



# NORTH KOREA CHRONOLOGY 2016

Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project  
Social Science Research Council

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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called for improved relations with South Korea, saying that he is open to talks with Seoul in an open-minded manner for unification. In his New Year's message delivered live on the North's television, Kim said North Korea can hold candid dialogue with the South, calling on Seoul to honor an inter-Korean deal reached in August to defuse military tension. "We are willing to have talks in an open-minded manner with anyone who wants peace and unification," Kim said. "South Korea should honor the spirit of the inter-Korean agreement in August. Seoul should refrain from doing acts that hurt the conciliatory mood." Kim did not mention North Korea's nuclear weapons program. (Yonhap, "N.K. Leader Says He's Open to Candid Talks with S. Korea," January 1, 2015)

Kim Jong-un's New Year Address: "...We should concentrate all our efforts on building an economic giant to bring about a fresh turn in developing the country's economy and improving the people's standard of living. .... **In order to achieve breakthroughs for a turning point in building an economic giant the electric-power, coal-mining and metallurgical industries and the rail transport sector** should advance dynamically in the vanguard of the general offensive. ... **Our Party maintains the improvement of the people's living conditions as the most important of the numerous state affairs. The crop farming, animal husbandry and fishing sectors should make innovations to effect a radical change in improving the people's standard of living.** ... The country's defense capability should be built up. In this year, which marks the 20th anniversary of the movement of winning the title of O Jung Hup-led 7th Regiment initiated by General Kim Jong Il, the People's Army should further

develop itself into a revolutionary army of the Party in which the Party's unified command system is thoroughly established, into a steadfast army of the Party that keeps the revolutionary faith to the death, and effect a turnaround in implementing the Party's four-point line of building up the army to be formidable. By keeping it as the seed to conduct training in a real-war atmosphere and put it on a scientific and modern footing, the army should raise the fierce flames of training so that all the service personnel are prepared to be elite soldiers of modern warfare and stout fighters who are equipped with the military strategies and tactics of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, the heroic fighting spirit and flawless abilities to fight an actual war. It should become a standard-bearer and shock force of the times to make breakthroughs as intended by the Party on the major fronts where a thriving country is being built, and look for more tasks that are for the good of the people. **Officers and men of the Korean People's Internal Security Forces should smash in embryo the maneuverings of the class enemy and hostile elements to harm the leadership of the revolution, our socialist system and our people's lives and property,** and members of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards should intensify combat and political training and fully prepare themselves to defend their villages. The munitions industry sector should develop defense science and technology, put the defense industry on a highly Juche-oriented, modern and scientific footing, and give full play to the revolutionary spirit of Kunja-ri, so as to develop and produce a greater number of various means of military strike of our own style that are capable of overwhelming the enemy. ...National reunification is the most pressing and vital task facing the nation. **Last year, greeting the 70th anniversary of national liberation, we appealed to all the compatriots to pool their efforts to open up a broad avenue to independent reunification, and strived for its realization. However, the anti-reunification forces that are not desirous of national reunification and improved inter-Korean relations ran amuck to realize their schemes for a war and even created a touch-and-go situation short of crossfire, causing grave apprehension at home and abroad. The south Korean authorities publicly sought to realize their goal of "regime change" in our country and unilateral "unification of systems" against the trend of inter-Korean dialogue and detente, and fanned distrust and confrontation between the north and the south.** This year we should hold up the slogan "Let us frustrate the challenges by the anti-reunification forces within and without and usher in a new era of independent reunification!" and press on with the national reunification movement more vigorously. **We should reject foreign intervention and resolve the issues of inter-Korean relations and national reunification independently in keeping with the aspirations and demands of the nation. It is none other than the outside forces that divided our nation, and it is also none other than the United States and its followers that obstruct the reunification of our country. Notwithstanding this, the south Korean authorities are clinging to a smear campaign against the fellow countrymen in collusion with the outside forces while touring foreign countries to ask for the solution of the internal issue of our nation, the issue of its reunification. This is a betrayal of the country and nation that leaves the destiny of the nation at the mercy of the outside forces and sells out its interests. The issues of inter-Korean relations and national reunification should, to all intents and purposes, be resolved by the efforts of our nation in conformity with its**

independent will and demands, true to the principle of By Our Nation Itself. No one will or can bring our nation reunification. The whole nation should struggle resolutely against the sycophantic and treacherous maneuvers of the anti-reunification forces to cooperate with the outside forces. The south Korean authorities should discontinue such a humiliating act as going on a tour of foreign countries touting for cooperation in resolving the internal issues of the nation. It is fundamental to realizing the country's reunification to prevent the danger of war and safeguard peace and security in the Korean peninsula. Today the peninsula has become the hottest spot in the world and a hotbed of nuclear war owing to the U.S. aggressive strategy for the domination of Asia and its reckless moves for a war against the DPRK. The U.S. and south Korean war maniacs are conducting large-scale military exercises aimed at a nuclear war against the DPRK one after another every year; this is precipitating a critical situation in the Korean peninsula and throwing serious obstacles in the way of improving inter-Korean relations. Last year's August emergency showed that even a trifling, incidental conflict between the north and the south may spark a war and escalate into an all-out war. The U.S. and south Korean authorities must discontinue their extremely dangerous aggressive war exercises and suspend acts of military provocation that aggravates tension in the Korean peninsula. It is our consistent stand to strive with patience for peace in the peninsula and security in the region. However, if aggressors dare to provoke us, though to a slight degree, we will never tolerate it but respond resolutely with a merciless sacred war of justice, a great war for national reunification. We should value such agreements common to the nation as the three principles for national reunification and declarations between the north and the south, and in conformity with them, open up an avenue to improved bilateral relations. These principles and declarations constitute the great reunification program common to the nation, and all fellow countrymen wish that they are implemented as soon as possible and a radical phase opened up in reunifying the country. **If they are sincere about improving inter-Korean relations and reunifying the country peacefully, the south Korean authorities must not seek pointless confrontation of systems, but make it clear that they intend to respect and implement with sincerity the three principles for national reunification, June 15 Joint Declaration and October 4 Declaration, which crystallize the general will of the nation and whose validity has been proved in practice. They should cherish the spirit of the agreement signed last year at the inter-Korean high-level emergency contact, and desist from any act that will lead to a breach of the agreement and mar the atmosphere of dialogue. In the future, too, we will make strenuous efforts to develop inter-Korean talks and improve bilateral relations. We will also have an open-minded discussion on the reunification issue, one of the national issues, with anyone who is truly desirous of national reconciliation and unity, peace and reunification.** All the Korean people in the north, in the south and abroad will smash all challenges and obstructive moves by the anti-reunification forces in and out of the country and build a dignified and prosperous reunified Korea on this land without fail under the banner of By Our Nation Itself. **The United States has persisted in ignoring our just demand for replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace pact to remove the danger of war, ease tension and create a peaceful environment in the Korean peninsula. Instead, it has clung to its**

**anachronistic policy hostile towards the DPRK, escalating the tension and egging its vassal forces on to stage a "human rights" racket against the country.** However, no plots and schemes of the enemy could break the indomitable will of our service personnel and people to firmly defend and add brilliance to our style of people-centered socialism, the base of their happy life. The challenges by the hostile forces remain uninterrupted and the situation is as tense as ever, but we will invariably advance along the road of independence, Songun and socialism under the unfurled red flag of the revolution, and make all responsible efforts to safeguard peace and security in the Korean peninsula and the rest of the world." (KCNA, "Kim Jong-un's New Year Address," January 1, 2016)

1/3/16

Stephen Bosworth, a long-time Korea expert who served as U.S. ambassador to South Korea and as Washington's special representative for North Korea policy, has died. He was 76. Bosworth served as Washington's top envoy to South Korea from 1997-2001 and special representative for North Korea policy from 2009-2011. He also served as executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from 1995-1997. Bosworth was considered pro-engagement toward the North. In an interview with Yonhap last March, Bosworth expressed concerns about the lack of dialogue with Pyongyang, stressing that there is nothing constraining the North's nuclear development. "What is important is the fact that North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons. They are unconstrained. At least in the past, when we've been talking to them they had not been conducting tests, and they had frozen the programs that we knew about, at least. Now, they have no constraints at all," Bosworth said at the time. "I think all the experts agree that in five years they could have many more nuclear weapons than they might have now. To deny that is to simply deny reality," he said. In January last year, Bosworth also participated in "Track 2" meetings with North Korea's chief nuclear envoy and other diplomats in Singapore, together with former U.S. nuclear negotiator Joseph DeTrani and some American scholars. (Yonhap, "Ex-U.S. Amb. Stephen Bosworth Dies," January 5, 2016)

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The United States rejected a North Korean proposal to discuss a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War because it did not address denuclearization on the peninsula, the State Department said. State Department spokesman John Kirby made the comment in response to a *Wall Street Journal* report that the White House secretly agreed to peace talks just before Pyongyang's latest nuclear bomb test. The newspaper, citing U.S. officials familiar with the events, said the Obama administration dropped its condition that Pyongyang take steps to curtail its nuclear arsenal before any peace talks take place, instead calling for North Korea's atomic weapons program to be just one part of the discussion. Pyongyang declined the proposal, and its January 6 nuclear test ended the diplomatic plans, the newspaper reported. "To be clear, it was the North Koreans who proposed discussing a peace treaty," Kirby said in an emailed statement. "We carefully considered their proposal, and made clear that denuclearization had to be part of any such discussion. The North rejected our response," he said. "Our response to the NK proposal was consistent with our longstanding focus on denuclearization." (Reuters, "U.S. Rejected Peace Talks before Last Nuclear Test," February 21, 2016) Days before North Korea's **latest nuclear-bomb test**, the Obama administration secretly agreed to talks to try to formally end the

Korean War, dropping a longstanding condition that Pyongyang first take steps to curtail its nuclear arsenal. [??] Instead the U.S. called for North Korea's atomic-weapons program to be simply part of the talks. Pyongyang declined the counter-proposal, according to U.S. officials familiar with the events. Its nuclear test on January 6 ended the diplomatic gambit. The episode, in an exchange at the United Nations, was one of several unsuccessful attempts that American officials say they made to discuss denuclearization with North Korea during President Barack Obama's second term while also negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program. Obama has pointed to the Iran deal to signal to North Korea that he is open to a similar track with the regime of Kim Jong Un. But the White House sees North Korea as far more opaque and uncooperative. The latest fruitless exchanges typified diplomacy between the U.S. and Pyongyang in recent years. "For North Korea, winning a peace treaty is the center of the U.S. relationship," said Go Myung-hyun, an expert on North Korea at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a Seoul-based think tank. "It feels nuclear development gives it a bigger edge to do so." The new U.S. sanctions and Washington's efforts to raise pressure on China, Pyongyang's main political and economic ally, will provide a test of whether the deadlock can be broken. The U.S. law goes further than previous efforts to block the regime's sources of funds for its leadership and weapons program, including by extending a blacklist to companies, primarily Chinese ones that do business with North Korea. Existing sanctions targeted North Korean individuals and entities with little presence outside the country. Advocates of the law, many of whom cite the example of Iran, say more pressure was needed to deter North Korea. The law will force Kim to "make a choice between coming back to the table and ending his nuclear-weapons program or to cut off the funding for that program and for his regime," House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Ed Royce, a California Republican, said recently. Skeptics, including those within the Obama administration, say North Korea is different from Iran because its decades of isolation limits the power of sanctions. Some say Pyongyang is increasingly using domestic technology in its weapons program and that many of the blacklisted Chinese companies are small with few other international dealings. "It's not like Iran where they have a lot of vulnerability because there's a lot of commercial activity," a senior U.S. official said. The sanctions "will have an effect, but the real lifeline is the Chinese assistance." While Obama felt emboldened by his success in reaching a nuclear deal last year with Iran, he has largely tried to use any momentum from that diplomatic effort to push for a political resolution to the conflict in Syria, rather than shift focus to North Korea. Iran and North Korea "are both countries that have a long history of antagonism towards the United States, but we were prepared to have a serious conversation with the Iranians once they showed that they were serious about the possibility of giving up the pursuit of nuclear weapons," Obama said last October. But he added, "there's been no indication on the part of the North Koreans, as there was with the Iranians, that they could foresee a future in which they didn't possess or were not pursuing nuclear weapons." North Korea's U.N. mission didn't respond to a request for comment. Its state media agency wrote this month of the U.S.'s prioritization of nuclear talks: "This is just like a guilty party filing suit first." The U.S.-South Korean missile-shield talks "further strengthens arguments of those in China who argue North Korea is a strategic liability," said L. Gordon Flake, head of the Perth US Asia Centre at the University of Western Australia. "It's becoming more difficult for China to give North Korea leeway." For the U.S.,

coordination with China is important to pass new U.N. sanctions against North Korea. Some American officials said in the past week that China agreed to cooperate. "I think it unlikely that China wants to be seen by the international community as the protector of North Korea, given its recent outrageous behavior in violation of international law and U.N. Security Council resolution," Susan Rice, Obama's national security adviser, said last week. A Chinese vice foreign minister has said Beijing will support a "new, powerful" U.N. resolution, though added that negotiations are key to fixing the problem. But any external pressure faces the challenge of North Korea's unwillingness to yield its nuclear weapons, especially after Pyongyang revised its constitution in 2012 to declare itself a nuclear-armed state. "Submitting to foreign demands to denuclearize could mean delegitimization and destabilization for the regime," said Nicholas Eberstadt, a North Korea expert at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. (Alastair Gale and Carol Lee, "U.S. Agreed to North Korea Peace Talks before Latest Nuclear Test," *Wall Street Journal*, February 21, 2016)

1/4/16 The United States said it will judge North Korea "by its actions, not its words" after Kim Jong-un, pledged efforts to improve inter-Korean ties in his New Year's message. Kim that the North will "make aggressive efforts to hold talks and improve relations" with South Korea, saying the country is willing to have talks in an open-minded manner with anyone who wants peace and unification. "As we have long said, we support improved inter-Korean relations. However, North Korea will be judged by its actions, not its words," said Ory Abramowicz, a spokesperson for the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. "We continue to call on North Korea to refrain from actions that raise tensions in the region and focus instead on taking concrete steps toward fulfilling its international commitments and obligations," the official said.

1/5/16 North Korea's military carried out a successful **ejection** test of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile recently, an indication that an earlier test failure has not derailed the underwater missile program, U.S. defense officials said. The test of the submarine-launched missile, or SLBM, which the Pentagon has called the KN-11, from a submerged submarine on December 21 took place near the port city of Sinpo, where the capability is being developed. The facility is located along the North Korean coast of the Sea of Japan. The test followed a November 28 ejection tube launch failure that damaged North Korea's first missile submarine, which officials identified as the Gorae, Korean for whale. No additional details of the test could be learned, including whether the missile's engine ignited after the ejection or whether the missile took flight. North Korean state-run media did not publicize the latest test. In May, North Korea announced that its developmental SLBM was flight tested from what analysts believe was an underwater test platform. One official said that based on the latest successful ejection test, North Korea could be as little as a year away from deploying a submarine armed with a nuclear-tipped missile. Other analysts remain skeptical that the North Koreans can master the technology for submarine missile firings. At the Pentagon, spokesman Cmdr. Bill Urban had no comment. "We are not going to be able to provide any information regarding matters of intelligence," he said. But military analysts said the successful test is a significant step forward in the difficult technical challenge of firing a missile from a submerged submarine. North Korea is building up its missile forces in an effort to develop a nuclear strike capability. Its current force of

strategic missiles includes long-range Taepodong missiles that are vulnerable to preemptive strike because of the time it takes to prepare the missiles for launch. To develop a more survivable missile force, North Korea has a small number of KN-08 road-mobile ICBMs and has also been developing the KN-11. The SLBM program was first disclosed by the *Washington Free Beacon* in August 2014. North Korea is believed by U.S. officials to have obtained the technology for a small warhead capable of being carried by missile in the late 1990s or early 2000s from the covert Pakistani nuclear supply network led by A.Q. Khan. David Maxwell, a retired Army colonel and expert on North Korea at Georgetown University, said a North Korean missile submarine could be a significant challenge to the United States and its allies. "If they can successfully field an operational SLBM in a capable submarine that can evade advanced anti-submarine measures, it could be a game changer as it could give them a possible second strike capability in a nuclear exchange," Maxwell said. Maxwell said he suspects the North Koreans remain "some ways off" from fielding a missile submarine and the current forces of submarines are not advanced and thus could be tracked. "If we were to determine that they had the capability, we would focus our anti-submarine efforts on perhaps one or two submarines that they might be able to deploy," he added. Maxwell noted that North Korea has "surprised us before" in developing arms and missiles. "What I think is most important is that their pursuit of an SLBM capability is another indicator that they believe their nuclear program is key to regime survival, and that they have absolutely no intention whatsoever of ever giving up their nuclear program," Maxwell said. Bruce Bechtol, a former Defense Intelligence Agency expert on North Korea, said the North Korean missile thought to be used in the test is a variant of an SS-N-6 SLBM obtained covertly from Russia. Bechtol, a professor at Angelo State University, said North Korea, with one of the largest missile arsenals and production capabilities in Asia, appears to have been able to reverse engineer an SLBM from one SS-N-6, just as Pyongyang was able to develop an array of missiles after obtaining a Russian short-range Scud decades ago. "North Korea has moved more quickly than most analysts would have anticipated on the SLBM program," Bechtol said. "Not only do they now have a missile that can successfully be fired using the technically challenging procedure of sub-surface launching... but now it appears they are actually able to do this from a submarine—as evidenced by the most recent test," he added. When operational, the submarine and missile capability will provide Pyongyang with a new strike option that could be potentially lethal to the United States and its allies. Iran is believed to have acquired North Korea's Musudan missile, and reportedly uses technology from the SS-N-6 in the Safir rocket, he said. The origin of the Gorae missile submarine is not known. It is believed to be based on either a Soviet design Golf II-class submarine, or reverse-engineered from Golf II submarines obtained by North Korea in the 1990s. The submarines are designed with launch tubes in the vessel's sail and are believed to be capable of launching two missiles. Commercial satellite photographs have identified the submarine and a test platform at the coastal facility at Sinpo. Rick Fisher, a military affairs analyst with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the latest test indicates the North Koreans are making progress in the SLBM program. "With an operational SLBM, North Korea will have more options for nuclear coercion against South Korea, Japan, and the United States, as well as being able to offer a new weapon of mass destruction for export," Fisher said, noting Iran would likely be among the first customers of an SLBM design. North Korean leader Kim

Jong Un made no mention of the new submarine missile program in his New Year's day speech. Kim warned that the Korean Peninsula is becoming "the world's biggest flashpoint and origin of nuclear war today" because of what he said were South Korean and U.S. nuclear war exercises. Meanwhile, North Korea may be preparing to conduct an underground test of a thermonuclear weapon, according to a South Korean military report. "We can't discount the possibility that the North's excavation of a new tunnel at its Punggye-ri test site could be designed for thermonuclear weapons tests," said the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Command, a Defense Ministry group, in a report made public Sunday. "Considering its research of nuclear technology, its history of underground and projectile tests, and elapsed time since its nuclear development, North Korea has the foundation for thermonuclear weapons," the report said, according to Yonhap. Thermonuclear bombs have more explosive power than early-generation nuclear arms. The weapons use the energy from a primary nuclear fission reaction to compress and ignite a secondary nuclear fusion reaction with greater blast yield. North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un has announced that it is capable of building hydrogen bombs, though the South Korean report contested this assertion. "The North could detonate its boosted fission weapon, but we don't believe it is yet capable of directly testing hydrogen bombs," the command report stated. North Korea carried out three nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013 at the Punggye-ri test facility in the northeastern part of the country. A South Korean Defense Ministry-affiliated think tank warned in a report made public last week that North Korea is pushing ahead with additional nuclear tests. "As threats to conduct nuclear and missile tests themselves have considerable impact on the regional balance of power, the North is expected to remain ready and seek appropriate timing for the tests while maintaining ambiguity about its ultimate intentions," Institute for Defense Analyses stated in the report made public January 3. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump on January 3 warned that North Korea poses a nuclear threat. "Nuclear is a major problem," Trump said on *Face the Nation*. "And we have major problems, because you have other people that would be very fast on that. You look at North Korea, you look at some of these countries, I don't think they would hesitate to use it if they really had it in a proper manner." (Bill Gertz, "North Korea Conducts Successful Submarine Missile Test," *Washington Free Beacon*, January 5, 2016) Bermudez: "Reports of a North Korean "ejection" test of the *Bukkeukseong-1* (Polaris-1, KN-11) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on December 21, 2015, appear to be supported by new commercial satellite imagery of the Sinpo South Shipyard. This imagery also indicates that despite reports of a failed test in late November 2015 North Korea is continuing to actively pursue its SLBM development program. Specifically: Activity at the secure submarine area may be an indicator supporting reports of a test two days earlier since it is similar to the level of activity that has been previously seen at the SINPO-class submarine prior to the May 2015 test of the *Bukkeukseong-1*. At the Sinpo South Test Stand, the structure used to support a rocket engine, missile or launch tube, usually present either immediately prior to or shortly after a test is conducted, is in place, suggesting that such a test has been conducted recently or will be conducted soon. Imagery shows the SINPO-class submarine docked at the secure boat basin with netting concealing ongoing work. While the nature of the work remains unclear, it seems that although the boat may have been damaged during a recent test as some reports have speculated, it remains seaworthy. The refurbishment and construction



program at the Sinpo South construction halls, fabrication buildings and machine shops that will allow building new submarines much larger than the SINPO-class is nearing completion. North Korea's development of a SLBM and associated ballistic missile submarine has the potential to present a significant threat in the future. However, the development of an operational system will be an expensive, time-consuming endeavor with no guarantee of success. On November 29, 2015 South Korean government sources reported that North Korea had conducted a failed test of the *Bukkeukseong-1* (Polaris-1, KN-11) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) the previous day. This test was conducted from the North's sole SINPO-class experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA) in the waters of the East Sea northeast of Wonsan. This follows an earlier test during May 2015 that Pyongyang claimed as a great success but was reported by South Korean intelligence sources as a simple ejection test and not a full capabilities operational test. The November test has been assessed as a failure because no missile flight was tracked on radar and debris—sometimes reported as “fragments of a safety cover”—was observed floating on the surface of the water following the test. It has also been suggested that the *Bukkeukseong-1* either never left the launch tube or that it was successfully ejected but the main engine failed to fire. There has also been speculation that the submarine was damaged during the test. While some assess this failure as a significant setback for the SLBM program, it should more accurately be viewed as a normal part of a development program that had likely been anticipated as a possibility by North Korea's development team. Indeed, the reports of a subsequent December 21<sup>st</sup> ejection test suggest that North Korean designers, engineers and technicians have probably learned from the previous test failure and actively continuing development of the *Bukkeukseong-1*, launch system and submarine.” (Joseph Bermudez Jr., “North Korea's Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Full Steam Ahead,” *38North*, January 5, 2016) The DPRK released footage on 8 January from a purportedly successful KN-11 SLBM test. There have been press reports that the US intelligence community detected a failed ejection test in November, followed by a successful ejection test in December. “No additional details of the test could be learned,” Bill Gertz wrote, “including whether the missile's engine ignited after the ejection or whether the missile took flight.” Based on the footage though, we have a pretty good guess. “It went kablooie,” as Jeffrey Lewis says. Along with several of my colleagues at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS)—Melissa Hanham, Bo Kim, Jeffrey Lewis, and Dave Schmerler—I created a video analysis, embedded below. Although the KN-11 appears to eject successfully, which is an improvement over November, we think that a catastrophic failure occurred at ignition. The DPRK has manipulated the footage in an attempt to obscure this result, but one clip plays for two frames too long. The rocket appears to explode. Compared to Soviet-era test footage of an R-27 launch—the KN-11 is based on the R-27—the failure seems clear. Dave geolocated the test to approximately 7 km west of the Sinpo Shipyard using the mountains along the coast. Sinpo is the location where the SLBM program is based, hosting a launch stand, a barge for underwater launches and a submarine outfitted with launch tubes. Our best guess is that this footage is from December, based on the report that the KN-11 successfully ejected. (Catherine Dill, “Video Analysis of DPRK SLBM Footage,” *Arms Control Wonk*, January 12, 2016)

DPRK government statement: "There took place a world startling event to be specially recorded in the national history spanning 5 000 years in the exciting period when all service personnel and people of the DPRK are making a giant stride, performing eye-catching miracles and exploits day by day after turning out as one in the all-out charge to bring earlier the final victory of the revolutionary cause of Juche, true to the militant appeal of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). **The first H-bomb test was successfully conducted in Juche Korea at 10:00 on Wednesday**, Juche 105 (2016), pursuant to the strategic determination of the WPK. Through the test conducted with indigenous wisdom, technology and efforts **the DPRK fully proved that the technological specifications of the newly developed H-bomb for the purpose of test were accurate and scientifically verified the power of smaller H-bomb**. It was confirmed that the H-bomb test conducted in a safe and perfect manner had no adverse impact on the ecological environment. The test means a higher stage of the DPRK's development of nuclear force. By succeeding in the H-bomb test in the most perfect manner to be specially recorded in history the DPRK proudly joined the advanced ranks of nuclear weapons states possessed of even H-bomb and the Korean people came to demonstrate the spirit of the dignified nation equipped with the most powerful nuclear deterrent. This test is a measure for self-defense the DPRK has taken to firmly protect the sovereignty of the country and the vital right of the nation from the ever-growing nuclear threat and blackmail by the U.S.-led hostile forces and to reliably safeguard the peace on the Korean Peninsula and regional security. Since the appearance of the word hostility in the world there has been no precedent of such deep-rooted, harsh and persistent policy as the hostile policy the U.S. has pursued towards the DPRK. The U.S. is a gang of cruel robbers which has worked hard to bring even a nuclear disaster to the DPRK, not content with having imposed the thrice-cursed and unheard-of political isolation, economic blockade and military pressure on it for the mere reason that it has differing ideology and social system and refuses to yield to the former's ambition for aggression. The Korean Peninsula and its vicinity are turning into the world's biggest hotspot where a nuclear war may break out since they have been constantly stormed with all nuclear strike means of the U.S. imperialist aggressor troops, including nuclear carrier strike group and nuclear strategic flying corps. While kicking up all forms of economic sanctions and conspiratorial "human rights" racket against the DPRK with mobilization of the hostile forces, the U.S. has made desperate efforts to block its building of a thriving nation and improvement of the people's living standard and 'bring down its social system.' The DPRK's access to H-bomb of justice, standing against the U.S., the chieftain of aggression watching for a chance for attack on it with huge nukes of various types, is the legitimate right of a sovereign state for self-defense and a very just step no one can slander. Genuine peace and security cannot be achieved through humiliating solicitation or compromise at the negotiating table. The present-day grim reality clearly proves once again the immutable truth that one's destiny should be defended by one's own efforts. Nothing is more foolish than dropping a hunting gun before herds of ferocious wolves. The spectacular success made by the DPRK in the H-bomb test this time is a great deed of history, a historic event of the national significance as it surely guarantees the eternal future of the nation. The DPRK is a genuine peace-loving state which has made all efforts to protect peace on the Korean Peninsula and security in the region from the U.S. vicious nuclear war scenario. The DPRK, a responsible nuclear weapons state, will

neither be the first to use nuclear weapons nor transfer relevant means and technology under any circumstances as already declared as long as the hostile forces for aggression do not encroach upon its sovereignty. There can neither be suspended nuclear development nor nuclear dismantlement on the part of the DPRK unless the U.S. has rolled back its vicious hostile policy toward the former. **The army and people of the DPRK will steadily escalate its nuclear deterrence** of justice both in quality and quantity to reliably guarantee the future of the revolutionary cause of Juche for all ages. Juche Korea will be prosperous forever as it holds fast to the great WPK's line of simultaneously pushing forward the two fronts." (KCNA, "DPRK Proves Successful in H-Bomb Test," January 6, 2016)

KCNA: "Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, issued an order to conduct the first H-bomb test of Juche Korea on **December 15**, Juche 104 (2015) on behalf of the Workers' Party of Korea and then signed the final written order on January 3, Juche 105 (2016). The DPRK government issues a statement on the first H-bomb test of Juche Korea conducted under the strategic resolve of the Workers' Party of Korea." (KCNA, "WPK Central Committee Issues Order to Conduct First H-Bomb Test," January 6, 2016)

South Korea's military played down North Korea's H-bomb capability, saying its new nuclear test doesn't appear to be hydrogen-based, given the intensity of the tremor. "It is hard to regard this test as that of a hydrogen bomb," the military said, requesting anonymity, "Only a few countries including the U.S. and Russia have conducted hydrogen bomb tests and the size of the detonations reached 20 to 50 megatons," the official said. The latest North Korean test amounts to 6 kilotons and it's too weak for a hydrogen bomb, he said. The latest test was conducted differently from the previous three tests, the official said, referring to the North's "organized and intentional efforts to hide the nuclear test plan in thorough secrecy." The Ministry of National Defense denounced the fresh nuclear detonation test as a "grave threat" to the peace of the Korean Peninsula and the world, vowing efforts to punish the communist country. "In close collaboration under the South Korea-U.S. alliance and with the international community, our military will take necessary measures to make North Korea pay for the nuclear test," ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said in a press briefing. In light of the nuclear test, the Defense Ministry also put the military on alert and beefed up surveillance of North Korea. "In addition, South Korea and the U.S. boosted the operations of their surveillance assets in order to better monitor North Korea's military movements," Kim noted. In a 10-minute telephone conference with United States Forces Korea (USFK) commander Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti earlier in the day, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Lee Sun-jin ensured close collaboration with the U.S., according to ministry officials. Defense Minister Han Min-koo will hold another phone conference with his U.S. counterpart Ashton Carter. Earlier in the day, a military expert well versed in the North's nuclear program called into question the validity of the country's claim of a hydrogen bomb test. "The scale of the latest nuclear test fell short of that of the third nuclear test (in 2013)," the expert said. The local meteorological administration put the magnitude of the tremor resulting from the test at 4.8, which is less than the 4.9 magnitude registered in the previous nuclear test three years ago. The explosive

power of a hydrogen bomb is up to 1,000 times stronger than that of an atomic bomb, and North Korea cannot afford a hydrogen bomb test inside the country, the expert stressed. Even if the tested bomb included hydrogen, it must have been a very low-end bomb, he said. Vice Defense Minister Hwang In-moo echoed the skepticism. "For now, it is unlikely," the vice minister told reporters after discussing the latest nuclear test with senior members of the ruling Saenuri Party. "It needs to be determined through further data analysis how powerful the explosion was and on what scale it was conducted," he said. (Yonhap, "S. Korean Military: N. Korea's Blast Doesn't Seem to Be from H. Bomb," January 6, 2016)

North Korea declared that it had detonated its first hydrogen bomb. The assertion, if true, would dramatically escalate the nuclear challenge from one of the world's most isolated and dangerous states. North Korea has made repeated claims about its nuclear capabilities that outside analysts have greeted with skepticism. "This is the self-defensive measure we have to take to defend our right to live in the face of the nuclear threats and blackmail by the United States and to guarantee the security of the Korean Peninsula," a female North Korean announcer said, reading the statement on Central Television, the state-run network. The North's announcement came about an hour after detection devices around the world had picked up a 5.1 seismic event along the country's northeast coast. It may be weeks or longer before detectors sent aloft by the United States and other powers can determine what kind of test was conducted. Ned Price, a spokesman for the White House National Security Council, said in a statement that American officials "cannot confirm these claims at this time." But he said the White House expected "North Korea to abide by its international obligations and commitments." The tremors occurred at or near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, where three previous tests have been conducted over the past nine years. In recent weeks, the North's aggressive young leader, Kim Jong-un, has boasted that the country has finally developed the technology to build a thermonuclear weapon – far more powerful than the low-yield devices tested first in 2006, then in different configurations months after President Obama took office in 2009 and again in 2013. The North Korean announcement said the test had been personally ordered by Kim, only three days after he signed an order on January 3 for North Korean engineers to press ahead with the attempt. Outside analysts took the claim as the latest of several hard-to-verify assertions that the isolated country has made about its nuclear capabilities. But some also said that although North Korea did not yet have H-bomb capability, it might be developing and preparing to test a boosted fission bomb, more powerful than a traditional nuclear weapon. Weapon designers can easily boost the destructive power of an atom bomb by putting at its core a small amount of tritium, a radioactive form of hydrogen. Lee Sang-cheol, the top nonproliferation official at the South Korean Defense Ministry, told a forum in Seoul last month that although Kim's hydrogen bomb boasts might be propaganda for his domestic audience, there was a "high likelihood" that North Korea might have been developing such a boosted fission weapon. And according to a paper obtained by Yonhap last week, the Chemical, Biological and Radiological Command of the South Korean military "did not rule out the possibility" of a boosted fission bomb test by the North, although it added it "does not believe it is yet capable of directly testing hydrogen bombs." The North has refused to enter the kind of negotiations that Iran did. [?] Unlike Iran, which denies it

has interest in nuclear weapons, the North has forged ahead with tests and told the West and China it would never give them up. Obama, determined not to give the country new concessions, has neither acknowledged that North Korea is now a nuclear power nor negotiated with it. The White House has said that it would only restart talks with the North if the goal – agreed to by all parties – was a “denuclearized Korean Peninsula.” China has also failed in its efforts to rein in Kim. He has never been invited to Beijing since his father’s death, and Chinese officials are fairly open in their expressions of contempt for him. But they have not abandoned him, or cut off the aid that keeps the country afloat. With this test three of the North’s four explosions will have occurred during Obama’s time in office. Combined with the North’s gradually increasing missile technology, its nuclear program poses a growing threat to the region – though it is still not clear the North knows how to mount a nuclear weapon on one of its missiles. The test is bound to figure in the American presidential campaign, where several candidates have already cited the North’s nuclear experimentation as evidence of American weakness – though they have not prescribed alternative strategies for choking off the program. The United States did not develop its first thermonuclear weapons – commonly known as hydrogen bombs – until 1952, seven years after the first and only use of nuclear weapons in wartime, the weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Russia, China and other powers soon followed suit. (David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Says It Detonated Hydrogen Bomb for First Time,” *New York Times*, January 6, 2015, p. A-1) World leaders sternly criticized North Korea for carrying out a fourth nuclear test, an explosion that Pyongyang claimed was a much more powerful hydrogen bomb test. The United Nations Security Council is set to hold an emergency meeting in New York to discuss the international response to the test, which North Korea called an “H-bomb of justice” that it needed for defense against the United States, labelling the U.S. “the chieftain of aggression.” North Korea’s three previous nuclear tests have been met with international condemnation, including resolutions from the U.N. Security Council, but have done nothing to deter Pyongyang. Still, in Seoul, South Korean President Park Geun-hye said North Korea would pay the price for the test, which she called a “grave provocation.” “Now, the government should closely cooperate with the international community to make sure that North Korea pays the corresponding price for the nuclear test,” Park said in a national security council meeting, according to Yonhap. In Tokyo, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo had a similar message. “This nuclear test by North Korea is a major threat to our country’s security, and I absolutely cannot accept it,” he told reporters. “Also, it is clearly a violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions so . . . we will take strong measures, including steps within the U.N. Security Council.” The United States said it was monitoring the situation. “While we cannot confirm these claims at this time, we condemn any violation of UN Security Council Resolutions and again call on North Korea to abide by its international obligations and commitments,” said John Kirby, the State Department spokesman. “We have consistently made clear that we will not accept it as a nuclear state. We will continue to protect and defend our allies in the region, including [South] Korea, and will respond appropriately to any and all North Korean provocations.” But the severity of any response will depend on the level of anger in China and Russia, both veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council and both the closest thing North Korea has to friends. After the nuclear test in 2013, the first of Kim Jong Un’s tenure, China supported expanded

sanctions against North Korea, although it's not clear how strictly Beijing has enforced the restrictions on its neighbor. Still, China also condemned the test. "Today the DPRK ignored the general objection from the international community and conducted a nuclear test once again. As to this matter, China strongly opposes," Hua Chunying, a Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman told reporters in Beijing. "China will resolutely promote the goal of denuclearization on the peninsula, and stick to solving the peninsula nuclear issues through the six-party talk framework," she said, referring to long-defunct multilateral talks aimed at convincing North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions. Russia, which declared 2015 a "year of friendship" with North Korea, also condemned the detonation. "If in fact the test is confirmed, it would be a new step in the development of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons, a flagrant violation of international law and the existing U.N. Security Council resolutions," said Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova in a statement. "Such actions are fraught with an aggravation of the situation on the Korean peninsula, which is already characterized by a very high potential for military-political confrontation." She said that Russia wanted to start six-party talks with North Korea as soon as possible. Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, Calif, said that Wednesday's explosion looked very similar to past tests and was not enormous, suggesting it was not a hydrogen bomb. South Korean lawmakers told local reporters that the explosion had a yield of about 6 kilotons - making it about the same size as North Korea's 2013 atomic test. Either way, Pyongyang's provocative action will present a new challenge to the outside world, which has struggled to find ways to bring about an end to North Korea's nuclear defiance. "North Korea's fourth test - in the context of repeated statements by U.S., Chinese, and South Korean leaders - throws down the gauntlet to the international community to go beyond paper resolutions and find a way to impose real costs on North Korea for pursuing this course of action," said Scott Snyder, a Korea expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Anna Fifield, "North Korea's Claims It Tested a Hydrogen Bomb Draw Skepticism, Condemnations," *Washington Post*, January 6, 2016) South Korea put its military on alert as it vows to forge a united stance with the international community to punish North Korea for going ahead with a fourth nuclear test in defiance of international warnings. North Korea claimed earlier in the day that it has succeeded in conducting a hydrogen bomb test, a provocative move that could prompt the U.N. Security Council to tighten its sanctions on the communist country. "Now, the government should closely cooperate with the international community to make sure that North Korea pays the corresponding price for the nuclear test" South Korea's President Park Geun-hye said in a National Security Council meeting at Cheong Wa Dae. Park said it's important to induce the international community to impose strong sanctions on North Korea. South Korea also issued a statement pledging to take all necessary measures against North Korea. Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se met with the U.S. ambassador to Seoul and the commander of the U.S. military in South Korea to discuss North Korea's claims of a successful hydrogen bomb test. In New York, the U.N. Security Council reportedly plans to hold an emergency session to explore ways to further tighten sanctions on North Korea. In Washington, the White House said that it cannot confirm North Korea's claims of a successful hydrogen bomb test, but condemns any violation of U.N. resolutions and urged North Korea to abide by its international obligations and commitments. Park called on the military to maintain readiness in cooperation with U.S.

troops in South Korea as she warned of a stern retaliation if North Korea stages a provocation against South Korea. "Currently, our military is strengthening our vigilance and surveillance posture against North Korea," the Defense Ministry said in a brief note to the media. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Lee Sun-jin spoke with Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of the U.S. military in South Korea, over the phone and ensured close collaboration with the U.S., the Defense Ministry said, without elaborating. About 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea to deter any possible North Korean aggression. (Yonhap, "S. Korea to Work with Partners to Punish N. Korea for H-Bomb Test," January 6, 2016) China's foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told reporters that the Chinese ministry will summon North Korea's ambassador to China, Ji Jae-ryong, to lodge a protest against the test of a hydrogen bomb that would mark the North's fourth nuclear test. However, Hua indicated that China has yet to confirm whether the North's claimed test of a hydrogen bomb is true or not, saying Beijing will "assess" the test. North Korea "carried out a nuclear test. The Chinese government firmly opposes this," Hua told a regular press briefing. "We strongly urge the North Korean side to remain committed to its commitment of denuclearization and stop taking any actions that will make the situation worse," Hua said. She said her ministry "will summon the North Korean ambassador to lodge a protest" against the nuclear test. Hua also said China did not receive prior notice from North Korea about the latest nuclear test. China is a key ally of North Korea, but it has expressed public displeasure over the North's nuclear ambition. "China is steadfast in its position that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized and nuclear proliferation be prevented to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia," Hua said. In a commentary, China's state-run Xinhua news agency said the North's claimed test of a hydrogen bomb is "highly regrettable." The commentary condemned the North's latest nuclear test as a "breach of U.N. resolutions and a blow to the Korean Peninsula denuclearization process." "The nuclear test, the fourth of its kind conducted by Pyongyang, has pushed further away any viable solution of the Korean Peninsula predicament and thrust more uncertainty into regional stability," the commentary said. (Yonhap, "China 'Firmly Opposes' N. Korea's Claimed H-Bomb Test," January 6, 2016) Japan slammed North Korea after it apparently conducted another nuclear test, its fourth, which involved what Pyongyang described as a powerful hydrogen bomb. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo denounced the action as "a grave threat to the safety of our country." There were stern responses from Seoul and Washington, and China, North Korea's sole major ally, said it "firmly" opposes the blast. Japanese officials said Wednesday they were trying to confirm whether the device was indeed a hydrogen bomb. Abe called the test "absolutely intolerable." "This is a clear violation of the past resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, and a grave challenge against the international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation," Abe said. Japan will take "decisive actions" in coordination with the United States, South Korea, China and Russia, he said. On January 1, Japan took up a nonpermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It also is currently holding the rotating presidency of the Group of Seven leading economies. Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio said Tokyo will ask the U.N. Security Council to convene an urgent meeting and adopt a new resolution on North Korea. Kishida called Pyongyang's announcement "a provocative action" that violates a number of U.N. Security Council resolutions and represents a "grave challenge" to peace and safety in the region. Later in the day, Kishida met with U.S.

Ambassador Caroline Kennedy at the Foreign Ministry in a gesture seen as presenting a united front. "We stand with Japan and our partners" in dealing with North Korea, Kennedy said in comments heard by reporters as the meeting began. Analysts say if the claim is true, it represents a new balance in the region, as North Korea may now be more of a threat to neighbors such as Japan. It would also mean Pyongyang possesses such advanced technology that even Beijing – its main ally – cannot now rein in its nuclear advances, said Takesada Hideshi, a professor at Takushoku University and an expert on North Korea. "Technologically speaking, it is possible the North has succeeded in developing a hydrogen bomb, as it has claimed," Takesada said, noting that the assertion is still unverified. Pyongyang has been trying for years to diversify its nuclear arsenal and the means of delivering warheads, Takesada said. It is thought to possess both plutonium- and uranium-based atomic bombs, and is known to have both mid- and long-range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, he noted recent reports of attempts to develop a submarine-launched rocket. This means it is logical that the North should try to develop a far more powerful hydrogen bomb, the production of which is more difficult to detect and monitor from overseas than regular atomic bombs, Takesada said. The implications for Japan would be "enormous," he said. A high-ranking Japanese official, speaking on condition of anonymity, echoed Takesada's concerns. "It is Japan that will be exposed to the biggest threat if the North develops a (new) nuclear weapon," the official said. The official said North Korea is now more unpredictable than ever, as it is more isolated than in the past and both Beijing and Moscow wield less clout in Pyongyang. "The North seems to be highly unpredictable now. That's scary," the official said. Meanwhile, today's development is likely to stall talks over Japanese citizens who were abducted by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 80s and are believed to be living there. Japan has long tried to persuade Pyongyang to return them with the offer of potential economic assistance. Pyongyang has said the individuals are either dead or never entered the country. The nuclear test will make it almost impossible for Tokyo to resume talks, the official said. "Japan won't ease its actions against the North" because of the abduction issue, the official said. "Now it's become difficult to have talks with the North." (Yoshida Reiji and Aoki Mizuho, "Japan Slams North Korean 'H-Bomb' Test," *Japan Times*, January 6, 2016) One government official involved in the assessment of the test last week told *JoongAng Ilbo* that the government thinks Pyongyang carried out a failed hydrogen test after reviewing various scientific data and evidence. "We have reviewed a wide range of scientific data such as the strength of the seismic event and sound wave and the detonation location before coming up with the assessment [that it was a failed H-bomb test]," said the official. (Jeong Yong-soo and Kang Jin-kyu, "North Tested Its Nuclear Device Deep in Ground," *JoongAng Ilbo*, January 13, 2015) The seismic data from the Jan. 6 underground bomb test, which produced a 5.1-magnitude quake, indicates that the yield was about 6 kilotons (possibly 10), in line with a conventional fission device, not a thermonuclear bomb, which can have a yield between 15,000 and 50,000 kilotons. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed what most other experts have said: "It was much more modest than they claimed," he said. "It's hard to say what they are trying." Some have argued that a so-called boosted bomb would represent a significant increase in North Korean capability. In a boosted bomb, fissile material such as plutonium (of which North Korea has a small stockpile) or highly enriched uranium is put into a fissile chain reaction. The reaction fuses deuterium and



tritium, two hydrogen isotopes, that have been thrust into the bomb's core. "While the fusion reaction does somewhat increase the explosive yield, the main purpose of this reaction is to release lots of neutrons that would then cause many additional fission reactions," Charles D. Ferguson, the president of the Federation of American Scientists, wrote in January. Bottom line, it's not exactly a mega-destructive hydrogen bomb, but it does allow you to get a lot bigger explosion out of much less fissile material. That means you can make smaller bombs that can fly farther atop a given missile. "A boosted fission bomb alone...would mean that North Korea is well on its way to making nuclear bombs that are small enough and lightweight enough to fit on ballistic missiles," wrote Ferguson. "In the case where North Korea does not need to produce a much bigger explosive yield per bomb, but is content with low to moderate yields, it can make much more efficient use of its available fissile material...and have much lower weight bombs," Ferguson wrote. He said North Korea probably has enough fissile material to make as many as "a few dozen" bombs. U.S. capabilities for detecting or analyzing different tests are limited. Besides seismic tests, the Air Force Technical Applications Center, or AFTAC, at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, can probe the atmosphere for different isotopes with sensors aboard a Boeing WC-135 Constant Phoenix plane. The presence of tritium would be a more conclusive evidence of a boosted bomb blast. Clapper's response suggests that AFTAC has yet to detect any telltale tritium. Other experts were more confident that North Korea had tested a boosted bomb. "Given Kim Jong-un's desire to claim North Korea had mastered H-bomb technology, North Korea likely did test a boosted weapon in January," Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst with the RAND Corporation, told *Defense One*. "According to the web site *38 North*, the fourth nuclear test was buried about twice as deep as the third nuclear test, suggesting that North Korea was seeking a 50 kiloton or so weapon yield. It got 10 kilotons. From just measuring the weapon yield, we cannot tell whether any of this explosion was due to fusion—the 'H-bomb' component of the explosion. But if North Korea had gotten 50 kilotons, it would almost certainly be the case that fusion was a part of the explosion. I think Kim wanted that proof, and likely was very unhappy that he did not get it," said Bennett. If North Korea developed a boosted bomb, how soon could they upgrade to a full hydrogen bomb? Clapper would not say. "Aspirationally, the current regime in North Korea, which is one guy, is very determined to portray to the world that North Korea is a nuclear power and he wants recognition of that," the U.S. intelligence chief said. "Despite some of the failure that they've recently incurred they will continue to press on to develop nuclear capabilities, which I think, ultimately, aspirationally, would include a hydrogen bomb capability. But I certainly can't prescribe a timeline," he said. "if you think about it, the North Koreans have achieved an objective there because they've created at least the psychology of deterrence." "It has taken the big countries 10 years or less to go from first fission test to first significant (beyond boosted) fusion test. On the other hand, the US and Soviet nuclear programs were massively staffed, and the North Korean program is not as well staff or financed," said Bennett. "I don't know if it is possible within five years," Ferguson told *Defense One* in an email. "It seems reasonably clear that they want such a capability. If they had outside help, they might be able to speed up the development process. Even more advanced states such as India and Pakistan have struggled to develop H-bomb capabilities. There are still some who doubt whether those two countries really have such capability. Recall that the United States,

Russia, China, France, and the UK made many tests (in the case of the United States more than 1,000) to develop more advanced nuclear weapons. So, North Korea would not be much different," he said. (Patrick Tucker, "Intelligence Chief: We Don't Know If North Korea Has a 'Boosted Bomb,'" *Defense One*, April 25, 2016)

Albright: "What could it have tested? On one side, North Korea may be bluffing about this test, meaning it tested a fission implosion device similar to the ones it previously detonated. This possibility should be carefully considered. On the other, another thermonuclear weapon design, also developed by the major nuclear-weapon states, should also be considered, namely a one-stage thermonuclear device. This design is easier to achieve than a two-stage H-bomb and can achieve very high explosive yields. There are many types of such weapons. Several are very complicated, involving plutonium, large amounts of weapon-grade uranium, and thermonuclear materials, and can achieve explosive yields of hundreds of kilotons. However, relatively simple variants exist that can achieve many tens of kilotons. South Africa researched one type of one-stage thermonuclear device during its nuclear weapons program. This design was seen as a straightforward, achievable way to a thermonuclear weapon and the much higher explosive yields these weapons generate. Its design focused on a conceptually simple approach, although achieving it in practice would have proven difficult. It involved a fission weapon with a lithium, deuterium, tritium solid tablet placed at its center. With this method, the yield can be enhanced or boosted many fold. South Africa investigated boosting the yield of its weapons in this manner from about 10-15 kilotons to about 60-100 kilotons. It is unclear if North Korea tested such a device. Its work to date suggests an interest and capability to obtain tritium, the hardest of the three thermonuclear-related elements to obtain. Nonetheless, the yield of a North Korean test of a one-stage thermonuclear device would also be expected to have been larger than reported so far. Also, despite its conceptual simplicity, a one-stage thermonuclear weapon poses several challenges, particularly the development of the solid lithium, deuterium, tritium tablet. One should be skeptical that North Korea has succeeded in any such endeavor with this test. However, even at relatively low yields, North Korea may have tested aspects of such a one-stage design, namely the ignition of the thermonuclear material in a predominately fission nuclear explosion. Moreover, success in developing simple thermonuclear devices is likely a matter of time and a relatively small number of additional tests."(David Albright, *North Korea's 2016 Nuclear Test*, Institute for Science and International Security, January 6, 2016)

In a strongly worded statement Hillary Clinton called for immediate additional sanctions against Pyongyang. "If verified, this is a provocative and dangerous act, and North Korea must have no doubt that we will take whatever steps are necessary to defend ourselves and our treaty allies, South Korea and Japan," Clinton said. "North Korea's goal is to blackmail the world into easing the pressure on its rogue regime." "We can't give in to or in any way encourage this kind of bullying," she added. Clinton said the Chinese government "must be more assertive in deterring the North's irresponsible actions." If China does not do more to halt "prohibited activities" from transpiring across its borders with North Korea, its firms should face sanctions, she said. In response to the apparent bomb test, Clinton used North Korea's provocations as an opportunity to highlight what she has argued is the risk of electing an inexperienced commander in chief. "Threats like this are yet another reminder of

what's at stake in this election," Clinton noted, without addressing any specific candidates by name. "We cannot afford reckless, imprudent publicity stunts that risk war." "We need a commander in chief with the experience and judgment to deal with a dangerous North Korea on Day One," she added. Meanwhile, Republican candidates for president have placed the blame for the test squarely on Obama and Clinton. "This underscores the gravity of the threats we are facing right now, and also the sheer folly of the Obama-Clinton foreign policy," Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) told reporters on Wednesday, calling for a change of course away from the current administration's foreign policy. Ohio Gov. John Kasich charged that the Obama administration has been "asleep at the switch on North Korea." (Abby Phillip, "Hillary Clinton Condemns North Korea's Bomb Test, Calls for Additional Sanctions," *Washington Post*, January 6, 2016)

In the days and weeks ahead, nuclear experts will be hunting for airborne radioactive particles that could shed light on North Korea's assertion that it tested a hydrogen bomb, but drawing an independent conclusion could prove lengthy and difficult. Seismic monitoring stations operated by governments around the world detected an earthquake that the U.S. Geological Survey measured at a magnitude of 5.1. But it is the detection of airborne radioactive particles that will give clues as to the type of device that was set off and whether it was a hydrogen bomb. Following the North's last nuclear test, in 2013, it was 55 days before radioactive xenon gas was detected at a monitoring station in Japan, located about 1,000 km (600 miles) from the test site, which pointed to a nuclear blast by Pyongyang. "What I would say at this point is that it's very consistent with what the world saw in 2013, which was a declared nuclear test, largely deemed to be a nuclear test," Randy Bell, head of the International Data Centre at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), told reporters in Vienna. "To go further into detail to try to ascertain some very particular nature, such as whether this indicated nuclear or non-nuclear, or a particular type of nuclear, is not appropriate at this stage. The seismic data alone would not provide that sort of insight," he said. Proving that the blast was a hydrogen bomb would depend on the presence of the hydrogen isotope tritium, which would set it apart from a fission atomic bomb and which in turn would require the presence of lithium. South Korean intelligence officials and analysts are doubtful that the test was of a full-fledged hydrogen device, which would be expected to produce a much greater yield than the reported 6 kilotons. By comparison, the blast produced by the weapon dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 measured 13 kilotons, according to the CTBTO, the global body set up to monitor a planned ban on nuclear testing. The first U.S. hydrogen bomb was equivalent to 10 megatons, nearly 1,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, and the Soviet Union in 1961 set off what is known to be the most powerful bomb in history, with a 50-megaton yield. "If they find lithium, then it's definitely a hydrogen bomb test, but if it's only xenon ... then you're not going to know," a member of South Korea's parliamentary intelligence committee, Shin Kyung-min, said, quoting from a briefing by the country's spy agency chief. The U.S. Air Force is likely to fly aircraft to try to detect gases in the air, a South Korean lawmaker said. There can be added detection challenges if the underground blast was completely contained, although that would be rare. (Jack Kim and Francois Murphy, "Verifying North Korea Hydrogen Bomb Claim May Prove Difficult," Reuters, January 7, 2016)

The United Nations Security Council condemned North Korea for its nuclear test, but there was no evidence yet that the North's most powerful backer, China, was willing to stiffen sanctions in a way that could push the unpredictable country to the point of collapse or slow its nuclear progress. As the question of how the international community should respond remained unanswered, White House officials, eager to undercut whatever propaganda value the North saw in claiming its first success in detonating a thermonuclear device, said that initial data from its monitoring stations in Asia were "not consistent" with a test of a hydrogen bomb. A two-hour closed session of the Security Council this afternoon ended with a pledge to "begin to work immediately" on a resolution containing additional measures to rein in Pyongyang. It did not specify what those measures could be, and in the past, China and Russia have usually objected to steps that could threaten the North's survival. The most obvious would be a prohibition on loading or unloading North Korean ships around the world, or on financial transactions with the nation. The White House press secretary, Josh Earnest, did not indicate the basis for the administration's skepticism of Pyongyang's claim. But more than a month ago, when Kim Jong-un, the country's young leader, boasted that he possessed the technology for a hydrogen bomb, American officials said they had a variety of evidence – some technical, some from human sources – to call that claim into question. A South Korean Defense Ministry official said January 7 that the ministry believed that even if the device was a boosted fission bomb, the test was probably a failure. The explosive yield was even smaller than that from the North's last and third nuclear test, in early 2013, he said. "Even a boosted fission bomb produces a yield bigger than this, so we don't think this is a successful test of a boosted fission bomb either," he added. But the true nature of the test may not be revealed until results are back from atmospheric testing, usually conducted by Air Force planes that run along the North Korean coast "sniffing" for byproducts of an explosion. Yet after the test in 2013, such inquiries were inconclusive. "We may never know," said one intelligence official involved in the testing. "The technology is pretty hit-and-miss." Gary Samore, Obama's top nuclear adviser in the president's first term, said Wednesday that the timing of the test was strange, with North and South Korea discussing restoring some economic ties and the North trying to reach out to the Chinese. Even China used unusually strong language, probably because it also appeared to have been given no warning about the test, which the North claimed – against considerable evidence to the contrary – was its first effort to detonate a hydrogen bomb. The Chinese said they were "strongly against this act," and their ambassador to the United States met with Susan E. Rice, President Obama's national security adviser, at the White House. President Obama said nothing in public about the test, in contrast to Bush, who responded to the first North Korean test in 2006 by declaring that the North would be held responsible if its bomb technology were found anywhere else in the world. Advisers said Obama was calculating that Kim was looking to get a rise out of him. "He's not going to give him the satisfaction," one aide said. On Wednesday evening, the White House said that Obama had spoken by telephone with President Park Geun-hye of South Korea and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan, reassuring both of America's support. Some American officials, declining to speak on the record, speculated that a dust-up last month over the treatment of an all-female band that North Korea sent to Beijing might have so angered Kim that he ordered the test to go ahead. Just before the band was supposed to perform, Kim declared that

the North possessed hydrogen bomb technology. The Chinese, with no explanation, downgraded the level of officials scheduled to attend the performance, and the band then headed home without performing. "I know this sounds like a crazy reason to set off a nuclear test," one American intelligence official said. "But stranger things have provoked North Korean action." But it is far from clear that all the major players with a stake in what the North does are willing to take the kind of risks, and impose the kind of sanctions, that might prompt Pyongyang to back down or, alternatively, to lash out. Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association in Washington, argued that stiffening existing sanctions, while sending a political message, would be insufficient. "Ratcheting up sanctions pressure demonstrates that there is a cost to violating Security Council resolutions," she said in an email. "However, sanctions alone are not going to change Pyongyang's behavior. North Korea has complex illicit trafficking networks for evading sanctions, and not all countries in the region are adequately enforcing existing measures." The one time the United States did clearly get the North's attention was when it cut off bank accounts in Macau that Kim Jong-il, the father of the current leader, used to finance the lifestyle of the North Korean elite. But eventually, the Bush administration had to lift that sanction, partly under pressure from allies. Japan's ambassador to the United Nations, Yoshikawa Motohide, told reporters after the Security Council meeting that his government expected the Council to adopt a robust resolution to check North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions. The American ambassador, Samantha Power, called for a "tough, comprehensive and credible package of new sanctions." But the Russian ambassador, Vitaly I. Churkin, would say only that a "proportionate response" was necessary. For Kim, there was some domestic politics in all this. His Workers' Party is scheduled to hold its first full-fledged congress since 1980 this May. With no big improvements in the lives of his people, he needs something else to show for his four-year rule. "The biggest achievement Kim Jong-un can offer ahead of the party congress is his nuclear program," said Choi Kang, vice president of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. "It also means that things don't look good in the economic sector." (Somini Sengupta, David E. Sanger, and Choe Sang-Hun, "Security Council Condemns a Test by North Korea," *New York Times*, January 7, 2016, p. A1)

South Korea said it will resume anti-Pyongyang broadcasts at noon tomorrow along the heavily fortified border with North Korea in retaliation of Pyongyang's claimed hydrogen bomb test. Cho Tae-yong, deputy chief of the presidential office of national security, told reporters, "The North's fourth nuclear test is a grave violation" of the August deal, referring to a breakthrough deal that defused heightened tension sparked by a landmine blast near the inter-Korean border blamed on North Korea. The move could further escalate tensions with North Korea, which had threatened to launch "strong military action" against loudspeakers blaring messages critical of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Park held a telephone conversation with U.S. President Barack Obama and they agreed to closely cooperate to ensure that the U.N. Security Council can adopt a resolution for strong sanctions on North Korea over its hydrogen bomb test, Cheong Wa Dae said. The two leaders also shared the view that the international community must make sure that North Korea pays the corresponding price for a nuclear test, the South Korean presidential office said. In Washington, the White House said Obama reaffirmed the "unshakable U.S. commitment" to South

Korea's security, and the two leaders agreed to work together to forge a united and strong international response to North Korea's latest reckless behavior. "The two leaders condemned the test and agreed that North Korea's actions constitute yet another violation of its obligations and commitments under international law, including several U.N. Security Council Resolutions," the White House said in a statement. Park and Obama also shared the need of coordinating a stance with China in dealing with North Korea's hydrogen bomb test. (Yonhap, "S. Korea to Resume Propaganda Broadcasts along Border with N. Korea," January 7, 2016)

South Korea is in talks with the United States to deploy U.S. strategic weapons on the Korean peninsula, a South Korean military official said, a day after North Korea said it successfully tested a hydrogen nuclear device. A South Korean military official told Reuters the two countries had discussed the deployment of U.S. strategic assets on the divided Korean peninsula, but declined to give further details. After North Korea last tested a nuclear device, in 2013, Washington sent a pair of nuclear-capable B-2 stealth bombers on a sortie over South Korea in a show of force. At the time, North Korea responded by threatening a nuclear strike on the United States. (Ju-min Park and Se Young Lee, "South Korea Seeks U.S. Strategic Weapons after North's Nuclear Test," Reuters, January 7, 2016)

Early in his first term, President Obama conducted some quick triage on how his administration would face a gamut of nuclear challenges: Focus on stopping Iran's nuclear program before it succeeded in building a weapon, but do not waste a lot of energy trying to roll back a North Korean program that had already built a small arsenal that the desperately poor country had little incentive to give up. It was a pragmatic roll of the dice. While it will be years before the strategy's long-term wisdom can be assessed, Iran, eager to have economic sanctions lifted, shipped 98 percent of its known stockpile of nuclear fuel to Russia last week, most likely crippling its ability to build a weapon over the next decade. But the North Koreans have a way of acting out when they feel ignored. The detonation that rocked Northeast Asia on Wednesday morning and Pyongyang's claim to have set off its first hydrogen bomb – a boast there is good reason to treat with skepticism – are a reminder that the North Koreans have been on something of an atomic spending spree while American negotiators were cloistered in Vienna striking deals with the Iranians. But what the Obama administration has advertised as "strategic patience" – not overreacting to every North Korean test and demand for a payoff, while continuing pressure through sanctions until the North agrees to negotiate – may well be judged by administration critics as having paved the way for an arsenal the size of Pakistan's. "Strategic patience has led to acquiescence," Robert Litwak of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the author of "Outlier States: American Strategies to Change, Contain, or Engage Regimes," said on Wednesday. "What a contrast to the effort and creativity the administration put into the Iranian case." It is not as if the administration has been doing nothing. Sydney A. Seiler, the State Department's coordinator for eliminating the North Korean nuclear program, put together a package of proposals to see if the North would consider resuming negotiations. It was intended to be a lot like the secret diplomacy that led to the two-year formal negotiations with Iran. But it went nowhere, and South Korean officials have warned for a long time that the North's program has

hit what one called a “point of no return”: a phrase the Israelis once used, wrongly, about Iran. Still, even some former Obama administration officials say the administration’s insistence that it would not talk to North Korea unless the North agreed that the ultimate outcome was complete nuclear disarmament was a prescription for diplomatic failure. Stephen W. Bosworth, Obama’s first special envoy for North Korea, who died over the weekend, argued in recent years that an administration willing to talk to Iran, Cuba and Myanmar had little to lose by dealing with the starving, isolated North Koreans. “Whatever risks might be associated with new talks, they are less than those that come with doing nothing,” Bosworth wrote in the *New York Times* in 2013 with Robert L. Gallucci, the North Korea negotiator in the Clinton administration. “Pyongyang’s nuclear stockpile will continue to expand, the North will continue to perfect its missile delivery systems, the danger of weapons-of-mass-destruction exports will grow, and the threat to U.S. allies will increase.” From Pyongyang’s viewpoint, there is little incentive to give up the nuclear arsenal. The world is not exactly banging on North Korea’s door to do business the way it is with Iran: The North has no oil, no striving middle class and little strategic value in the modern world. Its greatest power is the threat it poses to one of the most prosperous corners of the globe. But many also consider it too dangerous to allow North Korea to fail. The Chinese know that if it ceases to exist, the South Koreans, and their American allies, will be on the Chinese border. The South Koreans know that if a conflict breaks out, the North will lose – but only after Seoul, just 35 miles or so from the North Korean border, is a smoking ruin. So the North Korean strategy is to up the ante and hope the world will acknowledge it as a nuclear weapons power that has to be dealt with. H-Bomb or no H-bomb, nuclear weapons are the country’s insurance policy, and the test was a sign that it has no intention of cashing it in. (David E. Sanger, “North Korea Blast Revives Question: How Do You Contain Pyongyang?” *New York Times*, January 7, 2016, p. A-8)

In a striking public rebuke of China, Secretary of State John Kerry warned Beijing that its effort to rein in North Korea had been a failure and that something had to change in its handling of the isolated country it has supported for the past six decades. “China had a particular approach that it wanted to make, and we agreed and respected to give them space to be able to implement that,” Kerry said a day after North Korea’s latest nuclear test, after a phone call with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. “Today in my conversation with the Chinese I made it clear: That has not worked, and we cannot continue business as usual.” Two administration officials said the United States was now drafting a proposed resolution for United Nations Security Council approval that would impose sanctions on North Korean trade and finance, including a partial ban on permitting North Korean ships to enter ports around the world, an effort to cut off more of the country’s trade. A second set of sanctions under consideration is a cutoff of North Korean banking relationships, similar to the restrictions placed on Iran in the successful effort to drive it to the negotiation table on its nuclear program. After past North Korean nuclear tests, China, a member of the Security Council, has agreed only to Council resolutions that banned weapons shipments to the North and imposed sanctions on specific companies and individuals linked to the nuclear program. Although administration officials cast the proposed new sanctions as severe, in the past enforcement of such restrictions has been poor. “What we really want to see is

better teeth in the enforcement," one senior American official said, declining to be identified because he was discussing the internal process of drafting the sanctions. During President George W. Bush's administration, the United States shut down transactions at one particular institution, Banco Delta Asia in Macau, used by the North Korean leadership, including Kim Jong-il, the leader at the time. That caused considerable pain – the bank was used to finance the lifestyles of many in the North Korean elite – but eventually the Bush administration relented and lifted the sanction, in part because of pressure from the government then in place in South Korea. The Treasury Department has identified similar institutions used by Kim's son, the current leader, Kim Jong-un. The most effective step against North Korea, most experts believe, would be the one that the Chinese most oppose: a restriction or cutoff of oil exports to the North. The country is highly dependent on oil that runs through a small number of pipelines from China. "We just think it would be a nonstarter with the Chinese," said one American official, who said that it would be counterproductive if the inclusion of an oil ban led the Chinese to veto the entire resolution. China's fear is that without oil, the North Korean regime could collapse, putting South Korea, and its American ally, on the Chinese border. The United States Pacific Command met to take up other, if largely symbolic steps. One is an overflight of the border between North and South Korea with a nuclear-capable bomber, the B-52 or the B-2. Such flights were sent up after North Korea's third nuclear test, in 2013. "The North Koreans noticed," James Miller, the undersecretary of defense for policy during that test, said Thursday. "And the rest of the world saw that they noticed." But clearly the effect eventually wore off, given the North's decision to conduct a fourth test. South Korean and American officials said there was also renewed discussion of deploying an advanced missile defense system, called the THAAD for Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, in South Korea. The United States has been pressing for such a deployment for some time, but the South has resisted, largely because of opposition from China, which is the South's leading trade partner. Taken together, those steps amount to what one American official called "a big wish list." And they all reflect the reality of economic interdependence, which makes it hard for the South Koreans, or the United States, to be too confrontational with China. While American officials worked up sanctions possibilities, South Korea resumed the propaganda broadcasts that infuriated the North last summer. The South turned on about 10 batteries of so-called propaganda loudspeakers at the heavily armed border at noon on Friday, the Defense Ministry said. In August, the Koreas appeared on the verge of armed conflict partly because of the broadcasts, which the South used to blare news of the outside world and criticism of the North, as well as bouncy South Korean pop music, into the tightly controlled country. South Korea's decision to turn on the loudspeakers was made yesterday, when top national security officials met in Seoul to discuss a response to the North's test. South Korean officials said privately that resuming the propaganda broadcasts was the simplest and quickest way they could think of, for now, to retaliate. They insisted on anonymity while agreeing to discuss their thinking on a delicate security issue. Like the United States, the South has few options for punishing the North for its nuclear ambitions, which it has continued to pursue despite decades of international sanctions and resolutions from the United Nations Security Council. North Korea did not immediately respond to the resumption of the broadcasts. While loudspeakers may seem like a trivial response to a nuclear test, there is little doubt that the



broadcasts enrage the North Korean leadership, which rigorously controls what information its citizens receive and sees the propaganda as an attempt to undermine its authority. The Cold War-era tactic had gone unused by the South for 11 years until last summer, after two South Korean border guards were maimed by land mines, which the South accused the North of planting. North Korea then threatened to attack the loudspeakers, which it said sullied the "dignity of our supreme leadership," and put its military on what it called a "semi-war" footing, moving more troops to the border. The crisis was defused after top officials from both Koreas met in talks at the border on August 25. North Korea expressed "regret" over the wounding of the border guards, and South Korea agreed to stop the broadcasts unless an "abnormal situation" developed. (David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, "U.S. Prods China on North Korea, Saying Soft Approach Has Failed," *New York Times*, January 8, 2016, p. A-6)

Siegfried Hecker: "Do you believe that North Korea actually detonated a hydrogen bomb in its latest nuclear test? I don't believe it was a real hydrogen bomb, but my greatest concern is not so much whether or not they actually tested a hydrogen bomb, but rather that they tested at all. Since this test worked, they will have achieved greater sophistication in their bomb design - that is the most worrisome aspect. This is their fourth test - with each test they can learn a lot. ... White House officials say that initial data from nearby monitoring stations are not consistent with a hydrogen bomb test. How will we know for sure whether it was a hydrogen bomb or not? The short answer is that we may never know. The telltale signs of a hydrogen bomb are very difficult to pick up in a deeply buried test. Typically hydrogen bombs have greater explosive power or yield. This test is currently believed to have resulted in a seismic tremor of 5.1 on the Richter earthquake scale. That would make it roughly equivalent to the third nuclear test in February 2013. At that time, North Korea claimed it tested a miniaturized atomic bomb—there was no mention of a hydrogen bomb. My estimate of the yield for the 2013 test is roughly 7 to 16 kilotons—which is in the range of the 13-kiloton Hiroshima blast. As far as destructiveness, a Hiroshima-scale explosion is bad enough. Detonated in Manhattan, it may kill as many as a quarter million people. The power of the 2013 and the current explosion is more consistent with fission bombs than hydrogen bombs. Can you rule out the possibility that it was a hydrogen bomb? I find it highly unlikely that the North tested a real hydrogen fusion bomb, but we know so little about North Korea's nuclear weapons design and test results that we cannot completely rule it out. A modern hydrogen bomb is a two-stage device that uses a fission bomb to drive the second stage fusion device. A two-stage device is very difficult to design and construct, and is likely still beyond the reach of North Korea today. However, by comparison, China's early nuclear weapon program progressed rapidly. It tested its first fission bomb in 1964 and less than three years later demonstrated a hydrogen bomb—and that was 50 years ago. North Korea has now been in the nuclear testing business for almost 10 years, so we can't rule anything out for certain. If it wasn't a hydrogen bomb, what kind of bomb might it have been? What may be more likely than a two-stage hydrogen bomb is that they took an intermediate step that utilizes hydrogen fuel (actually hydrogen isotopes) to boost the explosive yield of the fission bomb, a sort of turbocharging. Such a device has a fusion or "hydrogen" component, but is not a real hydrogen bomb. It allows miniaturization—that is making the bomb smaller and lighter. Moreover, it would be the first step toward

eventually mastering a two-stage hydrogen bomb. The most important aspect then is to miniaturize, whether it is a fission bomb, a boosted fission bomb, or a hydrogen bomb. The Nagasaki bomb weighed 5,000 kilograms. It was delivered in a specially equipped B-29 bomber. North Korea wants to demonstrate it has a deterrent. To do so, it needs to be able to credibly threaten the U.S. mainland or our overseas assets. For that, you have to make the bomb (more correctly, the warhead) small enough to mount on a missile. The smaller and lighter, the greater the reach. At this point, what makes their nuclear arsenal more dangerous is not so much explosive power of the bomb, but its size, weight and the ability to deliver it with missiles. How close is North Korea to being able to credibly threaten a nuclear strike against the mainland United States? North Korea is still a long way off from being able to strike the US mainland. It has only had one successful space launch. It needs a lot more, but it has a large effort in that direction. Do you think North Korea conducted this test for political or technical reasons? North Korea had very strong technical and military drivers for this test, as well as follow-on tests. The political environment is mostly what has constrained it from testing earlier and more often. However, this test demonstrates that Pyongyang is willing to weather the political storm this test will bring. It has done so for all previous tests. What are your current estimates on the size of North Korea's stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials? Much like in the area of sophistication of the bomb, we have little information of what North Korea actually possesses. The best we can do is to estimate how much bomb fuel—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—they may have produced and estimate how many bombs they can produce from that stockpile. My best estimate at this time is that they may have enough bomb fuel for 18 bombs, with a capacity to make 6 to 7 more annually. That, combined with the increased sophistication they surely achieved with this test, paints a troublesome picture. How should the United States respond? I am concerned about what we haven't done to date. Washington has lost many opportunities we have had since North Korea began its nuclear weapon production in earnest in 2003. One thing that's clear is that doing what we and the rest of the world have done so far—half-hearted diplomacy, ultimatums, and sanctions—have failed, so these are not the answer. I have previously argued that we should focus on three "no's" for three "yes's"—that is no more bombs, no better bombs (meaning no testing) and no export—in return for addressing the North's security concerns, its energy shortage, and its economic woes. This could have worked when I first proposed it 2008 after one of my seven visits to North Korea. It will be more difficult now." (Steve Fyffe, "Hecker Assesses North Korean Bomb Claims," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 7, 2016)

1/7/16

Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump said that China needs to start getting involved in "the North Korea problem," amid claims from North Korea that it has conducted a hydrogen bomb test. "You have this madman over there who probably would use it and nobody talks to him other than, of course, Dennis Rodman talked to him. That's about it," Trump said on "Fox and Friends," referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. "But nobody is talking to him whatsoever, and nobody is discussing it with China." "China has total control, believe me. They say they don't; they have total control over North Korea," he said. "Without China, they wouldn't eat," he said. "They wouldn't have food, they wouldn't have anything. So, China should do it. They say they can't, they don't have that power – they're toying with our politicians who

don't know what they're doing." "It's about time that China now gets involved with the North Korea problem. We got to close it down, because he's getting too close to doing something," Trump said. "Right now, he's probably got the weapons, but he doesn't have the transportation system. Once he has the transportation system, he's sick enough to use [it]. So we better get involved." He also said South Korea is going to have to start "ponying up." (David Sherfinski, "Donald Trump: About Time That China Gets Involved with the North Korea Problem," *Washington Times*, January 6, 2016)

1/8/16

North Korea is seeking a peace treaty with the United States, China and South Korea to formally end the Korean War and will not stop its nuclear tests until it gets one, a person who relayed that message from North Korea to China told Reuters. The source, who has contacts in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and correctly predicted the North's first nuclear test in 2006, said the tests would go on until the North's demand for a treaty was met. "North Korea will do it to the end until China and the United States want to sign a peace treaty," said the source, who declined to be identified. "This explosion is mainly for the United States to see. The main objective is to persuade the United States to enter into four-country negotiations to end the war so that there can be everlasting peace on the Korean peninsula," the source said. The United States and China have both dangled the prospect of better ties, including the lifting of sanctions and eventually a likely peace treaty, if North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons. But North Korea believes the United States will only negotiate if Pyongyang can demonstrate its strength through its weapons. With its demand for a treaty ignored, North Korea has continued to develop its nuclear weapons and a stalemate has ensued. The source said he had relayed the message from North Korea to China's top leadership immediately after its latest test, urging China to support a push for a treaty. "China should not follow the United States," the source said, referring to the U.S. demand that North strategic mistake." The source with contacts in Pyongyang said North Korea was already largely cut off from the world after decades of sanctions, and more would not work. "North Korea is used to sanctions and not afraid," the source said, adding that the latest test pointed to advances in its weapons. "The (TNT) equivalent of this explosion was not big, pollution was very small. This demonstrates the technological level is high. It is even easier to make it bigger," the source said. (Benjamin Kang Lim and Ben Blanchard, "North Korea Seeks China Help on Treaty with U.S., Or More Tests - Source," Reuters, January 8, 2016)

Cha and Gallucci: "During nuclear negotiations in 2005, a North Korean diplomat let slip an unexpectedly candid comment, offering valuable insight into his government's nuclear policy: "The reason you attacked Afghanistan is because they don't have nukes. And look at what happened to Libya. That is why we will never give up ours." North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test on Wednesday, claiming that it had detonated a hydrogen bomb. The United States government disputes that, but one thing is clear: North Korea's leaders still believe that nuclear weapons will prevent others from attacking them no matter what they do. This is fanciful. What the world needs is reality. North Korea must recognize the limitations and risks of its nuclear program, and the United States must recognize that an American response is necessary. Many serious dangers come with being a nuclear power, and the North Koreans seem to recognize few of them. One is the temptation to transfer weapons,

fissile material or technology to other states or terrorist groups. North Korea has a history of selling its traditional weapons systems. But the government must recognize that selling its nuclear technology could compel the United States to respond in ways that would bring an end to nearly 70 years of Communist rule. There are other ways that the nuclear program makes the government less secure. Over the past several years, North Korea has degraded its conventional military capacity in order to pursue nuclear weapons. Under normal circumstances, a weaker North Korean Army would be welcome news to the rest of the world, but with a budding nuclear state it can lead to rapid escalation in the event of a conflict. This could mean either pre-emptive action by the United States, or, if North Korea ever used nuclear weapons, a massive retaliation. The North also mistakenly believes that its nascent nuclear abilities will deter the United States and South Korea from responding if North Korean forces carry out low-level military actions intended to extort food, fuel or other benefits. It is wrong. South Korea and the United States are unlikely to remain passive in response to future violence like the 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval ship. The Obama administration cannot punt to the next administration the problem of North Korea's growing stockpiles of fissile material, sophisticated weapons designs and long-range delivery ability. No one should take comfort in skepticism about whether Wednesday's test was a success. If North Korea's burgeoning nuclear weapons stockpile leads it to miscalculate American resolve, there will be horrible consequences. And at that point the whole world will wonder why no nation – especially the United States – stopped North Korea before it was too late. A new approach to persuading the North to abandon its nuclear program must focus on asymmetric pressure points. A look at recent history helps to outline such a strategy. In our experience working on North Korea policy, the government in Pyongyang has seemed truly caught off guard only twice: in September 2005 when the Treasury Department's sanctions led to a freezing of its bank accounts in Macau; and in February 2014 when a United Nations commission called for the Security Council to refer the North's leadership to the International Criminal Court for a long list of crimes against humanity. The United States and the United Nations should immediately increase sanctions. A new Security Council resolution will most likely emerge soon, providing one opportunity for this. Another comes in the form of the presidential executive order created after the cyberattack on Sony Pictures last year. These should include targeted financial sanctions; travel bans and indictments against officials working on the nuclear program, human rights abusers and cyber criminals; as well as secondary sanctions on anyone doing business with North Korean companies. But sanctions are only one part of the strategy. Many observers believe, credibly, that slave labor bankrolls the nuclear weapons program. The United Nations must also continue to hold individuals in the government directly accountable for crimes against humanity, and all countries, including China and Russia, should be pressured to stop accepting North Korean laborers. Even if China's government has made clear that it is unhappy with North Korea's behavior, Beijing won't abandon its ally anytime soon. But the United States can – and should – push for Beijing to dial back its support. China could instruct Chinese companies to curtail business with North Korea, and the government could reject any calls from North Korea for new economic projects until the government returned to negotiations. China could also agree to not obstruct any Security Council discussions on human rights abuses in the North. Washington must frame cooperation

on North Korea as a cornerstone of United States-China relations. North Korea thinks that nuclear weapons make it more secure. That's wrong. North Korea's only path away from isolation and insecurity will require negotiation on all issues, including security, human rights and economics. In order to help it understand this, the United States must use the nuclear test Wednesday to force the North back to the table." (Victor Cha and Robert Gallucci, "Stopping North Korea's Nuclear Threat," New York Times, January 8, 2016, p. A-23)

1/9/16

The young leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, has often been dismissed as inexperienced, erratic and even clueless. But with the North's test of a nuclear bomb this week, he appears to have mastered a strategy that has served his reclusive country well: playing one big power against another. The nuclear test quickly increased tensions between the United States and China. In a strong rebuke on January 14, Secretary of State John Kerry called China's approach to North Korea a failure, saying that something had to change in its handling of the isolated country it has supported for six decades. On January 15, China suggested that it was the Americans, not the Chinese, who were largely to blame for the North's nuclear program. The United States also used the North's test to tighten a trilateral alliance with Japan and South Korea, a relationship that China has long viewed as a check on its power. "This is exactly what North Korea wanted," said Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul. "If its erratic behavior drives South Korea closer to the United States, China will feel more surrounded, and that will give North Korea room for maneuver." North Korea has often lashed out when it felt ignored, especially by the United States, using threats and provocations to force its opponents to engage in dialogue or offer inducements, like badly needed aid or a peace treaty to formally replace the Korean War armistice. But for Kim to thumb his nose at China, he is gambling that Beijing will continue to believe that keeping a nuclear-armed North Korea on its border as a buffer against the Americans and South Koreans is more important than forcing it to denuclearize at the risk of its collapse. That is a big wager. President Xi Jinping of China is deeply distrustful of his counterpart, according to several Chinese diplomats and scholars, though he has sought a warmer relationship with the North in recent months. Xi sees Kim as naïve and impetuous, analysts said, and he is concerned about the country's growing nuclear arsenal. But Xi, who has adopted an assertive approach to foreign policy, is hampered by political and military realities, including a worry that destabilizing the North could result in a chaotic influx of millions of refugees and cede territory to South Korea, a close American ally. As pressure grows on China to take a leading role in restraining North Korea, by cutting oil shipments and disrupting financial transactions, Xi faces a critical test of his presidency: whether he can subdue a young, volcanic leader without undermining China's own interests. "The stars are probably as aligned as you could make them for Xi Jinping to do something unconventional and unprecedented," said Evans J. R. Revere, a former senior State Department specialist on North Korea. "It's really an open question as to whether he's prepared to do that." The North Korean test has also increased pressure on President Park Geun-hye of South Korea. Despite criticism from Tokyo and some misgivings in Washington, Park has doggedly cultivated closer ties with China, hoping that approach would help tame North Korea. At the same time, she shared Washington's "strategic patience," a policy of squeezing North Korea with

sanctions and offering serious deals only if it agreed to give up its nuclear weapons, even when the North was known to be stocking fuel for more nuclear bombs. In the wake of the North Korean test, her domestic critics said none of her approaches had worked. Since he came to power four years ago, Kim has begun a series of what outside analysts call window-dressing projects: amusement parks, ski resorts, high-rise apartment buildings in Pyongyang – still suffering from electricity shortages despite being the capital. Most of the country, especially outside the capital, remains in dire poverty, a fact that analysts say has spurred Kim to focus attention on his nuclear program. “Tensions with the external world is probably what he wanted, a good excuse for him to shift the blame for his failure to improve his people’s living standards,” said Koh Yu-hwan, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in Seoul. “I see a desperate young leader struggling to establish himself among his people, who are still unsure of his economic credentials, and in a region that has become increasingly unfriendly to his country,” he said. Yet despite the scrutiny he draws, Kim has always been a puzzle to analysts. Since inheriting power after his father’s death in 2011, he has proved as Machiavellian as his forebears of the totalitarian dynasty. He replaced or shuffled crucial posts of power in the party and military and executed potential threats, including his uncle, Jang Song-thaek. Last month Moranbong, a female pop group whose members were said to be handpicked by Kim, canceled a concert in Beijing and returned home in a huff. No explanation was given. But subsequent media reports from Beijing suggested that the group and its Chinese host argued over the list of songs, some of which glorified Kim and his nuclear weapons. Two days after the group returned home, Kim signed an order to send the “thunderclap of an H-bomb.” Kim – who apparently celebrated his 33rd birthday on Friday – cultivates his cult of personality carefully. A crucial prop of Kim’s rule is the nuclear arsenal. North Korea calls it the “treasured sword” of self-defense that he has secured for his people, who are seen as being forced to live under fear of American invasion. He has been a master of perpetuating that view of the world to North Koreans. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korean Gamble Pits Power against Power,” *New York Times*, January 9, 2016, p. A-1)

1/10/16

The United States' B-52 Stratofortress strategic bomber flew in the skies of South Korea today in a major show of force four days after North Korea conducted what it said was its first hydrogen bomb test. The B-52 bomber left U.S. Andersen Air Force Base in Guam on Sunday morning and arrived in the skies above Osan, Gyeonggi Province, at noon, armed with nuclear missiles and "bunker buster" bombs that are capable of bombarding North Korea's underground facilities, according to Seoul and Washington. The bomber flew low past the Osan air base, flanked by an entourage of two South Korean F-15Ks and two U.S. F-16s before returning to its home base, the two sides' militaries said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Deploy B-52 Bomber over Korean Peninsula,” January 10, 2016) A senior South Korean government official told *JoongAng Ilbo* on Sunday that U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter was the one to propose deploying its strategic military assets in a phone conversation with Defense Minister Han Min-koo. “On the evening of Jan. 6, Defense Minister Han’s phone conversation with Secretary Carter lasted longer than anticipated as they discussed how to respond to the nuclear test,” the official said. “During this conversation, Secretary Carter proposed deploying U.S. strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula.”

