports facilities and military units, South Korean intelligence officials believe Kim discussed follow-up measures for Jang’s case at a special retreat there. Photos of Kim’s trip to Samjiyon show that Kim Won-hong and Hwang Pyong-so accompanied him with other top Workers’ Party officials. Kim Yang-gon, a secretary of the Central Committee and head of the United Front Department of the North’s ruling party, was also seen in the photos. Han Kwang-sang, director of the party’s Finance and Accounting Department, and deputy directors Pak Tae-song, Kim Byong-ho and Ma Won-chun,
also accompanied Kim, indicating that they have risen to power under the young leader’s rule. South Korean intelligence officials concluded that the six men highlighted at the meeting of North Korean military security personnel and the officials who participated in the Samjiyon trip will be the core of the new elite group following Jang’s death. (Lee Young-jong and Ser Myo-ja, “Six Men Appear to Climb Ranks in Regime,” JoongAng Ilbo, December 14, 2013)

Kim Kyong-hui, an aunt of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, appears to have survived the purge and execution of her husband, Jang Song-thaek, as her name re-emerged on a leadership list in the North’s state-run news media over the weekend. KCNA included Ms. Kim’s name in the roster of top officials appointed to a national committee in charge of organizing a state funeral for Kim Kuk-tae, a former party secretary who died on December 13 at 89. In North Korea, whether an official’s name is included on such a list is an important gauge of whether the official is favored by the government. Kim was placed sixth on the list, which included most of the top party and military figures. The list also included Vice Premier Ro Du-chol, one of the people said to have been close to Jang, discrediting recent news reports in South Korea that Ro might be one of the senior North Koreans said to be fleeing a widening political purge after Mr. Jang’s downfall. Jang and his wife, who analysts believe to have been estranged, had been widely seen as parentlike figures for Kim Jong-un, helping their nephew establish himself as the supreme leader. As Jang’s purge unfolded, Ms. Kim’s name had also disappeared from North Korean news media, prompting speculation over her fate. Typically, the entire extended family of a traitor is executed or sent to a prison camp in North Korea, but analysts have said that Kim Jong-un would be likely to spare Ms. Kim. She is the only sister of Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, who ruled North Korea before him. Diminutive, frail and reportedly sick, Ms. Kim, 67, seldom appeared in public during her brother’s rule. But after his death, she raised her public profile by assuming more titles, accompanying Kim Jong-un during his public appearances and attending meetings where he has presided. Sitting erect and grim-faced in an oversized chair, she had been the only female face in a North Korean leadership that is filled with uniformed generals. Analysts have seen her as a regent helping to guide her nephew through the North’s treacherous internal politics to ensure a smooth generational change in her family’s dynasty. But her true status and her relationship with her husband had always been a subject of speculation. Some analysts said that her value to Kim was largely symbolic: She is his eldest surviving blood relative, one of the links Mr. Kim has to his grandfather, the North’s founding president, Kim Il-sung, whose godlike status among North Koreans helped legitimize Kim’s own rule. After Jang’s execution, the North’s state news media exhorted its people to stay loyal to the “blood line” that Kim inherited from his father and his grandfather. Even before Jang’s downfall, analysts in South Korea had speculated that he had been estranged from his wife. The couple’s only child, a daughter, committed suicide in France in 2006, according to the South Korean news media. In a party meeting on December 8 that condemned Jang as a traitor, he was called a depraved and corrupt womanizer. Yoon Sang-hyun, a deputy floor leader of the governing Saenuri Party in South Korea, told reporters on December 8 that Ms. Kim had been “separated” from Jang and that she did not oppose his purge. Secretary of State John Kerry condemned the execution of Kim’s uncle in extraordinarily strong and personal language. “It tells us a lot about, first
of all, how ruthless and reckless he is, and it also tells us a lot about how insecure he is,” Kerry said in an interview with the ABC News program “This Week” that was broadcast on December 15 but taped before Kerry left on an Asian trip. Kerry acknowledged the difficulty of assessing the deeply opaque government. But he said there was sufficient evidence to view Kim as “spontaneous, erratic, still worried about his place in the power structure and maneuvering to eliminate any potential kind of adversary or competitor.” The secretary of state said the recent developments underscored the urgency of efforts to denuclearize North Korea. His language, however, did not seem likely to lure North Korea to closer cooperation. Kim, he said, leads a “ruthless, horrendous dictatorship.” Separately, Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, said that the execution not only sent a worrisome message about Mr. Kim, but also should severely embarrass China, North Korea’s closest ally. “I think it’s very obvious this young man is capable of some very aberrational behavior, and given the toys that he has, I think it’s very dangerous,” McCain said December 15 on CNN’s “State of the Union.” “You would think that the Chinese would understand that, as well.” “They’ve got to rein this young man in – and they can.” Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, the top political officer in the Korean People’s Army, is now considered the North’s second-most-influential man. But “in the feudalistic Stalinist system of North Korea, even Choe Ryong-hae is nothing more than a ‘disciple or warrior of the leader’ who can be dismissed overnight,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a researcher on the North’s political system at Sejong Institute in South Korea, citing the fates of some of the people who were each previously known as the No. 2 man in North Korea. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Leader’s Aunt Appears Unscathed,” New York Times, December 16, 2013, p. A-8)

China’s state media warned that Beijing may consider imposing "some restrictions" on its relations with Pyongyang in the wake of North Korea’s stunning execution of the once-powerful uncle of leader Kim Jong-un. “The majority of the public here holds a negative attitude toward the recent events in Pyongyang,” the state-run Global Times said in an editorial, describing the execution of Jang as a “sharp struggle domestically.” “This may impose some restrictions on Sino-North Korean ties. Chinese aid to North Korea may face more questioning, and grass-roots interaction may lose some momentum,” it said.

“China needs to help the new North Korean leadership to properly solidify the sense of security it needs most, which is key to their mutual strategic trust. But at the same time, China also needs to make it clear that North Korea should adapt more to China’s situation,” the newspaper said. “China cannot pander to North Korea’s sentiments in every possible aspect.” China, North Korea’s key ally and economic benefactor, emphasized the need for stability after the execution of Jang, while calling it an "internal affair" of Pyongyang. “It is the DPRK’s internal affair,” China’s foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters yesterday. “As its neighbor, we hope to see the DPRK maintain political stability and realize economic development and people there lead a happy life,” Hong said. Washington is stepping up talks with its allies in Asia in the wake of the North’s execution, State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said. “Stability on the Korean Peninsula is very important to us.” (Yonhap, “Beijing Warns of Restrictions on Pyongyang,” Korea Herald, December 14, 2013)
Kerry: “Q: Mr. Secretary, I want to get right to reports out of North Korea that the young leader, Kim Jong-un, has executed his uncle, his mentor, one of the most powerful people in North Korea. What does this tell you about the danger coming from North Korea? KERRY: Well, it tells us a lot about, first of all, how ruthless and reckless he is. And it also tells us a lot about how insecure he is, to a certain degree. It tells us a significant amount about the instability internally of the regime, with the numbers of executions. This is not the first execution. There have been a significant number of executions taking place over the last months, which we’re aware of. And most importantly, it underscores the importance for all of us of finding a way forward with North Korea in order to denuclearize the peninsula. It’s an ominous sign of the instability and of the danger that does exist. Q: Well, what does it tell you about him? We know so little about him. KERRY: We don’t know. I mean, North Korea remains relatively opaque. It is not easy, but we do have insights. And the insights that we have tell us that he is spontaneous, erratic, still worried about his place in the power structure, and maneuvering to eliminate any potential kind of adversary or competitor and does so, obviously, ruthlessly. I mean, you saw the pictures of his uncle being arrested in front of everybody at this meeting. Q: And this was so public. KERRY: I mean, it really reminded me of a video that we saw of Saddam Hussein doing the same thing, having people plucked out of an audience, with people sitting there sweating, and nobody daring to move or do anything. This is the nature of this ruthless, horrendous dictatorship and of his insecurities. And I think we need to factor that into the urgency of getting China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, all of us to stay on the same page and to put as much effort into the denuclearization as possible. To have a nuclear weapon potentially in the hands of somebody like Kim Jong-un just becomes even more unacceptable.” (Secretary of State John Kerry, “Interview with Martha Raddatz of ABC’s This Week,” December 15, 2013)