Han and Carter held a phone conversation on January 6 after Pyongyang announced it had conducted its test, and in a joint press release, they agreed to close collaboration and said that North Korea should “pay a price that is proportional to the provocation.” But unlike this time, the request to deploy U.S. strategic assets last time was made by then-Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin, the official said, and the deployments came over a month after the nuclear test. “The United States actively proposing it this time led to a comparatively quick deployment,” he added. “The United States making public its strategic assets training serves as a strong warning to North Korea.”  
(Sarah Kim and Jeong Yong-soo, “U.S. Sends B-52 Bomber to Korea in Show of Force,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, January 10, 2016)

1/11/15

A man claiming to be a naturalized American citizen told CNN that he has been held in North Korea since October on charges of spying for the South, the network reported. The North Korean authorities took the man, identified as Kim Dong-chul, 62, to a hotel in Pyongyang, the North’s capital, to be interviewed by a CNN reporter, the network said. If his claim of American citizenship is true, he would be the latest American held in the North, whose government has detained several Americans over the years on charges of illegal entry or spying and other “anti-state” crimes. CNN said it had acquired what North Korea said was a copy of Kim’s American passport. The State Department declined to comment on the case. Kim said he had lived in Fairfax, Va., before moving to Yanji, a Chinese town near the border with North Korea, in 2001. Later, he said, he ran a trading and hotel services company in Rason, a special economic zone that North Korea runs near its borders with China and Russia. Kim said he began spying on behalf of “South Korean conservative elements” in 2013, by bribing residents to collect data about the North’s military and its nuclear program. He said he was arrested in October while he was meeting his local source, a former North Korean soldier. (Choe Sang-hun, “American Held by North Korea, Report Says,” *New York Times*, January 12, 2016, p. A-6)

1/12/15

KCNA: “The news of the success of the first H-bomb test of the DPRK has shocked the world. The test that was carried out in the outset of **significant year 2016 in which the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea will be held**, is a reflection of the fixed faith and will of the WPK invariably keeping to the road of independence, Songun and socialism and a bright fruition brought about by the WPK's idea on attaching importance to science and technology. The test was neither to “threaten” anyone nor to “provoke” someone for a certain purpose. It was a process **indispensable for carrying out the WPK's line on simultaneously carrying out the economic construction and the building of nuclear force to cope with the U.S. ever-more undisguised hostile policy** toward the DPRK. It was also a normal course that the H-bomb nations have undergone without exception. The recent test pursuant to the WPK's strategic line and resolution fully confirmed the accuracy of technical specifications of the new trial H-bomb and scientifically proved the power of the smaller H-bomb. This made it possible to declare with dignity that the nuclear physics of the DPRK has reached a new high stage. This also helped the DPRK **get fully armed with smaller and standardized H-bombs for ballistic rockets and get possessed of ultra-modern strike means for delivering nuclear bombs of various kinds in the land, sea and air without limitation**. The recent test laid a solid foundation for

keeping the creation and construction going after averting the danger of a war with the help of the strongest deterrence and provided a sure guarantee for reliably safeguarding the peace and security in the Korean peninsula and the region. Herein lies the historic significance of the H-bomb test. Now personages of governments, political and public circles, scientists and technicians of over 100 countries of the world are supporting the DPRK and admiring the spectacular nuclear scientific and technological successes made by it and its nuclear deterrence for self-defense, and even nuclear scientists and experts of the U.S. are acknowledging the remarkable progress made in the nuclear science and technology of the DPRK. The scientists and technicians of the DPRK are in high spirit to detonate H-bombs of hundreds of Kt and Mt level **capable of wiping out the whole territory of the U.S. all at once as it persistently moves to stifle the DPRK**, cradle of life and happiness of its people, if only there are no geographical restrictions and provided the territory is vast." (KCNA, "KCNA Commentary Lauds H-Bomb Test," January 12, 2016)

KCNA: "A ceremony of awarding party and state commendations to nuclear scientists, technicians, soldier-builders, workers and officials who contributed to demonstrating the dignity and might of Kim Il Sung's and Kim Jong Il's Korea through Juche Korea's first successful H-bomb test took place with splendor at the meeting hall of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) on January 12. Present there was supreme leader Kim Jong Un. Prior to the ceremony, he made a congratulatory speech. He said that the recent event instilled strength incomparable to the mysterious force of the vast space into the army and people of the DPRK, demonstrated the invincibility and mightiness of Kim Il Sung's and Kim Jong Il's Korea far and wide and struck terrible horror into the hearts of the U.S. imperialists and their followers. Thanks to a lot of sweat shed by you while conducting painstaking inquiry and showing patriotic loyalty, the DPRK, single-mindedly united politico-ideological power and world famous military power, proudly joined the advanced nuclear weapons states, he noted, and continued: Gone forever are the times when the U.S. imperialists could threaten and blackmail the DPRK with nuclear weapons while regarding them as its monopoly and now it has become the greatest threat to the U.S. ... We should never allow the high-handed and arbitrary practices of the enemies, he said, adding that the outrageous, illegal and wicked U.S. imperialists and their followers are working hard with blood-shot eyes to bring down our social system from all sides through harsh economic blockade and military pressure but we should make them clearly know the status of our strongest nuclear weapons state by making such a bold head-on charge as countering the enemy's dagger attack with a sword and retaliating against a rifle attack with an artillery piece just as we did in the grim years of the revolution. ... He underlined the need for the participants to bear deep in mind the pride and self-respect today, turn out as one in the campaign of brains and ability to bolster up both in quality and quantity the nuclear force, the greatest patriotic legacy of the great leaders, and thus thoroughly implement the WPK's idea and line on building the nuclear force. The WPK highly appreciates once again the feats of all the participants who brought about a great event to be specially recorded in the history of the nation spanning 5 000 years, he said, hoping that the scientists standing guard over the nation's nuclear arsenal would register bigger successes in the efforts to make a triumphant advance of the cause of the Juche revolution. Then a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK was read out. Kim Jong Un



personally awarded party and state commendations to the nuclear scientists, technicians, soldier-builders, workers and officials who contributed to the successful H-bomb test of Juche Korea. Seeing H-bomb developers full of conviction, I feel as if I gained everything, he noted, calling on the dependable nuclear combatants of the WPK to powerfully demonstrate the might of the nuclear power of Juche, Songun Korea before the whole world **through the detonation of more powerful H-bomb in the future** on the basis of the achievements and experience gained by them. He emphasized that the WPK laid down the line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force in order to honorably protect the country from the ever-increasing nuclear threat and blackmail and military pressure of the U.S. imperialists. Pointing out that the U.S. imperialists and their followers are now bringing dark clouds of a nuclear war, rendering the situation on the Korean Peninsula extremely tense through sanctions and introduction of strategic weapons into south Korea, he called for bolstering up both in quality and quantity the nuclear force capable of making nuclear strikes at the U.S.-led imperialists any time and in any space according to the order of the WPK Central Committee if they encroach upon the sovereignty of the DPRK and make threatening provocations. He set forth the important tasks to be fulfilled to bolster up the nuclear force." (KCNA, "Party and State Commendations Awarded to Contributors to H-Bomb Test," January 13, 2016)

Trade between North Korea and China has fallen off dramatically over the past year. According to Voice of America on Tuesday, the total trade volume between the two countries from January to November last year was US\$4.9 billion, a 15-percent drop compared to the same period the year before. China's exports and imports to and from North Korea decreased by 17 percent and 13 percent during the period. But North Korea's exports of iron ore to China fell 68 percent, while shipments of anthracite, a major export item, fell 6.3 percent. Experts believe the decline is due to the deterioration in relations between the two countries. (Arirang News, "Trade between N. Korea and China Plummet," *Chosun Ilbo*, January 13, 2016)

The U.S. House voted to toughen sanctions against North Korea following last week's nuclear test, showing overwhelming support for a measure that would mostly target non-U.S. companies. The sanctions bill was backed by Democrats and Republicans alike in the 418-2 vote. The legislation, H.R. 757, would authorize sanctions against companies that contribute to North Korea's nuclear program and ballistic missile development, send luxury goods to the country, help its censorship efforts or aid human rights abuses, according to a House Foreign Affairs Committee summary. The president would have the authority to waive penalties for as long as a year. "The latest test demands a response," Representative Eliot Engel, a New York Democrat and co-sponsor of the bill, said on the House floor yesterday. "North Korea has become more and more savvy at evading sanctions and that is why this bill broadens our sanctions." Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky said that he plans to schedule floor time on a companion measure, S. 2144, sponsored by Colorado Republican Senator Cory Gardner, which McConnell said will be considered soon by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The White House has yet to comment on either bill. It's difficult to say what companies would be affected by the legislation and whether any are in the U.S., said Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow for Northeast Asia with the

conservative Heritage Foundation. That's because any entities being sanctioned would have to already be in violation of U.S. law, he said. "The answer is we don't know," Klingner said in a phone interview. "It would only target activity against those who are breaking the law." The two votes against the measure came from Republicans Justin Amash of Michigan and Thomas Massie of Kentucky. The House measure would primarily target the banking industry, said Adam Smith, who served in the Obama administration as senior adviser to the director of the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. "In a page right out of the Iran playbook, the idea is that if you can force financial institutions into a choice between transacting with North Korea or transacting with the United States, they will all choose the latter and leave North Korea out in the cold," Smith, who is of counsel at the law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, said in an e-mail. "I don't think you are dealing with many U.S. companies here, though." The president could impose sanctions on individuals determined to have knowingly facilitated the transfer of funds, financial assets or property in violation of U.S. executive orders or United Nations Security Council resolutions, according to a review of the legislation by Bloomberg Government analyst Stacy Z. O'Mara. "Sanctions would apply to entities and individuals that engage in transactions with -- or provide financial services to -- North Korea and its financial institutions without adequate safeguards to protect against illicit activities," O'Mara said in an analysis of the bill. "Such protections have been defined in executive orders and United Nations Security Council resolutions covering nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction dating back to 2006." The bill could allow for stiffer inspections of any vessel that has used a port that doesn't sufficiently inspect traffic from North Korea. The legislation would require the White House to report to Congress on overseas ports and airports whose inspections are insufficient, according to the House Foreign Affairs summary. "Cargo coming from ports that consistently fail to inspect North Korean cargo, as required by UN resolutions, may be subject to increased inspection requirements at U.S. ports," the bill summary said. The bill might be altered as it moves through Congress, perhaps to order broader secondary sanctions against North Korea, said Richard Nephew, who served as principal deputy coordinator for sanctions policy against Iran at the State Department and was involved in the Iran negotiations from August 2013 through December 2014. "The set of discretionary sanctions can become mandatory," said Nephew, who now leads Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy. "Then all of a sudden you are in a problematic spot with U.S.-China relations in particular." Secondary sanctions, such as those in place for Iran, would force U.S. businesses and financial institutions to ban dealings with any foreign entity that may have facilitated illicit North Korean activity. That could mean a huge loss of U.S. business in China, the North's biggest trading partner, he said. "If I were still in government, I'd be telling Congress, 'Don't do anything,'" Nephew said. He advised against legislation "that would convince the Chinese that there is no point in doing anything at the UN because the Americans are going to do what they want anyway." "If the UN acts, then it's far better and we can complement it with our own authorities later on," he said. (Kathleen Miller, "House Passes North Korea Sanctions Bill after Nuclear Test," Bloomberg, January 12, 2016)

John Schilling: "While a reported third test of North Korea's submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system in December 2015 now appears to have failed, an

examination of the video of the initial stages of this launch along with commercial satellite imagery of the submarine and support vessels in port two days later, suggests that this test was probably conducted from a submerged barge rather than an actual submarine. The failed launch combined with testing from a barge shows that North Korea still has a long way to go to develop this system. Contrary to some speculation in the media, an initial operational capability of a North Korean ballistic-missile submarine is not expected before 2020. In May 2015, North Korea announced that they had launched a missile from a submarine, and it appears to have been from a submersible test barge rather than a sub. We later heard rumors that North Korea tried to launch another missile from a submarine, and damaged the submarine instead. The North Koreans, unsurprisingly, said nothing. Late last month, intelligence reports say there was another submarine-launched ballistic missile test. South Korea says it also failed, but the North Koreans claimed success. Clearly, there's some disinformation somewhere in the mix. The smart money is to look more closely at what we can see—and if it's the North Koreans showing us pretty pictures, take a close and skeptical look. North Korea did release a video of the launch, although closer examination of the video itself has revealed inconsistencies that suggest it has been spliced together to show success. But we also have commercial satellite imagery of the Sinpo South Shipyard, and those North Korea can't fake. So if we take the pictures we can trust, the video that has been edited by people we don't trust, and the various rumors and leaked intelligence reports, what does it all add up to? What we can learn from the video, is that for just a few frames, peeking out from behind the head of the official to Kim Jong Un's right, is what looks like the stern of a vessel—consistent in its features with the support ship that is usually berthed next to North Korea's "SINPO" or "GORAE" class missile submarine in port. The boat appears to be about 50 to 100 meters from the missile launch site. That would be dangerously close to a submarine operating at shallow depth for a missile launch. But it would be just about right, and quite necessary, for a submerged barge. There are other reasons to believe that this was a barge test rather than a submarine, such as the condition of the submarine. It was reported to have been damaged in the November test; even if it had been repaired since, it is unlikely that the DPRK would risk the boat in another test launch without first double checking the launch mechanism with another barge test. Commercial satellite imagery from December 23, 2015, just two days after the most recent test, also shows the submarine in port with its bow slightly elevated, missile hatch open or removed, and camouflage netting over the sail and deck. It seems that someone is doing repair or maintenance work on the boat. Possibly this is routine post-launch maintenance, but if that were the case, the most pressing issue would be to remove or replace the launch canister, and that would require a crane. Indeed, we see such a crane at the dock—next to the submersible test barge, not the submarine." (John Schilling, "North Korea Tests a Submerged-Launch Ballistic Missile, Take Three," *38North*, January 12, 2016)

1/13/16

An unmanned aerial vehicle presumed to have come from North Korea violated the border Wednesday, prompting the South Korean military to fire warning shots and scramble fighter jets, officials said. The drone emerged at around 2:10 p.m. near the Dorasan observation post in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, and turned back immediately after the South issued warnings and then fired some 20 rounds from a K-3 machine

gun. "An unidentified small flight vehicle, which was spotted by our radar flying in the North skies in the morning, approached the Military Demarcation Line and then invaded it by dozens of meters for several seconds," an official at the Joint Chiefs of Staff told reporters on the customary condition of anonymity. The drone, the first detected since the two Koreas' high-level dialogue late last August, is likely to have been dispatched to track the movement of frontline South Korean units following Seoul's restart January 8 of propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts throughout the Demilitarized Zone. In another apparent tit-for-tat move, Pyongyang has started distributing anti-Seoul propaganda leaflets across the frontier. Some of the leaflets were discovered in parts of Seoul and Goyang, Paju and other northern locales in Gyeonggi Province early in the morning. The papers mainly called for an end to the border broadcasts and "knockdown" of the Park Geun-hye government. The South's military said it detected the North's launch of plastic balloons believed to be carrying the fliers late Tuesday and early Wednesday, warning of a resumption of its own pamphlet-spraying activities. "We've yet to decide, but are ready to undertake our leaflet operations, closely monitoring the North Korean military's movement," the JCS official said. The communist state has previously sent anti-Seoul brochures mostly toward border islands in the West Sea, but the latest scattering is deemed unusual, given its vast scale traversing the Seoul metropolitan area. The two rare events, coupled with Pyongyang's reactivation of its own loudspeakers, are stoking concerns that it may soon stage a bigger provocation, such as in the frontline regions. Shortly after the South resumed the broadcasts last August in retaliation against the North's land mine attack, it fired artillery shells near a loudspeaker erected in a western border town, declaring a "quasi-state of war," forward-stationing offensive assets and placing troops in full combat readiness. The JCS released four different fliers, each measuring 12 centimeters by 4.5 centimeters and printed on white and violet laminated paper. "As we do with a rabid dog, let's crack the Park Geun-hye clique that deteriorated the North-South relations by resuming anti-North psychological warfare broadcasts," reads one, while another says, "Stop immediately the anti-North psychological warfare broadcasts that would light the fuse of a war." Others warn Seoul against jeopardizing its own safety through a provocation, and urge the U.S. to scrap what it calls an "anti-North hostile policy." The police also collected some 1,000 handouts near Seoul Forest that threatened a "bombardment of fire" for offending the Kim Jong-un leadership, and more from Uijeongbu, Dongducheon, Paju, Yangpyeong and other Gyeonggi Province areas. "The North spread them apparently to help offset the effects of our broadcasts," a Defense Ministry official said. The South Korean military's leaflet operations have been on hold since the two Koreas agreed to cease propaganda activities in June 2004, though some defectors and nongovernmental organizations have been allowed to carry out their own campaigns. Earlier in the day, seven members of the defector group Fighters For Free North Korea, led by Park Sang-hak, sought to launch about 300,000 anti-Pyongyang fliers in Gimpo, Gyeonggi Province. But the police blocked their advancement, citing concerns over residents' safety. (Shin Hyon-hee, "South Fires Warning Shots at Suspected N. Korean Drone," *Korea Herald*, January 13, 2016)

President Barack Obama intentionally avoided mentioning North Korea in his final State of the Union address, as he did not want to give attention to the communist

state's leader, according to a senior Washington official. "If there is one thing I know about the leader of North Korea, it is that he likes attention and probably would like nothing more than the president to spend a lot of time to talk about it in the State of the Union," Ben Rhodes, a deputy national security adviser told reporters. "We didn't particularly feel compelled to give him that attention." Rhodes still called North Korea-related issues a "top priority" to the president. But he stressed that "strength should not be defined by provocations." "The way in which you show strength in the world should not be defined by the occasional provocative launch or test of a device while your own people are starving. We don't seek to elevate him, personally. So, that was our thinking in that regard," he said. (Song Sang-ho, "Obama 'Intentionally' Avoids N.K. in Speech," *Korea Herald*, January 14, 2016)

President Park Geun-hye hinted at plans to step up South Korea's psychological warfare tactics against North Korea in response to the latter's fourth nuclear test last week. In addition to emphasizing the effectiveness of recent loudspeaker broadcasts to North Korea, Park also suggested Seoul might pursue "additional measures" such as staff reductions or withdrawals from the Kaesong Industrial Complex - the subject of two recent visitor limitation measures - if any military clash occurs with the North. Speaking in a New Year's address to the nation, Park focused particular attention on the effects of the loudspeaker broadcasts, resumed in the wake of last week's nuclear test, calling them the "surest and most effective means of psychological warfare." Park also went further by stating plans to "continue efforts to share the truth with the North Korean people," suggesting the possible additional use of other means of psychological warfare such as leaflet launches. "No decision has been made yet on the leaflet launch issue or additional loudspeakers, but all the relevant factors are currently being weighed," said a Ministry of National Defense source. As an example of the effectiveness of the broadcasts, Park cited a previous resumption last August. But the argument - that the broadcasts successfully led Pyongyang into dialogue with Seoul - is something of a stretch. The broadcasts were originally resumed for the first time in 11 years as a means of hitting back against North Korea following a mine explosion that severely injured two South Korean soldiers in the Demilitarized Zone. Ten days later, North Korean forces fired on the speakers, prompting the South to return fire. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un also declared a "quasi-state of war" for the first time since the 2010 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. It was under those circumstances that the countries held their "two-plus-two" high-level talks among senior defense and foreign affairs officials, which produced the agreement on August 25. That agreement in turn led to the staging of reunions among separated family members in October and a first round of vice ministerial-level talks in December. It was a process that entailed intensive senior dialogue to overcome hair-trigger military tensions - a fact that went unmentioned in Park's talk. A government source also noted that the "resumption of loudspeaker broadcasts [last year] did not have the intention of bringing about inter-Korean dialogue." While Park emphasized the effectiveness of the broadcasts, she was more circumspect on the issue of additional measures with the Kaesong Industrial Complex. When asked whether she was considering closing the complex, she replied, "We're not thinking of anything so extreme [as a shutdown] right now, but citizen safety is our top priority, and the question of additional measures depends entirely on North Korea." The message is that Seoul is not currently

considering whether to pull all South Korean workers out of the complex, but that it could drastically cut the number of workers, or withdraw them entirely, if North Korea pursues military action. One particularly notable aspect of Park's argument was that it linked the possibility of additional measures on the complex to the question of "citizen safety" rather than that of sanctions against North Korea. "The emphasis there was on the part of 'not thinking about anything so extreme,'" an administration source said. (Kim Jin-cheol, "Park Hints at Broadening Psychological Warfare Tactics in New Year's Address," *Hankyore*, January 14, 2016)

North Korea's U.N. mission claimed Wednesday that its successful nuclear bomb test showed that it could now "wipe out" the United States, as the U.N. Security Council grappled with a response to the underground blast. North Korea called it a hydrogen bomb and said the test "scientifically proved the power of the smaller H-bomb," though the United States and others expressed skepticism that Pyongyang actually tested a hydrogen bomb for the first time. Nonetheless, whatever the North detonated underground will likely push the country closer toward a fully functional nuclear arsenal, which it still is not thought to have. A Security Council diplomat said Wednesday that the U.N.'s most powerful body is working on a resolution that imposes tougher sanctions on North Korea to reflect the claim that it tested a more powerful hydrogen bomb, which is "a step change" from its three previous atomic test. The diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity because consultations have been private, said all 15 council members agree that North Korea should be denuclearized, and this will be reflected in a new resolution. North Korea's U.N. mission circulated a report from the country's news agency saying the January 6 test wasn't to "threaten" or "provoke" anyone but was indispensable to build a nuclear force "to cope with the U.S. ever-more undisguised hostile policy" toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It said North Korean scientists and technicians "are in high spirit to detonate H-bombs ... capable of wiping out the whole territory of the U.S. all at once as it persistently moves to stifle the DPRK." (Edith Lederer, "North Korea Says Nuclear Test Shows It Could 'Wipe Out' U.S.," Associated Press, January 13, 2016)

ISIS: "Over the last several years, North Korea has engaged in retrofitting and upgrading its small five megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor, likely to make plutonium for nuclear weapons. A historical analysis of satellite imagery gathered between the end of 2014 and the end of 2015 suggests that since October 2014, the reactor has operated at low power or intermittently. ISIS also gathered other information indicating that the reactor has operated intermittently during this period. For example, it operated for a limited time, sometimes a few weeks, followed by a shutdown. The reasons for this type of operation are not known. During the last year, the outflow of hot water from the almost one meter diameter pipe that discharges water into the nearby river has not been visible. In earlier images, the water outflow was visible in several satellite images. Assuming no other discharge point, and ISIS has not found any so far, the absence of this important signature suggests that the reactor has operated, but its power has likely been far below optimal. Consistent with on-going intermittent operation, Airbus imagery dated January 11, 2016, acquired and analyzed by ISIS, shows what appears to be the emission of steam from the 5MWe reactor's turbine building. This is a

signature of turbine activity which, in turn, indicates that the reactor is operational, although possibly at low power. Additionally, a very large truck is visible at the entrance of the reactor. The January 11, 2016 imagery does not show a steady stream of water being discharged from the reactor's discharge pipeline, the main sign of full-power operation. Therefore, it is not possible to assess that the reactor has resumed full power operation, as North Korea has claimed. However, the steam from the turbine building and the presence of vehicles and a large truck at the site are both important signatures indicating on-going activity. It is, therefore, very likely that the reactor is still operating intermittently or at low power as of January 2016. No new activities have been observed at the experimental light water reactor (LWR). As figure 1 shows, light snow is present on both the dome of the reactor and on the roof adjacent to the reactor. This is likely an indication that the reactor is not operational, although nothing suggests that construction has stopped. The delays in the reactor's operation, however, require further analysis. The reactor may no longer be a North Korean priority and have a significantly delayed start date. North Korea may have also encountered technical challenges or decided to redesign the reactor. There are also growing indications that the reactor may not be a light water reactor modeled after the KEDO reactors that were being supplied by South Korea under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Publicly, many have shared this view ever since visitors to North Korea announced the construction of this reactor in 2010. This type of reactor has a thick, relatively small pressure vessel that is extremely challenging to make. However, as of 2010, the reactor was at its early stages of construction, thus the visitors were not able to see any direct evidence about the type of reactor. The available evidence suggests a reactor with a larger core vessel than that typical of a KEDO-type LWR. Leading alternative candidates are a light water cooled, graphite moderated reactor, similar to Russian designs, or a large research reactor. Although ISIS is not in position to settle this issue at this time, it requires more scrutiny." (David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, "Update of Key Activities at North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Site," Institute for Science and International Security, January 13, 2015)

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William Mugford: "Recent commercial satellite imagery of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center has revealed new developments over the past six months, most recently in January 2016, suggesting that North Korea's Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) is edging closer to becoming operational. These developments are: 1) the completion of two channels that will feed water into a cistern connected to the reactor's pump house for its cooling system; and 2) the completion of the reactor's electric transformer yard with the installation of two new transformers. However, predicting when construction will finish and the ELWR will be become operational has proven to be difficult. Aside from determining whether work has been finished inside the externally complete building, it still remains unclear whether the North has succeeded in fabricating the fuel assemblies necessary to power the reactor. If the ELWR becomes operational, it would be a significant development for North Korea. Aside from laying the groundwork for the construction of additional light-water reactors and providing electricity for civilian purposes, the reactor could also produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. The ELWR may also pose a safety hazard given concerns about its design and the North's lack of experience in operating such a facility. ...Imagery from September 2012 to October 2015 shows continued slow

progress towards the completion of the reactor's transformer yard. (An electrical substation with transformers and switches to direct and control the reactor-produced power into the attached power lines, a transformer yard is a necessary part of every power producing (or power using) system.) When first observed in September 2012, the yard consisted of foundation excavations. Work on power line towers and switch stanchions that occupy the outer (eastern) section of the yard was completed within a year. Installation of probable transformers, located in the western section adjacent to the reactor hall, took more time, perhaps because they had to be ordered and delivered. The first transformer was installed in July 2015 and the second, nearly twice as large as the other one, in October 2015, completing the yard." (William Mugford, "North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Facility: Slow Progress at the Experimental Light Water Reactor," *38North*, January 14, 2016)

Choe Ryong-hae, 66, one of the leading figures in North Korea's "second generation of partisans," made an appearance at a public event for the first time in two months. In a January 15 report by *Rodong Sinmun*, Choe - identified by the paper as "Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee" - delivered an address at an awards ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League. The ceremony, the paper said, was held at the People's Palace of Culture in Pyongyang on January 14. (Kim Jin-cheol, "Choe Ryong-hae, High-Ranking N.K. Figure, Makes First Public Appearance in Two Months," *Hankyore*, January 16, 2016)

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DPRK FoMin Spokesman's statement "in which he said that its first successful H-bomb test was a just measure for self-defense to defend the sovereignty of the country and the right of the nation to live and ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula and regional security. The DPRK is not interested in aggravating the situation as it is channeling all its efforts into the building of an economic power and feels no need to provoke anyone. ...As the first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK clarified in his New Year Address, its primary task for this year is to develop economy and improve the people's standard of living and to this end **it requires stable situation and peaceful climate more than any time**. As the U.S. hostile acts against the DPRK have become "routine," the latter has also become routine in its work to implement the line of simultaneously developing the two fronts for self-defense to cope with them. Now **the U.S. should be accustomed to the status of the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state whether it likes or not**. As the DPRK had already clarified, it will bolster in every way the capabilities for nuclear attack and retaliation to cope with the U.S. ceaseless acts of infringing upon former's sovereignty and perpetrating threatening provocations, but it will not deliberately use nuclear weapons. **Still valid are all proposals for preserving peace and stability in the peninsula and Northeast Asia including the ones for ceasing our nuclear test and concluding a peace treaty in return for U.S. halt to joint military exercises**. It is preposterous for the U.S. to talk about "provocations" from the DPRK though it is persistently sidestepping the latter's fair and aboveboard proposals and escalating the tension. It is the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces that are making provocations against the DPRK, rendering the situation in the peninsula extremely tense. The south Korean puppet forces' resumption of psychological warfare broadcasting is a sheer



provocation nothing relevant to the normal process pursuant to the DPRK's line of simultaneously developing the two fronts. The U.S. is working hard to bring the dark clouds of a nuclear war by introducing the strategic nuclear strike means into south Korea. In the UN, too, it is making great haste to fabricate a "resolution on sanctions" aimed at such hostile acts as hamstringing our efforts for peaceful economic construction and the improvement of the people's standard of living. Such provocative and hostile acts against the DPRK will not be confined to escalating the tension in the peninsula but inevitably lead to a war. Once a powder keg catches fire and goes off, the responsibility for it will rest with those who ignited the fuse." (KCNA, "U.S. Should Be Accustomed to Status of DPRK as Nuclear Weapons State," January 15, 2016)

China is opposed to a set of tougher sanctions on North Korea proposed by South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, a diplomatic source said after key direct consultations between Seoul and Beijing. Hwang Joon-kook, South Korea's chief nuclear envoy, held talks with his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei in Beijing a day earlier. It was their first face-to-face meeting between them since the North's nuclear test on January 6. The two sides agreed to seek a "clear and certain" response to the North's provocation, Hwang told reporters. It strongly suggested that Beijing is against pushing Pyongyang too hard amid efforts by Seoul, Washington and Tokyo for "strong and comprehensive" sanctions. Hwang pointed out the format of the U.N. Security Council's punitive step has been already set. The 15-member council agreed to adopt a resolution. Its contents are a sticking point and it remains uncertain how quickly a resolution will be produced. Hwang would not reveal details. "It would take quite a lot of time for China to review the contents as those would affect many (Chinese) government agencies, not just the foreign ministry, as well as local authorities and private entities," the source said. "China is doing quite a bit of homework. Frankly, there is a difference (between South Korea and China) on the level of sanctions (on the North)." China believes excessive sanctions on the North will have a negative effect on dialogue efforts, added the source. Earlier today, South Korea and China had working-level military talks in Seoul. Rear Adm. Guan Youfei, foreign affairs office director at China's defense ministry, was quoted as reaffirming Beijing's commitment to a new U.N. resolution against the North. "China is absolutely against North Korea's nuclear test," he emphasized, according to a South Korean official. Still, China will hold onto three principles -- denuclearizing and keeping the peace on the Korean Peninsula and resolution through dialogue and negotiations -- in resolving issues arising from North Korea's recent nuclear detonation, Youfei added. In Beijing, China's foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters that a new U.N. resolution must focus on safeguarding stability in the region. "The Chinese side supports reactions from the U.N. Security Council on North Korea's latest nuclear test," Hong said. "The relevant resolution should focus on realizing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, preventing nuclear proliferation and safeguarding peace and stability in Northeast Asia." (Yonhap, "S. Korea, China Split over Level of Sanctions on N. Korea," January 15, 2016)

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North Korea demanded the conclusion of a peace treaty with the United States and a halt to U.S. military exercises with South Korea to end its nuclear tests. But U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Pyongyang needed to demonstrate by

its action that it was serious about denuclearization for any dialogues to start. "We now have unfortunately a decade during which North Korea has totally reversed its obligations to international community, when it comes to missile and nuclear programs," Blinken told a news conference in Tokyo. "So it's very hard to take any of their overtures very seriously, particularly in the wake of their fourth nuclear test," he said, after meeting his counterpart from Japan and South Korea. Asked if the United States would consider a halt to joint exercises, U.S. State Department spokesman John Kirby said it had alliance commitments to South Korea. "We are going to continue to make sure the alliance is ready in all respects to act in defense of the South Korean people and the security of the peninsula," he told a regular news briefing. Blinken said that Pyongyang should look to the example of Iran. Iran's foreign minister said international sanctions on the country will be lifted on Saturday when the United Nations nuclear agency declares Tehran has complied with an agreement to scale back its nuclear program. "What made that agreement (with Iran) possible was the decision by Iran to freeze, and in some respects roll back, its nuclear program, in order to allow time and space to see if we could negotiate a comprehensive agreement." (Tony Munroe and Sano Hideyuki, "N. Korea Says Peace Treaty, Halt to Exercises, Would End Nuclear Tests," Reuters, January 16, 2016) It was the fall of 2013, and the North's third nuclear test in seven years, carried out several months earlier, had rattled much of the world. But President Xi Jinping, in a private meeting with President Obama at Constantine Palace in St. Petersburg, Russia, warned against putting too much pressure on Kim Jong-un, the North's young, volcanic leader. "A barefoot person does not fear those who wear shoes," Xi told Obama, invoking a Chinese proverb to convey that an impoverished nation like North Korea had nothing to lose by standing up to China and the United States. The conversation was recounted by an American diplomat familiar with the talks, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of angering the Chinese. While Xi has taken a tougher approach than his predecessors on North Korea, he has resisted inflicting crippling punishments on the North, an ally for six decades and a valuable counterweight for Beijing to American military might in Asia. South Korea's president, Park Geun-hye, who has cultivated closer ties to Xi, called on China this week to match its disapproving words about the North's nuclear ambitions with "necessary measures." But Chinese scholars and officials involved in North Korean policy said that Xi was reluctant to take sweeping action, by cutting shipments of oil and food, for instance, or blocking access to banks. He has not wavered from his view, expressed to Obama in 2013, that destabilizing the North would create chaos in the region, these people said. And he is especially sensitive to the prospect of a reunified Korea backed by the United States when China is trying to assert its dominance in Asia.

"If North Korea becomes an enemy state, it would have plenty of ways to harm China," said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing. "Beijing cannot afford to have North Korea become permanently hostile." Adding to the complications, Xi, 62, and Kim, believed to be 33, have a fraught relationship, say American, Chinese, and South Korean officials. Yang Xiyu, a former senior Chinese official who oversaw talks with North Korea, said the chance of a meeting between the two leaders, which was discussed privately by Chinese officials last year, was now "sharply reduced." "The nuclear test will seriously damage the bilateral relationship," Yang said. "Xi Jinping has been forced to be more assertive." While his predecessors

welcomed North Korean leaders with the fanfare of Politburo meetings, Xi has kept a distance. Chinese and American officials trace that to his distrust of Kim, whose first nuclear test as supreme leader came in February 2013, just a few months after Xi came to power. In an unusually public rebuke, Xi warned that no country should be able to throw the world into chaos for "selfish gain." Later that year, he imposed sanctions, limiting shipments of materials used in weapons and cutting ties to some North Korean banks, though enforcement was lax. Xi has made clear to the North that its future lies in economic reform, not military development, and that China will not accept a nuclear state, current and former Chinese and American officials said. Increasingly, he has come to see the North as a liability, at odds with his vision of making China a pre-eminent superpower. "Kim has kept challenging China's fundamental interests, policies and the security of the whole northeast of Asia," Professor Shi said. In a sign of his displeasure, Xi has cultivated better relations with Park, the South Korean president, traveling to Seoul for a state visit in 2014. Those efforts seem in part aimed at undermining American power in Asia. Beijing considers Seoul the "weakest link" among American allies in the region, said Lee Seong-Hyon, an assistant professor at Kyushu University in Japan. Privately, officials at the Chinese Foreign Ministry have become more vocal about their distrust of the North and Kim, as unease among the Chinese public about the country's erratic ally has grown, American diplomats said. Jon M. Huntsman Jr., who served as the American ambassador to China from 2009 to 2011, said there was a generational divide among Chinese officials about how to deal with North Korea. "The older apparatchiks would defend the North Korean line," he said. "The younger ones wanted this issue to go away. There's no emotional connection, there's no war being waged." In recent months, Xi extended several olive branches to Kim, concerned that the relationship had deteriorated to the point that Kim might lash out again, American and Chinese diplomats said. In October, Xi dispatched a top official to a military parade in Pyongyang, carrying a letter from Xi extolling Kim's achievements, which some officials viewed as a precursor to a meeting between the two leaders. John Delury, an associate professor at Yonsei University in Seoul, said those efforts showed that Xi could accept Kim's leadership of North Korea. "But what he needs and expects from Kim is to show the kind of deference that Korea, a 'small country,' owes China, a 'great power,'" Delury wrote in an email. "Kim, for his own reasons, refuses to give it." At the parade in October, Kim stood next to Xi's envoy, smiling and waving. He spoke of a "blood-tied friendship" and said that "bilateral ties are more than neighborliness," according to North Korean news media. "Traditions should not be confined to history books," Kim said. "They should be carried out in practice." In its report on the visit, Xinhua, the official news agency of the Chinese Communist Party, omitted Kim's remarks. (Javier Hernandez, "China Resists Pressure to Curb North Koreans," *New York Times*, January 16, 2016, p. A-7)

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Fresh U.S. sanctions over Iran's ballistic missile program showed that Tehran has worked closely with North Korea to move its missile program forward. The Treasury Department sanctioned 11 individuals and entities for involvement in procurement on behalf of Iran's ballistic missile program. The sanctions were a punishment for Iran's test-firing in October of a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead in violation of a U.N. ban. The Treasury said three of the sanctioned Iranian officials have had close ties with the North. One of them, Sayyed Javad Musavi, is a commercial director of the

Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), a subsidiary of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) under Iran's Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). "Musavi has worked directly with North Korean officials in Iran from the U.N.- and U.S.-designated Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID)," the Treasury said in a statement. KOMID is North Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons, and has been sanctioned by the U.S. and the United Nations. "SHIG also coordinates KOMID shipments to Iran. The shipments have included valves, electronics, and measuring equipment suitable for use in ground testing of liquid propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles," the Treasury said. "Within the past several years, Iranian missile technicians from SHIG traveled to North Korea to work on an 80-ton rocket booster being developed by the North Korean government," it said. The two other Iranian officials with ties to the North are SHIG Director Seyed Mirahmad Nooshin and Sayyed Medhi Farahi, deputy of MODAFL. The Treasury said the two have been "critical to the development of the 80-ton rocket booster, and both traveled to Pyongyang during contract negotiations." (Yonhap, "Fresh U.S. Sanctioned Show Iran's Close Ballistic Missile Cooperation with North Korea," *Korea Times*, January 18, 2016)

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China urged all relevant parties to take a "comprehensive" approach to deal with North Korea's latest nuclear test, repeating Beijing's long-standing stance that is seen as more accommodating towards Pyongyang. "The Chinese side believes that a comprehensive approach needs to be sorted out to address the cause and crux of the Korean nuclear issue," China's foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a daily press briefing. "We hope that all sides can calmly react to the current situation, stick to dialogue and consultations, work toward the same direction and properly deal with each other's concerns," Hong said. (Yonhap, "China Calls for 'Comprehensive' Approach to N. Korea's Nuclear Test," January 18, 2016)

Sigal: "North Korea's fourth nuclear test is nothing to disparage. Even if it was neither an H-bomb nor a boosted energy device, the test advanced Pyongyang's effort to develop a compact nuclear warhead that it can deliver by missile. The question is, why test now? Technical considerations have never sufficed before and are unlikely now to have motivated Pyongyang, where security is always in the driver's seat. As its foreign ministry spokesman put it on May 30, "[T]he only way to prevent a war between the DPRK and the US, which lack even elementary trust in each other and have long stood in mistrust and hostility only, is for the former to bolster up its defense capabilities so as to ensure balance of forces." Negotiations to ease mistrust and hostility remain the only way to stop further nuclear advances by North Korea. The possibility that Pyongyang may have been willing to stop arming has received scant attention in recent days. Yet the test could possibly have been forestalled a year ago if the administration of President Barack Obama had explored a promising offer by Pyongyang to suspend testing - and much more - if its security were addressed as well. That was the gist of its January 9, 2015 offer of "temporarily suspending the nuclear test over which the US is concerned" if the United States "temporarily suspend[s] joint military exercises in South Korea and its vicinity this year." Like most opening bids in a negotiation, the offer was unacceptable, but instead of probing it further, Washington

rejected it out of hand within hours and publicly denounced it as an “implicit threat.” Unofficial contacts soon revealed that the North seemed ready to settle for Washington to modulate rather than cancel the largest exercises and take steps to end what Pyongyang calls US “hostile policy,” above all, begin work on a peace treaty to end the Korean War. In return, it seemed prepared to suspend not just nuclear testing, but also missile and satellite launches and fissile material production at Yongbyon. Those contacts might have opened the way to talks in January 2015, but the initiative was squelched in Washington. Instead, US officials continued to insist that Pyongyang take unilateral steps to show it was serious about denuclearizing and ruled out reciprocity by Washington. As the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Daniel Russel, put it on February 4, “North Korea does not have the right to bargain, to trade or ask for a pay-off in return for abiding by international law.” His premise is that the North failed to live up to past agreements, which sidesteps the fact that Washington and its allies failed to keep their side of the bargains, too. It also ignores the fact that for nearly three decades Pyongyang has sought an end to enmity with Washington, Seoul and Tokyo, or in the words of the 1994 Agreed Framework, “move toward full political and economic normalization.” To that end, it was prepared to suspend its weapons programs - or resume them if thwarted. North Korea’s nuclear and missile brinkmanship is well documented, but it is easily forgotten that from 1991 to 2003, North Korea reprocessed no fissile material and conducted very few test launches of medium- or long-range missiles and suspended its weapons programs again from 2007 to early 2009. Was Kim Jong Un again trying to improve relations, and if so, why? Not economic desperation, as some in Washington and Seoul believe. Quite the contrary, his economy has been growing over the past decade. To deliver on his pledge to improve his people’s standard of living, however, he needed to divert resources and investment from military to civilian production. To restrain military spending he needed a secure international environment. Failing that, he would “strengthen his deterrent,” reducing the need for greater spending on conventional forces. That was the basis of his so-called *byungjin* “strategic line on carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously under the prevailing situation,” that is, as long as US “hostile policy” persisted. It was his own version of President Dwight Eisenhower’s bigger bang for a buck. Demands for increased military spending may have prompted him to execute his defense minister. It may account for his exaggerated claims about testing an “H-bomb.” Putting the military in its place may also explain why he gave credit to the party and the government for the H-bomb. According to official North Korean media, Kim made the decision to test as head of the Korean Workers Party, not the National Defense Council, and the government, not the NDC, announced the successful test. With Washington unwilling to drop its preconditions for talks, Kim reached out to Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul. Beijing had kept its distance from Kim Jong Un, but sensing that he might soon attempt another satellite launch, it moved to head him off by accommodating its troublesome neighbor politically and economically. Dashing the hopes of many in Washington and Seoul for cooler relations, President Xi Jinping had a top official deliver an October 9 letter to Kim Jong Un pledging to “seek closer communication and deepen cooperation, pushing for a long-term, healthy and stable development of the Sino-DPRK ties.” He linked that pledge, however, to China’s interest in a peaceful and stable Korean peninsula and an early resumption of Six Party talks. A summit meeting with

Kim may have been on offer if he refrained from a satellite launch and nuclear test. Relations soon cooled again. On Dec. 10 Kim spoke publicly about having an H-bomb. Beijing promptly showed its displeasure. High-ranking officials who were expected to attend a concert in Beijing by Kim's favorite North Korean pop band abruptly proved unavailable, and the North Koreans canceled their tour and returned home. Pyongyang's relations with Tokyo and Seoul fared no better. Determined to resolve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by the North decades ago, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began talks. While he eased sanctions and reportedly offered economic assistance, he was slow to discuss a fundamental improvement in relations, as envisioned in the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration. The North for its part was less than forthcoming about its pledge to reinvestigate the abductions. As a result, the talks languished. Since coming to power, Kim has made repeated efforts to reach out to South Korea's president, Park Geun-hye – efforts that she did not reciprocate. Having failed, he resorted to brinkmanship, instigating a crisis last August that led to the resumption of talks and an easing of mounting tensions. Follow-up talks on December 11-12 went nowhere, however. With all his diplomatic initiatives unrequited, Kim Jong Un decided three days later to prepare a fourth nuclear test. Like his grandfather and father before him, he would stand up to all his neighbors in an effort to force them to be its friends. Now all the talk in Washington is about sanctions, but intensified pressure on Pyongyang will only lead to further tests. Even if it refuses to give up the few nuclear weapons it has, negotiations are still worth trying to see whether Pyongyang is willing stop arming." (Leon V. Sigal, "Why Did North Korea Test?" *Global Asia Forum*, January 18, 2015)

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North Korea's January 6 nuclear test did not expand its technical capability, but the U.S. government is keeping a close eye on Pyongyang's efforts to develop a thermonuclear warhead capable of reaching the United States, the head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency said. "I would assess that their technical capability has not increased," Vice Admiral James Syring told an event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "That said, everything that they're doing continues to be alarming and provoking. ... We continue to watch it closely." Syring gave no further details on what was North Korea's fourth nuclear test. The United States has made no major changes in efforts to identify, track and intercept potential North Korean missile threats as a result of the latest test, he said. "If it was warranted, you would see our program change," he said. "We are absolutely on the right path to stay ahead of that threat." He said the Missile Defense Agency would have 37 ground-based interceptors in place in Alaska and California by the end of the year, and 44 such interceptors by the end of 2017. Then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel ordered 14 additional interceptors to be put in place in March 2013 after North Korea's third nuclear test. Nuclear experts say North Korea likely gained data and practical know-how from the test. They reject North Korea's assertion that it detonated a hydrogen bomb. In an H-bomb, conventional explosives compress and detonate a conventional fission bomb, triggering a powerful secondary fusion device. The process likely used by North Korea, called "boosting," involves an intermediate device that uses a hydrogen isotope to vastly increase the explosive power of an old-fashioned fission bomb, the experts told Reuters. Boosting is key to miniaturizing a thermonuclear weapon, and Pyongyang must master miniaturization in order to build a warhead small enough to fit atop a

ballistic missile that can reach the United States or other distant targets, experts said. Siegfried Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, said the test "will certainly allow North Korea to increase the sophistication of its nuclear arsenal - specifically, to make the nuclear bombs smaller and lighter." Admiral Bill Gortney, commander of U.S. Northern Command, has said he believes North Korea already has the ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons and place them on missiles that could reach the United States. North Korea is likely moving along the miniaturization path, developing a boosting process and reducing the amount of chemical explosive needed to compress the core, experts say. "On those two levels, they can achieve some real weight savings," said Hans Kristensen, director of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project. North Korea has shown off two versions of a ballistic missile that appear to be of a type that could reach the U.S. West Coast, but there is no evidence the missiles have been tested. North Korea has also tested a space-launch vehicle that could be modified to work as an intercontinental ballistic missile. It also has released a video of what it said was a successful test of a submarine-launched missile. (Reuters, "Nuke Test Didn't Improve North Korea's Technology, U.S. Says," Reuters, January 19, 2016)

Carlin: "North Korea's fourth nuclear test surprised a lot of people. That surprise unleashed, among other things, the notion that Kim Jong Un is erratic, an especially loose cannon with no advisers who might counsel restraint because they have all been kicked aside or died. If that were true, one might wonder about the North's first two nuclear tests, which took place under Kim Jong Il. Presumably, if we accept the "erratic Kim Jong Un" thesis, the earlier tests took place because the old advisers thought nuclear tests were a good idea, and not because they feared contradicting the leader. But how would we know the difference? Consider for a moment: What if, as things seem to be headed, Beijing (although furious with the North for the test) is still not prepared to go along with seriously tough UN Security Council sanctions? How will Kim Jong Un look then? Like someone who reviewed the odds, looked at the history of Chinese reaction to the North's first three tests, and decided the risk was worth taking? The argument that the North's policies are hard to predict because Kim Jong Un is "erratic" is relatively easy to make but tough to defend if examined closely. To do so, first of all we would have to posit that "predicting" North Korean policies, i.e., knowing which way the ball was going to bounce at any particular time, was easier when Kim Jong Il was in charge, and before him, Kim Il Sung. After over 40 years in these rocky fields, I think I can say this has rarely been the case; the North Koreans have always been good at pulling fast ones. Even so, if plotted on a graph, over the long term the dots have traced recognizable, fundamental policy lines. In other words, though it's tough to predict what will happen on any given day, it is possible to see trends over time. Over the past four years, under Kim Jong Un, that is still the case. The recent nuclear test was a surprise only insofar as we didn't know exactly when it would occur. Barring something to stop it (and there were at least a few windows of opportunity that might have been explored since the third test in early 2013), there was going to be a fourth. The question was when. The answer, of course, became perfectly obvious a few minutes after 10:00 AM (Korea time) on January 6, 2016. How do those who think they see "erratic" moves from Kim Jong Un make their case? One way—well presented by Sam Kim in a January 12 article on *Bloomberg News*—is to attack the question from a

relatively dormant flank, i.e., the quality and courage of the leader's advisers. Before December 2011 when Kim Jong Il died, few outside observers looked at the issue of the leader's advisers. If anything, the question was put in terms of the "inner circle," most often short lists of those people who partied with the leader. Pondering what sort of advice they might have given was not usually considered. The problem is, we have never known who was, is, or will be actually "advising" the leadership and thus influencing policy. Perhaps it would be better to say we've known "next to nothing" because in the late 1990s, there was good reason to believe that Kang Sok Ju, then the First Vice Foreign Minister, in his own careful way, had at least some influence with Kim Jong Il in shaping policy toward the United States. Over the past two years, it has appeared that late Kim Yang Gon may have had somewhat similar influence (how similar is the interesting question) with Kim Jong Un. We can all pretty much agree that no regime is completely at the mercy of one man's (or woman's—no reason to leave out Catherine the Great or Elizabeth I here) fits of temperament or folly. History will support the notion that the loss of a key, trusted and wise adviser frequently ends up depriving a ruler of an important intellectual/emotional prop, at least for a time. The argument that Kim Jong Un lost something important when Kim Yang Gon died late last year is a useful hypothesis, and may even be a testable proposition. Still, Kim Yang Gon likely had able deputies. We can only wait and see whether and how policy changes toward South Korea with him off the stage. It is worth noting that the first *Rodong Sinmun* article on South Korea after Kim Yang Gon's death showed no change in the North's public approach toward Seoul—not a decisive indicator but one worth taking on board. It is also worth noting that monitored DPRK media have yet to react to President Park's January 13 statement on the nuclear test, a statement that would otherwise seem to be a fat target for a rhetorical broadside from Pyongyang. Details, details. From late August through today, the North has been exceedingly careful in its public treatment of President Park Geun-hye. It virtually ignored the US-ROK summit in October, including an unusual US-ROK joint statement specifically focused on North Korea and warning Pyongyang of "significant measures" by the UN Security Council in case of a ballistic missile launch or nuclear test, and praising President Park's "principled approach" to resolving last August's DMZ incident. Its initial reaction to the stalemate in the North-South talks in mid-December was brief and mild. Moreover, DPRK media have virtually ignored the South's resumption of DMZ loudspeaker broadcasts (the North, instead, has apparently decided to bury the South in a blizzard of its own balloon-delivered pamphlets). Similarly, there has been virtually no public reaction to the January 10 low-level flight of a US B-52 over Osan Airbase. (Contrary to what some Western press reports claimed, it was not acknowledged in a January 11 *Rodong Sinmun* article which said only that the US was "talking about projecting a nuclear strategic bomber squadron into South Korea.") Why are such details important? Because they show months-long and carefully sustained calculation, not erratic swings. Since Kim Jong Un assumed power in December 2011, North Korea's economic policy, its approach towards South Korea and even its approach toward the US have remained within the normal range of oscillation. The fact that the North's policies—or at least, the public presentation of them—may have tacked over the course of several months does not make the decision-making behind them erratic. "Erratic," if the word means anything, would be abrupt, almost inexplicable swings over short periods of time to significantly different policies. But we have not seen anything like



that. In North Korean terms, "erratic" is not periods of calm punctuated by loud explosions. Nor is "erratic" to be found in the ups and downs of boilerplate propaganda. A question worth pondering is, how does one distinguish between "erratic" and "opportunistic," or perhaps better put, "quick on their feet?" Consider: In summer of 1992, Kim Jong Il began planning withdrawal from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). When he finally pulled the trigger in March 1993, he was out in the field with his troops, expecting a military strike by the US. Only when his foreign ministry noted international calls for the North to return to the NPT did Pyongyang work out new plans. By April, Kim was engaged in a diplomatic ballet that would eventually lead to talks with the United States and an agreement to suspend the NPT withdrawal. Erratic? In the spring of 1994, the North withdrew spent fuel rods from its reactor at Yongbyon, knowing full well the extent of the crisis that would entail. Some of Kim Jong Il's advisers urged him to do it, others counseled strongly against it. Kim went ahead. Erratic? Bull headed? Crazy like a fox? In early 2013, Pyongyang declared the nuclear issue off the table. Months later, the issue was put it back on the table in a June 16 statement from the National Defense Commission, a surprise even to some DPRK officials. Erratic? Calculated? On January 6, in the DPRK Government statement announcing the fourth nuclear test, Pyongyang declared that, "As long as the United States' heinous hostile policy toward the DPRK is not eradicated, **our suspension of nuclear development or nuclear abandonment** cannot happen under any circumstance." Although not unqualified, that formulation would seem to have taken off table the North's previous offer from January 2015—to temporarily halt testing in return for a temporary suspension of US-ROK joint exercises. Nine days later, a Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement said that the previous offer to stop the testing was still valid, possibly foreshadowed by a *Rodong Sinmun* article on the 11th that seemed to fiddle with the "as long as" formulation. Erratic? Tacking? Taking advantage of signs that Beijing was looking for reasons not to go along with Washington's call for new, tough steps against the North? Perhaps rather than retreat to "erratic," a better observation is that one should never say never when dealing with the North. The idea that Kim has gunned down all of his close advisers holds no water. If someone has information suggesting that former defense minister Hyon Yong Chol was a close or influential adviser to Kim, I'd welcome hearing it. As far as I can tell, he was neither. Jang Song Taek may have been influential for a while at the beginning of Kim's reign, but he was probably under close watch, and was falling out of favor for nearly a year before he got the axe. Sam Kim mentions in his article that Choe Ryong-hae was sent down for "reeducation." Kim Jong Il also banished people from the court for months at a time, too. Even Kang Sok Ju was sent down once or twice. They came back, as has Choe, who returned after only a few months, identified as a party secretary. Here are six hypotheses to mull for now, and test over the next several months: 1. After a year of signaling interest in engagement on the nuclear issue to the United States and receiving no positive response from the US, the fourth test was essentially an "attention getter" to bring Washington to the negotiation table in response to crisis as has been the case in the past. (**Note:** A key problem with this hypothesis is that if the North's upcoming party congress is meant to be a flagship event to highlight economic progress, by conducting another nuclear test, Kim has all but ensured that the external atmosphere surrounding the congress is liable to be quite negative. This might suggest hypothesis #2.) 2. Kim Jong Un intends to get the

markets back under close control, and will now have a good reason to do so in light of increased international pressure, sanctions, etc. (This is not my favorite explanation, but we can wait and see.) 3. The purpose of the *byungjin* policy was explicitly to build up the nation's security through nuclear development to the point that it would be possible to divert resources from the military and concentrate on the economy. It is possible that Kim will use this test of a "hydrogen-bomb" to declare victory and state that North Korea has developed a sufficient deterrent to allow for shifting focus to the economy. In fact, a January 7 article in *Chosun Sinbo*—the newspaper of the pro-North Korean organization of Koreans in Japan which often carries articles directly reflecting views in Pyongyang—included this line. (**Note:** Taking this tack would potentially help to soften the blowback from China, as the Chinese are strong proponents of economic reform in North Korea.) 4. North Korea has concluded that negotiations with the US will not be possible in the waning months of the Obama Administration and in analyzing the current election season is bracing itself for a seemingly inevitable hostile policy from whoever succeeds the current president, from either party. Therefore, Pyongyang is setting the stage to make clear to whoever comes to office in January 2017 that it possesses a strong and credible nuclear threat, and must be taken seriously. 5. The test was planned for a particularly inopportune for the Chinese who are addressing their own issues, including softness in their economy and a major, multi-year reorganization of the armed forces. It also seems to have been carried out to demonstrate maximum independence from the Chinese. (Beijing says that, unlike in the past, it did not receive any advance notice of the test.) If the North wanted to stir several pots at once—Sino-US, Sino-ROK, and ROK-US— the test turns out to have been a good way to do it. 6. Give the devil his due: Dictators are erratic, and this decision was erratic but, if North Korea's luck holds, not irretrievable. If there is anyone who knows how to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, it is the North Koreans. Is there a bottom line? Kim Jong Un is young, but not as inexperienced as many outsiders continue to think. He was raised in utter privilege, and is no doubt used to being obeyed. If he is still, to some extent, learning the ropes, he now has 5 or 6 (or even 7) years of experience under his belt at or near the top of the regime. He does not seem all that different from his father at the same age, who also had a reputation for impulsive behavior and wild living. (So, as a matter of fact, did the young Henry VIII). Whatever Kim Jong Un's level of maturity or immaturity in the eyes of outsiders, and whatever the tonal shifts reflected in official North Korean statements over the past four years, the policies of the DPRK since he took power have not been noticeably out of line with what have been historic norms. This—in some sense the essential interests North Koreans believe they must defend—is what we have to deal with, difficult though it might be, and scaring ourselves with dancing shadows on the walls of a cave of our own making will, in the end, lead us nowhere good." (Robert Carlin, "Never Say Never," *38North*, January 19, 2016)

DeTrani: North Koreans want to be accepted as a nuclear weapons state. They also want normal diplomatic relations with the United States. Kim Jong-un knows that if he wants a normal relationship with the U.S., with an immediate peace treaty similar to his current request, North Korea will have to dismantle all of its nuclear programs and eventually resolve issues related to the north's human rights and illicit activities programs. There was positive movement on these issues with the September 2005

Joint Statement. Unfortunately, since 2008, there has been no meaningful dialogue with North Korea. And since 2008, North Korea has conducted numerous nuclear tests and missile launches. During a private discussion in Beijing during a 2004 plenary session of the Six Party talks, the North Korean deputy head of delegation said the United States should treat a nuclear North Korea as it treats a nuclear Pakistan, emphasizing that North Korea could become a good friend of the U.S. He was told the United States would never accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. During a series of private meetings leading up to the Sept. 19, 2005 joint statement on denuclearization, the North Korean head and deputy head of delegation said North Korea wanted a normal relationship with the United States. That, they said, was their leadership's goal. They were told that comprehensive and verifiable denuclearization had to precede a bilateral discussion with the United States dealing with the human rights situation in North Korea and the government's involvement in illicit activities. Only with significant progress on these issues would normalization of relations be possible. On that day, North Korea and the other five countries – the United States, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia – signed a joint statement committing North Korea to complete and verifiable dismantlement of all its nuclear programs in return for security assurances and economic and energy assistance. During the next two years, North Korea halted its plutonium program at Yongbyon and received significant amounts of food aid. Task forces were established to implement the joint statement. Progress came to an abrupt end in 2008 when North Korea refused to sign an agreement permitting nuclear monitors to go anywhere, anytime. Since then, Six Party negotiations have ceased and North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests (2009, 2013 and 2016), while claiming success at miniaturization. North Koreans have had numerous long- and medium-range missile launches, including putting a small satellite in orbit in April 2011. Reportedly, North Korea is close to launching a long-range, solid-fuel, mobile missile capable of reaching the United States. Last month, North Korea reportedly conducted a successful submarine missile test. Estimates of the number of nuclear weapons in North Korea vary, with the Institute for Science and International Security claiming that by 2020, North Korea could have up to 100 nuclear weapons. Permitting North Korea to retain its nuclear programs is a regional and global threat. It is also a proliferation threat if a nuclear weapon or fissile material is provided to a rogue state or terrorist non state actor. North Korea did in fact proliferate nuclear technology to Syria, providing assistance in the construction of a nuclear reactor at Al Kibar which, fortunately, was destroyed by Israel in 2007. Moreover, it is widely believed other countries in the region will seek their own nuclear weapons if North Korea retains and enhances its nuclear arsenal. The January 6 North Korean nuclear test probably was an upgraded atomic bomb using boosted fission, rather than a hydrogen bomb. But that in itself is significant. It's also likely North Korea is pursuing a hydrogen bomb program. Given China's close relationship and economic leverage with North Korea, Beijing could do more to moderate Kim Jong-un's behavior. And given North Korea's long-term interest in having a normal relationship with the United States, it's also obvious that a dialogue with North Korea could possibly prove productive. Additional sanctions on North Korea will have some impact, but it will not prevent Kim Jong-un from pursuing his nuclear and missile programs. North Korea is not Iran. But with Iran, the United States and others spent considerable time negotiating an agreement that prevents Iran from fabricating a nuclear weapon for at

least 15 years. North Korea has nuclear weapons and is aggressively increasing the number and quality of its nuclear weapons. Convening an exploratory meeting of the Six Party talks countries could prove productive. **When Ambassador Stephen Bosworth and I met in Singapore last January with North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho for two days of unofficial talks, Ri was personally amenable to an official meeting to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. An unconditional official meeting with North Korea could prove productive.**" (Joseph DeTrani, "A Feeler from Nuclear North Korea?" *Washington Times*, January 19, 2016)

Moon Chung-in: "South Korea and the international community have acted decisively to punish North Korea for its fourth nuclear test on January 6, which Pyongyang claimed was a powerful hydrogen bomb. The United States flew a B-52 bomber jet from its air base in Guam to South Korea, and the Korean and U.S. defense authorities are mulling the deployment of other "strategic assets," like nuclear-powered submarines and carriers, during joint military exercises. South Korea resumed its propaganda broadcasts along the border. Washington and Seoul also plan to adopt a so-called 4D Operational Concept, preemptive strikes designed to detect, disrupt, destroy and defend against missile, nuclear, chemical and biological threats from North Korea, during their next military drills. The U.S. Congress is preparing a stronger set of sanctions against North Korea. These measures are necessary, but somehow everything seems all too familiar. The same scene has played out ever since Pyongyang detonated its first nuclear device in October 2006. But what have we today? Powerful countries like the United States, China and South Korea can't even deal with a single isolated country. Looking back on the trajectory of the past two decades, the U.S. policy on North Korea was utterly unsuccessful, and yet we followed it blindly. The biggest blunder lies in our lack of intelligence. Worse than failing to detect the signs of another nuclear test, our allies did not possess up-to-date information concerning North Korea's advancements in weapons technology, the strategic intentions of the regime's leaders or their political ambitions. Authorities and experts underestimated the country's nuclear capacity and the resources it had to maintain its nuclear campaign alongside economic development. It was simply naive and wishful thinking that the regime would inevitably collapse. Then there was the "all-or-nothing" principle in dialogues with Pyongyang. Seoul and Washington have maintained that there be "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of nuclear activity in North Korea for any significant improvement in aid or ties to occur. Few argue that this should be the ultimate goal. But it should not serve as a universal guideline in all talks. We first need to access the nuclear facilities in North Korea to discuss what needs to be eliminated and then work toward complete dismantlement to establish a lasting peace framework on the Korean Peninsula to make North Korea an accepted member of the international community. We should heed what Pyongyang proposed on January 9, 2015, when it said it was willing to cease nuclear tests, and even any activity in nuclear materials, if Washington halted joint military exercises with Seoul. But the U.S. Department of Defense flatly ignored that proposal. Washington claimed Pyongyang had no right to bargain when it failed to honor past agreements. Given North Korea's track record, the U.S. position is understandable. President Barack Obama has been referred to as a realist in foreign policy, applying soft power and rapprochement toward its enemy states, though North Korea is

strangely an exception.

Overestimating Beijing's role and influence over the North has also made things worse. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying snorted at Washington's indication that Beijing was to blame for failing to take Pyongyang to task. "The key to solving the [North Korean nuclear] problem is not China," she said, hinting it was Washington that had aggravated the situation with its isolationist policy. A few hawkish officials in Beijing believe Washington was intentionally neglecting the North Korean nuclear issue to rein in China's influence on the global stage. That's why we can't expect strong and proactive engagement from Beijing in containing North Korea's nuclear campaign. There is one way out of this multiple conundrum. We must shake ourselves from the complacency we built toward the North Korean nuclear program over the decades. North Korea has long been trained and has become accustomed to hardship in return for its nuclear assets, and it will likely stand firm in the face of outside pressure and sanctions." However, it won't dare use it. A nuclear provocation will inevitably be apocalyptic for both Koreas. Leaving the option open for dialogue and negotiation, with some pressure, will be the only realistic solution. We must accept North Korea's realities and try to steer it toward an incremental and practical denuclearization process with the help of China and Russia. Time is not on our side. Our leadership must come up with an entirely new approach toward North Korea. (Moon Chung-in, "Why No One Takes Responsibility," JoongAng Ilbo, January 19, 2016)

1/20/16

The United States and its allies will bolster sanctions and go on the defensive against North Korea in ways that China may not like if Beijing fails to lend greater support to efforts to curb the North's nuclear ambitions, a top American diplomat said in Seoul. Deputy Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken made the warning a day before he planned to meet with Chinese officials in Beijing to pressure them to use their economic leverage over North Korea to force it to end its nuclear weapons program. "I think what we will be talking to China about is that we will, both in terms of sanctions and in terms of our defense postures, have to take additional steps in order to use the leverage we have in order to defend ourselves and our allies if North Korea doesn't change its behavior," Blinken said in an interview. Some of those steps "won't be directed at China, but China probably won't like them," he said. Blinken refused to go into detail. But he said that "everything is on the table," including so-called secondary sanctions, of the type the United States most recently used against Iran, which would target third-party countries doing business with North Korea. In its first statement since the nuclear test, North Korea's Foreign Ministry reiterated on Friday that it would settle American concerns about its nuclear weapons only if Washington first signed a peace treaty to end its "hostile policy" toward the North, which it described as "the root cause of all problems." The 1950-53 Korean War was halted in a cease-fire, leaving the peninsula technically still at war. Blinken said the North Korean demand was "a total nonstarter" that violated the 2005 agreement in which North Korea, China, the United States, Japan, Russia and South Korea agreed to a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula, but only in return for the North's verifiable denuclearization. "Now, North Korea says it wants a peace treaty, and it won't even talk about the nuclear program. It's impossible," he said, adding that Washington would start dialogue only if the North showed that it was prepared for "credible and authentic talks about denuclearization."

(Choe Sang-hun, "U.S. Presses China to Curb Ally's Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, January 21, 2016, p. A-6)

A top North Korean military official, thought to be behind the North's deadly attacks on South Korea in 2010, is sure to have replaced Kim Yang-gon, who died in a car accident in December, sources said. General Kim Yong-chol, 70, who leads the North's reconnaissance bureau, has been recently appointed as the party secretary handling inter-Korean affairs, also doubling as the head of the United Front Department (UFD) at the ruling party, the sources said. "It is certain that General Kim has replaced the dead official," said a source familiar with North Korean affairs. "He assumed the posts of the head of the UFD as well as party secretary." If confirmed, it is a rare case that a North Korean military official has become a secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea. General Kim, known as a hardliner, is believed to have orchestrated Pyongyang's two deadly attacks on the South in 2010 -- the sinking of the Cheonan warship and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. The two attacks killed a total of 50 South Koreans, including two civilians. He is also known for having masterminded the planting of land mines across the inter-Korean border that severely injured two South Korean staff sergeants in August last year. Since 2009, Kim has led the North's Reconnaissance General Bureau tasked with intelligence operations in foreign countries and cyberwarfare. The bureau is known to be behind Pyongyang's alleged cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014. "If General Kim is confirmed to have been appointed as a party secretary on inter-Korean affairs, there is the high possibility that he would not serve as the head of the North's Reconnaissance General Bureau any longer," another source said. The Unification Ministry declined to confirm Kim's nomination. "It is too premature to verify it," Jeong Joon-hee, a ministry spokesman, told a regular press briefing. (Yonhap, "Top N.K. Official Becomes Point Man on Inter-Korean Affairs: Sources," January 20, 2016)

South Korea's Red Cross said its programs for families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War and humanitarian aid to North Korea now face a murky prospect as North Korea's fourth nuclear test froze ties between the two countries. The Red Cross has made video messages of about 10,000 separated family members to be possibly delivered to their relatives in North Korea, but whether they can be delivered remains uncertain due to the strained inter-Korean ties following the North's nuclear test on January 6, it said. Seoul has also proposed to Pyongyang that the two Koreas exchange a list of how many separated family members from each side want to meet with their relatives living across the border. There are about 66,000 separated family members in South Korea, half of which have expressed a wish to confirm the fate of their relatives living in the North. "(Due to the North's nuclear test), there has been no progress over our projects on separated families and humanitarian assistance with North Korea," a Red Cross official said. South Korea is seeking to hold the family reunions on a regular basis, calling on the North to allow such families to exchange letters. But Pyongyang maintains a lukewarm stance. (Yonhap, "Red Cross' Projects with Pyongyang Suspended over Nuke Test," *Korea Herald*, January 20, 2016)

1/21/16

The South Korean government said it would not allow any direct civilian exchanges with North Korea for the time being, a punitive step against Pyongyang for its fourth

nuclear test. It's time to concentrate efforts on imposing effective sanctions on the North, said an official at the Unification Ministry that handles Seoul-Pyongyang relations. In the wake of the North's nuclear test, its national commission on reconciliation reportedly sent a fax message to several South Korean humanitarian and religious groups proposing meetings in China on their projects this year. "North Korea offered consultations on projects under way (by some South Korean aid groups)," the ministry official told reporters. He made clear the government's disapproval of any direct inter-Korean meeting at a time when the international community is discussing tougher sanctions on Pyongyang. The inter-Korean relationship should "not be business as usual," he said, adding the North's suggestion is like "asking for shaking hands and being on good terms after a slap in the face." (*Korea Times*, "Inter-Korean Exchanges Frozen after Nuke Test," January 21, 2016)

1/22/16

KCNA: "According to information available from a relevant institution, Warmbier Otto Frederick, student of Virginia University of the U.S., was arrested while perpetrating a hostile act against the DPRK after entering it under the guise of tourist for the purpose of bringing down the foundation of its single-minded unity at the tacit connivance of the U.S. government and under its manipulation. He is now under investigation." (KCNA, "American Arrested for His Hostile Act against DPRK," January 22, 2016) Otto Warmbier, the American university student being held by North Korea, was detained before boarding his flight to China over an unspecified incident that had taken place earlier in the trip at his hotel, his travel company told Reuters on January 23. Charlotte Guttridge, a tour leader at Young Pioneer Tours and the only outside witness to Warmbier's detention, said the 21-year-old University of Virginia student was not with other tourists when the events that appear to have prompted his arrest occurred. "What happened, happened at the hotel and my belief is that Otto kept it to himself out of hope it might go unnoticed," Guttridge told Reuters. Guttridge and colleagues at Young Pioneer Tours declined to share further details of exactly what had taken place at the Yanggakdo International Hotel, citing the safety of their client. Warmbier had been staying when the incident that led to his arrest occurred. China-based Young Pioneer Tours is a North Korea travel specialist that describes itself on its website as "an adventure tour operator that provides 'budget tours to destinations your mother would rather you stayed away from.'" During his five-day New Year's tour of North Korea, staff at Young Pioneer Tours said Warmbier had acted normally, and was keen to see daily life in one of the world's most isolated countries, which is visited by around 6,000 Western tourists a year. Ten other U.S. citizens were on the tour. "Throughout the trip, Otto behaved as a typical tourist - taking pictures, enjoying himself. We had no indication that anything untoward had happened until the airport," Guttridge said. When Warmbier's group reached the airport, he appeared to have been purposefully delayed at immigration, Troy Collings, director of Young Pioneer Tours, told Reuters. As the tourists checked-in at the gleaming, recently-renovated terminal, Warmbier was taken aside by two airport officials and escorted into a small immigration room behind a wooden door to one side of the check-in area. "He was not dragged away and he wasn't yelled at," Guttridge said. As Guttridge waited for Warmbier to come out of the room, she instructed the rest of her tour group to board the North Korean Air Koryo flight bound for Beijing. "When it became clear that he wasn't coming, I had to board the flight before it departed," said Guttridge, who still had colleagues in Pyongyang

with another group of tourists. "I was the last to board the flight." As the Russian-made Tupolev airliner prepared to leave the terminal, an airport official boarded the plane and told Guttridge that Warmbier had been "taken to hospital." Soon after, a North Korean contact passed on a message concerning Warmbier's detention to Young Pioneer Tours founder Gareth Johnson, who was in Pyongyang with a separate group due to catch a train to the Chinese border. "I stayed back when I heard Otto had been detained," Johnson told Reuters. "It was an automatic response. I wanted to try and work out what the situation was and it was my hope that I would at least be able to speak with him." Johnson said his company was in contact with Warmbier's family, U.S. officials and the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang, which represents U.S. interests in North Korea. Staff at the tour operator said as far as they knew Warmbier had not been in possession of any religious or political literature. (James Pearson, "U.S. Student Detained North Korea 'over Hotel Incident,'" Reuters, January 23, 2016) Gov. **John Kasich** of Ohio has asked former Gov. Bill Richardson of New Mexico to help in the effort to free Warmbier, Kasich's spokesman said February 12. Richardson confirmed the request and said he had begun making inquiries about the 21-year-old college student. The spokesman for Kasich, Rob Nichols, said the contact with Richardson was part of a broader effort by the Ohio governor to take action on behalf of Warmbier, who was arrested January 2 as he was **completing an organized tour of North Korea**. Nichols said Kasich, a Republican presidential candidate, also had spoken with Warmbier's parents and with officials at the White House. (Rick Gladstone, "Veteran Negotiator Aids Effort to Free Student in North Korea," *New York Times*, February 13, 2016) An American student held in North Korea since early January was detained for trying to steal a propaganda slogan from his Pyongyang hotel and has confessed to "severe crimes" against the state, the North's official media said on October 29. Otto Warmbier, 21, a student at the University of Virginia, was detained before boarding his flight to China over an unspecified incident at his hotel, his tour agency told Reuters in January. "I committed the crime of taking out a political slogan from the staff-only area of the Yanggakdo International Hotel," KCNA quoted Warmbier as telling media in Pyongyang. CNN showed video of a sobbing Warmbier saying: "I have made the worst mistake of my life, but please act to save me." Warmbier said a "deaconess" had offered him a used car worth \$10,000 if he could present a U.S. church with the slogan as a "trophy" from North Korea, KCNA said. The acquaintance also said the church would pay his mother \$200,000 if he was detained by the North and did not return, KCNA quoted Warmbier as saying. "My crime is very severe and pre-planned," Warmbier was quoted as saying, adding that he was impressed by North Korea's "humanitarian treatment of severe criminals like myself." (James Pearson and Jack Kim, "North Korea Says Detained U.S. Student Confessed to Stealing Political Slogan," Reuters, February 29, 2016)

President Park Geun-hye proposed that South Korea hold talks with the United States, China and other regional partners to discuss ways to denuclearize North Korea. "We should find various and creative approaches, including attempting to hold five-way talks excluding North Korea," Park said in a meeting with officials on how to deal with North Korea. The comments represent growing doubts about the effectiveness of the nuclear talks, which showed no signs of resumption. (Yonhap, "Park Proposes Five-Nation Talks over Pyongyang," January 22, 2016)



China urged all relevant countries to make joint efforts to resume long-stalled nuclear talks on ending North Korea's nuclear programs as South Korea floated the idea of holding talks without North Korea. China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei called for the "relevant parties" to "restart the six-party talks at an early date move forward the goal of denuclearization and ensure long-term stability and development of the (Korean) peninsula." Hong said, "Considering the current situation on the Korean Peninsula, dialogue and negotiation are still the fundamental way to resolve the Korean nuclear issue." The comments came hours after South Korean President Park Geun-hye proposed that the five countries hold a meeting to press Pyongyang to abandon nuclear programs as she questioned the effectiveness of the six-nation nuclear talks. (Yonhap, "China Calls for Swift Restart of Nuclear Talks with North Korea," January 22, 2016)

South Korea's point man on inter-Korean affairs made it clear the government is not considering shutting down a joint industrial complex in North Korea or withdraw South Koreans from there despite the North's nuclear test. "The government is seeking to focus on how to operate the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the North in a stable manner," Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo said in a press briefing. "But as President Park Geun-hye earlier said, how the situation over the complex develops will depend on North Korea," Hong said, leaving the door open for further restrictive measures. A total of 124 South Korean firms operate at the factory zone, employing about 54,000 North Korean workers to produce labor-intensive products. (Yonhap, "S. Korea Not Considering Closure of Kaesong Complex," January 22, 2016)

Harsh human rights conditions in North Korea have barely changed and its leader, Kim Jong Un, should be held criminally responsible, the top U.N. envoy on North Korea said. Mazrui Darusman said in Tokyo that his repeated requests to visit North Korea during his six years as the U.N. special rapporteur have never been accepted. "In addition to continuing political pressure to exhort the DPRK to improve human rights, it is also now imperative to pursue criminal responsibility of the DPRK leadership," he said. He said various institutions, civil groups and governments, as well as the United Nations, are collecting information "to identify the perpetrators, and to trace all these actions (of abuse) to the highest leadership in the country." Judicial proceedings have not started and he declined to identify the perpetrators. "There is a need to build up a strong case so that accountability is not compromised," he said. "When the moment comes, the judicial processes are made possible." Darusman was in Japan to assess North Korean human rights developments. He talked with Japanese police and legal experts, as well as relatives of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea decades ago. North Korean Ambassador-at-large Ri Hung Sik said in November that he had met Darusman once, but "we don't see any benefits" in talking to him again because "he has been talking of regime change whenever he's abroad." (Associated Press, "Criminal Case Building against N. Korea's Kim, Says U.N. Human Rights Envoy," *Asahi Shimbun*, January 23, 2016)

1/24/16

Senior DoS Official: "Q: Sure. Hi, this is Carol Morello from the Washington Post. I think several of us want to know if the Secretary's going to be discussing the UVA student who

*was arrested there recently, and if you think you can make any progress on getting him freed.* **SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:** Well, the - first of all, the welfare of American citizens is an absolute top priority for Secretary Kerry, and the Secretary and the State Department team leave no stone unturned. The fact that American citizens are detained in North Korea is, of course, troubling. The principal vehicle for our efforts to ascertain the well-being of the American citizens and to secure their early release is through our protecting power, the Swedes, in Pyongyang. We also convey our concerns directly to the North Koreans. But certainly, we would relish help from all quarters. I think that the preeminent issue, of course, to discuss with the Chinese vis-a-vis the DPRK is the question of how China, in tandem with international partners and on a bilateral basis - or I should say perhaps a unilateral basis - can convince the DPRK to reverse course, to come on into compliance with its international obligations and its own commitments, and to be in the process of rolling back its nuclear and its missile program. The Secretary has made no secret either to the Chinese or to you, the media, of his conviction that there is much more that China can do by way of applying leverage, building on the discussions that Tony Blinken had. I know that he's going to be looking for practical and effective steps on the part of the Chinese. *Q: Hi, it's Elise Labott from CNN. Thanks for doing the call. Just to follow up on that, given you said - given Tony Blinken's meetings over there and the fact that you have had, as you say, very substantive discussions by this team, I'm wondering - the Secretary's going to be looking for practical ways. But what is your impression of what the Chinese are prepared to do? Do you have a sense that you're going into these meetings with a united front about how to tackle it, or do you still think that the Secretary is going to need to do some more convincing on China to put some serious pressure on North Korea?* **SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:** ...It's still early days in terms of the discussions and negotiations in New York among the Security Council members as to what the suite of sanctions and other measures in a UN Security Council resolution will look like, and I expect that set of negotiations to play out for a little longer. The Secretary and his Chinese counterparts will compare notes on where that stands and what we can do by the Security Council. But there is also the issue of what China on a unilateral basis, as North Korea's lifeline, as North Korea's patron, will choose to do, both to cut off avenues of proliferation and retard North Korea's ability to gain the wherewithal to advance its nuclear and its missile programs. But also, and perhaps most importantly, to send an unmistakable message to Kim Jong-un that his strategy is meeting with real resistance from China. In the past, the Chinese have often quietly found ways to send a message that a North Korean leader simply couldn't afford to overlook. The fact that despite China's friendly overtures to the DPRK, Kim Jong-un turned around and did the thing that he knew the Chinese most objected to - a nuclear test - certainly tells me that that message hasn't yet gotten through. **Now, it is very important to present a united front to the DPRK, but that united front has to be a firm one, not a flaccid one. Now, the Secretary, of course, based on his consultations with his Japanese and Korean foreign minister counterparts, based on the conversations that President Obama has had with Prime Minister Abe and President Park, and very importantly, the in-depth, substantive discussions that Deputy Secretary Blinken led with his Japanese and Korean counterparts in the trilateral consultations that**

he held a week ago in Tokyo. We come into the conversation with the Chinese with a united front from that perspective. We want the Chinese to line up with Seoul, with Washington, with Tokyo in convincing the DPRK that there is a peaceful way forward which comes with compliance with the - to the international Security Council resolutions, but that continuing down the road of provocations is a dead-end street. ... Q: Hi [Senior State Department Official], this is David Brunnstrom from Reuters. I wanted - I could just ask you to expand a bit on when you talked about the need to cut off avenues of proliferation. Do you think that those avenues are still open via China? And on Laos and Cambodia, how concerned are you about ASEAN unity on the South China Sea? And is there any concern that the Lao presidency could be as problematic on that issue as the Cambodian one was? **SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, on the first point, I take the Chinese at their word in - when they say that they are doing a great deal to prevent illegal activities and proliferation from the DPRK via Chinese soil, Chinese ports, Chinese banks, and Chinese companies. Nevertheless, North Korea is still engaged in illicit and proliferation activities. They have very few avenues for conducting business with the international community that don't in some fashion involve transiting China. And so despite the determination and efforts of the Chinese Government, clearly there is more that they can do. And I certainly hope that in the aftermath of this latest nuclear test that the Chinese are examining those conduits and avenues and looking for ways to intercept and restrict North Korean proliferation activities. ...**

Q: Oh. Hi, it's Felicia Schwartz from The Wall Street Journal. Thanks for doing this. I had a quick question. I might have misheard you, but just going back to the student - the UVA student, you said - did you say that you raised his case directly with the North Koreans or the Chinese did or the Swedes? **OFFICIAL: Well, what I said is the primary vehicle for us to engage the DPRK on the topic of any American citizen's welfare is through the Swedes, who maintain an embassy in Pyongyang and who are our protecting power. But I'm not going to get into the specifics of any particular American citizen case. The U.S. does also have the ability to communicate directly with the North Koreans, and typically, we do so in an effort to ensure that our citizens are being well treated and to encourage their prompt release. ...**

Q: Hi, it's Elise. I was just wondering, when you talk about all the things you and China are going to talk about on North Korea, I mean, that's - a lot of that seems like kind of more punitive and pressure, but the Chinese have always maintained that the North Koreans are looking for you to get back to the table. And I'm just wondering, is there any thought to some kind of new approach at North Korea that you'll be discussing in China in terms of trying to get talks together - the Six-Party Talks or whatever you want to call them? **SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, what we're looking for is negotiations under the Six-Party framework and based on the Six-Party joint statement of 2005. That's what we've been pursuing consistently through the entire Obama Administration. The - it's the North Koreans who have walked away, it's the North Koreans who have shut the door, and it's the North Koreans who keep saying no to proposals from all quarters that we negotiate, as they committed to, to eliminate their nuclear missile program. Because that's what opens the door to our ability to work with them to normalize relations, to provide economic assistance, to replace the armistice with a successor peace arrangement. We've - we had the negotiations to**

**reach an agreement on how to proceed, and the North Koreans have walked away from it. We want them to walk back, and it's both pressure and incontrovertible evidence that the international community isn't going to change its mind and decide that we're good with a nuclear North Korea. That's not going to happen and the Chinese don't want it either.** Now, we don't think that talking about other topics is a soporific that pacifies North Korea and keeps them calm. We believe that unless and until we're dealing directly with the problem itself - North Korea's illegal pursuit of nuclear-armed missiles - that we're not making headway. **We want to make headway. We want to make headway through negotiations. And the sooner that North Korea's disabused of the view that it can change the subject and get away with sustaining a nuclear program, the sooner and the safer Northeast Asia will be.** (Senior State Department Official, Special Briefing via Teleconference, Preview of Secretary Kerry's Travel to Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and Beijing, January 24, 2016)

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1/25/16 Defense Minister Han Min-koo said South Korea needs to consider the deployment of the U.S. advanced defense system THAAD, reflecting growing security threats from North Korea's emerging nuclear and missile capabilities. "Speaking from the military's perspective, there's enough need to review it because our (defense) capabilities are limited," the defense minister said during his appearance in a news program by MBC. "The issue of THAAD should be considered from the defense and security standpoints," Han noted. (Yonhap, "Defense Minister Says THAAD Deployment Needs Consideration," January 25, 2016)

1/26/16 DPRK Institute for Disarmament and Peace: "...In his New Year Address this year, His Excellency Mr. Kim Jong Un, has put forward the idea of independence in inter-Korean relations and the reunification issues in line with the nation's desire and demand; the idea of safeguarding peace and security by eliminating the dangers of war on the Korean Peninsula; and the idea of adding value to the north-south joint declarations and implementing them. ... Inter-Korean relations and the reunification issues should, by all means, be resolved by efforts of the Korean nation itself in accordance with the independent will and demand of the nation true to the principles of By Our Nation Itself. This is the core idea of independent reunification clarified by His Excellency Mr. Kim Jong Un in his 2016 New Year Address. On the contrary, the current south Korean authorities are pursuing "system unification" which is, in essence, an idea to cooperate with foreign forces to eliminate the north's system and to impose its own ideology and system on the north. German-style reunification mode is what the current south Korean authorities are most fascinated by and trying to copy. The capitalist West Germany had degenerated the former socialist East Germany and enforced its idea and system over the latter. Likewise, the south Korean authorities aim to change the color of the DPRK by luring it to "reform" and "opening" and ultimately conquering the latter. In September 2014, the south Korean authorities, together with Germany, established a governmental consultative body and are engaged in a full-scale study on the experiences of German reunification. Given the fact that no one would be willing to surrender or compromise its own system, "system unification" will only invite distrust and confrontation between the north and the south. South Korea's "system unification" ultimately aims at creating a pro-U.S. "unified state" that submits to the U.S. strategy for

domination over northeast Asia by extending influence of the U.S. onto the whole Korean peninsula. Such "system unification" presupposes the permanent stationing of the U.S. troops, the very culprit of national division, on the Korean Peninsula and provision of its nuclear umbrella. Recently, there have been assertions by the U.S. conservative security experts that a reunified Korean Peninsula should continue to be under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and contain the surrounding countries with dependence on the U.S. These assertions prove that this topic is under discussion between the U.S. and south Korea. The south Korean authorities are trying to compromise the strategic interests of the U.S. and the regional countries by "promising the moon" that the U.S. forces would not move forward above the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel even after "unification" backed by the U.S. with its nuclear umbrella as the main pillar. In this way, the south is sticking to the "unification diplomacy" to obtain support for the south-led "unification." However, the U.S., the master of south Korea, is seeking to bind south Korea to U.S.-Japan-south Korea trilateral military alliance and based on this, stifle the DPRK and further contain the surrounding countries who are its strategic rivals. All in all, unification pursued by both the U.S. and south Korea is aimed at stretching the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. over the whole Korean Peninsula and realizing U.S. dominance over the northeast Asia. In respect of the security balance in the northeast Asia, this will remove the buffer zone that prevents a physical collision between the U.S. and the regional countries and eventually turn the Korean Peninsula into a direct nuclear frontline of the big powers. The U.S. deceived the world when it had promised that the NATO would not be expanded further east if the former Soviet Union supported German reunification. The strategic deception is being replayed by the U.S. in the northeast Asia. It is natural that the regional countries are vigilant about the "unification diplomacy" of south Korea for its instrumental role of the U.S. strategy. The DPRK's idea of independent reunification is to establish a just reunified state that checks the U.S. aggressive strategy to dominate Asia and that ensures the strategic interests of the regional countries in a balanced way with its self-defensive nuclear deterrent. The self-defensive nuclear deterrent of the DPRK serves as a solid guarantee for ensuring security balance in the region. It frustrates south Korea's wild attempt for "system unification" backed by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and thus assures peaceful reunification of the peninsula based on the co-existence of the two systems. The fundamental condition for Korean reunification is to prevent danger of war and ensure peace and security on the peninsula. Today, the Korean Peninsula is under the situation of neither war nor peace. It is now at the crossroad of life or death which leads either to durable and lasting peace through peace treaty or to crucial war. It is self-evident that reunification cannot be achieved under the existing armistice. The formula of reunification will decide war or peace on the Korean Peninsula. If the formula of reunification is set for a peaceful reunification based on co-existence of two systems in the north and the south, peace treaty is the answer. However, if the formula of reunification is set for "system unification" by one side, it comes to a conclusion that a war is inevitable. The DPRK's reunification proposal is to eliminate the danger of war and safeguard peace and security on the Korean Peninsula by concluding a peace treaty so as to achieve peaceful reunification. ... **The DPRK, which was non-nuclear state in 1970s, has today risen up to a dignified nuclear state. This brought a change in the position of the parties concerned in the peace treaty from a non-nuclear state versus a nuclear state to a nuclear state versus a nuclear state.** What

remains unchanged is the invariable stand of the DPRK to terminate the armistice and ensure an environment essential for peaceful reunification of Korea. To create a favorable environment and conditions for a peace treaty, in January 2015 the DPRK proposed a moratorium on nuclear testing in return for the U.S. suspension of joint military exercises. Later in August last year, still for the favorable environment for independent reunification, the DPRK straightened out the dangerous touch-and-go situation and proposed, once again, the conclusion of peace treaty. However, the U.S. responded to these proposals with enforcement of joint military exercises and commitment of aircraft carrier flotilla into the waters of the Korean peninsula. At the same time, the south Korean authorities are trying to secure its military predominance over the DPRK backed by the U.S. military and thus pursue the south-led "unification." Recently the south Korean authorities and the U.S. have endorsed the 4D operation plan for preemptive strike against the DPRK and attempt to translate it into action from coming February. The DPRK was left with no other choice but to strengthen its nuclear deterrent both in quality and quantity to cope with the U.S.'s ever-growing hostile maneuvers towards the DPRK. The DPRK succeeded in the test of its first hydrogen bomb early this year. ... It is the consistent stand of the DPRK that the south is its main counterpart for national reunification. The DPRK holds that reunification should be promoted by respecting the different ideologies and systems existing in the north and the south based on the principle of co-existence and co-prosperity. Nevertheless, the south Korean authorities, instead of seeking mutually-agreeable formula of reunification, totally deny the past historical inter-Korean agreements and tour foreign countries to solicit their support for the reunification issue, the internal affairs of the Korean nation. This is a dangerous war-inviting act that attempts to extend their system over the other side while designating the main counterpart for reunification as an enemy. It has been over 70 years since the Korean Peninsula was liberated from the Japanese colonial rule. Yet, south Korea remains under the control of U.S. military forces, which restricts them from any right to command its own military forces and to make decisions between war and peace. On the contrary, **the DPRK has risen up to a politico-ideological power and a nuclear power with defensive H-bomb and is capable of producing and launching satellites on its own. The DPRK is fully exercising its sovereignty with no worries to read others' expression.** Still, the DPRK has no intention and has never intended to force its system on the south at all. ... It is the very intention of the DPRK to accelerate national reunification in conformity with the three principles for national reunification which were agreed upon by the north and the south at the very beginning of inter-Korean reunification dialogues and the historical June 15 and October 4 declarations agreed upon at the summit level. The agreement and declarations have enjoyed unanimous appraisal and welcome from the international community including the UN as well as the entire Korean nation. Therefore, respecting the joint agreements and realizing reunification based on them is the very convincing and proper reunification formula that can be accepted by both sides and welcomed by the world. The main actors for national reunification are the north and the south. They are the ones that have the most direct interests in reunification and the ones that have the right to decide the mode of reunification. The south Korean authorities, ignoring the clear-cut fact, are trying to implicate foreign forces in the reunification process, the nation's internal issue. This is nothing but a disgraceful betrayal of the nation and the country that fans inter-Korean distrust and

confrontation. ... Today, with regards to Korean reunification issue, **the surrounding countries maintain clear position that they support independent reunification of Korea and the formula of reunification agreed upon by both the north and the south. Those countries maintain such position since Korean reunification based on mutual agreements ensures solid guarantee for peaceful cooperation in the region while not disrupting the status quo on the Korean peninsula and thus fully meets the strategic interests of the surrounding countries.** The surrounding countries are kindly advised to know what roles they should play for Korean reunification and regional peace." (Choe Un Ju, "The Fundamental Principles of Korean Reunification," DPRK Institute of Disarmament and Peace," January 26, 2016)

1/27/16

Secretary of State John Kerry warned China that North Korea was moving ahead with an effort to manufacture a nuclear weapon small enough to fit atop a long-range missile that could reach American shores, and said the United States "will do what is necessary to protect the people of our country." Kerry's statement came during a one-day stop in Beijing to see the country's leadership, during which he warned that if China failed to do more to curb North Korea's enhanced nuclear capacity, Washington would take steps that Chinese leaders have strongly opposed, including deploying defense systems to protect American allies in Asia. "This is a threat the United States must take extremely seriously," Kerry said of North Korea's growing nuclear arsenal and its missile capability at a news conference with the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi. "The United States will take all necessary steps to protect our people and allies. We don't want to heighten security tensions. But we won't walk away from any options." The United States has been concerned for half a decade about when North Korea will succeed in the difficult task of mating a nuclear weapon to an accurate missile – and it has already taken the North more time than American intelligence agencies once estimated. Almost exactly five years ago this month, Robert M. Gates, then the secretary of defense, on a similar trip to Beijing, warned his Chinese counterparts that he believed the North was within five years of reaching that milestone. To date they have not – it is unclear whether the North Koreans have designed a warhead small enough to fit atop the missile and able to withstand the stresses of atmospheric re-entry – and this week American officials would not say how far they believe the North is from that goal. In interviews, American officials say Kerry made the case that the nuclear and missile threat was "a direct threat to the U.S.," a way of explaining to the Chinese why North Korea's fourth nuclear test cannot be shrugged off as merely symbolic. Yet the Chinese have been resisting broad new sanctions against Pyongyang, just as they stripped such sanctions out of a United Nations resolution in 2013, after the North's last nuclear test. Instead, the officials say, Beijing is pressing for targeted sanctions against individuals in the North Korean nuclear complex, which are unlikely to have serious repercussions. Kerry adopted the tough tone after nearly five hours of talks with Wang that were dominated by North Korea and what the United States and China, a treaty ally of the North, should do in the aftermath of the latest nuclear test. Kerry was referring to the deployment of a missile defense system to South Korea that has been under discussion for some time but that the South, an American ally, has resisted because of China's opposition. The system is called Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD; China views it as a threat to its own capabilities in the Pacific. But after the North Korean test, the South's president, Park

Geun-hye, said she would consider accepting the missile system, as the United States has long insisted. China agreed during the talks on Wednesday to approve some form of new United Nations sanctions against the North, but one American official said "that's different from sanctions that hurt." A draft of new sanctions was sent to China about 10 days ago, but by the time Kerry arrived in Beijing, China had not responded in substance, American officials said. Negotiations on their content will proceed in the coming days, Wang said. But these new sanctions "must not provoke new tensions," he added. Suggesting that the Obama administration was evincing a little too much concern about the North Korean nuclear test, and that Washington's attention would soon drift away, Wang said China "will not be swayed by specific events or the temporary mood of the moment." Wang stuck to a basic theme, that China's preference is the reconvening of talks on North Korea. "Sanctions are not an end in themselves," he said. Kerry, however, made clear that Washington's position was that China, North Korea's biggest trading partner, needed to use its leverage and what he called its "connections" with the country to pressure it to give up its nuclear arsenal. The Americans would like China to curb exports of oil, including aviation fuel, that help keep the bare-bones North Korean economy afloat. It has also asked China to crack down on its banks and businesses that give the North access to foreign exchange. A bill calling for sanctions against Chinese entities that help North Korea in its military programs, criminal activities and money laundering recently passed with strong support in the House of Representatives. As part of his attempt to persuade Beijing, Kerry used the example of the recent Iran deal: The restrictions on Iran's banks and financial institutions to conduct transactions abroad helped bring that country to the negotiating table over its nuclear program, a feat that Kerry led and that China supported, along with Russia. Kerry used the news conference to urge China to take similar actions against North Korea and to create another "united front." "With all due respect, more significant and impactful sanctions were put against Iran, which did not have nuclear weapons, than against North Korea, which does," Kerry said. The secretary faces a tough sell. President Xi Jinping of China made a decision last year that it was better for China to have a friendly, nuclear-armed North Korea on its border than a hostile, nuclear-armed North Korea, Chinese analysts have said. "For China, the worst-case scenario is you push North Korea over to become an enemy with nuclear weapons," said Zhang Baohui, director of the Center for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. "I think China has decided to tolerate North Korea as a nuclear state." Xi sent a top lieutenant, Liu Yunshan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, to Pyongyang in October to attend a military parade and to deliver a letter from Xi to the North's leader, Kim Jong-un. Nevertheless, Zhang said, China has urged North Korea to denuclearize. And the North's detonation of a nuclear device was a way of telling Beijing that it could not dictate the country's foreign policy, he said. Chinese officials have told their American counterparts that they were not informed of the timing of the test and that it came as a surprise. China has accused Washington of using the tests as an excuse to deploy the missile defense system in South Korea. "The THAAD has nothing to do with North Korea," said Wang Junsheng, a research fellow on Northeast Asia at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "It is simply the U.S. technically trying to deter China and Russia with these missiles and strategically alienating South Korea from China." Hours after Kerry and Wang met, South Korea warned that North Korea might be preparing to launch a long-range



rocket. On January 28, Kim Min-seok, a spokesman for the South Korean Defense Ministry, declined to comment on a Japanese news agency report about possible preparations, but did note that North Korea had always tested a long-range rocket before each of its first three nuclear tests. There was no launch before the January 6 test, "so we worry that it may do" so now, Kim said. (Jane Perlez and David E. Sanger, "Kerry Urges Chinese to Curb North Korea's Expanding Nuclear Pursuits," *New York Times*, January 28, 2016, p. A-12)

**WANG:** (Via interpreter) ...Secretary Kerry and I have also had a very in-depth and comprehensive exchange of views on the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. China is a large country and our position on this issue is transparent and above board. It's also firm and consistent. Our position will not be swayed by specific events or the temporary mood of the moment. **China's basic position on this issue can be summarized as three commitments: We are committed to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We are committed to upholding peace and stability on the peninsula. We are committed to resolving the issues with full dialogue and consultation. These three points are tied to each other and we cannot do without any one of them. The goal is to have peace and stability on the peninsula, and to do that, we must press ahead with denuclearization. Otherwise, there can be no tranquility on the peninsula or in our region. And to achieve denuclearization, one has to take the path of negotiation and consultation. Sanctions are not an end in themselves. The key is to really resolve the issue.** For many years, China has been working very hard to implement these three commitments. We've fulfilled our responsibility and we've delivered on our obligation. **Recently, the DPRK has conducted another nuclear test in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and that nuclear test disrupted the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. So of course, China made clear its opposition, and we also agree that the Security Council need to take further action and pass a new resolution. On the basis of necessary preparations, China will act in a responsible manner, and to have comprehensive and in-depth deliberations with the United States and other parties on this. In the meantime, we must point out that the new resolution should not provoke new tension in the situation, (inaudible) destabilize the Korean Peninsula. Rather, the goal is to take the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula back to the right track of negotiation. I've had very forward, in-depth, and productive discussions with Secretary Kerry on this issue, which helped us to deepen mutual understanding and expand on our consensus. I want to point out that China and the United States share the same overall goal on this issue, and so far, the two sides have conducted continuous coordination and cooperation, and we are prepared to continue to work in that direction. China's position on this issue is clear-cut, consistent, responsible and sensible, and we reject all groundless speculation or distortion of China's position.** Before I conclude, I wish to say that it serves the fundamental interests of our two nations and it's a general expectation of the international community to have sustained, healthy, and stable development of China-U.S. relations. China is prepared to work with the United States to earnestly implement the important understandings reached between our presidents, and to have more communication, mutual trust and cooperation, and to make even greater progress in our bilateral relationship in the year ahead. Thank

you. **KERRY:** Let me just say with respect to one of the issues that the foreign minister raised on Taiwan, that since they've just had an election and a new party has won, the United States does reaffirm the three communiqués which have been the basis of our policy. We remain committed to a one-China policy. But we encourage cross-straits dialogue for resolution of that issue. **But the issue that topped our agenda today and on which we've spent most of the time that kept you waiting is the issue of North Korea. So let me be clear: Kim Jong-un's actions are reckless and they are dangerous. Whether or not he achieved the explosion of the hydrogen weapon is not what makes the difference. It's that he is trying, that he wants to do that, and made the attempt against all of the international sanctions and resolutions that have been passed by the global community to prohibit that behavior. As a result, North Korea poses an overt threat - a declared threat - to the world and it has stated its intention to develop a thermonuclear weapon. In addition, it has made clear its intent to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile with the capacity to carry a nuclear warhead to other places in the world. This is a threat to any nation in the world, but particularly, we in the United States understand what his purpose is, and therefore, it is a threat that the United States must take extremely seriously. And the United States will do what is necessary to protect the people of our country and our friends and allies in the world. All nations, particularly those who seek a global leadership role or who have a global leadership role, share a fundamental responsibility to meet this challenge with a united front.** We were united as a world in making it clear to the nation of Iran that it should not develop a nuclear weapon, and indeed, we all joined together and worked cooperatively in the effort to make certain that we could get to the table and have negotiations. With all due respect, more significant and impactful sanctions were put in place against Iran, which did not have a nuclear weapon, than against North Korea, which does. And with Iran, we implemented an agreement in the end with the great cooperation of China, with China's help, with Russia, Britain, France, Germany - all came together in order to assert a critical principle and enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions. **Now, the United States and China, along with countries and organizations across the international community, appropriately, quickly, and strongly condemned North Korea's nuclear test. This test was a blatant violation of the UN Security Council resolution, and as permanent members of the Security Council, our two countries and other countries are obligated to take action. So it is vital for us - and we talked about this today and agreed - that we need to reach consensus on a strong UN Security Council resolution. But we have yet to fill out the parameters of exactly what it will do or say. But one of the things that we emphasized today is that there has been a lot of talk about North Korea through these past years. Now is the time, we believe, for action that can bring North Korea back to the table. I agree with my fellow minister. There is a goal in sanctions. It's to get to the negotiations. And we must make it clear that is our objective - to negotiate the end to the nuclear program.** Let me emphasize the United States and China are united in our opposition to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and we agree - both of us - on the imperative of achieving a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. And you heard Foreign Minister Wang reiterate that on behalf of China a moment ago. It's good to agree on the goal, but it's not enough to agree on the goal. **We believe we need to agree on the meaningful**

**steps necessary to get to the achievement of the goal - to the negotiations that result in denuclearization. And we look forward to working with China, which China agreed today to do, to engage in an accelerated effort at the United Nations, instructing both of our representatives to work together to try to achieve an understanding about the strong resolution that introduces significant new measures to curtail North Korea's ability to advance its prescribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs.** The last resolution that we passed was in the year 2013 - I believe the date is 22 January - and in that resolution, paragraph 19, the last paragraph before the decisions of the UN, stated that in highlighted language, we expressed our determination to take significant action in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test. And that is what we are seeking in the UN - is the appropriate, significant action that we could agree on that will bring us to negotiations. **As I have said publicly before - it's not a secret - the United States believes very strongly that China has a particular ability because of its special role and its connections to North Korea, an ability to be able to help us significantly to resolve this challenge. And for our part, the United States will take all necessary steps to defend American people and to honor our security commitments to allies in the region. I say that making clear that we don't want to raise military tensions, we're not seeking additional steps other than the Security Council resolution, the negotiations - but we will not walk away from any options that may be necessary to achieve the goal. It is the policy of this Administration since it came into office, it has been the policy of the United States for always, that we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, and we glad that China agrees with us and we are united in that conclusion. Now, both the foreign minister and I agree that there has to be another side to the stick, if you want to call it that. There has to be another side to the sanctions, and there is, and we are prepared to restate it publicly as we have said previously: If Pyongyang will instead choose a different path, it could open the door to sanctions relief, economic cooperation, energy and food aid, more direct humanitarian assistance, and a whole range of other possibilities. ...** So here's the bottom line on today: We worked hard to understand each other's approach and the best ways of trying to resolve the challenge of North Korea. We agreed on the importance of a strong UN Security Council resolution, and we agreed to accelerate our work at the UN immediately in order to try to reach an understanding of what should be in it and how we achieve our goal. And what should guide all of us as we leave here is that China and the United States have surprised people in the last few years. We've proved through our work on climate change, our work on Iran, and other things that when we put our minds together, we have the ability to get things done. We approached the talks today with that spirit in mind, and we are leaving here committed to try to find progress on these difficult issues. I have no doubt that our differences will continue to test us, but they should not prevent us from cooperating in other arenas, as we have in the past. For the world to do better to find prosperity and security, the United States and China need to be able to work together. That is what this moment demands and that will be our responsibility in the years and months to come....**Q:** Thank you. Secretary Kerry, what measures specifically are you looking for the Chinese to take? And are you satisfied with the answers from the foreign minister about what China would do? Is the U.S. prepared to impose secondary sanctions and increase its defenses in the region? ... **KERRY:** So I don't want

to go into all of the specific options because I want to leave us the space to be able to negotiate going forward, and I think that that's important. **But let me just, in general, in sort of generic sectors - there are certain goods and services that flow between Korea, North Korea/DPRK and China; there are movements of ships, ports, so forth; aviation is an area and a sector of concern; various resource exchanges, whether it's coal or fuel - all of these are areas where there are border customs, different things. There are many different ways we think in which non-punitive to the people of North Korea but nevertheless effective steps can be taken.** In fairness, this is what we're going to talk about. We're going to negotiate, we're going to talk in the next days in an accelerated basis, and I don't want to get excessively specific about one thing versus another, because I think it's important for us to have the space to be able to have that discussion, and we will. So we'll see where we are. I think that what was important today is I heard from the foreign minister a commitment clearly to passing a resolution and make it strong, and adhere to the last resolution. And we now need to fill that out, and I think that's what's important." (Secretary of State John Kerry, Press Availability with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, January 27, 2017)

Senators are rallying around a bipartisan bill to strengthen sanctions against North Korea in a sign that lawmakers want to give the Obama administration less discretion over how it seeks to pressure Pyongyang following the regime's recent announcement that it tested a hydrogen bomb. Some senators are concerned the current slate of sanctions needs to be enhanced – and that the Obama administration is not using existing authority aggressively enough to crack down on North Korea and those who do business with the country. "The legislative branch wanted to make sure that what it's passing into law is going to force action," Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) said after his panel approved the bill on Thursday. "When you have discretionary sanctions and you've got blanket waivers, it's easy for an administration, Republican or Democrat, to waive those, and I think in this particular case, people felt strongly about that and wanted to make sure that [the sanctions] happened." The bill goes a step further than legislation the House passed earlier this month, which would require the president to impose sanctions on money launderers, weapons and luxury goods traders, and human rights abusers, but would leave it up to the administration to decide whether to impose sanctions for other financial transactions. The Senate legislation would make sanctions for such prohibited financial transactions mandatory, allowing the president to waive them only on a case-by-case basis when it is in the national security or law enforcement interests of the United States. This marks a departure from the traditional way sanctions laws are structured. The president would still retain discretionary authority on whether to sanction those facilitating the transfer of the North Korean regime's financial assets. "This is a much more rigid regime on sanctions than we usually impose," said Sen. Cory Gardner (R-Colo.), one of two senators who drafted the Senate bill, arguing that the administration's habit of "from time to time, add[ing] an additional entity" to the sanctions list "clearly isn't working, otherwise we'd have effective change on the peninsula." The push for taking a tougher stand with North Korea comes in the wake of a particularly tense period between lawmakers and the administration concerning sanctions against Iran. Lawmakers in both parties shared frustrations that the Obama

administration was not moving quickly enough to punish Iran for conducting ballistic missile tests in advance of the implementation of the nuclear pact with Tehran. Many of those lawmakers are now preparing new, non-nuclear sanctions proposals against Iran that will be unveiled in the weeks ahead. Gardner and Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) both wrote North Korea sanctions bills last year and have been working for the last two weeks to combine their efforts into a single proffer – a deal they struck today. In terms of the mandatory sanctions the administration would be forced to impose, the compromise product reflects the nature of Gardner’s bill more, but is slightly more stringent than either senator’s initial draft. Menendez said he was comfortable to “provide certain areas greater absolutism” to make sure “there are sanctions that will be enforced, versus at the end of the day having a lot of discretion that never gets implemented.” “The flexibility exists” through the waivers, Menendez added, arguing the case-by-case authority should placate any fears from the administration or South Korea that the Senate bill is too stiff. He also stressed that the Senate’s bill goes further than the House measure to ensure adequate exceptions for humanitarian aid for the North Korean people. That combination appears to have satisfied Menendez’s fellow Democrats as well. “In North Korea we’re not only going to speak as a united voice, we’re going to bring the House and the Senate together,” said committee ranking member Ben Cardin (D-Md.). Such support, he added, would “make it clear we won’t tolerate the type of activities that are taking place in North Korea.” Cardin called the bill a “corrective action” against the erosion of harsh measures against North Korea that many lawmakers believe was eased in error. A decade ago, harsh financial sanctions that crippled a key institution that handled transactions for the regime helped drive North Korea to the negotiating table over its nuclear program. But some of those measures were ratcheted back during the negotiations, which were ultimately unsuccessful. Since then, the Treasury Department has issued some new sanctions – but the Senate bill would intensify those efforts. Corker said that swift passage of the bill would not preclude working through the United Nations Security Council to take additional measures against North Korea. This week, China, widely accepted as North Korea’s most vital sponsor nation, agreed to work with the United States on a U.N. resolution denouncing Pyongyang’s latest nuclear test, but the two countries are still bitterly divided over what kind of additional punitive measures should be pursued. The Senate’s bill will come to a floor vote the week after next, Corker said, and it is expected to pass. It’s unclear whether the House will accept the Senate’s proposal, but House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce (R-Calif.) praised the committee for moving legislation, and supports the changes that were made. “Now is not the time to stand by while this regime works to build an arsenal capable of hitting the United States,” he said in a statement. (Karun Emirian, “Senate’s North Korea Bill Would Force Administration’s Hand on Sanctions,” *Washington Post*, January 28, 2016)

1/28/16

North Korea may be preparing to launch a long-range missile as soon as within a week, Kyodo reported, citing an unnamed Japanese government official. The official cited signs of possible preparations for a missile launch, based on satellite imagery of the North's Tongchang-ri missile test site on its west coast. Yonhap cited a government source as saying there had been steady activity at the missile base, with screens set up at key areas, probably to deter spy satellite surveillance. Much of the site's operation is automated and rails are set up to move rocket components quickly for final assembly

and launch, Yonhap quoted the source as saying. (Jun-min Park and Jack Kim, "North Korea May Be Readying Long-Range Missile Launch Soon: Kyodo," Reuters, January 27, 2016) North Korea may test a long-range ballistic missile soon amid increased activity at its northwestern launch site, sources and military officials said. Their analysis came after Kyodo reported that Pyongyang may be preparing for a missile launch in a week or so, citing an unnamed government source. "We have detected increased movement of equipment and personnel at the Tongchang-ri launch site," an intelligence source said. "We estimate that the North can carry out a missile launch without a notice at any time after it extended its missile launch pad at the facility." Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok also said the North had always fired a long-range missile ahead of a nuclear test in the past, but it did not do it before the January 6 nuclear test. The military was therefore concerned that the North would launch a missile afterwards. According to intelligence authorities, late last year, the North successfully finished upgrading the Sohae Satellite Launching Station at Tongchang-ri, raising the height of the gantry tower on the launch pad to accommodate a wider range of missiles. Experts estimate the upgrade could theoretically enable the North to launch a missile that could travel 13,000 kilometers, enough to strike the U.S. mainland. The North also has laid railroad lines from an assembly building to the launch pad as part of efforts to modernize the facility, and placed a cover over the pad last year to evade surveillance from spy satellites. However, the spokesman said the North had yet to declare a no-sail zone, a notification necessary before a long-range missile launch that affects other parts of the world. "A no-sail zone is required internationally because North Korea's past long-range missiles or rockets flew to the east coast of the Philippines," Kim said. "But I have not heard anything so far on that." Kim also said, "The South Korean government's stance on the issue is that the North must not carry out such a provocation that violates United Nations Security Council resolutions." (Kang Seung-woo, "N.K. May Fire Long-Range Missile Soon," *Korea Times*, January 28, 2016) The United States has seen increased activity around a North Korean missile site, suggesting preparations for a possible space launch in the near future, U.S. officials told Reuters. (Phil Stewart and Andrea Shalal, "North Korea Activity Points to Possible Space Launch," Reuters, January 29, 2016) "It appears that the North is almost ready to launch long-range rockets," a high-ranking South Korean government official said "I heard from an inside man in North Korea that the North dropped the plan to launch long-range rockets in October last year, around the foundation day of the Workers' Party, and it was not because of China, but because of a technical glitch," said a source. (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "Kim Jong-un Aims to Fire up Missiles before Party Congress," January 29, 2016)

South Korea, the U.S. and Japan have fully mobilized their surveillance assets as the countries are bracing for North Korea's possible launch of a long-range missile in the near future. "The South Korean military has deployed its Aegis destroyer in the Yellow Sea and given a mission to the early warning and control aircraft 'Peace Eye,'" a government official said. On the ground, the anti-ballistic radar 'Green Pine' has also started its surveillance operations, the official said. The Aegis combat system-equipped destroyer is one of the forward deployed surveillance assets of South Korea, with its capability to detect a ballistic missile coming from outside a 1,000-kilometer radius. Within a 500-km radius, the warship's radar could detect and track up to 1,000

targets simultaneously. It took only 54 seconds for the South Korean Aegis vessel to detect the launch after the North lifted off a long-range missile in December 2012, the latest of Pyongyang's five long-range missile tests. These are in addition to the U.S.' reconnaissance satellites that keeps watch on North Korea's missile launch sites as well as sea-based radar surveillance assets. From the side of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan, reconnaissance aircraft called Cobra Ball (RC-135S) is likely to be deployed for the increased surveillance efforts. Japan has also reportedly set sail one of its Aegis destroyers, JDS Kirishima, which is equipped with SM-3 anti-aircraft interceptor missiles. (Yonhap, "Surveillance in Full Swing on Prospect of North's Missile Launch," *Korea Herald*, January 29, 2016) Defense Minister Nakatani Gen has ordered Aegis destroyers that operate in the Sea of Japan to be ready to target any North Korean projectiles heading for Japan. A Defense Ministry spokesman declined to say whether PAC-3 batteries and the Aegis destroyers had been deployed to respond to any threat from North Korea. Nakatani, asked in a press briefing whether Japan would shoot down any North Korean missile, said: "We will take steps to respond, but I will refrain from revealing specific measures given the nature of the situation." Japan also has Patriot PAC-3 missile batteries around Tokyo and other sites to provide a last line of defense as warheads near the ground. Rather than a direct attack, however, Japan is more concerned that debris from a missile test could fall on its territory. (Reuters, "Japan Puts SADF on Alert for Possible North Korean Missile Test," *Asahi Shimbun*, January 29, 2016)

*Rodong Sinmun*: "The Austrian newspaper *Kronen—Zeitung*, Reuters, AFP and other media criticized the U.S. for reneging on its commitment to building the "world without nuclear weapons." ...Such criticism is quite justifiable in view of the present grave situation. ... In order to denuclearize the world, it is, first of all, necessary for the U.S. to abandon huge nuclear weapons it stockpiled in its mainland and other places around the world. Building the "world without nuclear weapons" is unthinkable without the denuclearization of the U.S. The U.S. is mulling realizing its wild ambition to dominate the world through an unchallenged nuclear edge after appeasing and deceiving several nuclear weapons states into disarming themselves. Today the Korean Peninsula is a hotspot in the world. The U.S. nuclear war maniacs who designated the DPRK as a target of their preemptive nuclear strike are threatening they would attack it without an advance notice. It is needless to say that the U.S. is the arch criminal of the nuclear threat and the chieftain of arms race harassing peace and security in the Korean Peninsula and the rest of the world. The U.S., the world's worst nuclear criminal, should not make a mockery of humankind with lies and deception. As long as the U.S. blinded by the preponderance of nuclear weapons exists, the denuclearization of the world can never be realized. Obama should abandon his Nobel Peace Prize though belatedly as he was awarded it for his whopping lies." (KCNA, "Denuclearization of the World Depends on U.S. Abandonment of Its Nuclear Weapons: *Rodong Sinmun*," January 28, 2016)

Recent commercial satellite imagery shows a range of low-level activities at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (also referred to as "Tongchang-ri")—at the launch pad, covered railway station, VIP housing area, launch control bunker and National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) buildings and helipad—that indicate

Pyongyang is in the early stages of preparation for launching a space launch vehicle (SLV). If that is the case, a rocket test in the coming week is unlikely. However, it is important to note that there is a high level of uncertainty about this judgment for a number of reasons and Pyongyang may be further along in its preparations. First, the gantry tower work platforms are covered by an environmental cover and are folded forward, obscuring any view of whether a SLV is inside or not. Second, the movable transfer structure could easily allow for stages to be assembled and transferred to the gantry tower during periods of darkness or heavy cloud cover. Moreover, since the entire launch pad area is now clear of snow, any movement by the structure cannot be determined. Third, commercial satellite imagery coverage of the test site is not continuous and therefore observers only have snapshots of activity at the launch pad. If North Korea follows previous pre-launch preparation practices, we would expect to see in the coming days increased site-wide activity, traffic at the fuel/oxidizer storage bunkers, activity at the launch pad and the presence of tracking equipment. Activity at Sohae also suggests a possible rocket engine test is under preparation at the vertical engine test stand. A recently completed large rail-mounted environmental structure large enough to shelter the first stage of rockets, such as the Unha space launch vehicle or the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile or a new engine of similar size, has been moved up to the test stand. While this may simply be testing the ability of the shelter to move it on the rails, a more likely alternative is that an engine test is being prepared. (Jack Liu, "Suspicious Activity at North Korea's Sohae Satellite Launching Station," *38North*, January 28, 2016)

*Chosun Ilbo* editorial: "The foreign ministers of the U.S. and China failed to reach agreement on [yesterday] on how to deal with North Korea after its recent nuclear test. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said Washington and Beijing agreed on the "need for a UN resolution" to impose sanctions but failed to provide details. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed that sanctions against the North should not be the final goal and insisted China continues to stand behind the policy of engaging Pyongyang in dialogue. This makes it quite clear that China will not tighten the noose around North Korea's neck by limiting trade to the point where it really hurts. North Korea has responded to each and every UN sanction by conducting a nuclear or missile test. It has vowed never to give up its nuclear ambitions, and there is no chance that it will buckle under further sanctions. Now that China has more or less promised to sit on its hands, Pyongyang will push ahead full steam in developing a nuclear warhead small enough to mount on a missile and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Once it develops these weapons, the military balance on the Peninsula will tilt dangerously. Even if the South bolsters its missile defenses with the aid of the U.S., such defense systems will only offer us brief psychological solace while the country remains in the crosshairs of the North's weapons of mass destruction. Using conventional weapons to counter such a threat is ludicrous. The U.S. has passed the buck for taming North Korea to China, and China is doing nothing. Seoul now faces a real need for public discussion of the development of its own nuclear weapons. If the public wants the country to arm itself with nuclear weapons, the government will simply have to scrap a joint declaration from 1991 to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and initiate talks with the U.S. to obtain the right to enrich uranium and reprocess its own spent nuclear fuel rods. It will require delicate handling. If Seoul is too aggressive in pushing ahead with



its own nuclear program, it could alienate the U.S. and face international sanctions. This would be devastating for an export-dependent country. And if it tries to obtain the technology on its own, its efforts could be thwarted by the superpowers, which will monitor every move. But Seoul can no longer sit idly by as the six-party talks lead to no results and Washington and Beijing are busy blaming each other for their diplomatic failures. North Korea has invaded this country in the past and has not hesitated to provoke Seoul repeatedly since the ceasefire agreement was signed in 1953. If it obtains nuclear weapons, the South faces a bleak fate. Would China come to the rescue if the North launched a nuclear attack against South Korea? Would the U.S. step in to protect Seoul? Judging by Washington's inaction in the military crises in the Ukraine and Syria, it would probably respond only after Seoul has been turned into a pile of smoldering ashes. The biggest victim of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is not China, Japan or the U.S., but the people of South Korea. They can no longer sit idly by and continue to ignore the options they have to deal with this threat. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "S. Koreans Must Discuss Acquiring Nuclear Arms," January 28, 2016)

1/29/16

The U.S. now believes North Korea might have attempted to test components of a hydrogen bomb on January 6, after further review and analysis of the latest intelligence information. A U.S. official directly familiar with the latest U.S. assessment said there may have been a partial, failed test of some type of components associated with a hydrogen bomb. The assessment comes after careful examination of the latest intelligence analysis of the test data. But the official emphasized there is no final conclusion. The U.S. still does not accept North Korea's claim that it tested a hydrogen bomb, but air sampling conducted after the test has proved inconclusive, the official said. That prompted another look at the seismic data. That analysis shows the test was conducted more than two times deeper underground than originally assessed -- at a depth consistent with what might be needed for a hydrogen bomb. However, the size of the seismic event and other intelligence indicates it was not likely a fully functioning device. The official said it's possible the North Koreans believe they conducted a full hydrogen bomb test, but the U.S. believes it was likely only some components, perhaps a detonator, that exploded. (Barbara Starr, "North Korea May Have Tested Components of a Hydrogen Bomb," CNN, January 29, 2016)

Choi Son-hui, deputy director-general of the North Korean foreign ministry's American affairs bureau, was seen entering China in the morning through the Beijing international airport, multiple sources here said. It was not immediately confirmed whether she will be staying here or transferring to another country. She may have the mission of having consultations on the international community's push for a U.N. resolution to punish Pyongyang. Choi served as deputy head of the North's delegation to the six-party nuclear talks. She was also in charge of translation in Pyongyang's major negotiations on its nuclear program. Some observers say Choi seems to be effectively leading the North Korean foreign ministry's American affairs bureau these days. A daughter of the North's former premier Choi Yong-rim, she is known to have studied in Austria, Malta, and China. (Yonhap, "North Korean Nuclear Envoy Seen in Beijing," *Korea Times*, January 29, 2016)

1/31/16

North Korea's trade with China dipped nearly 15 percent last year apparently due to a chilly bilateral relationship between the two neighboring countries, according to a report by state-run think tank Korea Development Institute (KDI). The North-China trade volume reached US\$4.9 billion in the January-November period, down 14.8 percent from \$5.76 billion a year earlier, marking the first double-digit on-year drop since 2000. Pyongyang's shipments to its neighbor sank 12.3 percent to \$2.28 billion over the cited period, while imports from China plunged 16.8 percent to \$2.63 billion. The trade between the allies has risen an average of 22.4 percent between 2000 and 2014. Only in 2009 and 2014 did it shrink on-year. The KDI report attributed the sharp decline to sluggish raw material exports, as shipments of anthracite coal and iron ore fell 6.3 percent and 68.5 percent, respectively. "The chilly relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing and a slowdown in the Chinese economy seemed to affect North Korea's sluggish trade with China," said the report. "North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's New Year message, which called for using home-made products and rejecting foreign-made ones, also had some influence on the downbeat trend." "North Korean trade will be dragged down by international economic sanctions sparked by the North's latest nuclear test in the first half of this year," the KDI said. "North Korea-China trade has shrunk to some extent, following sanctions by the U.N." (Kim Boram, "N. Korea's Trade with China Contracts in 2015," Yonhap, January 31, 2016)

2/2/16

North Korea has notified the International Telecommunication Union of the future launch of an earth observation satellite, an ITU source told Kyodo. DPRK Posts and Telecommunications Minister Kim Kwang Chol informed the Geneva-based ITU via diplomatic channels that the satellite will be of the Kwangmyongsong (Bright Star) type and have a four-year operational life. No clues as to the timing of the launch were provided, but sources at the London-based International Maritime Organization said the IMO was informed by North Korea that an earth observation satellite launch would be conducted between February 8 and 25. (Kyodo, "N. Korea Notifies U.N. Agency of Future Satellite Launch," February 2, 2016)

American troops stationed in South Korea are fully committed to deterring aggression and provocations from North Korea, the new commander of the United States' Eighth Army here said, vowing efforts to toughen joint combat readiness between the allies. "From its establishment, Eighth Army's mission has been to protect and defend freedom and democracy," Lt. Gen. Thomas Vandal said as he assumed his position as the commander of the Eighth Army, the backbone of U.S. Forces Korea. Vandal replaced the outgoing commander of the Eighth Army, Lt. Gen. Bernard Champoux, in a change of command ceremony earlier in the day held at the USFK base in Yongsan, central Seoul, which was attended by USFK Commander Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Mark Lippert and other key former and incumbent military officials from both countries. With his new role, Vandal also assumed the position as the chief of staff for United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and USFK. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Vandal previously served as the commander of the Eighth Army's Second Infantry Division for about two years until April 2015, in charge of defending South Korea's frontline areas. He has also been the assistant chief of staff for USFK before assuming this latest position. (Yonhap, "U.S.

Troops in Korea Focusing on Deterring N. Korean Threats: New Commander," February 2, 2016)

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KCNA: "An enlarged joint meeting of the Central Committee of the **Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and the Korean People's Army (KPA) Committee of the WPK** took place in Pyongyang on February 2-3. Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the WPK, first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the KPA, guided the enlarged joint meeting. Attending it were officials of the WPK Central Committee and members of the Party Committee of the KPA. Leading party officials of commissions and ministries and local areas and officials of armed organs were present as observers. The meeting had an in-depth discussion on the principled issues arising in further strengthening the WPK into the glorious party of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il as required by the developing revolution on the occasion of the 7th WPK Congress to be recorded as a new landmark in the history of the Party. It criticized mainly the practices of seeking privileges, misuse of authority, abuse of power and bureaucratism manifested in the party and proposed tasks and ways for thoroughly overcoming them. Before declaring the meeting open, Kim Jong Un noted that **it is the first time in the history of the WPK to have this meeting**. A report and speeches were made at the meeting. The reporter and speakers said that the meeting is a historic event in further developing the WPK into the powerful political staff of the Songun (army-first) revolution and a motherly Party sharing its fate with the popular masses and consolidating the integrated whole of the Party and the people as firm as a rock, true to the leadership of Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un made a conclusion. He said that the meeting is of weighty significance in further strengthening the Party organizationally and ideologically, rallied close around its Central Committee with one thought and purpose, with the whole party moving as one under the monolithic leadership of the Party. He set forth the tasks and ways for intensifying the work to imbue the whole society with Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and thoroughly establishing the monolithic leadership system of the Party. Our revolutionary faith will grow stronger as our revolution which started with struggle and advances with it is faced with manifold difficulties and ordeals, he said, adding that nobody in the world can block our way. The enlarged joint meeting, presided over by Kim Jong Un, marked **a significant occasion in consolidating the unbreakable unity and cohesion of the leader, party, army and people** as firm as a rock and realizing the modeling of the whole party and society on Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism on a new higher stage as required by the important historic period of the revolutionary cause of Juche." (KCNA, "Enlarged Joint meeting of C.C., WPK and Its KPA Committee Guided by Kim Jong-un," February 4, 2016)

A top general in North Korea was executed this month on corruption charges, around the time the nation's leader, Kim Jong-un, warned the party and military elites against abuse of power and other misdeeds, a South Korean official said February 10. The general, Ri Yong-gil, chief of the North Korean Army's general staff and ranked third in its hierarchy, was executed on charges of "factionalism, abuse of power and corruption" in the latest episode of Kim's "reign of terror," the official said. The official agreed to confirm the execution, first reported by the South Korean news media, only on the condition of anonymity because the information involved government

intelligence. Although South Korea's National Intelligence Service did not confirm it, many South Korean news outlets reported that General Ri had been executed, citing an unidentified intelligence source. Kim convened a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party and the Committee of the Korean People's Army on Feb. 2 and 3. There, he criticized "the practices of seeking privileges, misuse of authority, abuse of power and bureaucratism," according to KCNA. The South Korean news media quoted the unidentified intelligence source as saying that General Ri, a career army officer, might have been targeted for purging after resisting the control the ruling Workers' Party has reasserted over the military under Kim. General Ri was one of the most prominent generals under Kim, frequently accompanying him to important state events. But the general's name disappeared from North Korean news media after mid-January. He was not included in the lists of top officials who the North Korean news media said attended the party meeting this month or a large gathering in Pyongyang, the capital, on Monday to celebrate the country's launching of a satellite a day earlier. (Choe Sang-hun, "Accused of Graft, a General Is Executed in North Korea," *New York Times*, February 11, 2016, p. A-10) a source from within the North told *Daily NK* that General Ri Yong Gil was indeed arrested during a two-day joint meeting among Party and military officials, but no subsequent information exists as of yet to suggest that he has been executed. The incident occurred on February 2 at an expanded joint meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea [KPW] Central Committee and the Korean People's Army [KPA] WPK Committee. "Well into the meeting, the army chief of staff, Ri Yong Gil, and other generals were arrested and dragged out by 'Changkwang security agents' [designated for Kim Jong Un], who are expressly tasked with the arrest of top-tier cadres," a source in South Pyongan Province, citing a provincial-level Party cadre, told *Daily NK* on February 11. An additional source in Pyongyang corroborated this news. (Choi Song-min, "Ri Yong-gil Arrested Publicly Last Week, Inside Sources Report," *Daily NK*, February 12, 2016)

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China expressed "serious concern" over North Korea's plan to launch a long-range rocket this month, but admitted that it can't prevent Pyongyang from going ahead with the planned launch. "We express our serious concern about that," China's foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang told reporters, when asked about North Korea's planned rocket launch. "We believe that North Korea has the right for the peaceful use of space, but at the moment, the relevant right should be subject for restrictions by U.N. Security Council resolutions," Lu said. China's chief nuclear envoy Wu Dawei left for Pyongyang yesterday, but Lu declined to give details of Wu's visit, including how long he would stay there. Lu said Wu will "exchange views with the North Korean side on the current situation of the (Korean) Peninsula," describing Wu's visit to Pyongyang as a "bilateral exchange between the two sides." Asked whether North Korea's notification of its planned rocket launch is another slap in the face for China after the North's fourth nuclear test, Lu blamed the United States for raising tensions and repeated that China is not the main cause of North Korea's nuclear issue. "In response to some countries' outcry for pressure and sanctions, North Korea conducted one nuclear test after another," Lu said. "In this sense, North Korea did slap some country across the face. As for whose face North Korea did slap, I think the country itself knows well," Lu said. (Yonhap, "China Expresses 'Serious Concern' over N. Korea's Planned Rocket Launch," February 3, 2016)

Japan condemned Pyongyang's plan to launch a space rocket, calling it a thinly disguised test of a long-distance ballistic missile. The government ordered Aegis ballistic missile defense warships of the Maritime Self-Defense Force and land-based Patriot PAC-3 rocket units to respond should projections show components falling in Japanese territory. "This will effectively mean the firing of a ballistic missile. It would be a clear violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions and a grave, provocative act against the security of our country," Prime Minister Abe Shinzo told a Lower House session Wednesday. "Japan, in cooperation with the United States and South Korea, will strongly urge North Korea to refrain from (conducting) the launch," Abe said. During a daily news conference, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide pointed out that the projectile, expected to be launched from a site in western North Korea, would fly over part of the Sakishima island chain of Okinawa Prefecture, which includes the islands of Ishigaki and Miyako. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Nakatani Gen ordered the Self-Defense Forces to destroy any parts of the rocket should they threaten to fall within Japanese territory. Japan has already deployed Aegis destroyers equipped with the SM-3 missile system at sea and Patriot PAC-3 air-defense units of the Ground Self-Defense Forces on land. Both systems are designed to intercept ballistic missiles. Their primary mission is seen as monitoring the launch, but the deployment also appears to be a gesture underlining Japan's determination to defend its territory. Pyongyang's declared plan would involve three parts of the rocket falling west of the Korean Peninsula, in the East China Sea southwest of the peninsula and in the Pacific Ocean east of the Philippines, respectively. The rocket is expected to fly over the Sakishima island chain, according to a map with navigation warnings posted by the Japan Coast Guard on its website. The course matches that of a ballistic missile Pyongyang launched in December 2012, Suga said. (Yoshida Reiji and Mie Ayako, "Japan Orders JDF to Shoot down North Korean Missile," *Japan Times*, February 3, 2016) The government on February 4 detailed the information systems it will use to warn local municipalities if Self-Defense Forces radar detects North Korea's latest planned missile launch. Since the expected trajectory is similar to that of a missile North Korea fired in December 2012, the government indicated it will use the same systems, called J-alert and Em-Net, that were employed at that time. If the missile's course matches the information North Korea provided, Tokyo will first use J-alert to inform the residents of areas such as Okinawa Prefecture, which stand to be directly affected by the launch. J-alert instantly and directly informs the local municipalities at stake. Once J-alert has done its job, the rest of the country would subsequently be informed via an emergency information system called Em-Net, which is installed at designated government entities and institutions such as the public transportation system and news organizations. Both alert systems are set to be tested on February 5. In the event that the missile takes an unexpected course over Japanese territory, the government will also use J-alert. If the missile's debris should fall on Japanese soil, Tokyo will warn the residents of nearby communities to stay inside and away from the debris, which might contain a highly toxic chemical that can cause heart failure. The government will not use J-alert if the missile does not fly over Japan. But it will supply information about the launch through Em-Net. Meanwhile, a transport vessel carrying ground-based ballistic missile interceptors left a Maritime Self-Defense Force base in Hiroshima Prefecture for Okinawa on Thursday to prepare for the missile launch. The interceptors, named Patriot Advanced Capability-3, would be used should the missile

fall toward Japanese islands. The MSDF Osumi transport vessel is set to arrive in the southern island prefecture in a few days, and the Patriot PAC-3s will be deployed on Miyako and Ishigaki islands. (Mie Ayako, "Japan Explains Alert Systems to Be Used If North Korea Fires Missile," *Japan Times*, February 4, 2016)

North Korea recently held a massive artillery exercise along the frontlines of its West Sea border, a military source said. Military authorities here have put troops stationed on islands on the West Sea on high alert amid fears of a North Korean provocation along the Northern Limit Line ahead of its looming rocket launch. The drills fuel speculation after the North's recent nuclear test that military hardliners have gained the upper hand in internal power struggles there. The source said the North's live-fire artillery exercises "went beyond routine drills." The source added, "We are preparing for a North Korean provocation using South Korean artillery drills as an excuse." The military has also spotted North Korean coastal batteries ready to fire live ammunition. They are the same that shelled Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. North Korea apparently completed an observation post on Ari Island, an uninhabited island 12 km northeast of Yeonpyeong Island. A 20-m steel tower is apparently used to monitor Yeonpyeong and surrounding waters. Officials here believe the observation post enables North Korea to quickly react to movements by South Korean Marines and Navy vessels stationed on Yeonpyeong Island. The North also apparently stationed four 122-mm multiple rocket launchers on Gal Island 4.5km northwest of Yeonpyeong. (Jun Hyun-suk, "N. Korea Holds Massive Artillery Drills," *Chosun Ilbo*, February 4, 2016)

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The Ministry of National Defense said that the military was ready to shoot down a North Korean rocket or its debris if they enter South Korean airspace. "The military is strengthening its air defense posture to intercept the North Korean missile or its debris that could fall on our land or in our waters," spokesman Moon Sang-gyun told a press briefing. "In proportion to the level of the possible damage, South Korea will take action under its right of self-defense." The military has put its Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2 surface-to-air missiles into combat mode to guard against the possibility of a North Korean missile landing in South Korean territory, he said. Moon added that interceptor operations will be conducted under the ROK-U.S. joint defense system, indicating that the United States Forces Korea's PAC-3 missiles could also be mobilized, if necessary. (Jun Ji-hye, "Military Vows to Shoot down N. Korea Rocket," *Korea Times*, February 4, 2016)

North Korea likes to call South Korea a land of "political filth" and its leaders, including President Park Geun-hye, "human trash." Now, apparently to highlight its contempt, it has begun sending balloons into the South with an unusual payload, the police here said: cigarette butts. The balloons were timed to detonate their payloads, scattering thousands of messages that, among other things, called Park a "filthy president." Some of the timers failed to function, however, and the airborne cargo crashed onto rooftops and cars in South Korean villages near the border. Inspecting the debris, military and police personnel discovered that the balloons' payloads included things they had not seen before. "We can confirm that they included cigarette butts," Kim Hak-young, a chief superintendent of the police, said Thursday, though he declined to provide any details. The police and the Defense Ministry until today had refused to confirm a news

report earlier in the week that some North Korean balloons were carrying trash, including used toilet paper. The *JoongAng Daily* reported on February 2 that the discovery had alarmed South Korean officials and led to fears that the North might have sent hazardous biochemical agents. But an investigation showed the trash was just trash. (Choe Sang-hun, "Trash Flies across DMZ as Korea's Trade Insults.," *New York Times*, February 5, 2016, p. A-4)

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Japan has deployed PAC-3 missile batteries in the heart of Tokyo to shoot down any incoming rocket debris. South Korea is reportedly mobilizing two Aegis-equipped destroyers. The U.S. is already gunning to punish Pyongyang for what it says will be a ballistic missile test in the guise of a space launch. Whatever lifts off from North Korea's western coast space center this month, one thing is certain – since rockets and missiles inevitably have overlapping technologies, it will run afoul of U.N. resolutions that have been in place for years to bar North Korea from testing any technology that could be used to develop long-range ballistic missiles. But maybe it's time to take a deep breath. According to many experts, the North's rockets look a lot more like what the North says they are – space launch vehicles, or SLVs – and they aren't necessarily helping Pyongyang get that much closer to having a reliable, long-range missile capable of dropping a nuclear weapon on the United States any time soon. "What is needed now is a sober, serious, and reasonable public assessment of the threat from North Korea," said Ted Postol, a professor of science, technology and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations at the Pentagon. Postol and other experts who spoke to the Associated Press say the devil is in the details. The distinction between a rocket used to lift a satellite into space and a long-range ballistic missile is highly technical but of crucial importance to understanding North Korea's motives and capabilities and in forming a realistic and effective strategy to deal with them. It is also crucial to understand the limitations of what space rocket launches contribute to the North's ability to develop military-use missiles. According to some, that isn't necessarily very much. "A real ICBM is a weapon system that has to hit a given target on the other side of the world, being launched at any condition with the push of a button almost instantly," said Markus Schiller, a prominent expert on North Korean missile technology and founder of Munich-based ST Analytics. "Just launching a small satellite carrier every other year, which uses different technology than required for a real ICBM, does not get you much closer to this goal." "They gain experience by launching a large rocket like Unha," said Schiller. "But this is just one minor of so many steps required for a real ICBM, and the Unha is definitely designed as a satellite launcher." David Wright, co-director and senior scientist with the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists, also warned against quickly dismissing Pyongyang's space launches as a smoke screen. "While launching satellites helps North Korea learn about rocket technology, I think its desire to launch satellites is real," he said. "This is partly for prestige, and it was of course a huge deal that it put something into orbit before South Korea. But I think, like other countries, it sees learning how to use space for various activities as an important long-term capability." None of this means the threat of North Korea developing advanced ballistic missiles is a mirage. The North started its development of ballistic missiles in the 1970s by reverse-engineering Soviet-made, 300-kilometer (186-mile)-range Scud Bs it acquired from Egypt, according to South

Korea's Defense Ministry. The country began producing and deploying 500-kilometer (310-mile)-range Scud C missiles by the mid-1980s and the Roding missiles by the 1990s. South Korean officials also believe that beginning in 2007, the North has been deploying 3,000-kilometer (1,864-mile)-range missiles, which foreign analysts have dubbed Musudan after the name of the village near its test site. That would theoretically put locations as far as Guam and parts of the Philippines within striking distance. Even more advanced is the three-stage Taepodong-2 missile, which Seoul claims the North deployed after a test-firing in 2006. It has an estimated range of 10,000 kilometers (6,214 miles), bringing North's best-case scenario range out to the U.S. West Coast, Hawaii, Australia and Eastern Europe, according to the South's Defense Ministry. The basic structure of the Taepodong-2 is quite similar to the Unha-3 rocket. But even South Korean experts say an Unha-3-type rocket would make for a poor intercontinental ballistic missile because of the time needed for launch preparation and the requirement for it to be fired from a fixed launch site. Alison Evans, senior analyst of IHS Country Risk, argued in a recent assessment that if the North is seriously pursuing an ICBM, its next step is to prove that its SLVs are capable of carrying a payload that can re-enter the atmosphere, a key capability for ballistic missiles – which, after all, must hit targets on the ground. That has not so far been part of any of North Korea's space launches. But the focus on whether the North's space launch rockets are really missiles or, even if they aren't, that each launch brings the North closer to having an ICBM may be misguided. "There is no doubt that the leadership in North Korea presents a very serious threat to South Korea, Japan, and China," said Postol, the MIT scientist. But he added that the common reaction abroad to the North's rocket launches has been "severely inflated" and has become "a distraction from the real and serious security problems that North Korea creates." The more pressing concern, Postol believes, is underwater. He believes a "very good argument can be made" that if North Korea were to launch a nuclear-armed ballistic missile attack on the mainland of the United States, it wouldn't come from an ICBM at all, but from submarine launched ballistic missiles, which can be deployed in a far more stealthy manner and have relatively short flight times. "If North Korea uses these submarines in ways that keep them in coastal waters, anti-submarine warfare will be almost useless against them," he said. That's because shorter-range nuclear-tipped missiles launched from submarines closer to shore would be difficult or impossible to intercept with the kind of booster-phase defenses the U.S. and others rely on. "So if I were betting on a bad outcome in the future, my bet would be on a future North Korean SLBM and a future nuclear warhead that could be carried by it," Postol said. He said he expects this kind of a threat to emerge from North Korea in the next five years. "But I have serious doubts about whether North Korea will be able to build a compact nuclear warhead that is sufficiently rugged to be mounted on such missiles," he added. "If these two guesses are correct, North Korea will continue being not much more than a paper tiger. If not, we are in for real trouble." (Associated Press, "Experts Says Launch Won't Bring North Korea Much Closer to ICBM," February 5, 2016)

Newly uncovered documents and other testimony about a U.S. nuclear weapon accident reveal a Japan connection that was kept hidden from the Japanese public for more than half a century. The information gathered by *Asahi Shimbun* shows that the accident in 1959 occurred at the Osan Air Base in South Korea and involved a fighter



affiliated with the U.S. Air Force's Itazuke Air Base in Fukuoka city. The U.S. military in the 1980s did reveal 32 accidents involving nuclear weapons, but some of the locations were kept confidential. The initial U.S. military report defined the incident at Osan as a "nuclear accident" but only said an explosion and fire broke out when a fuel tank on a fighter jet jettisoned at a base in the Pacific on Jan. 18, 1959. The Japanese affiliation with the fighter and the name of the base were kept secret. One likely reason the U.S. military kept a tight wrap on the accident for so long was the situation in Japan at the time. Three months before the Osan accident, Japan and the United States began negotiations to revise the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Huge protests were held against the treaty and anti-nuclear public opinion was strengthening in Japan. "If American planes based in Japan were expected to carry out a nuclear mission, that was something that would be very harmful to the Japanese government," said Marc Gallicchio, a history professor at Villanova University in Philadelphia. "The United States would have classified all that information." The documents obtained by *Asahi Shimbun* showed the aircraft in question belonged to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, based at Itazuke. One document states the primary mission of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing was "to plan, execute and support Fighter Bomber missions with atomic weapons." At the time of the accident, the fighter was taking part in a training exercise in South Korea. South Korea was the front line of the U.S. nuclear strategy, and the fact that aircraft from Fukuoka were involved meant that Japan played an integral part in that strategy, less than two decades after the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A Pentagon spokesman said, "It is U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny" the specific location of nuclear weapons. Joe Catraw, 80, a U.S. Air Force veteran who belonged to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, said all training exercises were held in Osan, so the accident must have occurred there. The U.S. military's report about the accident said: "The bell for practice exercise was sounded. The pilots ran to their aircraft. When the starter button of the accident aircraft was depressed there was an almost simultaneous explosion. The external fuel tanks inadvertently jettisoned. The left 200-gallon tank ruptured and was burning." Another report said the atomic capsule used in weapons of that period "was not in the vicinity of the aircraft and was not involved in the accident." That meant no radioactive contamination occurred. The main target of the U.S. military operating in South Korea was Vladivostok, Russia. Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said the Itazuke base served as the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for U.S. military strategy because aircraft from Itazuke could fly not only into northern China but also as far away as Vladivostok. "The accident shows that the Itazuke Base of that time played a role in the U.S. military's nuclear warfare plans," Niihara Shoji, an international affairs researcher, said. Niihara has uncovered documents that show the U.S. military had planned a nuclear attack against China in 1958 during the crisis over the Taiwan Strait. The situation on the Korean Peninsula in the late 1950s was also more volatile than it is today. "Until the late 1960s, North Korea had a military advantage over South Korea," said Kan Hideki, a professor at Kyoto University of Foreign Studies who is knowledgeable about Japan-U.S. relations. "U.S. military bases in Japan functioned together with bases on Okinawa and in South Korea to respond to any military situation in the Far East." (Okada Gen and Okumura Satoshi, "U.S. Fighter from Fukuoka Involved in 1959 Nuclear Accident in South Korea," *Asahi Shimbun*, February 5, 2016)

2/6/16 "North Korea informed the IMO today that it will amend the date of its planned missile launch to between Feb. 7 and 14," said a South Korean government official. Experts earlier expected that the North would likely launch the rocket around February 16, the birthday of former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, who died due to heart failure in late 2011. "Weather in the North Korea Dongchang-ri launch site area is expected to be good between February 7 and Feb. 10," said the official, forecasting the launch could take place as early as on the 7th. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Moves up Planned Rocket Launch to Between Feb. 7-14," February 6, 2016)

2/7/16 Defying warnings of tougher sanctions from Washington, North Korea launched a rocket that Western experts believe is part of a program to develop intercontinental ballistic missile technologies. The rocket blasted off from Tongchang-ri, the North's main satellite launch site near its northwestern border with China, a spokesman for the South Korean Defense Ministry said. President Park Geun-hye of South Korea called an emergency meeting of top national security advisers to address the launch, her office said. South Korea, the United States and Japan also requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. In Washington, Secretary of State John Kerry called the launch a "major provocation, threatening not only the security of the Korean Peninsula, but that of the region and the United States as well." Susan E. Rice, the national security adviser, said it was "a flagrant violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions." Sung-Yoon Lee, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, said the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un wanted to show off advances in his missile and nuclear programs just before the February 16 birthday of his father, Kim Jong-il, who died in 2011. Pyongyang has timed some of its earlier nuclear and rocket tests to major national anniversaries. With the launch, North Korea was also defying China, which had issued strong appeals not to proceed. In flouting China, the North's only treaty ally, Kim was showing the ultimate disrespect to the government that has continued to trade with him, including sending oil that keeps the military and the rudimentary economy working. A senior Chinese diplomat, Wu Dawei, traveled to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, early last week with the specific message that the launch should not go ahead. Chinese analysts conceded that Wu had an impossible assignment, and he returned to Beijing on Thursday night unsuccessful. Kim appears confident that he can continue to show contempt for his ally, believing, it seems, that China fears his ability to turn on it. Beijing has resisted Washington's effort to place tough sanctions on the North since a nuclear test last month, concerned that the move might destabilize its neighbor. In a statement released after Japan, South Korea and the United States pressed for firmer action, China called for calm and said the major powers should "act cautiously." Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said, "China expresses regret over the launch with ballistic missile technology carried out by North Korea despite wide opposition from the international community." Dialogue was the best solution, the statement said, echoing a long-held position by Beijing that talks with North Korea that include the United States and China should be resumed. South Korea said the launch on Sunday showed that efforts to end the North's nuclear and missile programs through dialogue no longer worked. "They just gave North Korea time to advance its nuclear capabilities," Cho Tae-yong, first deputy director of national security of the South Korean presidential office, said in a statement. Cho said "the only way to make North

Korea abandon its nuclear weapons development” was through “effective and strong sanctions.” “We will continue to apply pressure so North Korea has no option but to change,” he said. Hours after the North declared the success of its launch on Sunday, the United States and South Korea jointly announced that they had begun discussing deployment of the American THAAD ballistic missile defense system. China, the South’s largest trade partner, has warned it would consider the system’s presence in the South a threat to its security. Washington and its regional allies, South Korea and Japan, deployed Aegis destroyers and PAC-3 missile interceptors in case debris from the rocket hurtled toward them. North Korea is widely believed to have at least several nuclear weapons. Although North Korea can learn much about the technology to build ballistic missiles from satellite launches, putting a satellite into orbit does not guarantee an ability to deliver a nuclear warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile. North Korea has never tested a ballistic-missile version of its Unha-series rockets. After four nuclear tests by the North, Western analysts were still unsure whether the country had mastered the technology to build a warhead small enough to mount on a long-range missile. They were also debating how close the country had come to acquiring the ability to build a warhead that could survive the intense heat while re-entering the atmosphere, as well as a guidance system capable of delivering a warhead close to a target. The Unha-3 rocket, if modified to carry a 2,200-pound warhead instead of a satellite, could have enough range to reach Alaska and possibly Hawaii, David Wright, co-director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, wrote in his blog on February 5. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korean Rocket Launch Called ‘Provocation,’” *New York Times*, February 7, 2016, p. A-6) “It’s presumed that the projectile has entered into orbit,” a military official said, indicating that the North successfully launched the long-range rocket. The official, however, qualified the assessment by saying that additional analysis is needed to confirm whether the satellite is operating normally in its orbit. Earlier in the day, South Korea’s Aegis destroyer’s radar detected the rocket lifting off at 9:30 a.m. from North Korea’s northwest Dongchang-ri launch site and concluded that it was a long-range rocket after studying the trajectory. Upon the launch on the west coast, the rocket flew southward, dropping its first stage into the Yellow Sea off the Korean Peninsula at 9:32 a.m. The first stage exploded in midair and splashed down in some 270 pieces, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Four minutes later, the missile disappeared from the military’s surveillance radar at about the same time it shed its fairing southwest of South Korea’s Jeju Island, the JCS said. The route matches what the North previously told United Nations agencies. “South Korea and the U.S. are jointly studying whether the disappearance means the launch was a failure or there were other technical issues,” a JCS official said. The allies are also examining the location where the second stage of the missile may have fallen, the official said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Launches Long-Range Rocket,” February 7, 2016) “We can definitely say that this was an attempted space launch,” said Melissa Hanham, a nuclear expert at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. North Korea previously fired a Kwangmyongsong-3 on an Unha-3 (“galaxy”) missile into orbit in December 2012, the month that North Korea marked the first anniversary of the death of Kim Jong Il, the current leader’s father. North Korea has said the launches were of satellites intended for scientific purposes, but analysts and many governments see this as a disguised missile test. “This kind of rocket is designed as a space launch vehicle. Before we can consider it an

intercontinental ballistic missile, there are a number of modifications that have to be made," Hanham said. A space rocket goes into the atmosphere to launch a satellite into orbit, but an intercontinental ballistic missile needs to return to Earth from the atmosphere to reach its target – and deliver a warhead. Jim Walsh, a research associate in the Security Studies Program at MIT, said that even though most of North Korea's rocket and missile tests had been failures and Pyongyang was still using liquid-launched rockets, a technology now considered "archaic" everywhere else, there was still reason for concern. "This doesn't mean that they're not making progress. The more tests they do, the more they learn, and they're beaver away trying to improve their technology," he said. "And it also means that at some level, they're still able to evade sanctions." (Anna Fifield, "North Korea Launches 'Satellite,' Sparks Fears about Long-Range Missile Program," *Washington Post*, February 7, 2016) North Korea's recently launched satellite has achieved stable orbit but is not believed to have transmitted data back to Earth, U.S. sources said of a launch that has so far failed to convince experts that Pyongyang has significantly advanced its rocket technology. "It's in a stable orbit now. They got the tumbling under control," a U.S. official said on Tuesday. That is unlike the North's previous satellite, launched in 2012, which never stabilized, the official said. However, the new satellite was not thought to be transmitting, another source added. Missile experts say North Korea appears to have repeated its earlier success in putting an object into space, rather than broken new ground. It used a nearly identical design to the 2012 launch and is probably years away from building a long-range nuclear missile, the experts said. Vice Admiral James Syring, director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, told reporters that North Korea's launch was "provocative, disturbing and alarming," but could not be equated with a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile. He said North Korea had never attempted to flight test the KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile it is developing. Syring said U.S. missile defenses would be able to defend against the new North Korean missile given efforts to improve the reliability of the U.S. system and increase in the number of ground-based U.S. interceptors from 30 to 44. "I'm very confident that we're, one, ahead of it today, and that the funded improvements will keep us ahead of ... where it may be by 2020," he said. (Andrea Shalal and David Brunnstrom, "North Korea Satellite in Stable Orbit But Not Seen Transmitting – U.S. Sources," Reuters, February 9, 2016) Experts said Sunday's rocket was likely bigger than those of previous tests. Sawaoka Akira, president of Daido University in Nagoya and an expert on rocket technology, pointed out that the latest rocket's first stage separated several minutes earlier than that of the December 2012 launch. This means the engine power was bolstered and the rocket flew faster than the previous one, Sawaoka told *Japan Times*. It also means the rocket is able to carry a heavier payload. "This is technological progress. Eventually a rocket would be able to carry something like a nuclear warhead" if the North succeeds in further improving the technology, Sawaoka said. According to the South Korean Defense Ministry, the first stage exploded into more than 270 pieces after separating from the rocket at around 9:37 a.m. Sunday over the Yellow Sea west of the Korean Peninsula. But the North may have intentionally destroyed the section because Seoul retrieved the 2012 rocket's first stage from the sea for analysis, said Takesada Hideshi, a professor and noted Korean affairs expert at Takushoku University's graduate school in Tokyo. "You can't say (the test-firing) was a failure just because the first stage exploded," Takesada said. The test-firing was "largely

successful” because the rocket was reportedly able to send an object into Earth orbit, he said. The developments came as Pyongyang works to eventually develop an intercontinental ballistic missile that can strike Washington or New York, Takesada said. According to the Defense Ministry’s 2015 white paper, a successfully developed variant of the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile could fly more than 10,000 km with a warhead weighing less than a ton. Such a range would put most of Western Europe, Asia and the Western U.S. within striking distance. Using what it learned in the test launches, the North’s long-range ballistic “missiles could have ranges that potentially reach the central, western and other areas of the U.S. mainland,” the Defense Ministry concluded in the white paper. Currently, the Taepodong-2 is believed to still be in the experimental stages. Experts say the North faces a number of technological hurdles before it is able to develop a functioning ICBM as well as master the miniaturization process needed to mount a warhead on the missile. Takesada noted that one key hurdle is to develop heat-resistant materials that allow warheads to endure the intense heat generated upon re-entry from space. It also faces an uphill battle in making a missile that can be launched at the drop of a hat. The Taepodong-2 uses liquid – not solid – fuels, which make it almost impossible for Pyongyang to have the missile on stand-by for immediate launch. According to Japanese government sources, a liquid-fuel rocket such as the Taepodong-2 would need to be launched within a few days – possibly a week at the most – once the fuel is injected because its strong acidic properties would badly damage the fuel tank. Experts appear to be split over whether Pyongyang has already succeeded in developing a miniaturized nuclear warhead. In May last year, Pyongyang claimed it has succeeded in creating a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on the tip of a ballistic missile. In response, U.S. National Security Council spokesman Patrick Ventrell disputed Pyongyang’s claim. “Our assessment of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities has not changed,” he said in a statement at the time, according to CNN. “We do not think that they have that capacity,” he was quoted as saying. However, the Defense Ministry, in its 2015 white paper, refused to rule out the possibility that the North had already mastered that critical technology. “In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity,” the paper said. “However, considering that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s ... the possibility that North Korea has achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has acquired nuclear warheads cannot be ruled out,” the paper read. (Yoshida Reiji and Mie Ayako, “North Korea’s Missile Technology Blitz Stokes Concern among Experts, Officials in Japan,” *Japan Times*, February 8, 2016) The rocket launched by North Korea had a longer range and carried a heavier payload than the one used to put a satellite in orbit in 2012, indicating that Pyongyang had made modest advances in its rocket technology, the South Korean Defense Ministry said on February 10. The rocket, the Kwangmyongsong, or shining star, put a satellite into orbit nine minutes and 29 seconds after its takeoff from the Tongchang-ri launch site in the country’s northwest, according to Defense Ministry officials, who briefed journalists on the condition of anonymity. It resembled the Unha-3 rocket that North Korea used to launch a satellite in 2012, but the officials said the satellite on Sunday was heavier. The ministry’s analysis indicated that the new rocket, if successfully reconfigured as a missile, could fly more than 7,400 miles with a warhead of 1,100 to 1,300 pounds,

compared with 6,200 miles for the Unha-3 launched in 2012 – in both cases, far enough to reach the West Coast of the United States. But North Korea has never flight-tested a long-range ballistic missile, which requires technology that enables a warhead to survive re-entry into the atmosphere. It is also unclear how close North Korea has come to miniaturizing a nuclear bomb so it could be mounted on a missile. (Choe Sang-hun, "Advances Seen in Rocket Fired by North Korea," *New York Times*, February 10, 2016, p. A-10) Using awnings and other cover, North Korea kept Japan, the United States and South Korea largely in the dark about its preparations for the February 7 ballistic missile launch. But Pyongyang left enough clues in the open for the three countries to make calculated guesses on what was occurring and eventually an accurate prediction on when the missile would be fired. Pyongyang's clandestine efforts began when a freight train arrived at the station near the missile launch pad in Tongchang-ri, North Phyongan province, soon after North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test on January 6, according to several sources with knowledge of sensitive intelligence. However, Western intelligence was unable to determine the content of the cargo because North Korea covered the train platform with a large awning and shielding boards. "North Korea did not want satellites to pick up what the cargo was or to allow radar waves to deflect off the object," one intelligence source said. Based on the number of freight cars and trucks, intelligence officials believed that parts for two upgraded Taepodong-2 ballistic missiles were transported to the launch site. North Korea launched similar missiles in December 2012. Delivering parts for two missiles "is the same phenomenon as the last launch," another source said. "That was designed to guard against defects in the rocket and insufficient parts." Six to eight spy satellites operated by Japan and the United States are believed to cover the Korean Peninsula. But they could not pick up on the missile parts when the cargo was moved to the processing building for assembly. "Infrared rays are used at night, but they are ineffective if there is no heat source," another intelligence source said. A large awning also covered the area around the launch site. But intelligence could still detect more active movement of vehicles and personnel at the site. One change occurred in late January when several water cannon trucks were deployed to the launch site area. Intelligence officials in Japan, the United States and South Korea believed those trucks were put in place to guard against a possible fire when fuel was being pumped through underground pipes. Such movements led to conjecture that the missile had been installed at the launch pad. The fuel pumping process is believed to have been completed by around February 3 because that is when the water cannon trucks left the launch site area. Around that time, the three nations intercepted telemetry test signals transmitted from the missile to the launch site. Telemetry test signals are used to confirm the trajectory of a missile. Weather conditions were also a factor that led officials in Japan, the United States and South Korea to determine that the missile launch would likely be held on February 7. The forecast called for cloudy skies for several days from February 8 and even possible snow, which could affect the missile equipment. The weather around the launch site was clear on February 7. The correct prediction enabled a South Korean Aegis destroyer deployed in the Yellow Sea near the launch site to pick up the trajectory of the North Korean missile about a minute after it was launched around 9:30 a.m. on February 7. (Makino Yoshihiro, "North Korea Went All out to Keep Missile Launch under Trilateral Radar," *Asahi Shimbun*, February 9, 2016) North Korea's weekend rocket launch repeated earlier success rather than

breaking new ground, using a nearly identical design from a 2012 launch, experts said, adding the reclusive country probably remained years from building a long-range nuclear missile. The rocket was based on engines taken from its massive stockpile of mid-range missiles based on Soviet-era technology and electrical parts too rudimentary to be targeted by a global missile control regime, the experts said. The three-stage launch vehicle, named Kwangmyongsong, separated its boosters successfully and put an object, which the North says is an earth observation satellite, into orbit, South Korea said on Tuesday. **A signal from the satellite had yet to be detected**, Seoul said. The object North Korea launched in 2012 never sent a detectable signal. "I suspect the aim of the launch was to repeat the success, which itself provides considerable engineering knowledge," said Michael Elleman, a missile expert at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. The South Korean navy recovered parts of the first-stage booster but failed to retrieve a significant section as it did in 2012 because the stage self-destructed after lift-off, probably with explosives detonated by a timer, the South's military said. South Korea said the launch resembled the one in 2012. The shape of the rockets was similar, as were the locations where the first and second stages splashed into the sea, it said. The U.N. Security Council has imposed layers of sanctions against the North for its nuclear tests and long-range rocket launches going back to 2006, banning arms trade and money flow that can fund its arms program. But the North has managed to circumvent those measures in pursuing a rocket program, widely suspected to be aimed at building an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could threaten the continental United States, and its fourth nuclear test last month. "Sanctions raise the cost and impact reliability, but a determined country can access the needed items if it is a priority acquisition," Elleman said. After the 2012 launch, South Korea retrieved a number of parts associated with the first-stage booster, including one of the steering engines, a nearly intact section of the fuel tank that contained propellant, wiring and pressure sensors. Some of those components were imported, "ranging from cannibalized Soviet Scud parts to equipment produced in the United States, Europe and Asia," said Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. "Most of the items are available commercially, off-the-shelf and are not controlled. The underlying components are less important than North Korea's ability to integrate them in a functioning rocket program," he said. If the Kwangmyongsong was powered by the same system as the Unha-3 launched in 2012, it used a cluster of Nodong missile engines with a thrust of about 27 tonnes each encased in an aluminum-magnesium alloy body, welded unevenly by hand. North Korea is believed to have more than 200 medium-range Nodong missiles with a range of 1,300 km (807 miles), developed from Scud missiles with Soviet technology. South Korea said it believes the North's rockets can fly more than 10,000 km (6,200 miles), putting the mainland United States in range. The boosters likely performed similarly in terms of thrust and burn time to the Unha-3, indicating the North again launched a vehicle that would be optimized to launch a satellite, not a ballistic missile which would require higher thrust. "Increasing thrust is a delicate issue, and depending on how much, you quickly have to completely re-develop the whole engine," German aerospace engineer Markus Schiller said. While sanctions have not stopped the North's rocket development, they likely limit what it can make or secure in large quantities of material, equipment and fuel that are needed to quickly make advances.

Some experts believe the North is a decade or more from using what it learns from its space launch vehicles to building an ICBM capable of threatening the U.S. west coast, which would have to be vastly bigger than the last two rockets launched. The North has also demonstrated no evidence of significant work in building and testing a nuclear warhead rugged and stable enough to withstand the stress of re-entry to atmosphere and detonate as intended when it reaches its target. Most experts believe it has also yet to show, after four nuclear tests over 10 years, all with relatively small yields, that it has successfully weaponized a nuclear device, let alone miniaturized one to fit on a missile. Schiller said if the North were to have made real progress, there is no reason not to demonstrate an advanced rocket rather than turning again to what is probably "their old workhorse." "I assume that they are doing the best they can with the Unha, showing a very slow but continuous progress toward a small satellite launch capability," he said. "Turning this program into a real weapon that is deployed in numbers and could hit cities at the push of a button will take decades at that pace." (Jack Kim and David Brunnstrom, "North Korea Turns to 'Old Workhorse' Rocket to Repeat Past Success," Reuters, February 9, 2016) John Schilling: "The US Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) has released the orbital elements of two new bodies in stable orbits, with the identifiers "KMS-4" for the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite and "Unha 3 R/B" for the launch vehicle's upper stage rocket body. In short, this is not a hoax. Images of the rocket departing the launch pad indicate an overall length of about 30 meters, the same as the Unha-3 rocket from North Korea's 2012 launch. To the extent that we can tell from low-resolution images, the shape and the engine exhaust plumes are also nearly identical. North Korea did politely tell the mariners and airmen of the world where to expect the expended rocket stages to fall, and these also match the 2012 launch. The satellite itself is in a very similar orbit to 2012. While many had expected North Korea to debut a new and larger rocket, and the new launch pad was clearly built for a larger rocket, that launch is still in the future. North Korea might call this new rocket an Unha-4, but it is almost certainly an Unha-3 with, at most, minor modifications. ...But it does seem likely that the first stage did explode—after safely separating from the rocket. That's a change from the 2012 launch, where the first stage fell into the ocean relatively intact and was recovered by the South Korean Navy. This could have been a late malfunction or a reaction involving unburnt residual propellant, but it could also be that the North Koreans didn't want their southern neighbors to get quite so good a look at their rocket this time. Self-destruct mechanisms are frequently added to stages for "range safety," to make sure no wayward rocket can land on a populated area, and it would be little trouble to deliberately activate one as soon as the first stage has done its job. Whatever minor modifications the DPRK may have made to the first stage will likely remain obscure. ...North Korea claims the satellite was launched into an orbit that ranges from 494.6 to 500 kilometers above the earth, inclined at 97.4 degrees from the equator. JSpOC's data indicates 466 to 501 kilometers and a 97.5 degree inclination. If we trust JSpOC more than we do North Korean newscasters, it looks like they missed their target by a little bit. The orbit they were aiming for was something called a "sun-synchronous orbit," which is particularly suitable for Earth observation satellites as it passes over targets at exactly the same local time every day. This one will drift, but should still be serviceable. The Unha-3 rocket can probably carry at least 200 kilograms of payload to such an orbit, though its last satellite was reportedly only half that weight. Until the North has mastered the



basics of satellite technology, there is little reason for it to try anything bigger or more ambitious at the moment; and little reason to use a bigger rocket that it may be developing either. The Unha-3 worked just fine three years ago; it's the satellites that need work. Presumably when they are confident with basic technology-demonstration satellites they will move on to bigger rockets with more capable payloads. But the obvious concern is that North Korea is testing ballistic missiles and only pretending to care about satellites. The Unha-3 or Unha-4 could certainly be used as an ICBM. The upper stages generate only about half the thrust we would expect if it were built for that purpose, but it could probably still carry a payload of almost 1000 kilograms to a range of 10,000 kilometers. And with two successful tests under its belt, it could probably do so reliably. What it can't do, quite yet, is hit anything of value. North Korea can probably build a nuclear warhead light enough for the Unha to carry, and they may well have tested one. What it has not done is tested a reentry vehicle that would survive hitting the atmosphere at roughly 16,000 miles per hour. That's not an insurmountable technical challenge, and we expect North Korea will succeed when it gets around to it, but the North will want to test its technology at least once. Of equal importance, the North still needs to work on the rocket guidance system. If this launch had been aimed at a point 10,000 kilometers distant on Earth, rather than the perfect sun-synchronous orbit we assume was the target, it would have fallen almost 50 kilometers short and 10 kilometers west of its aim point. That's an improvement over last time, but still a ways to go. And really, even if North Korea can turn the Unha-3 into a rocket that delivers 1,000 kilogram warheads with perfect reliability and pinpoint accuracy, there is still the fundamental problem that it weighs almost 100 tons, can only be launched from fixed sites and requires so much preparation that we can see it being readied days before launch. That doesn't make for a useful weapon. What North Korea almost certainly wants for a weapon is a much smaller, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). They are working on one of those, but we don't expect it to be operational until sometime after 2020. For now, North Korea is making small steps towards improving its rocket and satellite capabilities. What it will do with the satellites, we are not yet sure. That path may involve larger and more powerful rockets in the future. A real ICBM capability comes from following a different path, longer and less certain, and one where modest improvements in the Unha series of SLVs are of little relevance. Even if North Korea does try to adapt the Unha to serve as an interim ICBM, it will probably need one or two more tests—and the construction of hardened silos to replace the current open launch site. If the rocket is nothing new, the most important thing to look for in coming weeks is any indication that the satellite is doing something more than tumbling out of control. Even amateur astronomers will likely be able to tell that much from the flickering of reflected sunlight. If it can maintain a stable orientation, that will be an important step forward for North Korea. If it can perform any sort of maneuver using an onboard propulsion system that would be a bigger step forward, and one we would likely know about when JSpOC issues new orbit calculations. Radio signals from the satellite would mark critical progress for North Korea in another area, particularly if they occur over a prolonged period and show signs of two-way communication. Finally, if it is an Earth observation satellite, they may release images to the press to brag about how well it is working—but we will have to be careful not to be fooled if they release copies of someone else's satellite images. To address the concern that this might be a missile in disguise, we'll have to

look closer to Earth. First, if the North Koreans are planning to deploy a weaponized Unha, they'll need to test it at least once more to improve the accuracy, and they'll almost certainly want to test a reentry vehicle at the same time—there's no point in getting the launch perfect if the warhead is going to veer off course on reentry. They will also want to practice their launch preparation procedures. They were able to ready this rocket for launch significantly faster than they did in 2012, with the final, highly visible preparations taking only a few days instead of weeks; but for a weapon, they would want to bring that down to hours instead of days. If we see them repeatedly setting up and taking down rockets on the pad, that would be a dangerous sign. But even hours of preparation would probably be too long in wartime, and the North Koreans would want to hedge their bets by building hardened silos. The North Koreans are good at camouflage, but the Unha may be too big a rocket even for them to hide. Should anyone find silos set up to hold Unha-sized rockets, any pretense that this is just a satellite program would vanish and we would know that North Korea is deploying ICBMs. So far, we haven't seen any sign of that." (John Schilling, "North Korea's Space Launch: An Initial Assessment," *38North*, February 9, 2016) Michael Elleman: "...American efforts to deter and prevent North Korea from flight testing the KN-08, Musudan or other long-range ballistic missile must take priority over unwelcomed satellite launches using the Unha or equivalent rockets. The most recent launch is very nearly a repeat of the December 2012 firing, although the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite is reported to weigh 200 kg, about twice as much as the previous one. This may help explain why the designated splash down zones for the first and second stages were slightly less than for the 2012 firing, though other possibilities may have contributed to the change as well. The Kwangmyongsong-4's orbital parameters (501 x 466 km, at 97.5 degrees) differ<sup>[5]</sup> from the sun-synchronous orbit North Korea forecasted, suggesting that the Unha rocket experienced a small aiming deviation. Further, the US announced that the satellite was tumbling in its orbit, another sign that the mechanism that frees the satellite from the third stage did not perform as expected. Nevertheless, North Korea succeeded for the second time in placing an object into orbit. Satellite launches, especially those lifting payloads to low-earth orbits, initially boost upwards, but then accelerate the payload on a path nearly parallel with the earth's surface to reach the velocity needed to sustain the orbit. Low-thrust engines are typically used during the latter phase of the boosted trajectory to achieve the needed radial velocity. The maximum altitude of the payload is on the order of 200 to 500 km, depending on the orbital parameters required by the mission. Ballistic missiles, on the other hand, boost the warhead to high altitudes, allowing the payload to coast downrange to a maximum distance. A 10,000 km range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) reaches a peak altitude of more than 1,000 km when on a minimum energy (i.e. maximum range) trajectory. Lifting a warhead to such heights requires high-thrust engines to avoid gravity losses while accelerating upward. With the exception of the July 2006 firing of the Taepodong-2, which exploded too early in its liftoff trajectory to determine its mission, all of the other large rockets launched by North Korea were designed to maximize performance as a satellite launcher. In each case, the Taepodong-1 and Unha rockets flew on trajectories fully consistent with a satellite launch. Further, the Taepodong-1 used a low-thrust (Isayev 5D67) engine scavenged from an S-200 (NATO designated SA-5) air-defense missile on the second stage. Flight data displayed in the North Korean control room during

the December 2012 Unha-3 launch, indicate that the second stage is a modified Scud-B missile with a larger diameter airframe to hold more fuel. The third stage is likely similar to that found on Iran's Safir carrier rocket, which consists of vernier (i.e. steering) engines from either the Soviet R-27 (NATO designated SS-N-6) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), or another Soviet system, such as the ROTA, which was never fielded by the Soviet Union. The Unha's use of long-burning, low-thrust upper stages is optimal for space missions, though if used as a ballistic missile, the low-thrust engines would suffer significant gravity losses during its upward trajectory, robbing the missile of roughly 800 km of range. Without question, rockets designed to boost a satellite into orbit and long-range ballistic missiles employ many of the same technologies, key components and operational features. There are, however, key characteristics that differentiate satellite launchers from ballistic missiles, apart from the payload itself. Firstly, ballistic missile payloads must survive the rigors of re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. Protecting a long-range missile's payload from the extreme heat and structural loads experienced during re-entry requires the development and production of special materials, as well as testing and validation under real conditions. Secondly, as discussed previously, satellite launch vehicles and long-range ballistic missiles employ distinctly different trajectories to fulfil their respective missions. The different trajectories call for different propulsion systems for optimal performance. One cannot simply swap out one engine for another and expect the missile to perform with high dependability. Multiple flight tests of the new configuration are needed to validate performance and reliability. A third, less obvious difference lies with the operational requirements. Before flight, satellite launchers, unlike their ballistic missile counterparts, are prepared over a period of many days, if not weeks. Components and subsystems are checked and verified prior to launch, and the mission commander has the flexibility to wait for ideal weather before initiating the countdown. If an anomaly emerges during the countdown, engineers can delay the launch, identify and fix the problem, and restart the process. Recall that the Unha rockets launched to date have required at least a week, if not a full month to assemble and prepare for launch. In contrast, ballistic missiles, like other military systems, must perform reliably under a variety of operational conditions, with little or no warning. These operational requirements impose a more rigorous validation scheme, which includes an extensive flight-test program. Normally, only after successfully completing validation testing is a missile deemed to be combat ready. This latter requirement and the need to ensure pre-launch survivability explain why the Soviets and Americans never converted a satellite launcher into a ballistic missile, though the reverse process occurred frequently. China developed its early long-range missiles (DF-3, DF-4, and DF-5) and satellite launchers (CZ-2 and CZ-3) in parallel. However, running the developmental programs in tandem did not obviate the need to conduct a full set of flight trials over many years for the military missiles. Nor did the parallel programs shorten the development timeline significantly. North Korea could certainly opt to modify the Unha satellite launch platform for use as a ballistic missile, though the transformation would not be simple or quick. There would still be a need to flight test the transformed Unha in a ballistic missile mode. If North Korea built a ballistic missile using the first two stages of an Unha-3, the notional missile might achieve a maximum range of 4,000 to 6,000 km, depending on configuration details. To reach the continental US, a powerful third stage would have to be developed and added to the first two stages of the Unha-

3. The notional missile would remain poorly suited for use as a ballistic missile, however, especially if the low-thrust Scud engine was retained by the second stage. The Soviet Union considered an analogous upgrade in 1957, when the Yangel Design Bureau suggested combining the main boosters of the R-12 and R-14 missiles to create the R-16 ICBM. The R-16 was successfully developed, but only after substantial redesign, including the development of new engines using more energetic propellants. The Soviet experience suggests that North Korea might find it challenging and time consuming to build an operational ICBM derived mainly from Unha-3 hardware. North Korea could contemplate using the Unha-3 as the basis for an ICBM for emergency use in the direst of circumstances. The missile would weigh more than 90 tons, making it too large and cumbersome to be viably deployed on a mobile launch platform. Silo deployment might be possible, but North Korea is a relatively small country, with limited strategic depth, and would find it difficult to conceal the location of its silos. All of North Korea's silos would be fewer than 200 km from the coastline and thus vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes by advanced military powers, such as the US, or boost-phase intercept using SM-3 interceptors deployed on Aegis ships patrolling near the Korean peninsula. For an ICBM, a new missile design seems more likely. In April 2012, North Korea unveiled mock-ups of a mobile, long-range missile, dubbed Hwaseong-13 or, in US nomenclature, KN-08, during a military parade in Pyongyang. The missile has never been tested, and its origins and hardware configuration are not known. The configuration of the KN-08 has also undergone modifications, as suggested by the most recent display of the missile during a military parade in Pyongyang. If propellants more energetic than those used by the Unha-3, Nodong or Scud missiles were employed, the new missile might be capable of intercontinental range. But until it is flight tested, such possibilities remain speculative. There are reports that North Korea has already deployed the KN-08, as well as the Musudan. Because neither of these missiles have been flight tested, Pyongyang would necessarily have to assume great risk of failure should it attempt to fire them in anger. A cursory review of first- and second-generation development of long-range ballistic missiles—and satellite launchers—in the US, Soviet Union, China and France show that a new missile is more likely to fail than succeed over the first half-dozen flights. North Korea's Unha rocket failed three times before succeeding. While an untested ballistic missile could be fired during a crisis that threatens directly the Kim Jong Un regime, it cannot be viewed as a reliable strategic capability. North Korea has now successfully boosted two objects into orbit using variations of the Unha rocket. This achievement comes after three failed attempts using an Unha rocket, and one failed Taepodong-1 rocket. The results suggest that North Korean engineers have learned how to design, assemble and operate a multi-stage rocket, record enough flight data to identify and fix malfunctioning subsystems or processes, and systematically improve a newly developed system's performance and dependability. Future satellite launches using Nodong and Scud technologies will likely enhance the reliability of the Unha rocket, and facilitate the development of a larger version of the Unha, perhaps the Unha-9. The accumulated experience and knowledge of past and future satellite launches will not significantly contribute to the design and development of a viable and reliable long-range ballistic missile. As history has demonstrated, satellite launch activity does not provide a shortcut. If North Korea wants to have a credible nuclear capability, one that threatens the United States directly, it will necessarily have to commit to an

extensive flight-test program involving the KN-08 and Musudan ballistic missiles. Having never flight tested the Musudan and KN-08, Pyongyang has no measure of their respective performance and dependability. Threatening to use or firing the untested missiles would be risky adventure. First- and second-generation, long-range ballistic missiles developed by the US, Soviets, Chinese and French failed their first ten flight tests more often than they succeeded. The Unha failed on its first three firings. Thus, Pyongyang would have to assume great risk of failure if it threatened to launch or fired the KN-08, Musudan or other long-range missile before it validated its reliability. It is therefore highly unlikely that Pyongyang would elect to fire its unproven missiles except under the direst of circumstances, such as the regime coming under direct military threat by a foreign army. Stopping North Korea from flight testing either or both of these missiles, or similar long-range systems, must be a strategic priority for the Washington, second only to preventing Pyongyang from transferring nuclear material or technology, and detonating additional nuclear bombs. If North Korea succeeds in developing the KN-08, or equivalent, it could threaten the US mainland and erode America's long-standing extended deterrence commitments to South Korea, Japan and other regional allies. Deterring future satellite launches is important, but not at the cost of preventing long-range missile tests." (Michael Elleman, "North Korea Launches Another Large Rocket: Consequences and Options," *38North*, February 10, 2016)

KCNA: "The DPRK National Aerospace Development Administration on Sunday issued a report on the successful launch of earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong-4. The report said: Scientists and technicians of the DPRK National Aerospace Development Administration **succeeded in putting the newly developed earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong-4 into its orbit** according to the 2016 plan of the 5-year program for national aerospace development. Carrier rocket Kwangmyongsong blasted off from the Sohae Space Center in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province at 09:00 on February 7, Juche 105(2016). The satellite entered its preset orbit at 09:09:46, 9 minutes and 46 seconds after the lift-off. The satellite is going round the polar orbit at 494.6 km perigee altitude and 500 km apogee altitude at the angle of inclination of 97.4 degrees. Its cycle is 94 minutes and 24 seconds. Installed in Kwangmyongsong-4 are measuring apparatuses and telecommunications apparatuses needed for observing the earth. The **complete success made in the Kwangmyongsong-4 lift-off** is the proud fruition of the great Workers' Party of Korea's policy on attaching importance to science and technology and an epochal event in developing the country's science, technology, economy and defense capability by legitimately exercising the right to use space for independent and peaceful purposes. The fascinating vapor of Juche satellite trailing in the clear and blue sky in spring of February on the threshold of the Day of the Shining Star, the greatest national holiday of Kim Il Sung's Korea, is a gift of most intense loyalty presented by our space scientists and technicians to the great Comrade Kim Jong Un, our dignified party, state and people. The National Aerospace Development Administration of the DPRK will in the future, too, launch more satellites of Juche into the space, true to the great Workers' Party of Korea's policy of attaching importance to science and technology." (KCNA, "National Aerospace Development Administration Issues Report on Satellite Launch," February 7, 2016)

South Korea and the United States have agreed to begin negotiations for the deployment of an advanced American air defense system on South Korean soil, officials said, despite opposition from China and Russia. The announcement on the controversial defense system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, was given just hours after North Korea launched a long-range missile as part of the continual push of its intercontinental ballistic missile tests. "The U.S. and South Korea have decided to start official discussion on the possibility of U.S. Forces Korea's deployment of THAAD as part of measures to upgrade the South Korea-U.S. alliance's missile defense posture against North Korea's advancing threats," Yoo Jeh-seung, deputy minister for policy, said in a joint briefing with Lt. Gen. Thomas Vandal, the commander of USFK's Eighth Army. Vandal said the decision was made upon USFK Commander Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti's recommendation, adding that "it is time to move forward on the issue." (Yonhap, "S. Korea, U.S. to Begin THAAD Deployment Talks in S. Korea," February 7, 2016)

South Korea says it will further restrict the entry of its nationals to a jointly run factory park in North Korea. The number of South Koreans staying in the Kaesong industrial complex, the last major cooperation project between the rivals, will be decreased to 500 from the current 650, according to South Korea's Unification Ministry. South Korea took similar measures after the North's nuclear test last month. (*Korea Herald*, "Seoul Restricts Entry to Joint Park with North," February 7, 2016)

The U.N. Security Council has strongly condemned North Korea's long-range rocket launch, vowing to "expeditiously adopt a new resolution" with significant measures, and calling the launch a "dangerous and serious violation." "The members of the Security Council strongly condemn this launch," Venezuelan U.N. Ambassador Rafael Dario Ramirez Carreno, the council's president for February, told reporters while reading a press statement after the closed-door meeting. "The members of the Security Council underscore this launch as well as any other DPRK launch that use ballistic missile technology even if characterized as a satellite launch or a space launch vehicle contribute to the DPRK's nuclear weapon delivery system and is a serious violation of the Security Council resolutions," he said. The Security Council also noted its intent to develop "significant measures" in a new resolution in response to the North's latest nuclear test while also recalling previous warnings that it would take "future significant measures" in the event of another DPRK launch. "In line with this commitment and the gravity of this most recent violation, the council will adopt expeditiously a new security council resolution with such measures in response to this dangerous and serious violation," the council president said. The council also expressed its commitment to continue working toward a "peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation leading to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," the ambassador said. The launch came as the U.N. Security Council has been struggling in negotiations to put together a new resolution imposing sanctions on Pyongyang for the nuclear test because China has been reluctant to impose harsh measures on its communist neighbor. The rocket launch is expected to help break the deadlock as China would find it difficult to oppose tough measures any longer, analysts said. China's cooperation is key to any sanctions resolution because it's a veto-holding permanent member. "We are hopeful that China, like all council members, will

see the grave threat to regional, international peace and security, see the importance of adopting tough, unprecedented measures, breaking new ground," U.S. Ambassador to the U.S. Samantha Power told reporters. She also said she will ensure the Security Council imposes serious consequences on the North. "DPRK's latest transgressions require our response to be even firmer," she said. "I understand that there was a consensus on the need to put together a sanctions resolution, which has been under discussions since the nuclear test, at an early date and with stronger content," South Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Oh Joon said. "Existing Security Council sanctions on North Korea are mostly related directly to weapons," Oh said. "I think most Security Council members think that it's time for powerful sanctions that go beyond that, now that it's obvious they were unable to stop North Korea's weapons development." (Yonhap, "U.N. Security Council Strongly Condemns N. Korean Launch," February 8, 2016)

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A North Korean patrol boat crossed the de facto western maritime border between the two Koreas following the North's long-range rocket launch a day earlier, a South Korean military official said. The South's Navy fired five rounds of warning shots against the North's patrol boat, which trespassed across the maritime border in the Yellow Sea, widely known as the Northern Limit Line (NLL), at around 6:55 a.m., according to the official. The vessel retreated northward about 20 minutes after it intruded into South Korean territory. (Yonhap, "N. Korean Patrol Boat Crosses Inter-Korean Sea Border in Yellow Sea," February 8, 2016)

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said he is preparing to slap unilateral sanctions against North Korea for its "intolerable" act on firing a long-range ballistic missile that flew over islands of Okinawa Prefecture. "To resolve the abduction issue, nuclear development, missile launch and other problems (involving North Korea) comprehensively, we are moving to impose our own sanctions," Abe said at a meeting of government and ruling Liberal Democratic Party officials. "We will promptly map out the specific contents of our sanctions so that we can take firm and strict action against North Korea," he said. Abe yesterday issued instructions to prepare the unilateral sanctions at an emergency meeting of the National Security Council in Tokyo. (*Asahi Shimbun*, "Japan Moves toward Unilateral Sanctions over North Korea's Missile Launch," February 8, 2016)