12/15/13

President Park Geun-hye told a weekly meeting with senior secretaries that South Korea should be fully prepared against possible North Korean hostilities, warning that the communist nation could attempt “reckless provocations” after the execution of leader Kim Jong-un’s uncle. “When we look at a recent series of developments in North Korea, it is uncertain in which direction the North Korean situation will go. We are in a situation where we cannot rule out contingencies, such as reckless provocations,” Park said. Given the “gravity and unpredictability of the current situation,” South Korea should be fully prepared for all possibilities, Park said. She ordered the military to strengthen vigilance against various forms of provocations, especially in front-line areas, including border islands in the Yellow Sea. “Seeing the current situation on the Korean Peninsula and our security situation as very grave, the president stressed that the government should get itself thoroughly prepared for any situation,” senior presidential press secretary Lee Jung-hyun told reporters. Park also ordered officials to strengthen the combined defense posture with the United States, and work closely with the ally, neighboring nations and the international community in handling the situation, he said. (Yonhap, “N. Korean Provocations Cannot Be Ruled Out: Park,” December 16, 2013)

12/16/13

Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin has put the military on full alert for any provocations from North Korea. In a meeting with military commanders on Tuesday, Kim said there is a high

North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party held a meeting at the Pyongyang Indoor Stadium to commemorate the second anniversary of the death of former leader Kim Jong-il, and the new inner circle of his son Kim Jong-un could be discerned. Jong-un’s aunt Kim Kyong-hui, whose husband, Jang Song-thaek, was purged and brutally executed last week, did not make an appearance. At the party meeting, Kim Jong-un sat at the center of the stage, and top officials from the ruling party and military were seated to his left and right. According to an analysis by South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, the young leader has replaced 44 percent of his senior party, military and cabinet officials over the past two years. When his aunt Kim Kyong-hui attended last year’s commemoration, she sat to the right of the leader in the third seat, following two senior assemblymen in North Korea: Kim Yong-nam, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea, who was to Kim Jong-un’s right, and Choe Yong-rim, honorary vice president of the assembly. This year, her seat was filled by Hwang Sun-hui, head of the Korean Revolution Museum, who is a former anti-Japan Communist fighter. The seat to the right of Kim Jong-un was again taken by Kim Yong-nam, the assembly chairman. But to his right was Pak Pong-ju, premier of the cabinet, who is viewed as a rising economist. To the left of Kim Jong-un were a string of high-ranking military officials and several party officials in charge of security. The most notable figure sat directly to Kim’s left, Choe Ryong-hae, the director of the General Political Bureau of the army. Some analysts in Seoul think Choe triumphed over uncle Jang in a power struggle, while others think Choe doesn’t have the power Jang had. Choe, 63, is relatively younger than other senior military officials, who are in their 70s. Despite relatively little experience in the military, Choe was promoted to director of the General Political Bureau, which is in charge of the supervision of soldiers. He even visited China in May to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping as a special envoy of Kim Jong-un. In a speech at the meeting, Choe swore loyalty to the young leader who appointed him to the top military post, saying he would “grow as the forefront fighter and share the same fate as the respected great comrade [Kim Jong-un].” To the left of Choe were Ri Yong-gil, chief of the general staff of the army; Jang Jong-nam, minister of the People’s Armed Forces; Choe Thae-bok, chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly; Kim Yong-chun, Ri Yong-mu, and O Kuk-ryol, vice chairmen of the National Defense Commission; Kim Won-hong, minister of State Security; and Hyon Chol-hae, first deputy director of the People’s Armed Forces. Ri Yong-gil and Jang Jong-nam were reportedly promoted due to their ties to Choe Ryong-hae. Several figures who were considered close to the executed Jang appeared at the meeting yesterday, surprising analysts. They included Mun Kyong-dok, a party secretary; Choe Pu-il, minister of People’s Security; and Ro Tu-chol, the vice premier. During the funeral for leader Kim Jong-il two years ago, seven figures accompanied his hearse, including uncle Jang and military chief Ri Yong-ho, seen as the most powerful men under the new, young, hereditary leader. Yesterday’s list of the attendees at the second anniversary shows only two of the seven figures are still in positions of power: Kim Kiam, a party secretary in charge of South Korean affairs, and Choe Thae-bok, the chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly. “Although there are a lot of rumors about people close to Jang Song-thaek seeking asylum, we have not confirmed them
so far,” a Ministry of Unification official told reporters. (Kim Hee-jin, “Kim Jong-un’s Inner Circle Changed a Lot in Two Years,” JoongAng Ilbo, December 18, 2013)