The United States does not rule out imposing sanctions on North Korea similar to the 2005 financial restrictions that had almost cut off the communist nation from the international financial system, the White House spokesman said. "I wouldn't rule out additional steps like that," White House press secretary Josh Earnest said at a briefing in response to a question whether unilateral sanctions the U.S. is currently considering against Pyongyang would be different from the 2005 measures. Earnest said, however, that it would be difficult to come up with effective sanctions on Pyongyang because the North is already isolated and has also been under a series of sanctions for decades. "The North Korean economy is quite constrained, and it's not as if they are engaged in a significant number of financial transactions in the international system," he said. "If there were, they would be more vulnerable to the kinds of sanctions that actually did put a lot of pressure on Iran, for example." (Yonhap, "U.S. Does Not Rule out Banco Delta Asia-Type Sanctions on N. Korea," February 8, 2016)

2/9/16

The leaders of Japan, the United States and South Korea staged a united front against North Korea, calling for a strong new U.N. Security Council resolution over Pyongyang's rocket launch and nuclear test. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo held separate telephone talks with U.S. President Barack Obama and South Korean President Park Geun-hye in which the leaders affirmed trilateral coordination over Pyongyang, senior Japanese officials said. In a 35-minute conversation with Obama, Abe reportedly told his U.S. counterpart that the launch of a "long-range ballistic missile" poses a direct and serious threat to Japan and the United States. His words were relayed to reporters by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Sego Hiroshige. Abe told Obama that Japan plans to tighten its own penalties against North Korea as a way of resolving not only the nuclear and missile issues but also Pyongyang's abductions of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s. The international community must make "every effort to put the brakes on Pyongyang's dangerous, provocative acts," Seko quoted Abe as saying. Abe said he wants to speed up work on a "swift adoption of a strong resolution." He called for greater trilateral cooperation with Washington and Seoul. On February 7, the U.N. Security Council held an emergency meeting in which it condemned North Korea's actions. It has yet to produce a resolution following the underground nuclear test in January, which Pyongyang said was of a hydrogen bomb. Obama told Abe that the Security Council must adopt a resolution without delay, according to Seko. He said the United States remains committed to the defense of Japan and South Korea in the face of North Korea's provocation and called Washington's security commitment unshakable. Obama vowed to use every defense capability, including possibly deploying the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea. THAAD is a land-based network of missile interceptor batteries. Its rockets are designed to intercept ballistic missiles at points in their arc when they may be at extremely high altitudes. In a 15-minute conversation with Park, Abe said Japan would support the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. He said he wants to advance security cooperation with Seoul, according to Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Hagiuda Koichi. Hagiuda quoted Park as agreeing with Abe on the need to aim for a strong Security Council resolution as soon as possible. She also vowed to step up cooperation bilaterally – and trilaterally with Washington – over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. (Kyodo, JJI, "Tokyo, Washington, Seoul Affirm Cooperation over Pyongyang," *Japan Times*, February 9, 2016)

The national intelligence director, James R. Clapper, warned that North Korea had expanded its production of weapons-grade nuclear fuel, making clear that the Obama administration now regarded the reclusive government in Pyongyang, rather than Iran, as the world's most worrisome nuclear threat. Clapper's warning, delivered in his annual worldwide threat assessment to the Senate Armed Services Committee, came a day after President Obama called the leaders of Japan and South Korea to reassure them after a satellite launch by North Korea deepened fears that the North could strike the two countries with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. "Pyongyang continues to produce fissile material and develop a submarine-launched ballistic missile," Clapper said. "It is also committed to developing a long-range nuclear-armed missile that's capable of posing a direct threat to the United States, although the system has not been flight tested." In his testimony, Clapper put North Korea at the top of his list of nuclear- and proliferation-related threats. American intelligence agencies say that



North Korea has expanded its uranium-enrichment facility at its main nuclear complex in Yongbyon and restarted a plutonium production reactor. North Korea "could begin to recover plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel within a matter of weeks to months," Clapper said. With North Korea testing a nuclear device and launching a satellite in quick succession, the White House has grown frustrated by its inability to curb the government in Pyongyang. Obama spoke with President Xi Jinping of China a few days before the satellite launch to urge him to use China's influence over North Korea to prevent it. The White House has been careful not to criticize China for its failure to rein in North Korea. But Clapper emphasized that the Chinese account for 90 percent of North Korea's trade, buying \$1.2 billion worth of coal from their impoverished neighbor every year. "To the extent that anyone has leverage over North Korea," he said, "it's China." White House officials stopped short of ranking North Korea as the world's No. 1 proliferation threat. But with Iran in compliance with the terms of the nuclear deal, and with North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un, embarking on a series of provocative acts, Pyongyang has clearly supplanted Tehran as a focus for the president's national security staff. "Obviously, we are concerned about the risk of proliferation from North Korea," the White House press secretary, Josh Earnest, said February 8. "And the proliferation threat from Iran has, of course, been significantly diminished because of the international agreement to prevent them from obtaining a nuclear weapon." "If you were ranking them on the list and if at one point Iran were ranked above North Korea," Earnest said, "that's certainly no longer the case." (Mark Landler, *North Korea Nuclear Effort Seen as a Top Threat to the U.S.*, *New York Times*, February 10, 2016, p. A-10)

U.S. experts of international politics seem to have given up all hope for changing Pyongyang's policy, according to media reports. Prevalent views among these gurus of regional politics are that Washington should put ultrahigh pressure on the North that exceed the sanctions it put on Iran before the Islamic country reached an agreement with the United States to abandon its nuclear programs, the reports said. They call on the Barack Obama administration to discontinue its "strategic patience" policy and turn toward far bolder and more destructive steps with some even suggesting a shift such that regime change in North Korea might be inevitable. This indicates how seriously the U.S. experts regard the North's "lethal combination" of nuclear warheads and long-delivery vehicles, they said. "The recent nuclear test and missile launch have put an end to the possibility of improving the relationship between the U.S. and North Korea," Revere Evans, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, was quoted as saying by Yonhap. "There is no room for passive approaches like 'strategic patience' any longer in the face of escalating threats from North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles." Evans, also a former U.S. deputy mission chief in Seoul, said he could not rule out the possibility that Washington would turn toward changing the North Korean regime given Pyongyang's ability to increase its nuclear and missile capacity. "Some experts here think the only way to terminate the North's nuclear programs is put an end to its regime," he said. This is a dangerous approach but the North Korean provocations and its pursuit of nuclear power have shut off room for all alternatives, said Evans who had emphasized the two-track approach of dialogue and pressure. "Some U.S. military officials think North Korea is capable of attacking the mainland U.S. with miniaturized nuclear weapons," he said. "The U.S. and its allies ought to take new,

strong and unprecedented sanctions, and the focus of these measures is to put the stability and survival of the North Korean regime in danger." Evans said the allies should not only deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system but strengthen the joint military drills of the U.S., Japan and Korea, and put economic, financial and political sanctions on the North. "They should block oil supplies to the North, interrupt its access to the international financial system and adopt a 'secondary boycott' of banks, businesses and individuals that deal with North Korea," Evans said. Robert Manning, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, agreed, saying, "The U.S., Korea and Japan will need to take strong measures in ways to drastically increase costs for the North's nuclear and missile development." He said the U.S. should strip Kim Jong-un of his "credit cards," as Washington did with Iran, and called for South Korea to stop all activities that could help the North earn hard currency, such as the operation of the inter-Korean factory park at Kaesong. Alan Romberg, a researcher at the Stimson Center, said North Korea has already crossed an important line or is on the border line, and the Obama administration has no other choices but to cope with it on a different dimension. "As direct military sanctions accompany too huge a cost, however, the U.S. administration would avoid them," he was quoted as saying. Other experts also agreed on the need for drastically toughening sanctions on the North and to prepare for its eventual collapse while emphasizing China's role in the process. Victor Cha, chief Korea analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who has returned from "track two" contact with the North, expressed concerns about escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula. "Sanctions may be important but we are entering into a dangerous phase," Cha said. "Regional countries conducting nuclear tests, and then having military exercises against them without any channel of dialogue are highly likely to lead to a misjudgment and likely raise the tension to an unthinkable level." (Choi Sung-jin, "U.S. Experts Say 'Strategic Patience Is over,'" *Korea Times*, February 9, 2016)

2/10/16

South Korea said that it would shut down an industrial complex that it runs jointly with North Korea, its strongest retaliation yet for the North's recent nuclear test and its launching of a long-range rocket over the weekend. In announcing the decision, Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo said the industrial complex in the North Korean border town of Kaesong, which went into operation in 2004, had wound up providing funds for the North's weapons programs. Hong, the South's point man for negotiations on the North, said South Korea had informed Pyongyang of its decision and asked it to help the 184 South Korean factory managers at the complex to cross the border safely and return home. Although the Kaesong complex was temporarily shut down in 2013, it was the North that initiated the closing, by pulling out its workers to protest joint South Korean-American military drills. The South responded by withdrawing its managers. Today's action was the first time the South unilaterally closed the complex. And by officially identifying the factory park as a source of cash for the North's nuclear program, the South seemed to indicate that the shutdown was permanent. "We cannot stop North Korea's nuclear and missile programs with the existing methods of response," Hong said in a nationally televised statement. "We need to act strongly together with the international community to ensure that North Korea pay a price, and we need to take special actions to leave the North with no option but to give up its nuclear program and change." Hong said the Kaesong factory park had been an important source of cash for the North Korean government. He said North Korea had

earned more than \$560 million in wages for its workers there, including \$120 million last year. Businesses and the government from the South have also invested \$852 million in factories, roads and other facilities there. "In the end, it appears that the money was used not for the peace the international community wanted but to advance the North's nuclear weapons and long-range missiles," he said. Kaesong was the last of those joint projects still functioning and the most important symbol of inter-Korean good will. Streams of cars and trucks going to and from the complex crossed the otherwise tightly sealed border daily, carrying South Korean factory managers into the North and manufactured goods into the South. More than 45,000 North Koreans worked for 123 South Korean-owned factories at Kaesong last year, producing more than \$515 million worth of textiles, electronic parts and other labor-intensive goods, according to the South Korean government. But the wages, paid in American dollars, did not go directly to the North Korean workers. Instead, the Pyongyang government took the bulk of the cash, with the workers getting just a small fraction of their wages in the local currency, according to South Korean officials here. Conservative South Koreans and some American policy makers have long feared that proceeds from Kaesong have benefited the North's nuclear arms program. Hong, the unification minister, said that the South had needed to take drastic action. He said the North's nuclear ambitions, if left unchecked, could set off a "nuclear domino effect" in the region, with other countries pursuing their own arms programs in response to the North's. South Koreans who have argued for keeping Kaesong open said that cutting off trade with the North would only weaken Seoul's economic leverage and push Pyongyang closer to China. South Korea was once a major trading partner of the North, but almost all of the isolated country's trade now goes through China, which has resisted appeals from Seoul and Washington to use its influence to curb the North's nuclear ambitions. Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute in South Korea, said the shutdown of Kaesong was "the worst possible option" for the South. Economically, he said, it would do the North less harm than Seoul hoped, because the North could earn more cash by sending the same skilled North Korean workers to China. "When you look at the South Korean government's policies since the North's nuclear test, you cannot help thinking that it is reacting emotionally," Cheong said. The Kaesong complex had been closed since February 7 for the Lunar New Year holiday; the South's announcement means it will not reopen tomorrow as planned. Most of the roughly 500 South Korean managers based at the complex are home for the holiday, but 184 are still in Kaesong, South Korean officials said. (Choe Sang-hun, "South Korea to Shut Joint Factory Park over Nuclear Test and Rocket," *New York Times*, February 10, 2016) "The operation of the complex should not be used for North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction at a time when the international community is pushing for tougher sanctions against the North," said a ministry official. A total of 124 South Korean companies are operating in the zone, some 50 kilometers northwest of Seoul, employing more than 54,000 North Korean workers to produce labor-intensive goods, such as clothes and utensils. The official said that it is not the time to talk about when and whether operations at the complex can be resumed. "Whether the park can be reopened will entirely hinge on North Korea," he said. "The North should first dispel the international community's concerns about its nuclear and missile developments, and provide a favorable atmosphere for our firms to normally operate factories." (Yonhap, "S. Korea to Suspend Operation of

Kaesong Complex," February 10, 2016) South Korea's ruling and opposition parties showed mixed responses to the Seoul government's decision to suspend the operation of a joint industrial complex in North Korea. The ruling Saenuri Party said the party respects the government's decision, saying it was "an inevitable measure to end the vicious circle of North Korea's provocations." In a press release, the party said, "It is time for us to send a firm message that repeated provocations will only deepen the impoverished regime's isolation." Kim Moo-sung, the party's chairman, said he welcomes the decision, saying that the Seoul government has so far taken passive measures against the North's provocations. "There is no choice but to sanction North Korea until the country gives up its nukes," the chairman said during a meeting with senior party members. Meanwhile, the main opposition Minjoo Party of Korea strongly opposed the decision, saying that the move will exacerbate tensions on the Korean Peninsula by completely cutting off inter-Korean exchanges. "There is a high possibility that this measure will eventually lead to the permanent closure of the complex," Kim Sung-soo, the party's spokesman, said in a press release. The party said the decision is not the ultimate solution to the current situation, asking the government to reexamine the decision. (Yonhap, "Rival Parties Split over Suspension of Kaesong Complex," February 10, 2016) Park Geun-hye, the South Korean president, has acted with unusual decisiveness – and **acted alone**, following her gut instinct, advisers say – to close down the complex in the wake of North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, and with it the "sunshine policy" era of engagement. "She's the president. The buck stops with her," said a senior government official. The Kaesong complex was shut down once before – by North Korea, which withdrew its workers during a period of heightened tensions in 2013. But experts think that this time, the closure is permanent. "Realistically, it's closed for good," said Lee Jong-seok, who was South Korea's minister of unification during the "sunshine policy" years and remains a strong proponent of engagement. "Now that the South Korean government has alleged that the money is going into North Korea's nuclear program, there's no way they can reopen this." Park had tried to find a middle ground between the sunshine policy and the hardline tendencies of her predecessor, pursuing what she called a "trustpolitik" approach to North Korea – a combination of carrots and sticks. But the nuclear test and missile launch forced her to call an end to this approach. "She's come to realize that trustpolitik doesn't work," said Chun Yung-woo, national security adviser to Park's predecessor and an advocate of a much tougher approach to the North. "She's now decided to speak the language that North Korea understands – the language of sanctions and regime change." (Anna Fifield, "After a Nuclear Park Has Epiphanies on North Korea, China," *Washington Post*, February 21, 2016)

Japan announced it will impose unilateral sanctions on North Korea, including a ban on entry by North Korean ships. Earlier in the day, the government held a meeting of the National Security Council to make final arrangements on unilateral sanctions on North Korea, which fired a ballistic missile on Sunday in defiance of international warnings. The entry into Japanese ports by North Korean ships, including those on humanitarian purposes, will be banned, which also applies to ships of third countries that made a port call at North Korea. The government will also revive a reentry ban, in principle, on senior officials of the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) and expand the scope of the ban to other officials.

The ban on reentry to Japan will also include such non-Japanese living in Japan as engineers related to nuclear and missile technologies who have traveled to North Korea. The entry into Japan by North Korean nationals will also be banned, in principle. According to the government, the scope of organizations and individuals subject to asset freezes will also be expanded. "The government decided on resolute sanctions," Prime Minister Abe Shinzo told reporters this evening. "We will closely cooperate with the international community to settle abduction, nuclear and missile issues." Asked about the effectiveness of the sanctions, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide said at a press conference, "We believe our country's intention will fully come across to [North Korea] and they [the sanctions] will be effective." (Sakurai Yosuke, "Govt. Slaps Unilateral Sanctions on N. Korea," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 10, 2016) Japan in 2014 eased some earlier sanctions on North Korea in exchange for its pledge to reinvestigate the fate of the Japanese abductees. Today's measures go slightly beyond the restoration of the previously eased measures. The ban on port entry extends to any foreign ships coming to Japan after visiting North Korea. The travel ban will also be broadened to include any foreigners with nuclear and missile expertise who visit North Korea. All money transfers, except for those below 100,000 yen (\$880) for humanitarian purposes, will be banned. Takesada Hideshi, a North Korea expert at Takushoku University in Tokyo, said Japan has already severed trade and most other exchanges with North Korea, and there is not much left to do. He said there is more room for tougher sanctions elsewhere, including South Korea, where North Korea still earns foreign currencies. "Japan has a dilemma," he said. "North Korea's missile development poses a serious threat to Japan's national security, but Japan has the abduction issue and it doesn't want to lose its communication with the North." (Associated Press, "Japan Announces New Sanctions on North Korea," *Asahi Shimbun*, February 10, 2016) Abe explained the strengthening of Japan's unilateral sanctions against North Korea in a telephone conference with U.S. President Barack Obama on Tuesday, reportedly saying, "We'll take a risk with the abduction issue, but we'll do this [enforce sanctions], Barack." (Yonekawa Takeshi, "Sanctions Adopted in Unison," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 11, 2016)

Crossing a red line. Unacceptable. Won't be tolerated. Serious consequences. Those are just a handful of the scolding phrases uttered over the past two decades at every bend on North Korea's road to becoming a nuclear state, from pulling out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and expelling inspectors to its more recent advances in weapons and missile technology. Over the past decade in particular, since North Korea tested its first nuclear device in 2006, the international community has turned repeatedly to one means of showing Pyongyang just how angry it is: sanctions. There have been sanctions designed to stop North Korea from acquiring weapons technology and conventional arms, sanctions to block its ability to move money around the world and sanctions to prevent the ruling Kim family and its cronies from getting personal watercraft and fancy watches. The United Nations was already considering a new round of measures to punish Pyongyang for its fourth nuclear test, conducted last month, when leader Kim Jong Un ordered the launch Sunday of a long-range rocket thought to be part of his country's ballistic missile program. Denunciations of North Korea's behavior and pleas for China – a veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council – to get tough on the regime followed

immediately, prompting a familiar sense of déjà vu. "The U.S. and North Korea are mired in a 'tit for tat' situation where there is a provocation by North Korea followed by a U.S. or U.N. response, followed by a North Korean response," said Keith Luse, executive director of the National Committee on North Korea and a former top congressional aide. "The situation resembles layers of an onion." Although sanctions have no doubt made it harder for Pyongyang to do business, they clearly have not forced the regime to change its behavior or prevented significant advances in the North's nuclear weapons program. As Iran prepares to welcome international oil companies after its historic nuclear deal with the United States, Cuba welcomes American tourists and Burma comes to grips with democracy, one question continues to vex U.S. officials: How do you solve a problem like North Korea? The Obama administration has exercised "strategic patience," the idea – championed by Hillary Clinton while she was secretary of state – that the United States can wait for North Korea to agree to denuclearization talks. Republican presidential hopefuls, no doubt mindful that Clinton could end up as the Democratic nominee, have denounced that policy and laid out alternative plans. At the most recent GOP debate, which began just half an hour after North Korea launched Sunday's rocket, former Florida governor Jeb Bush said he was not against a "preemptive strike" on North Korea, Florida Sen. Marco Rubio said North Korea should be put back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and businessman Donald Trump said, "Let China solve that problem." Analysts across the spectrum agree that the current policy appears not to have worked. "There's a decent consensus out there that we have no strategy. It's very hard to find anyone to defend strategic patience," said John Delury, an international relations professor at Yonsei University in Seoul. "We can't just go on like this." But there is no appetite in Washington for engagement, and North Korea has made clear that it has no interest in talks about denuclearization. Its message has been: We're a nuclear state now. Deal with us as such. Military action, meanwhile, is problematic. While North Korea's outdated military technology is no match for the United States', it has enough artillery trained on Seoul to inflict huge damage on the South Korean capital before falling. So what's left? Sanctions. And in the absence of tough new punishments from the United Nations, where China and Russia typically water down multilateral action, the burden of strengthening existing sanctions falls on the United States. "There's lots more we can do on the punitive track," said Bruce Klingner, a former North Korea analyst at the CIA, now at the Heritage Foundation. "We can continue to try to enforce our own laws and to constrain North Korea." This is a rare subject of bipartisan agreement on Capitol Hill. The House last month approved a sweeping new sanctions bill by a vote of 418 to 2, and the Senate is set to vote on a similar bill Thursday. There are still plenty of tools left in the sanctions box, Klingner said, noting that the United States has targeted twice as many Zimbabwean entities as North Korean ones and has not designated North Korea as a primary money-laundering concern, as it did with Iran and Burma. Even Christopher Hill, the former U.S. diplomat who brokered a 2005 agreement under which North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear program, advises against trying to engage the regime. "We have to take the North Koreans at their word, and they have repeatedly said that they're not interested in negotiation," Hill said. "They want to talk to us, but they want to talk to us as a nuclear power." Instead, it all comes back to China, he said. "I would like to see much more focus on a deep dive with the Chinese to see what can be done." Indeed, no matter how strong any sanctions may be, they

count for almost nothing if China is not on board. As North Korea's main, if reluctant, patron, China could cut off its neighbor's access to goods, oil and financing. But even as it has supported U.N. sanctions, Beijing has still allowed enough trade and aid to get through to keep North Korea afloat. "If North Korea realizes that the road is blocked, then they will have no choice but to turn around," said Scott Snyder, a Korea specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations. "But can we block the road? The less China cooperates, the more difficult that challenge is for us." Chinese officials have not sent positive signals on the expansion of sanctions, instead urging all sides to "remain calm, act cautiously, avoid taking moves that could further increase tensions on the peninsula." China has long shown it prefers a contained North Korea to a collapsed North Korea that could bring thousands of the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea right up to its border. "They suggest that the imperative for stability has trumped denuclearization," Snyder said. But in trying to figure out how to deal with North Korea, Snyder said, the United States has taken the wrong approach. Washington has been sending officials to Beijing to exhort it to crack down on North Korea, he noted, while also trying to make up for China's lack of action with unilateral punitive measures. "We should be showing up in Beijing," Snyder said, "and saying, 'Hey, that's a heck of a problem you've got on your hands with North Korea.'" (Anna Fifield, "When It Comes to Punishing North Korea, It's Groundhog Day," *Washington Post*, February 11, 2016)

The top military officers from the United States, South Korea and Japan said they agreed at a meeting to step up information-sharing and coordination of security efforts in light of increasing North Korean nuclear and missile threats. The three chiefs of defense issued a joint statement calling North Korea's fourth nuclear test and "long-range missile launch" direct violations of U.N. resolutions and "serious provocations against the international community." They said they agreed to firmly respond to Pyongyang's actions through "trilateral information sharing" and "to coordinate further on mutual security issues to enhance peace and stability in the region." Adm. Kawano Katsutoshi, head of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, met with U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, while Army Gen. Lee Sun-Jin, chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined them by video teleconference. It was the second meeting among the defense chiefs of the three countries since July 2014, said U.S. Navy Capt. Greg Hicks, Dunford's spokesman. (Reuters, "U.S., South Korea, Japan Boost Data-Sharing in Response to North Korean Threat," *Japan Times*, February 11, 2016)

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump recently unveiled his plan to stop the North's experiments with nuclear weapons and to topple the Kim Jong-un regime. The plan, which experts here often describe as "half-baked," is centered on U.S. pressure on China, the reclusive state's most important ally. "I would get China to make that guy [Kim Jong-un] disappear in one form or another very quickly," Trump said in an interview with CBS. Co-host Norah O'Donnell asked Trump what he meant and if he was calling for North Korea's leader to be assassinated. "Well, you know, I've heard of worse things, frankly," Trump said. "I mean, this guy is a bad dude. And don't underestimate him." Asked why the U.S. would not address the North Korean issue itself, Trump said China needed to do so because it already had control over the North. Trump said he would use economic sanctions to force China to act. "China has

control — absolute control — of North Korea," Trump said. "They don't say it, but they do, and they should make that problem disappear." (Park Si-soo, "Can Trump Defuse North Korea's Nuclear Program?" *Korea Times*, March 6, 2016)

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North Korea ordered a military takeover of a factory park that had been the last major symbol of cooperation with South Korea, calling Seoul's earlier suspension of operations at the jointly run facility as punishment for the North's recent rocket launch a "dangerous declaration of war." North Korea said it was responding to Seoul's shutdown order by immediately deporting the hundreds of South Koreans who work at the complex just across the world's most heavily armed border in the city of Kaesong, pulling out the tens of thousands of North Korean employees and freezing all South Korean assets. The North also said it was shutting down two crucial cross-border communication hotlines. Hours after the North's expulsion deadline, South Korea's Unification Ministry, which is responsible for ties with the North, said all of the 280 South Korean workers who had been at the facility had finally crossed into South Korea. South Korea said it would ban reporters from the border crossing tomorrow. "I was told not to bring anything but personal goods, so I've got nothing but my clothes to take back," a manager at a South Korean apparel company at the complex, who declined to give his name, told *The Associated Press* by phone before he crossed to the South. Chang Beom Kang, who has been running an apparel company in Kaesong since 2009, said from South Korea that his company has about 920 North Korean workers – who didn't show up today – and seven South Korean managers at Kaesong. He said one of his workers, who entered Kaesong earlier today, was about to cross the border to return to South Korea with thousands of women's clothes produced at the factory. But at the last minute the employee had to drive back to the factory to unload the clothes because of North Korea's announcement that it would freeze all South Korean assets there. "I'm devastated now," Kang said by phone, saying he's worried about losing credibility with clients because of the crisis. *Yonhap*, citing an unidentified military official, reported that South Korea bolstered its military readiness and strength along the western portion of the border in the event of a North Korean provocation. The report didn't elaborate on what that meant. Seoul's Defense Ministry would only say that its military has been on high alert since the North's nuclear test last month. North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea said in a statement that the South's shutdown of Kaesong was a "dangerous declaration of war" and a "declaration of an end to the last lifeline of the North-South relations." Such over-the-top rhetoric is typical of the North's propaganda, but the country appeared to be backing up its language with its strong response. The statement also issued crude insults against South Korean President Park Geun-hye, saying she masterminded the shutdown and calling her a "confrontational wicked woman" who lives upon "the groin of her American boss." Such sexist language is also typical of North Korean propaganda. Last year, 124 South Korean companies hired 54,000 North Korean workers to produce socks, wristwatches and other goods worth about \$500 million. South Korean businesses with factories at the park reacted with a mixture of disappointment and anger. In a statement, the association of South Korean companies at Kaesong denounced Seoul's decision as "entirely incomprehensible and unjust." (Ahn Young-Joon, "N. Korea Orders Military Takeover of Inter-Korean Factories," *Associated Press*, February 11, 2016) In April 2013, the North shut down the complex



for about four months, citing what it called heightened tensions sparked by a military drill between Seoul and Washington. The two Koreas agreed not to shut it down again "under any circumstances" when they decided to reopen it. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Expels S. Koreans from Kaesong Complex, Freezes Assets," February 11, 2016)

South Korea has cut off power and water supplies to a factory park in North Korea, officials said a day after the North deported all South Korean workers there and ordered a military takeover of the complex that had been the last major symbol of cooperation between the rivals. Last night, the 280 South Korean workers who had been at the park crossed the border into South Korea, several hours after a deadline set by the North passed. Their departure quashed concerns that some might be held hostage, and lowered the chances that the standoff might lead to violence or miscalculations. But they weren't allowed to bring back any finished products and equipment at their factories because the North announced it will freeze all South Korean assets there. The North also said it was closing an inter-Korean highway linking to Kaesong and shutting down two cross-border communication hotlines. "I was told not to bring anything but personal goods, so I've got nothing but my clothes to take back," a manager at a South Korean apparel company at the complex, who declined to give his name, told The Associated Press by phone before he crossed to the South. Chang Beom Kang, who has been running an apparel company in Kaesong since 2009, said from South Korea that his company has about 920 North Korean workers – who didn't show up Thursday – and seven South Korean managers at Kaesong. He said one of his workers, who entered Kaesong earlier Thursday, was about to cross the border to return to South Korea with thousands of women's clothes produced at the factory. But at the last minute the employee had to drive back to the factory to unload the clothes because of North Korea's announcement that it would freeze all South Korean assets there. "I'm devastated now," Kang said by phone, saying he's worried about losing credibility with clients because of the crisis. (Associated Press, "Seoul Cuts off Electricity to Factory Park in North Korea," February 11, 2016)

CPRK statement "condemning the U.S. and the south Korean puppet group for declaring the total suspension of the operation in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) [yesterday], not content with kicking up the sanctions racket, while branding the DPRK's H-bomb test and launch of a satellite for peaceful purposes as what they called violation of the "UN resolutions." The statement said that the KIZ has been put in the state of total closure under the "regime" of Park Geun Hye, a traitor for all ages, though it operated for the common prosperity for more than a decade amid the concern and expectation of all compatriots since the adoption of the June 15 Joint Declaration.

**The recent provocative measure is a declaration of an end to the last lifeline of the north-south relations, total denial of the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration and a dangerous declaration of a war driving the situation in the Korean Peninsula to the brink of a war. ...** Since the outset of its office, the Park's group has desperately worked to close the KIZ, describing it as a "financial source" for the north. This time it finally took the action of totally suspending its operation after unreasonably raising matters having nothing to do with the north-south relations. Such act is a product of Park Geun Hye's inveterate sycophancy and abnormal confrontational hysteria kicked off by her at the prodding of the U.S. As the south Korean people are condemning the above-said action with indignation, the total

suspension of the operation in the KIZ is little short of an act of dropping an axe on one's own foot. Hit hard by this action are entrepreneurs and people of south Korea and it is the Park Geun Hye group of traitors who should pay a dear price for it. Unpardonable is the puppet group's act of totally suspending the operation in the KIZ, finding fault with the DPRK's H-bomb test and launch of a satellite, a just measure for self-defense and an exercise of its legitimate right. The DPRK solemnly clarifies internally and externally the following crucial measures in view of the prevailing situation: Firstly, **the DPRK will totally block the Military Demarcation Line near the KIZ from 10 am, Feb. 11, 2016, cut off the roads along the west coast in the areas under the control of the north and the south and close the KIZ and declare it as the area under the military control.** Secondly, **it will expel all persons of the south side in the KIZ till 5 pm, Feb. 11, 2016.** Thirdly, **it will completely freeze all assets including equipment, materials and products of the south Korean enterprises and relevant organs in the KIZ. The persons to be expelled are not allowed to take things out of the zone, except for their personal belongings, and the frozen equipment, materials and products will be put under the control of Kaesong City People's Committee.**

Fourthly, **the military communication and Panmunjom hotline will be cut off the moment the personnel of the south side are expelled.** Fifthly, **all workers of the DPRK will leave the KIZ on Feb. 11, 2016.** The south Korean puppet group will experience what disastrous and painful consequences will be entailed by its action." (KCNA, "DPRK Warns S. Korean Authorities of Most Serious Consequences of Total Suspension of Operation in KIZ," February 11, 2016)

North Korea has reconfigured Japanese-made civilian radar systems for use by naval ships as showcased at an anti-ship missile test reported last year, a document compiled by experts investigating U.N. sanctions against the country says. The 73-page document, seen by Kyodo News ahead of its submission to the Security Council next month, also cites a ship linked to a U.N.-blacklisted North Korean shipping company berthed near a city in western Japan for a few days last March.

With the revelation that commercial Japanese devices have been funneled to North Korean military forces, the Japanese government may feel compelled to come up with a new response to ensure the effectiveness of sanctions, particularly after its decision to tighten measures to punish Pyongyang for its recent activities. Concerning the Japanese radars, the report says, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea acquired and adapted commercial antennas for their naval vessels, three of which were seen during the test-firing of an anti-ship missile publicized on Feb. 7, 2015." Although the unnamed Japanese manufacturer said it had "no records of sale" to the country after June 12, 2009, the panel notes that the systems displayed aboard the missile boats were "off-the-shelf products." They are widely used around the world in the fishing and leisure craft markets, it adds. As the items cannot be traced without a serial number, the panel cautions countries to remain on guard when exporting any maritime electronics, including radars, sonar systems and compasses. This was not the first case of Japanese commercial products being converted for illicit purposes in North Korea. The International Atomic Energy Agency uncovered a Japanese-made vacuum pump being used at a North Korean nuclear facility in a 2007 inspection. A

Tokyo-based trading agent escaped charges for conducting the unauthorized export. The Japanese police reported that an executive admitted to exporting the pump to Taiwan knowing it would eventually be shipped to North Korea. The company was warned by the Japanese government the following year not to engage in similar practices. Also mentioned in the report was an incident involving the Hui Chon, a vessel associated with Ocean Maritime Management Co., which anchored off the coast of Sakaiminato city in Tottori Prefecture from March 9-13 last year. OMM, based in Pyongyang, was added to the U.N. sanctions list in 2014 by the Security Council after one of its cargo ships was seized in Panama. The Chong Chon Gang was laden with concealed arms buried under bags of sugar when it was intercepted in 2013 while traveling from Cuba to North Korea. Japan told the panel the Hui Chon "had been permitted to take shelter from inclement weather," but it remained outside the harbor the entire time. Tokyo claimed it had no legal grounds to detain the ship, as it had the right to "innocent passage" in territorial waters. It remains unknown why the ship was traveling near Japanese waters. The panel also cites a report from a member state in December 2015 about a shipment of cargo from Dalian to Lattakia, Syria, containing commercially available items that could be used for military purposes. The shipment was controlled by entities tied to Korea Mining Development Trading Corp., which handles weapons exports for North Korea. The cargo, seized in May 2014, included machinery and measuring devices. "Certain items may be used in the production of arms or a principal component of Scud missile liquid propellant," says the panel, which conducted an on-site inspection. The items were "mostly sourced from the Mainland (China), Hong Kong and Taiwan with some coming from Denmark, Japan and the United States." None of the suppliers knew they would be re-exported to Syria, the panel says. The Japanese supplier told the panel it asked one of the Chinese procurement companies about the "end user," but did not get a response. Japanese technology was also found in North Korean drones, which was also highlighted by the panel in the report. It says the country has around 300 drones and its intelligence service, the Reconnaissance General Bureau, is involved in the procurement and operation of drones for reconnaissance. The drone that crashed into Baengnyeong island in March 2014, for instance, contained components that were from Japan, including a camera that had been sold to a Chinese distributor. Of the two other drones that crashed into Paju and Samcheok in the spring of 2014, there were three Japanese components – an engine and muffler, a gyro board and a motor. The report points out that the drones' components, also from the United States, China and Switzerland, are "widely available" and not on a list of prohibited items. The panel is recommending expanding the scope of prohibited items to include unmanned aerial vehicles with reconnaissance and other capabilities as well as navigation and guidance systems for UAVs. Drones are subject to the current ban but only if they have a range of more than 300 kilometers and can carry an object of over 500 kilograms. (Kyodo, "Japan Radar Components Used by North Korean Navy: U.N. Report," *Japan Times*, February 12, 2016)

The prospect of a friendly new era between China and South Korea seemed to collapse this week. After North Korea, China's treaty ally, launched a rocket, apparently to test ballistic missile technology, South Korea embraced what China had been trying to prevent: an American antimissile defense system that will be deployed on China's

doorstep. China now appears angrier at the South Koreans than at Kim, who ignored its advice against the rocket launch. Park's government said it was entering talks with the Obama administration regarding the deployment of THAAD, and the Pentagon said the installation, paid for by the United States, would take place as quickly as possible. "President Park was very disappointed and upset with Xi's inaction and silence against North Korea when she desperately needed Xi's help," said Kim Heung-kyu, director of the China Policy Institute at Ajou University in Suwon, South Korea. Xi was then embarrassed domestically by Park's rush to accept the American defense system, Kim said. "Xi Jinping's efforts to enlist President Park as a friend have not gone as well as he hoped," he said, "and she was certainly disappointed in his efforts to control Kim Jong-un." After the rocket launch on Sunday, China expressed "regrets" and argued vigorously at the United Nations against sweeping new sanctions. In contrast, China said it was "deeply concerned" about South Korea's decision to allow the deployment of the missile defense system. It warned that "every country must not undermine the security interest of other countries while pursuing its own security interests," clearly implying that the missile system was aimed at solidifying Washington's network of alliances in Northeast Asia rather than offering protection against North Korea. To demonstrate its annoyance, the Chinese Foreign Ministry summoned the South Korean ambassador in Beijing, Kim Jang-soo, to protest the talks between Seoul and Washington on the missile defense system. (In a nod to even-handedness, the Chinese also called in the North Korean ambassador, Ji Jae-ryong, over the rocket launch.) China's anger at the imminence of an American missile system so close to its borders stems from two propositions, said Chu Shulong, a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing. First, many in the Chinese government do not believe that North Korea would use its nuclear weapons, Chu said. Second, the belief that deploying the THAAD system is aimed principally at solidifying America's position in Northeast Asia is widespread in Beijing, where officials fear the ultimate goal is to contain China. "North Korea is a bad regime, yes, everyone agrees on that," Chu said. "Is North Korea going to use its weapons? Perhaps not. They are not seen as an immediate threat." Of more concern to the Chinese than the North's nuclear weapons, Chu said, is the notion that THAAD would knit South Korea and Japan, allies that have their own deep squabbles, more tightly under a United States umbrella. "THAAD will bring South Korea and Japan closer to the U.S. defense system, making much more of a military bloc that is targeting China and Russia," he said. Chinese experts contend that THAAD has a radar range capable of reaching into China and threatening its own missile deterrence. "China is worried about THAAD's radar range – more than 2,000 kilometers – so long it can penetrate into China," said Shen Dingli, a professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai who is also a physicist. For China, the "introduction of THAAD is a setback because it links South Korea to a U.S. regional strategy," said Scott A. Snyder, senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. "It remains to be seen whether China will respond to this setback by further limiting cooperation with the United States on North Korea or whether China is able to impose costs on South Korea for its decision." (Jane Perlez, "North's Rocket Launch Frays South Korea's Ties with China," *New York Times*, February 11, 2016, p. A-10)

2/12/16

KCNA: In recent days, foreign experts on international affairs and major media are presenting various views on the issue of ensuring peace and security in the Korean Peninsula. They are unanimous in asserting that in order to find a solution to the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula it is necessary for the U.S. to admit the fact that it was spawned by its persistent military threat and nuclear blackmail against the DPRK and put an end to the state of truce in the peninsula through the conclusion of a peace treaty with the latter. Kalashnikov, first vice-chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the State Duma of Russia, at the interview with TV Tsentr of his country on January 22 said that the U.S., south Korea and Japan are chiefly to blame for compelling the DPRK to have access to nuclear weapons as they have posed military threats to it since the 1950s. Posted on a U.S. website mainly dealing with foreign policy matters was an article which held that the U.S. persistent policy of confrontation brought about the consequences of compelling the DPRK to bolster up its nuclear force and now is the time to conclude a peace treaty which can make everybody feel safe. This drew world attention. On January 18 an Asian medium viewed the DPRK's proposal for concluding a peace treaty as a reasonable and positive one, adding that everything can be fundamentally settled only when the Armistice Agreement is replaced by a peace treaty and confidence is built between the DPRK and the U.S. This goes to prove that whoever has reasonable thinking about the issue of ensuring peace and security in the peninsula agrees with the necessity and urgency to put an end to the hostile relations between the DPRK and the U.S. It is a top priority task for preserving peace and security in the peninsula and the rest of the world to put an end to such relations. The DPRK and the U.S. are in the de facto relations of belligerency due to the latter's vicious hostile policy toward the former and its moves to isolate and stifle the DPRK in order to bring down its social system. They are not simply at war technically, pursuant to the Armistice Agreement concluded in 1953. U.S. President Obama is openly trumpeting about "collapse" of the DPRK, regarding it as an enemy. Various strategies and operational scenarios for stifling it are being steadily modified and supplemented by the U.S. and its followers and its plans for political, economic and military blackmail are getting undisguised with each passing day. Consequently, the peninsula has turned into the hottest spot in the world and a hotbed of a nuclear war where an evil cycle of confrontation and tension is ceaseless and even a trifling accidental case may spark off a thermonuclear war all of a sudden. It is as clear as a pikestaff that in case a nuclear war breaks out in the Korean Peninsula, the center of Northeast Asia beset with a lot of social, historic, political and military issues, it will spill over into a regional and global nuclear war. The fundamental and best way for preventing such grave situation is for the U.S. to put a definite end to its hostile policy toward the DPRK and build a lasting peace-keeping mechanism in the peninsula. However, the U.S. is persistently crying out for the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear weapons, paying no heed to such unanimous demand of the international community. The U.S. is raising the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear weapons as a precondition for building the above-said mechanism. This is just like a guilty party filing the suit first. Its scenario is to keep instability in the peninsula and threaten the DPRK by force of arms and make a military strike at it anytime and occupy it. But it is nothing but a daydream. The U.S. desperate pursuance of its anachronistic policy for stifling the DPRK would only increase the danger of a nuclear war in the peninsula and touch off the world's bitterer criticism of it and adversely affect its security. The U.S. would be

well advised to respond to resolving this urgent matter as desired by the world, bearing in mind that putting an end to the hostile relations between the DPRK and the U.S. is directly linked with the issue of ensuring not only peace and security on the peninsula but also security in its mainland." (KCNA, "KCNA Calls for End to Hostile Relations between DPRK and U.S.," February 12, 2016)

DPRK "Special Investigation Committee" statement: "The Japanese government on [February 12] decided to make the first move to take sanctions measures against the DPRK independent of the UN sanctions under the pretext of the H-bomb test and satellite launch of the DPRK. The measures would reportedly include the expansion of objects to be subject to the freeze of fund and to the restrictions as for the personnel visits and remittance as well as re-effectuation of those sanctions which Japan partially lifted under the May, 2014 DPRK-Japan inter-governmental Stockholm agreement. The "Special Investigation Committee" of the DPRK issued a statement Friday denouncing the Japanese government for scrapping even the agreement reached at the inter-governmental talks without hesitation, being bereft of elementary fidelity. The Japanese reactionaries, who are accustomed to the bad habit of abusing the sincerity of the dialogue partner to use it as a source of provocation, reneged on all their commitments made in the inter-governmental agreement by citing an issue which has nothing to do with its implementation, and made a frontal challenge to the DPRK. ...We have already told Japan enough what consequences it may face for its reckless acts. But the Abe regime reapplied the sanctions which had been lifted and even took additional sanctions. This is little short of the declaration of its own scrapping of the Stockholm agreement. We clarify as follows our just stand now that Japan revealed its sinister intention to push the DPRK-Japan relations into a stalemate and to keep stand-off with the DPRK to the last: Firstly, the comprehensive investigation into all the Japanese that had been under way under the inter-governmental Stockholm agreement will be totally stopped and the "Special Investigation Committee" be dissolved from February 12, 2016. Secondly, Japan's provocative acts of hostility toward the DPRK will ensue stronger countermeasures. The Abe regime has to hold full responsibilities for causing such a grave consequence as today's." (KCNA, "Japan Assailed for Scrapping DPRK-Japan Inter-Governmental Agreement," February 12, 2016)

North Korea said it has disbanded a special committee that was set up in 2014 to look into the whereabouts of missing Japanese nationals suspected of being abducted, in response to Tokyo's decision earlier this week to impose new sanctions on Pyongyang. In Tokyo, a senior official of Abe's government said North Korea's announcement was "within expectations" and that Japan will have to take a wait-and-see stance as it watches developments in Pyongyang. Another official said that despite the stalemate, Japan will tackle the abduction issue "tenaciously," pointing out Tokyo's principle of "action for action" in dealing with Pyongyang. (Kyodo, "N. Korea Disbands Special Probe Team on Japanese Abduction Issue," February 12, 2016)

Ruediger Frank: "If we assume that all wages were transferred to the government, the income North Korea was able to generate from operating Kaesong was about US\$ 100 million annually, less than one percent of its annual trade volume. One could argue

over the significance of that amount; it is certainly no small change for a country that has very limited options of acquiring hard currency. At the same time, it is also not an amount that would make or break the North Korean economy. Obviously, South Korea has for many years shared that assessment, otherwise it would have closed the zone much earlier. So what benefits has South Korea gained from Kaesong? To begin with, there were economic benefits from exploiting cheap North Korean labor. Over 50,000 Korean-speaking women, well educated, disciplined and tightly controlled by Pyongyang helped a number of South Korean sunset industries (textiles, shoes, watches, etc.) survive. The wage level in South Korea is way too high for producers with high inputs of labor who need to be price competitive. Their alternatives would have been to go to China or Southeast Asia, or to exit the market altogether. Semi-finished products from South Korea were brought to Kaesong, value was added, and they were sent back to South Korea for further processing or to be sold to the final user. Kaesong thus secured South Korean jobs and profits. But, more importantly, Kaesong was a huge propaganda machine. I have visited the zone a couple of times since 2004 and compared it to the working environment I knew from regular North Korean factories. In Kaesong, everything was clean, bright and modern—a perfect showcase. The employers also provided meals and snacks to their North Korean workers who couldn't help but believe that what they learned from illegally watching South Korean soap operas was true: that the South was a land of plenty. In a subtle way, even South Korean language was smuggled in: the restrooms were marked "Hwajangsil" (powder room), rather than "wisaengsil" (hygienic room) as anywhere else in North Korea. Now, those once lucky girls have lost their jobs. Does anybody seriously believe they will blame Kim Jong Un for this? It clearly wasn't he who closed the factories. To hope that he will be held responsible by the "Kaesong 50,000" is a long shot. Furthermore, it is simply impossible that years and years of close day-to-day contacts with tens of thousands of young North Koreans would not have yielded rare, systematic and valuable insights into an otherwise essentially closed country. Seemingly innocent information (what music do you like) and more substantial data (how happy are you) have continuously flowed into the office of the South Korean intelligence service, providing a barometer of the mood in North Korea. Last but not least, with all other channels closed, Kaesong was one of the few, if not the only option for an informal dialogue at times when bilateral talks were officially impossible but urgently necessary to prevent an escalation or to smooth the way to better relations. The existing hotlines have now been cut at a time when the next round of military maneuvers of South Korean and US troops will likely trigger an angry response from Pyongyang. These were all good reasons for Seoul to keep the KIZ open despite, or perhaps rather because of the otherwise rocky relationship with Pyongyang. But that era is now over and Kaesong has been closed. There is no doubt that it is the sovereign right of any state to cancel joint economic projects and to withdraw investments, but was it a wise decision? The rationale for closing Kaesong seems to be that North Korea has to be punished for the January 6 nuclear test and the February 7 rocket launch and that this time the punishment has to be different. Pyongyang will miss the US\$ 100 million annually, but will it miss the money enough to trigger a change in its behavior? That is far from certain, given that this amount of money is merely a fraction of North Korea's exports to China. And there are many options to make up for the loss; among the wildcards in this respect is Russia, a country that is perhaps even less inclined than

China to adhere to US demands for sanctions. The South Korean Ministry of Unification argues that the revenue from Kaesong has been used to upgrade North Korea's nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, however with little evidence. It's not like payments were made in cash with marked notes that could be clearly tracked. For that matter, the same could be said for any payment to North Korea, for example in the context of tourism or trade. But will it be legally possible to ban free citizens of Western countries, not to mention China, to travel? And would this be a good idea? As an East German, I can only repeat how deeply subversive the experience of observing, let alone interacting with, West Germans was before unification. And let's not forget that money that ends up on the markets in North Korea helps the non-state part of the economy to flourish and strengthens the new middle class that has developed over the past decade or so. Cutting all this off would be a stupid thing to do for any government that aims at economic and other reform in North Korea. It would also be interesting to know which components of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs really depend on imports. Given the harsh sanctions and the proud claims of the Pyongyang government, it seems that after decades of research and **initial external input**, the programs are currently more or less indigenous. If this is true, then a reduction in hard currency income will achieve nothing. In addition, it is yet unclear how the government in South Korea—often called East Asia's most developed democracy—came to this decision. For a step of such significance, and considering the potential countermeasures by the North, one would hope that it had been discussed in Seoul thoroughly with all relevant parties, particularly the businesses who suffer directly from the closure, and the opposition parties. Although it might be too early to tell, unlike in previous cases when Kaesong was affected, it seems that the South Korean decision to close the zone is not a temporary signal, but a permanent decision. Given the many positive aspects of that project as mentioned above, it would not be a very forward-looking step. Where do we pick up when things calm down again, as they have always done? The fate of the Mt. Kumgang tourism project is not very uplifting in this regard. It was **closed in 2008** after one million South Koreans had a chance to visit North Korea. Rather than opening another tourism project with South Korea or giving in otherwise, North Korea turned to China—successfully, as it seems—with now about 100,000 visitors annually. Something similar could happen this time if Pyongyang improves conditions for investment in the Northern zones of Sinuiju and Rason, or in any other of the over two dozen special economic zones across the country. The case of China has shown that concerns over human rights or the freedom of Tibet have not deterred Western enterprises from investing, as long as the chances for making profits were big enough. North Korea, with its abundant natural resources and its proximity to China, has even greater potential than South Korea before its "economic miracle." The case of Japan shows that North Korea is able to react quickly to changing conditions. Until 2001 Japan was North Korea's biggest trading partner; the failure to resolve the abductee issue reduced this trade to almost zero, but North Korea found new partners while Japan lost a major source of influence and intelligence. In return for depriving North Korea of a relatively small amount of money which has questionable relevance for its nuclear and missile programs and will likely be made up for from other sources, South Korea gives up substantial economic, political and intelligence benefits. Some politicians might hope this move makes a strong statement ahead of the South Korean parliamentary elections in April. However, it is in the eye of the beholder whether the



balance is positive or negative." (Ruediger Frank, "The Kaesong Closure: Punishment Or Shot in the Foot?" *38North*, February 12, 2016) William Brown: "Ruediger Frank, in his February 12 article on *38 North*, opines that in closing the Kaesong Industrial Zone (Kaesong or KIZ), South Korea may have "shot itself in the foot." I beg to differ, sharply. Closure might not change North Korea's nuclear and missile development, but it can open the door to reform driven by the continued slow-motion collapse of North Korea's command economy, of which, Kaesong has been an integral part. Furthermore, as a reformed economy is probably the only thing that will convince Kim Jong Un to quit his nuclear ambitions, we should make all efforts to encourage economic reform in North Korea. First, and a minor point, Frank appears to exaggerate the data, stating that Kaesong's \$100 million in annual income to the North Korean state is equivalent to only one percent of the country's total trade volume. That says North Korean foreign trade equals about \$10 billion a year, which seems rather high. Just released data from China indicates that North Korean trade with China in 2015 amounted to about \$5.4 billion (plus about \$600 million in free crude oil no longer included in the official statistics) and that is most of North Korea's trade. But why even compare the government's income from Kaesong to the total volume of trade? Aside from the crude oil, North Korean exports and imports are nearly in balance given the country's lack of credit and small amount of aid receipts, so any loss of income translates directly into the loss in the state's ability to buy what it needs. In that respect, \$100 million a year is not a small amount. It is twice the amount spent on Chinese computer related imports, for example, and six times the amount spent on Chinese grain imports. Much more important is the role that Kaesong has played in keeping alive the state enterprise or command economy system. It follows a long list of West European, Japanese and even American projects putatively aimed at helping North Korea transform its economy, but which instead have helped it degenerate into the mess it is today. Feeding the state these foreign interventions has allowed Pyongyang to muddle along without allowing an efficient private export industry to develop, something terribly needed by the people so they can earn money to feed and support themselves. I'm pretty sure if China had been the recipient of such largess, it also would not have reformed along Deng Xiaoping's lines in the 1980s. The specific economic problem with Kaesong is that the 54,000 workers there have never been paid in real money; instead, they have been provided rations from the state agency that manages the project. Most outsiders don't seem to understand this since the wages are negotiated in US dollars (about \$75 a month plus a large amount of overtime) and the South Korean firms pay this to the state agency. The workers get a portion, but as exchanged at the official rate of about 170 North Korean won per dollar, instead of the market rate of about 8,000 won per dollar—mere lip service to UN labor rules that say workers must be paid directly. So even if the worker received the entire dollar amount of her wage, her buying power would equate to only about two kilograms of rice *a month* in the Kaesong market. Or maybe \$5.00. Even in North Korea, this is nothing. No money circulates to employ other people in the village, encourage private activities, or to save and invest—a perfect solution for Pyongyang's otherwise frustrated and scarred central planners. Of course, the socialist system is supposed to provide every worker a food ration, free housing and education, and health care for what it is worth, so they may not need money to survive. And South Korean managers often provide perks unavailable in domestic factories, which the

workers sell in the markets for a little pocket money. In my view, the only correct way to describe such an employment system is slavery. One definition of slavery might be a system in which workers are not paid directly, lest money give them the power to become independent of their employer. The women of Kaesong have none of the economic power that real wages would provide. They work difficult jobs far from their families, are bused often at long distances from their dormitories, and are rotated out every several years. They can be fired at the whim of their Workers' Party bosses. How can this be a good experience for them? And how can the rest of the world countenance this kind of state behavior? An American analogy might be British support for Southern cotton plantations prior to the Civil War amid suggestions that this was good for the slaves since it supported their employment. So what will become of the 54,000 workers suddenly let go from Kaesong? They will be sent back to their family homes, but I suspect they will not fare much worse. Fortunately, a new phenomenon is occurring in North Korea as a result of the drying up of Western and South Korean aid—Pyongyang is being forced to allow private activities that generate foreign exchange earnings. The May 30, 2013 administrative measures, for example, allowed some pilot exporting firms to pay workers up to 300,000 won per month, 100 times the ordinary fixed wage schedule paid by state enterprises, in a bid to increase export goods production. In real terms, this is still a small wage but a livable one even completely apart from the command economy, and one that seems to be catching on. I suspect small Korean-Chinese investors are the ones taking advantage, employing many workers similar to those employed in Kaesong but in old decrepit factories in industrial North Korean cities. I don't know how well these pilots are working, but North Korean exports of the kinds of things such factories produce—textiles for example—have increased in the last couple of years, and markets of all kinds seem to be expanding rapidly. Amazingly, US dollars now flow freely within the economy. This comes at a big cost to state enterprises which are funded in won or are supplied directly through the central plan. The state enterprises are suffering loss of workers and material support with devastating impact on the important services they normally provide, such as electricity, rail transportation and the products of heavy industry. The military has high priority but even it is not immune from state resource constraints and increasingly has to earn dollars to compete for resources from the private sector. This is why the Kaesong dollars are so important. Hopefully, with the closure of Kaesong, North Korean authorities will have to expand the export earning pilots, maybe to Kaesong itself, or even throw out the socialist wage system. A new deal in which Kaesong is reopened with direct pay to workers and a reasonable tax cut for the state would signal real economic reform and should be welcomed by all sides." (William Brown, "The Economics of Kaesong," *38North*, February 12, 2016) Ruediger Frank: Brown and I seem to agree that a reformed economy is something to aim for in North Korea. We seem to disagree over how this should be achieved. I use systematic scholarly evidence from China and Vietnam documented in countless books, as well as my own anecdotal evidence on the ground in North Korea and Northeastern China, to argue that "success breeds success," and that more substantial reforms will follow after smaller reforms have produced positive effects. I disagree with the idea that sustainable and substantial reforms will be the result of an economic crisis. Pressure will NOT do the trick, it rather helps those in Pyongyang who argue that the country is under attack and thus personal (economic and political) interests needs to be

subordinated under national (security) interests. The South Korean president seems to have thought the same; she called her policy *Trustpolitik* in an obvious reference to Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. And you know what, in Germany's case, it worked. Or why would Franz Josef Strauss, one of West Germany's most hardline anti-Communists, have together with Helmut Kohl negotiated a 1 billion Deutschmark loan to Erich Honecker in 1983? On a more technical matter, Brown questions the statement that the 100 million from Kaesong amount to only 1 percent of North Korean trade. South Korea's KOTRA is the leading authority on that topic. They publish an annual report which in its latest version says that in 2014, total North Korean trade was US\$ 7.6 billion, excluding trade with South Korea, which would be another US\$ 1 billion annually. That's 8.6 billion. Add unrecorded trade. What is this? All one needs to do is take a plane or train from China to NK and see how many goods are transported this way, or drive along the Chinese border with North Korea and keep your eyes open. I did. Or read reports about illegal trade with copper, crystal meth and so forth. Or think about arms trade that would typically be a rather shady business. To be sure, this does not produce reliable numbers but it led me to understand that what finds its way into official statistics is not all there is. Finally, when it comes to North Korea related economic data, I like rounding such figures to make sure everyone understands these are only rough estimates. I think among the big fallacies in North Korean Studies is the pretense of possessing statistics that are correct to the point. That's why I would usually write 100 million if the number I found or calculated is 120 million, and this is why I used the 10 billion figure as an estimate of North Korea's foreign trade volume. Why compare the income from Kaesong to the country's trade at all? Because trade is North Korea's only alternative to acquiring hard currency, and because I could not think of any other figure that we could use as a sensible benchmark. As for the argument that aid prevents change, I agree in principle. Last Sunday was the 250th birthday of a certain Mr. Malthus who thought along a similar line, and who am I to challenge his views. Indeed, we have countless frustrating examples from all over the world where permanent receivership has only created bigger problems. But there are two reasons why I disagree with the notion that doing business with and in North Korea leads to such effects. The first one is that Mr. Brown and others seem to imply that business equals aid (or that talking is a concession). This is simply not true, at least not since the end of preferential trade agreements with socialist countries around 1990. Western companies do business in North Korea because they want to earn money. I have talked to dozens of businessmen (and women), starting in 1991 with a Dutch gentleman who had raw diamonds cut in Pyongyang and then brought them back to Europe. He was anything but a nice, naive left-leaning idealist. That guy wanted to make money, and he did. That's as simple as it is. The second reason is that in addition to economic effects, there are political and ideological effects as well. There are pundits who argue that the North Korean propaganda successfully manages to portray Western business in North Korea as a kind of kowtow in front of the leader, as a humble tribute of the barbarian who should be honored by the fact that his present is generously accepted even though it comes from such impure hands. This is total nonsense. North Koreans are under the influence of a strong ideology, but they are neither blind nor idiots. Did Kaesong "keep alive the state enterprise or command economy system"? No, it did not. It undermined it. Mr. Brown writes: "I'm pretty sure if China had been the recipient of such largess, it also would not have reformed along Deng Xiaoping's lines in the

1980s." That's an interesting point, considering that for example Volkswagen went to China in 1978 and established Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive in 1984. That's a degree of "largess" that North Korea can only dream about. OK, Volkswagen means "People's Car," so perhaps... Mr. Brown and others are most probably right in pointing out that the 54,000 North Korean workers in Kaesong did not receive a single US dollar; this is why I estimated the NK state's income from that project at US\$ 100 million (US\$ 100 a month, times 12 months, times 54000 women, plus X) and not at 30 million. Regarding the "official" rate, take a look at the image below. The same rate is being used officially and openly in Pyongyang in the Chinese Department Store in Kwangbok Street. Concerning slave labor... Mr. Brown has a point of course, but I have spoken with a number of such "slaves" and their employers in Yanbian/China, and it turns out that they bend over backwards to get these jobs. University graduates from Pyongyang work as waitresses, seamstresses, etc. and consider it a privilege to get such a chance. Now they could of course all have lied to me; at the end of the day I am just a German professor who knows nothing about the reality in North Korea. But that's the only evidence I have. Will the North Korean government decide to create more opportunities for firms to operate according to market principles and use at least a portion of their profits, including in hard currency? Yes, I think so. But they will do so partly because of what they have learned from experiments like Kaesong, not despite of it. And for that US\$ 100 million, they will find other sources. Russia and China are more than big enough to fill the gap. I know that many Japanese companies are already anxiously awaiting the day when the government in Tokyo finally declares the abductee issue as resolved, so that they can finally participate in exploiting North Korea's mineral resources, cheap labor and land border to China. A really bad person would even suggest that the Tokyo government, mindful of the beatings it received over Tokdo/Takeshima and the Comfort Women issue, would silently enjoy the immediate angry protests from Seoul. Let me close with an argument that I have posted as a comment to the discussion to my Kaesong article. Why (only) now? If Seoul wins so much by closing the KIZ, why has the zone been left open despite [the sinking of the ROKN] *Cheonan* in 2010, [shelling of] Yeonpyeong in 2010, the 2009 nuclear test, the 2013 nuclear test, the 2015 landmine, and so forth? Talk is cheap; actions matter. The South Korean government (conservative since 2008) has been unhappy with North Korea's nuclear program and other policies for many, many years. I believe that they have left Kaesong open until February 2016 is proof that until very recently, their assessment of the costs and benefits of the zone corresponded with mine. I wonder how and why this has changed, and would love to hear more about it."

Booseung Chang: "The February debate on *38 North* between Ruediger Frank and William Brown ... missed some important aspects of the KIZ, and included arguments based on misplaced assumptions about the reality of Kaesong. The most conspicuous of these dubious points was Brown's assertion that Kaesong's workers were "slaves." This article will attempt to provide a more accurate picture of the KIZ, first by addressing the characterization of Kaesong workers as slaves, and then by considering Kaesong's significance to both Koreas as well as its shutdown and possible future. Kaesong's workers cannot necessarily be considered slaves, as Brown claims, for three reasons: 1) they were paid although not in dollars, but in goods; 2) they responded to price signals in a manner similar to workers in capitalist economies; and 3) the constant labor scarcity in Kaesong likely enabled them to avoid the most brutal abuses typically

associated with slavery. Brown argues that each KIZ worker received minuscule compensation—on the order of \$5 per month—because the North Korean government effectively garnished their wages through distortion of the exchange rate. According to Brown, South Korean companies provided all Kaesong salaries to the government, which in turn conveyed wages to workers at the very low official exchange rate of about 170 North Korean won per dollar. He suggested that workers had to re-exchange their won for US dollars at an extremely high black-market rate (about 8,000 North Korean won per dollar) to buy rice and other daily necessities at black markets. This description is only partially true. While the North Korean government indeed took 30 percent of the total labor compensation as a de facto tax, the remainder (70 percent) went to each worker, mostly in the form of ration coupons redeemable for rice and other goods at Kaesong’s state-run commissaries. Employees reportedly preferred the state-run commissaries to black markets because, with the coupons, they could purchase goods at more favorable prices. According to Song Yong-deung, a Korean-Australian whose company managed Kaesong’s commissaries from 2004 to 2006, the dollar value of commissary goods purchased by North Korean workers amounted to roughly 90 percent of their total wages after tax. That is, they actually consumed most of their disposable income over the three years that his company ran the commissaries. His estimate was based on the fact that workers were paid in the form of coupons, not actual cash, issued from the North Korean government’s General Central Bureau of Development and Supervision for the Special Zone (CGB), a subsidiary organ of the North Korean Cabinet, which manages the KIZ and which pays the workers. Workers would then use these coupons to purchase goods in the KIZ commissaries. Additionally, in order to purchase commissary inventory from countries like China and Malaysia, Song had to trade these coupons received from KIZ workers for actual US dollars also at the CGB. This recycling of coupons through the commissary provided a way to track how the coupons were being used and what portion was going toward consumption. Song’s experience provides only a limited picture, since he turned over management of the commissaries to the North Korean government in 2007. Since then, the North Korean government may have emptied the shelves of Kaesong’s commissaries to the extent of store inventories elsewhere in the country, rendering the coupons useless. For this reason, the recent real wages of KIZ workers require confirmation. In a recent *OhMy News* report, Kim Chin-hyang, who worked in the KIZ from 2008 to 2011, explained that since 2006, few changes had been made to the salary payment system of the KIZ, which was based on coupons and commissaries. Another South Korean official, who worked in the KIZ from 2013 until the February 2016 shutdown, explained that Kaesong’s workers “appeared to receive adequate nutrition through the commissaries.” Second, “slaves” do not typically receive extra pay in the form of incentives, bonuses and overtime premiums. The base monthly salary for each KIZ worker before the shutdown was \$73.87 for 48 labor-hours per week,<sup>1</sup> but they generally earned far more than that through incentives and bonuses: they earned a 50 percent premium over their base hourly pay for each hour of overtime work, and earned double when working on holidays. As a result, some workers earned up to \$240 per month while others earned as little as \$150. For some, working extra hours was possible, in part, because physical conditions in the KIZ far surpassed those of other North Korean workplaces or of Kaesong residential areas. This pay disparity indicates that many Kaesong workers were willing to work longer hours in order to

receive additional wages. They knew exactly how much they had earned each month, and to confirm that they received the proper amount on payday, each employee signed a ledger—shared by the North Korean government and South Korean companies—that contained the labor-hours of every worker. A kind of a price mechanism was therefore at work in the KIZ, though its signal was measured in hours and coupons rather than wages. Finally, the labor market in Kaesong was a “seller’s market” that benefited North Korean workers in key respects. As of October 2015, the number of North Korean workers in the KIZ was 54,357, while the population of the city of Kaesong was 192,574, based on the most recent available data. It means roughly 28 percent of Kaesong’s population worked in the KIZ. The South Korean companies demanded more labor, but supply was limited. Kaesong lacked dorms or apartments to accommodate more labor, and with the exception of roughly 200 commuter buses that connected Kaesong city to the KIZ, there was no long-distance transportation to bring in more laborers. Given this labor scarcity, workers who faced significant abuses, if any, on the shop floor presumably could move to other workplaces. Such conditions may not sound heavenly to residents of the free world, but they appeared wonderful to many North Koreans and are sufficient to cast doubt on Brown’s characterization of KIZ workers as “slaves.” While South Korean companies in the KIZ plainly benefited from employing a low-cost workforce with deeply limited opportunities outside their factories, Kaesong workers did enjoy a degree of independence through the site’s payment scheme and through the relative freedom of movement afforded by its labor market. Observers have often asked whether the KIZ helped to fund North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development. While the answer is not entirely clear, the KIZ could not have provided significant support to these programs. According to the announcement of the South Korean Ministry of Unification, a total of \$110 million went to North Korea through the KIZ in 2015. This total can be broken down into three parts: 1) after-tax salary; 2) tax or what North Korea calls “socio-cultural policy cost (SCPC)”; and 3) social insurance. If we assume that the total labor compensation is 100, for example, then, 70 will be after-tax salary, and 30 will be SCPC, and to this total labor compensation, social insurance premium of 15 is added (see Table 1).

Total Dollar Transfer to North Korea (115%, \$110 m)			
Total Labor Compensation (100%, \$96 m)			Social Insurance Premium (15%, \$14 m)
After-tax Salary (70%, \$67 m)		Tax or Socio-cultural Policy Cost (30%, \$29 m)	
Base Salary* (\$48 m)	Incentives and Overtime Charges (\$19 m)		
Consumed by the NK workers (\$67 m)		Left to the discretion of the NK Gov't (\$43 m)	

\* Equals

base monthly salary times 12 months, multiplied by the number of North Korean workers in the KIZ (\$48 million = \$73.87 X 12 months X 54,357).

As we analyzed above, however, most of the after-tax salary are actually consumed by the workers. Therefore, it is roughly \$43 million or 39 percent of the total dollar transfer ( $=\$43m/\$110m$ ) that is left to the discretion of the North Korean government. According to the agreements signed between North and South Korea, the North Korean government is supposed to spend these funds to cover the costs of education, medicine and other public services including social infrastructure, industrial accident compensation, retirement annuity and social security for the KIZ workers and their families in Kaesong. In theory, it is possible the North Korean regime could have misused these funds for weapons. In practice, however, it would have been difficult given the public demand for use of those funds. Kaesong must have schools and hospitals, however low their quality may be. There must be police and fire stations, too. All these institutions must have employees who depend on government ration coupons to survive. There should also be utilities, roads and bridges that require at least minimum maintenance. What is the size of these actual demands? We do not know for sure how much this city of 200,000 needs for these purposes, but we can estimate. The South Korean city closest to Kaesong in size is Yangju, whose population as of 2015 was 204,907. Yangju's total annual budget in 2014 was 493 billion South Korean won, meaning that its annual budget per citizen was 2.4 million South Korean won, or about \$2,000. This per capita maintenance cost is not much different in the United States, where the city of Palo Alto budgeted \$185.7 million annual general expenses in 2016 (excluding capital improvement and utilities). Using the city's estimated population of 66,642 in 2013, the city's per capita cost for the maintenance appears to be roughly \$2,787 ( $=\$185.7 \text{ million}/66,642$ ). If we suppose that the city of Kaesong spends one-tenth the amount of Yangju per citizen on maintenance, the annual cost required for Kaesong is approximately \$39 million ( $=\$200 \times 192,574$ ), which happens to approximate the combined annual amount of the SCPC and social insurance premium (\$43 million). If our assumptions about the estimated maintenance cost of Kaesong are true, then not much money would go to Pyongyang because most of the "discretionary funds" would be consumed in Kaesong. While we cannot exclude the possibility that at least some KIZ funds may have ended up in Pyongyang—therefore possibly used for weapons—the city of Kaesong probably spent a significant portion of funds taxed from KIZ workers to meet the fundamental demands of the population. To the question of whether the KIZ was merely a form of unilateral aid to North Korea, the answer is a definite "no." The South Korean companies in Kaesong, the South Korean employees of those companies, and the South Korean consumers who bought KIZ products at low prices all benefited from the KIZ. As of October 2015, there were 124 South Korean companies in the KIZ. Their projected output for 2015, based on the sum of the values added in the KIZ, was roughly \$500 million, about five times more than the wages they paid to workers. In addition, if we calculate the total output based on the actual market prices of the final products, then the value of the total production may soar to \$1.5 billion or more. Moreover, the KIZ created jobs for South Koreans. As of October 2015, 809 South Koreans also worked in the KIZ. If we include the number of workers in the South Korean offices of those companies as well as those employed by their subcontractors, the number of people employed because of Kaesong may have been much larger. South Korean consumers benefited from the KIZ, too. Its accumulated total production as of October 2015 was \$3.14 billion. Of this total, South Korea exported products worth \$268 million, or 8.5 percent of the total

output. The remainder of the total output, worth \$2.87 billion, was consumed by South Korean end-users.<sup>1</sup> As a result, for example, about 70 percent of all underwear and 30 percent of all clothing sold in South Korea came from the KIZ. In addition, a total of 679 middle and high schools in South Korea planned to procure school uniforms from KIZ factories prior to its February shutdown, and the students of those schools consequently had no uniforms when the new semester began in early March. Kaesong's economic benefits were mutual, not a form of unilateral aid. In fact, the South reaped greater economic benefit from the KIZ than the North. Why then, despite all these benefits, did President Park close the KIZ? The reason is simple: realism overwhelmed functionalism. The KIZ was founded on functionalist thinking: that accumulated functional cooperation across borders will lead to peace and integration. A realist perspective, on the other hand, called for South Korea to stop any cooperation that tipped the balance of power in the North's favor, no matter how large the South's gains. North Korea's recent nuclear test and satellite launch changed the South's perception of Kaesong, regardless of whether Seoul's cost-benefit analysis had shifted. In light of Pyongyang's heightened threats, Seoul could no longer tolerate the possibility that even small amounts of KIZ funds were supporting the North Korean military. The lack of transparency in North Korea's allocation of dollars from Kaesong contributed to this perception change. The KIZ's instability was theoretically predictable even before it began operations. The late Seoul National University professor Ku Young-rok once told me, before he passed away in 2001, that if such inter-Korean cooperative projects succeeded, then political scientists would have to award President Kim Dae-jung for breaking new ground: previously, functionalism had worked only between parties that were not antagonistic toward one another. If functional cooperation created peace and integration between military opponents like North and South Korea, the success would have opened a new theoretical horizon in the study of international relations. The shutdown of Kaesong proved that the Korean peninsula remains far from that horizon. However, its closure must not mark the end of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Kaesong's profitability revealed the potential of such cooperation. Its revenue model brought firsthand benefits to South Korean investors and consumers just as it supported North Korean leaders and workers, and all sides now understand the boon it represented. As long as memories of easy profits, cheap products, regular cash and hot water remain alive among Kaesong's stakeholders, its economic model may yet be revived." (Booseung Chang, "The Real economics of Kaesong," 38North, March 30, 2016)

2/13/16

The United States temporarily deployed an additional Patriot missile battery in South Korea in response to North Korea's nuclear test and a long-range rocket launch, ahead of talks next week to set up an even more sophisticated U.S. missile defense in a move that has worried China and Russia. The U.S. military command in South Korea said that an air defense battery unit from Ft. Bliss, Texas, has been conducting ballistic missile training using the Patriot system at Osan Air Base near Seoul. Lt. Gen. Thomas Vandal, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, said "exercises like this ensure we are always ready to defend against an attack from North Korea." "North Korea's continued development of ballistic missiles against the expressed will of the international community requires the alliance to maintain effective and ready ballistic missile defenses," he said in a statement. A spokeswoman for U.S. Forces Korea couldn't



confirm how long the Patriot missile battery from Texas would be deployed in South Korea. The U.S. military already has an operating Patriot missile defense system in South Korea to counter the threat of North Korea's shorter-range arsenal and medium-range missiles. (Associated Press, "U.S. Deploys More Patriot Missiles in South Korea," *Asahi Shimbun*, February 13, 2016)

2/14/16

South Korea's point man on inter-Korean affairs said he believes that North Korea has used wages paid to its workers at the joint inter-Korean factory complex to develop nuclear and other military weapons. In a television appearance, Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo said "70 percent" of the money that flowed into the Kaesong Industrial Complex has been used by the ruling Workers' Party to bankroll weapons development. "Workers at Kaesong are paid in cash (U.S. dollars), but the money doesn't go directly to these workers. It goes to the North Korean government instead," Hong said. "Any foreign currency earned in North Korea is transferred to the Workers' Party, where the money is used to develop nuclear weapons or missiles, or to purchase luxury goods." When asked if South Korea should have shut down the complex earlier, Hong responded by saying the positive impact of running the factory park outweighed the risk of financing the North's weapons programs until now. "The international community recognized the significance of operating the Kaesong Industrial Park," Hong said. "So we continued to keep the place in operation despite multiple nuclear tests. We decided to shut it down this time because North Korea was only going to intensify its weapons development, and we needed to make a decisive move to alleviate our people's security concerns." Hong said the decision to close down the factory zone was solely South Korea's, adding, "China and other neighbors showed some interest in the matter, but we reached the decision on our own." The minister added he hasn't identified any problems in the area since the South Korean workers were pulled. Hong said the government was prepared for the North's expulsion of South Korean workers and its freezing of South Korean assets. "It goes against international norms for North Korea to arbitrarily freeze our assets," Hong added. "We'll do the best we can to recover them, but North Korea is unlikely to budge and there's only so much we can do." Asked if the closure of the complex has hit South Korea harder than North Korea, the minister said the damage should be considered in relative terms. "Given the discrepancy in the sizes of our economies, I think North Korea is clearly reeling from this," Hong added. He also said the ball is now in the North Korean court. "The shutdown was basically intended to teach North Korea a lesson, and it'll be now up to North Korea," Hong said. "When North Korea shows sincere willingness to assuage our and the international community's concerns, then we can discuss normalizing operations [at Kaesong]." (Yonhap, "S. Korea Says N. Korea Used Kaesong Wages to Develop Weapons," February 14, 2016) South Korea's point man on unification reversed his claim February 15 that North Korea has used wages paid to its workers at a joint industrial park for its nuclear and missile program. Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo said yesterday that 70 percent of the money that has flowed into the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the North has been funneled into the ruling Workers' Party of Korea to bankroll its weapons development. Reversing what he said, the minister told lawmakers that there is no clear evidence for such speculation, apologizing for causing a stir. "If there is clear proof for the North's misappropriation, it would constitute a breach of relevant U.N. resolutions," Hong said.

"There are concerns (speculation) about the North's misuse of the money, but I've not said that there is clear evidence." (Yonhap, "Unification Minister Reverses Claim over N.K. Kaesong Revenue Use," February 15, 2016) "Most of the dollars we paid are presumed to have been funneled to the Workers' Party responsible for nuclear and missile development, instead of being used to improve the lives of ordinary people," President Park Geun-hye said in a nationally televised address at the National Assembly February 16. Park said South Korea cannot allow a situation to continue in which its money is used for North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. (Yonhap, "Park: "S. Korea's Money Ended up in N. Korea's Nuclear Program," February 16, 2016) Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo reaffirmed his earlier claim that 70 percent of the money that has flowed into the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the North has been funneled into the North's ruling Workers' Party of Korea to bankroll its weapons development. "It is understood that 70 percent of the cash payment in U.S. dollars has gone to the ruling party's Secretariat Office 39 and used for weapons and missile development or the regime's own projects," Hong told a parliamentary interpellation session. (Yonhap, "Minister Hong Reaffirms N. Korea Used Wages to Develop Nukes, Missiles," February 18, 2016)

An expert in missile defense systems said the propellant explosion technology seen in North Korea's recent long-range rocket launch could render useless the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system South Korea and the US have all but officially decided to deploy on the Korean Peninsula. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) emeritus professor Theodore Postol explained the situation in a series of email and telephone interviews with the *Hankyore* in the wake of the launch and the announcement that South Korea and the US have begun official discussions on THAAD deployment. One point Postol particularly noted about North Korea's recent launch was the first stage's explosion and separation into hundreds of scattered fragments. Indeed, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense noted on February 9 that Aegis radar showed tracks from some 270 exploded fragments from the first stage. "The explosion is believed to have been carried out through a self-destruct mechanism to prevent South Korea from collecting the propellant," the ministry said at the time. Postol said use of the same self-destruct technology with North Korea's Nodong missile would prevent THAAD radar from identifying an actual warhead. At the moment THAAD launches an interception missile, North Korea could explode its own warhead-carrying missile into multiple fragments. "Once the rocket completes its powered flight, it is at very high altitude where for all practical purposes there is no air-drag to slow up light objects relative to heavy objects," Postol observed. "Thus, if a missile is cut into many pieces after it has completed its powered flight, all of the pieces will float along with its warhead payload on the same general trajectory," he continued. "Cutting the missile into many pieces simply makes it possible for an adversary to create many false targets that a distant infrared homing interceptor would not be able to see in any detail." In short, an interception missile would be rendered useless because of the large number of more or less identical targets. "All the interceptor sees are unresolved points of light, any one of which could be the warhead," Postol explained. In particular, he noted that "[objects that are elongated and tumbling . . . will appear to change their brightness when they rotate from orientations that present a large projected area to the interceptor relative to

orientations that present a small projected area." "However, this information is not useful to the sensor because any of the objects, including the warhead, could be tumbling," he concluded. Postol went on to note that "this technology could be applied to a North Korean Nodong ballistic missile carrying a nuclear warhead aimed at South Korea." Postol was also highly critical of Seoul and Washington's public claims that THAAD would not pose a threat to China. "To suggest that the THAAD radar is not capable of the FB [forward-based] mode is the same as suggesting that a tank that can travel 100 km to a destination and then return from that destination . . . is not capable of traveling 200 km to a more distant location," he said in response to the argument that THAAD radar on the Korean Peninsula could not be used in FB mode. "It is the right of the South Korean government and people to choose to deploy THAAD in spite of this technical situation, but they should not take this action under the mistaken belief that China will not correctly assess the THAAD radar as a potential danger to its nuclear deterrent forces," he added. (Yi Yang-in, "Missile Defense Systems Expert Says THAAD Could Prove Useless," *Hankyore*, February 14, 2016)

North Korea has formed a new military unit to deploy a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), multiple South Korean government sources said. They said the KN-08 Brigade, designated after the ICBM of the same name, is a subordinate unit of the Strategic Forces, which oversees all missile units in the North. Sources said it indicates North Korea has inched closer to fielding the road-mobile ICBM. Last week, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said North Korea "has already taken initial steps toward fielding this (KN-08) system, although the system has not been flight-tested." Clapper also said Pyongyang was committed to developing "a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is capable of posing a direct threat" to the United States. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Launches New ICBM Unit: Sources," February 14, 2016)

The threat of an American missile defense system being stationed in South Korea appears to have concentrated minds in Beijing on how to punish Pyongyang. China now seems ready to support limited United Nations sanctions against North Korea over a recent nuclear test and rocket launches, partly in response to U.S. pressure, experts said. Beijing has reacted angrily to the prospect of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system being deployed in South Korea, but a tougher line from Washington and Seoul seems to be having some effect on Beijing's calculations, experts said. At the very least, Beijing is now talking up the prospect of stiffer sanctions against North Korea. In an editorial today, *China Daily* argued that the missile defense system was not the answer to the North Korean crisis. "There will be no ground for its introduction, should the parties agree to a sanctions package that is sufficient for Pyongyang to reevaluate its nuclear program," the editorial said. "For that to happen, the new U.N. resolution must truly bite." The editorial echoes comments by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who told Reuters in Munich on February 12 that the United Nations should adopt a resolution to ensure "North Korea will pay the necessary price and to show there is a consequence for its behavior." China, of course, would never admit it was reacting to American pressure. It still favors much weaker sanctions than those proposed by the United States and is likely locked in negotiations to "soften the blow," according to Yanmei Xie, a senior China analyst at the International Crisis Group in

Beijing. It could even be argued that Beijing is merely hyping the likely effect of a limited sanctions package to convince Seoul that the anti-missile system deployment is unnecessary – and to cast Washington as the real troublemaker. Still, even nationalist tabloid *Global Times* argued today that China should shift policy toward North Korea in the face of “mounting pressure and growing challenges.” It argued that elite and public opinion was changing, with greater numbers of people now seeing North Korea as a “burden and an annoying neighbor rather than an old friend.” This in turn led to a shift in favor of actions that “make Pyongyang feel pain for its obduracy.” “The more China’s policy in this regard departs from public opinion, the more political cost China has to pay,” *Global Times* wrote. (Simon Denver, “As U.S. Pressure Mounts, China Talks up Prospect of N. Korea Sanctions That ‘Bite,’” *Washington Post*, February 15, 2016)

2/15/16

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has praised scientists involved in the country's recent rocket launch that he said struck a “telling blow” to enemies and ordered them to press ahead with more launches, state media reported. (Associated Press, “North Korea’s Kim Orders More Rocket Launches,” February 15, 2016)

South Korea is questioning North Korea's eligibility to be a member of the United Nations in connection with its recent provocations in breach of U.N. resolutions. During a U.N. open discussion today on the U.N. charter's principles and goals, South Korea's U.N. ambassador Oh Joon questioned whether North Korea still has the right to be a U.N. member after reneging on membership obligations. “Twenty-five years ago, the DPRK solemnly pledged to comply with the obligations of the U.N. Charter as a new member, but during the past decade, the DPRK has persistently violated all Security Council resolutions on the DPRK,” Oh said. “This is not only a direct challenge to the authority of the Security Council, but also a contradiction to both the letter and spirit of the pledge it made. This breach of obligation by the DPRK calls into question its qualification as a member of the United Nations,” Oh added. South Korea's Deputy U.N. Ambassador Hahn Choong-hee continued questioning the North's qualifications during a meeting of the Special Committee on the Charter of the U.N. on the 16th. It is the first time that South Korea has taken issue with the North's U.N. membership since the two Koreas jointly entered the international body in 1991. Analysts cast doubt over whether South Korea's move will pay off.

“It is unlikely to happen, as suspension of U.N. membership also needs the agreement of the 15-member Security Council (UNSC) which includes China and Russia,” said Lee Jang-hie, an emeritus professor of the law school at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. According to article 5 of the U.N. Charter, a U.N. member, against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the UNSC, may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership upon the recommendation of the UNSC. The “recommendation” should be made in the form of a UNSC resolution, Lee noted. Cho Chang-beom, vice president of World Federation of United Nations Associations, also said it's hardly expectable, noting other countries like Syria and Iran have reneged on U.N. obligations, but calls have yet to be made for suspension of their membership. “We can ask North Korea to respect international regulations like human rights laws because it is a member of the international community,” Lee added. “It is more beneficial for us to leave the country as a U.N.

member." (Kim Hyo-jin, "South Korea Questions North Korea's UN Membership, *Korea Times*, February 19, 2016)

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**Park: "It has now become indisputably clear that the existing approach and good intentions will by no means work in countering the North Korean regime's determination to develop nuclear weapons, but will only lead to the enhancement of the North's nuclear capabilities, with catastrophic implications for the Korean Peninsula. We can no longer afford to be pushed around by North Korea's deceit and intimidation. Gone are the days when we caved in to the North's provocations and unconditionally pumped aid into the North. Now is the time for us to find a fundamental solution to bringing about real change in the North and muster the courage to achieve that end. ...We have lived far too long under the shadow of the North's intimidation that we have admittedly become somewhat blithe about our security. Because we are one nation destined to be reunified, perhaps we have been burying our heads in the sand in the face of the uncomfortable reality that North Korea's nuclear weapons are aimed at none other than us. We must cast away our incredulous nonchalance and the helplessness that comes from depending solely on the international community for sanctions. Now, we must spearhead strong international coordination and look to ourselves to mobilize every possible means to resolve the problem. The Government's latest decision to completely shut down the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex is predicated on the recognition of the gravity of the situation and of the need to block the flow of foreign currencies into the North if we are to prevent it from upgrading its nuclear and missile capabilities. As you know, a total of 616 billion won in cash has been paid in dollars through the Kaesong Industrial Complex to date, with 132 billion won having flowed into North Korea just last year alone. Instead of being used to improve the lives of the North Korean people, it has been found that most of that money is being funneled into the leadership of the Workers` Party, which oversees the North`s nuclear and missile development. We cannot allow the situation to persist where we are, in effect, inadvertently redounding to the North Korean regime's development of nuclear weapons and missiles. ...The Government will reimburse the investments of businesses that have set up shop in Kaesong and provide active support so that their business operations can be normalized in the near future. We will tap into the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Fund insurance and swiftly disburse up to 90 percent of the amount invested into the Kaesong Industrial Complex.... From this moment on, the Government will employ tougher and more effective measures to create an environment in which the North keenly realizes that nuclear development does not offer the path to survival but will merely hastens the regime's collapse, and therefore has no choice but to change of its own volition. ...But no matter how strong and effective the sanctions turn out to be, those measures will only start to truly work when our country stands its ground and is resolved to steadfastly see those sanctions through to the very end, and when our people stand united behind those efforts. (President Park Geun-hye, Address to the National Assembly, February 16, 2016)**

The floor leader of the conservative ruling party openly demanded a nuclear-armed South Korea, stressing that the time has come for the country to consider atomic weapons and longer-range missiles as effective deterrence against Pyongyang. "Considering North Korea's nuclear [and missile capabilities], we need to think about our own survival strategy and countermeasures that include peaceful nuclear and missile programs for the sake of self-defense," said Rep. Won Yoo-chul, the floor leader of the Saenuri Party. "We cannot borrow an umbrella from a neighbor whenever it rains," he continued in an address Monday morning at the National Assembly. "We must be prepared and wear our own raincoat." "The time has come for us to seriously consider effective and substantial measures of self-defense and deterrence against North Korea," Won said.

Won proposed bringing back tactical nuclear weaponry from the United States - removed following the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula - or developing South Korea's own temporary nuclear arsenal as possible options. (Ser Myo-ja, "Saenuri Floor Leader Calls for a Nuclear South," *JoongAng Ilbo*, February 16, 2016)

2/17/16

Speaking to reporters after talks with Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China supports a new U.N. resolution that makes North Korea "pay the necessary price." Wang described North Korea's nuclear test and rocket launch as "serious" violations of the existing U.N. resolutions against Pyongyang. However, Wang said efforts to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War and denuclearization of North Korea should be pursued at the same time, echoing the demand by North Korea. The Korean War ended in a cease-fire, not a peace treaty. "North Korea's nuclear test and satellite launch constituted a serious move against Security Council resolutions," Wang said. "So, North Korea needs to pay the necessary price, and the purpose of ongoing discussions at the Security Council of adopting a new resolution is to stop North Korea from going any further down the path of developing nuclear weapons," Wang said. Wang said Iran's nuclear issue was resolved because there were decade-long negotiations between Iran and world powers. However, North Korea's nuclear issue is at a standstill because the six-party talks have "broken down for eight years," Wang said. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Must Pay 'Necessary Price' for Nuke Test, Rocket Launch: China FM," February 17, 2016)

Foreign Minister Wang Yi said after a press conference with Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop. "As chair country for the six-party talks [on the nuclear issue], China proposes talks toward both achieving denuclearization [of the Korean Peninsula] and replacing the [existing North Korea-US] armistice agreement with a peace treaty," Wang declared. The proposal, Wang said, was intended to "find a way back to dialogue quickly." He also argued that the approach would "also help in achieving a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula." "He is saying that because the North Korean nuclear issue is a product of the Cold War system on the Korean Peninsula, you can't resolve it without also offering ideas for overcoming that Cold War system," said Inje University professor Kim Yeon-chul of Wang's proposal. "He's pleading for a revival of the basic spirit of the six-party talks," Kim concluded. In terms of its formal logic, Wang's proposal occupies a middle ground between the official South Korean and US positions on one side and North

Korea's on the other. So far, the two sides have been marching in parallel lines, with Seoul and Washington demanding that North Korea prove a sincere intent to denuclearize before any dialogue or negotiation and Pyongyang insisting, as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson's statement from December 3, 2015, put it, on "a peace treaty first, denuclearization discussions later." In reality, Beijing's position is tipped slightly more toward Pyongyang; neither Seoul nor Washington has mentioned the possibility of discussing normalization of relations with North Korea or a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula lately. This suggests China has deemed it necessary to listen more to North Korea if the aim is to prevent any further nuclear tests and rocket launches and get the six-party talks started again. So far, Seoul has been dismissive of Wang's proposal. Speaking at a regular briefing on February 18, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Cho Joon-hyuk said the "priority must be on North Korea stopping its provocations and showing a sincere commitment to denuclearize." The US has yet to give any official response - but it is worth noting that it has not dismissed the proposal out of hand. **"The prospects of Washington continuing to push ahead with sanctions against North Korea are unrealistic," said a South Korean government source with experience in the six-party talks. "There's a chance the US will start taking the peace treaty issue seriously once time passes. The danger for the South Korean government is that it's going to end up isolated by insisting on going all in' on sanctions and pressure against the North," the source added.**

Clinton, who is considered the front-runner in the US presidential race, previously shared ideas for the future of North Korea-US relations in an address to the Asia Society on Feb. 13, 2009, during her time as Secretary of State. "If North Korea is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate their nuclear weapons program, the Obama administration will be willing to normalize bilateral relations, replace the peninsula's long-standing armistice agreements with a permanent peace treaty and assist in meeting the energy and other economic needs of the North Korean people," she said at the time. It's a message Clinton later reiterated at the ASEAN Regional Forum that July, just after North Korea's third nuclear test. In an autobiography titled "Hard Choices" that she published on the eve of her presidential bid in 2014, Clinton recalled the "invitation" she extended to Pyongyang with her 2009 vision. "[A]s with Iran, another regime with nuclear ambitions, we started off with the offer of engagement," she wrote. From Beijing's standpoint, a possible approach may be hold a summit with North Korea so that President Xi Jinping can use the promise of increased economic cooperation to coax a promise of a moratorium on nuclear testing and rocket launches, swift action to freeze the nuclear program, and a return to the six-party talks from leader Kim Jong-un. From there, it would then go on to hold discussions with the Obama administration and attempt to make significant progress in denuclearization and peace treaty talks by the time the next US administration - presumably under Clinton - is sworn into office. "What Wang Yi proposed was that all parties follow the terms of the September 19 Joint Statement," said a former senior South Korean government official familiar with the six-party talks situation, referring to an agreement reached at the talks in 2005. "The September 19 Joint Statement accords with everyone's interests: North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons and development program, normalizing North Korea-US relations, and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula," the former official continued. "We need a more forward-thinking approach from the Park administration." (Lee Je-hun, "Could

Wang's Two-Track Proposal Lead to Breakthrough?" *Hankyore*, February 19, 2016) In basic terms, Wang's proposal differs little from Beijing's standard position to date on Korean Peninsula issues. The important aspect is the timing, with Beijing making its first formal calls for a two-track denuclearization and peace treaty negotiation approach after North Korea's fourth nuclear test on January 6. The proposal, Wang said, was intended to "find a way back to dialogue quickly." He also argued that the approach would "also help in achieving a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula." "He is saying that because the North Korean nuclear issue is a product of the Cold War system on the Korean Peninsula, you can't resolve it without also offering ideas for overcoming that Cold War system," said Inje University professor Kim Yeon-chul of Wang's proposal. "He's pleading for a revival of the basic spirit of the six-party talks," Kim concluded. Wang's proposal occupies a middle ground between the official South Korean and US positions on one side and North Korea's on the other. So far, the two sides have been marching in parallel lines, with Seoul and Washington demanding that North Korea prove a sincere intent to denuclearize before any dialogue or negotiation and Pyongyang insisting, as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson's statement from December 3, 2015, put it, on "a peace treaty first, denuclearization discussions later." In reality, Beijing's position is tipped slightly more toward Pyongyang; neither Seoul nor Washington has mentioned the possibility of discussing normalization of relations with North Korea or a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula lately. This suggests China has deemed it necessary to listen more to North Korea if the aim is to prevent any further nuclear tests and rocket launches and get the six-party talks started again. So far, Seoul has been dismissive of Wang's proposal. Speaking at a regular briefing on February 18, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Cho Joon-hyuk said the "priority must be on North Korea stopping its provocations and showing a sincere commitment to denuclearize." The US has yet to give any official response - but it is worth noting that it has not dismissed the proposal out of hand. **"The prospects of Washington continuing to push ahead with sanctions against North Korea are unrealistic,"** said a South Korean government source with experience in the six-party talks. **"There's a chance the US will start taking the peace treaty issue seriously once time passes. The danger for the South Korean government is that it's going to end up isolated by insisting on going all in' on sanctions and pressure against the North,"** the source added. For its part, the Chinese government doesn't appear to be expecting an immediate positive response from South Korea or the US. Wang's remarks about "hoping for concrete discussions at a suitable time" can be read as suggesting that no answer is needed right away. Instead, former South Korean Unification Minister and current Korea Peace Forum permanent representative Jeong Se-hyun, sees the move as a medium- to long-term gesture assuming that the UNSC resolution and a Workers' Party of Korea Congress in early May will be followed by a North Korea-China summit and the eventual election of Hillary Clinton as US President. Clinton, who is considered the front-runner in the US presidential race, previously shared ideas for the future of North Korea-US relations in an address to the Asia Society on February 13, 2009, during her time as Secretary of State. "If North Korea is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate their nuclear weapons program, the Obama administration will be willing to normalize bilateral relations, replace the peninsula's long-standing armistice agreements with a permanent peace treaty and assist in meeting the energy and other



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A formation of four U.S. F-22 stealth fighters swept through the skies of South Korea as the militaries of South Korea and the U.S. flexed their muscles against North Korea following its nuclear and missile tests. The four F-22 Raptors flew at a low altitude over U.S. Forces Korea's Osan Air Base in Gyeonggi Province, 55 kilometers south of Seoul, in the latest of the allies' continuing show of force after North Korea's recent provocations. The nuclear-propelled USS North Carolina attack submarine joined a combined training exercise in the East Sea with South Korea earlier this week, while the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis is also scheduled to join annual South Korea-U.S. defense drills slated to open in March. Previous deployments of the Raptor on the Korean Peninsula reportedly scared late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il into holing up and not making public outings. It is rare for the U.S. to deploy four units of the stealth fighter to South Korea all at once. (Yonhap, "U.S. Deploys F-22s in S. Korea against N. Korea," February 17, 2016)

KCNA: "There took place a ceremony of conferring party and state commendations on the scientists, technicians, workers and officials who contributed to the successful launch of the earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong-4 at the Mansudae Assembly Hall on Wednesday [February 17] morning. Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, appeared at the ceremony. He declared the start of the ceremony and made a congratulatory speech. He said that space conquerors who demonstrated the self-esteem and authority of our great state and indomitable mettle of the strong people over the world were the best patriots and admirable heroes of Juche Korea. He noted that the great success of the

satellite launch was made by the intense loyalty of the scientists of Juche Korea to the party and their ardent patriotism for the country and sweat. Our party values patriotism of the scientists loyal to the party and revolution, he noted. He, on behalf of the Workers' Party of Korea, extended gratitude once again to space conquerors who instilled sure conviction and courage into the service personnel and people of the DPRK rushing forward like wind toward the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea and made distinguished contribution to implementing the behests of leader Kim Jong Il. He indicated the principled stand and strategic tasks of the WPK on the space development. Conquering space is not just the path of science but that of revolution, independence and self-sustenance and the drive for defending the leader and upholding the party's policies to implement the behests of the great leaders, and a fierce class struggle against the hostile forces seeking to usurp our peace and sovereignty, he said. **He underscored the need to successfully launch more working satellites of Juche Korea faster** by conducting a dynamic campaign of intelligence and drive of breaking through the cutting edge as demanded by the new era of Chollima and Mallima in order to more dynamically pave a wide avenue to conquering space. ..." (KCNA, "Party, State Commendations Conferred on Contributors to Satellite Launch in Presence of Kim Jong-un," February 19, 2016)

North Korea's recently launched satellite is once again tumbling in orbit after stabilizing briefly, according to a U.S. official and other sources. The satellite update came as a key congressional watchdog agency said the U.S. military had not demonstrated its ability to protect the United States against a possible North Korea missile attack. The U.S. official, and two other sources with knowledge of the issue, said they are less concerned about the function of the satellite than with the technology involved in launching it. They added that the launch was clearly intended to demonstrate North Korea's ability to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile. The U.S. Government Accountability Office, the research arm of Congress, highlighted concerns about missile attacks from North Korea in a report released today. "GMD flight testing, to date, was insufficient to demonstrate that an operationally useful defense capability exists," the GAO said. GMD is an acronym for **Ground-based Midcourse Defense**, a type of missile defense system. The report said that the GMD had only **demonstrated "a partial capability against small numbers of simple ballistic missile threats."** Ken Todorov, former deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency, said the organization faced a difficult balancing act in meeting the needs of the U.S. military and operating with limited resources for testing. Last month the Missile Defense Agency conducted a successful test of the ground-based U.S. missile defense system managed by Boeing Co. aimed at demonstrating the effectiveness of a redesigned "kill vehicle" built by Raytheon Co. The test purposely did not include an intercept by a ground-based interceptor but was designed to demonstrate the ability of new "divert thrusters" that were developed by Raytheon to maneuver the warhead. The report said that while there were benefits in the way the agency was acquiring the kill vehicle, challenges remained. It added that the Pentagon's goal to reach 44 ground-based missile defense systems by the end of 2017 was based on a "highly optimistic, aggressive schedule" leading to "high-risk acquisition practices." (Reuters, "North Korea Satellite Tumbling in Orbit Again," February 18, 2016)

China called for South Korea and the U.S. to "withdraw" their plan to deploy an advanced U.S. missile defense system in South Korea, stepping up rhetoric against the possible deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery. "With regard to the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system on the Korean Peninsula, we have expressed our firm opposition because it damages China's national security interests," China's foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a regular press briefing. "We hope that the relevant parties can withdraw the plan," Hong said. Earlier in the day, a newspaper published by China's ruling Communist Party warned that China should deploy more missile systems in Northeast Asia if the THAAD is deployed in South Korea. "Beijing should voice its objection to Seoul's deployment of THAAD. If South Korea insists on doing so, China can take reference from Russia in responding to Eastern European countries' deployment of U.S. anti-missile systems," the state-run *Global Times* said in an editorial. "China will install more defensive missiles in Northeast Asia and take the highest-level precautions against the THAAD system," the editorial read. (Yonhap, "China Urges S. Korea, U.S. to 'Withdraw' Plan to Deploy THAAD," February 17, 2016)

The floor leader of South Korea's main opposition party vowed to enact a special law to reopen the troubled inter-Korean joint factory park in North Korea, describing it as "a safety pin" for preventing a war between the two Koreas. "The Minjoo Party will enact a special law to revive the Kaesong Industrial Complex," Lee Jong-kul said in a speech at the National Assembly. Currently, the opposition party cannot unilaterally pass any bill as it has only 108 seats in the 293-member parliament, though its chance of approving a special bill could go up if it wins a sweeping victory in the upcoming elections. South Koreans are set to go to the polls in April to elect new lawmakers. (Yonhap, "Opposition Party's Floor Leader Calls for Special Law to Reopen Kaesong Complex," February 17, 2016) The next day, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn said that the government maintains a denuclearization policy despite some debates on the possibility of the country's own nuclear armament. "It is the government's basic position that the nuclear armament is not permitted," Hwang said during a National Assembly interpellation session. (Yonhap, "PM Rules out Possibility of Nuclear Armament," February 18, 2016)

In a report to the UN Human Rights Council, special rapporteur for North Korean human rights Marzuki Darusman wrote the council should "advise [Kim] and other senior leaders that they may be investigated and, if found to be responsible, held accountable for crimes against humanity committed under their leadership." Darusman also recommended the appointment of three experts to find "creative and practical" ways to hold the North Korean regime accountable. The 13-page report will be considered by the Human Rights Council next month. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "UN Urged to Warn Kim Jong-un of War Crimes Charges," February 17, 2016)

2/18/16

President Barack Obama slapped North Korea with more stringent sanctions. Democratic and Republican lawmakers, many of whom say Obama hasn't been tough enough on North Korea, overwhelmingly approved the bill last week and sent it to the White House. The House voted 408-2, following a unanimous vote by the Senate.

(Associated Press, "U.S. Tightens Sanctions on North Korea after Nuclear Test and Rocket Provocations," February 18, 2016) The bill includes:

- A requirement for the President to sanction entities found to have contributed to North Korea's WMD program, arms trade, human rights abuses, or other illicit activities. (Sanctioned entities may face civil or criminal penalties, as well as loss of access to the U.S. financial system.)
- Mandatory sanctions for entities that are involved in North Korea's mineral or metal trade, which contribute to a large component of the country's foreign export earnings.
- Discretionary authority for the President to sanction entities that provide support to persons sanctioned by the UN Security Council.
- A requirement that the Treasury Department determine whether North Korea should be listed as "a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern," which would entail the application of new financial restrictions.
- The blocking of any property belonging to the North Korean government, the Korean Workers' Party, or a person acting on their behalf, if it comes under U.S. jurisdiction.
- New sanctions authorities related to North Korean human rights abuses and violations of cybersecurity.
- Authorization for the President to waive sanctions contained in the Act in order to facilitate humanitarian activities in North Korea. Certain activities including operations related to POW/MIA remains recovery missions are exempt from sanctions, and the President may also waive the application of sanctions contained in the Act on a case-by-case basis for national security or for other reasons. (National Committee on North Korea Summary of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, February 18, 2016)

Kim Jong Un recently ordered preparations for launching "terror" attacks on South Koreans, a top Seoul official said. In televised remarks, senior South Korean presidential official Kim Sung-woo said North Korea's spy agency has begun work to implement Kim Jong Un's order to "muster anti-South terror capabilities that can pose a direct threat to our lives and security." He said the possibility of North Korean attacks "is increasing more than ever" and asked for quick passage of an anti-terror bill in parliament. Earlier today, Seoul's National Intelligence Service briefed ruling Saenuri Party members on a similar assessment on North Korea's attack preparations, according to one of the party officials who attended the private meeting. During the briefing, the NIS, citing studies on past North Korean provocations and other unspecified assessments, said the attacks could target anti-Pyongyang activists, defectors and government officials in South Korea, the party official said requesting anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak to media publicly. Attacks on subways, shopping malls and other public places could also happen, he said. The official quoted the NIS as saying North Korea could launch poisoning attacks on the activists and defectors, or lure them to China where they would be kidnapped. The Saenuri official refused to say whether the briefing discussed how the information was obtained. The NIS, which has a mixed record on predicting developments in North Korea, said it could not confirm its reported assessment. (Hyung-jin Kim, "Seoul's Spy Service Says North Korea Is Preparing Attacks," Associated Press, February 18, 2016)

Next month's joint military drills by South Korea and the United States will simulate an endgame scenario for North Korea that has the military recover the entire territory of the peninsula after the collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime, a military official said. The relatively rare simulation -- military operations are usually focused on hitting the North

Korean leadership in Pyongyang -- coincided with Defense Minister Han Min-koo saying that the annual war games would be "the biggest yet," in line with President Park Geun-hye's hardline policy toward North Korea. Seoul and Washington are slated to carry out annual Key Resolve and Eagle Foal drills from March 7 to April 30. Key Resolve, a computer-simulation exercise, is conducted for two weeks. According to the official, the war game is a multiple-stage drill that simulates war breaking out, military operations surrounding the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and operations that take place in the later stages of the war. "This year's operations will involve recovering key facilities that are located deep within North Korea, all the way near its northern borders," the official said. This means that the war game scenarios will simulate the military taking over the entire peninsula, beyond the North Korean capital. But the official said that the scenario was not affected in any way by recent North Korea provocations, stressing that it was already agreed upon last year. He added that Key Resolve had been conducted under the same scenario before. He explained that the biggest elements of North Korean threat are its leadership under Kim Jong-un and its weapons of mass destruction, which means it is important to neutralize related facilities north of Pyongyang.

The North's main nuclear complex is located in Yongbyon, in the northwest corner of the country. "The scenario will include the special operations forces being deployed to border areas adjacent to China and Russia," the official explained. The troops will attempt to keep the Chinese and Russian military in check, while trying to avoid altercations, he said. President Park two days ago said that the North must realize that its nuclear programs will lead to its downfall. According to Defense Minister Han, 290,000 of South Korean military personnel will take part, which is about 1.5 times more than usual. Around 15,000 soldiers from the U.S., including the Combat Aviation Brigade and Marine Expeditionary Brigade, will participate, which is also double the annual average. (Yoon Min-sik, "Korea-U.S. Drills to Map out N.K. Endgame Scenario," *Korea Herald*, February 18, 2016) Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis and B-2 stealth bombers, will join the allies' annual Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises next month, according to the Ministry of National Defense and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command,. The plan to continuously send the U.S. assets, following the previous dispatch of a B-52 bomber, the nuclear submarine USS North Carolina and F-22 stealth fighters, is the allies' apparent show of force against the North's fourth nuclear test and launch of a long-range rocket. Defense Minister Han Min-koo told a National Assembly session, "Some 15,000 American troops will participate in the drills next month, which will take place on the largest-ever scale." Last year, some 12,000 American troops and some 210,000 South Korean soldiers participated in the drills. Anonymous sources told reporters that the U.S. may also dispatch one of its Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons (MPSRON) for the exercise. The maritime prepositioning ships provide combat commanders with persistent forward presence and rapid crisis response by pre-positioning combat equipment and supplies to support two Marine Expeditionary Brigades for up to 30 days. Another source noted that the amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans is also expected to participate in the allies' annual Ssangyong (Double Dragon) amphibious landing training for marines and navy personnel, also scheduled to begin early next month. The U.S. Air Force's airborne battle management and surveillance aircraft, the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), could also

possibly come to the peninsula, according to some reports. Washington has sent strategic assets here since North Korea conducted the fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6. On January 10, a B-52 Stratofortress strategic bomber performed a flyover at Osan Air Base, 55 kilometers south of Seoul, and the nuclear submarine USS North Carolina participated in a three-day joint exercise held in the East Sea February 13-15. (Jun Ji-hye, "More Strategic Assets Arriving in Korea," *Korea Times*, February 18, 2016) The annual Korea-U.S. joint exercises will be the largest ever in terms of both "quality and quantity," Defense Minister Han Min-goo told Saenuri Party officials at the National Assembly. Twice as many U.S. troops and double the equipment as before, or about 15,000 U.S. troops and hardware like a combat aviation brigade, a Marine mobile brigade, an aircraft carrier fleet, a nuclear-powered submarine fleet, and aerial refueling tankers, will be participating in the drills dubbed "Key Resolve/Foal Eagle." On the Korean side, the troop numbers will be greater by half than usual at 290,000 personnel, including special operations forces, Army corps in the front-line areas, and Army divisions in the rear areas. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "Korea-U.S. Drills to Be Biggest in History," February 19, 2016) South Korea and the United States Marines Corps will intensify their joint amphibious drill in March, a South Korean military official told Yonhap February 21. The two Marines will strengthen their inland ground operations, which are conducted after landing in an amphibious vehicle. The two allies will try to boost their capability to infiltrate deep into North Korean territory and destroy the North's key facilities, such as its nuclear and missile test sites, the official said. The two countries will double the period of the exercise and widen the area covered from last year. The drill will involve some 10,000 South Korean sailors and 7,000 U.S. ones, the largest scale since the drill, known as Ssangyong, was launched in 2012. (Yonhap, "S. Korea, U.S. Marines to Intensify Amphibious Attack," February 21, 2016)

Concerns and skepticism persist over Seoul's policy direction and future cross-border relations since President Park Geun-hye broke a taboo by warning of "regime collapse" in North Korea during her parliamentary address two days ago. The speech heralded a sweeping shift from her much-trumpeted trustpolitik. Having singled out "pressure" as the centerpiece of this year's North Korea policy, Seoul is now expected to further toughen its line, with the door for talks likely to stay shut. But the abrupt turnaround sparked criticism that without a well-thought-out strategy and detailed action plans, as well as close cooperation with key regional partners, it may backfire on Seoul and raise the chances of another major provocation, including limited attacks on South Korea. "Pressure is mostly intended to make Kim realize that his parallel pursuit of nuclear and economic development is not working, and bring him back to the negotiating table. But if the dialogue part is missing, it will be very hard to convince the international community," a diplomatic source said. While Pyongyang deserves punishment for the latest nuclear and missile tests, such a hard-line approach would firm up the backing by Russia and China of the Kim regime, said Koh Yu-hwan, a North Korean studies professor at Dongguk University in Seoul. Another source of concern is what the Unification Ministry called an "inevitable" severance of humanitarian assistance in addition to private-level exchanges. This represented a major reversal in the administration's long-held principles toward humanitarian aid, as well as Park's own vow during the speech "never to face away" from the dire livelihoods of the rank-and-file North Koreans. "The president appears to have decided that she will break its

nuclear ambitions and make a regime change happen through omnidirectional pressure on the North, but whether it will prove effective is a different matter," Koh said. "Given the deepening mutual mistrust, it would be extremely difficult to redefine inter-Korean ties throughout her remaining presidency, and a local provocation and armed clash cannot be ruled out, unless the sides manage to hold meaningful talks such as for a China-mediated exchange of a nuclear moratorium and a peace treaty, which is no less easy." Though the State Department yesterday expressed the U.S.' support for Park's "principled and firm approach," spokesman Mark Toner said strategic patience is a "really big-picture foreign policy concept" and "valid approach in some cases." "I think there's also a realization given the past actions, and these are being pursued not only bilaterally or unilaterally, rather, but also within the Security Council, of the need for additional actions on North Korea," he said at a news briefing. In his own parliamentary address Thursday, Ahn Cheol-soo, co-head of the minor opposition People's Party, lashed out at the burst of the "regime collapse" discourse among not just the president and ruling party but also some from the opposition. "This does not help to tackle our security worries or bring peace and stability to the peninsula, or even a unification," Ahn said. "The people know that a sudden change and unification could be a disaster, not a bonanza. What we need is a practical approach instead of an ideological one," he added, referring to Park's 2014 drive portraying unification as a "bonanza" for all Koreans. Kim Chong-in, interim chairman of the main opposition The Minjoo Party of Korea, who formerly was an economic adviser to Park, has also said in a media interview that the president's argument that South Korean cash given to the Kaesong industrial park has been used to fund the North's nuclear and missile programs was "incomprehensible." He called for the administration to provide evidence and reasonable logic behind its decision to shutter the project. (Shin Hyon-hee, "Park's Sudden Shift on N.K. Raises Doubts," *Korea Herald*, February 18, 2016)

The Dawnlight, a steel-hulled bulk carrier outfitted with large gray cranes, looks no different from the many other container ships that ply East Asia's busy shipping lanes, heading in and out of the bustling port of Singapore. But the Dawnlight is not just any container ship: It's a ship that has been suspected of illegal dealings with North Korea. It was blacklisted by the United States last year because it was owned by a Singaporean company alleged to have helped Pyongyang with its weapons program, and then sold two months later, according to the company. The ship continues to shuttle between Singapore and the Korean Peninsula, with occasional diversions to China, according to data reviewed by the *Washington Post*. The Dawnlight has traveled to the peninsula nine times over the past 31 / 2 months, the data shows. Its ultimate destinations were unclear, though, because even on trips when the crew logged a North Korean port as its goal, the radar and satellite data examined by The Post showed it appearing to turn around off the coast of South Korea and make its way back without having called at a port. The Dawnlight's previous owners insist the ship has carried only commercial cargo. The new, Hong Kong-based owner could not be contacted. While international sanctions against North Korea prohibit trade involving certain goods, such as those that could be used in conventional or nuclear weapons programs, general commercial trade is permitted. And with its nascent market economy, the country has more reason than ever to do business abroad. But

inspection regimes in the region's busy ports are selective, making it hard to determine what is being shipped to North Korea. Expanded U.S. sanctions that President Obama signed into law today don't take this step but require the administration to report on foreign seaports and airports with "deficient" inspections of vessels originating from North Korea. "Doing this wouldn't just crack down on North Korea, it would also be for our own protection," said Chun Yung-woo, national security adviser in the last South Korean administration, talking about Seoul's actions. "Ships are the best way North Korea has for delivering nuclear weapons." But the difficulty of monitoring the Dawnlight underlines the limits of international sanctions. The ship could be operating entirely legitimately. But the questions remain: What is the Dawnlight carrying? Where is it going? And who even owns it? China, which shares a long land border North Korea, is by far its largest trading partner. But most of the goods heading to North Korea by sea come through Southeast Asian transshipment hubs. Singapore, one of the biggest, relies on speed and efficiency to maintain its competitive edge. Cargo lists are not publicly available, and inspections are generally conducted only when there is intelligence to suggest a breach of international sanctions. "In Southeast Asia, it's very hard to see what's going on," said a former Western diplomat who has dealt with North Korea for years and who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he works in a related field. He described the implementation of sanctions as "patchy." "Are they turning a blind eye to things going through, or is it just too difficult to stop things?" he said. When enforcing sanctions, the Singaporeans make a clear distinction: While they will enforce multilateral orders, they will not uphold U.S. sanctions unless the targeted company has also broken local laws. "We generally ignore unilateral sanctions," said a former Singaporean official who was involved in enforcement and spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid jeopardizing his current work. He described periods when his office would receive daily emails from U.S. officials asking for action. "American requests come in at such a volume, we have to be very selective on how we act on them," he said. "We have millions of containers coming through every day." The case of the Dawnlight encapsulates the problem. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Senat Shipping, a Singaporean company, and its president, Leonard Lai, in July, saying the company was working with North Korean entities that procure weapons for the regime. In the process, the Treasury Department blacklisted the Dawnlight, then owned by Senat, meaning that U.S. individuals and companies were prohibited from doing any business involving the company or the ship. Senat protested the designation, saying that all of its dealings pertained to the legal shipment of commercial commodities and that it had not had a "business relationship" with North Korea since late 2011. The company was not sanctioned by the United Nations, meaning that Senat and Lai were allowed to operate in and out of Singapore – including sending ships to North Korea. In November, the *Post* started monitoring the Dawnlight using data collated by MarineTraffic, a community-based, online ship-tracking service. All ships submit data through the automatic identification system, or AIS, which pings radar stations when a vessel is in range or allows detection by satellites when ships are in the right place. Tracking ships traveling to North Korea is inherently challenging, because the North does not have radar stations that feed into the international ship-tracking system and satellite coverage in that part of Asia can be spotty. Still, many vessels are routinely recorded by satellite calling at North Korean ports. Although it is against international



regulations, a ship's crew can turn off the AIS, ensuring that it will not be tracked. On some of its voyages, the Dawnlight generated extremely limited AIS data even in areas far from the Korean Peninsula with reliable radar and satellite coverage. Using the signals that were sent and logged, The Post observed the Dawnlight make nine journeys that brought it close to North Korea – from Singapore and, in one case, from Chinese ports along the Yangtze River – but never tracked it docking in North Korea. “The vessel may very well have gone into a North Korean port, but because we don’t have any antennas in the vicinity, for obvious reasons we have no idea what’s going on there with that ship,” Argyris Stasinakis, a partner at MarineTraffic, said of one of those journeys. On its latest trip, the Dawnlight sailed to Busan, at the southern edge of the Korean Peninsula, before turning around February 14 and backtracking without calling at a port, according to AIS data. Its original destination, as declared by the crew via the AIS, was the Japanese port of Chiba, near Tokyo. But on the morning of the 12th it had changed its destination and was at Jingjiang, a Chinese port on the Yangtze. The *Post* approached Senat and Lai, who authorized his attorney to respond to questions. The attorney, Thong Chee Kun, said Senat never intended to be, and never was, involved in any illegal activities. Asked about the ship’s journeys to the Korean Peninsula and whether it had gone to North Korea, Thong said that the Dawnlight had been sold in September. He produced a notarized bill of sale signed by Lai and dated September 21, showing that the Mongolian-flagged Dawnlight was sold to a Hong Kong-based shipping company called Bene Star for \$2.2 million. Thong also supplied a certificate of deletion from the Mongolia Ship Register dated Aug. 26, 34 days after Senat was sanctioned by the United States, to show that Dawnlight was no longer sailing under a Mongolian flag. “Since the sale, our clients have no knowledge of the routes it has sailed to, and they are not kept informed of Dawnlight’s operations,” Thong said. When the Dawnlight was last subject to a spot inspection – at the port of Vanino in Russia’s Far East at the end of October – it was still sailing under a Mongolian flag, according to the Tokyo MOU, the organization that monitors ports in Asia. Even today, international shipping registries and the Tokyo MOU show the Dawnlight as being owned by Senat and registered in Mongolia, and a U.S. Treasury Department spokeswoman said the vessel remains covered by last year’s sanctions. The department had not been informed that Senat had sold the ship. Thong said the Dawnlight may still be listed as Senat’s property because the new owner has not registered the vessel under a flag. Efforts to locate Bene Star were not successful. The company has no website and, although it is registered in Hong Kong, there is no phone number listed with its registration and no entry for it in Hong Kong telephone directories. The *Post* attempted to contact Bene Star using an email address and a phone number in the Chinese port city of Dalian supplied by Thong. There was no response to repeated emails, and the phone number did not work. Asked why the registries do not bear out the claim of a sale, Thong said Senat would be “taking the necessary steps to request an accurate listing of the information in the relevant databases.” The *Post* also tried to ask North Korea’s representatives in Singapore whether its shipping companies had links with Senat, as the U.S. Treasury Department claimed. But the lights were off at the North Korean Embassy’s registered office in the run-down Golden Mile complex, and a neighbor said he had not seen anyone there in at least a month. For Singapore, which has strong ties with the United States, monitoring North Korean shipping activity presents a challenge, and the government

acknowledges the inherent tension between speed and vigilance. "It's a delicate balance and one that we want to maintain without choking off legitimate trade or compromising on our counterproliferation efforts," said one official, speaking on the Singapore government's customary condition of anonymity. Recent actions underscore the tough approach that Singapore takes toward middlemen acting for North Korea, he said, referring to the prosecution of Chinpo Shipping, which was found guilty in December of transferring money on behalf of Ocean Maritime Management, a North Korean shipping company sanctioned by both the United States and the United Nations, so that an Ocean Maritime ship could pass through the Panama Canal. The ship, called the Chong Chon Gang, was intercepted in 2013 on its way from Cuba to North Korea. On board, under 10,000 tons of sugar, were two Soviet-era MiG fighter jets and parts for many more, surface-to-air missile launchers, and antitank rockets. This is the same case that ensnared Senat: It had previously chartered the Chong Chon Gang, although it was not involved with this journey. The Treasury Department sanctioned Senat because of its previous dealings with Ocean Maritime Management, effectively making it guilty by association. "North Koreans or any other country thinking of using Singapore or Singapore companies for illicit activities in contravention of U.N. sanctions or resolutions will know that Singapore is a no-go zone," the Singaporean official said. "The outcome of the Chinpo case has good signaling and deterrent effect." But as U.S. and U.N. officials formulate a new round of sanctions, diplomats say, it is worth bearing in mind the priorities of countries in the region. "You often hear the view in Southeast Asia that the more trade and the more economic linkages that are done, the better," said Euan Graham, a former diplomat who was stationed at the British Embassy in Pyongyang and is now at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. "That probably plays some part as well in the resistance to putting sanctions further up the priority list." (Anna Fifield, "The Voyages of the Dawnlight: Where Is It Heading? And What Is It Carrying?" *Washington Post*, February 18, 2016)

2/19/16

Japan implemented new sanctions against North Korea in response to its recent nuclear test and rocket launch, though the government still said Tokyo is willing to continue dialogue with Pyongyang to address the abductions of Japanese nationals decades ago. The Cabinet of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo approved the punitive measures, including the ban on entry into Japan by all North Korean-registered ships as well as by third-country ships that visited ports in North Korea, effective the same day. Japan will also impose in principle a ban on remittances to North Korea that will be put into effect as early as next week after the government notifies financial institutions, government sources said. (Kyodo, "Japan Implements New Sanctions on N. Korea," February 19, 2016)

A lawmaker here claimed North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has ordered more cyberattacks against South Korea. Citing information from the National Intelligence Service, Lee Cheol-woo of the ruling Saenuri Party told an emergency security meeting of government and ruling party officials the North could also use poison or abduct South Korean citizens as part of what he described as a "terror" campaign. "The North can inflict damage on anti-North Korean activists, defectors and government officials here," Lee later told reporters. Cheong Wa Dae in an emergency briefing on this afternoon confirmed the intelligence. Chief presidential secretary for public affairs Kim

Sung-woo said, "The chance of a North Korean terror attack is greater than ever." But neither Cheong Wa Dae nor the National Intelligence Service offered concrete evidence pointing to an impending North Korean terror attack. Intelligence officials claimed that would compromise South Korea's ability to deal with such an attack. Skeptics say the government is using fear tactics to pressure lawmakers to swiftly ratify an anti-terrorism bill that has been stuck in parliament since 2001. A government official said, "We have identified multiple signs of North Korea gathering related information via hacking in order to find suitable targets for cyberattacks." The NIS warned that government agencies, South Korean media that are critical of the North and financial institutions could become targets. "It could target public facilities and key infrastructure, including subways, shopping malls and power stations," Lee claimed. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn said at a National Assembly hearing that the government has no legal means to punish or block a known terrorist who has entered Korea. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "N. Korea 'Preparing Terror Attacks,'" February 19, 2016) South Korea is bracing for any possible terror attacks from North Korea, an official said. "The presidential office of national security is thoroughly in control of every situation related to terror," presidential spokesman Jeong Yeon-guk told reporters. Still, he declined to comment on whether National Security Adviser Kim Kwan-jin or other South Korean officials are included on North Korea's alleged hit list. South Korea believes that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has ordered intensified preparations for terror attacks on South Korea, Kim Sung-woo, chief presidential press secretary, told reporters yesterday. Police said earlier this week that North Korean hackers sent massive amounts of spam emails to South Korean public organizations last month, the latest in a series of cyberattacks against the South in recent years. Lee Chul-woo, a lawmaker of the ruling Saenuri Party, said on local radio that North Korea could launch a cyberattack in March or April, citing the North's track record of waging such attacks against South Korea soon after its nuclear tests. North Korea launched a cyberattack against South Korea in July 2009, two months after its second nuclear test. It also hacked South Korean media organizations in March 2013, a month after its third nuclear test. Also today, presidential chief of staff Lee Byung-kee met with the parliamentary speaker and leaders of the ruling and opposition parties at the National Assembly to persuade them to pass an anti-terrorism bill. The rare visit is the latest move in the push by the presidential office to win parliamentary blessing for a bill meant to better protect the lives of South Koreans from possible terror attacks. (Yonhap, "S. Korea Braces for Possible Terror Attacks: Official," February 19, 2016) Following the latest intelligence assessment that North Korea is planning terrorist attacks against the South, security measures to protect high-value targets including influential defectors have been beefed up. The National Police Agency has reinforced the security detail for former North Korean diplomat Ko Young-hwan, vice president of the Institute for National Security Strategy of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). He was put under the highest level of monitoring, as the intelligence community obtained a death threat from the North. Ko served in the North's Foreign Ministry from 1978 to 1991. He defected from his post as the first secretary of the North Korean Embassy in the Republic of Congo in 1991. "I was told by the police that they had obtained specific threats," Ko told Yonhap. "I was normally guarded by two agents, but the number has increased to eight." The police also improved security measures for Park Sang-hak, a North Korean defector currently leading the campaign to send anti-

Pyongyang leaflets across the border using balloons. The North has previously assassinated a high-profile defector in the South. Yi Han-yong, nephew of the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's mistress Song Hye-rim, defected to the South in 1982 while studying in Switzerland. He was shot in February 1997 by two assailants suspected of being agents from North Korean special forces. He died in a hospital later that month. The NIS informed the government and the ruling party yesterday that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un had ordered the country's intelligence agencies to prepare for terror attacks against the South. In addition to threats on cyberattacks and attacks on public facilities, assassination and kidnapping of high-value targets were also feared. *JoongAng Ilbo* reported today that the North had created a list of terrorism targets, including top security officials of the Park Geun-hye administration. The information was revealed at yesterday's intelligence briefing by the NIS. Kim Kwang-jin, head of the Blue House National Security Office, and foreign, defense and unification ministers were included on the North's list of targets, sources who attended the meeting told *JoongAng Ilbo*, quoting the intelligence authority's statement. Citing the latest terror threats from the North, top presidential secretaries on Friday renewed their pressure on the National Assembly to pass the long-delayed counterterrorism bill. "It is rare for the presidential secretaries to visit the legislature to demand the passage of bills," a presidential official said. "It seems to reflect President Park's push for the passage." Presidential Chief of Staff Lee Byung-kee, Senior Secretary for Policy Coordination Hyun Jung-taik and Senior Political Secretary Hyun Ki-hwan met with National Assembly Speaker Chung Ui-hwa Friday morning to urge the passage of the pending bills including the terrorism prevention bill. The presidential aides also paid visits to the leaders of the ruling Saenuri and main opposition Minjoo parties. "Lee told Chung that the counterterrorism bill must be passed as soon as possible," a National Assembly official said. "They also requested that other pending bills including the labor reform measures and North Korea human rights act be passed before the end of the February session." The ruling and opposition parties and the administration have repeatedly introduced counterterrorism bills to the National Assembly over the past 15 years. The first bill was proposed in 2001 in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. No vote has ever taken place, however, and some lawmakers fear such a bill would yield too much power to the NIS. The latest bill, proposed by the ruling Saenuri Party, seeks to establish a counterterrorism center inside the NIS, a plan that the main opposition Minjoo Party of Korea strongly opposes. Rep. Won Yoo-chul, Saenuri Party floor leader, said that it is imperative for the opposition to cooperate to pass the terrorism bill. "Even if this bill is passed, the NIS will not go through bank accounts and wiretap to eavesdrop on conversations as we see in movies," he said. "It needs to obtain permission in advance, and the outcome will be recorded." Won said citizens are being left unprotected to the growing terror threats because of the Minjoo Party's obstinate opposition. "I urge the opposition party to seriously consider this urgent situation," he said. Won and other Saenuri leaders met with their Minjoo counterparts yesterday to negotiate voting on the counterterrorism bill, but once again failed to reach an agreement. A senior Saenuri lawmaker said Friday that the North is expected to launch cyberattacks on the South in the coming months. "The North is expected to launch cyberattacks in March or April, before its Workers' Party convention in May," Rep. Lee Chul-soo, the Saenuri's chief negotiator for the National Intelligence Committee, said in a radio interview. "They have always

launched cyberattacks after a nuclear test. The NIS also made the same assessment.” (Ser Myo-ja, “Police Step up Security after North Orders Terror Attacks,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, February 20, 2016)

KCNA: “The Park Geun Hye regime of south Korea announced on February 7 that it would negotiate with the U.S. for the deployment of THAAD in south Korea. Commenting on it, south Korean media termed the negotiations a gesture for clinching the deal, claiming that Washington and Seoul have already thrashed out such issues as deployment and operation expenses, site for deployment and offer of its infrastructure through informal contacts. This proves that deployment of THAAD sparking concerns of Asian countries has entered the phase of execution after going beyond the stage of discussion. THAAD, which Lockheed Martin developed and steadily increased its firing range with an investment of tens of millions dollars for years, is known to be capable of intercepting ultra-supersonic objects flying even in outer space. The range of the X-band radar, its main component, reportedly covers thousands of kilometers. In case THAAD is deployed in south Korea, the sphere of U.S. military domination will extend to the depth of the Asian continent only to trigger off a hot arms race for developing cutting-edge weapons and escalate military tensions in the region. The Park regime is set to play a flagship role in carrying out the brigandish and hegemonic scenario of the U.S. to neutralize with MD system the military offensive capability of rapidly developing Asian countries, notably the regional powers, and establish the sphere of political, economic and military control in the region. Calling Asian countries trade partners and the like in public, the Park regime is unhesitatingly bringing the dark clouds of a nuclear war to hang over the people in the region behind the scene, pursuant to the scenario of the U.S. It is as sly as a herd of foxes, the unpardonable common enemy of the Asian people. The south Korean regime is justifying the deployment of THAAD under the pretext of “threat from nuclear weapons and missiles” of the DPRK. But no one will be taken in by such sophism. The strong war deterrent for self-defense of the DPRK is means of justice for punishing the U.S. imperialists, the sworn enemy of the Korean nation. If the south Korean puppet regime persists in its puppy-like behavior, calculating that it can stifle the compatriots in the north and attain all other ill-advised purposes with the backing of outsiders, it will only precipitate their ruin when a merciless war of justice is launched by the service personnel and people of the DPRK against the U.S. **The political and military tensions to be ratcheted by the deployment of THAAD will inevitably lead to physical conflicts** and, in this case, south Korea, a nuclear outpost of the U.S. for realizing its strategy for dominating the Asia-Pacific, will become a primary target of the neighboring countries. In a word, the deployment of THAAD will only precipitate the self-destruction of the south Korean puppet regime. The Park regime would be well advised to face up to the reality and stop running riot.” (KCNA, “KCNA Commentary Snipes at Projected U.S. THAAD Deployment in S, Korea,” February 19, 2016)

Jeffrey Lewis: “The rocket that put the satellite in orbit had a new name written on it – *Kwangmyeongseong* or “Shining Star” – but it looked awfully familiar. Basically, it’s the same rocket that North Korea launched in 2006, 2009, and twice in 2012. These rockets have had various names, but in the United States we call them the same thing –

the Taepodong-2. (Taepo is the name of a small village, or *dong*, near the missile test site where it was first observed.) And while North Korea says this rocket series is for putting satellites in orbit, the United States has long asserted that the Taepodong-2 is a de facto intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM). ...It might seem that deploying missile defenses is a sensible response to a missile launch, although if you know much about either PAC-3 or THAAD you'll be scratching your head. After all, THAAD and PAC-3 are what is known as terminal defense systems – they defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles as they come back down to Earth. They have no capability to defend against a Taepodong-2. Space launches, of course, don't come back down. THAAD and PAC-3 would have fire at the missile as it going up, during its boost phase, a capability that neither possesses. And, of course, if North Korean were to use the Taepodong-2 as an ICBM it would come back down, as the name suggests, on another continent (North America) not in South Korea or Japan. Nuclear warheads delivered by ICBMs enter the atmosphere at very high speeds, leaving THAAD and PAC-3 essentially helpless to defend against it. This is why the United States has invested in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System located in Alaska, a system that has its own limitations. So, if THAAD and PAC-3 are useless against a Taepodong-2 class threat, just what the heck is going on? Governments loathe looking helpless. When North Korea stacks a long-range rocket up on a pad and starts fueling it, reporters are bound to ask politicians and experts what the United States should do. Sure, every now and again, someone gets a wild hair up his ass and suggests blowing it up. Ash Carter was asked about his 2006 proposal to use a cruise missile strike to prevent North Korea from launching a rocket and shut down the conversation. "So that was then, and now is now," he said. Generally, what people are thinking is "We aren't going to do anything." But god help them if you say that out loud. So, a PAC-3 photo op in Shinjuku it is, followed by tough talk about the THAAD deployments in South Korea. If you press knowledgeable officials about the fact that these missile defenses can't intercept this particular missile, they'll usually give you some nonsense about shooting down any debris that might go off course. Guess what happens to any debris from a missile? It continues along its ballistic trajectory. There really isn't much chance of fragmenting debris falling into populated areas. And, in any event, the North Koreans seem to have taken care of that for us. There are reports that they detonated the first stage to prevent nosy busybodies from recovering the debris and seeing where the North Koreans are getting help. The South Koreans have still managed to pull up bits of the rocket, but so far the haul hasn't been as impressive as it was following the December 2012. Nor is THAAD much of a solution to North Korea's most threatening capability – a short-range, solid-fueled missile based on Russia's SS-21 called the KN-02 Toksa. Since 2014, North Korea has been testing an extended-range version of the missile that travels more than 120 miles. That's a nice range if you want to rain death and destruction against Seoul, a mere 35 miles from the DMZ. Since the Toksa is solid-fueled, the missile is a permanent state of launch readiness, unlike North Korea's liquid-fueled rockets, which must be fueled before launch. The Toksa (or SS-21/KN-02, if you are trying to keep track) would actually fly *under* the THAAD engagement zone. In the 1990s, the Department of Defense studied theater missile defense architectures in the Asia-Pacific, specifically considering four THAAD batteries in South Korea. While those batteries might defend much of South Korea against medium-range ballistic missiles like the Nodong, defending against short-range

threats requires different missile defense interceptors more like Israel's Iron Dome system. (There is a second system called David's Sling that would probably be just right.) The United States, South Korea and Japan don't have the slightest idea what to do about North Korea's missile programs. But the funny thing is, we already have the right weapon in the toolkit: it's called diplomacy. Unfortunately, it's been 16 years since the United States actually tried to do something about North Korea's ballistic missile program. Actually, it wasn't just us. The first people to try diplomacy to constrain North Korea's missile programs were the Israelis. Israel's Foreign Ministry was alarmed that North Korea was selling missiles to neighboring states like Iran. So someone had the inspired idea to make the North Koreans a better offer. The negotiations didn't get very far, but the Israelis proposed various forms of economic assistance reported at a hard-to-believe \$1 billion, including investments in a North Korean gold mine. Ultimately, Mossad got wind of the plan and sent its own delegation to Pyongyang to torpedo it. Apparently competing delegations from the Israeli Foreign Ministry and Mossad ran into each other when they took the same flight out of Pyongyang. (The scene is fictionalized in James Church's *Bamboo and Blood*.) There was a minor scandal back home, but the real problem was the United States found out about it. Ultimately, the United States leaned on Israel to knock it off. After all, buying out the North Koreans might have helped Israel's situation, but it would have left North Korea armed to the teeth with missiles, and a billion bucks to boot. The United States wanted a total elimination of the North's missile programs, a sentiment shared by South Korea and Japan – at which most of the missiles were pointed. Still, there was a beautifully unsentimental quality to how the Israelis approached the situation. Still, the Clinton administration thought it could do better. Over the course of the last few years of his presidency, Clinton sought an agreement in which North Korea would give up its long-range missile programs in exchange for assistance and free launches on foreign rockets. These negotiations involved a cast of characters, some of whom, like Wendy Sherman, would a decade and a half later play major roles in negotiating the Iran deal. This was the process that led, ultimately, to Secretary of State Madeline Albright's visiting North Korea – still the highest ranking official to visit the Hermit Kingdom. But Clinton ran out of time. It is hard to say whether the United States and North Korea were close to a deal in 2000. On one hand, the sides were much nearer to an agreement than I think most people realize. The North Koreans were saying, behind the scenes, that if Clinton would just get on a plane to Pyongyang, everything could be worked out. But the North Koreans were also taking a hard line on missiles that were already deployed. In the end, I think Clinton was right to spend his remaining days in Northern Ireland not North Korea – although the Bush administration made a fateful error stepping back from the negotiations to conduct a policy review. When Clinton left office, North Korea was observing a moratorium on launches of long-range missiles of any kind. That moratorium that held for a few years, but it ultimately fell victim to the collapse of the Agreed Framework. The moratorium ended with fireworks on July 4, 2006, when North Korea launched a number of missiles – including a Taepodong-2. The Bush administration made a half-hearted attempt to resume talks with North Korea over its nuclear programs, but never really talked about missiles. The Obama administration hasn't made much of an effort to do anything about Pyongyang's missiles either. There was the ill-fated "Leap Day Deal" in 2012, when North Korea agreed to meet a series of preconditions for disarmament talks to resume. One of

those preconditions was that North Korea agree not to test long-range missiles “of any kind” but U.S. diplomats were asleep at the switch. They didn’t even notice that the North Korean version of the deal omitted the phrase “of any kind” – which was a kind of diplomatic allusion to space launches – and were caught totally flat-footed when the DPRK announced that it would celebrate the centenary of Kim Il Sung’s birth in April 2012 with a space launch. That launch failed, but the Leap Day Deal was dead. There was something different about what happened in 2012 – and not just that North Korea tried again later that year and succeeded. During the 1990s, the North Koreans were offering to trade away a program that did not exist in exchange for other things. In 2012, as I wrote at *Foreign Policy*, U.S. diplomats had fundamentally misunderstood that North Korea was no longer interested in trading away its space program. Space launches are now part of the story that the North Korean government tells its citizens. They weren’t offering to come back to talks to give away their space program. They were offering to come back to talks so we might be more likely to let them keep it. That’s a big change. So here is an unpopular opinion: How about we strike a deal in which the North Koreans get to keep their space launch program in exchange for a series of constraints? Oh, I know, you’ll get howls from the usual quarters about how we are legitimizing North Korea’s missile programs. I hate that argument. I don’t even know what that means. Sure, we won’t be able to send them sternly worded letters complaining about their active missile programs. It will be a real blow to the people who make State Department stationary. But no one thinks the latest round of sanctions means North Korea will give up its rockets. In the real world, North Korea and Iran have very active missile programs. You don’t have to like it, but judging by the enormous investment in Pyongyang’s new satellite control and launch centers, the North Koreans don’t seem to be in a mood for bargaining away the space program. What might we realistically achieve? First, we might get North Korea to agree to only “peaceful” space launches. There isn’t much difference, but we might seek to prevent North Korea from testing its road-mobile KN-08 ICBM and stop development of new solid-fueled missiles. Everyone will hate this recognition, but in 10 years I am pretty sure I will be emailing this column around reminding people back when I said we should live with the liquid-fueled rocket program to head off the solid-fueled one. (This is just a future “I told you so” paragraph.) Second, and sort of pursuant to the first point, North Korea might agree not to test rockets in a ballistic missile mode, not to test reentry vehicles, and not to test missile defense penetration aids. North Korea can probably build crude casings for its nuclear warheads that can survive the heat of reentering the earth’s atmosphere, but these would have real limitations. They would probably be inaccurate and might slow down when reentering the atmosphere. With a little luck, a terminal defense like THAAD or PAC-3 might have a shot at them. If North Korea can develop much better reentry vehicles and penetration aids to defeat missile defenses, our task gets harder. And perhaps most importantly, North Korea is likely to sell such technologies to other countries like Iran. Third, North Koreans would have to abide by guidelines that bar the export of missiles and missile-related technologies. (I am not suggesting we let North Korea in the Missile Technology Control Regime that publishes guidelines for missile-related exports, but rather that we insist they adhere to the guidelines from outside, as China does.) I have my doubts about whether North Korea would really agree to such a thing, but I wouldn’t mind trying to slow down the bustling missile trade between Iran and North Korea. Frankly, I think North Korea will



probably cheat on such a deal, but I am not sure it matters. I am always for kicking the can down the road. If we can slow North Korea's development of various missile capabilities, that would be worth the sort of things we usually offer in negotiations – a high-level meeting or two, nutritional assistance, limited forms of sanctions relief, and suitcases full of South Korean money. There is a lot I would not put on the table – starting with missile defenses since a primary goal would be trying to make the North Korean program more susceptible to the defenses we have. North Korea is going to be launching a lot of rockets in the next few years. It might be time to do the unthinkable and approach the situation with something short of maximalist demands for total surrender. I realize this is a very unpopular sentiment. Letting North Korea launch a rocket into space without demarching them is unthinkable. The North Koreans might even think it a bit rude, like forgetting to send a Christmas card or thank-you notes after a wedding. But not demarching North Korea doesn't really amount to a policy change because no one thinks another round of sanctions is going to change Pyongyang's play. A tough statement from the Security Council is, in fact, doing nothing. Which is why it is easy. It doesn't require admitting that our policy has failed or making painful compromises. In a strange way, it serves our short-term interests to wail ineffectually at each North Korea launches. But it is our long-term interests that I worry about. If we continue to do nothing, North Korea will continue to test nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. This story will end with a North Korean thermonuclear weapon on an ICBM – pointed at Los Angeles. And all the THAAD batteries in South Korea won't matter one bit." (Jeffrey Lewis, "Are You Scared about North Korea's Thermonuclear ICBM?" *Foreign Policy*, February 19, 2016)

2/20/16 The South Korean military confirmed that the North conducted a firing drill on its western coast after an explosive sound was heard near the northernmost frontline island of Baengnyeong, causing unease among residents. A military official said "several artillery rounds" were likely fired at around 7:20 a.m. from the North's shore as part of a drill. An announcement was made immediately to the island's residents. The official added that none of the rounds crossed the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a maritime border in the Yellow Sea, and that the military will continue to closely monitor the North. Residents were requested to remain alert for a possible evacuation. (Kwon Ji-youn, "North Korea Conducts Firing Drill near Front-Line Island," *Chosun Ilbo*, February 20, 2016)

2/21/16 The United States rejected a North Korean proposal to discuss a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War because it did not address denuclearization on the peninsula, the State Department said. State Department spokesman John Kirby made the comment in response to a *Wall Street Journal* report that the White House secretly agreed to peace talks just before Pyongyang's latest nuclear bomb test. The newspaper, citing U.S. officials familiar with the events, said the Obama administration dropped its condition that Pyongyang take steps to curtail its nuclear arsenal before any peace talks take place, instead calling for North Korea's atomic weapons program to be just one part of the discussion. Pyongyang declined the proposal, and its January 6 nuclear test ended the diplomatic plans, the newspaper reported. "To be clear, it was the North Koreans who proposed discussing a peace treaty," Kirby said in an emailed statement. "We carefully considered their proposal, and made clear that

denuclearization had to be part of any such discussion. The North rejected our response," he said. "Our response to the NK proposal was consistent with our longstanding focus on denuclearization." (Reuters, "U.S. Rejected Peace Talks before Last Nuclear Test," February 21, 2016) Days before North Korea's **latest nuclear-bomb test**, the Obama administration secretly agreed to talks to try to formally end the Korean War, dropping a longstanding condition that Pyongyang first take steps to curtail its nuclear arsenal. [??] Instead the U.S. called for North Korea's atomic-weapons program to be simply part of the talks. Pyongyang declined the counter-proposal, according to U.S. officials familiar with the events. Its nuclear test on January 6 ended the diplomatic gambit. The episode, in an exchange at the United Nations, was one of several unsuccessful attempts that American officials say they made to discuss denuclearization with North Korea during President Barack Obama's second term while also negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program. Obama has pointed to the Iran deal to signal to North Korea that he is open to a similar track with the regime of Kim Jong Un. But the White House sees North Korea as far more opaque and uncooperative. The latest fruitless exchanges typified diplomacy between the U.S. and Pyongyang in recent years. "For North Korea, winning a peace treaty is the center of the U.S. relationship," said Go Myung-hyun, an expert on North Korea at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a Seoul-based think tank. "It feels nuclear development gives it a bigger edge to do so." The new U.S. sanctions and Washington's efforts to raise pressure on China, Pyongyang's main political and economic ally, will provide a test of whether the deadlock can be broken. The U.S. law goes further than previous efforts to block the regime's sources of funds for its leadership and weapons program, including by extending a blacklist to companies, primarily Chinese ones that do business with North Korea. Existing sanctions targeted North Korean individuals and entities with little presence outside the country. Advocates of the law, many of whom cite the example of Iran, say more pressure was needed to deter North Korea. The law will force Kim to "make a choice between coming back to the table and ending his nuclear-weapons program or to cut off the funding for that program and for his regime," House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Ed Royce, a California Republican, said recently. Skeptics, including those within the Obama administration, say North Korea is different from Iran because its decades of isolation limits the power of sanctions. Some say Pyongyang is increasingly using domestic technology in its weapons program and that many of the blacklisted Chinese companies are small with few other international dealings. "It's not like Iran where they have a lot of vulnerability because there's a lot of commercial activity," a senior U.S. official said. The sanctions "will have an effect, but the real lifeline is the Chinese assistance." While Obama felt emboldened by his success in reaching a nuclear deal last year with Iran, he has largely tried to use any momentum from that diplomatic effort to push for a political resolution to the conflict in Syria, rather than shift focus to North Korea. Iran and North Korea "are both countries that have a long history of antagonism towards the United States, but we were prepared to have a serious conversation with the Iranians once they showed that they were serious about the possibility of giving up the pursuit of nuclear weapons," Obama said last October. But he added, "there's been no indication on the part of the North Koreans, as there was with the Iranians, that they could foresee a future in which they didn't possess or were not pursuing nuclear weapons." North Korea's U.N. mission didn't respond to a request for comment. Its state media agency

wrote this month of the U.S.'s prioritization of nuclear talks: "This is just like a guilty party filing suit first." The U.S.-South Korean missile-shield talks "further strengthens arguments of those in China who argue North Korea is a strategic liability," said L. Gordon Flake, head of the Perth US-Asia Centre at the University of Western Australia. "It's becoming more difficult for China to give North Korea leeway." For the U.S., coordination with China is important to pass new U.N. sanctions against North Korea. Some American officials said in the past week that China agreed to cooperate. "I think it unlikely that China wants to be seen by the international community as the protector of North Korea, given its recent outrageous behavior in violation of international law and U.N. Security Council resolution," Susan Rice, Obama's national security adviser, said last week. A Chinese vice foreign minister has said Beijing will support a "new, powerful" U.N. resolution, though added that negotiations are key to fixing the problem. But any external pressure faces the challenge of North Korea's unwillingness to yield its nuclear weapons, especially after Pyongyang revised its constitution in 2012 to declare itself a nuclear-armed state. "Submitting to foreign demands to denuclearize could mean delegitimization and destabilization for the regime," said Nicholas Eberstadt, a North Korea expert at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. (Alastair Gale and Carol Lee, "U.S. Agreed to North Korea Peace Talks before Latest Nuclear Test," *Wall Street Journal*, February 21, 2016) North Korea quietly reached out to U.S. officials through the United Nations in New York last fall to propose formal peace talks on ending the Korean War, a response to President Barack Obama's comments that the U.S. was willing to engage Pyongyang as it has with other rogue regimes, senior U.S. officials told CNN. That effort fell short, the officials said, with the North Koreans refusing to include their nuclear program in any negotiations as the U.S. required and soon after testing a nuclear weapon. But it represented a new step from the Obama administration as it tried to lure the hermetic country out of its isolation and extend its track record of successful negotiations with nations long at odds with the United States, such as Iran and Cuba. The U.S. told North Korea it was willing to discuss a formal peace to replace the 63-year-old armistice that ended hostilities after the Korean War, but only if efforts to curb Pyongyang's nuclear program were part of the discussions. In doing so, the administration dropped a longstanding demand that North Korea take steps toward "denuclearization" before talks on a formal peace treaty began. Still, the North Koreans refused to allow the nuclear issue to be part of any talks. (Elise Labott and Nicole Gaouette, "North Korea offered - Then Rebuffed - Talks with U.S.," February 22, 2016) "The peace treaty negotiations is not just an issue between the United States and North Korea, but needs to be led by South Korea," Jeong Joon-hee, a spokesman for the South Korean Ministry of Unification, said in a briefing February 22. An official from South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs added, "Our government has made efforts to coordinate between the other six-party nations to draw North Korea to the table before its fourth nuclear test. The five party nations already agree that if North Korea shows concrete signs toward denuclearization, it will be able to resume six-party talks." (Sarah Kim, "Denuclearization Issue Killed Korea Peace Talks," *JoongAng Ilbo*, February 22, 2016)

DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement: "The U.S. is getting evermore frantic with the anti-DPRK campaign obsessed with inveterate hostility toward it. "2016 North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act" passed through the U.S. Senate and House of

Representatives and it took effect after Obama signed it on February 18. The act is peppered with rubbish-like provisions calling for obstructing the normal economic and trading activities of the DPRK while intensifying psychological warfare for internal destabilization and plot-breeding over "human rights issue." The U.S. scenario to hold in check the DPRK's implementation of the line of simultaneously developing the two fronts through despicable sanctions and psychological warfare is as foolish as trying to get the sun eclipsed by palms. Sanctions do not work on the DPRK as it has been subject to the U.S. harsh sanctions more than half a century. The DPRK manufactured even H-bomb entirely on the basis of its self-development principle despite the sanctions. It is the unanimous view of the international community that sanctions and threats cannot help settle the issue of the Korean Peninsula but make it more complicated. The DPRK can never overlook the fact that the campaign launched by the U.S. while branding the DPRK's just measure for self-defense as an act of disturbing peace is aimed at bringing down the socialist system in the DPRK, cradle of worthwhile life and happiness of its people. The U.S. has often repeated the assertion that sanctions are not targeting the people of the DPRK and their living but this time it openly blustered that the essence of its policy toward the DPRK is to suffocate its overall national economy and bring down its social system. This proves that the U.S. remains unchanged in its hostile policy aimed at physically eliminating the state and people of the DPRK and is going beyond the tolerance limit, far from weakening. The U.S. is working hard to use the "human rights issue" as an excuse for slapping sanctions in a sinister bid to bring down the social system of the DPRK but the harsh economic sanctions mean the worst abuse of the human rights of its people and the U.S., a kingpin of human rights abuses, is bound to be punished for them. The desperate moves of the U.S. will only harden the unshakable will of the service personnel and people of the DPRK to firmly defend the most advantageous socialist system whereby they fully enjoy their genuine human rights and to proudly build an economic giant and a highly civilized nation under the unfurled banner of the self-development-first principle. **The harsher the U.S. becomes in its hostile policy, the more firmly the DPRK will stick to its line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force.**" (KCNA, "U.S. Anti-DPRK Sanctions Denounced," February 21, 2016)

A former security minister of North Korea has replaced the head of the North Korean military, who is presumed to have recently been executed, according to the North's state media. Ri Myong-su, former People's Security Minister, was referred to as "chief of the Korean People's Army (KPA) General Staff" KCNA dispatch reporting on leader Kim Jong-un's observation of aerial maneuvers. He was again mentioned in another dispatch the same day in which he was reported to have accompanied Kim as "chief of the KPA General Staff" to a flight drill inspection. This is the first time Ri Myong-su's promotion was officially confirmed by KCNA. Ri had been rumored to have succeeded Ri Yong-gil, who was executed on charges of corruption and pursuing personal gains. *Rodong Sinmun* did not mention Ri Yong-gil in the list of officials present at an event attended by Kim Jong-un and listed Ri Myong-su in his place. Analysts suggest Ri Myong-su was promoted because of his "extensive knowledge in missile technology." "Ri Myong-su was one of Kim Jong-il's top three aides and is known to be well-versed in missile technology," said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean

Studies in Seoul. (Yonhap, "N. Korea's Ex-Security Minister Replaces Executed Military Chief," February 21, 2016)

Tiny flash drives or memory storage cards could become powerful weapons to use against North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his military regime. The idea behind the Flash Drives for Freedom campaign, led by the Human Rights Foundation (HRF) and Forum 280, is to smuggle flash drives into the isolated state in order to provide North Koreans with flash drives holding South Korean soap operas or Hollywood movies. "Outside information and knowledge will transform North Korea," Alex Gladstein, chief strategy officer for HRF, told the *Korea Times*.

"According to the Seoul-based North Korea Strategy Center, only about 30 percent of North Koreans know that they are brainwashed and that the outside world is much more prosperous. Through campaigns like this, we hope to get that number closer to 50 percent or even 75 percent, and at that point, the evil Kim dictatorship will not be able to survive." The way to participate in the campaign is simple: just ship any USB sticks to the campaign office in Palo Alto, California. According to the organizers, campaigners will then find ways to smuggle the sticks into the repressive state. Few citizens have access to computers and the Internet. However, portable video players known as Notels are becoming increasingly common, Gladstein noted. According to HRF, about 200 flash drives and \$10,000 have so far been donated. (Jung Min-ho, "New Weapon against North Korea: Flash Drives," *Korea Times*, February 21, 2016)

2/22/16

KCNA: "The DPRK acceded to the agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts and the return of objects launched into outer space and the convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects on February 22, Juche 105 (2016), according to the decision of its government. The agreement concluded on April 22, 1968 stipulates the issue of handing over to the launch nation any astronaut, space objects and their parts as they fall or are discovered in the territorial land and waters of a signatory country and open sea. The convention concluded on March 29, 1972 undertakes a launch nation to make responsible compensation when space objects caused human or property losses on the earth surface or caused damage to a plane in flight. The DPRK's accession to the agreement and the convention will further promote the international trust in space scientific researches and activities and make positive contributions to strengthening cooperation with other countries. (KCNA, "DPRK Accedes to Space-Related International Agreements," February 23, 2016)

Some Chinese banks in northeastern China, including the Dandong, Liaoning Province branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the country's largest bank, have suspended cash deposit and transfer services for accounts owned by North Koreans since December last year. In telephone conversations with *Dong-A Ilbo* on February 18-19, an employee of ICBC's Dandong branch said that the measures started in late December, adding that the bank had suspended all deposits and transfers of foreign currencies, including the Chinese yuan, in and out of those accounts. Dandong is located in a border area with North Korea. More than 70 percent of North Korea-China trade takes place in the city. A source quoted a Chinese entrepreneur in Shenyang, Liaoning Province as saying that a Chinese bank he was doing business with recently informed him that it would not take deposits in or make

cash transfers from North Korean accounts. The businessman, who invested in several mines in North Korea, had paid for minerals from the mines imported to China through the bank. His North Korean partner is urging him to send money quickly, according to the source. In December 2015, before the North's four nuclear test conducted on January 6, Beijing said it had not been informed by Pyongyang of the test. "(The bank) had never told me why it was taking such measures, but it seems that they are related with the strained relations between North Korea and China," an employee at the bank said. One North Korea expert said that the Beijing-Pyongyang relations were worsened after the North's Moranbong Band canceled its first overseas concert in Beijing and returned home on December 12. "After the Chinese government started some measures to put pressure on Pyongyang, it could have further expanded and strengthened the sanctions following a series of provocations such as the nuclear test and the missile launch," the expert said. It is possible that Beijing, which participated in some of the international sanctions on the North following the third nuclear test in February 2013, has broadened the scope its sanctions on the North. Chinese companies operating plants in the border area and employing North Korean workers are restless. "If we trade minerals with North Korea and make transactions of the United Nations-designated contraband goods, our business will be hit hard by the U.S. sanctions law," another Chinese businessman said. "Many entrepreneurs are worried because their major importers such as the U.S., Europe and South Korea will likely block imports of Chinese products manufactured by North Korean employees." (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "China's Biggest Bank Freezes N. Korean Accounts," February 22, 2016)

*"Hankyore (Hani):* President Park Geun-hye recently shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex and decided to deploy THAAD missile defense in response to North Korea's nuclear test and long-range rocket launch. In addition, she implied in a recent address to parliament that if North Korea refuses to give up its nuclear weapons, South Korea will keep pushing it until the regime collapses. What do you think about Park's hard-line response to North Korea's recent actions? Sigal: Now is the time for serious reconsideration of policy, not flights of fancy. Seeking the collapse of the regime is utterly unrealistic. Far from encouraging the North to stop arming, it only reinforces the North's drive to make more and better nuclear weapons and missiles. Hani: China is objecting strongly to South Korea and the US's plan for the THAAD deployment on the Korean peninsula. The rifts between the US and China, China and South Korea appear to be widening. Some South Koreans are concerned that the THAAD might spur an arms race in Northeast Asia. What kind of impact do you think this will have on Northeast Asia's peace and stability? Do you think it may cause a security dilemma in this region? Sigal: THAAD has very limited anti-missile capability and can easily be offset by China's adding a few more missiles without triggering an arms race. China's real concern is the tightening of the U.S. alliances in Asia, which is necessitated by missile defense. Hani: As you know, the 'Pivot to Asia' policy of the Obama administration has two sides, one is cooperation with China and the other is blocking China's rise. One of the most prominent characteristics of Pivot to Asia is military cooperation among three countries, US, Japan, South Korea. Could you tell me what is the problem of trilateral military cooperation? Sigal: The pivot has no such purpose. It is not the policy of the Obama administration to block the rise of China, but to reassure its allies as China's military capabilities increase. It continues to pursue areas of

cooperation, including on North Korea policy. A serious US-China dialogue about security issues would be useful head off conflict. Hani: Can you talk a bit more about possible problems with the US-led Missile defense system. Sigal: Missile defense cannot operate without greatly intensified cooperation among the allies. That is a lot less worrisome than renewed talk of nuclear arming in Seoul and Tokyo. Hani: After three years in power, inter-Korean relations have only gotten worse under Park. Also, Obama administration has reiterated 'strategic patience' toward North Korea. What do you think about this? What has made two administrations push the ineffective policies? Sigal: The only realistic way to stop North Korean arming is to negotiate and that involves addressing North Korea's security concerns, not insisting on preconditions for talks. It would entail a gradual peace process and normalization of economic relations in parallel with denuclearization and missile constraints. Sustained negotiations may not succeed, but failing to try them is inexcusable. Similarly, the only realistic way for Seoul to bring about desired change in the North, however gradually, is to sustain economic, cultural and political engagement. President Park has unfortunately been of two minds about that, with unfortunate results. The failure is due to politics in both capitals where wishful thinking has prevailed over realism. Hani: South Korea is compared to a shrimp between two whales (US and China). On the side of South Korea, what position it should take between U.S and China? Sigal: It has been the policy of all recent governments in Seoul to remain a firm ally of the United States while seeking to engage with and accommodate China where possible. That is a sound approach to South Korean security. (Yi Yong-in, ""Expert Says Waiting for North Korea's Collapse Is 'Utterly Unrealistic,'" *Hankyore*, February 22, 2016)

Tensions have increased significantly along the Demilitarized Zone since North Korea's recent nuclear test and rocket launch, a North Korean military official told the Associated Press on Monday, adding that while he could not comment on operational details, "the reality is that it is touch and go." Though parts of the world's most fortified border can seem like a tourist trap, drawing throngs of camera-happy visitors on both sides every year, to the military-trained eye the Cold War-style standoff along the 257-kilometer (160-mile) DMZ – established when the 1950-53 Korean War ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty – is an incident waiting to happen. That's now truer than ever, the North Korean officer said, as tensions are escalating between Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington. Thousands of U.S. troops are deployed in South Korea and units based around the DMZ have the motto "Be Ready to Fight Tonight." "People come here and they think it's like a resort. But if you know it better, you know how dangerous it is," Lt. Col. Nam Dong Ho of the North Korean People's Army said in Panmunjom. Nam said tensions have increased significantly since the nuclear test in January and rocket launch earlier this month. "Something could happen at any time," he said. To stand on the North Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone is almost otherworldly. After crossing through military checkpoints and passing roadside concrete structures rigged to detonate and keep any vehicles from passing – defenses that are also common in the South – the air is peaceful and fresh, and birds can be heard chirping as they fly over a carefully manicured landscape dotted with rock monuments and meticulously maintained historical buildings. But closer to the Demarcation Line that marks the actual border, soldiers stand rigidly on guard, armed and intimidating, often just a few steps away

from their South Korean counterparts. Today, the surreal feeling at the Demarcation Line was heightened by the absence of anyone – soldiers or civilians – visible on the South's side. South Korea halted tours to its side of the DMZ the day after the nuclear test, when it also announced it would resume cross-border propaganda broadcasts, which have in the past brought strong recriminations from North Korea. The tours have gradually resumed. A popular observatory where people can catch a glimpse into the North via binoculars was set to reopen tomorrow. Along with restarting the broadcasts, South Korean President Park Geun-hye responded to the North's nuclear test and launch by shutting down a joint industrial park in Kaesong, a city just north of the DMZ, and telling the South Korean National Assembly that if North Korean leader Kim Jong Un doesn't change his ways his regime will surely collapse – predictably outraging the North. North Korea reacted by putting the industrial park under military control, cutting off emergency hotlines with Seoul and – through its state-run media – accusing Park of being a traitor and a "senile granny." "I don't even want to utter her name," Nam said. "I'm just a soldier so I don't know how the situation has changed. But as the Kaesong industrial zone has been totally closed by South Korea, our people and army are getting more enraged." Nam said the broadcasts cannot be heard in Panmunjom during the day, which he suggested was because the South doesn't want them to be heard by South Korean tourists. "But when it's quiet, late at night, you can hear them here," he said. Nam said he remains focused on his duties. But he added that, now that North Korea says it has an H-bomb – a claim disputed by some outside experts – the U.S. might be better advised to focus on negotiating a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War. "On the international stage, the U.S. talks about peace," he said. "But it should not interfere in the affairs of other countries." (Eric Talmadge, "Tensions Rising on DMZ, North Korean Officer Tells AP," Associated Press, February 22, 2016)

A trail of money stretching from a Panamanian shipping agent to an octogenarian Singaporean to a Chinese bank provides a window on why U.S. efforts to tighten sanctions on North Korea may be harder to achieve than in the case of Iran. For decades North Korea has built networks of front companies and foreign intermediaries to channel currency in and out, circumventing attempts to isolate it over its nuclear-weapons program. Court documents and interviews with investigators, banks and prosecutors show the cornerstone of those networks is China. "Its geographic proximity, the huge trade volume, having the contacts, and having the historic relationship all contribute to making China the center point for any North Korean initiative to evade international financial sanctions," said William Newcomb, a former member of a panel of experts assisting the United Nations' North Korea sanctions committee. "China is a very important piece in making sure that blockages work." Iran's economy is about 15 times the estimated size of North Korea's, and that country's decades of isolation mean its economy is more self-contained. "The primary playbook for upping sanctions effectively is Iran -- although that may not make practical sense here," said Adam M. Smith, former senior adviser to the Director of the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control and now a Washington-based lawyer with Gibson Dunn. "Such implementation would call for the U.S. -- and perhaps others - - to begin threatening sanctions on North Korea's supporters and protectors." North Korea relies on China, its biggest trading partner, for food, arms and energy. About 70



percent to 80 percent of North Korea's foreign earnings have in the past come via China, said Kim Kwang Jin, who ran the Singapore branch of North Korea's North East Asia Bank before defecting in 2003. "That huge trade volume means there are more people in China who are willing to cooperate with the regime," Kim said by phone from Seoul. But China is no longer turning a blind eye to illicit North Korean activities, according to Richard Nephew, a former principal deputy coordinator for sanctions policy at the State Department until last year. "In the last 10-15 years, they actually really do care about trying to prevent some of these bad acts." China's Foreign Ministry and central bank didn't respond to faxes seeking comment on what measures China is taking to stop the flow of illegal money to and from North Korea using banks and intermediaries in China. A tightening of control in China would make North Korea more dependent on the connections it has built up to do business further afield, where it risks having funds frozen in overseas accounts. To avert this, the regime uses a mix of bank accounts in the names of intermediaries who wire money at its request. One example of how those intermediaries work can be seen from Chinpo Shipping Company Ltd., a Singapore-registered ship-supplies firm set up by 82-year-old Tan Cheng Hoe, which channeled North Korean funds for years, according to court documents. Chinpo's role came to light after a routine inspection of the Chong Chon Gang, a North Korean cargo vessel passing through the Panama Canal in July 2013. Inside the hold, hidden under 200,000 bags of sugar, were disassembled MiG-27 fighter jets, Soviet-era radar systems and munitions headed for Cuba. Inspectors also found documents detailing a \$72,017 wire transfer from Chinpo to C. B. Fenton & Co., a Panama shipping agent, to pay for passage through the canal. The seizure sparked a two-year, international investigation that led to Singapore and brought the first criminal conviction for offering financial services to facilitate North Korea's arms proliferation. Singapore District Judge Jasvender Kaur fined Chinpo S\$180,000 (\$128,000) in January for violating UN sanctions and remitting money without a license. Edmond Pereira, Chinpo's lawyer, said the company is appealing the conviction and fine. Tan, a director of Chinpo, wasn't accused of wrongdoing. Calls to Chinpo's office were unanswered. Court documents, UN reports and interviews with lawyers on both sides show the payment for the Chong Chon Gang was the tip of the iceberg. Between 2009 and 2013, North Korea used Chinpo to funnel more than \$40 million through the global financial system, even after other Asian banks blocked Chinpo's accounts for making suspicious transfers. "It's almost as though this was their bank account for worldwide expenditures," said Sandy Baggett, who led the case against Chinpo as a Singapore deputy public prosecutor. Chinpo said in court documents that its staff were "acting within their scope of their responsibilities as shipping agents." The difficulty for North Korea was avoiding the attention of U.S. regulators, who can go after foreign banks conducting dollar transactions, because almost all are routed through clearing networks in the U.S. Tan minimized scrutiny by leaving ships' names off wire transfer forms, testifying in court that Bank of China had advised Chinpo to do so. Bank of China has denied it knew the payments were linked to Pyongyang. Bank of China officials did not respond to e-mailed requests for comment on the payments or its vetting system for suspicious payments, said Unice Liu, a consultant at Baldwin Boyle Group in Singapore which provides public relations for the bank. Chinpo's Bank of China accounts were closed in December 2013. "I think it was just really a lack of internal anti-money laundering procedures within the bank,"

said Baggett, now a consultant for Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP in New York. Court papers show Bank of China was the only lender that processed Chinpo's North Korean transactions. Other banks including Singapore's United Overseas Bank Ltd. shut down Chinpo accounts in 2005 for attempting to carry out suspicious wire transfers. Chinpo was told the money coming in was payments from clients who used North Korea's ships to carry cargo, according to testimonies. Those payments were sometimes as much as \$500,000, an unusually large amount for a shipping-related fee, said Baggett. Baggett said that, once a year, a woman with diplomatic status would show up and ask Chinpo to withdraw as much as half a million dollars in mint banknotes. "She was stopped once leaving Singapore for China with undeclared currency," said Baggett. "Her explanation was that she needed the cash to pay crew wages on some North Korean ships that were in China. But who knows if that's where the money actually went?" Newcomb, the former UN sanctions investigator, said North Korea's money largely stays abroad. Funds from sales of North Korean goods and services are held in the same offshore accounts, ready to be used to pay salaries for diplomats and officials operating overseas and to buy equipment or supplies. Money returned to North Korea is taken across the border in cash. "They build up these credits with the intermediaries and use that to trade," said Newcomb, who is also a former U.S. Treasury official. "But if they need to bring in the cash to Pyongyang, the only way to do that is by hand." Chinpo wasn't the only one helping North Korea make payments. When Austrian luxury goods broker Josef Schwartz was investigated in the late 2000s for fraud and money-laundering, he reassigned his contract to buy two yachts on North Korea's behalf to Complant International Transportation (Dalian) Co., according to Newcomb, who investigated the case. The Chinese logistics company was declared the end user for eight Mercedes cars Schwartz's firm had purchased on behalf of a North Korean citizen, according to a 2012 report by the UN sanctions committee's panel of experts. Complant didn't respond to a fax requesting comment on the transaction. North Korea has also tried to expand ties with Russia, especially as it shifted to ruble-based transactions in 2014 after Russia wrote off 90 percent of its \$11 billion debt, said Ludmila Zakharova, a senior researcher at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "Russia is observing the sanctions regime in full," she said, but the shift to the ruble helps "keep trade away from sanction mechanisms." Since October 2014, transactions had been going through Regional Bank For Development, a small bank whose office moved to Moscow from Russia's Bashkiria republic shortly before its license was revoked in 2015 as part of a nationwide review of lenders, and transactions are probably now going through China until a replacement bank can be found, Zakharova said. In the aftermath of North Korea's fourth nuclear test last month, U.S. President Barack Obama signed into law a bill that requires him to sanction individuals, foreign governments and financial institutions involved in prohibited transactions with North Korea. But the key is China, which has resisted efforts for UN sanctions to target energy shipments to North Korea. Squeezing Kim so hard that the regime collapses could also remove the buffer between China's northern border and the U.S. military in South Korea. David Asher, a former George W. Bush administration official who was involved in freezing North Korean assets at Banco Delta Asia, said sanctions can only be effective when China is coerced into cooperating. "The only way to cut off North Korea's illicit cash flow is by interdicting these intermediaries," said Asher, now an adjunct senior fellow at the

Center for a New American Security. "That requires the cooperation of China, the biggest domicile for this type of integrated, clandestine, business-to-business relationship with North Korea." (Sangwon Yoon, Sam Kim, Andrea Tan, "How North Korea Funnels Cash into the Country," Bloomberg, February 22, 2016)

The struggle between the US and China over China's rise and their rivalry for primacy in Asia is triggering a regional arms race, a new report concludes. According to a report released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), six of the world's 10 biggest arms importers between 2011 and 2015 were in the Asia-Pacific region: India, China, Australia, Pakistan, Vietnam and South Korea. South Korea ranked 10th on the list, accounting for 2.6% of global arms imports. Arms imports in Asia and Oceania were up sharply, by 26%, from the previous five years (2006-2010). Huge amounts of weapons were bought by countries in the region, making up 46% of global arms imports. "China continues to expand its military capabilities with imported and domestically produced weapons," a SIPRI analyst was quoted as saying in the report. "Neighboring states such as India, Viet Nam and Japan are also significantly strengthening their military forces." In a recently published report, the UK's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) stated that last year's economic downturn had barely affected military spending in the Asia-Pacific region. The ratio of military spending to gross domestic product (GDP) throughout the entire Asia-Pacific region last year was 1.48%, the highest it has been since 2010, the IISS said. The IISS also pointed out that attention last year South Korea, China, Japan and Indonesia all announced plans to increase their military spending. "In order to effectively respond to the security risk factors connected with the Korean Peninsula and the possibility of a North Korea provocation, we have set the rate of increase for defense spending next year at 4.0%, which is higher than the rate at which overall expenditures will increase (3.0%)," South Korean President Park Geun-hye said during a policy speech before the National Assembly in Oct. 2015. Japan has been increasing its defense budget for four years in a row, with defense spending last year surpassing 5 trillion yen (US\$44.30 billion) for the first time ever. This was described by officials at the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) at the time as creating a greater deterrence against China. In China, the situation is largely the same. While President Xi Jinping announced that the Chinese armed forces would be cut by 300,000 soldiers during his speech at a military parade in Sep. 2015 on the 70th anniversary of victory in World War II and has recently pushed through several measures designed to reorganize the military, China's defense budget is likely to receive a substantial boost. Next month, China is expected to announce a double-digit rate of increase in this year's defense budget at the National People's Congress next month, Reuters reported on February 16. Since 2011, China has been steadily increasing its defense budget by 10% or 12% each year. While the US has maintained its lead in weapons exports, China is experiencing considerable growth in the area. According to SIPRI figures, the US accounted for 33% of total arms exports between 2011 and 2015, leaving Russia, the second biggest arms exporters at 25%, in the dust. With Russian exports slipping for two years in a row because of the sanctions from the West that followed conflict in Ukraine, the US arms industry appears to be enjoying a boom. "The USA has sold or donated major arms to at least 96 states in the past five years, and the US arms industry has large outstanding export orders, including for a total of 611 F-35 combat aircraft to 9 states," SIPRI said. China

accounted for 5.9% of total arms exports, edging out France, Germany and the UK to take third place on the list. (Kim Oi-hyun, "Reports Point to a New Arms Race Breaking the Asia Pacific," *Hankyore*, February 23, 2016)

2/23/16

KPA Supreme Command "crucial statement: "The U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces are making desperate efforts after being taken aback by the first successful H-bomb test of Juche Korea and its successful launch of earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong-4. As the hysteric farce for adopting resolutions on "sanctions" at the UN, madcap military moves for stifling the DPRK with all type nuclear weapons and all unprecedented "options" against the DPRK could not break the will of the DPRK, the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces have now turned to their last gambling. That is the "collapse of social system" through "beheading operation" targeting the supreme headquarters of the DPRK. The U.S. imperialist aggression forces' nuclear-powered submarine North Carolina has already entered Pusan Port, F-22A Stealth fighter-bombers have been deployed in the Osan air force base and special operation troops of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces are finding their way to south Korea one after another to get involved in the operation. **The first special warfare corps of the U.S. Army, 75th commando regiment, special commando regiment of the U.S. marines, 720th special tactics corps of the U.S. air force, special warfare team Seal and other special operation troops have already been deployed in fields. Their operation missions are to strike major strategic targets including the supreme headquarters and nuclear and strategic rocket force bases of the DPRK in wartime.** Never has there been such a time as now when almost all the special operation troops of the ground force, navy, marines and air force of the U.S. that earned an ill fame in the past overseas aggression wars, and the aggression troops that go operational for the so-called "high-density strike" have found their way to south Korea all at once. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces openly bluster that they will **examine the feasibility of the combined "beheading operation," a key program of new OPLAN 5015, and the "removal operation" of nuclear and strategic rocket forces of the DPRK at the upcoming Key Resolve, Foal Eagle 16 joint military exercises.** The "beheading operation" touted by the enemies means a preemptive strike for "removing in advance the one empowered with the mandate of order" to deter the "use" of the nuclear and strategic rockets of the DPRK. Gravity of the situation is that the south Korean puppet forces are frantically joining the gangster-like U.S. in the implementation of "beheading operation," not content with introducing nuclear war means of the U.S. into south Korea to kill the compatriots in the north. The above-said "beheading operation" and the moves to "bring down the social system in the DPRK" are the height of hostile acts against it. The service personnel and people of the DPRK regard the supreme headquarters of our revolution as dearer than their own lives. All the service personnel and people of the DPRK are ready to immediately and mercilessly punish without slightest leniency, tolerance and patience anyone provoking the dignified supreme headquarters even a bit. The Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army clarifies the following principled stand reflecting the will of all the angry service personnel and people to take a thousand-fold revenge upon the enemies in view of the situation that has reached the dangerous phase which can never be overlooked any longer: **From this moment all the powerful strategic and tactical strike means of our revolutionary armed forces will go into preemptive**

**and just operation** to beat back the enemy forces to the last man **if there is a slight sign of their special operation forces and equipment moving to carry out the so-called "beheading operation" and "high-density strike."** **Our primary target is the Chongwadae**, the center for hatching plots for confrontation with the fellow countrymen in the north, and reactionary ruling machines. The Park Geun Hye group of traitors has long been disqualified to live in this land as it has recklessly introduced nuclear war means of its U.S. master to bring a nuclear disaster to this land, desperately decrying the DPRK's nuclear deterrent and successes made in space development, treasures common to the Korean nation. The group will have to pay a very high price for its high treason to get the sun eclipsed and destroy the cradle of our life. If the enemies persist in their foolish military action, failing to come to their senses despite the DPRK's crucial warnings, the DPRK will stage the second striking operation to totally eliminate its very source. **The U.S. imperialist aggressor forces' bases for invading the DPRK in the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. mainland are its second striking target.** The Korean-style striking operation which has been in the making for several decades for the final battle against the U.S. imperialists, robbers, will be an unimaginable retaliation war and reduce the cesspool of all evils to ashes never to rise again on our planet. They should bear this in mind. The DPRK is possessed of the most powerful and ultra-modern strike means in the world which are capable of dealing fatal blows at the U.S. mainland any moment and in any place. There is no need for the DPRK to keep secret about its military capabilities for which it has exerted all efforts to fight decisive battles with the U.S. for more than half a century. The U.S. is fated to be punished and perish in the flames due to the DPRK's deadly strikes. The doom of the U.S. has been sealed. Its strongholds for aggression are within the range of the DPRK's strikes and its weaponry is ready to open fire. The U.S. and south Korean puppet forces would be well advised to make the final choice: Whether they are to face merciless punishment or opt for making apology, though belatedly, and putting the situation under control. Nothing is more foolish and reckless than trying to make the sun sink. The DPRK's service personnel and people who are like manifold fortresses protecting the supreme headquarters of the revolution will mercilessly frustrate any provocation of the hostile forces and dash forward more dynamically for the final victory of the great Paektusan nation." (KCNA, "Crucial Statement of KPA Supreme Command," February 23, 2016)

Kerry-Wang Yi: **"KERRY:** ...First, we discussed North Korea's increasingly provocative actions. The nuclear test that the DPRK conducted last month and its subsequent ballistic missile launches are provocative; they are threatening; they are a violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. And China and the United States agree completely that this - these actions merit an appropriate response through the United Nations Security Council, which was promised if they violated a resolution, and it was promised in the last resolution. There now have been several flagrant violations of multiple UN Security Council resolutions, and those violations threaten not only the peninsula, but they also are a threat to international peace and security. We, therefore, need to respond accordingly. And we agreed today to continue our efforts to make certain that response is forthcoming rapidly. Today, **Foreign Minister Wang and I also discussed ways that we, along with our partners in the UN and the Six-Party Talks framework, can deepen our cooperation not only to respond to the actions**