Taking Japan a step further from its postwar pacifism, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo approved a new five-year defense plan that calls for the acquisition of drones and amphibious assault vehicles to strengthen the nation’s military as it faces the prospect of a prolonged rivalry with China over islands in the East China Sea. While Abe described the spending plan as “proactive pacifism,” it continues a trend started earlier this year when Abe began to reverse a decade of military cuts to help offset China’s rapid military buildup and the relative decline of U.S. influence in the region. He is building on moves by previous prime ministers to inch Japan toward what many here call a more “normal” nation that can defend itself. While Abe, an outspoken conservative, has long wanted to wean the country from what he and other nationalists consider excessive pacifism and an unhealthy negativity about its World War II-era past, the tensions with China have made a skeptical public more willing to accept an expanded military. The spending plan was approved by the cabinet in tandem with a new 10-year defense strategy and a broader national security strategy that call for Japan to create a more dynamic military force, loosen self-imposed restrictions on exporting weapons, and nurture a stronger sense of patriotism among its citizens. Under the new strategy, Japan will continue to build closer ties with the United States, whose 50,000 military personnel stationed here still form the basis of Japan’s national security. But it will also acquire weapons meant to increase its own capabilities — acquisitions that would have once been unthinkable for a nation that viewed its military with suspicion after its disastrous defeat in World War II. Japan will “build a comprehensive defensive posture that can completely defend our nation,” according to the security strategy. “China is attempting to alter the status quo by force in the skies and seas of the East China Sea and South China Sea and other areas based on assertions that are incompatible with the established international order.” Political analysts say that China’s assertive stance in the dispute over the East China Sea islands has made Japan’s once proudly pacifist public more willing to accept an expanded role for the nation’s military, called the Self-Defense Forces. China’s claims in the South China Sea have also put it at odds with several countries in Southeast Asia that say they own some of the territory in question. The new security strategy calls for Japan to continue to raise its regional profile by building security ties with other Asian nations, though it is unclear how a stronger Japanese military will be greeted by neighbors such as South Korea, where memories of Japan’s early-20th-century empire-building are still raw. The spending plan will raise the military budget by 1.2 trillion yen, or $11.7 billion, over the next five years, to about 24.7 trillion yen. While that is an increase of almost 5 percent, it is still far below the annual double-digit increases in China’s military spending. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Japan had the fifth-largest military budget in the world last year. China had the second largest, behind the United States. The spending plan also includes the acquisition of beach-assault vehicles and American Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft to equip a recently created Marine Corps-style amphibious infantry unit that can defend and recapture remote islands. The 10-year military strategy approved today calls on Japan to create a more mobile military that can deal with contingencies on far-flung islands, as well as so-called gray-zone conflicts that might involve small numbers of terrorists or
paramilitary attackers. It maintains the army’s current troop level of about 160,000, reversing earlier plans to reduce that number. The strategy also calls on Japan to study whether it should buy or develop long-range strike capability, like cruise missiles, that would allow it to destroy a threat like a North Korean ballistic missile before it was launched. Japan has so far eschewed such clearly offensive weapons in order to maintain the defensive nature of its military, whose existence already pushes the limits of a postwar Constitution that bars the nation from possessing “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential.” Abe wants to go even further by stretching the definition of self-defense to include action taken on behalf of allies under attack—for example, allowing Japan to shoot down a North Korean ballistic missile heading toward the United States. That doctrine, known as collective self-defense, has run into stiff public opposition, including from a small Buddhist political party within Abe’s own governing coalition. The top government spokesman, Suga Yoshihide, said consideration of collective self-defense would be put off until next year at the earliest. (Martin Fackler, “Amid Chinese Rivalry, Japan Seeks More Muscle,” New York Times, December 17, 2013, p. A-8)

DeTrani: “This has been a dreadful year for North Korea and its relations with the outside world. Indeed, during his two years at the helm in North Korea, after the death of Kim Jong II in December 2011, Kim Jong Un, has managed to plunge his country to the lowest point in its relations with the international community, including China. Tragically, North Korea does not see it this way. Pyongyang says its missile tests in April and December 2012 were satellite launches, for which it has a sovereign right, regardless of the United Nations resolutions prohibiting them. The North’s February 2013 nuclear test was in response to additional sanctions imposed due to these launches. The harsh rhetoric from Pyongyang from March to June 2013, threatening the US, South Korea and Japan with pre-emptive nuclear attacks and posting a video of a simulated nuclear attack on New York were, the North said, in response to the yearly joint US-ROK military exercises. The list goes on and on and includes the incarceration of Kenneth Bae, a US missionary found guilty of an unspecified crime and sentenced to 15 years of hard labor. South Korea also experienced this intemperate behavior when Pyongyang recently and abruptly refused to permit North-South divided family reunions. When Pyongyang issued its statement on November 23, 2013—the third anniversary of its artillery shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island that killed four people—which declared that the North would respond to any provocation from the South with an attack on the President’s compound, making it a “sea of flames,” it further exacerbated this sad series of events. The real threat from North Korea, however, is more than the over-the-top rhetoric coming from Pyongyang. The real threat is its enhanced nuclear programs and the assessment that the North has both a significant number of plutonium-based nuclear weapons and an active uranium enrichment program meant to build new uranium-based bombs. Moreover, it appears that North Korea has restarted operation of its 5 MW reactor at Yongbyon, which eventually will provide more plutonium for additional bombs. It has also expanded the uranium enrichment facility at that complex, presumably meant to also produce weapons-grade material. North Korea’s missile programs continue as well, with numerous short and medium-range ballistic missiles as well as long-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching distances as far as the United States. Recently, the
development of the road-mobile, long-range KN-08, capable of reaching the US, has been of great concern, as has the new mobile Musudan missile with a range of 4000 kilometers. Pyongyang also has other military programs, some even less transparent, such as its chemical and biological programs and conventional weapons, which continue to pose a significant danger to the United States and its allies in Seoul and Tokyo. The North now says it wants to return to the Six Party Talks (6PT), unconditionally. It walked away from these negotiations in 2008, after refusing to commit in writing to a verification regime that would have permitted monitors to leave Yongbyon to inspect other specified areas and collect soil and water samples for testing in facilities outside of North Korea. If Pyongyang had agreed to this type of verification, halted its nuclear programs and started to disable and eventually dismantle them, the US and other countries in the 6PT were prepared to provide North Korea, in an “action-for-action” process, security assurances, economic assistance, light water reactors and eventual normalization of relations. Now after five years of disengagement, Pyongyang says it is willing to return to talks. Of course, over this period of time, it has enhanced its uranium enrichment program, worked on miniaturizing its nuclear weapons and built more sophisticated missiles, all while selling whatever weapons it could, to whomever was willing to conspire with North Korea in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. In fact, North Korea has enshrined its development of nuclear weapons with its “Byungjin” policy—putting economic and nuclear development on equal footing. While the North claims that it is prepared to implement the September 2005 Six Party Talks Joint Statement, its past behavior leads many of us to seriously doubt that it will implement this agreement. Rather, the North is more likely to return to the talks with a real objective of garnering attention and seeking compromises that will eventually permit it to retain some nuclear weapons while accruing all the benefits promised in the Joint Statement. This assessment is based on 20 years of fruitless denuclearization negotiations. And for these obvious reasons, the United States, South Korea and Japan are not presently prepared to return to the Six Party process. If North Korea is serious about implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement, it should take unilateral steps to convince the many critics that renewed talks might prove productive. For example, to help build confidence, North Korea could unilaterally return Kenneth Bae for humanitarian reasons, as they did with the US Korean War veteran Merrill Newman. On the WMD front, North Korea should unconditionally declare a moratorium on nuclear tests and missile launches. While affirming its sovereign right to launch a satellite (despite the prohibition of this under UN sanctions), Pyongyang should also state its willingness to forego this right and declare a moratorium on future tests of space launch vehicles. Second, the North should suspend operations of all facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear installation and allow international inspectors back in. Finally, the North should make it clear that once the 6PT are reconstituted, it is prepared to verifiably dismantle all of its nuclear programs, including its uranium enrichment effort at both known and undeclared facilities. The likelihood of North Korea pursuing this approach would be enhanced if China also privately pushed North Korea in this direction. During the past year, China has expressed concern about North Korea’s brazen escalation of tensions through its missile launches, nuclear test and vitriolic commentary. As North Korea’s only meaningful ally, with a Peace and Friendship Treaty going back to 1961 that commits China to come to the defense of the North in
time of strife, as well as being its main source for food and energy assistance, Beijing’s support is critical for the survival of the North. It is time for Beijing to use its leverage over North Korea to convince the new leadership in Pyongyang that China will not accept a nuclear-armed North. This would require Beijing to push the North not only to accept the need for actions to build confidence but also for verifiable denuclearization in return for security assurances, economic assistance and eventual normalization of relations with the US, South Korea and Japan. Positive movement in this direction by North Korea, with China’s encouragement, would also help to enhance US-China relations. A first step in this process would be to convene a preliminary meeting between senior representatives of the six countries to determine if North Korea is prepared to unconditionally declare a moratorium on missile launches and nuclear tests and to release Kenneth Bae for humanitarian purposes prior to any commitment to resume 6PT negotiations, assuming the North and the other five countries also state their willingness to abide by and verifiably implement the September 2005 Joint Statement. Hopefully, this would start the process of overcoming the considerable mistrust between all parties and begin to establish a clear understanding of what North Korea is willing to do and what, in turn, Pyongyang would receive from the other countries for their actions. There is one more reason why we should move forward quickly. With change underway in the North, especially with the removal of Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Un’s uncle and the former “number two” official in Pyongyang, it would be even more advisable to engage the leadership in Pyongyang since dialogue of this type will at least give us clarity on its thinking about denuclearization as well as the future of relations with the United States. If dialogue does resume, we should take steps to ensure that the negotiations are not going to be used by the North Koreans to buy time while they further develop their nuclear weapons and missiles. First, the North should understand that while these negotiations are being actively pursued, its moratorium on nuclear and missile tests would continue. Second, it would also be advisable to put a timeline on reconstituted negotiations. Six to nine months should be sufficient to reach an agreement if North Korea and the other countries are serious. Third, any agreement should also set a time limit for comprehensive and verifiable implementation. Negotiations with Pyongyang on denuclearization have been going on for 20 years. It is time we resolved these issues, expeditiously, comprehensively and fairly.” (Joseph DeTrani, “North Korea’s Irrational Diplomacy – Is There Any Hope?” 38North, December 17, 2013)

In high-level strategic talks here, the allies noted the possibility that North Korea will take additional provocative steps due to possibly increased instability following the execution of Jang Song-thaek, who was a putative regent for leader Kim Jong-un. “Accordingly, (the two sides) agreed to the need to further bolster their joint defense posture on the basis of a robust alliance and prepare thoroughly for all possible scenarios,” Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kyou-hyun told reporters, emerging from a meeting with his American counterpart, William Burns, at the State Department. South Korea and the U.S. have concurred with each other on the need to handle the North Korea issue with “cautiousness and prudence,” while closely monitoring what’s happening in the nation, he said in a roundtable meeting with Korean reporters here later in the day. Kim cited Pyongyang’s track record of escalating tensions with other nations in a bid to distract its people from internal instability. “Since South Korea-U.S.
joint military exercises are planned to take place between February and April, there is a chance that North Korea will take a provocative step in response," he said, adding there is no specific indication yet of any imminent missile launch or nuclear test. Meanwhile, a senior South Korean official said both South Korea and the U.S. believe that it’s still premature to resume talks with North Korea. "For now, it’s difficult to find a U.S. government official who suggests dialogue with North Korea aimed at managing the current situation," he said on background. (Lee Chi-dong, “S. Korea, U.S. Discuss ‘All Possible Scenarios’ on N. Korea,” Yonhap, December 18, 2013)