**that DPRK took but equally importantly because those reactions have a purpose and that purpose is to bring the DPRK back to the table for the purpose of the Six-Party Talks and particularly discussions about denuclearization. ...WANG:** (Via interpreter) Friends from the media, good afternoon. Indeed, this is my third meeting with the Secretary of State in the last 30 days. This shows that both sides attach a lot of importance to our relationship and we hope to deepen mutual understanding through dialogue and to promote cooperation in various fields. I know you are very interested in the talks that we've just had. In particular, you are interested in the issues on the Korean Peninsula and in the South China Sea. But actually, the Secretary of State has told you that we had a very extensive agenda. We discussed China-U.S. cooperation and we also discussed the problems that exist, but both sides know that China and United States have far more common interests than areas of disagreement. And we work together on so many areas that far outweigh areas of friction. As diplomats, it is our responsibility to identify problems, face them, and resolve them so as to create a good environment and atmosphere for a strong bilateral relationship. So in some way, as foreign ministers it is our task to clear the way ahead and to remove obstacles to the smooth development of our bilateral relations. ...And of course, we discussed the current situation on the Korean Peninsula, as we did on previous occasions. In order to uphold the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, both sides do not accept the DPRK's nuclear missile program, and we do not recognize the DPRK as a nuclear weapon state. The UN Security Council is in consultation about a new resolution. I would like to tell you that important progress has been made in the consultations, and we are looking at the possibility of reaching agreement on the draft resolution and passing it in the near future. Once we pass that agreement, we can effectively limit further progress of the DPRK's nuclear missile program. **At the same time, China would like to emphasize that the Security Council resolution cannot provide a fundamental solution to the Korean nuclear issue. To really do that, we need to return to the track of dialogue and negotiation. And the Secretary and I discussed this many times, and we agree on this.** That is, the goal is to get back to the negotiation. China, as the chair of the Six-Party Talks, will continue to act in an objective and impartial way, and we will play our due role in exploring ways to resume the Six-Party Talks. **In light of the evolving situation, we have put forward a basic proposal. That is, we want to pursue in parallel tracks the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the replacement of the Korean armistice with a peace agreement. We know certain parties have different views on this proposal. It has not come as a surprise to us, and China is open to new ideas or better ideas so that the relevant parties can have a proper discussion.** China sees the parallel track approach as a reasonable one. It highlights the overriding goal of denuclearizing the peninsula at the same time it seeks to address the major concerns of the various parties. We would like to have further discussions about this with interested parties, including the specific steps that may lead to a resumption of dialogue. The Secretary and I also discussed the evolving situation on the peninsula. Both sides feel that we need to monitor the situation on the peninsula very closely in the coming two months. Various factors of instability might intertwine and have an impact, so under that situation it's very important that the various parties have more dialogue so as to prevent the heightening of tension or escalation of the situation. In particular, we must prevent the situation on the peninsula from spinning out of control. That is a scenario

that neither China nor the other parties wish to see, so China hopes that the relevant parties will not take any action that might heighten tension on the peninsula. ... **KIRBY:** The first of our just two questions today will come from Voice of America. **Q:** Thank you very much for this opportunity. Mr. Secretary, on DPRK, could you please elaborate on the discussions of the language of a new UN Security Council resolution that is highly anticipated to move on this week? What's the difference comparing to previous resolutions? ... (Via interpreter) Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during the meeting, have you agreed on the resumption of the Six-Party Talks? ... **KERRY:** I'm not going to elaborate with any detail on the proposed resolution because it is currently being evaluated by our teams in both Beijing and here in Washington. But the fact that it has reached a stage of where it is being evaluated is significant. It is fair to say, as Minister Wang Yi said a few minutes ago, we have made significant progress; it has been very constructive in the last days; and there is no question that if the resolution is approved, it will go beyond anything that we have previously passed. That was specifically called for in the last resolution in 2013. We passed a resolution then that said if China - if China - if DPRK - if DPRK violated the resolution and they either tested or engaged in a missile launch, there would be, quote, "significant impacts," or steps taken as a consequence of that. I believe that what we are considering is significant, but as I say, it is in the appropriate evaluative stages and we both hope that this can move forward very soon. I also would emphasize what the foreign minister has said, and I think I said this in my opening comments, the goal of **this is not to be in a series of cycling, repetitive punishments. That doesn't lead anywhere. The goal is to try to get Kim Jong-un and the DPRK to recognize that all of the countries of the world are united, as we were with respect to Iran, in saying that the world will not be safer with additional nuclear weapons. That's a fundamental decision. And what we need is for the DPRK to understand that it can rejoin the community of nations, it can actually ultimately have a peace agreement with the United States of America that resolves the unresolved issues of the Korean Peninsula, if it will come to the table and negotiate the denuclearization.** So that's the road ahead. That is precisely what this is about. We want a negotiated outcome. And it's up to the DPRK to make a sensible decision and not deprive their people, as they are today, of the normal commerce of nations and the normal standard of living which their people could have, were they to reach a reasonable agreement. ... **WANG:** (Via interpreter) The Chinese side, as the host party of the Six-Party Talks, of course wants to have an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. And I remember last time I said that in today's world any hotspot issue will require a solution based on negotiations, and the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is no exception. But resumption of the peaceful talks require the concerted efforts of all parties and requires all parties to meet each other halfway. And we hope that in the near future there will be an opportunity emerging for the resumption of the peace talks, of the Six-Party Talks. And the Chinese side for this purpose is ready to take up our responsibility as the host party and to continue to play our constructive role and express our objective and just position. ... **Q:** (Via interpreter) Thank you. My first question goes to Secretary Kerry. (In English.) (Inaudible) by the conversations you've had with Minister Wang with regard to the THAAD - the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea. Is the U.S. concerned about potential Chinese and Russian opposition? ... **KERRY:** Thank you very much. Russia and China have obviously both expressed concerns about THAAD. We have made it

very clear that we are not hungry or anxious or looking for an opportunity to be able to deploy THAAD. The only reason for THAAD being in consultation - a decision has not yet been made; it is not deployed - but the reason the consultation is taking place is because of the provocative actions of North Korea, which has publicly announced it is focused on the United States and which is developing weapons which have the ability to attack the United States. THAAD is a purely defensive mechanism - weapon. It's not an offensive weapon, doesn't have offensive capability. It is purely capable of shooting down a ballistic missile that it intercepts, and it is there for the protection of Korea and the protection of the United States, if it were to be there. **Now, we have said very clearly many times that the way to not only prevent THAAD from being deployed but also to see America be in a position to have less troops on the peninsula - maybe, one day - is by resolving the issue of the nuclear program in the DPRK and ultimately making peace on the peninsula. We are still living under the same armistice which ended the war back in the 1950s. So what our hope is that we could move down those tracks one way or the other over a period of time. And we have said that if we can get to denuclearization, there's no need to deploy THAAD.** I don't think anything could be a better articulation of our desire. We've stated publicly, openly, and clearly what the conditions are for not having to consider its deployment, and that would be the denuclearization. That's all - not even if North Korea fundamentally changed, but if it denuclearized, then this particular threat goes away. So we're very clear about it. We hope very much that over the course of the next weeks and months the DPRK will come to some wisdom with regard to its program, recognizing that we are joined together with other nations at the United Nations in our readiness to put in place some additional tough measures to make clear that we are serious. Now, with respect to - it's a very, very good question about the two tracks. Let me make this as clear as I can. There is only one foreign policy in the United States, and I have expressed that policy with respect to our desire to resolve the problem of North Korea, to pursue a negotiated resolution of the challenges of the South China Sea. And PACOM and DOD and State Department and CIA and all of our national security team are on the same page with respect to our policy with respect to the region. Our job is to put out the policy, work on the policy, try to implement the policy, and particularly, to try to pursue the diplomatic opportunities for peaceful resolution and a negotiated settlement to one conflict or another. But it is PACOM's job and it is the Department of Defense's job and it is the Secretary of Defense's job to address what happens if those measures fail. Those are the departments of preparedness. They are the people who have to be prepared for any eventuality in the event that we are unsuccessful in pursuing the other track. So they will see the world in terms of potential future threats. And by the way, the PLA does the same thing. They see the world in terms of potential future conflict. Our job - Foreign Minister Wang Yi and myself and the President's job - first of all, is to exhaust the options of diplomacy. The United States has usually done that and we're at our best when we do. And so that is what we're going to continue to do here, but make no mistake, nobody is in search of conflict. We are simply trying to be in a position where we can defend against any and all threats. And the most important thing that can happen over a period of time is for military-to-military cooperation to also take place so people understand what the other people are doing. I watched, as we all did, 50 years in the Cold War and an arms race. And we and the former Soviet Union went up to some 50,000 nuclear warheads aimed at each other -



50,000 - until finally, Gorbachev and Reagan met at Reykjavik and decided this was insanity and we needed to move in a different direction. And we did. And now we've ratified the START agreement and we're down to some - or we will be at 1,500 or so, a huge difference from where we were as we went into a very dangerous course of move and countermove and lack of any understanding of what we were doing. That's why diplomacy is important, that's why these relationships are important - so that we understand each other, so that we know what the eventualities and possibilities are. And when the Defense Department makes the statement it made, it makes it based on its best judgment about how to deal with eventualities. But the more we can work together, the more we resolve these issues peacefully, the less need there is, obviously, for the measure of expenditure that is taking place in those other sectors, particularly in a world where counterterrorism is so urgent, and counter violent extremism and expenditures to try to deal with failed and failing states is far more important than a bi-state arms race. And I think that's something we all ought to think about very carefully." (Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, DoS, February 23, 2016)

Kim Gunn, the ministry's director general for North Korean nuclear affairs, met with Jennifer Fowler, deputy assistant secretary of treasury for terrorist financing. They "consulted on ways to strengthen sanctions on North Korea," it said. (Yonhap, "S. Korea, U.S Discuss Sanctions on N. Korea," February 23, 2016)

2/24/16

Tensions between **South Korea** and **China** over how to deal with the North have flared into an unusually blunt diplomatic dispute, with Seoul telling Beijing not to meddle in its talks with the United States over the possible deployment of an American missile-defense system. Jung Youn-kuk, a spokesman for President **Park Geun-hye**, said Seoul's decision to discuss the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense was based on its own need for "self-defense against **North Korea's** growing nuclear and missile threats." "This is a matter we will decide upon according to our own security and national interests," Jung said. "The Chinese had better recognize this point." A senior official, speaking to reporters at the South Korean Foreign Ministry on the condition of anonymity, went further, advising **China** to "look into the root of the problem if it really wants to raise an issue with it" - a reference to the North's pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile technology and what South Koreans and Americans consider **China's failure to dissuade Pyongyang** from that path. The angry retorts came a day after the Chinese ambassador to South Korea, Qiu Guohong, warned that the two countries' relationship could be "destroyed in an instant" if Seoul allowed the THAAD system to be deployed on its soil. Beijing says the system would enable United States military radar to penetrate deeper into China, compromising its security. "The THAAD deployment would have a grave impact on China's security interests," Qiu was quoted as saying in a meeting with the leader of South Korea's main opposition party. "The two nations have worked a lot to develop bilateral ties as they are today, but these efforts could be destroyed in an instant because of this one problem, and it would be difficult to restore the relations." The opposition party, Minju, said Qiu had asked that his comments be made public. The United States has wanted to deploy the THAAD system in South Korea for years, and Seoul **has long felt caught** between its longtime ally and China, its leading trade partner, with which it has been trying to cultivate a

closer relationship. But that equation changed after North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test on January 6 and followed up a month later with the launch of a long-range rocket. After China resisted efforts to place tougher sanctions on the North, South Korea formally announced that it was discussing the THAAD deployment with Washington. The floor leader of Park's governing party in Parliament, Won Yoo-chul, called Qiu's warning "blackmail." "A real friendly relationship between South Korea and China can be maintained not by words, but by action," he said, admonishing Beijing for not acting aggressively enough to rein in Pyongyang. Secretary of State John Kerry expressed a similar message in Washington during a joint news conference yesterday with Wang Yi, the visiting Chinese foreign minister. "We have said that if we can get to denuclearization, there's no need to deploy THAAD," Kerry said. The talks between South Korea and the United States have stoked old fears in China and Russia of an American antimissile shield stretching from Alaska to Southeast Asia. The Defense Ministry in Seoul says THAAD would provide a second, higher-altitude layer to the South's own ballistic-missile interception abilities, which are based on Patriot missiles intended mainly to stop missiles at low altitudes. Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of the American forces in South Korea, and the South's defense officials have said that it was critical for the allies to establish a "layered and interoperable" ballistic missile defense system. Yet many South Koreans, including the main opposition party, have reservations about the possible diplomatic and economic costs of deploying the system and about its effectiveness in defending the country against hundreds of short-range missiles from the North. A research institute in Seoul, the Peace Foundation, has argued that THAAD's main purpose would be to protect the United States from intercontinental ballistic missiles from the North, should Pyongyang succeed in developing them. Such a missile "is not a direct threat to us," it said. Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute in South Korea, said a THAAD deployment would probably undermine the South's strategic interests by pushing China closer to the North. China, which accounts for one-fourth of South Korea's external trade, could retaliate by boycotting South Korean exports and discouraging visits by Chinese tourists, he warned. According to analysts, China thinks THAAD in South Korea would undermine its nuclear deterrence by giving the Americans the ability to quickly track launches of Chinese missiles. But defense officials here said that would not make much difference because the Americans already have a THAAD battery on Guam and operate powerful radar in the region, as well as satellites over China. Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., commander of the United States Pacific Command, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing yesterday that it was "preposterous that China would try to wedge itself between South Korea and the United States for a missile system designed to defend Americans and Koreans on the peninsula." Qiu, the Chinese ambassador, was quoted as telling the opposition politicians yesterday that Beijing trusted Seoul's promise that any THAAD radar deployed here would be directed toward North Korea, and that it would not have enough range to cover China. Choe Sang-hun, "South Korea Bluntly Tells China Not to Meddle in Its Missile-Defense Talks with U.S.," *New York Times*, February 25, 2016, p. A-6)

President Barack Obama made a surprise appearance at a meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice, the White

House said. The meeting between Wang and Rice was watched closely as the two sides were expected to reach a final agreement on a draft U.N. Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear and missile tests. The two sides "agreed on the importance of a strong and united international response to North Korea's provocations, including through a U.N. Security Council Resolution that goes beyond previous resolutions," the White House said in a statement. "They agreed that they will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state," it said. (Yonhap, "Obama Makes Surprise Visit at Meeting between His Security Adviser and Chinese FM," February 24, 2016)

2/25/16

ROK Foreign Ministry spokesperson Cho June-hyuck dismissed recent media reports suggesting the U.S. has opened up to North Korea's demand for peace treaty talks. "South Korea and the U.S. maintain the consistent view that now is the time to make North Korea pay a bone-numbing price for its provocations through stronger pressure on the North on all levels, to concentrate on creating an environment in which North Korea must change, and that denuclearization is the foremost issue in any future talks with the North," he said. He added that speculating on the possibility of peace treaty talks is not helpful to responding to the current "grave situation." (Yonhap, "Senior U.S. Official to Visit S. Korea for N.K. Talks," February 25, 2016)

Michael Madden: "With less than three months left before the 7th Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Congress is scheduled to convene in May, Kim Jong Un appears to be appointing hardliners to key national security positions. The growing prominence of these officials—party cadres and military officers who support a more belligerent policy toward the ROK, the United States and Japan, and who generally do not favor North-South engagement—is worthy of note for those focused on North Korea. In appointing hardliners, the supreme leader may be trying to balance the divergent interests and agendas of competing constituencies, which can be broadly identified as: hawks disposed to tighter domestic restrictions and moderates (and a few reformers) seeking somewhat looser social and economic controls as well as opportunities to expand cultural and economic contacts. Possible additional personnel changes near or after the meeting might form a more stable environment in which Kim could implement longer-term policies. In the meantime, given the North's nuclear test in January and satellite launch in February, Pyongyang watchers should expect the coming months to resemble the tense geostrategic environment last seen during the spring of 2013, after the North's third nuclear test, when Pyongyang declared a national emergency, mobilized its military and declared that the safety of foreign citizens in the two Koreas could not be guaranteed. Three recent appointments—Rim Kwang Il, Kim Yong Chol and Ri Myong Su—suggest the country will answer a new round of denunciations with heightened brinkmanship in advance of its 7th Party Congress. **Rim Kwang Il** In the second half of 2015, Lieutenant-General Rim Kwang Il was appointed Director of the Korean People's Army (KPA) General Staff Operations Bureau, arguably the most powerful position in North Korea's armed forces. An unabashed hawk, the 51-year-old has spent much of his military career in the KPA's forward-deployed ground corps. These units are deployed along the MDL and would be first to protect the DPRK from an invasion from the South or, conversely, the first to attack the ROK in a Northern invasion. In 2015, he took part in the planning and command of the DMZ landmine

deployments that precipitated the inter-Korean crisis in August. This KPA director position has seen a dramatic turnover since Kim Jong Un came to power, strongly suggesting that Kim has taken a more active role than his father in the daily operational command of the North's armed forces.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, the supreme leader has continued a generational change within the KPA high command, gradually removing all military commanders who gained their formative military experience in the Fatherland Liberation War (Korean War). While leaders of Lieutenant-General Rim's generation have studied traditional combined arms operations like their predecessors, they began their careers when the DPRK was starting to develop and expand an asymmetric warfare toolkit that now includes light infantry special operations forces, cyber and other electronic warfare capabilities, and weapons of mass destruction. North Korea's high command now consists of general-grade officers who know how to integrate the KPA's conventional assets with asymmetric capabilities in military planning and training. As a result, North Korean leaders seem to be better prepared to use asymmetric tactics in future military provocations. **Kim Yong Chol** The rise of hawks in the DPRK's national security establishment and political culture are even more evident in the recent appointment of Kim Yong Chol as WPK Secretary and Director of the United Front Department (UFD), a civilian intelligence agency and policymaking shop which formulates the North's policy toward South Korea and manages ROK interactions. The 70-year-old is a four-star general and a career military intelligence official. Kim Yong Chol is the former head of the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), which manages the bulk of the DPRK's intelligence community, who was implicated as having a major role in the 2010 sinking of the ROK naval corvette *Cheonan*. In addition, he manages cyberwarfare units alleged to have been involved in cyberattacks against South Korea. In 2009, Kim Yong Chol supervised the migration of three key intelligence agencies—the Operations Department, the External Liaison Department and Office No. 35—from the WPK Central Committee (the party apparatus) to the RGB, which was then placed under the National Defense Commission (NDC). The sole holdout was UFD, which remains firmly under WPK control. Given Kim Yong Chol's involvement in the 2009 intelligence reorganization, what are the likely institutional effects of his new WPK and UFD appointments? As the overseer of UFD's formidable bureaucratic fiefdom, Kim may now take a more active role in formulating the DPRK's substantive policies toward the ROK. He would be able to exercise some control over personnel appointments to various ROK-related organizations involving cultural exchanges, civilian aid and public affairs. In addition, he would have a hand in selecting the DPRK representatives who participate in further inter-Korean interactions. Finally, Kim Yong Chol would have an active role in the management of the Kaesong Industrial Complex—if it reopens—which he previously inspected in his capacity as a senior KPA official. At least two possible interests may have motivated Kim Yong Chol's UFD appointment. 1. The regime may want to return all of its intelligence programs and assets to **direct Party control**, dissolving the RGB as it has existed for the last seven years and tasking Kim Yong Chol with overseeing an expanded UFD on behalf of the WPK Central Committee. If this is the case, Kim Jong Un would be re-establishing the intelligence structure established by his grandfather and signal stronger and less ambiguous Party control of the military. Kim may also gain control over elements of the WPK International Affairs Department (IAD), which contains some basic intelligence collection and analysis units. Like his predecessor at UFD, Kim Yong

Chol is juggling leadership responsibilities for both UFD and IAD in order to cope with the declining health of Kang Sok Ju, the latter organization's current director. 2. Kim Yang Gon's demise and Kim Yong Chol's appointment could conceivably be linked to a military plot to grab revenue from the Kaesong Industrial Complex. If some insider ordered Kim Yang Gon's death, the perpetrator might well have guessed that the supreme leader would replace the late UFD boss with Kim Yong Chol, who was already well positioned at Kaesong to support a money grab. There may also be a personal motivation because Kim Yang Gon—and other senior cadres at UFD, IAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—called for Kim Yong Chol's ouster as head of the RGB because they viewed him as an impediment to inter-Korean interactions and better relations. It is also worth noting that Kim Yong Chol had served as the chief North Korean delegate in several rounds of inter-Korean talks in 1991-92 and 2006-07 (and maybe more). He might be a hardliner, but if Kim Jong Un wanted to reach for someone in a hurry who had long experience actually at the negotiating table with the ROK, who knew the history by heart and had the authority to stare down the South Koreans, it would be Kim Yong Chol.

**Ri Myong Su** In early February, prior to the launch of the Kwangmyongsong-4, General Ri Yong Gil was removed from his position as Chief of the KPA General Staff. Replacing him is General Ri Myong Su, an 82-year-old who had been in retirement for more than two years prior to his latest appointment. Previously, he served concurrently as Minister of People's Security and as a National Defense Commission member. From 1996 to 2007, he was Director of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau. General Ri is one of the symbolic faces of the DPRK's *songun* (military-first) politics because of his high command position during the 1990s. More substantively, General Ri's crisis-management experience is certain to prove useful as international tensions rise this year. General Ri's advancing age bucks the trend of recent personnel appointments that have favored relatively younger officials, but he possesses valuable institutional memory and experience in both the North's internal security apparatus and its conventional armed forces. If the vertiginous nature of the numerous personnel changes to the KPA high command metastasized into internal instability, for example, Kim Jong Un's survival could depend on someone with Ri Myong Su's level of institutional knowledge and experience. In short, General Ri possesses the necessary command experience and ability to keep more ambitious hardliners in check as their influence grows. These recent personnel appointments show a continuation of two trends. First, an unfolding generational change in the KPA high command meant to equip the military leadership with the ability to plan and exploit relatively new military assets. Second, Kim Yong Chol's appointment provides Pyongyang watchers with another salient example of a senior military official migrating from the upper echelon of the KPA to the upper levels of the party leadership. For Kim Jong Un, the appointment of hawkish and hardline senior officials appears strategic. Hawks and hardliners are traditionally the most loyal to the Kim family's leadership, even if the hawks may possess and press their own agendas in front of the supreme leader. At the same time, a power balance is underway prior to the convocation of the 7th Party Congress in May. The gathering is likely to establish a more prominent role for the Party, greater civilian control over state resources, and stronger Party control over the North's armed forces. Therefore, Kim Jong Un seems to be practicing inclusive politics by letting military officials migrate into the Party power structure and putting hawks at the head of the military. In the short term, the hawks in high positions

will serve Kim Jong Un well as tensions continue to rise on the peninsula. (Michael Madden, "Let the Hawks Soar," *38North*, February 25, 2016) 5/13/16 Three months have passed since the Kaesong Industrial Complex was shut down. That same day saw the "execution" of former Korean People's Army Chief of General Staff Ri Yong-gil. Yet the intelligence proved false when *Rodong Sinmun* reported on May 10 that Ri had been named as a KWP Central Military Commission member and politburo candidate member at the first plenary session of the party's seventh Central Committee. It was an embarrassment for the Park Geun-hye administration, which had previously leaked the false intelligence to the media. The big problem, though, is that it was the result of a structural issue: the misuse and abuse of North Korea intelligence by the Blue House, National Intelligence Service, and other state agencies to suit Park's policies and perceptions, which are rooted in predictions of an imminent collapse in Pyongyang. At 11:48 am on Feb. 10, the South Korean government made its final decision to shut down the complex and told the press of an upcoming announcement. At around 3 pm that same day, the Unification Ministry, which was in a commotion over the decision, provided reporters with an "off the record" PDF file titled "North Korea unexpectedly purges Chief of General Staff Ri Yong-gil in early February." It asked to be cited anonymously as a "North Korea source." In addition to stating that North Korea had "executed Chief of General Staff Gen. Ri Yong-gil in early February on charges of 'factionalism' and 'abuse of power and corruption,'" it also described Ri as an "avid drinker" who was "in poor health because of a deteriorating liver." The report of Ri's execution was in itself unusual. "This kind of reporting of North Korea intelligence has not happened since the Unification Ministry was founded," said a reporter who has covered the ministry since the early 1990s. The Unification Ministry's function is to analyze North Korea intelligence, not produce it. Even when it has received intelligence from the NIS in the past, it has not made it public. But the reports about Ri were just one of several recent leaks of intelligence from a "related organization." A similar situation happened with the group defection of 13 workers at a North Korean restaurant in China. In such cases, the "related organization" is almost without exception the NIS. After *Hankyore* printed a May 11 article showing the claims of Ri's execution to be unfounded, an NIS official telephoned the reporter to insist that "the NIS never made that intelligence public" - effectively confirming speculation that after its decision to shut down the Kaesong Complex, Park's Blue House then had the Unification Ministry release "intelligence" produced by the NIS on Ri's alleged purge. The false reports of Ri's purge appear connected with the Kaesong Complex's shutdown. Indeed, it seems likely to have been a way of drawing renewed emphasis to the Pyongyang regime's "violence and instability" to counter possible negative opinion at home over the decision. The document on Ri's execution stressed current leader Kim Jong-un's "distrust and anxiety" toward key officials and predicted that his "politics of fear" would result in "senior North Korean officials seeming blindly obedient on the surface, but with deepening inward skepticism." The execution, it added, was "expected to function to increase the North Korean regime's instability." A structural factor behind the intelligence failure and abuse may have been Park's longstanding perception of the North Korean regime as being on the verge of collapse. "Working-level intelligence agents don't play around when it comes to intelligence," said a source with abundant experience working with North Korea intelligence within the administration. "Most of what we have described as 'intelligence failures' have been

disasters brought on by the top leaders and the 'tiger moths' currying favor with them in an attempt to use North Korea issues for domestic political ends," the source added. "The problem lies in the skewed perceptions of President Park Geun-hye, who wants to interpret every purge or execution of a high-ranking North Korean military or party figure like Jang Song-thaek, Hyon Yong-chol, or Ri Yong-gil as a sign of the Kim Jong-un's instability and imminent collapse," said a former senior government official. "For Ri Yong-gil to be confirmed alive and well after the administration essentially announced he had been executed is a serious intelligence failure and misuse that speaks to the need for the Park administration to do some serious reflection on its North Korea policy," the former official added. (Kim Jin-cheol, Lee Je-hun and Choi Hye-jung, "Why Does the NIS Have So Many Intelligence Failures," *Hankyore*, May 12, 2016)

2/26/16

The United States has unveiled a United Nations resolution on North Korea, packed with additional sanctions. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power told reporters that the resolution, if adopted, would represent the strongest set of U.N. sanctions imposed in more than two decades. The frustrated Security Council is acting in the wake of another North Korean nuclear test and a missile test. "These sanctions, if adopted, would send an unambiguous and unyielding message to the DPRK regime. The world will not accept your proliferation. There will be consequences for your actions, and we will work relentlessly and collectively to stop your nuclear program," Power said. She outlined key points of the proposal, including: All cargo going in and out of North Korea would be subject to mandatory inspection; all small arms and other conventional weapons would be prohibited from being sold to North Korea; financial sanctions would target North Korean banks and assets; limiting, and in some cases banning, exports of coal, iron, gold, titanium and rare earth minerals; prohibiting the supply of aviation fuel, including rocket fuel. Power stressed that the resolution is not meant to punish the people of North Korea. "The North Korean people have suffered so much already under one of the most brutal regimes the world has ever known. Rather, this resolution focuses on a ruling elite that have inflicted so much of that suffering," she said. A U.S. official familiar with the text said the 22-page resolution lists 17 North Korean individuals and 12 North Korean entities that would be subject to sanctions. The people and companies are believed to be facilitators for North Korea's weapons programs. Some operate overseas. The company list includes the aerospace equivalent of NASA in Pyongyang. A major bank in North Korea suspected of conducting lots of financial transactions for the nation's military nuclear and missile tests is also on the list, the official said. The sanctions would reportedly ban more luxury goods going into North Korea. When asked whether the resolution would make a difference in North Korea's behavior, the official expressed confidence. "It will have an impact," said the official. (Richard Roth and Dana Ford, "U.S. Proposes 'Unprecedented' Sanctions Resolution on North Korea," CNN, February 25, 2016) As a new set of sanctions against North Korea circulated at the United Nations Security Council, analysts in South Korea and China expressed doubts that the measures would be tough enough to force the pariah state to give up its nuclear weapons. The United States presented a draft resolution it had negotiated with China to the Security Council yesterday, calling for wide-ranging penalties against North Korea for a nuclear test it conducted on January 6 and for its launching of a long-range rocket a month later, both of which violated previous council resolutions. If adopted, the proposed

resolution would ban countries from selling to the North all small arms and other conventional weapons, as well as dual-use nuclear and missile-related goods and items like trucks that could be converted for military use. It would also ban the sales of aviation and rocket fuel to hurt the North Korean military's ability to conduct regular drills. It would require United Nations member states to inspect all cargo passing through their territories to or from North Korea for illicit goods. Until now, countries were required to inspect North Korean cargo only if they had reasonable grounds to believe it contained illicit items. "This could be bad because most of the parts for the nuclear facilities could only come from the outside world," Wang Junsheng, a researcher on North Korea at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said about the mandatory inspection of cargo. The resolution is also expected to expand the list of luxury goods countries are banned from selling to the North. It would also attempt to limit North Korea's sale of minerals, especially coal and iron ore, two of its most important exports. Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for China's foreign ministry, said yesterday that her government was confident that new United Nations sanctions on North Korea could curb its nuclear arms program. But the draft contained no effective sanctions against a booming trade across the relatively porous 870-mile border between China and North Korea – a lifeline not only for the impoverished North Korean people but also for their government's ability to earn cash. Nor did it require countries, especially China, to cut off oil exports to the North. It would also not affect tens of thousands of North Korean workers at factories, construction sites and logging camps in China, Russia, Africa and the Middle East. According to some estimates, they send home \$200 million to \$300 million a year, most of which human rights groups contend ends up in the coffers of the North's leader, Kim Jong-un. "These sanctions will certainly hurt the North," said Koh Yu-hwan, a professor at Dongguk University in Seoul. "But I don't think they will hurt them enough to abandon their nuclear weapons." Analysts in China said Beijing's approval of the sanctions proposed by the United States was the result of a complex calculus by Communist Party leaders. A factor that has loomed large for them in recent weeks is plans by Washington to deploy an antiballistic missile system, called THAAD, in South Korea. Chinese officials are seeking ways to prevent that from happening. "If it was not for the THAAD issue, there might not be such cooperation between China and the U.S.," said Shen Dingli, a professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai. "By doing this, it is still possible for China to dissuade the Americans from deploying THAAD at China's doorstep." China's agreement to limit imports of North Korean coal and iron ore, for example, came with an important caveat: It should be demonstrated that such imports would support illicit North Korean activities. North Korea's minerals, mainly its coal and iron ore, accounted for 53 percent of its \$2.8 billion in exports to China in 2014, according to data compiled by the government-run Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul. But because of a slowing Chinese economy and sharp declines in global prices, those coal and iron ore exports have been decreasing since 2013. North Korea has already begun making up for the shortfall by exporting more workers abroad, the analyst Lee Seok said in a report published by the Korea Institute last month. The workers have therefore become an increasingly important source of cash for the North Korean government. Nor would the proposed sanctions affect North Korea's growing business of making clothes on contracts from Chinese companies. North Korean textile exports to China expanded to \$741 million in 2014 from \$186



million in 2010, and the goods are made mostly at factories run by the North Korean military or the ruling Workers' Party, analysts and officials in Seoul said. Currently, an estimated 75 percent of North Korea's foreign trade, including almost all of its oil imports, is with China, providing Beijing with unique economic leverage over the North. The two-way trade amounted to \$5.5 billion last year, according to figures from Chinese customs authorities. But China's approach on how to solve the North Korean problem is fundamentally different from that of the United States or South Korea. It insists that sanctions should not aim to push North Korea toward instability but to induce it back to the negotiating table. After negotiating the proposed sanctions with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, Secretary of State John Kerry said on Tuesday that North Korea could ultimately have a peace agreement with the United States "if it will come to the table and negotiate the denuclearization." Still, the proposed sanctions, especially mandatory inspections of all cargo, would make it harder for North Korea to raise funds and import technology for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, analysts said. Wang Junsheng said negotiations between the United States and China over the terms of the sanctions had dragged on for seven weeks because Washington had wanted Beijing to cut off more trade. That included exports of oil and imports of coal, he said. But although China was fed up with Kim's aggressive and unpredictable behavior, it refused to enshrine those trade limits in the sanctions because energy supplies are tied to the well-being of civilians in North Korea and China – especially important during the harsh winter, he said. "Cutting off the trade could trigger a mass-scale humanitarian crisis," Wang said. (Choe Sang-hun and Edward Wong, "Doubts in Asia over Whether New Sanctions Can Work," *New York Times*, February 27, 2016, p. A-8) China's foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said the new U.N. resolution must focus on preventing North Korea from developing its nuclear and missile programs. "The Chinese side believes that the relevant sanctions should focus on curbing North Korea's nuclear and missile programs," Hong told a daily press briefing. "Sanctions should not affect the normal life of North Korean people." (Yonhap, "UN Resolution Must Not Affect Normal Life of N. Korean People: China," February 25, 2016)

The U.S. test-fired Minuteman-3 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on February 25. ..." (KCNA, KCNA Commentary Blasts Most Shameless U.S. DPRK Policy," March 12, 2016)

The U.S. director of national intelligence said it's only a matter of weeks or months until North Korea recovers plutonium from its nuclear facilities. Speaking before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, James Clapper said in addition to plans to extract plutonium, North Korea exports ballistic missiles and related materials to countries like Iran and Syria. But the North's claims of a "successful" hydrogen bomb test don't quite measure up to certain requirements. The low yield of the test is not consistent with a successful test of a thermonuclear device, Clapper said. (Elizabeth Shim, "Intelligence Chief James Clapper: North Korea Ready to Start Plutonium Production," UPI, February 26, 2016)

2/27/16

North Korea boasted of a newly developed anti-tank weapon that its leader said was so powerful it could turn the most heavily armored enemy tanks into "boiled pumpkin." Pyongyang's state media said leader Kim Jong-Un had watched tests of the portable,

laser-guided rocket and declared it had the "longest firing range in the world", and was "as accurate as a sniper's rifle." "He noted with great satisfaction that even the special armored tanks and cars of the enemies which boast their high maneuverability and striking power are no more than a boiled pumpkin before the anti-tank guided weapon," reported KCNA. Kim called for the weapon to go into mass production as soon as possible and for it to be deployed to frontline units and coastal defense units. (AFP, "New N. Korean Weapon Turns Tanks into 'Boiled Pumpkin,'" *Korea Herald*, February 27, 2016)

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel dismissed allegations that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system is a diplomatic bargaining chip in Washington's negotiations with Beijing over the North Korean issue and other security agendas in the region. "There's no connection between what is going on in the diplomatic track in the U.N. Security Council and the question of the deployment of THAAD," Russel told reporters in Seoul. "THAAD is not a diplomatic bargaining chip." Russel made the remarks after a meeting with Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam and Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun. He visited Seoul to discuss issues related to a U.N. resolution on tougher sanctions against North Korea. (Yi Whan-woo, "'THAAD Is Not 'Bargaining Chip,'" *Korea Times*, February 27, 2016)

2/29/16

Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun has been appointed as South Korea's top nuclear envoy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced, Monday. Hwang Joon-kook, Kim's predecessor, will become Korea's ambassador to the United Kingdom. Kim, who joined the foreign ministry in 1984, has worked in various appointments within it, including the director of the North America Division 2 under North American Affairs Bureau and the senior coordinator for ROK-U.S Security Cooperation Division. From 2009 to 2012, he served as the director-general for the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Bureau under the Office of Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, dealing with the North's torpedoing of the naval ship Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. He also worked for the presidential transition committee in 2013 before serving as the secretary for policy coordination at the National Security Office in 2014. (Kang Seung-woo, "Seoul Replaces Nuke Envoy," *Korea Times*, February 29, 2016)

A senior South Korean diplomat dismissed growing concerns over the absence of progress in Seoul's initiative to build trust with North Korea, saying the initiative is still valid and should be pushed for with a long-term perspective. Speaking at a forum that the state-run Korea National Diplomatic Academy hosted to evaluate the first three years of the Park Geun-hye administration's diplomacy, Second Vice Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul also pointed to Pyongyang's recalcitrant and provocative behavior, which he said has made it difficult for Seoul's "peninsular trust-building process" to yield meaningful progress. "When North Korea does not show any signs of willingness to change course, there can't be any progress. That is a corollary," he said at the forum "The trust-building process remains valid and should be seen from a long-term perspective." He added that the trust-building process would move forward should the communist regime take a path toward denuclearization with "sincerity." (Yonhap,

"Peninsular Trust-Building Process Still Valid: Vice Minister," *Korea Herald*, February 29, 2016)

3/1/16

President Park Geun-hye vowed to show North Korea that its nuclear arms program will not guarantee the regime's survival, warning Pyongyang of newer and tougher sanctions. "Based on unyielding readiness and international cooperation, the government will make sure North Korea will have no choice but to give up its nuclear program," Park said in an address commemorating the 97th anniversary of Korea's independence movement against Japanese colonial rule, which was celebrated Tuesday. "Now, it is time for North Korea to make a choice. It has become clear that the existing countermeasures won't stop the North's determination for nuclear development," Park said. "We must show the North clearly that exploiting its people and concentrating everything on nuclear development for the regime's survival will never succeed. We will show them it is meaningless." Park said Seoul will keep the door open for talks on denuclearization, but pressure by the South and the international community will continue if Pyongyang refuses to give up its nuclear program. Since the North's fourth nuclear test in January, it was the first time Park mentioned the possibility of dialogue. Park's message to Pyongyang was strong but toned down from a February 16 speech at the National Assembly in which she warned the Kim Jong-un regime that it would only speed along its "collapse" by maintaining its nuclear ambitions. That speech was seen as a departure from her previous policy of so-called trust-building on the peninsula. Park also issued a conspicuously brief and reserved message to Japan after Korea and Japan struck a deal to settle the issue of the Japanese military's forced recruitment of Korean women into sexual slavery during colonial times and World War II. "The Japanese government must not forget its past misdeeds, respect the spirit of the agreement and fully implement it so that our future generations will learn from it," she said. She added that a new chapter in Korea-Japan relations could be opened when Japan faces history squarely. The main opposition Minjoo Party of Korea criticized Park's approach to both Pyongyang and Tokyo. "A realistic and effective policy based on a rational assessment of the situation is as important as the president's determination to resolve the nuclear crisis," Minjoo Party spokesman Kim Sung-soo said. "Above all, she must seriously consider the impact that strained inter-Korean relations have on national security and the economy to make sure there will be no burden on the country and the people." Kim said Park was making an empty request to Japan to remember its wartime past and fully implement the agreed settlement on the comfort women issue. "The Japanese government not only refused to offer a formal apology but also denied that it had forced the women into sexual slavery despite its agreement with the Korean government," Kim said. "Park must show a bold attitude to Japan that the meaningless agreement will be voided in order to receive a true apology from the Japanese government." (Ser Myo-ja, "Park Vows to Denuclearize North," *JoongAng Ilbo*, March 2, 2016)

North Korea dismissed South Korea's demand for it to first denuclearize before holding any discussions to sign a peace treaty, accusing the South of starting a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula. In a signed commentary carried by KCNA, Pyongyang also rejected Seoul's demand to be a part of such discussions to sign a peace treaty that will replace the Korean armistice agreement "(The) great irony is that

the South Korean puppet forces who are no more than war servants of the U.S. are talking about the main player in replacing the Armistice Agreement (AA) which has existed for more than 60 years. As well known to the world, the AA concluded on July 27, 1953 was signed by the DPRK and the U.S.," it said. The commentary came a few days after a spokesman for South Korea's Unification Ministry insisted any discussions on signing a peace treaty must be preceded by denuclearization of the North. The North again dismissed the call, claiming the South was equally responsible for the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. "The South Korean puppet forces have allowed the conversion of South Korea into the biggest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the Far East as a shock brigade of the U.S. for a war for more than six decades and ceaselessly staged war exercises, big and small, against the DPRK under various codenames," the KCNA commentary said. "Peace will never settle in the Korean Peninsula as long as the South Korean puppet group is hell-bent on confrontation with the compatriots in the north as the shock brigade of the U.S. for carrying out its scenario for stifling the DPRK," said the commentary. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Rejects S. Korea's Call for Denuclearization before Peace Treaty Talks," *Korea Herald*, March 1, 2016)

3/2/16

Exasperated with North Korea's defiant testing of nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to severely toughen its penalties against the isolated country. The 15-member Council approved a resolution, negotiated for weeks by American and Chinese officials, that called for inspecting all cargo going in and out of the country, banning all weapons trade and expanding the list of individuals facing sanctions. Diplomats said the resolution contained the most stringent measures yet to undermine the North's ability to raise money and secure technology and other resources for its nuclear weapons program. Much depends, however, on whether China – North Korea's leading trade partner and diplomatic shield – will enforce it. Samantha Power, the American ambassador to the United Nations, called the resolution "comprehensive, robust and unyielding," and said enforcement must be as well. The Council has sought to hobble North Korea's nuclear weapons program before, but the country has repeatedly flouted those measures. In January, it conducted its fourth nuclear test and launched a rocket in February, even as diplomats were negotiating the current resolution. The toughest component would require all countries to inspect all cargo passing through their territory to or from North Korea. Inspections had been required only if there was reasonable suspicion of contraband aboard. The list of banned goods was expanded by the resolution to include luxury watches, Jet Skis and snowmobiles worth more than \$2,000. While that may seem inconsequential for such a poor country, Kim Jong-un has been known to use such items to curry favor with his fellow elites. The resolution also requires countries to expel North Korean diplomats accused of illicit activities. It prohibits North Korea from sending martial arts experts to train police officers in foreign countries, as a United Nations panel recently accused Pyongyang of doing in Uganda. Loopholes remain, however. North Korea can still buy oil and sell its coal and iron ore, as long as such transactions are not used for its nuclear weapons program; compliance would be difficult to prove. Although prices have fallen in recent years, minerals still account for 53 percent of North Korea's \$2.5 billion in exports to China, its chief supplier of oil. The Obama administration welcomed passage of the resolution, with the spokesman Josh Earnest calling it "a strong message to Pyongyang." The administration also

announced related actions by the Treasury and State Departments that levied sanctions on five North Korean government entities, including the National Defense Commission, and a dozen North Koreans, including four high-level military officials, for their nuclear and weapons proliferation work. The designation freezes any properties they may have under American jurisdiction and bars American citizens from doing business with them. "Together, these actions reflect a strong and unified response to North Korea's provocative, destabilizing and dangerous activities," Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew said in a statement. China signaled that it saw the resolution as spurring peace talks soon, a goal that was welcomed by nonproliferation advocates. Darryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association said the resolution could be useful as leverage to persuade Pyongyang to return to the bargaining table. But he also criticized the Obama administration's policy of "insisting on denuclearization as a precondition for talks to halt and reverse North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities." "In the next several weeks, it will be important for Washington and Beijing to communicate to Pyongyang that they are willing to formally resume negotiations," Kimball argued. Beijing has been loath to draw attention to Pyongyang's human rights abuses, which the United Nations has documented and Washington has emphasized. The new resolution is not explicitly aimed at human rights violations, though Power made that link in her remarks to the Council. Referring to widespread malnutrition, Power accused North Korea of caring more about expanding its nuclear weapons program than "growing its children." The Chinese ambassador, Liu Jieyi, focused on the North's tests, done in violation of previous resolutions. He also expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions, and used the occasion to criticize an American proposal to deploy a missile shield in South Korea. "Sanctions are not an end to themselves, and the Security Council cannot fundamentally resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula," Liu said. "Today's resolution should be a new starting point and a paving stone for the political settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula." Analysts noted that previous sanctions were hampered because of a lack of vigorous enforcement by member states and the North's ingenious ways of circumventing them. The Council does not punish countries that aid North Korea's illicit trade or that fail to put sanctions in effect. China's agreement to limit imports of North Korean coal and iron ore came with a condition: It should be demonstrated that such imports would support the North's illicit weapons programs. By determining whether a shipment of coal from North Korea was for "livelihood purposes," China can maintain leverage it hopes to use to bring the North back to talks, but not to push it to the point of disintegration, South Korean analysts said. It is also up to China to control a booming network of trade and smuggling across its 870-mile border with North Korea. Those transactions have become a lifeline for the impoverished people, but most of them are also run directly by – or involve kickbacks to – party and military officials, according to the analysts. (Somini Sengupta and Choe Sang-Hun, "Security Council, Led by U.S. and China, Toughens Penalties on North Korea," *New York Times*, March 3, 2016, p. A-4)

Resolution 2270 (2016) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7638th meeting, on 2

March 2016:

*The Security Council, Recalling* its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013) and resolution

2094 (2013), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), *Reaffirming* that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, *Expressing* gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on 6 January 2016 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond, *Underlining* once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community, *Underlining* also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population DPRK, *Regretting* the DPRK's diversion of financial, technical and industrial resources toward developing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program, and condemning its declared intent to develop nuclear weapons, *Expressing* deep concern at the grave hardship that the DPRK people are subjected to, *Expressing* great concern that the DPRK's arms sales have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have great unmet needs, *Expressing* serious concern that the DPRK has continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated launches of ballistic missiles in 2014 and 2015, as well as the submarine-launched ballistic missile ejection test in 2015 and *noting* that all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond, *Expressing* continued concern that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, *Expressing* its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear-, and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security, *Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 6 January 2016 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Council's relevant resolutions, and further *condemns* the DPRK's launch of 7 February 2016, which used ballistic missile technology and was in serious violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013);
2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation, and shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches, and *demand*s that the DPRK immediately comply fully with these obligations;
3. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities;

4. *Reaffirms* its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;
5. *Reaffirms* that, pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006), all Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and *underscores* that this provision prohibits the DPRK from engaging in any form of technical cooperation with other Member States on launches using ballistic missile technology, even if characterized as a satellite launch or space launch vehicle;
6. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) **shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, including small arms and light weapons and their related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel;**
7. *Affirms* that the obligations imposed in paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006), as extended by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009), apply with respect to the shipment of items to or from the DPRK for repair, servicing, refurbishing, testing, reverse-engineering, and marketing, regardless of whether ownership or control is transferred, and *underscores* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any individual traveling for the purposes of carrying out the activities described in this paragraph;
8. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to **any item, except food or medicine, if the State determines that such item could directly contribute to the development of the DPRK's operational capabilities of its armed forces, or to exports that support or enhance the operational capabilities of armed forces of another Member State outside the DPRK**, and *decides* also that this provision shall cease to apply to the supply, sale or transfer of an item, or its procurement, if:
  - (a) **the State determines that such activity is exclusively for humanitarian purposes or exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue, and also not related to any activity prohibited** by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, provided that the State notifies the Committee in advance of such determination and also informs the Committee of measures taken to prevent the diversion of the item for such other purposes, or
  - (b) the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that a particular supply, sale or transfer would not be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;
9. *Recalls* that paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009) requires States to prohibit the procurement from the DPRK of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related materiel, and *clarifies* that this paragraph prohibits States from engaging in the hosting of trainers, advisors, or other officials for the purpose of military-, paramilitary- or police-related training;

10. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to **the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II** of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means;
11. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;
12. *Affirms* that “economic resources,” as referred to in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), includes assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, actual or potential, which potentially may be used to obtain funds, goods, or services, such as vessels (including maritime vessels);
13. *Decides* that **if a Member State determines that a DPRK diplomat, governmental representative, or other DPRK national acting in a governmental capacity, is working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity, or of an individual or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, then the Member State shall expel the individual** from its territory for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede the transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters or other UN facilities to conduct United Nations business, and *decides* that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply with respect to a particular individual if: a) the presence of the individual is required for fulfillment of a judicial process, b) the presence of the individual is required exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or c) the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution;
14. *Decides* that, if a Member State determines that an individual who is not a national of that State is working on behalf of or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, then Member States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the individual’s state of nationality, consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of the individual is required for fulfillment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede the transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters or other UN facilities to conduct United Nations business;
15. *Underscores* that, as a consequence of implementing the obligations imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2094 (2013), all Member States shall close the representative offices of designated entities and prohibit such entities, as well as individuals or entities acting for or on their behalf, directly or indirectly, from participating in joint ventures or any other business arrangements, and *underscores* that if a representative of such an office is a DPRK



national, then States are required to expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law, pursuant to and consistent with paragraph 10 of resolution 2094 (2013);

16. *Notes* that the DPRK frequently uses front companies, shell companies, joint ventures and complex, opaque ownership structures for the purpose of violating measures imposed in relevant Security Council resolutions, and, in this regard, **directs the Committee, with the support of the Panel, to identify individuals and entities engaging in such practices and, if appropriate, designate them to be subject to the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution;**

17. *Decides* that all Member States shall prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including teaching or training in advanced physics, advanced computer simulation and related computer sciences, geospatial navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, aeronautical engineering and related disciplines;

18. *Decides* that **all States shall inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory, including in their airports, seaports and free trade zones, that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, or by designated individuals or entities, or that is being transported on DPRK flagged aircraft or maritime vessels, for the purposes of ensuring that no items are transferred in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution, and calls upon States to implement such inspections in a manner that minimizes the impact on the transfer of cargo that the State determines is for humanitarian purposes;**

19. *Decides* that Member States shall prohibit their nationals and those in their territories from leasing or chartering their flagged vessels or aircraft or providing crew services to the DPRK, and *decides* that this prohibition shall also apply with respect to any designated individuals or entities, any other DPRK entities, any other individuals or entities whom the State determines to have assisted in the evasion of sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, any individuals or entities acting on behalf or at the direction of any of the aforementioned, and any entities owned or controlled by any of the aforementioned, *calls upon* Member States to de register any vessel that is owned, operated or crewed by the DPRK, further *calls upon* Member States not to register any such vessel that is de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to such leasing, chartering or provision of crew services notified to the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis accompanied by: a) information demonstrating that such activities are exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue, and b) information on measures taken to prevent such activities from contributing to violations of the aforementioned resolutions;

20. *Decides* that all States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from registering vessels in the DPRK, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the DPRK flag, and from owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel classification, certification or associated service, or insuring any vessel flagged by the DPRK, and *decides* that this measure shall not apply to activities notified in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, following provision to the Committee of detailed information on the activities, including the names of individuals and entities involved in them, information demonstrating that such activities are exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue and on measures taken to prevent such activities from contributing to violations of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

21. *Decides* that all States **shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly, unless under the condition of landing for inspection, their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions** 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, except in the case of an emergency landing, and *calls upon* all States, when considering whether to grant overflight permission to flights to assess known risk factors;

22. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the entry into their ports of any vessel if the Member State has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a designated individual or entity, or contains cargo the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, unless entry is required in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, or for inspection, or unless the Committee determines in advance that such entry is required for humanitarian purposes or any other purposes consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

23. *Recalls* that the Committee has designated the DPRK firm Ocean Maritime Management (OMM), *notes* that the vessels specified in Annex III of this resolution are economic resources controlled or operated by OMM and therefore subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), and *underscores* that Member States are required to implement the relevant provisions of that resolution;

24. *Decides* that the DPRK shall abandon all chemical and biological weapons and weapons-related programs, and shall act strictly in accordance with its obligations as a State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, or Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, and *calls upon* the DPRK to accede to the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, and then to immediately comply with its provisions;

25. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution through the designation of additional goods, *directs* the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and further *decides* that, if the

Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report;

26. *Directs* the Committee to review and update the items contained in S/2006/853/CORR.1 no later than sixty days from the adoption of this resolution and on an annual basis thereafter;

27. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other weapons of mass destruction programs, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution;

28. *Reaffirms* paragraphs 14 through 16 of resolution 1874 (2009), and paragraph 8 of resolution 2087 (2013), and *decides* that these paragraphs shall apply also with respect to any items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution identified in inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 18 of this resolution;

29. *Decides* that **the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK,** and *decides* that **this provision shall not apply with respect to:**

(a) **Coal that the procuring State confirms on the basis of credible information has originated outside the DPRK and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), provided that the State notifies the Committee in advance and such transactions are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;**

and,

(b) **Transactions that are determined to be exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;**

30. *Decides* that **the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, and rare earth minerals, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;**

31. *Decides* that **all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of aviation fuel, including aviation gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, and kerosene-type rocket fuel,** whether or not originating in their territory, to the territory of the DPRK, or **unless the Committee has approved in advance on an exceptional case-by-case basis the transfer to the DPRK of such products for verified essential humanitarian needs,** subject to specified arrangements for effective monitoring of

delivery and use, and *decides* also that this provision shall not apply with respect to the sale or supply of aviation fuel to civilian passenger aircraft outside the DPRK exclusively for consumption during its flight to the DPRK and its return flight;

32. *Decides* that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to all the funds, other financial assets and economic resources outside of the DPRK that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by entities of the Government of the DPRK or the Worker's Party of Korea, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, that the State determines are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, *decides* further that all States except the DPRK shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, and *decides* that these measures shall not apply with respect to funds, other financial assets and economic resources that are required to carry out activities of the DPRK's missions to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and related organizations or other diplomatic and consular missions of the DPRK, and to any funds, other financial assets and economic resources that the Committee determines in advance on a case-by-case basis are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

33. *Decides* that **States shall prohibit in their territories the opening and operation of new branches, subsidiaries, and representative offices of DPRK banks, decides further that States shall prohibit financial institutions within their territories or subject to their jurisdiction from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, unless such transactions have been approved by the Committee in advance, and decides that States shall take the necessary measures to close such existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices, and also to terminate such joint ventures, ownership interests and correspondent banking relationships with DPRK banks within ninety days** from the adoption of this resolution;

34. *Decides* that States shall prohibit financial institutions within their territories or subject to their jurisdiction from opening new representative offices or subsidiaries, branches or banking accounts in the DPRK;

35. *Decides* that **States shall take the necessary measures to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK within ninety days, if the State concerned has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, and decides** further that this provision shall not apply if the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such offices, subsidiaries or accounts are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the activities of the United Nations or its specialized agencies or related organizations, or for any other

purposes consistent with resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

36. *Decides* that **all States shall prohibit public and private financial support from within their territories or by persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions** 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, including paragraph 8;

37. *Expresses* concern that transfers to the DPRK of gold may be used to evade the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution, and *clarifies* that **all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) to the transfers of gold, including through gold couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK so as to ensure such transfers of gold do not contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or other activities prohibited by resolutions** 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

38. *Recalls* that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has called upon countries to apply enhanced due diligence and effective countermeasure to protect their jurisdictions from the DPRK's illicit financial activity, and *calls upon* Member States to apply the FATF Recommendation 7, its Interpretive Note, and related guidance to effectively implement targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation;

39. *Reaffirms* the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and *clarifies* that the term "luxury goods" includes, but is not limited to, the items specified in Annex V of this resolution;

40. *Calls upon* all States to report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner, and *directs* the Committee to prioritize outreach to those Member States who have never submitted implementation reports as requested by the Security Council;

41. *Calls upon* all States to supply information at their disposal regarding non-compliance with the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

42. *Encourages* all States to examine the circumstances of previously reported sanctions violations, particularly the items seized or activities prevented pursuant to the relevant resolutions, so as to assist in ensuring full and appropriate implementation of these resolutions, especially paragraph 27 of this resolution, and *notes* in this regard the reporting of the Panel of Experts and the information regarding sanctions violations that the Committee has released publicly;

43. *Directs* the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution, and, in this regard, *directs* the Committee to designate additional individuals and

entities to be subject to the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution;

44. *Directs* the Committee to continue its efforts to assist Member States in implementing the measures imposed on the DPRK, and, in this regard, *requests* the Committee to draft and circulate a comprehensive compilation of all the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution so as to facilitate Member State implementation;

45. *Directs* the Committee to update the information contained on the Committee's list of individuals and entities, including new aliases and front companies, and *directs* the Committee to complete this task within 45 days of the adoption of this resolution and every twelve months thereafter;

46. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013) and this resolution;

47. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

48. *Underlines* that **measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, and the work of international organizations and non-governmental organization carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK;**

49. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;

50. *Reaffirms* its support to the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, and that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;

51. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;

52. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

**Annex I Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)**

1. **CHOE CHUN-SIK** a. *Description:* Choe Chun-sik was the director of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS) and was the head of the DPRK's long-range missile program. b. *AKA:* Choe Chun Sik; Ch'oe Ch'un Sik c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 12 October 1954; Nationality: DPRK
2. **CHOE SONG IL** a. *Description:* Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Vietnam b. *AKA:* NA c. *Identifiers:* Passport: 472320665; Passport Date of Expiration: 26 Sep 2017; Passport: 563120356; Nationality: DPRK
3. **HYON KWANG IL** a. *Description:* Hyon Kwang Il is the Department Director for Scientific Development at the National Aerospace Development Administration. b. *AKA:* Hyon Gwang Il c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 27 May 1961; Nationality: DPRK
4. **JANG BOM SU** a. *Description:* Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria b. *AKA:* Jang Pom Su c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 15 April 1957; Nationality: DPRK
5. **JANG YONG SON** a. *Description:* Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) Representative in Iran b. *AKA:* NA c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 20 February 1957; Nationality: DPRK
6. **JON MYONG GUK** a. *Description:* Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria b. *AKA:* Cho'n Myo'ng-kuk c. *Identifiers:* Passport: 4721202031; Passport Date of Expiration: 21 Feb 2017; Nationality: DPRK; DOB: 18 Oct 1976
7. **KANG MUN KIL** a. *Description:* Kang Mun Kil has conducted nuclear procurement activities as a representative of Namchongang, also known as Namhung. b. *AKA:* Jiang Wen-ji c. *Identifiers:* Passport: PS 472330208; Passport Date of Expiration: 4 July 2017; Nationality: DPRK
8. **KANG RYONG** a. *Description:* Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) Representative in Syria b. *AKA:* NA c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 21 August 1969; Nationality: DPRK
9. **KIM JUNG JONG** a. *Description:* Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Vietnam b. *AKA:* Kim Chung Chong c. *Identifiers:* Passport: 199421147 Passport Date of Expiration: 29 Dec 2014; Passport: 381110042, Passport Date of Expiration: 25 Jan 2016; Passport: 563210184, Passport Date of Expiration: 18 Jun 2018; DOB: 07 Nov 1966, Nationality: DPRK
10. **KIM KYU** a. *Description:* Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) External Affairs Officer b. *AKA:* NA c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 30 July 1968, Nationality: DPRK
11. **KIM TONG MY'ONG** a. *Description:* Kim Tong My'ong is the President of Tanchon Commercial Bank and has held various positions within Tanchon Commercial bank since at least 2002. He has also played a role in managing Amroggang's affairs. b. *AKA:* Kim Chin-So'k, Kim Tong-Myong, Kim Jin-Sok; Kim, Hyok-Chol c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 1964; Nationality: DPRK
12. **KIM YONG CHOL** a. *Description:* KOMID Representative in Iran b. *AKA:* NA c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 18 February 1962; Nationality: DPRK
13. **KO TAE HUN** a. *Description:* Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative b. *AKA:* Kim Myong Gi c. *Identifiers:* Passport: 563120630; Passport Date of Expiration: 20 March 2018, D.O.B. 25 May 1972; Nationality: DPRK
14. **RI MAN GON** a. *Description:* Ri Man Gon is the Minister of the Munitions Industry Department. b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 29 October 1945; Passport number: PO381230469; Passport Date of Expiration: 6 April 2016; Nationality: DPRK
15. **RYU JIN** a. *Description:* KOMID Representative in Syria b. *AKA:* NA c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 07 August 1965; Passport Number: 563410081; Nationality: DPRK
16. **YU CHOL U** a. *Description:* Yu Chol U is the Director of the National Aerospace Development Administration. b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Identifiers:* Nationality: DPRK List Update for Alias: Ra, Kyong-Su (KPi.008) –*New AKA:* Chang, Myong Ho

**Annex II Asset Freeze (Entities)** 1. ACADEMY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SCIENCE a. *Description:* The Academy of National Defense Science is involved in the DPRK's efforts to advance the development of its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK 2. CHONGCHONGANG SHIPPING COMPANY a. *Description:* The Chongchongang Shipping Company, through its vessel, the Chong Chon Gang, attempted to directly import the illicit shipment of conventional weapons and arms to the DPRK in July 2013. b. *AKA:* Chong Chon Gang Shipping Co. Ltd. c. *Location:* Address: 817 Haeun, Donghung-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Alternate Address: 817, Haeum, Tonghun-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; IMO Number: 5342883 3. DAEDONG CREDIT BANK (DCB) a. *Description:* Daedong Credit Bank has provided financial services to the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) and Tanchon Commercial Bank. Since at least 2007, DCB has facilitated hundreds of financial transactions worth millions of dollars on behalf of KOMID and Tanchon Commercial Bank. In some cases, DCB has knowingly facilitated transactions by using deceptive financial practices. b. *AKA:* DCB; *AKA:* Taedong Credit Bank c. *Location:* Address: Suite 401, Potonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Alternate Address: Ansan-dong, Potonggang Hotel, Pongchon, Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT: DCBK KKPY 4. HESONG TRADING COMPANY a. *Description:* The Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) is the parent company of Hesong Trading Corporation. b. *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK 5. KOREA KWANGSON BANKING CORPORATION (KKBC) a. *Description:* KKBC provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, a subordinate of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. Tanchon Commercial Bank has used KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, including transfers involving Korea Mining Development Corporation related funds. b. *AKA:* KKBC c. *Address:* Jungson-dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK 6. KOREA KWANGSONG TRADING CORPORATION a. *Description:* The Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation. b. *Address:* Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK 7. MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY a. *Description:* The Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry was created in 2013 for the purpose of modernizing the DPRK's atomic energy industry to increase the production of nuclear materials, improve their quality, and further develop an independent DPRK nuclear industry. As such, the MAEI is known to be a critical player in the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons and is in charge of day-to-day operation of the country's nuclear weapons program, and under it are other nuclear-related organizations. Under this ministry are a number of nuclear-related organizations and research centers, as well as two committees: an Isotope Application Committee and a Nuclear Energy Committee. The MAEI also directs a nuclear research center at Yongbyun, the site of the DPRK's known plutonium facilities. Furthermore, in the 2015 Panel of Experts (POE) report, the POE stated that Ri Je-son, a former director of the GBAE who was designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) in 2009 for engagement in or support for nuclear related programs, was appointed as head of the MAEI on April 9, 2014. b. *AKA:* MAEI c. *Address:* Haeun-2-dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK 8. MUNITIONS INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT a. *Description:* The Munitions Industry Department is involved in key aspects of the DPRK's missile program. MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the



DPRK's ballistic missiles, including the Taepo Dong-2. The MID oversees the DPRK's weapons production and R&D programs, including the DPRK's ballistic missile program. The Second Economic Committee and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences –also designated in August 2010 –are subordinate to the MID. The MID in recent years has worked to develop the KN08 road-mobile ICBM. b. AKA: Military Supplies Industry Department c. *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK 9. NATIONAL AEROSPACE DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION a. *Description*: NADA is involved in the DPRK's development of space science and technology, including satellite launches and carrier rockets. b. AKA: NADA c. *Location*: 10. OFFICE 39 a. *Description*: DPRK government entity. b. AKA: Office #39; AKA: Office No. 39; AKA: Bureau 39; AKA: Central Committee Bureau 39; AKA: Third Floor; AKA: Division 39 c. *Location*: DPRK 11. RECONNAISSANCE GENERAL BUREAU a. *Description*: The Reconnaissance General Bureau is the DPRK's premiere intelligence organization, created in early 2009 by the merger of existing intelligence organizations from the Korean Workers' Party, the Operations Department and Office 35, and the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Korean People's Army. The Reconnaissance General Bureau trades in conventional arms and controls the DPRK conventional arms firm Green Pine Associated Corporation. b. AKA: Chongch'al Ch'ongguk; KPA Unit 586; RGB c. *Location*: Address: Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK; Alternate Address: Nungrado, Pyongyang, DPRK. 12. SECOND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE a. *Description*: The Second Economic Committee is involved in key aspects of the DPRK's missile program. The Second Economic Committee is responsible for overseeing the production of the DPRK's ballistic missiles, and directs the activities of KOMID. b. AKA: N/A c. *Location*: Kangdong, DPRK List Update for Alias: NAMCHONGANG TRADING CORPORATION (KPe.004) –New AKA: Namhung Trading Corporation (Resolution 2270 (2016) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7638th meeting, on 2 March 2016)

The Obama administration sanctioned two of North Korea's most powerful government bodies as part of a broader effort to try to choke off funding to Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. The new U.S. penalties were announced today to coincide with the passage of new United Nations sanctions on North Korea, in response to the testing of a nuclear weapon in early January, its fourth overall, said senior U.S. officials. The U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted both the National Defense Commission and the Workers' Party of Korea Central Military Commission for their alleged central roles in overseeing Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons program. U.S. officials said North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered the Jan. 6 nuclear test through his position as first chairman of the National Defense Commission. "Our coordinated efforts send a clear message: the global community will not tolerate North Korea's illicit nuclear and ballistic-missile activities, and there will be serious consequences," Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said in a statement. In all, the Treasury and State departments sanctioned 17 North Korean individuals and entities for their alleged roles in developing Pyongyang's nuclear weapons. These included a dozen senior North Korean military officers and diplomats. They also included individuals allegedly involved in Pyongyang's procurement networks. The U.S. sanctions ban the North Koreans from conducting any business in U.S. dollars or with American entities. They also freeze any assets the individuals or entities hold inside the

U.S. (Jay Solomon, "U.S. Imposes Its Own New Sanctions on North Korea," *Wall Street Journal*, March 2, 2016)

Chinese banks in the northern border city of Dandong have suspended the transfer of the yuan currency to North Korean banks, Chinese financial sector officials told Yonhap. Employees of the Dandong branch offices of China's top four state-owned banks, including Agricultural Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, as well as six commercial banks such as China Merchants Bank, told Yonhap that the suspension came after "orders" from their headquarters. Since North Korea's third nuclear test in 2013, the Dandong branches of the Chinese banks have halted the transfer of U.S. dollars to North Korean banks. An employee of the Dandong branch of the Agricultural Bank of China said the order came down after North Korea's fourth nuclear test in January. (Yonhap, "Chinese Banks Halt Transfer of Yuan Currency to N. Korean Banks," March 2, 2016)

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North Korea fired six short-range projectiles into the sea off its east coast, South Korean officials said, just hours after the U.N. Security Council approved the toughest sanctions on the North in two decades for its recent nuclear test and long-range rocket launch. The firings also came shortly after South Korea's National Assembly passed its first legislation on human rights in North Korea. The North Korean projectiles, fired from the eastern coastal town of Wonsan, flew about 100 to 150 kilometers (60 to 90 miles) before landing in the sea, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement. It wasn't immediately known exactly what North Korea fired, and the projectiles could be missiles, artillery or rockets, South Korea's Defense Ministry said. Today's firings were seen as a "low-level" response to the U.N. sanctions, with North Korea unlikely to launch any major provocation until its landmark ruling Workers' Party convention in May, according to Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. North Korea has not issued an official reaction to the new U.N. sanctions. But citizens in its capital, Pyongyang, interviewed by Associated Press said today they believe their country can fight off any sanctions. "No kind of sanctions will ever work on us, because we've lived under U.S. sanctions for more than half a century," said Pyongyang resident Song Hyo Il. "And in the future, we're going to build a powerful and prosperous country here, relying on our own development." North Korean state media earlier warned that the imposition of new sanctions would be a "grave provocation" that shows "extreme" U.S. hostility against the country. It said the sanctions would not result in the country's collapse or prevent it from launching more rockets. (Hyung-jin Kim, "Seoul: North Korea Fires Short-Range Projectiles into Sea," Associated Press, March 3, 2016)

The United States does not rule out the possibility of pursuing a "parallel process" by which it holds peace treaty talks with North Korea in tandem with denuclearization negotiations, the State Department spokesman said. "We haven't ruled out the possibility that there could sort of be some sort of parallel process here," State Department spokesman John Kirby said at a regular briefing. "But, and this is not a small 'but,' there has to be denuclearization on the peninsula and work through the six party process to get there." As a way to defuse heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, China has proposed to pursue peace treaty talks and denuclearization

negotiations with North Korea at the same time. A peace treaty replacing the 1953 armistice that halted the Korean War has long been a key demand from Pyongyang. The U.S. and South Korea have already rejected the proposal, saying denuclearization must be the priority. Today, however, Kirby appeared to be putting more of the focus on leaving open the possibility of a parallel process than on denuclearization, even though he stressed that nothing has changed in the U.S. position on the issue. "I don't think we're in a position to rule out possible discussions on a peace process. But we're not going to decouple that in any way from what really needs to happen, which is complete denuclearization and adherence to the six party process," Kirby said. When the North proposed peace treaty talks last year, Kirby said that the U.S. "made it clear that we weren't even going to begin to have that discussion until denuclearization was factored in." "But nothing has changed on our policy that denuclearization has to be a part of this. And the six party talks is the process and the vehicle to do that," he said. (Yonhap, "U.S. Does Not Rule out 'Parallel Process' of Peace Treaty, Nuclear Talks with N. Korea: State Department," *Korea Times*, March 4, 2016)

DoS Daily Briefing: "**Q:** Yesterday, John, after the resolution passed, the Chinese ambassador to the UN once again suggested that it might be a good idea to have peace talks operate in parallel alongside the Six-Party denuclearization talks. I know that you guys have spoken to this many times, but since he's raised it again, do you have - is there any interest at all in the United - inside the Administration for this - to do this? **KIRBY:** Well, I think the Secretary actually addressed this when Foreign Minister Wang Yi was here last week when he talked about that we haven't - we're - **we haven't ruled out the possibility that there could sort of be some sort of parallel process here. But - and this is not a small "but" - there has to be denuclearization on the peninsula and work through the Six-Party process to get there.** So I don't think we're in a position to rule out possible discussions on a peace process, but we're not going to decouple that in any way from what really needs to happen, which is complete denuclearization and adherence to the Six-Party process moving forward. **Q:** So does that mean that it is not - the Administration does not rule out having talks to finally make the armistice permanent before there is a resolution to the nuclear issue? **KIRBY:** I didn't say that. I said, as the Secretary said -- **Q:** Well, that's what I'm trying to find out. ...**KIRBY:** The Secretary said he - that he wouldn't rule out the possibility that there could be discussions about a peace - resolution of the armistice. **Q:** Discussion about a parallel track -- ...**KIRBY:** There - nothing is going to change about our belief that first and foremost there has to be denuclearization. And we - and as we talked about before when the North Koreans floated this idea, and we made it clear that we weren't even going to begin to have that discussion until denuclearization was factored in; then it all kind of collapsed at that point. So nothing has changed about our position and our policy on denuclearization. **Q:** So there has to be denuclearization and then you can contemplate a peace process? **KIRBY:** I don't want to get ahead of every bit of the process, but nothing's changed on our policy that denuclearization has to be a part of this, and the Six-Party Talks is the process and the vehicle to do that. Thus far, the North has shown no willingness or even the ability to consider returning to that process, but that's the right process, that's the vehicle, and that's what - that's how we want to pursue this. (Daily Press Briefing Department of State, John Kirby, Spokesperson, March 3, 2016):

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KCNA: "The U.S. imperialists and their followers' flagrant moves for political and economic pressure and military aggression on the DPRK have gone to a grave phase that can no longer be overlooked. They committed a ferocious hostility of illegalizing the DPRK's independent rights as a sovereign state by adopting an unprecedented and gangster-like, new "resolution of sanctions" over its bolstering of self-defensive nuclear deterrent and legitimate launch of earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong-4. All the people in the DPRK are now waiting for an order of combat to annihilate the enemy with their surging wrath at the U.S. imperialists and south Korea's Park Geun Hye group of traitors. Under such situation, there took place a test-fire for estimating the might of controlled ordnance rocket warhead for large-caliber multiple launch rocket system of new type to be deployed in the reserve artillery units of the Korean People's Army. Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, guided the test-fire on the spot. At an observation post he learnt in detail about the planned test-fire of new-type large-caliber multiple launch rocket system and the tactical and technological specifications of controlled ordnance rocket and gave an order on starting the test-fire. The test-fire in various ways with mine rockets, under-ground penetrating rockets and canister rockets showed that the ordnance rocket warhead, made in combination with high-energy material, has amazing destructivity and killing power. Kim Jong Un was very satisfied to see controlled ordnance rocket hitting accurately and destroying to pieces the strongly-built simulated enemy personnel, tank, artillery and vehicle shelters. He said the development of Juche weapon representing the era of the dignified Workers' Party is a proud result from the undying feats of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il, who had dedicated their mental and physical efforts to the strengthening of the Juche-based defense capability, and from the Party's policy of attaching importance to the defense science and technology. At the same time, **it eloquently shows the tremendous potentials of the DPRK's self-supporting defense industry, he added.** The **serial production** of Korean-style large-caliber multiple launch rocket system of new type helps further strengthen the striking power of the Korean People's Army qualitatively, he said with satisfaction. The situation has reached a very dangerous phase that can no longer be neglected as the enemies are intent on such last-ditch attempt as "beheading operation" and "collapse of social system" while working hard to violate the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK and its right to existence, he said, adding: Now is the time for us to convert our mode of military counteraction toward the enemies into a preemptive attack one in every aspect. It is a very foolish act for **Park Geun Hye** to cry out for "preemptive attack" while recklessly beefing up the armed forces in league with the U.S. scoundrels, but her hysteria will precipitate only her ruin in the long run, he noted. He said that the DPRK would see what sophism the enemies, seeking to deprive it of the independent right to use space for peaceful purposes, would spout to mislead public opinion over the test-fire of its new weapons system held today, with their large-scale joint military exercises against it ahead. **He stressed that the national defense sector should deploy at an early date new-type large-caliber multiple launch rocket system and other recently-developed strike weapons in the operation areas of the Supreme Command so as not to allow the enemies to sleep in peace till the moment they meet their final end in their land. The only way for defending the sovereignty of our nation and**

**its right to existence under the present extreme situation is to bolster up nuclear force both in quality and quantity and keep balance of forces, he said, stressing the need to get the nuclear warheads deployed for national defense always on standby so as to be fired any moment.** He expressed belief that the officials, scientists and technicians engaged in the defense science would steadily develop new-type ultra-modern strike arms and equipment, make fresh leaping progress in the strengthening of military capability this year greeting the Seventh Congress of the WPK and thus consolidate the country's defense capability as firm as a rock. He was accompanied by Choe Ryong Hae, secretary of the C.C., WPK, Hong Yong Chil and Kim Jong Sik, vice department directors of the C.C., WPK, and Army Colonel General Yun Tong Hyon, vice-minister of the People's Armed Forces." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New Multiple-Launch Rocket System," March 4, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement: "The U.S. fabricated another "resolution on sanctions" by abusing the UNSC, while finding fault with the DPRK's H-bomb test and satellite launch. The "resolution" unprecedented in its viciousness and illegality is a brigandish product which can never be justified. If the access to nuclear weapons is to be called into question, the U.S., the first country in the world which had access to nuclear weapons and the only user of them, should be done so and if any fault is to be found with the DPRK's access to nuclear weapons, it is imperative to pull up the U.S. over the hostile policy and nuclear threat toward the DPRK for which it is responsible. The DPRK's access to nuclear weapons is an unavoidable option for self-defense made by it as the U.S., the world biggest nuclear weapons state and the only user of the nuclear weapons, designated the dignified DPRK as an "axis of evil" and target of a preemptive nuclear strike and has persistently escalated the hostile moves and nuclear threats to the DPRK by introducing various kinds of lethal hardware for a nuclear war. The DPRK's H-bomb test and satellite launch are being termed a breach of the previous "resolutions" of the UNSC but, in essence, those "resolutions" are a product of high-handedness practiced beyond the mandate of the UNSC. If the UNSC has the mandate to ban an individual country from conducting a nuclear test, what does the NPT exist for and what is the nuclear test ban treaty necessary for? As for the satellite launch, it is the legitimate right of a sovereign state. The DPRK shaped the 5-year program for national aerospace development through the legitimate exercise of the independent right recognized by international law and according to it successfully launched earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong-4 which is now under normal operation. Where in the UN Charter is the mandate investing the UNSC with the right to deprive an individual UN member nation of the right to use space for peaceful purposes, a right specified in international law, stipulated? If the DPRK's satellite launch is to be found fault with, it is necessary to call into question all countries that launched satellites including the U.S. The U.S., preoccupied with the hostility toward the DPRK, went so crude as not to hesitate to devise "luxury goods" as embargo items in a bid to prohibit the DPRK from importing even sports apparatuses such as ski resort facilities which have nothing to do with the development of weaponry. Underlying it is a vicious hostile purpose and nature against human rights aimed to arrest happy laughs of people from being heard from such cultural recreation grounds as the Masikryong Ski Resort in the DPRK and to prevent its people from enjoying highly civilized socialist life, the promise the Workers' Party of Korea made to them, and, furthermore, to bring

down the social system of the DPRK. The DPRK bitterly denounces and totally rejects all "resolutions" against it including the recent "resolution", which are being misused for sinister political purpose of a big power in wanton violation of the independent right, right to development and right to existence of the sovereign state, as the criminal documents devoid of impartiality, legitimacy and morality. Many member nations of the United Nations, small countries, in particular, are getting increasingly vocal in their call for the democratic reform of the UN Security Council the most undemocratic and unfair old structure and nature of which are still left intact within the UN machinery. And they are expressing their protest by ignoring unreasonable resolutions of the UNSC. The DPRK, a country that covered the path of self-reliance and self-development in face of the U.S. sanctions and blockade, recently took the path it should have taken, while being fully aware that the U.S. would slap sanctions again. The DPRK's self-development-first principle is the strength of the courageous people who emerged as a H-bomb state and satellite launching state by dint of its indigenous wisdom and technology with firm belief in their own efforts despite the U.S. ceaseless hostile policy and sanctions that lasted for more than seven decades. It is a serious miscalculation to think that sanctions would work on the DPRK. The DPRK's bolstering up of the nuclear deterrent is an exercise of the just right to self-defense which should be done constantly as long as the U.S. persists in its hostile policy, and the DPRK's satellite launch is the work for space development pursuant to the legitimate right of a sovereign state which should be done ceaselessly forever irrelevant to the U.S. hostile policy whose termination is still up in the air. **The world will soon witness more steps and actions to be taken by the DPRK on its path of successfully implementing the line of simultaneously developing the two fronts.** The U.S. will be wholly responsible for the total failure of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as **it refused to the last the abandonment of its hostile policy toward the DPRK.**" (KCNA, "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Rejects UNSC 'Resolution on Sanctions,'" March 4, 2016)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered his country to be ready to use its nuclear weapons at any time and the military to be in "pre-emptive attack" mode in the face of growing threats from its enemies. The comments, carried by KCNA news agency, marked a further escalation of tension on the Korean peninsula after the U.N. Security Council imposed harsh new sanctions on the isolated state for its nuclear program. Military experts doubt it has yet developed the capability to fire a long-range missile with a miniaturized warhead to deliver a nuclear weapon as far as the United States. Kim made the comments as he supervised military exercises involving newly developed rocket launchers, KCNA reported. It did not mention the date of the drills but said the new weapons had South Korea within range. Kim criticized South Korean President Park Geun-hye in his first direct published mention of her by name for acting "in league with the U.S. scoundrels," adding, "her hysteria will precipitate only her ruin in the long run," KCNA said. A spokesman for South Korea's Unification Ministry, which handles relations with the North, said Kim's comments were not helpful and may have been intended for the domestic audience, to boost morale in the face of the new U.N. sanctions. Responding to the report, a U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Commander Bill Urban, said, "We urge North Korea to refrain from provocative actions that aggravate tensions and instead focus on fulfilling its international obligations and

commitments." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that given the sensitive and complex situation on the Korean peninsula, China hoped the parties would maintain restraint, and "be careful in their words and actions, and not take any actions that would exacerbate tensions in this situation." Later today, North Korea rejected the Security Council resolution as a "criminal act" masterminded by the United States and vowed to continue boosting its nuclear deterrent and move forward on the path to become a "satellite superpower." "Our response will involve the full use of various means and tools including a strong and ruthless physical response," KCNA quoted an unnamed government spokesman as saying. *38 North*, which monitors North Korea, said recent commercial satellite imagery showed new activity in the isolated country, including a convoy of trucks at its satellite launch station that could be preparations for a rocket-engine test. Yesterday, South Korean President Park repeated a warning to the North to abandon its nuclear ambitions and said she would work to "end tyranny" by its leader. They were the toughest-ever comments against Pyongyang by Park, whose recent hard line against the North is a shift from her earlier policy of "trustpolitik" that focused on trying to engage in dialogue. *Rodong Sinmun* today carried three pages of a report and photographs of leader Kim supervising the rocket drills. It also ran a full-page commentary insulting Park as "a wicked woman who does everything evil against the compatriots in the North." (Jack Kim, "North Korea Leader Tells Military to Be Ready to Use Nuclear Weapons," Reuters, March 4, 2016)

Seoul and Washington officially launched talks on the deployment of the U.S.-led Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea, a bolstering of their joint missile defense posture that has been fiercely protested by some neighboring countries. The two sides signed a "term of reference" agreement in the morning and then convened the first meeting of a joint working group to discuss the details of the placement of the antiballistic missile defense system in South Korea, according to the Ministry of National Defense. Initially, signing of the joint agreement was set for February 23 but was delayed at the last minute in the midst of testy negotiations between China and the United States in Washington on a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for the strongest sanctions against North Korea in 20 years. The agreement was signed between Yoo Jeh-seung, deputy minister for policy at the Defense Ministry, and Lt. Gen. Thomas Vandal, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea's Eighth Army, in Seoul at 10 a.m., to set the guidelines for the talks. "The Korea-U.S. alliance, as a part of its efforts to develop its missile defense posture, will go forward with discussions on the possibility of the deployment of the THAAD system, which will be operated by the U.S. Forces Korea," said Na Seung-yong, a deputy spokesman of the Defense Ministry. A Defense Ministry official admitted the wording, "the possibility of the deployment of THAAD" took into consideration "opposition from China, who cooperated in the adoption of the UN sanctions resolution on North Korea." The official said, "The South Korean Defense Ministry's position is that because of its outstanding military usefulness, the quicker the deployment of THAAD, the better it is." Secretary of State John Kerry said after talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi last week that Washington was "not hungry or anxious to deploy THAAD," downplaying the urgency of its deployment in South Korea. And Adm. Harry Harris, head of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Command, said on February 25 that the decision to start discussions on the placement of THAAD "is not necessarily a decision to do it, not yet."