Randall Ireson: “The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Program recently released their 2013 Crop and Food Security Assessment Report (CFSAR) for the DPRK, continuing a series of annual reports on farm production begun in 1995.[1] [2] Like its predecessors, the 2013 CFSAR estimates the total main season production of major food grains and tubers, and projects next year’s harvest of winter wheat and barley as well as spring potato crops. Overall, the CFSARs provide a useful time-series of data to analyze changes and developments in the North’s farm sector. Since 2011, the assessment teams have included international Korean-speaking members, and since last year, they have been able to take sample crop cuttings from selected fields as a cross check against farm production reports. In 2013, as in recent years, there were four assessment teams, accompanied by members of the resident international aid community. They visited 51 farms from 27 counties in all nine agricultural provinces, and also interviewed a small number of individual households. The mission used official data provided by the government, but adjusted those data based on ground observations and satellite information. The 2013 CFSAR has two main conclusions: (1) Aggregate farm production is again up slightly, bringing the North the closest it has come to sufficiency in almost two decades. Production rose to a total 5.03 million metric tons (mMt), cereal equivalent, slightly less than the estimated annual food requirement of 5.37 mMt. Assuming that commercial grain imports (mostly from China and Russia) stay around 300,000 Mt as they have for the last several years, the shortfall is only 40,000 Mt, valued at around $8 million in the world market. That said, the CFSAR methodology assumes an average per capita food requirement of 174 kg grain equivalent per person/year, amounting to around 1640 kcal/day. The missions have consistently assumed that the remaining energy (>400 kcal) and other nutrients are “derived from the limited quantities of available fish, poultry, meat, sweet potatoes, vegetables, fruits, and wild foods.” Given how limited those other sources are, North Koreans still by no means get enough to eat. (Figure 1 graphs the change in aggregate food production compared to need over time.) (2) Despite signs last year that price structure and farm-led incentives might be changed, the 2013 mission found no evidence that there had been any changes in pricing for farms or any incentives other than “traditional” ones where sub-work teams receive benefits if their production exceeds specified targets. In 2012, the mission recommended for the first time that pricing policy for agriculture produce should be changed to provide more of an incentive for production. Prior to that, recommendations had been confined entirely to agronomic and land use issues. Because the DPRK does not appear to have moved forward on this front, the mission again recommended that changes in agricultural marketing are necessary to increase productivity. Given that the CFSARs are produced in cooperation with the DPRK government, and subject to certain diplomatic constraints regarding their conclusions, one can speculate that the relatively mild wording of this recommendation covers an increasing
frustration among aid donors that the structural obstacles to farm production in the DPRK are still not being addressed. Nonetheless, some things are changing—for better and for worse. For starters, rice yields have steadily increased since 2008 and now are at the almost respectable level of 5.3 Mt/ha (see Figure 2). This is a noteworthy achievement and reflects the emphasis that Korean farmers place on rice production. Second, the area allocated to winter grains for double cropping has declined, especially since 2010. This trend is also a positive change because the double cropping system creates untoward stresses on the soil, and production has been extremely uneven and low, depending especially on the severity of winter weather. Winter wheat and barley are insurance crops for the hungry months of the spring, but in a more productive farming system should be mostly discontinued. Third, given declining access to chemical fertilizer but an overall increase in food production, one can speculate that the use of compost and other organic fertilizer has expanded. The DPRK has emphasized this practice since at least the late 1990s, and beginning six or seven years ago, efforts were coordinated to develop composting systems that used crop residue as well as animal wastes much more effectively than previously, with corresponding improvements to crop yields. Finally, the area planted to soybean, which began to rise from 2008 to 2011, has declined in the last two years. Since soybean is the primary source of protein in the North Korean diet, this development is unfortunate. Yields have apparently also declined, compounding the problem. The assessment mission notes for the second year that the farm price for soybean is much too low compared to the price of maize, thus undercutting any economic motivation for farmers to plant this essential crop. In contrast, the 2011 CFSAR was very optimistic regarding increased soy production, with a rather detailed discussion of the motivation and reasons why the planted area had increased to 131,000 ha from 68,000 ha in 2009. Production in 2011 was 245,000 Mt or about 10 kg/person—not a great deal but still a vital contribution to a diet strikingly short of protein. Unfortunately, the area fell in 2013 to 116,000 ha and yields declined from 1.8 to 1.4 Mt/ha, bringing the per capita production down to 6.5 kg. Other aspects of the DPRK agricultural sector appear to be unchanged. Yields of crops other than rice show no apparent trend, with variations due to weather as much as anything else. In addition to the decline in soybean yields, winter grain yields are also down. Maize and potatoes are trending upward, but with no strong consistency. Second, crop diversity remains low and highly concentrated on rice and maize, especially with the decline in winter grains and soybean. Leguminous crops (soybean, mung bean, etc.) have been identified for many years as an essential addition to the DPRK crop mix, but to date, have not been planted at an adequate level. Rotating crops helps to break disease and insect cycles, and legume crops, which add nitrogen to the soil, also contribute to better yield in the following season. Third, the fertilizer supply is still inadequate, and the mix very imbalanced. Application of phosphate and potassium (almost all locally produced) is very low. Plants require a balanced mix of nutrients and without adequate phosphate and potassium, which contribute to root and seed health, the plant does not grow well, even when plenty of nitrogen is available. Soils in the DPRK are also typically very acidic, which chemically binds the main nutrients in ways that reduce their availability to plants. But farms have consistently been unable to apply enough lime to counteract this acidification. Finally, the official prices farms receive for their grain crops are still set by the state at levels on the order of 2 percent of the market price, thus removing any economic motivation to increase the supply of grains to the state. …The CFSAR reports that steeply sloping hillsides are still being planted with grains. This is a continuing response to chronic
food shortages, but subjects the land to permanent damage from severe erosion. The Ministry of Land and Environmental Protection regulates this practice to some degree, with land use assigned to “Land User Groups” made up of under-employed factory workers. Based on remote sensing data, the mission estimates that 550,000 ha of land with slope greater than 15 degrees is being farmed, and produces about 220,000 Mt of grain (or equivalent). This is about 4 percent of total food production, but uses (and degrades) land equal to about a quarter of the main farm fields. Areas of continuing uncertainty in the farming system include production from household gardens and the extent of post harvest losses. The area of household gardens at the farms can be well estimated based on the number of households, but yields are less certain. Based on repeated observations by international aid workers, since 2008, the reports have assumed potatoes and corn are grown on half the area of household and kitchen plots (vegetables on the rest), at an average yield of 6 Mt/ha, for a total addition of 75,000 Mt to the national production. Because of the intensive care given to these small plots, the figure is not unreasonable. While the grain contribution is small, household gardens produce a significant proportion of the fruits and vegetables consumed in the North, and are the foundation of the farmers’ markets. While post-harvest losses appear to remain significant, there are no observed data to draw from. Since 2010 the reports assume that 15 percent of rice, maize and potatoes are lost, 10 percent of soybean, and 5 percent of spring small grains. Causes are all related to inadequate harvest and food handling infrastructure and include late threshing, bird, rat and insect damage in the fields and in storage, and rotting of tubers in storage. These estimated losses (over 700,000 Mt in 2013) are added to the food requirement when calculating the overall balance. Reducing post-harvest losses should be a priority, and would be relatively easy if farms had effective harvesting equipment and better crop handling and storage facilities. Lack of capital and access to fuel and machinery are the main obstacles. If losses were cut in half, the national grain requirement (using the CFSAR methodology) would drop to 5.02 mMt and the country would be self sufficient in food production. Despite numerous reports about the growing predominance (both legal and otherwise) of the open market for food distribution, the CFSAR continues, perhaps by necessity, to focus on the role of the public distribution system (PDS). The report does conclude: The continuous inability to achieve the official Government target of 573 grams of cereal equivalent per person per day in any given year points to not only issues of food availability, but also broader supply chain constraints such as storage, transport and commodity tracking. There are indications that mechanisms other than the PDS contribute to household sustenance. Understated, to say the least. This year’s report includes more information about the organization of the PDS than in the past, including an interesting map showing the main grain distribution flow routes. Observations by the mission of county-level distribution centers in October found inadequate storage facilities for the full amount of grain that would be needed each month for the local target population, and in any case, extremely low stocks on hand. The monthly national average distribution over the last six years has never exceeded 400 gm per person per day, and in most years was reduced between April and September well below that. These data confirm that the PDS is simply unable to meet its designed purpose. Overall, the picture is one of continuing incremental change in the DPRK agricultural system, which is reflected in the steadily declining incidence of child malnutrition. The changes are mostly marginal, and somewhat positive overall, but do not address the fundamental structural problems: an overly rigid quota system for crop allocation; a procurement system and price structure
that does not adequately compensate farms and farmers; and a market that cannot supply the essential materials (fertilizer, machinery, parts, fuel, etc.) that are needed for a more productive agriculture. Twenty years into the economic contraction that caused the food crisis, national policy continues to ask the people to do more with less.” (Randall Ireson, “The State of North Korean Farming: New Information from the U.N. Crop Assessment Report,” 38North, December 18, 2013)