Maj. Gen. Jang Kyung-soo, head of the Defense Ministry's Policy Planning Bureau, and U.S. Forces Korea Maj. Gen. Robert Hedelund led the joint working group talks. It is expected that the joint working group made up of around 10 military, legal and foreign affairs experts will discuss the location of the battery, the timing of its placement, safety and environmental concerns. The cost of one THAAD battery comprising 48 interceptors, six truck-mounted launchers, a fire control and communications unit and an AN/TPY-2 radar is around 1 trillion won (\$831 million), according to a defense official. However, additional interceptor missiles could raise the cost to 1.5 trillion won. (Sarah Kim and Jeong Yong-soo, "Postponed Talks on THAAD Finally Get off the Ground," *JoongAng Ilbo*, March 5, 2016)

Jeffrey Lewis: "On Friday, March 4, North Korea showed off<sup>[1]</sup> a new "large-caliber" artillery rocket system. In this context, large-caliber probably means between 300-400 mm. North Korea appears to have tested the system from its coastal test range at Wonsan, with the projectiles flying about 150 km. Although Kim Jong Un watched a number of tests of different kinds of conventional warheads, the North Korean statement on the weapon described the system as one of a series of new strike capabilities under development. It also talks about the importance of increasing the quantity and quality of North Korea's nuclear weapons, implying—but not asserting directly—the system might eventually be nuclear armed. There have been a number of press reports in recent years about North Korea's development of a new, large-caliber artillery weapon. The pictures released in North Korea's *Rodong Sinmun*—24 in total—reveal a number of details. The launch vehicle itself appears to be Chinese. Its cab is a perfect match for a 122 mm rocket artillery system produced by Sichuan Aerospace in China. The same vehicle appeared in an October 2015 parade honoring the 70th Anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea, carrying smaller artillery tubes, but did not attract notice at the time. The Chinese system was first shown at a defense exhibition in November 2006, which suggests it may have been exported after that date and may represent a violation of UN sanctions. As of October 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1718 prohibited the export to North Korea of most kinds of conventional weapons, including large-caliber artillery systems (defined as greater than 100 mm). In 2009, UNSCR 1874 widened the ban to cover all arms exports. The cab and chassis appear to be marketed for commercial uses<sup>[7]</sup>, raising the possibility that China will deny it knew the end use of the trucks as it did with the launch vehicle for the KN-08 road mobile ICBM in 2012. The UN Panel of Experts will have to seek clarification regarding what precisely China exported to North Korea and when. Each launcher carries eight rockets. Although North Korea describes them only as "large-caliber," they appear similar to other rockets such as Russia's Bm-30, Pakistan's Hatf-9 (Nasr), and China's SY-300, which would suggest a size of about 300-400 mm in diameter. This is not to say that any of these rockets are identical, merely that they appear similar in design. Finally, the launch appears to have occurred out of Wonsan, at the test site we geolocated in 2014, with the rockets hitting a target on an uninhabited islet about 150 km away. This would be consistent with the upper-end of range estimates for large-caliber artillery rockets. North Korea's announcement emphasized the importance of developing a range of strike options to hold targets in South Korea at risk. Longer-range artillery allows North Korea to deploy the new systems out of range of South Korean and US artillery rockets, reducing their vulnerability to counter-battery



fire. One often hears that North Korea's artillery could easily destroy Seoul, but more careful estimates of the number, type and deployment of existing North Korean artillery suggests that the US and ROK artillery fire would quickly silence North Korea's existing artillery forces. Longer-range North Korean artillery may restore some of this threat. Rocket artillery is also difficult to address with missile defenses, both because of the low-engagement altitudes and the potential volume of fire. In response to the most recent North Korea space launch, Seoul announced that it was negotiating the deployment of US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defenses in Korea. While systems like THAAD would provide an additional layer of defense against Scud ballistic missiles, they would provide no capability to defend Seoul against North Korea's rocket artillery. In recent years, South Korea has tested new ballistic and cruise missiles with precision-strike and earth-penetrating capabilities—developments that have alarmed the North Korean leadership. In turn, the North Koreans have accused South Korea and the US of pursuing a strategy of “beheading,” which we would normally call a “decapitation strike.” The presence of long-range artillery that is relatively safe from counterbattery fire and not liable to be intercepted by missile defenses may help restore confidence in North Korea that it can hold targets in Seoul at risk during a crisis. The North Korean statement only hints at the possibility the system will be nuclear-armed, but it is perhaps worth considering the plausibility of the idea and its potential implications. It is unclear whether North Korea can develop a nuclear warhead small enough for the new artillery system. Pyongyang has conducted four nuclear tests, but it is generally thought that the purpose of these tests has been to develop an implosion-type device that weighs a few hundred kilograms. Such a warhead would probably be about 60 centimeters in diameter and thus too large for the new artillery system. Pakistan has asserted that it deploys small nuclear weapons for the Hatf-9 (Nasr) artillery system. The Nasr, according to some estimates, is approximately 360 mm in diameter. That would allow only for a relatively small nuclear weapon. Based on design information that appeared in the public domain following the collapse in 2002 of the nuclear smuggling network run by A.Q. Khan—the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb—many analysts think the most modern Pakistani design is approximately 60 centimeters in diameter. If the Nasr has a nuclear warhead, it must be considerably smaller. One possibility is that Pakistan or North Korea might attempt to develop an artillery shell similar to early US nuclear artillery projectiles such as the W-9 shell, which was 280 mm in diameter. The W-9 was a gun-type device that used uranium. There is no evidence to suggest that Pakistan or North Korea have developed such a device, although it would be technically feasible. North Korea might choose to build nuclear-armed artillery for a number of reasons. Nuclear-armed artillery would pose a serious threat to Seoul that would be difficult for the United States and South Korea to completely eliminate. And North Korea, like Pakistan, might see nuclear artillery rockets as a possible way to compensate for its conventional inferiority, particularly if U.S. and South Korean armored units were racing northward. Nuclear-armed artillery would pose real stability challenges for the Korean Peninsula. North Korea may view nuclear-armed artillery as an effective deterrent to South Korean military action, particularly to South Korean threats to decapitate the North Korean leadership. But this deterrence may come at a cost. The decision in the United States to deploy nuclear-armed artillery was accompanied by a decision to pre-delegate the authority to use nuclear weapons to commanders in the field. The possibility that

conventional war might escalate to a nuclear war, and that the decision might not be fully under the control of North Korea's leadership, is what Thomas Schelling termed "the threat that leaves something to chance." This also, however, creates the prospect of inadvertent to uncontrollable escalation. Moreover, South Korea's leaders may be more alarmed than deterred by such a threat. Seoul might reasonably conclude that the possibility of inadvertent escalation is yet one more reason in a crisis to attempt to decapitate the North Korean leadership in the hope that lower-level North Korean commanders would not use nuclear weapons. Although the point of pre-delegating nuclear use to local commanders would be to create a sort of "dead hand" that will retaliate even after the Kim family is gone, South Korean leaders might gamble that the will of the North Korean army will dissipate without the Kims in charge. The appearance of a new long-range artillery system that is specifically linked to North Korean fears about decapitation strikes deserves our attention, even if the possibility of nuclear armament is only hinted at. Over the past few years, both North and South Korea have invested in new artillery and missile systems in what is clearly an action-reaction cycle. The development of these capabilities has been described in terms of doctrines in both countries that raise questions about whether future crises on the peninsula will be stable. The new system is a wake-up call that stability on the Korean peninsula is not something that will happen naturally. The bottom line is that far more attention needs to be paid to North Korea's evolving nuclear doctrine, on the one hand, and South Korea's development of conventional doctrines that involve preemption and decapitation on the other." (Jeffrey Lewis, "More Rockets in Kim Jong Un's Pockets: North Korea tests a New Artillery System," *38North*, March 7, 2016)

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*Rodong Sinmun* commentary: "The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces are mulling staging the largest-ever aggressive Key Resolve and Foul Eagle 16 joint military exercises, not content with spearheading the fabrication of the new brigandish UN "resolution on sanctions" under the pretext of the DPRK's bolstering of nuclear deterrent for self-defense and its legitimate satellite launch. ...The DPRK's military counteraction is inevitable now that the U.S. imperialists' brigandish aggressive ambition and the puppet warmongers' attempt at invading the north have become obvious. It is the determination and will of the DPRK to wipe out by the force of justice the ferocious aggressors and warmongers resorting to the force of injustice bereft of common sense and reason. ...To root out the source of aggression and provocation on this land is the DPRK's exercise of the legitimate right to defend the sovereignty of the country and the peace in the Korean Peninsula. The powerful ultra-modern offensive means of the DPRK's revolutionary armed forces have embarked upon **carrying out the preemptive operation to thoroughly contain in advance the special operation force and equipment of the enemies involved in the "beheading operation" and "high-density strike" in case they shows a slight sign of movement.** No force on earth can deter the service personnel and people of the DPRK from making a clean sweep of the warmongers to the last man and winning the final victory of the great war for national reunification. A preemptive attack is not a monopoly of the U.S., the commentary notes, warning that if the U.S. recklessly dares attack the DPRK, the former will face such catastrophic disaster as meeting its final doom in face of the latter's nuclear strike of justice." (KCNA, "Preemptive Attack Is Not Monopoly of U.S.: *Rodong Sinmun*," March 6, 2016)

The Philippines will become the first country to enforce tough new United Nations sanctions on North Korea when it begins formal procedures tomorrow to impound a cargo vessel linked to the reclusive nation, a government spokesman said. The Jin Teng, which is suspected of being a North Korean ship, arrived Thursday at Subic Bay, a commercial port about 50 miles northwest of Manila. It will be impounded, its crew will be deported, and it will most likely be inspected by a team from the United Nations, said Charles Jose, a spokesman for the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs. The vessel is registered and flagged under multiple countries, but it is one of 31 listed as being owned by North Korea, Philippine officials said, and therefore subject to seizure under the new sanctions. "The world is concerned over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and as a member of the U.N., the Philippines has to do its part to enforce the sanctions," Manuel L. Quezon III, a member of the president's communications team, said on a government-run radio station yesterday. The 4,355-ton vessel had a crew of 21 North Korean citizens and was in the Philippines to unload a shipment of agricultural byproducts often used as livestock feed. The Philippine Coast Guard searched the vessel on Friday and found no prohibited items. Only minor safety violations, including missing fire hoses and exposed wiring, were discovered. The vessel's last port of call was in Indonesia, and it was going to proceed to Zhanjiang Port in China after unloading in Subic Bay, Philippine Coast Guard officials said Saturday. It was not scheduled to pick up any cargo in the Philippines. (Floyd Whaley, "Philippines Will Impound Ship Linked to North Korea," *New York Times*, March 7, 2016, p. A-3)

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NDC statement "in connection with the fact that the U.S. imperialists and south Korean puppet forces decided to kick off the largest-ever joint military exercises Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 today. They are claiming that the joint military exercises amount to "a crucial pressure" pursuant to the unreasonable UN "resolution on sanctions" faked up by them under the groundless pretext of the DPRK's self-defensive first H-bomb test and its legitimate launch of earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong-4. The enemies, seized with extreme frenzy for invading the north, threw off even the deceptive mask "annual and "defensive ones." The situation is getting ever more serious as the enemies decided to stage the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 joint military exercises by the way of fighting an actual war involving the thrice-cursed "beheading operation" aimed to remove the supreme headquarters of the DPRK and "bring down its social system" pursuant to the extremely adventurous OPLAN 5015. The statement solemnly clarified the following principled stand as regards the fact that the prevailing situation reached a dangerous phase which should not be overlooked any longer: 1. The army and people of the DPRK will launch an **all-out offensive to decisively counter the U.S. and its followers' hysteric nuclear war moves** to plunge the space of the DPRK's existence into a nuclear disaster, not content with wantonly encroaching upon the sovereignty and security of the dignified DPRK. Tragedy is that the U.S. and its followers have not yet realized how the illegal and outrageous "sanctions" make this land boil like a crucible of battle for wiping out the enemies and into what great fury their war frenzy for invading the north with nuclear threat is lashing all the service personnel and people of the DPRK. As the enemies are foolishly resorting to military means including nuclear attack on the DPRK, all its service personnel and people will turn out in the general offensive to fully demonstrate the

tremendous military muscle with nuclear force as pivot which they have built under the slogan of wiping out the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys to the last man. 2. The army and people of the DPRK will take **military counteraction for preemptive attack** so that they may deal merciless deadly blows at the enemies under the grave situation where they are working with bloodshot eyes to infringe upon the dignity, sovereignty and vital rights of the DPRK. We have the Juche-based mode of military counteraction to defend the socialist country as firm as a rock from any aggression and war in the world. As the joint military exercises to be staged by the enemies are regarded as the most undisguised nuclear war drills aimed to infringe upon the sovereignty of the DPRK, its military counteraction will be more preemptive and offensive nuclear strike to cope with them. The indiscriminate nuclear strike to be made by the DPRK will clearly show those keen on aggression and war the military mettle of Juche Korea. Preemptive nuclear strike of justice is to be made in the order specified by the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army in its crucial statement. 3. If the enemies dare kick off even the slightest military action while vociferating about "beheading operation" aimed to remove the supreme headquarters of the DPRK and "bring down its social system", its army and people will not miss the opportunity but realize the greatest desire of the Korean nation through a sacred war of justice for reunification. We have **a military operation plan of our style to liberate south Korea and strike the U.S. mainland ratified by our dignified supreme headquarters**. Pursuant to it, **offensive means have been deployed to put major strike targets in the operation theatres of south Korea within the firing range and the powerful nuclear strike means targeting the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces bases in the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. mainland are always ready to fire**. If we push the buttons to annihilate the enemies even right now, all bases of provocations will be reduced to seas in flames and ashes in a moment and the U.S. imperialists' nuclear strategic means on which the puppet forces depend as "saviors" turn into piles of scrap iron whether they are in the air, seas and land. The time will prove how the crime-woven history of the U.S. imperialists who have grown corpulent through aggression and war will come to an end and how the Park Geun Hye group's disgraceful remaining days will meet a miserable doom as it is keen on the confrontation with the fellow countrymen in the north. The army and people of the DPRK will make the gunfire of provocateurs in the reckless war of aggression sound as a sad dirge." (KCNA, "DPRK National Defense Commission Warns of Military Counter-Action for Preemptive Strike," March 7, 2016)

South Korea and the United States will launch their largest-ever joint exercise this week to warn North Korea against further provocations, a South Korean military official said. The Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises running from March 7 through April 30 will involve more than 300,000 South Korean and 15,000 U.S. troops and simulate previously unattempted strategies. The Key Resolve portion of the exercise will include OPLAN 5015, which aims to remove the North's weapons of mass destruction and prepare the allied troops for a pre-emptive strike in the event of a North Korean attack. "OPLAN 5015 was included in the Ulchi-Freedom Guardian (UFG) exercise last year, but this is the first time for it to be carried out in a Key Resolve exercise," another South Korean military official said. The UFG is another combined military exercise conducted by South Korea and the U.S. Meanwhile, this year's Ssangyong exercise will also be the largest ever, involving more than 5,000 South Korean marine and Navy personnel,

7,000 U.S. marine troops and five maritime prepositioning ships. It runs from Monday to March 18. During the exercise period, the allies will strengthen their monitoring of the North for any signs of pre-emptive attack. "We will carry out these exercises while keeping tabs on signs of North Korean provocations," a South Korean official said. "If the North provokes us during this exercise, the U.S. and our troops will retaliate with an attack ten-fold stronger." The warning was made after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered his military to be on standby for pre-emptive nuclear strikes earlier this week. North Korea continued its bellicose rhetoric, threatening to "demolish" the U.S. mainland in case of provocations. "Our targets are the U.S. bases in South Korea and the rest of the Asia-Pacific region as well as the U.S. mainland," reads *Rodong Sinmun*. "We have state-of-the-art weapons that no country in the world has previously possessed and that can bombard the U.S. in any way we want." Meanwhile, South Korea and the U.S. say the North lacks evidence to back up its claimed possession of a nuclear arsenal. "We can't determine the whereabouts of the nuclear weapons North Korea claims to have placed on combat readiness," a South Korean official said. "They may have created a prototype, but we suspect they may just be blackmailing us." (Yonhap, "S. Korea, U.S. to Kick off Largest-Ever Joint Exercise," March 6, 2016) The United States and South Korea kicked off major military exercises, including rehearsals of surgical strikes on North Korea's main nuclear and missile facilities and "decapitation raids" by special forces targeting the North's leadership. The drills always elicit an angry response from Pyongyang, but Monday's statement was particularly ferocious, accusing the United States and South Korea of planning a "beheading operation" aimed at removing Kim Jong Un's regime. The North Korean army and people "will take military counteraction for preemptive attack so that they may deal merciless deadly blows at the enemies," the North's powerful National Defense Commission said in a statement. About 17,000 American forces and 300,000 South Korean personnel – a one-third increase from last spring's drills – will take part in 11 days of computer-simulated training and eight weeks of field exercises, which will involve ground, air, naval and special operations services. The exercises will revolve around a wartime plan, OPLAN 5015, adopted by South Korea and the United States last year. The plan has not been made public but, according to reports in the South Korean media, includes a contingency for surgical strikes against the North's nuclear weapons and missile facilities, as well as "decapitation" raids to take out North Korea's leaders. *JoongAng Ilbo* reported that Kim Jong Un would be among them. The joint forces will also run through their new "4D" operational plan, which details the allies' preemptive military operations to detect, disrupt, destroy and defend against North Korea's nuclear and missile arsenal, the Yonhap News Agency reported. "The focus of the exercises will be on hitting North Korea's key facilities precisely," a military official told the wire service. Christopher Bush, a spokesman for U.S. Forces Korea, declined to comment on the reports. "Alliance operational plans are classified, and we aren't authorized to discuss them for operations security reasons," he said. USFK said in a statement that it had informed the North's Korean People's Army – through the U.N. Command, which controls the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas – about the exercise dates and "the non-provocative nature of this training." But North Korea apparently did not see it this way. "We have a military operation plan of our style to liberate south Korea and strike the U.S. mainland ratified by our dignified supreme headquarters," the North's National Defense Commission said in its statement, carried

by KCNA. It said it had deployed "offensive means" to strike South Korea and "U.S. imperialist aggressor forces bases in the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. mainland." "If we push the buttons to annihilate the enemies even right now, all bases of provocations will be reduced to seas in flames and ashes in a moment," the commission said. North Korea is particularly sensitive to suggestions of attacks on Kim – as the furor surrounding the 2014 Hollywood film "The Interview" showed – and it has a habit of making threats on which it cannot follow through. Last week, Kim ordered his military to be ready to use its nuclear weapons at any time, saying they were needed, given the "ferocious hostility" of new "gangster-like" sanctions imposed on Pyongyang. The threats issued today were "absolutely not credible," said Daniel Pinkston, a former Korean linguist with the U.S. Air Force who teaches at Troy University's campus in Seoul. "They would trigger everything North Korea wants to avoid, which is their absolute destruction in retaliatory attacks," Pinkston said. "Second, if you are going to launch an attack against a much stronger adversary, why would you telegraph that? You'd want the element of surprise." Much of North Korea's rhetoric is for domestic consumption, as Kim tries to burnish his leadership credentials ahead of a much-anticipated Workers' Party congress in May, the first in 36 years. Kim, however, has shown himself willing to use the means available to him to express his anger. Last year, during a period of increased tensions with South Korea, he ordered his military onto a war footing, sending army units to the demilitarized zone and submarines out of port. South Korea and the United States said they will increase monitoring of North Korea during the exercises. "We will carry out these exercises while keeping tabs on signs of North Korean provocations," a South Korean official told reporters. "If the North provokes us during this exercise, the U.S. and our troops will retaliate with an attack ten-fold stronger." (Anna Fifield, "In Drills, U.S., S. Korea Practice Striking North's Nuclear Plants, Leaders," *Washington Post*, March 7, 2016)

American diplomatic experts believe their country has changed its longstanding position about signing a peace treaty with North Korea – despite their government's repeated denials. An unsuccessful attempt to hold a secret meeting before the North's Jan. 6 nuclear test suggests that the United States is shifting from its hardline stance. The talks did not take place because North Korea declined the former's proposal to discuss its atomic weapons program; nevertheless, the failed attempt sparked speculation that the United States is stepping back from its denuclearization precondition for peace treaty talks with the North. "It looks like the administration realizes that refusing to engage the North is a dead end policy. It still wants to set denuclearization at the center of U.S. policy, but it is showing more flexibility in addressing the North," said Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. U.S. Naval War College professor Terence Roehrig echoed Bandow's view. "The apparent change has come in making denuclearization a precondition. It is no doubt that the U.S. administration also realizes that North Korea will not voluntarily relinquish its nuclear weapons so that holding out denuclearization as a precondition means there will be no dialogue whatsoever," he said. In response to a Wall Street Journal report last month about the United States' attempt to engage the repressive state, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel told reporters in Seoul on February 26 that the country's original position has not changed. However, the United States is still showing signs that it could hold talks with North Korea about the

peace treaty simultaneous with denuclearization negotiations, which amounts to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's proposal to his U.S. counterpart John Kerry last month. Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York, said the U.S. government is reverting to the stance it agreed to on the September 19, 2005 six-party joint statement that committed the "directly related parties" to "negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula," parallel to negotiations on the North's denuclearization and political and economic normalization. "It recognizes the reality that denuclearization cannot advance very far without a peace process in Korea that addresses North Korea's security concerns," he said. While negotiating on new international sanctions on North Korea for its recent nuclear test and long-range rocket launch, China proposed holding peace treaty negotiations with North Korea simultaneously with denuclearization talks as a way to defuse the heightened tensions on the peninsula. Even after the U.N. adoption of the new resolution, the Chinese side continues to raise the issue. "China does not want a nuclear North Korea any more than anyone else. It also wants a stable North Korea. A peace treaty would recognize North Korea's right to exist – which the U.S. and South Korea do not currently accept – and remove the need for its nukes," said Robert Kelly, an international relations professor at Pusan National University. "A peace deal strongly suits Chinese interests here, and I expect they will emphasize it." In addition, given that China cooperated with the U.S. push for the toughest resolution thus far, China is expected to continue to call for a peace treaty. "The U.S. shift in its stance is also meeting China's condition for supporting U.N. Security Council sanctions," Sigal said. Meanwhile, South Korea may not have any say in the proposed peace treaty talks. While Washington and Beijing are leaning toward peace treaty talks, Seoul still calls for Pyongyang's denuclearization before such talks. As such, some experts speculate it will be excluded from possible discussions. "I think that President Park Geun-hye has rendered South Korea irrelevant to talks to North Korea for the foreseeable future due to her rupture with past policy and the Kaesong decision, leaving the issue to the big powers to resolve," said Peter Hayes, the executive director of the U.S.-based Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. "This is the nature of international politics. Seoul has a history of engaging with North Korea behind the back of America, so it shouldn't be that surprising that the U.S. would do the same," said Van Jackson, a professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. "It's just how business is done. When it's possible to simultaneously consult with allies, the U.S. and South Korea will do so, and when it's not, they won't." However, the other experts said South Korea does not have anything to worry about. "There is no way Washington will do that. Pyongyang has acknowledged that many times in the past. A peace process makes no sense without including all the parties with armed forces in Korea," Sigal said. "I doubt the U.S. administration would proceed with detailed talks over a peace treaty without insisting on the inclusion of Seoul," Bandow also said. Kelly advised the South Korean government to be accountable for and take initiative with any deals made with the North. "It is South Korea, not the U.S., that is ultimately responsible for fixing North Korea, and if a deal is made without South Korea, the South Korean public might not see it as legitimate and hold to it. That said, I do think South Korea could do more," he said. "Greater South Korean defense outlays, and greater public seriousness and sustained attention regarding North Korea, would put South Korea in the driver's seat of the North Korea debate. Ultimately North Korea

is South Korea's problem first, not America's or China's." Experts said North Korea's repeated calls for peace treaty talks with the United States seek both political and security interests. "North Korea's most important goal is regime survival. A peace treaty with the United States helps to ensure that goal but would also be a huge political victory for Kim Jong-un," Roehrig said. Jackson also said, "Thus, concluding a peace treaty would be a significant accomplishment both politically, and for its security." "The real value to North Korea is fracturing alliance solidarity while implicitly gaining de facto recognition of its nuclear weapons program." (Kang Seung-woo, "Will U.S. Shift to Peace Treaty Talks with N.K.?" *Korea Times*, March 7, 2016)

Jong Nam Hyok: **"The United States is directly responsible for terminating armistice and ensuring lasting peace in Korea"** The primary reason that the United States is directly and mainly responsible for replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement is because it is a direct signatory to the Armistice Agreement as the leading force of the united forces involved in the Korean War against the DPRK. The armed forces from 15 satellite countries and south Korea mobilized for the Korean War engaged in combat operations under the direct command of the US commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the Far East veiled as the commander-in-chief of the "UN Forces" in the whole period of the war. However, the US commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the Far East never answered to the UN, but to the US president, Pentagon, and the headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is noteworthy that when the counterattack by the Korean People's Army turned tables in the wake of the war it provoked by instigating the south Korean puppet army, the United States raised the veil as the wire puller and took over and exercised operational command over the south Korean land, naval, and air forces from the Syngman Rhee regime over the whole period of the war. The US military personnel mobilized for the Korean War were numbered at about 1,408,000 which far exceeded the number of military personnel from 15 satellite countries and south Korea, which respectively stood at about 79,000 and over 570,000. The US generals acted as representatives in the talks for the Korean ceasefire and the Armistice Agreement was signed by US Army Gen. Clark, US commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the Far East and US Army Lt. Gen. Harrison, not representatives of the UN or any other country. The United States has been abusing the name of the "UN Forces" of its own accord without any agreement among or consent of the United Nations and there is no doubt that the so-called "UN Forces" are none other than the US Forces. Hence, the UN has also acknowledged on several occasions that the "UN Forces" in south Korea have nothing to do with the UN, but are only a military instrument which the United States has arbitrarily forged. That the US is the very one that has been posing the gravest threat to the survival and development of the DPRK since the end of the war further substantiates the fact that the US is directly responsible for concluding a peace agreement with the DPRK. The United States has for decades pursued a hostile policy - the harshest ever in its history - toward the DPRK and sought to politically obliterate, economically isolate, and militarily stifle the latter. As early as the 1950s, the United States ignited the Korean War with the aim of destroying the DPRK by the use of force. In the post-war days after its defeat in the war, the United States has made a string of agreements with south Korea including the "US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty" so as to permanently station its land, naval, and aerial forces in any part of the south Korean territory, and it holds the wartime operational



control over the south Korean puppet army till date. The United States has systematically brought a large stockpile of nuclear arsenal into south Korea since the late 1950s, turning south Korea into a huge depot of nukes. In the late 1960s, the United States kicked off US-south Korea joint military exercises featuring surprise landing and capture and airlifting operations targeting the DPRK. Since then the US has continued to update and elaborate a series of north-targeted nuclear operational plans with the objective of toppling the DPRK's leadership and occupying the northern part of the Peninsula at a stroke. Under those plans, the means for preemptive nuclear strike such as aircraft carrier fleets and strategic bombers have frequently been dispatched to the Korean Peninsula.

The US has also employed political and economic means along with military instruments in their persistent pursuance of its strategy to undermine our State. The US seeks to tarnish the image of our Republic by raising the alleged "Human Rights issue" while imposing toughest economic sanctions on the latter for its differing ideology and ideals and for its alleged development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Declaration for developing inter-Korean relations and ensuring peace and prosperity adopted at the inter-Korean summit meeting in 2007 states that the north and the south shared the understanding about the need to put an end to the existing armistice mechanism and build a lasting peace mechanism and agreed to cooperate with each other in the efforts to push forward the issue of arranging the meeting of the heads of state of three or four parties directly concerned on the Korean Peninsula and declaring an end to the war.

**Given the fact that it is a party to the Korean War and to the issue of reunification, one cannot say that south Korea is totally irrelevant to establishing lasting peace mechanism by way of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement.** Nonetheless, under the circumstances where the US stations its huge armed forces in the south targeting the DPRK and takes hold of wartime control over the south Korean armed forces, **it is meaningless to give precedence to north-south talks on signing a peace agreement.** China is also a participant in the Korean War and a signatory to the Armistice Agreement. **But, its involvement in signing a peace agreement is something to be considered only after the US actually agrees to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement.** Moreover, China has officially announced its position, through the speech of the then-foreign minister at the UN General Assembly in 1975, that it is the practical way for the direct parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement to negotiate and sign a peace agreement in replacement of the Armistice Agreement under the changed circumstances where the Chinese People's Volunteers' Corps withdrew from Korea a long time ago and a majority of components of the "UN Command" dispersed. It stands to reason that, to put an end to the unstable state of ceasefire and secure lasting peace by way of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement, the US should be the first to come out to sign a peace agreement. **Significance of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement** Once the state of ceasefire between the DPRK and the US is terminated and **a peace agreement** is reached, a precarious ceasefire regime can be replaced with a lasting peace regime and it would, in turn, lead to fundamental removal of risks of war on the Korean Peninsula. **An armistice agreement technically means a temporary suspension of combat operations by warring parties,** and even if the armistice agreement is duly observed, it does not imply that the state of war has

actually terminated and durable peace has settled in. Furthermore, given that the Korean Armistice Agreement and the subsequent ceasefire regime has completely lost its binding force and is no longer in effect due to the US during the past 60 years, signing a peace agreement becomes all the more urgent. The US intentionally refused to implement Article IV of the Armistice Agreement which stipulates that a higher level political conference shall be convened to seek to secure lasting peace in Korea, and systematically shipped ultra-modern war equipment including nuclear weapons into the whole territory of south Korea. Worse still, in the 1990s, the US appointed a general of the south Korean puppet army, which is neither an actual signatory nor a nominal party to the Armistice Agreement, as the senior representative to the Military Armistice Commission, thus completely breaching core provisions of the Armistice Agreement. In particular, the US has been hell-bent on aggressive military provocations against the DPRK for decades under the pretext of "defense-oriented exercises," in flagrant violation of the basic spirit of the Armistice Agreement: a complete cessation of all hostilities by all armed forces under their control. The **venue** of such military movements, the **size of the forces mobilized**, and the **contents of constantly renewed, north-targeted operational plans** vividly indicate that those exercises are dangerous hostile acts aimed at occupying the northern part of our Republic by mounting a large-scale surprise attack at any time. It is a universally acknowledged international practice and the requirement of any international law that **if an agreement between any countries becomes essentially nullified due to one party, such an agreement would no longer be valid and subsequently, there would be no reason for the other party to stay bound by that agreement. At present, the central boundary line of the ground military demarcation line drawn by the Armistice Agreement is barely retained.** However, the August incident of last year teaches a lesson that any accidental incident can lead to a full-scale nuclear war in this region where huge forces of warring parties are standing in acute confrontation. **The uncontrollable and dangerous situation, in which the DPRK and the US remaining technically at war consider themselves no longer legally bound in terms of use of force against each other, can be alleviated only when the Armistice Agreement that exists only in name is replaced with a peace agreement.** The danger of a war can be completely averted only **when the US withdraws its troops stationed in south Korea, quits reinforcing its armaments, and suspends hostile military acts such as joint military drills as a result of the conclusion of a peace agreement.**

If the hostile relations between the DPRK and the US are improved and the US hostile policy toward the DPRK is verifiably terminated through the process of a peace agreement, a radical change would be brought about in normalizing relations between countries in northeast Asia. In general, **termination of acts of war and normalization of relations through elimination of hostile relations between warring parties constitute two major elements of a peace agreement.** At present, the US hostile policy against our Republic is extremely vicious, which is unprecedented in intensity. The resultant hostile relations between the DPRK and the US seriously obstruct the development of inter-Korean relations and DPRK-Japan relations as well as DPRK-US relations. Only when the belligerent and hostile relations between the DPRK and the US are put to an end with the conclusion of the peace agreement can the relations between the countries in the Northeast Asian region be normalized and lasting peace

regime be established on the Korean Peninsula. In the past, a number of countries were engaged in a war with the United States, and in the long run, they brought the war to a complete halt and secured permanent peace by way of concluding or proclaiming a peace treaty or similar documents. Like the Korean War, the Vietnamese War was a clash between the US strategy toward Asia and the interests of the Vietnamese people and, at the same time, a confrontation between two conflicting ideals. Vietnam was of geopolitical significance as much as Korea for the United States in terms of realizing its strategy for domination over Asia. However, unlike the Korean War, the Vietnamese War came to an end with the signing of the peace agreement. As seen above, there is no reason why the United States can't agree to reaching a peace agreement. Despite the fact that signing of a peace agreement between the DPRK and the US is becoming a matter of great urgency, the latter persistently rejects the proposal by demanding nuclear abandonment on the DPRK's part as a precondition. Although the signing of a peace agreement is an issue to be addressed without any delay or precondition in light of its priority and urgency, the United States refuses to sign a peace agreement by asking for the DPRK's nuclear abandonment as a precondition, claiming it as a package solution to all other relevant issues. As long as belligerent and hostile relations between the DPRK and the US continue to exist, talk of "respect for sovereignty," "equality," and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula sounds hollow, devoid of any practical significance.

**The DPRK's option for building up its nuclear force under such difficult circumstances is not intended to seek any political and economic benefits from the US and other countries or for intimidating anyone. The DPRK was compelled to opt for building up its nuclear force to deter serious threats to our State and people posed by the United States** which possesses the world's most destructive nuclear force in quantity and quality and is in a state of war against the former.

**Therefore, the argument that the DPRK's scrapping of nuclear weapons would pave the way for concluding a peace agreement is a sophism where the cause and the outcome are completely reversed.** That out of the two parties in belligerent and hostile relations, **one party demands that the other disarm while continuing to inflict serious military threats on the latter is an expression of inequality in itself and proves that the former intends to prolong the belligerent relationship,** not to bring peace. We have witnessed a string of precedents where the United States has coaxed those countries with differing ideology and ideals, the countries that stand in the way of realizing its strategy for world domination, into disarming themselves with fraudulent promises to lift sanctions and normalize the relations before toppling them. It is utter nonsense for the United States to demand DPRK denuclearization while constantly imposing nuclear threats upon the DPRK by military provocations such as large-scale joint military drills involving nuclear strike means. "A policy based on the approach of laying stress on denuclearization alone on the conception that North Korea is equal to nuclear threats is doomed to fail. It is because the only way for North Korea to scrap its nuclear weapons is to convince the former into trusting in the US, and therefore, such a policy of merely sticking to the nuclear issue and pursuing stand-off is infeasible," once noted Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State. Sitting US government officials voice their interest, on every possible occasion, in détente and ensuring peace on the Korean Peninsula, and if they are as sincere as they sound, they should take a strategic option for giving priority to replacing the Armistice Agreement

with a peace agreement before addressing the rest of the issues. Today, **thanks to the DPRK's deterrence, the balance of power is maintained and nominal peace is preserved by the skin of its teeth on the Korean Peninsula.** The conclusion of a peace agreement is **not the only way for achieving peace. If the US persists on its strategy of stifling our Republic by use of force while constantly rejecting the conclusion of a peace agreement, the DPRK will have to make the inevitable choice to deter the war by means of force and protect peace.**" (Jong Nam Hyok, "Replacing Armistice Agreement with Peace Agreement Is the Best Way for ensuring Peace on the Korean Peninsula and the Rest of the Northeast Asian Region," Institute for American Studies, DPRK, March 7, 2016)

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The government said that it has decided to pull out of a joint logistics project involving the two Koreas and Russia and has notified Moscow of the decision. The government said the suspension of the Rajin-Khasan project is part of a set of punitive measures in response to Pyongyang's nuclear test and long-range rocket launch. The measures include a ban on the entry of foreign ships if they have visited North Korea six months before making a port call here. The three-way logistics project was aimed at securing a sales route for Siberian coal through a railroad between Russia's border town of Khasan and North Korea's ice-free port of Rajin, from where vessels carried it to South Korean companies. Involving Chinese-flagged ships, a total of three trial runs took place from 2014 to 2015. "We've notified Russia of our action concerning the joint project through diplomatic channels," said a government source on condition of anonymity. It added that Russia regarded South Korea's move as "regrettable." Moscow threatened to use its veto power at the UNSC unless international sales of Siberian coal through Rajin could continue before joining hands to approve UNSC Resolution 2270 on Pyongyang, last Wednesday. Lee Suk-joon, who leads the Prime Minister Office's secretariat, said Seoul's unilateral sanctions are expected to play a key role in implementing the U.N. measures. "The government will thoroughly carry out UNSC Resolution 2270 to spearhead international efforts," he said during a joint press conference involving related ministries at the government complex in downtown Seoul. "We've come up with our own measures accordingly to pressure North Korea." The government blacklisted 40 individuals and 30 entities in its efforts to cut off cash flows to North Korea for the development of weapons of mass destructions (WMDs). Two of the 40 individuals are from Singapore and Taiwan while the rest are North Koreans. Six of the 30 entities are in Egypt, Singapore, Myanmar, Thailand, the British Virgin Islands and Taiwan. One of the targeted North Korean officials is Kim Yong-chul, who has masterminded intelligence operations against South Korea for years. He is also subject to sanctions adopted by the United States, the European Union, Japan and Australia but was excluded from 16 individuals and 12 entities blacklisted under UNSC Resolution 2270. Theoretically, the blacklisted individuals will be banned from travelling to other countries while the targeted entities will be barred from engaging in overseas trade. Under the ban on maritime shipping, vessels originating from the repressive state but caught flying the flags of other countries will be prohibited from entering South Korea. Seoul said it will also closely monitor and prevent goods from North Korea being imported to South Korea via other nations while ensuring South Korean goods will not be exported to the military state regardless of the circumstances.

It also said that it will urge South Koreans to refraining from eating at North Korean restaurants when they travel abroad. The restaurants are suspected of being operated by Office 39, a secretive branch of the repressive regime. It directly reports to North Korea leader Kim Jong-un concerning the use of money for the development of WMDs. (Yi Whan-woo, "Seoul Suspends Ragi-Khasan Logistics Project," *Korea Times*, March 8, 2016) The government newly designated 30 North Korean and foreign organizations, and 40 individuals subject to an asset freeze and a ban on financial and property transactions with any South Korean entity, sharply expanding the existing blacklist to 34 groups and 43 people. With North Korean restaurants around the world serving as a cash-earning tool, the government appealed to citizens not to visit them and other profit-making facilities overseas. Some 130 branches in 12 countries are believed to make about \$10 million in total every year, it said. The blacklist includes some military, financial and trading institutions that are already under sanctions imposed by the U.N., the U.S., European Union or other countries for their suspected involvement in the North's nuclear and missile programs, such as the Foreign Trade Bank, Strategic Forces, Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation and Kim Yong-chol, former director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Among the newly banned are Ilsim International Bank, Korea Foreign Technical Trade Center, deputy director of the ruling Workers' Party's Munitions Industry Department Ri Byong-chol and Hong Yong-chil, a deputy director of the party's Central Committee. Six institutions of foreign nationalities also made it to the record, in addition to Leonard Lai Yong Chian, the Singaporean president of Senat Shipping Agency, and Lyou Jen-Yi, the Taiwanese head of Royal Team Corporation. The firms are EKO Development and Investment Company of Egypt, Senat Shipping Agency Ltd. of Singapore, Soe Min Htike Co. Ltd. of Myanmar, Daedong Credit Bank or DCB Finance Ltd. of the British Virgin Island, Mariner's Shipping & Trading of Thailand, and Royal Team Corporation of Taiwan. The first four are already sanctioned by Washington, and all the six are assumed to have been supporting North Korea's illicit activities. With the port entry ban in place, international shipping companies will now eschew doing business with the North given that carriage contracts are usually made on a six month basis, officials said, citing Japan's case. Last year, 66 third-country-flagged ships with records of staying in the North made a total of 104 entries to South Korean ports, typically loaded with steel and general merchandise, government data shows. Tokyo also imposed a similar embargo last month on all North Korean and foreign-flag vessels including on humanitarian missions. The Japanese government said 44 ships that previously went to the North arrived in the country last year alone. (Shin Hyon-hee, "Seoul Imposes Financial, Shipping Sanctions on North Korea," *Korea Herald*, March 8, 2016)

China has barred a North Korean freighter from one of its ports, stepping up sanctions against the isolated state. North Korean general cargo ship Grand Karo arrived at Rizhao port in northeastern China a few days ago, but the port did not allow the ship to berth, said a person at the Rizhao Maritime Authority, declining to be identified because he was not authorized to speak to the media. The ship is among 31 vessels blacklisted by China's Ministry of Transport after they were covered by harsher sanctions on North Korea that were approved by the U.N. Security Council last week. At least two other ships on the list of barred freighters are now sailing away after being anchored off Chinese ports, ship tracking data on the Reuters Eikon terminal showed.

Another of the vessels has been banned from leaving port in the Philippines until safety deficiencies, found during a security and safety inspection of the vessel, are rectified. The 6,593 deadweight tonne (dwt) Grand Karo is now anchored about 35 km (22 miles) from Rizhao, ship tracking data showed. "The vessel operator will have to decide what they can do," the Rizhao maritime official said. "If non-sanctioned North Korean ships enter the port, officials will ask senior authorities for instructions on how to deal with them," the official added. Officials of Mariner's Shipping & Trading declined comment. One of them referred queries to the Thai foreign ministry and said: "All this has been very bad for us. Very bad for trade." Mariner's Shipping & Trading, with its head office in Bangkok, has operated and financed vessels associated with Ocean Maritime Management Co. Ltd, a North Korean company that has been blacklisted along with the 31 ships it controls. Taiwan's Royal Team Corporation, which is believed to have sold parts that were used in North Korea's long-range rocket launched in 2012, according to a U.N. panel, did not immediately have comment. Nineteen of the 31 ships have their automatic identification systems (AIS), a mandatory vessel tracking safety device, switched off, according to Reuters data. Some have gone silent in the last few days while others have not been online since 2014. One vessel, the 5,686 dwt Hui Chon, is moored at the Russian Far East port of Vostochny. Port officials could not be contacted because it is a public holiday in Russia. Eight vessels are sailing, while there is no record on Reuters and shipping databases of one of the sanctioned ships. The Grand Karo, which was turned away at the Chinese port, is owned by Yuanyao Shipping Ltd and managed by Aoyang Marine Company, two Hong Kong-registered firms, according to the Reuters' Eikon and the Equasis shipping database, although is no telephone number listing for either company. Of the two ships sailing toward North Korea, the 14,379 dwt Dawnlight, now renamed First Gleam, was heading to the port of Wonsan, after being anchored in the outer Yangtze River estuary near Shanghai until early on Tuesday. The 6,901 dwt Ever Bright 88, owned and managed by Hong Kong companies, Pantech Shipping Ltd and Baili Shipping & Trading Ltd, was sailing towards North Korea after being anchored off China. A Shanghai Maritime Bureau official who was only willing to give his surname as Yu confirmed the bureau had received the transport ministry notice but had not dealt with any of the ships. Shanghai Port was unavailable for comment. Maritime safety and port officials in the Chinese ports of Longkou, Yantai and Shandong and Lianyungang declined to comment. (Ju-min Park and Ruby Lian, "China, South Korea Step up Sanctions on North Korea," Reuters, March 8, 2016)

South Korea's main spy agency accused North Korea of hacking the smartphones of dozens of senior government officials here, saying that Pyongyang had stolen their text messages, contact information and voice conversations. The National Intelligence Service has said that South Korea faces a growing threat of major online attacks from the North, possibly in retaliation for the latest international sanctions over Pyongyang's nuclear arms and missile programs. The intelligence agency said in a news release that it had shared information about recent North Korean hacking attempts in a meeting with other government agencies, which was called to discuss the country's readiness for a major online attack. Between late February and early March, the agency said, North Korea tried to infiltrate the smartphones of senior South Korean officials by sending them text messages designed to activate a virus. About 20 percent of those

phones were infected with the virus, according to the agency, which did not identify the officials who had been targeted. The agency also said that North Korea had successfully hacked into the network of a company that provided security software for an online banking system used by more than 20 million South Koreans. But it said that the attack, which took place in February, was detected early and that there was no major disruption to banking services. The intelligence service did not explain how it had concluded that North Korea was responsible. (Choe Sang-hun, "South Korea, Saying North Hacked Phones, Warns of a Looming Cyberattack" *New York Times*, March 9, 2016, p. A-4)

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KCNA: "Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, met the scientists and technicians in the field of researches into nuclear weapons and guided the work for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets. He learned in detail about the signal successes made by the nuclear scientists and technicians in the field of national defense science in the work true to the party's line of founding the Juche-oriented nuclear force. He listened with great attention to the briefing on the research conducted to tip various type **tactical and strategic ballistic rockets with nuclear warheads** and acquainted himself with the specifications and mechanism of the **miniaturized powerful nuclear warheads with a Korean-style structure of mixed charge**. Praising the nuclear scientists and technicians, trustworthy "nuclear combatants" of the party, for having made a signal success in the national defense scientific researches to significantly bolster up the nation's defense capability and self-defensive deterrent true to the party's line of simultaneously developing the two fronts, he noted it is very gratifying to see the nuclear warheads with the **Korean-style structure of mixed charge adequate for prompt thermonuclear reaction**. The nuclear warheads have been standardized to be fit for ballistic rockets by miniaturizing them, he noted, adding this can be called true nuclear deterrent. He noted with great satisfaction that Koreans can do anything if they have a will. **Being a proud nuclear weapons state at present, we have a firm guarantee for making a breakthrough in the drive for economic construction and improving the people's standard of living on the basis of the powerful nuclear war deterrent, he stressed**. He said that the WPK's line of simultaneously developing the two fronts is not a temporary counter-action for coping with the rapidly changing situation but a strategic line to be permanently held fast to **as long as the imperialists' nuclear threat and arbitrary practices persist**. He called on the nuclear scientists, the frontline combatants responsible for the country's nuclear deterrent, to creditably perform their honorable mission and duty on behalf of the party, the country and the revolution on the first battle line for decisively foiling with a nuclear treasured sword the enemies' daily escalating reckless moves to stifle the DPRK and glorifying it as the matchless nuclear power which no force on earth dares to provoke. **Noting that our nuclear force's real "enemy" is a nuclear war itself, he added that the stronger our nuclear strike capability gets, the more powerful our deterrent to aggression and nuclear war grows and it is the most just and reliable way of preventing the country from a nuclear war disaster to firmly bolster up the nuclear force both in quality and quantity**. The right to make a preemptive nuclear strike is by no means a monopoly of the U.S., he said, declaring that if the U.S. imperialists infringe upon the DPRK's

sovereignty and right to existence with nuclear weapons, it will never hesitate to make a preemptive nuclear strike at them. He expressed great expectation and belief that scientists and technicians in the field of researches into nuclear weapons would develop and produce more Korean-style various type nuclear weapons of Juche to completely contain the enemies with nuclear force and thus provide a firmer guarantee for the eternal future of Kim Il Sung's nation and Kim Jong Il's Korea. He was accompanied by General Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the KPA Strategic Force, Hong Yong Chil and Kim Yo Jong, vice department directors of the Central Committee of the WPK." (KCNA, "Kim Jong-un Guides Work for Mounting Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic Rockets," March 9, 2016)

North Korea said it has made nuclear warheads small enough to fit on ballistic missiles in its latest threat to South Korea and the United States, which have recently begun their annual joint military drills. At a meeting with nuclear scientists and technicians, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said that his country has made a nuclear bomb lighter and achieved its "standardization," according to KCNA. "The nuclear warheads have been standardized to be fit for ballistic missiles by miniaturizing them," Kim was quoted as saying by KCNA. "This can be called true nuclear deterrent." In a display of its military prowess, North Korea unveiled a photo on Wednesday of what appears to be a mockup of a round-shaped nuclear warhead that could be mounted atop the KN-08 missile. The U.S. Pentagon said Tuesday that Washington has not seen the North demonstrate the capability to miniaturize a warhead. "With regard to the ballistic missile threat, we still feel confident that we can deter and respond to a missile threat from North Korea," said Peter Cook, Pentagon press secretary. An official at Seoul's defense ministry cast a similar view. "We think the North's technology of miniaturizing nuke arms has reached a significant level," the official said. "But South Korea and the U.S. have not had any intelligence that the North has succeeded in fitting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles. There is no sign for that." (Yonhap, "North Korea Says It Has Miniaturized Nuclear Warheads," March 9, 2016)

South Korea said that it will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea despite its fresh sanctions aimed at punishing the North for its nuke and missile programs. The Ministry of Unification said that there is no change in its principle that Seoul will continue to allow civic groups to offer humanitarian assistance to the underprivileged in North Korea. "Despite the new sanctions, there is no change in the government's stance that Seoul will continue to offer humanitarian aid to North Koreans including infants and their mothers," Jeong Joon-hee, a ministry spokesman, said in a regular press briefing. "But we will take a cautious approach in deciding the timing and size of the assistance by taking various factors into consideration." A U.N. report showed in April last year that about 70 percent of North Korea's 24.6 million people are suffering due to food shortages. It said 1.8 million, including children and pregnant women, are in need of nutritional food supplies aimed at fighting malnutrition. (Yonhap, "Seoul to Continue Providing Humanitarian Aid to Pyongyang," *Korea Herald*, March 9, 2016)

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CPRK spokesman's statement: "No sooner had the U.S. and its followers masterminded the UN 'sanctions resolution' against the DPRK than the Park Geun Hye group of south



Korea announced what it called independent "sanctions" against the DPRK. ... As far as the 'sanctions resolution' announced by the Park group is concerned, it is no more than rubbish as it is peppered only with nonsensical items. The farce is no more than a last-ditch attempt of the puppet group of traitors being frightened by the blast of the DPRK's Juche-based H-bomb for achieving national reunification and a foolish act of psychopaths jumping into fire with faggot on their backs. Park Geun Hye, who is no more than a servant of the U.S., goes so ridiculous as to dare attempt to undermine the status of the dignified DPRK as a nuclear power and put a brake on the advance of the DPRK's just cause for bolstering up its nuclear force for self-defense. **The DPRK will take the following measures under the condition that Park Geun Hye**, obsessed with confrontation with fellow countrymen in the north, unhesitatingly spewed out her venom **to impose independent 'sanctions' upon the north after shutting down the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ), which was the last hope of the north-south relations.** From this moment, **we declare all the north-south agreements on the economic cooperation and exchange null and void.** We will **totally liquidate all the properties of the south side's business groups and relevant organs in the north side** as the south Korean puppet group unilaterally and totally stopped the tour of Mt. Kumgang and operation of KIZ. We will continuously take the planned special measures for hastening the miserable end of the Park Geun Hye group of traitors by dealing fatal political, military and economic blows at it. The criminal Park Geun Hye group resorting to evil things in Chongwadae, primary target of the Korean People's Army, will be made to pay dearly." (KCNA, "Park Geun-hye Regime's Anti-DPRK 'Sanctions' Will Only Precipitate Its Ruin: DPRK Spokesman," March 10, 2016)

North Korea said it will nullify all cross-border agreements on economic cooperation and liquidate South Korean assets in the country in response to Seoul's latest sanctions on it. In response, the South Korean government strongly condemned Pyongyang's move, rejecting North Korea's unilateral argument. "We cannot condone the North's decision to make the inter-Korean agreements invalid and sell off South Korean assets," the ministry handling inter-Korean affairs said, calling the latest steps taken as "provocations." It said that North Korea should not infringe on South Korean assets, warning that the North will be held accountable for its decision. Earlier in the day, North Korea fired two short-range missiles into the East Sea in a show of protest against the ongoing annual joint military drills between Seoul and Washington. "North Korea showed a tit-for-tat response to South Korea over Seoul's move to suspend the factory zone and slap on fresh sanctions," said Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University. He said it was a show of strong protest indicating that the North has no intent to seeking exchanges and reconciliation if Seoul does not change. (Yonhap, "N. Korea to Nullify Inter-Korean Projects, Liquidate S. Korean Assets," March 10, 2016)

Michael Elleman and Michael J. Zagorek, Jr.: "To defend against the North Korean missile force, South Korea currently has a mix of Patriot systems with the older PAC-2 batteries to be upgraded or replaced by the more modern PAC-3 by the end of the year. These are supplemented by US deployments of the same weapon. The PAC-3 system is intended to provide protection for key installations such as airfields, ports, critical infrastructure, military command centers or leadership locations. Comprised of

Extended Range Interceptors (ERINT), a MPQ-53 phased-array radar, launch canisters, a mast group for communications, and a fire-control unit, PAC-3 intercepts short- and medium-range missiles by colliding with the threatening missile or warhead at low altitudes (less than 25 km, or endoatmospheric) and at short distances (35-40 km or less) from its location. Because PAC-3 destroys targets at low altitudes, it is said to be a 'lower-tier' defense system. The THAAD system intercepts incoming short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles above the atmosphere—exoatmospheric intercept—providing an upper-tier layer of defense when operating in conjunction with the lower-tier Patriots. THAAD consists of five primary components: interceptor missiles, launch canisters, AN/TPY-2 phased array radar, a fire-control unit, and support equipment—including a power-generation and cooling units. These can detect and track targets at a range of about 1000km—assuming the target has a radar-cross section of about 1 m. The first scenario for deployment of a layered defense assumes that North Korea launches its missiles from an operating area in the far north near its border with China. A single THAAD battery is stationed at an airbase a few kilometers north of Cheongju, which, in principle, will be able to defend a major portion of South Korea except a few islands south of the peninsula. This conclusion assumes that North Korean missiles fly on what is called a minimum-energy trajectory: a normal flight path that maximizes range for a specified burn-out velocity. However, analysis shows that if North Korea were to alter the launch trajectory—for example using a depressed or flattened trajectory—that would shift the footprint to the south by up to 90-100 km. As a result, that might create gaps in coverage and, as a result, the South may need to deploy a second THAAD battery. Depressed and normal, minimum-energy trajectories differ in the same way a line drive and fly ball take different paths to the outfield in baseball. ...Given this launch position, covering the entire territory of South Korea under varying North Korean launch positions, missile trajectories and missile types, will require two batteries. A single battery still provides coverage of most of South Korea, except for the northeastern corridor. The shape of the footprint is different primarily because the interceptor and Hwasong launch locations are near enough to each other to allow THAAD to intercept in the North Korean missile's ascent phase, in addition to the terminal phase of flight. THAAD's ability to intercept short-range missiles in the ascent phase has yet to be demonstrated, so prudence dictates that a second THAAD battery located near the south end of the peninsula would be required to ensure short-range missiles launched by North Korea from positions within 100 km of the DMZ can be engaged successfully. All told, this preliminary analysis of THAAD capabilities indicates that two THAAD batteries are required to defend all of South Korea. While two THAAD batteries can be deployed in such a way to cover all of South Korea, an additional critical question is how effective will the system be in destroying incoming missiles. Because THAAD intercepts targets at altitudes above 50 km and is capable of protecting large areas, it ideally complements the lower-tier PAC-3, which protects point targets. In essence, intercepting targets at multiple levels, or tiers, offers more opportunities to succeed and improves intercept efficiency, which is the calculated number of interceptors needed to achieve a specified measure of protection. Interceptor efficiency is governed primarily by the probability an individual interceptor will collide with and destroy a missile or warhead. It is often referred to as the "single-shot probability of kill," or SSPk. Historically, missile defense designers at the US Missile Defense Agency have sought to achieve SSPk values of between 0.8 and 0.9,

which means a single interceptor should succeed 80 to 90 percent of the time. Recent development and validation testing of THAAD indicate a kill probability of 0.8 is feasible, though design goals and test results may not be replicated under wartime conditions. Nonetheless, assuming an SSPk of 0.8 offers a measuring stick for evaluating the theoretical benefits of deploying THAAD in South Korea. It is unclear what performance criteria South Korea or the US military have established for missile defenses on the peninsula. Two criteria are posited here for purely illustrative purposes. The first criterion would require the missile defense architecture to intercept all attacking threats with a probability of 0.75, and the other would dictate a probability of 0.9 that no attacking missiles leak through the defenses. The latter criterion might be required as an absolute minimum if North Korea is launching nuclear-armed missiles; the former, more relaxed criterion, might be acceptable for conventionally-armed attacks. If one further assumes that two interceptors are launched at each layer of defense, the SSPk requirement to meet the overall defense criterion that all warheads in an attack are destroyed with a probability of 0.75, or a more stringent probability of 0.90, can be calculated. For illustrative purposes, assume the attacks consist of either 20 or 50 missiles at a time, which is a small fraction (less than 10 percent) of the overall stockpile held by North Korea, but is reasonably consistent with the estimated number of trained and equipped firing brigades capable of launching Hwasong and Nodong missiles under wartime conditions. The benefits of layering the defenses are captured in Table 1, where the calculated results for one-and two-tiered defenses are presented. The results captured in Table 2 illustrate the conclusion that a layered defense is likely to be more effective. In a single-layer defense where two interceptors are fired at each of the 20 or 50 attacking warheads, the requirement that all warheads are destroyed 75 or 90 percent of the time cannot be satisfied unless the SSPk of each interceptor is significantly greater than 0.80. If two layers are operational when an attack of 20 or 50 warheads is executed, the SSPk requirement is less than 0.8. This suggests that if THAAD and PAC-3 can achieve the same degree of success on the battlefield as in validation testing to date, a two-tiered defense in South Korea can meet the notional requirements assumed here. In addition to reducing the SSPk value needed to defend against 20 or 50 missiles, a layered defense can also reduce the total number of interceptors that must be fired, assuming the first intercept attempt occurs early enough to facilitate a “shoot-assess-shoot” strategy. Shoot-assess-shoot is possible if the upper-tier (THAAD) intercept attempt occurs early enough in the threat missile’s trajectory to allow the lower-tier defense (PAC-3) to determine if the THAAD succeeded before launching the PAC-3 interceptors. For each success by THAAD, the PAC-3 defense would not have to fire its interceptors, thereby preserving them for use against future attacks. This becomes increasingly important as North Korea increases the number of missile firings above the 20 or 50 launches assumed. Also, if each of the PAC-3 batteries has access to THAAD radar data, it would be possible for them to be launched before the target enters PAC-3 radar coverage. This scenario is referred to as a “launch on remote” where one system launches its missiles on data generated by a remote sensor. PAC-3 batteries with a launch on remote capability would, in principle, have the capacity to protect a larger swath of territory, in some limited cases nearly doubling its defended footprint. While THAAD can provide an important additional capability to protect for South Korea, a critical question is whether Pyongyang’s large missile inventory will

afford it opportunities to overwhelm the postulated one-to-two THAAD battery architecture. A single THAAD battery holds a limited number of ready-to-launch interceptors, likely ranging from 48 to 96. Spare interceptors can be stockpiled, though at great expense. This implies that one THAAD battery can defend against 20 and 50 attacking missiles if two interceptors are assigned to each incoming warhead. If additional interceptors are available, the launch canisters can be reloaded within an hour or so. However, there is no assurance that North Korea would pause firing its missiles to allow THAAD to reload. And given that North Korea has hundreds of Hwasong and Nodong missiles, one can easily recognize how large the defenses would have to be if the mission was to attempt intercepts on all incoming missiles over an extended time. Further, the AN/TPY-2 fire-control radar is limited in terms of the number of objects it can track while also providing updated guidance information to the interceptors in flight. Once again, if North Korea launches more than roughly 20 missiles simultaneously, this would likely saturate the radar, as it would necessarily be tracking 60 objects at once. The precise limitations are classified, though it is clear that if the objective is to blunt large salvos from North Korea, at least two or more THAAD batteries would be required. Lastly, to protect against missile attacks launched from North Korean territory, all of the PAC-3 and THAAD radars would necessarily be pointed north. If North Korea successfully develops and deploys a submarine-launch ballistic missile, as it has been attempting over the past year or two, the missile defenses discussed above would be ineffective against the missiles fired from the waters east, west and south of the lower Korean peninsula. No missile defense system or architecture will be "leak proof." Rather, missile defenses are designed to reduce the number of missiles striking critical targets, much in the way air defenses retard attacks by an enemy's air forces. If North Korea fires conventionally-armed missiles, a low leakage rate is acceptable since the damage caused will be manageable. However, missiles equipped with nuclear warheads are another matter entirely. Even if only one penetrates the defenses the death and damage would be immense. In this context, the addition of THAAD, or any other missile-defense system will not guarantee that South Korea is immune to Pyongyang's nuclear-armed missiles. To better understand the catastrophic damage caused by a nuclear bomb, let's assume that one missile with a nuclear warhead beats THAAD and lands on Seoul. A 20 kiloton warhead would result in casualties extending up to 5 km. from the point of detonation. The data in the following table show the casualties in each of the five rings/zones shown in the Google Earth satellite image below plus the total casualties in comparison with the total population of Seoul proper. The deployment of one or two THAAD batteries in South Korea would substantially enhance its capacity to defend against a North Korean missile attack. To be sure, there is no perfect defense against ballistic missile attacks, but the probability of greatly reducing the damage resulting from missiles with conventional warheads increases when THAAD is incorporated into the defense architecture. When viewed through the lens of providing maximum protection from a North Korean missile threat, accepting the American offer to provide THAAD to the Republic of Korea is a prudent and defensible policy decision for Seoul." (Michael Elleman and Michael J. Zagorek, Jr., "THAAD: What It Can and Can't Do," *38North*, March 10, 2016)

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KCNA: "A mobile drill for ballistic rocket launch aimed at examining the capability to fight an actual war of the Strategic Force of the Korean People's Army (KPA) equipped with powerful nuclear deterrent means was conducted by a combat order of Marshal Kim Jong Un. He watched the ballistic rocket launch drill of the Strategic Force of the KPA. At the launching drill ground, he listened to the determination of General Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the Strategic Force, to make firepower strike and ratified it. By the order of the commander of the Strategic Force to open fire, its powerful ballistic rockets were launched to break the silence at night. The drill was conducted under the simulated conditions of exploding nuclear warheads from the preset altitude above targets in the ports under the enemy control where foreign aggressor forces are involved. Expressing great satisfaction over the successful firepower strike drill of the strategic force in which high maneuverability was ensured and a correct launching method was applied to different enemy targets as required by a modern war, he extended a militant salute to the service personnel of the KPA Strategic Force in the name of the supreme commander. **He set forth the important tasks to be fulfilled to further round off the nuclear weapons operation system and properly wage a Juche-oriented ballistic rocket battle.** He underscored the need to put greater spurs to developing nuclear weapons, a new goal set by the party, and dynamically push forward the diversification of means for delivering nuclear warheads so as to get ready to make nuclear strikes at the enemies from anywhere on the ground, in the air, at sea **and underwater.** Underlining the need to steadily improve the nuclear strike capability by boosting the cooperation between the nuclear weapons research field and rocket research field in the future, **he gave militant tasks to conduct more nuclear explosion tests to estimate the destructive power of the newly produced nuclear warheads and other tests to bolster up the nuclear attack capability.** He stressed the need to ensure a prompt and safe operation of nuclear attack system in the state of the nation's utmost emergency and more thoroughly establish a unitary system of command and control over the strategic nuclear force. As the war-thirsty Park Geun Hye group is now set to launch the most undisguised nuclear war against the DPRK while staging the largest-ever Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 joint military exercises after introducing huge aggressor forces including the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces and their satellite troops and even lots of U.S. nuclear strategic means into south Korea despite our crucial warning, our self-defensive countermeasures should adopt a more preemptive and offensive mode, he said. He declared that the DPRK would make the enemies regret for their misjudgment made in a wrong time and reckless action taken without any measure and take a series of Korean-style powerful countermeasures in succession to this end. If the U.S. imperialists and south Korean puppet group kick off **another reckless military action and stage a clumsy farce** against the dignified DPRK, prompted by an extreme wild ambition for invading it, the puppet reactionary regime in south Korea will fall, hit so hard physically that it would never appear again, he noted, adding that as a strong warning had been served already, it is the only way for the Park Geun Hye regime to exercise prudence and self-control so as to escape a miserable end until the last day of its office. He went on: We remain unperturbed in face of the enemies' any dangerous saber-rattling under our eyes, **but if they destroy even a single tree or a blade of grass in our inviolable territory, I will issue a prompt order to launch attack with all military strike means including nuclear weapons and strike the Park regime** and hordes of the puppet

military with deadly baptism of fire so that they may not exist any longer. He called on the service personnel of the KPA Strategic Force to clearly show the reckless warmongers what the Juche-oriented military counteraction is like. **He issued an order to all the nuclear strike means of the Strategic Force targeting major strike objects in the operation theatres of south Korea and the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces bases in the Asia-Pacific region** to be always ready for action and fully prepared to fight a decisive battle till the U.S. imperialists and the Park Geun Hye group of traitors are worn out and dispirited with war hysteria against the north. Watching the launch drill were Hwang Pyong So, Ri Pyong Chol, Hong Sung Mu, Kim Jong Sik, Yun Tong Hyon, officials of the Munitions Industry Department of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and scientists and technicians in the field of researches into nuclear weapons." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Watches Ballistic Rocket Launch Drill of Strategic Force of KPA," March 11, 2016)

North Korea successfully hacked the smartphones of scores of senior South Korean officials recently, a ruling party lawmaker said, citing Seoul's spy agency. "(The North) sent malicious emails to (smartphones belonging to) 300 diplomats and military officials by impersonating the presidential office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Unification Ministry. Forty of them were successfully hacked," Lee Cheol-woo of the ruling Saenuri Party said. Lee made the comments to reporters after attending a closed-door parliamentary session of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in Seoul. The NIS believes that North Korean hackers successfully infected the 40 phones between late February and early March, and eventually gained access to lists of phone calls made, along with the contents of text messages and phone conversations. Lee further assumed that National Security Adviser Kim Kwan-jin and Defense Minister Han Min-koo were included on the list. "The NIS did not identify of the officials (whose smartphones were hacked), but it is speculated that those people would be included," Lee told Yonhap. The North also opened a Facebook account posing as a North Korean female to approach dozens of former and incumbent South Korean government officials for espionage purpose, according to Lee. Rep. Joo Ho-young, who also attended the session, said that the North Korean cyberattacks against Seoul have doubled in the past month, citing the NIS briefing. Joo also said the North had tried to hack into the control tower of South Korea's rail system as well as the computer networks of major financial institutions. These attempts, however, were interrupted by the NIS, the lawmaker said. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Successfully Hacks into Accounts of Scores of S. Korean Officials: Spy Agency," March 11, 2016)

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with Gil Won-ok, one of the less than 50 surviving victims of Japan's wartime military-run brothel system known as "comfort women." Ban met with Gil and Yoon Mee-Hyang, co-chair of the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. An agreement in December between South Korea and Japan included an indirect apology from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and a Japanese pledge to provide ¥1 billion yen (\$8 million) to a fund for the South Korean victims. Ban, who is South Korean, said in a statement that he was sympathetic with Gil. "It is crucial that the voices of victims and survivors are heard," he said. The meeting came the same week that survivor Yongsoo Lee addressed the United Nations Correspondents Association. "I know Ban Ki-moon is Korean person

but what does he know about what happened to us?" she said at the Tuesday meeting. Only a handful of the Asian comfort women are still alive today, most of them in their late 80s and 90s. The meeting came a day after U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Hussein indicated that the Japan-South Korea agreement to "finally and irreversibly" resolve the issue is insufficient. The terms in the agreement, announced late last December, "have been questioned by various U.N. human rights mechanisms, and most importantly by the survivors themselves," Hussein told a U.N. Human Rights Council meeting Thursday, where he made an annual report on the human rights situations around the world. Hussein said, "It is fundamentally important that the relevant authorities reach out to these courageous and dignified women," adding, "Ultimately, only they can judge whether they have received genuine redress." In a related move, a group of U.N. human rights experts, including special rapporteurs tackling discrimination against women and promoting truth, justice and reparation, said in a statement Friday that the Japanese and South Korean governments "should understand that this issue will not be considered resolved so long as all the victims, including from other Asian countries, remain unheard, their expectations unmet and their wounds left wide open." They also said that they are "deeply concerned" that South Korea "may remove a statue commemorating not only the historical issue and legacy of the comfort women but also symbolizing the survivors' long search for justice." In a report to conclude its examination on Japan on March 7, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women expressed regret over the Japan-South Korea agreement, saying, among other things, that it "did not fully adopt a victim-centered approach." (AP, JIJI, "U.N. Chief Meets with Comfort Woman; Rights Chief Calls Japan-South Korea Deal 'Insufficient,'" *Japan Times*, March 12, 2016)

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's two-day visit to Moscow this week has largely focused on North Korea's increasing nuclear threats. After meeting with Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, Wang said China would not recognize North Korea's status as a nuclear power. He also said Pyongyang's development of nuclear weapons must be stopped, and that China was firmly committed to denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula. Vowing that Beijing would not abandon efforts to resume six-party talks, Wang said all provisions of the U.N. resolution sanctioning North Korea must be fully implemented, but with an eye to minimizing any adverse impact on ordinary North Koreans. In the meantime, he said, escalation of tensions on the peninsula should be avoided at all costs. Both Wang and Lavrov stressed opposition to South Korea's possible deployment of THAAD, the advanced U.S. missile defense system that has been at the center of recent talks between Washington and Seoul. Wang said the system would "undermine security interests of China and Russia, destroy the strategic balance and trigger a regional arms race." On March 7, Leon Panetta, a former U.S. defense secretary and CIA director, told VOA that ongoing THAAD talks might have pressed Beijing to support the latest U.N. sanctions on North Korea. Lavrov said Russia and China oppose using North Korea's nuclear activity as justification for an increased military presence in the region, and that he hoped Pyongyang would heed U.N. Security Council appeals to return to the six-party talks. Some international relations experts say Beijing and Moscow have been forced to coordinate their positions on Pyongyang because Kim Jong Un refuses to compromise. "The problem of the Korean Peninsula is extremely important, and it has caused widespread concern among all

parties. It is not only a headache for China but also for Russia," said Dmitry Streltsov, a scholar with the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. "Since they don't see the possibility of any improvement of the situation in the future, it is very important for China to find out about Russia's bottom line on the issue. The two sides may also discuss any possibilities of taking joint actions." Russian scholar Alexey Maslov, head of the Oriental Studies Department at the Russian Higher School of Economics Research University, said China is already taking a tougher stance on North Korea by restricting its supply of various material goods. Maslov said Russia should follow suit by reducing its own exports to North Korea. Maslov also said he thought Beijing supports Washington's current position on North Korea. **"We should also notice Wang Yi visited the United States recently, and even met with Secretary of State John Kerry," he said. "This shows that on some international issues, especially the North Korean nuclear issue, China and the U.S. share the same position."** Lavrov said after meeting Wang that he expected political interaction between Russia and China "to be no less than last year," and that the quality of economic and trade cooperation between the two countries would improve. Lavrov also announced that Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has accepted an invitation to visit Russia at the end of this year, and that this fall's G20 summit in China's Zhejiang province will provide another opportunity for improved Sino-Russian ties. Russian President Vladimir Putin briefly met with Wang today at the Kremlin, where he told Wang that he hoped to have in-depth discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to China this summer. Putin also hailed bilateral relations between the two countries and called for more economic cooperation and cultural exchanges. (Bai Hua, "China-Russia Talks Focus on North Korea," VOA, March 11, 2016)

Lewis: "On March 9, KCNA and *Rodong Sinmun* announced that Kim Jong Un had visited a facility where he learned about North Korea's progress in mating nuclear weapons to ballistic missiles. A subsequent television broadcast included more than dozen still images from the visit. Not only did Kim Jong Un pose with a number of missiles, including the KN-08, but he also posed with a model of compact nuclear weapon and modern reentry body. Here are the five things you need to know about Kim's visit. 1. Kim might have been visiting the Chamjin Missile Factory outside of Pyongyang. North Korea did not announce the location of the visit, but a likely location is the North's main missile production facility outside of Pyongyang, the Tae-sung Machine Factory (also known as the Chamjin Missile Factory). Michael Madden has matched the ceiling lights to the lone picture believed to have been taken at the site. The Tae-sung Machine Factory is located at: 38.951517°N, 125.568482°E. 2. The room is filled with a number of North Korean ballistic missiles. Although attention has understandably focused on the nuclear weapon sitting in front of Kim, the factory room contains two known modifications of the KN-08, unpainted Nodong missiles and what may be Musudan missiles. While most of the press reporting has focused on North Korea's ICBM, the official announcement said that the North's nuclear warheads "have been standardized to be fit for ballistic rockets by miniaturizing them." That, along with the variety of missiles in the room, suggests North Korea plans to arm several types of missiles with nuclear warheads. 3. We know a lot more about the KN-08, including that it uses two Nodong engines. Since North Korea displayed the KN-08 ICBM during parades in 2012 and 2013, followed by a substantially modified version in 2015,



analysts have attempted to estimate the missile's design and performance. In 2013, John Schilling argued that the first stage of the KN-08 was most likely a pair of Nodong engines. Although the images do not provide quite enough detail to determine the type of engine, for the first time we can confirm that the first stage of the KN-08 Mod 1 comprises two engines. That increases our confidence in our estimates of the KN-08's range and payload. The fact that both missiles are displayed, along with an analysis of the serial numbers, suggests that North Korea intends to deploy both variants of the KN-08.

4. North Korea has a more plausible reentry body. One of the big questions about North Korea's nuclear program is whether or not North Korea can design a reentry vehicle that will protect the warhead during its journey from launch to target. The KN-08 missiles that North Korea paraded in 2012 and 2013 were almost certainly mock-ups. Although the quality of the mock-ups improved between parades, the nosecones were particularly unconvincing. North Korea has now shown a reentry body<sup>[7]</sup> that looks like early US and Soviet ones. The reentry body still hasn't been tested, but this is the first credible reentry vehicle design that North Korea has displayed.

5. The nuclear weapon—a compact fission device—would be small enough for a missile. There has long been a debate about whether to take the DPRK's claims to have "miniaturized" its nuclear weapons seriously. As I have argued previously, there is enough open source evidence to take seriously<sup>[8]</sup> the possibility that North Korea has developed a compact fission device that is approximately 60 cm in diameter and weighs between 200-300 kilograms. It is hard to make precise measurements at this size, but we assume the warheads fit inside the reentry body next to it. This would be similar to a Pakistani nuclear design that surfaced in Switzerland after the break-up of the A.Q. Khan network. The size of the object is consistent with these expectations. The device is not a classical two-stage thermonuclear weapon, but North Korean designers may use deuterium-tritium gas to "boost" the yield of the nuclear explosion. The object is probably a mockup, since nuclear weapons are filled with conventional explosives and would be very dangerous. Some US experts are skeptical—they don't think the object looks right. It does not look like US devices, to be sure, but it is hard to know if aspects of the model are truly implausible or simply that North Korean nuclear weapons look different than their Soviet and American cousins. The size, however, is consistent with my expectations for North Korea. And it is hard to believe that, after four nuclear tests, the North Koreans can't make a plausible mock-up. Kim Jong Un's decision to pose with a nuclear weapon is not surprising. For several years now, North Korean officials have asserted that they have the capability to strike targets in the United States. North Korea has paraded variants of the KN-08 ICBM on three occasions, announced that previous nuclear tests were for the purpose of "miniaturizing" the North's nuclear weapons, and published a map of the targets in the United States including Washington, DC. In response to these threats, US officials have consistently stated that North Korea has yet to demonstrate the full range of technologies necessary to target the United States. The images released on March 9 are intended to bolster the North's deterrent in the face of such skepticism." (Jeffrey Lewis, "Five Things You Need to Know about Kim Jong Un's Photo Op with the Bomb," *Military Affairs*, March 11, 2016)

3/12/16

KPA General Staff statement: "Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 joint military exercises kicked off by the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces are becoming

more reckless as the days go by. **The enemies are opening to public without hesitation that the largest-ever Ssangyong drill being staged in the Phohang area of south Korea is the climax of OPLAN 5015 to "bring down the social system" by striking the supreme headquarters and major core facilities in the DPRK through the "operation to advance into Pyongyang" accompanied by a sudden surprise landing on the DPRK. ... The prevailing grave situation makes all the service personnel of the KPA discard the patience which they have long exercised.** The KPA General Staff in charge of all operations of the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK, upon the authorization of the dignified Supreme Command, formally declares the following military counteractions: **From this moment, the first combined task units stationed in the eastern, central and western sectors of the front will go over to carrying out the operation for preemptive retaliatory strike at the enemy groups involved in the Ssangyong drill.** It is the Juche-oriented **counter-operation mode of the KPA** to immediately contain and wipe out by force of arms troops and means involved in the operation the moment it judges their scenario to intrude into inviolable territory, air and waters over which the DPRK's sovereignty is exercised. **The KPA will counter the enemies' landing drill aiming at "advance into Pyongyang" with the operation to liberate the whole of south Korea including Seoul and the enemies' tactics of "high-density strike" with an ultra-precision blitzkrieg strike of the Korean style.** Steadfast is the will of the KPA to mercilessly wipe out those troops hurled into the "operation for advancing into Pyongyang" and blow up the den of architects of it. Those who intend to launch aggression and war against the DPRK will be as most foolish and miserable as digging their own graves by themselves from that moment. The KPA is waiting for the moment to punish the aggressors, keeping them within its firing range. The gun roar for retaliating against the aggressors will turn out to be fireworks celebrating national reunification. The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK holding tightly the arms to annihilate the enemies with towering hatred for them are waiting for the dignified Supreme Command to issue an order to launch a preemptive strike of justice on the aggressors." (KCNA, "KPA Will Go over to Preemptive Retaliatory Strike: Its General Staff," March 12, 2016)

**The U.S. test-fired Minuteman-3 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on February 25.** The U.S. impudently branded the DPRK's satellite launch for peaceful purposes as a long-range missile launch. This brought to light the true colors of the U.S. as the arch criminal harassing global peace and security. It test-fired ICBM while incriminating the DPRK's exercise of the right to use space for peaceful purposes. This is little short of an open declaration that it is the U.S. only in the world which can enjoy all rights and humankind should be dominated by it without condition. Pursuant to such brigandish logic, the U.S. conducted ceaseless nuclear tests of various types in a concealed manner despite the opposition of the international community and has conducted ICBM tests 15 times since 2011. These facts made clearer the fact that the U.S. scenario to block the space development by the DPRK is truly aimed to stifle and dominate it. ..." (KCNA, KCNA Commentary Blasts Most Shameless U.S. DPRK Policy," March 12, 2016)

Adm. William Gortney, commander of the U.S. Northern Command, told a hearing at the Senate Committee on the Armed Services he assesses that Pyongyang has the

ability to "put an ICBM in space and range the continental United States and Canada." The remark strongly suggests the possibility that the North has secured the atmospheric re-entry technology, one of the core technologies for intercontinental ballistic missiles. Gortney said, "It's the prudent decision on my part to assume that he has the capability to ... miniaturize a nuclear weapon and put it on an ICBM" and "range all of the states of the United States and Canada." In October, he said he agreed to the analysis that Pyongyang was capable of making nuclear warheads small enough to be mounted on rockets to be delivered to the mainland U.S. Adm. Cecil Haney, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, also told the Congressional hearing that the U.S. should take such threats seriously as the North's claims of nuclear development. Gortney's assessment has a different nuance from the comments by the South Korean and the U.S. military authorities following the North's announcement on Wednesday of its "success" in miniaturizing nuclear warheads. "We have not seen North Korea test or demonstrate the ability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and put it on an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile)," Pentagon spokesman Bill Urban said Tuesday. "The U.S. government assessment has not changed." In fact, many people from inside and outside of the U.S. government say Washington should not underestimate the North's ICBM capabilities. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in his written report to Congress that Pyongyang "has already taken initial steps toward fielding this (KN-08) system, although the system has not been flight-tested." Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told the Voice of America on Tuesday that it had yet to be confirmed whether Pyongyang has the ability to deploy a nuclear warhead on top of an ICBM but will have the capabilities in the future, considering its continued ICBM launches and nuclear tests. (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "U.S. Officials Call for Preparations for N. Korea's ICBM Capabilities," March 12, 2016)

3/13/16 U.S. and South Korean troops staged a big amphibious landing exercise on Saturday, storming simulated North Korean beach defenses amid heightened tension and threats by the North to annihilate its enemies. The landing and assault drills on South Korea's east coast were part of eight weeks of joint exercises between the allies which the South has said are the largest ever. The North has denounced the exercises as "nuclear war moves" and threatened to respond with an all-out offensive. About 55 U.S. marine aircraft and 30 U.S. and South Korean ships, including the USS Bonhomme Richard and USS Boxer, which carry AV-8B Harrier attack jets and V-22 Osprey aircrafts, took part in the assault on beaches near Pohang city, the U.S. navy said. "They will penetrate notional enemy beach defenses, establish a beach head, and rapidly transition forces and sustainment ashore," the U.S. military based in South Korea said in a statement before the exercise. (Do-gyun Kim, "U.S., South Korea Stage Assault Drill; North Korea Threatens to Wipe out Enemies," Reuters, March 13, 2016)

3/14/16 Repression remains unabated and the authorities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continue to exercise the strictest control over all aspects of its citizens' lives, said the United Nations human rights expert Marzuki Darusman. "The totalitarian governing structure in North Korea absolutely denies rights to its people and its unchecked power appears as strongly entrenched as ever throughout the whole country," he stressed. "The international community must ensure that the senior DPRK leadership, including Mr. Kim Jong Un, are held accountable for the crimes against

humanity committed in the country," the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea urged today during the presentation of his last report\* to the UN Human Rights Council. "In this extremely centralized and hierarchical ruling structure, where tight control is extended to the smallest unit of the society, the principle of command and superior responsibility should offer a plausible theory to hold the 'Supreme Leader' Mr. Kim Jong Un and most of the past and present senior leaders individually culpable," he underscored. "Accountability for crimes against humanity must be an integral part of any discussion about the future of the Korean peninsula, including the scenario of a peace treaty," he said. "As the term implies, crimes against humanity are a concern for all of humanity. Ensuring accountability for such crimes justly requires the international community to play a role." The Special Rapporteur also highlighted the possible roles to be played by neighboring countries, like South Korea and Japan, which are State parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) that sets out the crimes falling within its jurisdiction and the mechanisms for States to cooperate with the ICC, among other things. He further touched upon the principle of universal jurisdiction that could open the possibility of prosecution in a second country. The Special Rapporteur called for the establishment of a group of experts to study possible accountability measures. "Now is a critical point in the history of the Korean people and the resolve of the international community to seek accountability for the crimes committed in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will have the most profound impact on the lives of individuals and for human rights in Asia and further afield," the Special Rapporteur concluded. (U.N. Human Rights Office Seoul, "Efforts to Hold DPRK's Leadership Accountable Must Continue, U.N. Expert Urges in Last Report," March 14, 2016)

Escalating threats from North Korea's communist regime are indicators of a future military attack or another nuclear test in the coming days, according to a recent U.S. intelligence assessment. Intelligence agencies issued the assessment last week warning that threatening rhetoric from Pyongyang in response to large-scale U.S.-South Korean military exercises and new U.N. sanctions had reached the highest level in years. The **unclassified** assessment circulated within government states that the intense language suggests North Korea is preparing for a surprise military strike or a demonstration of strategic capability, such as a new long-range missile test or underground nuclear blast, according to U.S. officials familiar with the report. (Bill Gertz, "U.S. Says North Korea Rhetoric a Prelude to Attack," *Washington Free Beacon*," March 14, 2016)

Iran advanced its missile development with the help of North Korea, and the Middle Eastern nation may still rely on the communist nation for materials necessary for producing its ballistic missiles, a Congressional Research Service report said, noting that the intelligence community assessed until the latter 2000s that North Korean cooperation with Iran's ballistic missile program was ongoing and significant. "Iran has likely exceeded North Korea's ability to develop, test and build ballistic missiles. But Tehran may, to some extent, still rely on Pyongyang for certain materials for producing Iranian ballistic missiles, Iran's claims to the contrary notwithstanding," the report said. "For example, some observers argue that Iran may not be able to produce even its Scud B and Scud C equivalents -- Shahab-1 and Shahab-2, respectively -- without some

foreign support for key materials or components," it said. Nevertheless, however, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in 2014 that Iran is not currently receiving assistance with its ICBM program. Clapper also said in February this year that there has "not been a great deal of interchange" between Iran and the North, it said.

The report said Syria continues to rely on North Korean and Iranian assistance for its missile program, noting that Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael Flynn testified in 2013 that Syria's liquid-propellant missile program -- Scud B, Scud C and Scud D missiles -- depends on "essential foreign equipment and assistance, primarily from North Korean entities." On suspected nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea, the report said that the official U.S. assessment has been that there is no such cooperation between the two countries, even though some press reports have pointed to alleged cases of nuclear cooperation, such as the possibility of Iranian officials witnessing North Korean nuclear tests. "U.S. officials have stated publicly that there is no nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea," the report said. "Knowledgeable current and former U.S. officials contacted by CRS said that they were unaware of official unclassified U.S. government evidence of nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea." But the report cited then-Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair saying in 2009 that Pyongyang could attempt to transfer nuclear technology and material across its border. "Pyongyang probably also perceives that it would risk a regime-ending military confrontation with the United States if the nuclear material was used by another country or group in a nuclear strike or terrorist attacks, and the United States could trace the material back to North Korea," Blair was quoted as saying. "The North might find a nuclear weapons or fissile material transfer more appealing if its own stockpile grows larger and/or it faces an extreme economic crisis where the potentially huge revenue from such a sale could help the country survive." (Yonhap, "Iran May Still Rely on N. Korea for Missile Materials," *Korea Herald*, March 14, 2016)

3/15/16

KCNA: "Scientists and technicians in the defense industry of the DPRK succeeded in the development and local production of heat-resisting materials for rocket with their own efforts and technology after having made painstaking researches of years under the direct guidance of supreme leader Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), first chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, gave an order to **conduct a test for estimating the heat stability of ballistic rocket warhead tip**, designed and manufactured with indigenous efforts and technology, and the corrosion of heat-resistant coating material. And he guided an environmental simulation for reentry of the rocket warhead tip on the spot. The simulation was conducted in such a way as to verify the thermodynamic structural stability of newly-developed heat-resisting materials through measurement of corrosion and temperature on the tip under high pressure and thermal flow caused by aerodynamic heating when a ballistic rocket reenters the atmosphere. The test results met the requirements of all the technical parameters. The test proved that **the tip's thermodynamic structural stability is ensured under the pressure equivalent to actual environmental condition and heat flow about five times stronger than the condition caused at the time of ballistic rocket reentry** and, after all, it provided a sure guarantee for the

reliability of the inter-continental ballistic rocket warhead reentry. Very satisfied over the test results, Kim Jong Un said with high appreciation that the trustworthy scientists and technicians in the defense research field and workers in the munitions industry field true to the WPK's revolutionary line of simultaneously developing the two fronts have made long strides in the rocket industry and nuclear technology this year when the Seventh Congress of the WPK is to be held. **We have proudly acquired the reentry technology**, possessed by a few countries styling themselves military powers, by dint of self-reliance and self-development, thus making great progress in the ballistic rocket technology that helps increase the independence of the country's defense capability and munitions industry and remarkably enhance the invincible might of the powerful revolutionary Paektusan army, he added. The level of our advanced strike means, irrefutable in terms of science and technology, just shows the strength and dignity of our country, he said, stressing the need for the munitions industry to rapidly develop the defense science and technology and raise higher the level of putting the defense industry on a Juche-based, modern and scientific basis and thus develop and produce on the highest level more diverse and Korean-style military strike means and Juche-based rockets for realizing the Party Central Committee's idea on the military strategy and tactics. **Declaring that a nuclear warhead explosion test and a test-fire of several types of ballistic rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads will be conducted in a short time to further increase the reliability of nuclear attack capability, he instructed the relevant field to make thorough prearrangement for them.** He was accompanied by First Vice Department Director Ri Pyong Chol and Vice Department Director Kim Jong Sik of the WPK Central Committee and General Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the KPA Strategic Force." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Guides Ballistic Rocket's Reentry Environmental Simulation," March 15, 2016) Bermudez and Kan: "On March 15, North Korean media carried photographs of Kim Jong Un as he observed and guided a test of the nose cone for what appears to be the KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) reentry vehicle. The photographs show a vertical engine test stand that, while similar in structure to those at the Sohae and Tonghae Satellite Launch Facilities, is considerably smaller and more rudimentary. While the location of the test was not revealed, it appears that this test was conducted from the vertical engine test stand at the Chamjin Missile Factory southwest of Pyongyang, one of North Korea's primary missile production facilities. Some experts believe that this factory was also the site of Kim Jong Un's recent photo inspecting a nuclear warhead." (Joseph Bermudez, Jr., and Henry Kan, "Location of KN-08 Reentry Vehicle Nosecone Test Identified," *38North*, March 23, 2016)

Executive Order 13722 of March 15, 2016: "By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 *et seq.*), the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-122), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in view of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2270 of March 2, 2016, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, find that the Government of North Korea's continuing pursuit of its nuclear and missile programs, as evidenced most

recently by its February 7, 2016, launch using ballistic missile technology and its January 6, 2016, nuclear test in violation of its obligations pursuant to numerous UNSCRs and in contravention of its commitments under the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, increasingly imperils the United States and its allies. To address those actions, and to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466 of June 26, 2008, as modified in scope and relied upon for additional steps in subsequent Executive Orders, I hereby order:

Section 1. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in. (b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order or pursuant to the export control authorities implemented by the Department of Commerce, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order.

Sec. 2. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:

- (i) to operate in any industry in the North Korean economy as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to be subject to this subsection, such as transportation, mining, energy, or financial services;
- (ii) to have sold, supplied, transferred, or purchased, directly or indirectly, to or from North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea, metal, graphite, coal, or software, where any revenue or goods received may benefit the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea, including North Korea's nuclear or ballistic missile programs;
- (iii) to have engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for an abuse or violation of human rights by the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of either such entity;
- (iv) to have engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for the exportation of workers from North Korea, including exportation to generate revenue for the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea;
- (v) to have engaged in significant activities undermining cybersecurity through the use of computer networks or systems against targets outside of North Korea on behalf of the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea;
- (vi) to have engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for censorship by the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea;
- (vii) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order;
- (viii) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or
- (ix) to have attempted to engage in any of the activities described in subsections (a)(i)-(viii) of this section.