In the two years under Kim Jong-un's rule in North Korea, a total of 31 high-ranking officials in the ruling party, the cabinet and the military were purged, demoted or retired, and 52 new figures arose, a South Korean government report said. JoongAng Ilbo exclusively obtained an internal report yesterday, titled "An Analysis of the Shake-up of the Power Elite in the era of Kim Jong-un," which was written by intelligence authorities. The report divided the North Korean power elite into two groups dubbed “rising stars” and "waning stars.” It said the young leader carried out a generational shift across the board, replacing many older figures with relatively youthful ones, lowering the average age of the inner circle from 76 to 62. “Those senior party secretaries and military officials in their 70s - who exerted their influence in the era of Kim Jong-il - appear to have lost actual power now,” the report said. “The speed of the power shift was also faster than expected.” One of the examples of the shakeup is Jon Pyong-ho, an 87-year-old political bureau director of the cabinet. He has apparently been demoted from more powerful posts he once held such as party secretary in charge of the war industry or vice chairman of the National Defense Commission. On the list of so-called “rising stars” are a total of 52 people, according to the report. The report picked four deputy-ministerial-level officials of the ruling Workers' Party as the most notable figures: Kim Byong-ho, a deputy director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department; Pak Tae-song, a deputy director of the Organization and Guidance Department; Hong Yong-chil, a deputy director of the Machine Industry Department; and Ma Won-chun, a deputy director of the Finance and Accounting Department. “In the ruling party, these technocrats are reportedly praised by Kim Jong-un,” the report said. “Kim Jong-un brought them on several field guidance trips, and he appears to use those trips to groom or publicize new faces in the power shift. “Those who frequently accompanied leader Kim Jong-un on his field trips are expected to rise as the new inner-circle elite,” the report said. “So we need to keep a close eye on the intelligence sources regarding this.” The military has gone through a bigger shuffle than any other organization, the report said. The report focuses on 25 newly appointed senior generals who were promoted in the Kim Jong-un era. “They are mostly specialized in operations and have experience as field commanders,” the report said. “Fifteen of them were recruited strictly because of their abilities rather than their family backgrounds or educations.” The rising military stars include Kim Won-hong, minister of State Security, and two deputy directors of the General Political Bureau of the army, Yom Chol-song and Kim Su-gil. They reportedly led the purge and the execution of the second most powerful man in North Korea, Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of the leader. Ri Song-guk, commander of the Fourth Corps of the North Korean Army, which faces South Korea's western frontline units, is known to be 44 years old and a former commander of the 39th division. The report admitted that the South Korean government is still lacking sources and specific information on the rising military stars. “Except Kim Kyok-sik, the former chief of the General Staff of the army
who is known as a hawk, we are still lacking in sources to distinguish which of the new military officials are hawks or doves,” the report said. “We will put our efforts into focusing on this point from now on.” The report added that 17 senior military officials, who were praised as “the generation of the Songun [military-first] policy” and promoted under founding leader Kim Il Sung, were dismissed from their posts. Thirteen of them were actually purged, and the remaining four were retired. The report also pointed out that North Korea reappointed several economists, such as Cabinet Premier Pak Pong-ju, who were once dismissed for their failure in the so-called July 1 new economic measures, a reformist policy in 2002 to partly adopt a capitalist system to boost the moribund economy. Pak was an architect of the reform plan at the time, which attempted to give more autonomy to local businessmen. But some military hard-liners reportedly protested his move, resulting in the plan floundering. After the plan was scrapped, Pak was demoted to a textile factory in 2007 but returned to Pyongyang in 2013 as the cabinet premier. “If the new economists fail again in improving the economy, they will have to take responsibility for the failure,” the report said, implying those economists could face the fate of other planners such as Jang Song-thaek. (Lee Young-jong, “Report Traces North Korea’s Rising, Falling ‘Stars,’” JoongAng Ilbo, December 19, 2013)

The Defense Ministry in South Korea said that at least 11 officials at its cyberwarfare unit, created four years ago to fight North Korean propaganda, had spread 2,100 online political messages attacking the domestic opponents of President Park Geun-hye ahead of her election a year ago. Military investigators asked prosecutors to indict the officials on charges of violating a law that bans public servants from meddling in domestic politics, the chief investigator, Maj. Gen. Baek Nak-jong, said at a news conference. But he said his team had found no evidence that the cyberwarfare specialists tried to influence the result of the election, which Ms. Park won by a margin of a million votes. The opposition Democratic Party called the military investigation a whitewash designed to prevent political fallout against Park. Since the military’s cyberwarfare command was begun in January 2010, General Baek said it spread 280,000 messages through Twitter, blogs and other Internet sites. Most were used to counter what South Korea considered North Korean propaganda on the Internet, such as Pyongyang’s denial of involvement in the sinking of a South Korean navy ship in 2010 that killed 46 sailors, he said. But General Baek said that the cyberwarfare officials had violated their political neutrality in 15,000 messages, and that 2,100 of them were used to attack Park’s political opponents. One such message called Park’s main rival – the opposition party’s presidential candidate Moon Jae-in – “not qualified to become the top commander of the military,” accusing him of trying to cede a disputed western sea border to North Korea. General Baek said the military was considering reprimanding the current commander of the cyberwarfare unit and his immediate predecessor for a lack of oversight. But he said the two commanders were not directly involved in the alleged political intervention – a finding the opposition party called a whitewash. One of the commanders, Yeon Jae-wook, who led the unit until October last year, is now a senior military aide in Park’s presidential office. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korean Cyberwarfare Unit Accused of Political Meddling,” New York Times, December 19, 2013)
North Korea has sent a letter threatening “retaliatory strikes without warning” if conservative activists’ anti-Pyongyang rallies in Seoul were not stopped, officials here said. In its letter delivered through the border village of Panmunjom, the National Defense Commission, a top North Korean governing agency headed by Kim Jong-un, condemned recent rallies in downtown Seoul in which anti-North Korean and Confucian activists burned Kim in effigy, berating him as a “devil” who killed his own uncle. North Korea called the rallies “megaprovocations” against Kim’s authority. The letter was addressed to the National Security Council at President Park’s office in Seoul, said Kim Min-seok, spokesman for the South Korean Defense Ministry. “We are closely monitoring the North Korean military’s moves, preparing to sternly react to any provocations,” he said. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Warns South of Strikes amid Turmoil,” New York Times, December 20, 2013) The Ministry of National Defense confirmed that North Korea sent a threatening message to South Korea yesterday, despite the fact that the two were holding working-level talks on how to improve business conditions at the inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong. The message also came as delegates to the G20 Seoul meeting visited the area. “The North sent a fax Thursday under the name of its National Defense Commission’s secretariat via the west coast military hotline,” ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok told a regular briefing. “It reads that the North would strike the South without notice if insults to their highest dignity continued to take place.” The threat was directed to Cheong Wa Dae’s National Security Office, according to reports. According to the ministry, the threat came as a response to the latest anti-Pyongyang rallies held here December 17, the second anniversary of the death of its former leader Kim Jong-il, at which several conservative groups and North Korean defectors staged a protest against North Korea’s authoritarian rule and human rights abuses, with the burning of a photograph of Kim Jong-un. The spokesman said the defense ministry immediately replied through the military line, vowing to “sternly react” to any provocations. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Unification, which handles all inter-Korean affairs, downplayed worries about Pyongyang’s double play of engagement and provocation. “I think North Korea neither factored in the Kaesong Industrial Complex committee meeting nor the G20 delegation’s visit when sending such a message since it was delivered following media reports of the conservative groups’ rallies,” said Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Eui-do. “Also the content is similar to what the North has said in previous statements,” he added. “We usually don’t disclose to the public every time the North make such provocative comments but they have always been there,” the spokesman said. “The latest message is a mere extension of the North’s previous moves.” (Chung Min-uck, “N. Korea Sends Threat over Hotline,” Korea Times, December 20, 2013) South Korea’s top point man on North Korea urged Pyongyang to stop its provocative threats against Seoul and called for cooperation to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. “North Korea should take the attitude to resolve inter-Korean issues in a step by step manner through dialogue,” Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said in a forum at the National Assembly. “In that case, we will play an active role” in easing the dire economic situation in North Korea, one of the poorest countries in the world. His comments came a day after North Korea has threatened to strike South Korea in anger over a recent Seoul rally condemning North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for his reign of terror. The North’s powerful National Defense Commission warned of ruthless retaliation against the South “strike mercilessly without any notice,” accusing South Korea of insulting its
highest dignity, referring to Kim. On December 17, some 70 South Korean conservatives and North Korean defectors staged a protest against the North, burned effigies of Kim and his father and grandfather, the North's two late leaders, Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung. On Thursday, South Korea's defense ministry immediately replied through the military line, vowing to "sternly react" to any provocations, ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Urges N. Korea to Stop Provocative Acts,” December 20, 2013)

South Korea plans to set up a secretariat and standing committee within the National Security Council (NSC) to tackle increased security concerns following the execution of North Korea's No. 2 man Jang Song-thaek. Ju Chul-ki, President Park Geun-hye's senior aide for foreign affairs and security, said that they will be under the control of the presidential National Security Office (NSO). “With our security situation looking grim after Jang’s execution on December 12, risks could increase because the North issued threats on possible provocations and took issue with rallies held by some of our conservative groups,” Ju said. The North sent a threatening message yesterday to the South after anti-Pyongyang rallies were held in Seoul to coincide with the second anniversary of the death of former dictator Kim Jong-il, father of the current leader Kim Jong-un. “Following the instructions of President Park, we will found the NSC secretariat and the permanent committee that will convene every week involving the intelligence chief and other high-ranking national security officials.” (Kim Tae-gyu, "Korea to Set up NSC Secretariat," Korea Times, December 20, 2013)

While concerns that North Korea will launch provocations in the aftermath of Jang Song Thaek’s execution may be justified, recent commercial satellite imagery indicates that Pyongyang has no plan to conduct a nuclear test over at least the next few months. Through much of 2012, the site of the February 2013 nuclear test at the West Portal area was dormant. It appears that once the order to prepare for a possible test was issued, there was a spurt of activity at the site beginning in December 2012 and culminating in the February blast. As of early December 2013, there are no signs of stepped up activities at either the West or South Portal areas. Imagery indicates that North Korea recently resumed excavation of a probable new test tunnel at the West Portal area, site of the 2009 and 2013 nuclear detonations, after a two-month hiatus. However, completion of that tunnel may take some time. There appear to be two completed test tunnels at the South Portal area that could be used for a future test if a decision is made to do so. In the ten months since the February 2013 nuclear test, the main observable activities at the Punggye-ri site can be summarized as the following: 1) the excavation of what appears to be a new test tunnel at the West Portal area; 2) the sealing of entrances at tunnels associated with the 2009 and 2013 nuclear tests in the same area to prevent the release of radiation; 3) maintenance of the two available test tunnels at the South Portal area; and 4) substantial renovation and construction at the central support/staging area. (Jack Liu, “North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Site: No Indication of Nuclear Test Preparations,” 38North, December 20, 2013) The five-megawatt reactor was restarted this year after a six-year hiatus. Its ability to produce plutonium again depends in part on how quickly North Korea can supply it with new fuel rods. North Korea is believed to have only 2,000 fuel rods in its inventory, a quarter of the 8,000 needed for a full load of fuel. In a report on December 5 for the
Institute for Science and International Security, two nuclear experts, David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, had reported steam rising from the fuel fabrication complex in Yongbyon, which they said could be a sign of reactor fuel production. On Tuesday, the U.S.-Korea Institute also identified another building in Yongbyon that it said could be used to produce fuel for the light-water reactor. The 25- to 30-megawatt light-water reactor may not become operational until late 2015 or 2016, it said. “The identification of these facilities indicates a more wide-ranging, extensive effort by North Korea to modernize and restart the Yongbyon complex” than previously understood, the institute said. (Choe Sang-hun, “Activity Seen at North Korean Nuclear Site,” New York Times, December 25, 2013, p. A-8)

12/23/13  Commercial satellite imagery has identified facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center that may produce fuel for North Korea’s recently restarted 5 MW plutonium production reactor and the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) still under construction. Identification of these facilities indicates a more wide-ranging, extensive effort by North Korea to modernize and restart the Yongbyon complex dating back to 2009 than previously understood. Imagery analysis indicates that a probable fuel fabrication plant for the 5 MW reactor is located in the old pilot fuel fabrication plant for that reactor which fell into disuse in the 1980s. Renovation of the main building in this complex began in 2009 and the facility has been operating since 2010. Imagery analysis has also identified a possible ELWR fuel assembly plant, built in 2013, north of the pilot fuel fabrication facility. One of the largest structures at Yongbyon, the building’s configuration—including a high bay area measuring 1,500 square meters—is suitable for the production of LWR fuel assemblies. Alternatively, it may serve as a heavy machine shop for the entire Yongbyon complex or for producing large components for light water reactors. If the building is intended to produce fuel assemblies, that process could take several years. As a result, the ELWR may not become operational until late 2015 or 2016. (Nick Hansen, “Major Development: Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facilities Identified at Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” 38North, December 23, 2013)

12/24/13  Japan planned to let South Korea continue to preside over a three-nation summit in 2014, but then sought to take over the chairmanship to break the stalemate with its two neighbors. In vice-ministerial dialogue with South Korea on December 19, however, China made it clear that it would never accept a trilateral summit if Japan chaired the framework. Japanese and South Korean diplomats failed to reach a consensus when they met in Tokyo on December 24. (Makino Yoshihiro, “Abe’s Shrine Visit Blew Japan-S. Korea Efforts for Summit Sky-High,” Asahi Shimbun, January 28, 2014)

12/25/13  Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine shattered the painstaking groundwork Japanese and South Korean foreign policymakers were laying for a bilateral summit. South Korean officials were appalled when Japan informed them on the night of December 25 that Abe might visit the shrine, where 14 Class-A war criminals are commemorated, the next day. The day before, South Korean diplomats met with their Japanese counterparts in Tokyo to discuss a possible trilateral summit among Japan, South Korea and China. In a meeting on December 18, Japanese and
South Korean officials also considered arranging vice-ministerial dialogue in January to smooth the way for a future bilateral summit. Foreign policymakers of the two countries were holding out hopes that Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye might sit for one-on-one talks around March, when a nuclear security summit is scheduled. Abe’s December 26 visit meant all their hard work had come to naught, however. “A sense of weariness has sunk in,” a Foreign Ministry source said of the mood among ministry bureaucrats. Around October, Abe’s lieutenants in the prime minister’s office told Foreign Ministry officials that he would decide between visiting Yasukuni and flying to Beijing to improve ties with China on the first anniversary of his administration in December. The ministry sprang into action to arrange a summit with China, another with South Korea and a three-way summit as ways to keep Abe from paying his respects at Yasukuni. “If the prime minister visits the shrine, the wheels of Japanese diplomacy will fall off,” a senior Foreign Ministry official said. Japan and South Korea had already begun consultations for a summit when their foreign ministers met in July and September. On November 7, vice-ministerial officials from Japan, South Korea and China met in Seoul, raising hopes of a three-nation summit. A week later, Vice Foreign Minister Akitaka Saiki called on Lee Byung-kee, South Korean ambassador to Japan, to work toward a trilateral summit by the end of the year. “We will consider whatever date is feasible,” Saiki told Lee during a meeting at the Foreign Ministry on Nov. 14. South Korea, however, set several conditions for a summit with Japan. Seoul asked for Abe’s promise to abide by Japan’s past apologies for its wartime actions issued in the names of former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono. The 1995 Murayama statement expressed remorse and an apology for Japan’s aggression and colonial rule, while the 1993 Kono statement acknowledged that the nation’s military forcefully recruited “comfort women” to provide sex for its troops before and during World War II. Seoul also called for a letter of apology to former comfort women from Abe, and Japanese government assistance to those women for reasons other than humanitarian support. Japan’s Foreign Ministry was not amenable because Abe had demanded there be no strings attached to a summit with Park. Negotiations were brought to a standstill when the ministry asked South Korea to refrain from anti-Japan activities in the international community and to guarantee that Japanese assistance to former comfort women would be its last. (Makino Yoshihiro, “Abe's Shrine Visit Blew Japan-S. Korea Efforts for Summit Sky-High,” Asahi Shimbun, January 28, 2014)
encouraged Abe to reconcile with Japan’s neighbors and keep quiet about deeply held, but historically inaccurate, views on Japan’s wartime past. “Japan is a valued ally and friend,” the U.S. embassy in Tokyo said in a statement. “Nevertheless, the United States is disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions” in the region. (Chico Harlan, “Japanese Prime Minister’s Visit to Yasukuni War Shrine Spurs New Tensions in Asia,” Washington Post, December 26, 2013)

A long-simmering dispute between the United States and Japan over the fate of a Marine base on Okinawa was apparently resolved when the Okinawan governor gave his approval to move the base to a remote area. The agreement would bolster efforts by the Pentagon to rebalance American military forces across the Asia-Pacific region and by the Japanese prime minister, Abe Shinzo, to raise his country’s strategic posture and check the growing military influence of China. Amid protests against keeping the base on Okinawa, Gov Nakaima Hirokazu approved a landfill on which much of the base would be built, clearing the way for the relocation. But in a reflection of the controversy surrounding his decision, Nakaima said later that he was personally skeptical of the planned location for the new base and that he would prefer that it be moved out of the region altogether, as many Okinawans want. Protesters opposed to the base have branded Nakaima a traitor for reversing his previous opposition to the relocation plan. Nakaima also said he would call for the closure of the old base in five years, even though the plan lays out a relocation process that lasts twice as long. “I gave my legal approval,” Nakaima said at a news conference broadcast live on national television. “But the relocation will not be easy. In fact, I don’t think its feasibility is very high. I think moving the base outside Okinawa is a better plan.” The original agreement to move the base, which is in a heavily populated area, was reached in 1996 after the gang rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by American servicemen. “I thank Mr. Nakaima for the brave decision,” Abe said in Tokyo. He said that the government would “continue to do what it can to reduce the burden” of the base on local residents. Much would depend on future negotiations with the United States on the move, he added. In a meeting on December 25 in Tokyo, Abe unveiled a set of measures to reduce the burden of the American bases on Okinawa, together with promises of financial support to the prefecture, Japan’s poorest. That cleared the way for Nakaima’s approval of a landfill for the new base, Camp Schwab-Henoko Bay in the north. The approximately 18,000 Marines now stationed on Okinawa will drop to about 10,000 once the new base is completed over the next decade. During that time, facilities are to be built that would shift about 5,000 Marines to Guam. There are also plans to eventually deploy about 2,500 Marines in Australia. Those movements, Pentagon officials said, would create a more militarily useful distribution of Marines across the region, allowing them to be closer to a broader swath of territory as required for traditional security missions or disaster relief efforts. Prolonged delays and uncertainty over the base in Okinawa had undermined the Obama administration’s plan for a strategic rebalancing in Asia. A senior Pentagon official called the Okinawa agreement the “most significant” breakthrough in moving the American military to “a very operationally sustainable, distributed lay-down in the Pacific.” “This sends a clear signal to the region that the alliance is strong, capable,” added the official. Another senior Defense Department official said that with an agreement in place, “We can focus on the larger strategic issues on our plate.” Senior Pentagon officials acknowledged
that additional hurdles could arise over the 10-year timetable required to replace Futenma with the new base at Henoko Bay, which is near a small existing installation called Camp Schwab. Staunch opposition to the base remains, and about 2,000 protesters gathered at the Okinawa Prefecture offices on Friday after the agreement became known. Some pushed into the building’s lobby, occupying it, according to reports by the NHK television network. (Hiroko Tabuchi and Thom Shanker, “Deal to Move Okinawa Base Wins Approval,” New York Times, December 27, 2013, p. A-1) Prior to the Abe-Nakaima meeting, Okinawa Prefecture had made four demands, including an end to operations at the Futenma base within five years and an early return of the base site, as well as a revision to the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, which governs U.S. forces in Japan. “The prime minister accepted all four demands and showed his strong commitment to negotiating with the United States [to realize the demands],” Nakaima said. (Jiji Press, “Nakaima OK’s Landfill for Relocation,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 27, 2013) Even as officials on both sides of the Pacific hailed an agreement to resolve a tangled dispute over a Marine base on Okinawa, strong opposition to the deal in Okinawa and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s recent visit to a war shrine cast a shadow over the diplomatic celebration. Despite the United States’ deep satisfaction with the agreement, a congratulatory telephone call expected Friday between Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and his Japanese counterpart, Onodera Itsunori, was put off, American officials said. The postponement had less to do with complications in Okinawa than with Washington’s concerns over Abe’s appearance at the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors the nation’s war dead, including several war criminals who were executed after Japan’s defeat in 1945. A State Department spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, said in a statement that the United States was “disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors,” echoing a statement yesterday by the new American ambassador to Japan, Caroline Kennedy. Swift and angry opposition from some local leaders in Okinawa, who continue to demand that the base be moved off the island altogether, has raised some questions on how smoothly the relocation can proceed. Much of the ire remains directed not so much at Washington as at Tokyo, and what locals see as the excessive concentration of American bases in Okinawa. Okinawa Prefecture makes up a fraction of Japan’s total land area, but it hosts almost three dozen American military facilities and over half of the 50,000 American service members stationed in Japan. The strongest response came from Inamine Susumu, the mayor of Nago City, near where the new base would be built, which is not far from another American installation, Camp Schwab. He told reporters in Okinawa after the decision that he “definitely opposed” the plan, and said he had told the governor so. Inamine is up for re-election next month, and how much he will complicate the relocation process will hinge on whether he will prevail over a pro-base candidate backed by Abe’s party. “The battle lines are now drawn” for the January 19 ballot, Inamine said. Opponents of the relocation plan have accused Nakaima of betrayal for his reversal. And today, he himself expressed personal skepticism, saying he also would prefer that the base be moved out of the region. Nakaima also said he would call for the closing of the old base in five years, even though the plan lays out a relocation that lasts twice as long. “I gave my legal approval,” Nakaima said at a news conference broadcast live on national television. “But the relocation will not be easy. In fact, I don’t think its feasibility is very high. I think moving the base outside Okinawa is a

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In an annual New Year’s message delivered live on the North’s television and radio, Kim Jong-un called for improved ties with South Korea and pledged to rebuild the North’s moribund economy in 2014 with emphasis on food production. “We will make aggressive efforts to improve relations between the North and the South,” Kim said in the speech which lasted 25 minutes. “The South side should also come forward to improve relations between the North and the South.” (Kim Kwang-tae, “N. Korea Extends Olive Branch to S. Korea,” Yonhap, January 1, 2014)