(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued

pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order. The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section are in addition to export control authorities implemented by the Department of Commerce. Sec. 3. (a) The following are prohibited: (i) the exportation or reexportation, direct or indirect, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, services, or technology to North Korea; (ii) new investment in North Korea by a United States person, wherever located; and (iii) any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by this section if performed by a United States person or within the United States. (b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order or pursuant to the export control authorities implemented by the Department of Commerce, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order. Sec. 4. I hereby find that the unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens determined to meet one or more of the criteria in subsection 2(a) of this order would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and I hereby suspend entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of such persons. Such persons shall be treated as persons covered by section 1 of Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry of Aliens Subject to United Nations Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency Economic Powers Act Sanctions). Sec. 5. I hereby determine that the making of donations of the type of articles specified in section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to section 1 or 2 of this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by sections 1 and 2 of this order. Sec. 6. The prohibitions in sections 1 and 2 of this order include but are not limited to: (a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; and (b) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Sec. 7. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited. (b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited. Sec. 8. Nothing in this order shall prohibit transactions for the conduct of the official business of the Federal Government or the United Nations (including its specialized agencies, programs, funds, and related organizations) by employees, grantees, or contractors thereof. Sec. 9. For the purposes of this order: (a) the term "person" means an individual or entity; (b) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization; (c) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States; and (d) the term "Government of North Korea" means the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities. Sec. 10. For those persons whose property and interests in



property are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466, there need be no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to section 1 or 2 of this order. Sec. 11. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA and the UNPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order. Sec. 12. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. Sec. 13. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on March 16, 2016. (U.S. Federal Register, Presidential Order, March 18, 2016)

President Barack Obama hit North Korea with new sanctions in response to the country's "illicit" nuclear and ballistic missile tests earlier this year. An executive order signed by the president implements two sets of sanctions: those that unanimously cleared the U.N. Security Council and a separate round of U.S. sanctions signed by Obama February 18 after Congress overwhelmingly approved and sent him legislation. "These actions are consistent with our longstanding commitment to apply sustained pressure on the North Korean regime," White House press secretary Josh Earnest said. "The U.S. and the global community will not tolerate North Korea's illicit nuclear and ballistic missile activities, and we will continue to impose costs on North Korea until it comes into compliance with its international obligations." The executive order prohibits the exportation of goods, services and technology to North Korea and prohibits new investment in North Korea. It also establishes nine new criteria allowing the Treasury Department to target North Korea's human rights abuses, censorship, cybersecurity threats, trade in metals, graphite, coal, or software; revenue from overseas workers; and attempts to engage in those activities. Individuals employed in North Korea's transportation, mining, energy or financial services industries may also be subject to sanctions. (Darlene Superville, "Obama Sanctions N. Korea for Nuclear, Missile Tests," Associated Press, March 16, 2016)

3/16/16

KCNA: "The Supreme Court of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Wednesday held a trial on Otto Frederick Warmbier, a student at the University of Virginia, the United States who was arrested on the charge of anti-DPRK hostile acts. Attending the trial as observers were citizens from different walks of life. The trial examined the case of Otto Frederick Warmbier, accused of violation of Article 60 of the DPRK Criminal Code (State Subversion Charge). A written indictment confirming his crimes was submitted and there were inquiries into the facts of the case. In the course of the inquiry, the accused confessed to the serious offense against the DPRK

he had committed, pursuant to the U.S. government's hostile policy toward it, in a bid to impair the unity of its people after entering it as a tourist. The court sentenced him to fifteen years of hard labor." (KCNA, "American Student Sentenced to 15 Years of Hard Labor in the DPRK," March 16, 2016) An American college student who tearfully apologized for trying to steal a political propaganda poster from his hotel in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, was sentenced to 15 years of prison and hard labor. The punishment of the student, Otto F. Warmbier, infuriated the White House and elicited strong condemnations from other officials and rights activists. Even by North Korea's standards, the punishment for Warmbier appeared to be extreme for an act that might amount to a harmless misdemeanor elsewhere. Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, said that it was "increasingly clear that the North Korean government intends to use these citizens as pawns," and that Warmbier's arrest demonstrated why it was hazardous to visit North Korea. Gov. John Kasich of Ohio, a Republican candidate for president, said in a statement on his website that Warmbier's detention "was completely unjustified and the sentence North Korea imposed on him is an affront to concepts of justice." Phil Robertson, the deputy Asia director for Human Rights Watch, said that the punishment of "15 years' hard labor for a college-style prank is outrageous and shocking." Warmbier's punishment was announced less than a day after Bill Richardson, a former governor of New Mexico met with two North Korean officials in New York to urge Warmbier's release on humanitarian grounds. "An unfortunate development but a familiar pattern with American detainees," Richardson said in an email. "Hopefully a prelude to negotiations that might lead to a release on humanitarian grounds." (Choe Sang-Hun and Rick Gladstone, "North Korea Gives U.S. Student a 15-Year Sentence," *New York Times*, March 17, 2016, p. A-8)

Sydney Seiler, senior advisor to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) said that the United States has always made great efforts for talks with North Korea but that such efforts have never evolved to negotiations. The former U.S. special envoy for the six-party talks made the remark at an undisclosed forum held in Washington last week hosted jointly by South Korea's state-run Korea Institute for National Unification and the U.S. Center for a New American Security. "It seems that the United States does not want to have deep negotiations for a peace agreement with the North Korean regime," Choi Jin-wook, president of the Korea Institute for National Unification, said in an interview with *Dong-A Ilbo*. Choi quoted the U.S. official as saying that when the U.S. asked the North about its willingness to include its denuclearization into the agendas for peace negotiations which Pyongyang demanded, the North took a step back, refusing to negotiate its denuclearization. Choi also quoted Seiler as saying, "The U.S. does not take peace negotiations (with the North) seriously. South Koreans misunderstand the issue. The U.S. will never put South Korea on the sidelines." According to Choi, Seiler also said that the North's call for a peace agreement is an offensive aimed at undermining the Seoul-Washington alliance and rationalize Pyongyang's nuclear development. Seiler added the North is well aware that negotiations on a peace agreement will not take place any time soon. However, Seiler said that it is necessary to have dialogue with the North to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, according to Choi. "Don't be overconfident about U.S. deterrence against the North. It is not the deterrence that keeps the North from making provocations. Therefore, there is no need to be sensitive about the U.S. trying to have talks with the

North to ease tensions," the U.S. official was quoted as saying. Choi said Seiler stressed U.S. efforts for talks with the North, showing a name card of a senior official at the North Korean Permanent Mission to the United Nations he kept in his diary. (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "U.S. Will Not Sideline S. Korea in Peace Talks with N. Korea: U.S. Official," March 17, 2016)

North Korea tested a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), two weeks after the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) slapped its latest sanctions in response to Pyongyang's nuclear and missile tests in January and February, according to the *Washington Free Beacon*. Citing defense officials, it reported March 22 that a "pop-up" or "ejection test" of a KN-11 missile was carried out from a canister at the Sinpo shipyard on North Korea's east coast. The site is where a KN-11 missile is under development along with the new Sinpo-class submarine that can carry ballistic missiles. Both the U.S. and South Korean governments refused to verify the report. "We're not going to comment on matters of intelligence," U.S. Department of Defense spokesman Cmdr. Bill Urban was quoted as saying by the *Beacon*. "It's a matter of intelligence and we can't confirm whether the report is true or not," Ministry of Defense spokesman Moon Sang-Gyun said March 23. If confirmed, the test will be in violation of the UNSC's Resolution 2270 approved on March 2. (Yi Whan-woo, "N.K. Fires SLBM in Violation of UN Sanctions: Report," *Korea Times*, March 23, 2016)

China has strengthened inspections of North Korean cargo transiting through its three northeastern border provinces, while some North Korean restaurants in China have closed their doors, a government source said. "The circumstances are that Beijing has increased the number of customs officials to conduct near-complete inspections of all cargo going to and from the North," the source said. "This situation has in fact been observed." (Yonhap, "China Strengthens N.K. Cargo Inspections: Source," *Korea Herald*, March 16, 2016)

To view the humbling limits of round after round of international sanctions against North Korea, come to Masik Pass. It isn't a secret military facility where Kim Jong Un's best and brightest are hard at work developing nuclear warheads and long-range missiles. It's a ski resort. The U.N. has been trying for years to punish North Korea for its nuclear program by barring trade not only in weapons but in luxury items, in hopes of making Pyongyang's elite feel some pain. If they feel pain at Masik Pass, it's more likely because they've had a tumble on their French Rossignol skis. The resort boasts the amenities of a first-world ski destination – a luxury hotel, a half-dozen upscale restaurants and a well-equipped, professionally staffed ski rental shop. Visitors can stock up on European chocolates, drink their fill of Heineken beer, even buy T-shirts with themselves and the slopes Photoshopped and emblazoned across the back. Imported snowmobiles from China were buzzing up and down its slopes even as the U.N. Security Council was discussing how to crack down after the North's latest nuclear test in January and subsequent rocket launch. Despite an occasional power outage, its Doppelmayr chairlifts from Austria were working just fine. To its critics, Masik Pass is a shining example of how Kim's regime has been able to pour resources into prestige projects and flaunt restrictions designed to block its access to imported luxury items, set through four prior rounds of U.N. sanctions. Part of the problem is that countries

disagree over what items are banned. Masik is also important because it is a signature project of Kim Jong Un himself. It opened in 2013, just two years after Kim, who lived in Switzerland when he was a teenager, assumed power. Adding salt to the wounds of ardent sanctions supporters, the resort has become a big hit with Western tourists. Though exact figures on how many have gone and how much they have spent are not available, Masik Pass is part of package tours offered by the main tourism agencies that specialize in North Korea, which has for several years been trying hard to build its still-nascent tourism sector. Andreas Hofer, a well-traveled skier and lawyer from Austria who recently visited the resort, described it as “surprising, and full of unexpected luxury.” He rated its slopes as somewhat less than stellar for the true ski enthusiast, but gave it bonus points for being among the most exotic ski locations on the planet. “Nobody from abroad will come for the skiing only,” he said in an interview by email. “They want to have an idea about new ways and developments in North Korea. And the hospitality and friendliness and welcoming are ample compensation for the more limited skiing.” North Korea, which obviously opposes the sanctions, argues that skiing isn’t a luxury anyway, but a sport for the masses. Masik, it claims, has opened up the door for the country to provide large numbers of common people with recreation enjoyed by millions all over the world. It’s a facility where the North can train serious skiers who may one day compete internationally, maybe even in the upcoming Winter Games – which, it’s worth noting, will be held in Pyeongchang, South Korea, in 2018. Indeed, most skiers on Masik are North Korean. Many come in groups organized by their work units, trade or community associations or schools. The prices for North Koreans are far lower than for foreigners and the lodgings are much more modest. But Washington, the strongest advocate of sanctions, sees Masik within the larger context of cracking down on any income streams Pyongyang can use to fund its nuclear program, or reward the North Korean elite for their loyalty to the regime. “We have eyes on how they spend their money, what they look at, what merchandise, what goods that they purchase from abroad. We try to target those to limit, frankly, their ability to enjoy themselves,” State Department spokesman Mark Toner said at a recent news conference. Actually cracking down, however, has been a challenge. According to the latest U.N. Security Council report examining enforcement of sanctions, efforts have been severely undermined by the North’s ability to use its diplomatic missions abroad to get the goods it wants. It also has acquired goods in roundabout ways that involve passage through multiple countries. Manufacturers, it said, often have “no idea about their final destination.” The report also noted that not all countries agree on what they are supposed to be banning to begin with. Sanctioned luxury items range from caviar and gems to yachts and limousines. But each country is essentially allowed to choose what it does or does not ban. That gives the North a lot of wiggle room. In a section devoted to Masik Pass, the report said Beijing acknowledges Chinese companies provided ski lifts and other equipment but said it was “of the view that skiing is a popular sport for people, and ski equipment or relative services are not included in the list of prohibited luxury goods.” Other countries interpreted the same luxury goods category to include such things as snowmobiles and certain makes of snow groomers. “This creates a situation of uneven practice by member states,” the report concluded. Masik’s success and past failures to enforce sanctions have exasperated Washington. “China does not enforce the mandated ban on luxury goods,” Bonnie Glaser, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in

testimony before the U.S. Congress in January. "Chinese customs data shows that North Korea imported \$2.09 billion worth of luxury goods between 2012 and 2014." Her conclusion? Washington should consider sanctioning Beijing, too. The latest sanctions on North Korea, announced by the Security Council earlier this month, try to close some of those loopholes. Explicitly banned are "luxury watches: wrist, pocket, and other with a case of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal;" "aquatic recreational vehicles (such as personal watercraft);" "items of lead crystal;" and "recreational sports equipment." And just to make sure everyone is on the same page, the Security Council added: "snowmobiles (valued greater than \$2,000)." (Eric Talmadge, "N. Korean Ski Resort's Amenities Defy UN Luxury-Imports Ban," Associated Press, March 16, 2016)

3/17/16

China expressed its opposition to unilateral sanctions against North Korea saying they could raise tension, after the United States imposed new curbs on the isolated country in retaliation for its nuclear and rocket tests. The so-called secondary sanctions will compel banks to freeze the assets of anyone who breaks the blockade, potentially squeezing out North Korea's business ties, including those with China. Asked whether China was worried the sanctions could affect "normal" business links between Chinese banks and North Korea, Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said this was something China was "paying attention to." "First, as I've said many times before, China always opposes any country imposing unilateral sanctions," Lu told a daily news briefing. "Second, under the present situation where the situation on the Korean Peninsula is complex and sensitive, we oppose any moves that may further worsen tensions there." "Third, we have clearly stressed many times in meetings with the relevant county, any so-called unilateral sanctions imposed by any country should neither affect nor harm China's reasonable interests." (Ben Blanchard, "China Says Opposes Unilateral Sanctions on North Korea," Reuters, March 17, 2016)

A senior U.S. official came out strongly against major powers in East Asia pursuing nuclear reprocessing that nonproliferation experts warn could lead to spiraling quantities of weapons-usable material in a tense region. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman, who heads the State Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, told a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel "has little if any economic justification" and raises concerns about nuclear security and nonproliferation. The administration appears to be elevating its public expressions of concern over plans by Japan and China to produce plutonium for energy generation – a technology that South Korea also aspires to have. Countryman's unusually critical comments come as President Barack Obama prepares to host more than 50 world leaders for a nuclear security summit in Washington at the end of this month. The committee's chairman, Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN), accused the Obama administration of encouraging reprocessing despite the concern over proliferation. Corker pointed to the renegotiation a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with China last year that allows the reprocessing of fuel from U.S.-designed reactors for nonmilitary purposes. It is similar to the arrangement the U.S. has with close ally Japan. The U.S. has deferred a decision on giving similar consent to another close ally, South Korea, but has not ruled it out. "We're not calling for a plutonium time-out like we could have done," Corker told the

hearing. Countryman denied that the administration has encouraged reprocessing. He said China, which unlike Japan and South Korea has nuclear weapons, already had the capability to reprocess on its own. "I would be very happy to see all countries get out of the plutonium reprocessing business," Countryman said. Japan began building a major reprocessing plant with French state-owned company Areva in the early 1990s. The project has been plagued by delays and cost overruns, and in November, its opening was postponed until 2018 to allow for more safety upgrades and inspections. China, meanwhile, has been negotiating with Areva for a plant on a similar scale. Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA) warned of a domino effect in East Asia, saying if Japan and China went ahead with their plants, there would be pressure on South Korea to pursue its own reprocessing efforts, and that could undermine any U.S. efforts to get North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. Countryman said the U.S. has raised with France its concerns about the dynamics in Asia, a region steeped in historical rivalries dating back to World War II and beyond. "There is a degree of competition among the major powers in East Asia. It is a competition that in my view extends into irrational spheres, such as, 'Hey, they have this technology, we have got to have it, too.' No matter (that) it is a technology that makes no economic sense and that would not improve their standing in their world," he said. In Beijing, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz voiced concern about China's plans for its first commercial-scale reprocessing plant. He told *The Wall Street Journal* that China's recent announcements that it would press ahead with the facility "certainly isn't a positive in terms of nonproliferation." (Matthew Pennington, "U.S. Official Comes out Strongly against Major Powers in East Asia Pursuing Nuclear Reprocessing," Associated Press, March 17, 2016)

3/18/16

North Korea launched two Nodong missiles in the latest show of force against the ongoing joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States, but one appears to have blown up mid-flight, military sources said. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said one ballistic missile was fired around 5:55 a.m. from Sukchon located in the western part of the country. The missile, believed to be a mid-range Nodong model, flew about 800 kilometers across North Korea before falling into waters off the country's east coast. "The missile dropped into waters within the Japanese Air Defense Identification Zone," the JCS said. Military sources said the North did not declare a no-sail zone for the launch - it is required under international conventions to give prior warnings to ships passing through the area. About 22 minutes after the first launch, the South Korean military's radar detected what appeared to be a second missile fired from the same area. But the radar lost track of it at an altitude of 17 km, the JCS said. According to military sources, the second missile may have exploded in the air briefly after takeoff, without reaching its target area. "An analysis so far indicates it was a missile, but more examination is needed to verify the data," the JCS said. Military officials here said the first ballistic missile appears to have been launched from a transporter erector launcher, a mobile missile vehicle. It is North Korea's first firing of the mid-range Rodong missile in about two years. With a maximum range of 1,300 km, the Rodong puts all of South Korea and part of Japan within striking distance. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Fires Two Ballistic Missiles; One Blows up in Flight," March 18, 2016)

North Korea has yet to master ballistic missile technology that can allow a warhead to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere after flying through space, Seoul's top defense official

said, refuting Pyongyang's claims that it can build an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM). A re-entry vehicle protects a ballistic missile's warhead through the course of its flight, including the re-entry stage. Without proper protection, a missile's warhead will burn up from the heat and pressure. The North said its test subjected the re-entry vehicle to 1,500 to 1,600 degrees Celsius of intense heat. Defense Minister Han Min-koo said during his appearance on a local broadcast news program that existing re-entry vehicles can withstand upwards to 7,000 degrees Celsius of heat in addition to other types of ablation effects like extreme pressure and vibrations. "I don't think North Korea has gained the re-entry technology in this test and many experts also share that point," he said. On its efforts to make small nuclear weapons that can be mounted onto ballistic missiles, North Korea may have made significant strides, although the country's claim to own a real nuclear warhead is dubious, Han noted. "North Korea has steadily conducted nuclear tests, and now it has become a realistic threat," the defense chief said, adding that the South Korean military is maintaining its readiness posture to deal with any threats. North Korea has come very far in diversifying and making its missile arsenal more sophisticated, he said, referring to the country's programs for the submarine launched ballistic missile and the KN-08 intercontinental missile. North Korea is technically ready to conduct an additional nuclear test at any time, he also noted, saying that another nuclear test can take place at a moment's notice. "We should squarely face the fact that North Korea's nuclear weapons are aimed at South Korea, not other countries," Han pointed out, calling for public support for denuclearizing of the North. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Has Yet to Master Re-Entry Technology for ICBM: Defense Minister," March 18, 2016)

U.N. Security Council statement: "The Members of the Security Council strongly condemned and expressed grave concern at the ballistic missile launches conducted by the DPRK on March 18 and on March 10. The Members of the Security Council stressed that all these launches were unacceptable, constituted a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), and posed a threat to regional and international security. The Members of the Security Council reiterated that the DPRK shall refrain from further actions in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and comply fully with its obligations under these resolutions. Recalling the Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2270 (2016) on March 2, the Members of the Security Council expressed grave concern over the DPRK's reaction to that resolution and its demands. The Members of the Security Council therefore are determined to ensure that resolution 2270 (2016) is implemented fully. In light of these recent violations, the Members of the Security Council emphasized the importance of the work of Security Council's Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and urged all Member States to redouble their efforts to implement the measures imposed in all relevant Security Council resolutions. The Members of the Security Council reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and expressed their commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomed efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue. The Members of the Security Council agreed that the Security Council would continue to closely

monitor the situation and act as appropriate." (UN Press Spokesman, "Democratic People's Republic of Korea Launches," March 18, 2016)

The chief nuclear envoys of South Korea and China held talks about how to better implement fresh U.N. sanctions targeting North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, a Seoul diplomat said. The talks between Kim Hong-kyun, South Korea's special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs and his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei come as North Korea fired two mid-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea earlier in the day in its latest defiance of U.N. resolutions. How to ensure the effectiveness of the new U.N. sanctions as well as North Korea's latest launch of ballistic missiles were expected to top the agenda of the Friday talks, a Seoul diplomat who was involved in the meeting said. "This morning, North Korea launched a ballistic missile in violation of Security Council resolutions," Kim told Yonhap by phone before boarding his plane. "I plan to share assessments of the threat of North Korea's provocations and focus on discussing overall ways to change the North's thinking and behavior through the faithful implementation of the Security Council resolution." The ministry said it expects Friday's meeting to contribute to close coordination among South Korea, China and the U.S. over the North Korean nuclear issue. **"I plan to hold talks with the Chinese side on ways to diversify dialogue within the context of the six-party talks, including trilateral talks involving South Korea, the U.S. and China, and five-party talks,"** Kim said. (Yonhap, "S. Korean Chinese Envoys Discuss U.N. Sanctions on N. Korea," March 18, 2016) China is open to three-way talks with South Korea and the United States on implementing new U.N. sanctions targeting North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, South Korea's chief nuclear envoy said March 19 after meeting with his Chinese counterpart. Kim Hong-kyun, South Korea's special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, also said he and his Chinese counterpart, Wu Dawei, shared "concerns" about North Korea's test-launch of two mid-range ballistic missiles a day ago. "In order to cooperate on the process of implementing U.N. resolutions, we proposed holding a three-way consultation among South Korea, the U.S. and China," Kim told a group of South Korean correspondents in Beijing. "In response, the Chinese side said it will review the proposal in an open-minded manner," Kim said. South Korea and China agreed that, "North Korea must not take further actions that violate U.N. resolutions." "By earnestly implementing the U.N. resolutions, both sides agreed that it is important (for relevant countries) to create a situation where North Korea has no choice but to change its course," Kim said. (Yonhap, "China Open to 3-Way Talks with S. Korea, U.S. on N. Korea Sanctions," *Korea Herald*, March 19, 2016)

Vincent Brooks, the current commanding general of the U.S. Army Pacific, has been tapped as the new head of the U.S. Forces Korea. Brooks is to replace USFK Commander Curtis Scaparrotti, who becomes NATO's top military commander. A source in Washington said Brooks has yet to be formally appointed, but the U.S. Defense Department "is in the process of making the appointment official." A graduate of West Point, Brooks became the academy's first African-American Cadet First Captain, the highest position a cadet can hold. He is considered a firm supporter of U.S. President Barack Obama's "pivot to Asia" doctrine and keenly follows South



Korean, North Korean and Chinese military developments. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "U.S. Pacific Commander Tapped as New USFK Chief," March 18, 2016)

3/20/16 North Korean drones that crashed in South Korea near the inter-Korean border in March and April of 2014 two years ago were too poorly built to carry any threatening weapons, a government source said Sunday, citing the results of a close analysis by a South Korean military research agency. Three unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, that had crashed were found. The government source in Seoul said that the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) has restored the three drones and conducted flight tests with them before concluding that they are incapable of carrying weapons weighing 3 or more kilograms. "The ADD has successfully restored the three North Korean drones and flown them to gauge their actual performance," the official said. "The drones failed to carry weapons weighing 3 to 4 kilograms. Instead they were only able to carry a grenade-level object weighing 400 to 900 grams." He added that engines and cameras found in the North Korean drones were all low-grade and built in the 1980s. Despite their poor quality, however, the North Korean drones are hard for radars to detect, the official said, adding that the South Korean military's relevant radar system is being reinforced to deal with the problem. (Yonhap, "Flight Tests of Restored N.K. Drones Reveal Lack of Threat," March 20, 2016)

3/21/16 North Korea fired five short-range missiles into the sea off its east coast -- the latest in a series of launches ordered by leader Kim Jong-Un amid rising military tensions. An official with South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said the five short-range missiles were launched from near the eastern city of Hamhung, beginning just before 3:20pm (0620 GMT), and landed in the East Sea (Sea of Japan). (Hwang Sung-hee, "N. Korea Fires Five Short-Range Missiles into Sea," AFP, March 21, 2016)

Among South Korean members of families divided by the Korean War who have applied for a chance to meet their relatives in the North, the number of the dead has exceeded the number of the living for the first time. This reflects the rapidly increasing age of these family members. When *Hankyoreh* checked a database of divided families managed by the Unification Ministry and the South Korean Red Cross on Mar. 20, it found that, of the 130,838 South Koreans who had applied for reunions with family members in North Korea between 1988 and the present (Feb. 29), 65,922 (50.4%) were deceased, while 64,916 (49.6%) were still alive. Of the reunion applicants who have passed away, 37,897 (57.4%) were 90 or older while 23,117 (35.1%) were between 80 and 90 years old. This means that 92.6% of the total deceased were at least 80 years old at the time of death. Of the survivors, 53,479 (82.4%) are 70 or older, while 36,754 (56.6%) are at least 80 years old. (Lee Je-hun, "For First Time, More Divided Families Dead Than Alive," *Hankyoreh*, March 21, 2016)

Bradley Babson: "Coupled with South Korea's closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in February, the new economic measures could significantly dampen North Korea's income from abroad. However, several provisions in UNSCR 2270 substantially reduce the likelihood of a catastrophe like North Korea faced in the 1990s. For instance: The effectiveness of new curbs on North Korean exports of coal, iron and other minerals is unclear because potential buyers are only obligated to turn back

shipments when there are grounds to believe that proceeds would finance North Korea's military. This onus of proof may develop into a point of contention during implementation, depending on what evidence Member States actually require to deny such shipments. The resolution excludes oil imports from China and elsewhere from sanctions, with the exception of aviation and missile fuel. Oil shipments, mainly from China, will likely enable North Korean domestic industry and transport to continue without significant disruption, depending on China's policy for such shipments to the North going forward. UNSCR 2270 does not affect trade for livelihood and humanitarian purposes that produces foreign exchange earnings (i.e., in seafood and textiles), unless there is cause to believe that the military would benefit from proceeds. The burden of judgment on this matter would fall on the importer or exporter, who may well lack adequate information with which to deny transactions. Assessing dual-use potential may prove problematic for many organizations involved in such trade with North Korea. The sanctions exclude remittances from workers in foreign countries and foreign exchange earnings from tourism, both of which have been growing in recent years. Informal cross-border barter trade that feeds North Korean markets may also avoid mandated inspections. In addition, North Korea's economy appears potentially more resilient than in the 1990s in two key respects: markets now play a much larger role in meeting basic daily needs and Kim Jong Un's regime has tolerated a degree of related growth in private initiative and business acumen. These internal developments, seen in the context of North Korea's continued pursuit of economic "self-reliance" through new domestic replacements for consumer imports and outsourced industrial capacities, suggest that its economy may be surprisingly resilient to the impact of the new sanctions, potentially encouraging continued defiance from North Korean leaders. It is crucial, then, to consider how the new sanctions may affect the North's *byungjin* policy—the two-track strategy of expanding its nuclear and missile programs while developing its economy. The resolution's impact on this strategic calculation will be evident in the leadership's future levels of support from key constituencies in the military, the Workers' Party of Korea and inner elite cadres. An important question will be how the regime balances its essential military needs and national pride against the management of economic challenges amplified by the sanctions. In the past, entrenched economic interests in the military have significantly compromised the government's stated effort to improve the livelihoods of ordinary North Koreans, despite steps to broaden the Cabinet's authority to direct economic policy and manage the economy. North Korea has creatively circumvented earlier UN sanctions, and the new resolution aims to correct many deficiencies in past measures. By increasing restrictions on banking relationships, requiring inspections of all ingoing and outgoing shipments, tightening rules for handling diplomatic infractions, and expanding lists of designated firms and individuals, the new resolution is intended to increase the difficulty and cost of North Korea's attempted end runs around the sanctions regime. But how effectively will these additional restrictions prevent North Korea from exploiting further loopholes and shifting to new evasive methods? It can certainly be expected to probe for weak spots in their enforcement, and to find creative alternate channels. Given the international community's less-than-stellar compliance with past North Korea sanctions, the success of these costly new measures will depend on the UNSC's ability to convince Member States to follow through with implementation. China's willingness to commit to the new sanctions remains an area of

particular concern. The measures will, to a large degree, succeed or fail as a result of on-the-ground implementation by Chinese local authorities, companies and banks that have wide ranging dealings with North Korea. However, even a concerted sanctions implementation effort by Beijing will be complicated by China's decentralized approach to economic engagement with the DPRK. For coal and iron restrictions, a critical measure of success will be the frequency with which Chinese authorities block specific transactions on the basis that they would benefit North Korea's military. However, a sobering truth is that it may not be at all obvious that specific transactions will actually be used for military purposes, and both sides will have incentives to allow shipments to the extent that there is business demand for continued trade. Meanwhile, implementation of the inspection requirement—of all shipments to and from North Korea—would ideally involve systematic checks of all North Korean truck or rail shipments that cross the border in the Dandong and Rason regions. It must be noted, though, that a tightened inspection regime may well lead to incentives for expanded clandestine cross-border dealings, especially if North Korean security services determine that the country could benefit from scaling back its anti-smuggling efforts. Ironically, UNSCR 2270 may help to accelerate domestic economic reforms in North Korea, altering incentives for economic policy and practices in ways that may result in longer-term benefits for North Korea's economy and population. For instance: The resolution could create new incentives to reduce the DPRK's heavy reliance on coal, iron and other minerals for export earnings. This dependence on unprocessed natural resources has reduced incentives to invest in human resources and value-added manufacturing, even though such investment would be more beneficial for North Korean workers and economic productivity. The new sanctions may create more opportunity for state enterprises and private entrepreneurs to expand the role of market-based economic activity. More flexible labor practices may also allow a greater role for market mechanisms in allocating workers, potentially increasing efficiency and contributing to both domestic demand and international competitiveness in non-sanctioned economic activities. The government may seek to provide assistance for workers most affected by the sanctions. It may prioritize use of its PDS as a social safety net rather than a resource for less vulnerable constituencies. As the *donju* (moneyed) entrepreneurial class gains increasing levels of control over significant business activities, there is less of a need for the regime to rely on patronage to maintaining the loyalty of the elite, most of whom now have incentives and opportunities to make money in the market economy. Even though financial sanctions imposed by UNSCR 2270 target North Korea's ability to use the international financial system to support its trade and foreign business interests, the impact on the country's domestic financial system will be mainly to increase macroeconomic management challenges and efforts to control the role of foreign currencies in the markets. North Korean financial authorities have been making timid efforts to improve financial system management and services to businesses and households in recent years. The impact of sanctions is thus likely to spur greater efforts to implement long-overdue reforms in the North's financial system and macroeconomic management capabilities." (Bradley O. Babson, "UNSCR 2270: The Good, the Bad and the Perhaps Surprising Opportunity for the North Korean Economy," *38North*, March 21, 2016)

Trump interview: "...HIATT: So what do you think China's aims are in the South China Sea? TRUMP: Well I know China very well, because I deal with China all the time. I've done very well. China's unbelievably ambitious. China is, uh... I mean, when I deal with China, you know, I have the Bank of America building, I've done some great deals with China. I do deals with them all the time on, you know, selling apartments, and, you know, people say 'oh that's not the same thing.' The level of... uh, the largest bank in the world, 400 million customers, is a tenant of mine in New York, in Manhattan. The biggest bank in China. The biggest bank in the world. China has got unbelievable ambitions. China feels very invincible. We have rebuilt China. They have drained so much money out of our country that they've rebuilt China. Without us, you wouldn't see the airports and the roadways and the bridges; I mean, the George Washington Bridge is like, that's like a trinket compared to the bridges that they've built in China. We don't build anymore, and it, you know, we had our day. But China, if you look at what's going on in China, you know, they go down to seven percent or eight percent and it's like a national catastrophe. Our GDP is right now zero. Essentially zero. DIEHL: Could you use trade to cause them to retreat in the South China Sea? TRUMP: I think so, yeah. I think so DIEHL: What would you do? TRUMP: We, well, you start making it tougher. They're selling their products to us for... you know, with no tax, no nothing. By the way, we can't deal with them, but they can deal with us. See, we are free trade. The story is, and I have so many people that deal with China -they can easily sell their product here. No tax, no nothing, just 'come on, bring it all in, you know, bring in your apples, bring in everything you make' and no taxes whatsoever, right? If you want to deal with China, it's just the opposite. You can't do that. In other words, if you want to, if you're a manufacturer, you want to go into China? It's very hard to get your product in, and if you get it in you have to pay a very big tax. HIATT: So, if they occupied what the Japanese call the Senkaku Islands, is that something the United States... TRUMP: Well, I, you know, again, I don't like to tell you what I'd do, because I don't want to... You understand what I'm saying, Fred? If I... Okay, if I say 'Well, we should go in and do this or that or that,' I don't want to, I don't want to sort of... red flag all over it. I do think this: It's an unbelievable thing that they've done, it's unbelievable aggression, it's unbelievable lack of respect for this country. HIATT: This theory of unpredictability, I want to push a little bit, I mean - there are many people who think that North Korea invaded South Korea precisely because Acheson wasn't clear that we would defend South Korea. So I'm curious, does ambiguity sometimes have dangers? TRUMP: Well I'll give you, I'll give you an example. President Obama, when he left Iraq, gave a specific date - we're going to be out. I thought that was a terrible thing to do. And the enemy pulled back, because they don't want die. Despite what you read, you know, they don't want to die - and they just pulled back, and after we left, all hell broke out, right? And I'll give you another example that I think was terrible: when they sent, a few months ago, they sent fifty troops in. You know, fifty elite troops. Now, why do we have to have a news conference to announce that we're sending fifty troops? So those troops now have targets on their back. And...you shouldn't do it. We're so predictable: "Ladies and gentlemen, we're sending fifty troops into Iraq or Syria. And these are our elite troops. And they're going to do this and that and that and this." And those troops now are being hunted. If you didn't send them, they wouldn't - if you didn't say that, they wouldn't know. I mean, there are times when you just can't be... You talk too much. We talk too much. I guess they thought that was good politically, to

say we're sending fifty troops? I don't think it was good. LANE: Can I ask you... Just going back to NATO, because... TRUMP: Yes. LANE: As you know, the whole theory of NATO from the beginning was to keep the United States involved in the long term in Europe to balance, to promote a balance of power in that region so we wouldn't have a repeat of World War I and World War 2. And it seems to be like what you're saying is very similar to what President Obama said to Jeffrey Goldberg, in that we have allies that become free riders. So it seems like there's some convergence with the president there. What concerns me about both is that to some extent it was always thought to be in our interest that we, yes, we would take some of the burden on, yes, even if the net-net was not 100 percent, even steven, with the Germans. So I'd like to hear you say very specifically, you know, with respect to NATO, what is your ask of these other countries? Right, you've painted it in very broad terms, but do you have a percent of GDP that they should be spending on defense? Tell me more. Because it's not that you want to pull the U.S. out. TRUMP: No, I don't want to pull it out. NATO was set up at a different time. NATO was set up when we were a richer country. We're not a rich country. We're borrowing, we're borrowing all of this money. We're borrowing money from China, which is a sort of an amazing situation. But things are a much different thing. NATO is costing us a fortune and yes, we're protecting Europe but we're spending a lot of money. Number 1, I think the distribution of costs has to be changed. I think NATO as a concept is good, but it is not as good as it was when it first evolved. And I think we bear the, you know, not only financially, we bear the biggest brunt of it. Obama has been stronger on the Ukraine than all the other countries put together, and those other countries right next door to the Ukraine. And I just say we have, I'm not even knocking it, I'm just saying I don't think it's fair, we're not treated fair. I don't think we're treated fair, Charles, anywhere. If you look everything we have. You know, South Korea is very rich. Great industrial country. And yet we're not reimbursed fairly for what we do. We're constantly, you know, sending our ships, sending our planes, doing our war games, doing other. We're reimbursed a fraction of what this is all costing. LANE: You know, well, they say and I think this is on public record, it's basically 50 percent of the non-personnel cost is paid by South Korea and Japan. TRUMP: 50 percent? LANE: Yeah. TRUMP: Why isn't it 100 percent? HIATT: Well I guess the question is, does the United States gain anything by having bases? TRUMP: Personally I don't think so. I personally don't think so. Look. I have great relationships with South Korea. I have buildings in South Korea. But that's a wealthy country. They make the ships, they make the televisions, they make the air conditioning. They make tremendous amounts of products. It's a huge, it's a massive industrial complex country. And – HIATT: So you don't think the US gains from being the force that sort of that helps keep the peace in the Pacific? TRUMP: I think that we are not in the position that we used to be. I think we were a very powerful, very wealthy country. And we're a poor country now. We're a debtor nation. How you going to get rid – let me ask you – how are you going get rid of \$21 trillion in debt? You're going to be at 21 trillion in a matter of minutes because of that new omnibus budget. So they passed that ridiculous omnibus budget. How you going to get rid of that debt. We're spending that to protect other countries. We're not spending it on ourselves. Because we have, we have armor-plated vehicles that are obsolete. The best ones are given to the enemy. We give them to our allies over in the Middle East. A bullet shot in the air and they immediately run and the enemy takes over. I have a friend whose son is in his third, his third tour over in Iraq. He's over in, I

mean he's a very special kid, he's a great kid. But he's over in the Middle East, and, uh, Afghanistan, different parts of the Middle East, actually. And he said to me, I said to him what do you think. And he said, it's so sad. He said the enemy has our equipment - the new version - and we have all the old version, and the enemy has our equipment, because they get into a fight with the so-called people like the Freedom Fighters, you know the whole Syrian deal, where we're sending billions and billions of dollars' worth, and they capture the equipment. In most cases the shots are fired and everybody leaves. And these are the people we're backing. And we don't know if it's going to be another Saddam Hussein deal, in other words, let's get rid of Assad with these people and these people end up being worse. Okay? But he said, they have better equipment. It's our equipment. They have, I guess we send 2,300 Humvees over, all armor-plated. So we have wounded warriors, with no legs, with no arms, because they were driving in stuff without the armor. And the enemy has most of the new ones we sent over that they captured. And he said, it's so discouraging when they see that the enemy has better equipment than we have - and it's our equipment. (Transcript of Donald Trump's Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board, March 21, 2016)

3/22/16

KCNA: "Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK, again guided the fire of the new type large-caliber multiple rocket launching system. He took an observation post with the officials accompanying him before giving an order to start the fire. Watching the results of the fire, he expressed great satisfaction over the perfect accuracy of rockets. He highly praised once again the officials, scientists and technicians in the field of defense science and munitions factories for successfully manufacturing the system which is of great strategic importance in remarkably increasing the capability of the KPA to mount a precision attack on the enemies' targets in the operational theater in the southern part of Korea. **He expressed great expectation and belief that they would bring the greatest heyday in the development of national defense science this year when the Seventh Congress of the WPK is to be held by steadily intensifying the work for developing new Juche-based weapons of Korean style**, true to the WPK's idea of attaching importance to national defense science and technology, before having a photo taken with them. He was accompanied by KPA Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong So, director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA, Army General Ri Myong Su, chief of the KPA General Staff, Army Col. General Yun Tong Hyon, vice-minister of the People's Armed Forces, and Jo Yong Won, Hong Yong Chil and Kim Jong Sik, vice department directors of the C.C., WPK. (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Again Guides Fire of New Type Large-Caliber Multiple Rocket Launching System," March 22, 2016) North Korea's new large caliber rocket launcher system has the range to strike large parts of South Korea, posing new security challenges for Seoul's military, observers said. The assessment of security threats comes after KCNA carried a report earlier in the day showing a photo of its leader Kim Jong-un being present at the final test-fire of a multiple rocket launching system (MLRS). It said the new system is ready for combat deployment. The new weapon would help increase "the capability of the Korean People's Army (KPA) to mount a precision attack on the enemies' targets in the operational theater in the southern part of Korea," KCNA claimed. South Korea's military has been tracking North Korea's tests of the newest multiple rocket launching

system with a 300 millimeter caliber since the country was first seen test-firing it in mid-2013. In October last year, the North showed off the system during a military parade to mark the anniversary of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea. Currently, North Korea has three types of the multiple launcher system actually used by combat troops, with the largest having a caliber of 240 mm. The forthcoming introduction of a larger-caliber launcher system into North Korea's arsenal would significantly enhance the country's attack capability. The rockets fired near the northeastern city of Hamhung early this week flew some 200 kilometers, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This means they can easily fly over South Korea's capital of Seoul and even reach far down into the country, should they be fired near the inter-Korean border. Possible targets within this range include the headquarters of the military's three branches -- Army, Navy and Air Force -- in the central province of South Chungcheong, and the new base of the United States Forces Korea in Pyeongtaek. In terms of warheads, these rockets could carry high-yield explosives or dual-purpose improved conventional munitions that, after being fired, burst into sub-munitions over the target area for anti-armor and antipersonnel attacks. (Yonhap, "Newly Unveiled N.K. Rocket Launcher Can Hit Large Parts of S. Korea," March 22, 2016)

Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said the US and South Korea had agreed in principle to deploy THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) on the Korean Peninsula. While the South Korean Defense Ministry has already treated the THAAD deployment as an accomplished fact, this is the first time for a high-ranking official in the US government to confirm it. After making this statement in a hearing about the defense budget before the House Armed Services Committee, Carter said that the reason for deploying THAAD is "to be able to protect the entirety of the peninsula against North Korean missiles of greater range." "That's why we want to add THAAD to the already existing Patriots, both South Korean Patriots and U.S. Patriots," he said. While there had been some speculation that the two countries would postpone the deployment of THAAD in exchange for China's cooperation in tougher sanctions against North Korea, the US and South Korea officially launched a joint working group to deliberate the deployment of THAAD on March 4. "Deliberations in the joint working group are addressing the selection of an appropriate site for deploying THAAD along with issues of safety, the environment and cost. Once the deliberations have made some progress, this will be brought to the attention of the public," said a source in the South Korean military. Some of the possible sites mentioned for deploying THAAD include Pyeongtaek, Wonju, Daegu and Chilgol. "This is a very sensitive issue for the partners throughout the region, especially when you look at South Korea, one of [China's] largest trading partners [. . .] so we don't minimize the sensitivity of these discussions," said US Lieutenant General David Mann, who heads up the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command. Mann spoke with reporters from a defense industry publication. (Lee Yong-in and Park Byong-su, "S. Korea and U.S. Agree in Principle to Deploy THAAD System," *Hankyore*, March 24, 2016)

Senior officials from South Korea and Japan resumed working-level discussions on implementing the agreement that the two countries reached on December 28 on the issue of the comfort women for the Imperial Japanese Army. Chung Byung-won, director-general for Northeast Asian Affairs at South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met today with Ishikane Kimihiro, director-general of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs

Bureau at Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo to discuss how to proceed with implementing the agreement. This was the first deliberation between director general level officials since Japan and South Korea made the December 28 agreement. Prior to the settlement, the two governments had organized 12 such meetings, beginning in April 2014, in regard to the comfort women issue. "Based on our conclusion about the importance of the swift implementation of the December 28 agreement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently in deliberations with the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and the related departments in regard to the issue of setting up the foundation," said South Korea's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Cho June-hyuck during today's regular press conference. *Sankei Shimbun* reported that the governments of the two countries will begin moving forward this summer with efforts to establish the foundation called for in the agreement they reached at the end of last year. In order to achieve this, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is planning to meet with South Korean President Park Geun-hye during the Nuclear Security Summit that will be held in the U.S. starting on March 31 to reconfirm that both countries are definitely going to implement the agreement, the paper reported. From that point through this summer, South Korea and Japan plan to continue working-level deliberations toward implementing the agreement while also attempting to placate the former comfort women and groups that support them, including the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Jeongdaehyeop). Arrangements will also be made for removing a statue of a young woman symbolizing the comfort women from in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to coincide with the establishment of the foundation, the *Sankei Shimbun* reported. However, the fact is that there is virtually no chance of the former comfort women and Jeongdaehyeop accepting the December 28 agreement. If South Korea's political opposition is crushed in the April general elections, the Park administration is very likely to accept the 1 billion yen (US\$8.30 million) in funding from the Japanese government and to push ahead with establishing the foundation. (Gil Yun-hyung and Lee Je-hun, "S. Korea and Japan Have Highest-Level Meeting Yet on Comfort Women Agreement," *Hankyore*, March 23, 2016)

3/23/16

CPRK "crucial report in connection with the fact that the reckless military provocations of the U.S. and the Park Geun Hye group of traitors of south Korea against the DPRK have gone beyond the tolerance limit. At the instigation of the U.S. imperialists the south Korean warmongers **dared stage an outrageous "precision strike drill" aimed to destroy the office of the supreme headquarters of the DPRK on March 21 with 16 fighter bombers carrying air-to-surface guided missiles involved.** ... This is a thrice-cursed provocation to the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK and intolerable hideous confrontation action. **Under authorization**, the CPRK clarifies the following actions to cope with the prevailing grave situation: From this moment all the actions of the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK including the regular units of the Korean People's Army (KPA), the Workers-Peasant Red Guards, the Young Red Guards and all people will be oriented to **launch a retaliatory battle of justice in order to resolutely eliminate the Park Geun Hye group of traitors** on this land and under this sky. The battle to be fought by the DPRK will be the sacred one for devotedly defending the leader and the one for annihilating the enemy without mercy. We do not hide the fact that **it may start inside the Chongwadae or near it.** We had already



declared that all the dens of the enemy in south Korea including the Chongwadae are the primary targets of the ultra-precision strike means of the Strategic Force of the KPA ready to go into action. **The powerful large-caliber multiple rocket launching systems of the invincible KPA artillery units are highly alerted to scorch the Chongwadae** bossed by Park Geun Hye in a jiffy. Once their buttons are pushed, **it is bound to be reduced to a sea in flames and ashes.** The **KPA units behind enemy lines** to be deployed in the operational theater of the southern part of Korea are fully ready to start a storm operation, lightning operation to conquer the Chongwadae and other major targets at one blow any time and mercilessly wipe out Park Geun Hye and other south Korean warmongers. The U.S. imperialists and the Park group should clearly understand the will of all the service personnel and people of the DPRK to annihilate the enemy as they regard their supreme headquarters and dignity dearer than their own lives. There's a limit to our patience. The U.S. imperialists and the Park group of traitors had better pay heed to the DPRK's warning that it has done everything required after having access to everything necessary. They would be well advised to behave prudently, if they wish to spend their remaining days. Once it is determined, the DPRK will launch a preemptive attack operation of Korean style to wipe out not only the Park Geun Hye group of traitors but all big or small strongholds of aggression the way the world has never known. What the DPRK warns is not hot air. It will be clearly proved by the miserable end the U.S. and the Park group will meet while going reckless." (KCNA, "DPRK Will Show in Practice Its Warning Is Not Empty Talk: CPRK," March 23, 2016)

3/24/16

KCNA: "Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK, personally came out to the testing site and guided the ground test of jet of high-power **solid-fuel rocket engine** and its cascade separation. The test was aimed to examine the structural safety of the rocket engine newly designed and manufactured by the Korean style and its thrust and estimate the working specifications of heat separation system and other system. Before the test, he touched the engine smoothly and said with confidence that the test would prove successful as it was manufactured by defense scientists and technicians of the DPRK, a product of self-reliance and self-development. He gave an instruction to start the test. The engine spewed out huge flames with deafening boom. The results of the test proved that the values of estimation conformed to those of measurement to an amazing extent and they are in full line with all scientific and technological indexes. He expressed great pleasure and satisfaction, clapping his hands and congratulating them on their success. He noted with great pleasure that the successful test provided a firm guarantee for attaining the high goals of national defense science and technology without fail this year when the Seventh Congress of the WPK would be held and helped boost the power of ballistic rockets capable of mercilessly striking hostile forces. The **successful test of the jet and cascade separation** of the above-said rocket engine which is of historical and strategic importance by dint of self-reliance and self-development makes it possible to remarkably bolster the military capability of the invincible revolutionary Paektusan army, he noted, stressing that the feats the national defense scientists and technicians of the DPRK performed by working hard to increase the national defense capability would always go down in the history of the

country. He had a photo session with them. He expressed expectation and belief that the scientists and technicians in the field of national defense science would achieve successes one after another to instill conviction and optimism into the service personnel and people of the DPRK and, at the same time, strike great horror and terror into the hearts of the enemies, bearing in mind the heavy yet honorable duties they have assumed before the times, the revolution, the country and its people." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Guides Ground Test of Jet of High-Power Solid-Fuel Rocket Engine and Its Cascade Separation," March 24, 2016)

"North Korea appears to be in the (early) stages of developing solid-fuel rockets," Moon Sang-gyun, spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, said during a press briefing. "North Korea's switch to solid fuel means it could do (missile) launches frequently." South Korea's military takes the move as a serious development and is preparing countermeasures, he said. Currently, North Korea relies on liquid fuel to propel most of its ranged ballistic missiles, including the short-range Scud, mid-range Nodong and the KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Using liquid fuel means that fueling a rocket takes longer, allowing the outside world more time to detect an imminent launch and predict its timeframe. Solid propellant helps reduce the time that the fueling stage takes, thus significantly reducing the chance of launch preparations being noticed by outside surveillance. Still, it may take a long while for North Korea to complete the development of solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles, experts said. "It is possible for the Scud and Rodong missiles to have solid rocket fuel, but it may take time for it to be used on the KN-08," Lee Chun-geun, a researcher at the Science and Technology Policy Institute, said. (Yonhap, "Seoul Confirms North Korea's Push to Develop Solid-Fuel Rockets," *Korea Times*, March 24, 2016)

President Park Geun-hye ordered the government to strengthen the level of vigilance across the country, an official said, as North Korea has ratcheted up its threats against its southern neighbor. The chief executive also "instructed the military to be fully prepared to aggressively cope with North Korea's reckless provocations," Kim Sung-woo, chief presidential press secretary, told reporters. North Korea threatened to turn the presidential office into a "sea of flames and ashes" and warned yesterday that it is militarily ready to start operations to hit major targets and "mercilessly wipe out" Park and "other South Korean warmongers." Reflecting the seriousness of the threat, the country convened a session of the National Security Council during which senior officials told the military to closely monitor the North Korean situation and get ready to retaliate against the North if provoked. The NSC told police and other relevant organizations to take all necessary measures to tighten security. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Lee Sun-jin also convened an emergency meeting of military commanders later in the day, vowing to sternly punish the North in case of any further provocations. The South Korean military is maintaining its high-level vigilance posture since the North carried out its fourth nuclear test in January, according to the defense ministry. (Yonhap, "Park Orders Military to Brace for Possible N. Korean Provocation," March 24, 2016)

3/25/16

KCNA: "Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and first chairman of the National

Defense Commission of the DPRK, guided the large-scale intensive striking drill of long-range artillery pieces of the KPA large combined units on the front for blowing up the Chongwadae and the reactionary ruling machines in Seoul. The largest-ever exercise was aimed to demonstrate once again the might of the Paektusan army to bring the most miserable doom to the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet group of traitors through the above-said striking action **for turning into a sea of flames Seoul, the den of the Park Geun Hye group of traitors who dared stage the undisguised "precision striking drill" targeting the supreme headquarters of the Korean revolution and the office of the WPK Central Committee.** Involved in the drill were more than one hundred long-range artillery pieces of various calibers including the Juche artillery pieces of the elite artillery units of the large combined units on the front. Prior to the start of the drill, General Pak Yong Sik, minister of the People's Armed Forces, made a speech. The firing drill of artillery pieces today is the one for devotedly defending the Supreme Commander and the retaliatory one of justice to demonstrate the tremendous might of the Paektusan Army to inflict the most miserable doom upon traitor Park Geun Hye, he said. He called upon the elite artillery combatants of the large combined units on the front to make large intensive strikes with long-range artillery pieces, reflecting the faith of devotedly defending the leader and the unshakable resolution to annihilate the enemy, and thus blow up the Chongwadae and the reactionary ruling machines in Seoul bossed by the Park Geun Hye puppet group of traitors. Kim Jong Un mounted a field observation post and received a report on the plan for the drill before issuing an order to start it. The moment, the artillery pieces opened fire with deafening roar, fiercely pounding the imaginary targets--the Chongwadae and the puppet reactionary ruling machines in Seoul. Watching the brave artillerymen on the front mercilessly hit the targets, he said they are very good at firing. I am pleased with their very accurate striking, he added. Expressing great satisfaction over the successful drill, he extended the thanks of the KPA Supreme Commander to all units which participated in the drill. He said that the KPA should prepare all service personnel as a match-for-a-hundred fighters capable of fighting actual battles by intensifying their training just as the anti-Japanese guerrillas did in Mt. Paektu and keep itself highly alerted so that it may mercilessly pound the reactionary ruling machines in Seoul, the cesspool of evils, and advance to accomplish the historic cause of national reunification, once it receives an order for attack. Watching the drill were executive members of the KPA Committee of the WPK, commanding officers of the General Political Bureau, the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces and the General Staff of the KPA, commanders and political commissars of all services, corps commanders and political commissars, commanders and political commissars of artillery units, instructors of military academies at all levels and officials of the C.C., the WPK." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Guides Large-Scale Intensive Striking Drill of Long-Range Artillery Pieces," March 25, 2016)

A Korean-American man detained in North Korea has confessed to stealing military secrets and plotting subversion with South Koreans, the North's official news agency and foreign media reported. Kim Dong Chul, who has previously said he was a naturalized American citizen and was arrested in North Korea in October, admitted to committing "unpardonable espionage" under the direction of the U.S. and South Korean governments and deeply apologized for his crimes, KCNA said. "The

extraordinary crime I committed was defaming and insulting the republic's highest dignity and its system and spreading false propaganda aimed at breaking down its solidarity," KCNA quoted Kim as saying. A source in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang told Reuters that diplomats were notified in the morning of the confession and Kim's comments were similar to the recent confession of another American being held there, Otto Warmbier. The U.S. State Department said it was aware of the reported incident but had no further details, citing privacy concerns. "The welfare of U.S. citizens is one of the Department's highest priorities," department spokeswoman Elizabeth Trudeau said in a statement. Kim apologized for trying to steal military and state secrets in collusion with South Koreans, and said he was paid for doing it. He described the acts as aimed at overthrowing the North Korean regime, KCNA said. Photographs issued by the North's state news agency showed Kim bowing and wiping away tears. Kyodo and Xinhua also reported Kim's meeting with media outlets in Pyongyang where he confessed to anti-state activities. Kim spoke of making contacts with South Koreans to pass secret information contained in USB memory sticks and also images state media said were damaging to the North on data storage cards. Outside information is strictly controlled in North Korea and ordinary people there often use USB sticks or other portable memory drives to share foreign media. A defector from the North previously told Reuters that Kim was a Christian pastor who had worked in China and the United States and sent medical aid into the North. CNN reported in January that Kim was 60 and from Fairfax, Virginia, and that he said he had spied on behalf of South Korea. Kim told media he was born in Seoul in 1953 and moved to the United States when he was 19. He said he set up a business in the North Korean special economic zone of Rason in 2008, KCNA said. He said his two daughters lived in New York and he had siblings in South Korea, it said. (Jack Kim and James Pearson, "Korean-American in North Korea Confesses to Stealing Secrets - Media," Reuters, March 25, 2016)

President Park Geun-hye warned that North Korea's provocations will eventually lead to the regime's self-destruction, as she ramped up pressure on the isolationist regime to give up its nuclear weapons program. "The Republic of Korea will stay firm despite North Korea's threats and the regime will eventually self-destruct with its consistent provocations," Park said during a ceremony at the national cemetery in the central city of Daejeon. The ceremony was held to commemorate South Korean military personnel killed in three separate clashes with North Korea in the Yellow Sea area. "North Korea is currently isolated due to the unprecedented sanctions imposed by the international community which means there is a higher chance that the regime may carry out further reckless provocations," Park said. Earlier in the day, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called on the military to be ready to strike government organizations in Seoul. During his inspection of a long-range artillery exercise, Kim said the North's military should be ready to "ruthlessly" destroy South Korea's government bodies. (Yonhap, "Park Warns That N. Korea's Provocation Lead to Self-Destruction," March 25, 2016)

South Korea's top military commander checked the combat readiness of frontline troops as inter-Korean tensions have flared up in the face of North Korea's continuing provocations. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Lee Sun-jin visited the VIII Corps and Navy 1st Fleet earlier in the day to look into their military preparedness, the military

said. The Army corps is in charge of guarding the eastern part of the heavily militarized border while the Navy fleet defends the East Sea area. "North Korea is likely to launch sudden provocations at an unexpected time and place," the four-star general said. He said Pyongyang could also conduct an additional nuclear test or launch a long-range missile. Other possibilities involve artillery attacks, drone infiltration or terrorist activities in the rear, he noted. **"In the event of provocations, retaliate powerfully and without hesitation,"** the JCS chairman stressed to Army servicemen. During his visit with Navy troops, Lee brought up earlier maritime military clashes with North Korea, and ordered the forces to "safeguard the East Sea at all cost so such tragedies would never be repeated." (Yonhap, "S. Korea's Top Military Commander Checks Frontline Combat Readiness," March 25, 2016)

The Philippines has released a cargo ship linked to North Korea that it had seized as part of tough new United Nations sanctions imposed on the reclusive country, an official said. "There is no longer any basis to continue to hold the M.V. Jin Teng," said Charles Jose, a spokesman for the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs. The Jin Teng, a 4,355-ton vessel, had been held since March 4 in Subic Bay, a port 50 miles north of Manila. The ship flew a Sierra Leone flag and was linked through registration to other countries, Philippine officials said, but it carried a crew of 21 North Korean sailors and was one of 31 vessels that had been listed as owned by North Korea under an annex to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270. The Jin Teng and three other vessels were later removed from the list of ships to be searched and seized under the resolution, Reuters reported this week. The report said China had asked for their removal from the list, quoting its ambassador to the United Nations as saying the ships did not belong to Ocean Maritime Management Company, a North Korean shipping firm targeted by the sanctions. The Philippine Coast Guard said it had searched the ship and found no weapons or other contraband. The vessel was carrying palm kernel expeller, a commodity often used as livestock feed, the coast guard said. In seizing the ship, the Philippines became the first country in the world to enforce the new sanctions. The ship left the Philippines yesterday bound for China, with the North Korean crew members aboard, according to the coast guard. (Floyd Whaley, "Philippines Releases Cargo Ship Linked to North Korea," *New York Times*, March 26, 2016, p. A-3)

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KCNA: "The recent simultaneous firings conducted by the long-range artillery force of the Korean People's Army, rocking the earth and sky, turned the imaginary enemy bases of provocation into a sea of flames in a flash. This was a great eruption of its irrepressible hatred and wrath at the enemy which committed the thrice-cursed act of daring attempt to hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK. It was, at the same time, the beginning of the merciless retaliatory campaign to put the most miserable end to the Park Geun Hye group of south Korea. **The long-range artillery force of the large combined unit of the KPA on the front sent the following ultimatum to the Park Geun Hye group** Saturday [March 26]: 1. The thrice-cursed traitor Park and her group should **make an official apology** to all Koreans in the north, the south and abroad for daring commit high treason. Our dignified sun of Songun represents the life and destiny of all Koreans and their rosy future. It is the worst crime never to be pardoned in the world to dare attempt to slander and do harm to the

sun. The Park group should apologize to all Koreans. This will be the last and the best way for it to spend its remaining days. 2. Park Geun Hye, traitor without an equal in the world, and **her group should mete out the severest punishment to the worst criminals at once as they mapped out the thrice-cursed "operation for striking the leadership"** and dreamed of its implementation and finish them off without mercy on behalf of all Koreans. If there is a sin which must not be committed as a human being in the world, it is a foolish act to do harm to the sun in the sky. Neither excuse nor evasion of responsibility is allowed for such high treason. It only deserves the severest punishment of Heaven. Put them to death in the eyes of all fellow countrymen. This would be the last opportunity for the Chongwadae, cesspool of evils, and reactionary ruling machines to escape baptism of retaliatory fire. 3. **If matchless traitor Park Geun Hye and her group do not respond to the ultimatum of the KPA, the long-range artillery force of the KPA large combined unit on the front will move over to merciless military action.** Public apology and punishment are the ultimatum of the long-range artillery force of the KPA which keeps the Chongwadae and the reactionary ruling machines within the firing range and waits for an order for a preemptive strike to punish the enemies. If the force pushes the button for intensive strike, the enemy's positions that produced all evils and tragedies of confrontation between compatriots and national division will turn into ashes in a moment. No matter how busy Park and her group may go, talking about the "strengthening of guard posture across south Korea" and "urgent meeting of operational officers", this would get them nowhere. The only way out for them is to sincerely accept the ultimatum of the KPA. They should always remember that the Chongwadae and the reactionary ruling machines are within the intensive striking range of the long-range artillery force of the KPA large combined unit on the front. What the Paektusan army says is not hot air." (KCNA, "KPA Long-Range Artillery Force Sends Ultimatum to Park Guen Hye Group," March 26, 2016)

South Korea's civic group, Fighters for a Free North Korea, floated some 80,000 anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the inter-Korean border Saturday amid rising tensions sparked by the North's nuclear tests and missile launches. Five members of the group said they have floated 30,000 leaflets from the city of Gimpo and 50,000 from Paju, Gyeonggi Province, in their bid to criticize the communist regime. The S. Korean government, despite the growing tension from the North over the leaflet campaign, has largely remained disinclined to mitigate the matter. (Ko Dong-hwan, "Activists Float Anti-Pyongyang Leaflets to N. Korea," *Korea Times*, March 26, 2016)

A North Korean Web site unveiled video footage in which its submarine-launched ballistic missile scorches Washington D.C., ratcheting up its provocative acts in defiance of international pressure.

The 4-minute long footage, uploaded on the website of dprktoday.com, one of the North's propaganda sites for outside online users, shows an SLBM, after re-entering the earth's atmosphere from outer space, hitting the U.S.' capital. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Unveils Video Footage Showing SLBM Attack on Washington," March 26, 2016)

Tensions along China's border with North Korea's have noticeably heightened since the U.N. Security Council imposed tougher sanctions to protest Pyongyang's latest nuclear and missile tests. Three Chinese fighter jets were recently spotted flying over

the border area. But otherwise, it was business as usual as trade back and forth across the border continued as before. Dandong in Liaoning province is a popular tourist destination because pleasure boats depart there for trips along the Yalu River, which separates the two countries. The boats allow passengers to glimpse North Korea up-close. However, temporary checkpoints have been erected on roads in the area. Large vehicles from the border patrol are also more evident in the region. An observation deck at a Chinese hotel that faces the Yalu River was closed after the sanctions were imposed. A hotel official said the government ordered the deck closed. A restaurant where North Korean women perform in regular singing shows has few patrons these days. Such restaurants used to be popular with South Korean tourists, but business fell off after Seoul warned off visitors on grounds that profits for the enterprises might be used for the development of nuclear weapons and missiles by North Korea. However, private-sector activity appeared to be continuing as usual. Trucks were seen transporting all manner of goods across the bridge connecting Dandong with the North Korean city of Sinuiju, which lies across the Yalu River. The trucks carried electrical appliances, construction materials and fruit. An official working in the local produce market said, "More than 30 percent of the produce goes to North Korea." North Korean products such as crabs and shellfish were also found in markets at Yanji, which is in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. One trader who does business between the two nations said: "The economy along the border is supported by North Korea. The sanctions have also had a negative effect on the Chinese side as well." However, the sanctions have not deterred an estimated 3,000 North Koreans from continuing to work at an industrial park in Tumen, which is in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. An industry source said companies pay North Korean personnel dispatch firms between 2,000 won and 3,000 won (about 35,000 yen and 52,000 yen, or \$308 and \$457) a month per worker. "They are hard workers who receive lower wages than Chinese workers," said the source. Each worker gets paid about 600 won. Much of that wage is believed to go to the North Korean state. The sanctions do not cover wages earned outside of North Korea. (Yagi Takaharu and Hiraga Takuya, "China-N. Korea Border More Tense As Sanctions Bite," *Asahi Shimbun*, March 26, 2016)

Trump interview: "**HABERMAN:** I wanted to ask you about some things that you said in Washington on Monday, more recently. But you've talked about them a bunch. So, you have said on several occasions that you want Japan and South Korea to pay more for their own defense. You've been saying versions of that about Japan for 30 years. Would you object if they got their own nuclear arsenal, given the threat that they face from North Korea and China? **TRUMP:** Well, you know, at some point, there is going to be a point at which we just can't do this anymore. And, I know the upsides and the downsides. But **right now we're protecting, we're basically protecting Japan, and we are, every time North Korea raises its head, you know, we get calls from Japan and we get calls from everybody else, and "Do something." And there'll be a point at which we're just not going to be able to do it anymore. Now, does that mean nuclear? It could mean nuclear. It's a very scary nuclear world. Biggest problem, to me, in the world, is nuclear, and proliferation. At the same time, you know, we're a country that doesn't have money. You know, when we did these deals, we were a rich country. We're not a rich country. We were a rich country**

**with a very strong military and tremendous capability in so many ways. We're not anymore. We have a military that's severely depleted. We have nuclear arsenals which are in very terrible shape. They don't even know if they work. We're not the same country,** Maggie and David, I mean, I think you would both agree. **SANGER:** So, just to follow Maggie's thought there, though, the Japanese view has always been, if the United States, at any point, felt as if it was uncomfortable defending them, there has always been a segment of Japanese society, and of Korean society that said, "Well, maybe we should have our own nuclear deterrent, because if the U.S. isn't certain, we need to make sure the North Koreans know that." Is that a reasonable position? Do you think at some point they should have their own arsenal? **TRUMP:** Well, it's a position that we have to talk about, and **it's a position that at some point is something that we have to talk about, and if the United States keeps on its path, its current path of weakness, they're going to want to have that anyway with or without me discussing it, because I don't think they feel very secure in what's going on with our country, David. You know, if you look at how we backed our enemies, it hasn't - how we backed our allies - it hasn't exactly been strong. When you look at various places throughout the world, it hasn't been very strong. And I just don't think we're viewed the same way that we were 20 or 25 years ago, or 30 years ago.** And, you know, I think it's a problem. You know, something like that, unless we get very strong, very powerful and very rich, quickly, I'm sure those things are being discussed over there anyway without our discussion. **HABERMAN:** Will you - **SANGER:** And would you have an objection to it? **TRUMP:** Um, **at some point, we cannot be the policeman of the world. And unfortunately, we have a nuclear world now. And you have, Pakistan has them. You have, probably, North Korea has them. I mean, they don't have delivery yet, but you know, probably, I mean to me, that's a big problem. And, would I rather have North Korea have them with Japan sitting there having them also? You may very well be better off if that's the case. In other words, where Japan is defending itself against North Korea, which is a real problem. You very well may have a better case right there. We certainly haven't been able to do much with him and with North Korea.** But you may very well have a better case. You know, one of the things with the, with our Japanese relationship, and **I'm a big fan of Japan, by the way. I have many, many friends there. I do business with Japan. But, that, if we are attacked, they don't have to do anything. If they're attacked, we have to go out with full force. You understand. That's a pretty one-sided agreement, right there. In other words, if we're attacked, they do not have to come to our defense, if they're attacked, we have to come totally to their defense. And that is a, that's a real problem. ...** **SANGER:** There are several countries that have joined NATO in recent times - Estonia, among them, and so forth - that we are now bound by treaty to defend if Russia moved in. Would you observe that part of the treaty? **TRUMP:** Yeah, I would. It's a treaty, it's there. I mean, we defend everybody. *(Laughs.)* **We defend everybody. No matter who it is, we defend everybody. We're defending the world. But we owe, soon, it's soon to be \$21 trillion. You know, it's 19 now but it's soon to be 21 trillion. But we defend everybody. When in doubt, come to the United States. We'll defend you. In some cases free of charge. And in all cases for a substantially, you know, greater amount. We spend a substantially greater amount than what the people are paying. We, we have to think also in terms - we have to think about**



**the world, but we also have - I mean look at what China's doing in the South China Sea. I mean they are totally disregarding our country and yet we have made China a rich country because of our bad trade deals. Our trade deals are so bad. And we have made them - we have rebuilt China and yet they will go in the South China Sea and build a military fortress the likes of which perhaps the world has not seen.** Amazing, actually. They do that, and they do that at will because they have no respect for our president and they have no respect for our country. Hey folks, I'm going to have to get off here now. Did you - **HABERMAN:** I just had one quick follow-up on what you were saying about the South China Sea. How would you counter that assertiveness over those islands? Among other things, it's increasingly valuable real estate strategically. Would you be willing to build our own islands there? **TRUMP:** Well what you have to do - and **you have to speak to Japan and other countries, because they're affected far greater than we are - you understand that - I mean, they're affected far - I just think the act is so brazen, and it's so terrible that they would do that without any consultation, without anything, and yet they'll sell their products to the United States and rebuild China, and frankly, even the islands, I mean, you know, they've made so much economic progress because of the United States. And in the meantime we're becoming a third-world nation.** You look at our airports, you look at our roadways, you look at our bridges are falling down. They're building bridges all over the place, ours are falling down. You know, we've rebuilt China. The money they've drained out of the United States has rebuilt China. And they've done it through monetary manipulation, by devaluations. And very sophisticated. I mean, they're grand chess players at devaluation. But they've done it - ... **SANGER:** I wasn't referring to that in the ISIS context, I was referring more in the realm of dealing with our allies, dealing with China, dealing with Japan, the other places that we've discussed. **TRUMP:** So ISIS I think you'd agree with me on that and the rest will come. I have really strong feelings on China. I like China very much I like Chinese people. I respect the Chinese leaders, but you know China's been taking advantage of us for many, many years and we can't allow it to go on. And at the same time we'll be able to keep a good relationship with China. And same with Japan and same with - you have to see the trade imbalance between Japan and the United States, it's unbelievable. They sell to us and we practically give them back nothing by comparison. It's a very unfair situation. **SANGER:** They also pay more for troop support than any other country in the world. **TRUMP:** They do but still far less than it costs us. **HABERMAN:** Would you be willing - **TRUMP:** You're right about that David, but it's - and they do pay somewhat more, but they pay more because of the tremendous amount of business that they do with us, uneconomic business from our standpoint. **HABERMAN:** Would you be willing to withdraw U.S. forces from places like Japan and South Korea if they don't increase their contribution significantly? **TRUMP:** Yes, I would. **I would not do so happily, but I would be willing to do it. Not happily. David actually asked me that question before, this morning before we sort of finalized out. The answer is not happily but the answer is yes. We cannot afford to be losing vast amounts of billions of dollars on all of this. We just can't do it anymore.** Now there was a time when we could have done it. When we started doing it. But we can't do it anymore. And I have a feeling that they'd up the ante very much. I think they would, and if they wouldn't I would really have to say yes. **SANGER:** So we talked a little this morning about Japan and South Korea, whether or not they would

move to an independent nuclear capability. Just last week the United States removed from Japan, after a long negotiation, many bombs worth, probably 40 or more bombs worth of plutonium or highly enriched uranium that we provided them over the years. And that's part of a very bipartisan effort to keep them from going nuclear. So I was a little surprised this morning when you said you would be open to them having their own nuclear deterrent. Certainly if you pull back one of the risks is that they would go nuclear. **TRUMP: You know you're more right except for the fact that you have North Korea which is acting extremely aggressively, very close to Japan. And had you not had that, I would have felt much, I would have felt differently. You have North Korea, and we are very far away and we are protecting a lot of different people and I don't know that we are necessarily equipped to protect them. And if we didn't have the North Korea threat, I think I'd feel a lot differently,** David.

**SANGER:** But with the North Korea threat you think maybe Japan does need its own nuclear... **TRUMP:** Well I think maybe **it's not so bad to have Japan – if Japan had that nuclear threat, I'm not sure that would be a bad thing for us.** **SANGER:** You mean if Japan had a nuclear weapon it wouldn't be so bad for us? **TRUMP:** Well, **because of North Korea. Because of North Korea. Because we don't know what he's going to do. We don't know if he's all bluster or is he a serious maniac that would be willing to use it. I was talking about before, the deterrent in some people's minds was that the consequence is so great that nobody would ever use it. Well that may have been true at one point but you have many people that would use it right now in this world.** **SANGER:** For that reason, they may well need their own and not be able to just depend on us... **TRUMP:** I really believe that's true. Especially because of the threat of North Korea. And they are very aggressive toward Japan. Well I mean look, he's aggressive toward everybody. Except for China and Iran. **See we should use our economic power to have them disarm – now then it becomes different, then it becomes purely economic, but then it becomes different. China has great power over North Korea even though they don't necessarily say that. Now, Iran, we had a great opportunity during this negotiation when we gave them the 150 billion and many other things. Iran is the No. 1 trading partner of North Korea. Now we could have put something in our agreement that they would have led the charge if we had people with substance and with brainpower and with some negotiating ability. But the No. 1 trading partner with North Korea is Iran.** And we did a deal with them, and we just did a deal with them, and we don't even mention North Korea in the deal. **That was a great opportunity to put another five pages in the deal, or less, and they do have a great influence over North Korea.** Same thing with China, China has great influence over North Korea but they don't say they do because they're tweaking us. I have this from Chinese. I have many Chinese friends, I have people of vast wealth, some of the most important people in China have purchased apartments from me for tens of millions of dollars and frankly I know them very well. **And I ask them about their relationship to North Korea, these are top people. And they say we have tremendous power over North Korea. I know they do. I think you know they do.** **SANGER:** They signed on to the most recent sanctions, more aggressive sanctions than we thought the Chinese would agree to. **TRUMP:** Well that's good, but, I mean I know they did, but I think that they have power beyond the sanctions. **SANGER:** So you would advocate that they have to turn off the oil to North Korea basically. **TRUMP:**

**So much of their lifeblood comes through China, that's the way it comes through. They have tremendous power over North Korea, but China doesn't say that. China says well we'll try. I can see them saying, "We'll try, we'll try." And I can see them laughing in the room next door when they're together. So China should be talking to North Korea. But China's tweaking us. China's toying with us. They are when they're building in the South China Sea. They should not be doing that but they have no respect for our country and they have no respect for our president. So, and the other one, and this is an opportunity passed because why would Iran go back and renegotiate it having to do with North Korea? But Iran is the No. 1 trading partner, but we should have had something in that document that was signed having to do with North Korea as the No. 1 trading partner and as somebody with a certain power because of that. A very substantial power over North Korea.**

**SANGER:** Mr. Trump with all due respect, I think it's China that's the No. 1 trading partner with North Korea. **TRUMP:** I've heard that certainly, but I've also heard from other sources that it's Iran. **SANGER:** Iran is a major arms exchanger with... **TRUMP:** Well that is true but I've heard it both ways. They are certainly major arms exchangers, which in itself is terrible that we would make a deal with somebody that's a major arms exchanger with North Korea. But had that deal not been done and they were desperate to do it, and they wanted to do it much more so than we know in my opinion, meaning Iran wanted to make the deal much more than we know. We should have backed off that deal, doubled the sanctions and made a real deal. And part of that deal should have been that Iran would help us with North Korea. So, the bottom line is, I think that frankly, as long as North Korea's there, I think that Japan having a capability is something that maybe is going to happen whether we like it or not.

**SANGER:** O.K.. We wanted to ask you a little bit, and Maggie maybe you may have something on this as well, about what standards you would use for using American troops abroad. You've said you wouldn't want to send them in against ISIS, that that should be the neighbors. But you did say this morning that if we have a treaty obligation under NATO to protect the Baltics, you would do that. When you think of your standards under which you would put American lives... **TRUMP:** Well I think, I do think I'd want to renegotiate some of those treaties. I think those treaties are very unfair, and they're very one-sided and I do think that some of those treaties, just like the Iran deal. But I think that **some of those treaties would – will be – renegotiated.**" (Maggie Haberman and David E. Sanger, "Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views," *New York Times*, March 27, 2016)

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North Korea fired a short-range projectile into a northeastern inland area from Wonsan, Kangwon Province. It is rare for such projectiles not to be lobbed into the sea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff here said the projectile flew about 200 km and came down in Ryanggang Province about 70 km from the Chinese border. "Generally, missiles or rockets are fired into the sea to minimize damage to civilians in case the launch fails," a military officer here said. "We believe that the firing at an inland target is aimed at showing off how accurate their new multiple rocket launcher is." Rockets from the new 300 mm MRL are equipped with a satellite and inertial navigation system. In April last year, the North fired four short-range missiles from Tongchang-ri, North Pyongan Province into the estuary of the Taedong River, some of which hit inland targets. But the missiles flew only about 140 km at that time. The military here says the projectile

could have struck the Seoul metropolitan area if it had been fired southward. The North is threatening almost every day to strike Cheong Wa Dae. The North's frontline Army units warned last week "Never forget that Cheong Wa Dae and reactionary governing agencies are within the range of our intensive artillery strikes." (Chosun Ilbo, "N. Korea Fires Projectile into Inland Area," March 30, 2016)

China renewed its calls for restarting talks with North Korea about the isolated ally's nuclear weapons program ahead of a nuclear security summit in Washington where the North's nuclear standoff is likely to be one of the key topics. "All parties should make efforts to maintain the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula," China's foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters. "The current situation also shows that we must find a long-term solution to the current issue." "We are going to talk with relevant parties to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and restart relevant talks and negotiations as soon as possible." In the latest ramped-up rhetoric, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong told Russia's Itar-Tass news agency yesterday that his country is ready to launch a "pre-emptive nuclear strike" at "U.S. hostile activities." Without mentioning North Korea by name, Hong said, "all parties should keep calm, exercise restraint and avoid taking actions that may escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula." While tensions on the Korean Peninsula persist, a Chinese expert told *Global Times* earlier in the day that North Korea would return to the negotiation table if the new U.N. sanctions bite. "North Korea will come back to the table sooner or later," Yang Xiyu, a senior research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, said in his article published by the newspaper. "Apart from the fact that Pyongyang will never get what it wants if it keeps acting this way, the sanctions will impose increasing pressure on the nation, including slowing down the pace of its nuclear development, and hampering the country's economic and social development," Yang said. "If North Korea wants to realize sustainable growth, it will have to reconsider and eventually stop the current nuclear policy, and cast its eyes to peace and development," Yang said. (Yonhap, "China Renews Call for Talks ahead of Nuclear Summit," March 29, 2016)

North Korea's military has sharply increased drone sorties along the western part of its border with South Korea, a government official said. "Drone activity has increased sharply around the western part of the frontline as of late," the official said. "There is a brisk pace of take-off and landing exercises involving various types of small and bigger-than-medium-size unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)." Roughly seven or eight drone missions are being detected by South Korea's surveillance system every day, according to other military sources. The South Korean military is trying to determine the reason for the rise in drone exercises and stepping up its own surveillance over the area, the official said. "These drones may possibly cross over to our side of the demarcation line unexpectedly to confuse our military's combat readiness," the official said. "Or they could divert attention to the western front so as to allow the North to create problems elsewhere." According to other military officials, "The North Korean drones have not trespassed on the Military Demarcation Line, but the military has stiffened its surveillance for the possibility of infiltration." South Korea is seeking an aerial defense network that can detect and shoot down North Korean drones since the country has been steadily conducting drone exercises, Moon Sang-gyun, spokesman

of the defense ministry, said during a press briefing. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Increases Drone Sorties along Western Border: Official," March 29, 2016)

Blinken: "Together with Japan and the Republic of Korea, we have tried to show North Korea that a different future is possible... if it refrains from actions that threaten regional peace and security. If it abandons destabilizing provocations. If it ceases its deplorable human rights violations. And if it fulfills its denuclearization obligations. Our own unity and determination in the face of the challenge posed by North Korea has played a vital and, indeed, stabilizing role in the region. We will continue to increase the costs on North Korea until it comes into compliance with its international obligations. And we will take every necessary step to protect our people from the threat posed by its nuclear and missile programs. In fact, there is no better indication of the strategic priority of our trilateral relationship than the fact that Strobe alluded to earlier—that President Obama will meet with President Park and Prime Minister Abe just two days from now during the Nuclear Security Summit here in Washington. It is the second trilat our leaders have convened in as many years—further evidence of its growing importance and vitality." (Deputy Secretary of State Anthony J. Blinken, "U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Relationship," Brookings Institution, March 29, 2016)

John Schilling: "North Korea recently showed images of a large solid-fuel rocket motor test that appears to have been both real and successful. The motor, much bigger than any solid-fuel motor previously seen in the North, is not appropriately sized to be used on any existing missile in Pyongyang's stockpile. Rather, a more likely role for the motor is as the upper stage of a solid-fuel replacement for the liquid-fuel Nodong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). Such a missile would be more operationally robust, capable of being transported off-road without damage and launched on very short notice. With no indication that such a missile yet exists, and with substantial testing yet to be done, deployment is likely to be five years or more in the future if the program proves to be successful. This new development could serve as a stepping stone to the development of a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), but even if Pyongyang pursues the development of such a system, it would not become operational until after 2030. In recent months, the North Koreans have displayed mocked up missiles in parades, television footage of "new" missile tests that faked success and given us a look at [ground test activities](#). Ground test activities are not as sexy as rockets on parade or in flight, but are more revealing—and harder to fake. Moreover, coming soon after a satellite launch and an underground nuclear test, it is increasingly difficult to credit the hypothesis some analysts have advanced that the North's missile related-activities are a giant hoax. The most recent episode is a series of photographs of a ground test of a solid-fuel rocket motor. Video would have perhaps been more convincing, but the pictures are not only detailed and specific but also real. They show a solid-fuel rocket motor—much larger and more powerful than anything we had suspected North Korea possessed—both while firing and as one slightly-charred piece afterwards. There's some grandiose text to go with the pictures, but these pictures are worth far more than the words that accompany them. A bit of technical background: Aside from short-ranged battlefield weapons, North Korea's rockets to date have all used liquid-propellant. A liquid-propellant rocket engine is a machine for turning fuel into thrust at a prodigious rate. They are more powerful and efficient than

any other self-contained propulsion system that can be built; they put men on the Moon. And if you are desperately struggling to find a way to deliver warheads to an enemy beyond your reach, that's where you start. But the engines are complex pieces of machinery. The propellant tanks are simple but fragile. And the propellants tend to be highly corrosive and toxic. Putting that combination in the hands of frightened conscript soldiers working in a remote location under extreme stress is a recipe for disaster. The United States retired its last liquid-fuel missile in 1987 after several **lethal fires and explosions** were caused by simple mistakes. For weapons, solid propellant is the preferred fuel. The simplest solid-fuel motors have no moving parts, just a strong hollow case with an igniter on one end and a nozzle on the other. Inside is a full load of propellant, cast in place from a tough rubbery compound that burns like thermite's more exuberant cousin. Small solid-fuel motors can be made simple and safe enough for amateurs to manufacture from scratch and launch even to the edge of space. At the scale the North Koreans demonstrated, there are technical challenges. Slight cracks or voids in casting the propellant can lead to explosions. Prolonged exposure to intense heat can destroy the nozzle. And if you're hoping to hit a specific target, solid motors can be tricky to steer and even harder to turn off at the right time. While the performance of a solid rocket will never be as good as a liquid-fuel system, it is far more likely to work on the battlefield. They require little maintenance, can survive rough handling and off-road transport, are less prone to leaking toxic, corrosive vapor at the slightest provocation, and even the largest solid-fuel missiles can be launched on a few minutes' notice. That last characteristic is going to be particularly important for North Korea, as South Korea's missiles can reach targets anywhere in the North in the fifteen minutes or so it would take to fuel and ready a liquid-fuel missile for launch. The North Koreans have always been able to build small solid-fuel rocket motors suitable for battlefield weapons. About ten years ago they introduced the **KN-02 "Toksa,"** a short-ranged ballistic missile based on an old Soviet design probably provided by Syria. Weighing about two tons, the Toksa can be transported and launched from a six-wheeled off-road vehicle and deliver a roughly 500 kg warhead to a range of 120 kilometers. Subsequent improvements have increased the range to maybe 200 kilometers, but this is still a tactical weapon suitable for use against targets not far behind the front line. To reach military bases and logistics targets deep in South Korea or, perhaps more importantly to North Korean strategists, to threaten Japan or the United States, would require much larger rocket motors. The key question is whether the new solid-fuel motor just displayed is able to fly that far? The answer is that, as part of a two-stage missile, it could probably reach Japan but not the United States. The North Koreans didn't give us the dimensions of the rocket they tested, but they did photograph two cheerful figures posing in front of the test article. With some margin for error due to an uncertain camera angle, the motor case looks to be about 1.25 meters in diameter and 3 meters long. Since the Toksa is longer, but only 65 centimeters in diameter, this is something new. If the motor uses a steel case and is filled with the usual sort of propellants, it would weight about 800 kg empty and hold about four tons of propellant—twice the weight of an entire Toksa missile. Based on the evidence of these pictures, North Korea appears to have conducted a successful test of a large solid-fuel motor of 15-20 tonnes thrust and about one minute of burn duration. This is roughly three times more powerful than the biggest solid motor North Korea has previously demonstrated. Further testing, including a functional steering and thrust

termination mechanism, would be needed to use this motor in an operational system. Still, it represents a step forward in North Korea's capabilities. **A set of barely-visible drawings indicates that this motor is meant to be used as the upper stage of a larger missile or rocket, as does its relatively squat geometry. The motor's 1.25 meter diameter is the same as North Korea's Nodong missile, a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), and the upper stage of its Unha space launch vehicle. But this motor is too heavy to simply be stacked on top of a Nodong carrying a 4.8-tonne upper stage in addition to its usual warhead; it would barely be able to get off the ground.** While the solid-fuel motor is almost a perfect fit in terms of size, it would also have distinct disadvantages when compared to the Unha's current liquid fueled third stage. An Unha would launch easily enough, but using this motor as a third stage would reduce overall performance. The liquid-propellant third stage, while limited in thrust, is lightweight and efficient while the powerful solid motor would be heavier and less efficient. And the low thrust of the liquid upper stage has a hidden benefit—by requiring a very long burn, it allows the Unha to reach its target orbit under continuous powered flight and active control. A powerful but fast-burning solid-fuel motor would have to coast through space for several minutes before being ignited. During that time, the rocket would be in danger of tumbling out of control. Even if North Korea is having difficulty producing the current Unha third stage, a solid-fuel motor like this wouldn't be the best solution. Similar objections apply to using the solid motor as the third stage of the road-mobile KN-08 ICBM seen in Pyongyang parades and in a recent photo op with Kim Jong Un. The substitution would reduce the missile's range, payload and accuracy, and with the large first and second stages still dominated by fragile tanks of toxic, corrosive propellants, the missile would still be limited in mobility and responsiveness. Since there are clear disadvantages to using this motor in any existing North Korean missile systems, could a new missile be under development? One possibility is a two-stage solid fuel replacement for the Nodong. Both Iran and Pakistan, once major customers for the Nodong, have developed two-stage solid-fuel missiles of similar size and performance but much greater robustness and operational flexibility. Pakistan's *Shaheen* and Iran's *Sejil* missiles would be well-suited to North Korea's regional deterrence and perhaps warfighting requirements. But in spite of past cooperation between all three nations, neither of them seems willing to sell these systems to Pyongyang. And the dimensions of the new North Korean motor don't seem to match the Pakistani or Iranian systems, though the diameter and maybe thrust vanes are a match for the *Sejil*. So if North Korea wants a solid-fuel MRBM, it will have to design its own. And the new motor is ideally suited for such a missile. It would need to be mated with a new first stage motor, likely of the same diameter but almost three times the length. Developing and building such a motor would be no trivial matter, but stretching a proven 1.25-meter solid-fuel motor to that extent should be within North Korea's capabilities. Then the North Koreans would need to design, build, and test the missile. While there is no sign that they are pursuing such a weapon, it would be premature at this early stage of the development process to do anything more than the most basic design work for a missile that doesn't yet have an engine. After the recent test, presumably North Korea knows enough to start designing whatever missile will use the new motor. The 1.25 meter diameter of the new motor may mean the North Koreans want to match the dimensions of the Nodong, perhaps with the idea of using the existing transporter-erector-launchers

(TELEs) and other infrastructure. If that is the case, a new two stage missile could match the Nodong in overall length, weigh 18 tonnes at launch and deliver a 1000 kg warhead to a range of roughly 1800 km. With a lighter 500 kg warhead, the range could be as high as 2600 km. Such a missile could be transported both on and off road, and launched on no more than five minutes' notice. Since, as far as we know, this missile does not yet exist, North Korea has a lot more work to do before it becomes operational. It will have to conduct more tests of this motor that will probably last over the next year or so if things go well. The design will then need to be stretched to make a first-stage motor. That will probably take another year. Design of the missile could, to some extent, proceed in parallel with the motor tests, but it still took Iran three years from its first ground motor firings to the first flight test of the Sejil missile, and Iran has greater industrial resources than North Korea. Even if North Korea can match Iran's performance in this respect, we would not expect to see a solid-fuel MRBM fly before 2019, or to enter operational service before 2020. Could the KN-08 ICBM, which has undergone one **major design change** already, be transformed into a solid-fuel missile? A solid-fuel KN-08 would have significant advantages over the current liquid-fuel version, which has very limited mobility and could require an hour or more to prepare for launch. But such a transformation would require a completely new, larger missile. The first-stage engine would need to be almost an order of magnitude bigger than the one recently tested. Moreover, solid rocket motors get trickier as they get bigger; that level of up-scaling has traditionally called for at least a decade of steady work, often accompanied by one or two catastrophic explosions on the test stand, the aftermath of which would probably be visible in satellite imagery. We haven't seen any sign that the North Koreans have begun to test such a system. If this analysis proves correct, this development is certainly a step forward in building solid-fuel motors. However, rather than moving North Korea closer to building an advanced ICBM, a development that is still far in the future—perhaps 2030 or later—it is only likely to result in an improvement in the regional-range ballistic missiles already in North Korea's inventory. A new solid-fuel Nodong, possibly ready for deployment after 2020 if the development program succeeds, will have greater off-road mobility and take less time to prepare for launch." (John Schilling, "A Solid but Incremental Improvement in North Korea's Missiles," *38North*, March 29, 2016)

3/30/16

South Korean President Park Geun Hye said her nation must take the lead in ridding the world of nuclear weapons -- not develop its own arsenal as Donald Trump has advocated in recent days. "I have a strong conviction that the vision for a nuclear-free world must begin with the Korean peninsula," Park said in a written interview with Bloomberg News before a two-day summit on nuclear security in Washington, starting today. "The Korean government maintains an unwavering stance in support of denuclearization." (Sam Kim, "Park Says South Korea Must Rid the World of Nukes, Not Develop Them," *Bloomberg News*, March 30, 2016)

Donald Trump's calls to overhaul the Japan-U.S. security alliance have agitated Japanese government officials, and one local leader is now urging debate on the Republican Party front-runner's suggestion that Japan arm itself with nuclear weapons. Government officials said a possible Trump presidency would fundamentally change the course of U.S. diplomacy with Asia and could force Japan to rethink its diplomatic



principles to strengthen the alliance. During his campaign, the real estate mogul has said the alliance is unfair to the United States. And in an interview with a U.S. daily on March 26, Trump again made clear his intention to drastically reduce the U.S. military presence in Japan, adding that he would allow Japan to possess nuclear weapons as a deterrent to North Korea. "It seems he only has experts on Middle East affairs and terrorism-related issues among his diplomatic brain trust but no analyst specializing in Asian matters," a Foreign Ministry official said. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said at a news conference on March 29 that it would be "improper" to comment on Trump's remarks at this point. Trump's remarks have already sparked a reaction within the political circles in Japan. Osaka Governor Ichiro Matsui, who heads the Osaka Ishin no Kai regional party, called on Diet members to promptly discuss whether Japan needs nuclear weapons. "Trump has questioned the validity of the current Japan-U.S. alliance," Matsui said. "We may already need to start debate on whether we should keep staying away from nuclear weapons or have them as a deterrent." The governor added that if Japan decides to develop military capabilities to defend itself on its own, it will need the "ultimate weapons." "I believe it is already high time, particularly for the Diet members, to start serious discussions on this issue," he added. (*Asahi Shimbun*, "Trump's Remarks about Asia Cause Bewilderment, Unease in Japan," March 30, 2016)

South Korea announced plans to introduce new weapons to counter nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, including the GPS-guided ground-to-ground munitions, nonlethal bombs to neutralize the electric grid of the enemy and enhanced radar systems to detect incoming attacks. The military will spend a total of 226.5 trillion won (\$196.7 billion) from 2017 to 2021, the primary focus of which will be spending 7.9 trillion won in preparing against potential attacks from Pyongyang, said the Ministry of National Defense. The annually announced five-year plan was scaled down by 6 trillion won from the 2016-20 version revealed last year, which the officials said was a result of adjusting 83 minor details. "Our assessment for the period shows that there will be a need to enhance our military capacity in light of the constant threats by North Korea, ongoing military reform and preparation for Seoul's takeover of wartime operational control from the U.S.," an official from the ministry said. The South Korean military is expected to resume the OPCON in the mid-2020s, after the country has procured its "Kill Chain" missile defense system and its KAMD air defense system. The ground-to-ground munitions is directed to strike the North's recently revealed 300-millimeter caliber multiple rocket launcher. The weapon is presumed to have a maximum range of 200 kilometers, which puts nearly half of South Korea within its range if fired adjacent to the inter-Korea border. Seoul's 18.6 trillion won research and development plan includes the "graphite bomb," also known as a "blackout bomb" or "soft bomb." Using fine carbon filaments over electrical compounds, the nonlethal weapon is used to disrupt the enemy's electrical supply. Its key technologies will be developed by the ministry-affiliated Agency for Defense Development, and will be deployed in the field by the early 2020s, the ministry said. Another segment of the new plan is introducing the enhanced antiballistic early-warning radar against the North's submarine-launched ballistic missiles. South Korea believes the North will be able to deploy a SLBM within the next three or four years. Seoul's surveillance system currently includes two ground-based Green Pine radar units to detect upon a launch, then track and calculate the estimated location of its fall. Officials said the new radar will work on

a similar principal, but have substantially improved functions. The military also said it has changed the required operational characteristics for its radars to detect smaller drones from North Korea. Antiballistic missiles, radar and ground-to-air munitions all were introduced this year in light of the bellicose rhetoric and show of force from the communist country. (Yoon Min-sik, "Seoul Rolls out Weapons to Counter N.K. Threats," *Korea Herald*, March 30, 2016)

National Reunification Institute report: "Marshal Kim Jong Un wisely led the drive for bolstering up the nuclear force, boldly foiling the moves of the U.S. and its followers to stifle the DPRK. He set forth the line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in March of 2013. Then, he indicated the orientation of strengthening the nuclear force and provided a legal foundation for doing so by legitimizing the bolstering of the nuclear force for self-defense and discussing and settling the practical matters of developing more Korean-style cutting-edge weapons and equipment and consolidating the defense capability of the country in every way at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK and an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the WPK. Under his wise leadership the DPRK has achieved miraculous successes startling the world one after another in the building of Juche-oriented nuclear force. The DPRK succeeded in the H-bomb test in January this year, in particular, fully demonstrating its might as a nuclear power in the world. Some days ago, the actual miniaturized nuclear warheads manufactured by scientists and technicians in the field of research into nuclear weapons were opened to public, startling the world people again. The report referred to the fact that the international community and people of different social standings in south Korea recognized the DPRK's nuclear capability and expressed admiration at this. ...Kim Jong Un at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the WPK held in March, 2013 indicated tasks and ways to channel great efforts into stepping up the economic construction and improving the standard of people's living while further bolstering up the country's defense capability with less expense without increasing the defense expenditure, and wisely led the drive for carrying out them. Under his energetic leadership, the people's dreams and ideals have come true on this land and miracles and events **heralding the omen of prosperity** have taken place one after another in the DPRK over the past three years. The world public is lavishing praises with keen interest in the reality of the DPRK where a year is enough to change mountains and rivers and remarkable changes are taking place every day. Screams and shrill cries are being made by the hostile forces without let-up at a time when the world is becoming vocal admiring and praising the validity and vitality of the above-said line of the DPRK. ...The DPRK's above-said line is not a temporary countermeasure for coping with the grave situation but serves as an immortal banner meeting the supreme interests of the revolution and providing a firm guarantee for the eternal future of the nation. ... It is a revolutionary strategy and landmark of the WPK to achieve a final victory in the decisive battle with the U.S. imperialists, a sacred war for national reunification and the building of a thriving socialist nation without fail through the simultaneous development of the two fronts. Rosy is the future of the DPRK which gets stronger with nukes and achieves great happiness through economic development. The servicepersons and people of the DPRK will as ever consolidate the

treasured sword of nuclear deterrent for self-defense which constitutes the life of the nation and a national treasure of reunified Korea that can never be bartered for anything, holding higher the banner of the line under the wise leadership of Kim Jong Un, and dynamically advance towards the high eminence of a thriving nation by the efforts of the Koreans, in the spirit of Korea and at its speed." (KCNA, "National Reunification Institute Issues Detailed Report," March 30, 2016)

3/31/16

DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement "hitting out at the U.S. for its foolish attempt to shift the blame for the escalated tension on the Korean peninsula on to the DPRK: The U.S. is describing the just self-defensive countermeasures taken by the DPRK to cope with the former's frantic war moves and its sanctions and racket to stifle the latter as a "provocation" and "threat" and creating impression that the latter was to blame for the above-said tension. This is profound confusing of right and wrong. ...The prevailing grave situation was entirely attributable to the U.S. ...The U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail are neither temporary ones started recently nor an abstract conception but a potential threat it has posed to the DPRK every day for the past several decades after adopting the preemptive nuclear attack on it as a policy. The U.S. attempted to mount a nuclear attack on the DPRK as early as in the 1950s and the Bush administration officially listed the DPRK, which was a non-nuclear state, as part of "the axis of evil" and target of preemptive nuclear attack early in the 21st century. The Obama administration excluded the DPRK from the list of the "nuclear non-use" in April of 2010, fully revealing its scenario for mounting a preemptive attack on the DPRK. The U.S. is reiterating it still now. It has staged large-scale joint military drills every year and made practical preparations for a nuclear attack on the DPRK by mobilizing various type nuclear war hardware. The on-going Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 joint military exercises, in particular, are unprecedented in their scale and provocative nature. While threatening the DPRK with nukes, the U.S. is resorting to an extreme political and economic pressure on the former. Lording it over the UN and the international community, the U.S. is recklessly working to stifle a sovereign state at any cost with every conceivable illegal and brigandish means and methods employed. This can never be tolerated. **Now that it is as clear as noonday the U.S. military threats and hostile acts against the DPRK are designed to decapitate the supreme leadership and bring down the "social system" of the DPRK, it is left with no option but to take actions to protect the dignity of its supreme leadership, sovereignty and right to existence.** The U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail, joint military exercises, sanctions and other moves to stifle the DPRK are the root cause of pushing the situation on the peninsula to the brink of a clash of nuclear weapons. The U.S. seeks to shift the blame for the escalating tension on to the DPRK by triggering off its resistance through diverse pressure but it brings into bolder relief the true colors of the former as an aggressor and provocateur. **If the U.S. tries to infringe upon the supreme interests and sovereignty of the DPRK even a bit, the latter will mete out a prompt merciless punishment to it with all means including nuclear force involved and defuse the threats to its sovereignty and regional peace and security.**" (KCNA, "DPRK FM Spokesman Blames U.S. for Escalation Tension on Korean Peninsula," March 31, 2016)

North Korea has developed a new long-range mobile intercontinental ballistic missile

that the Pentagon says moves the country's leader Kim Jong Un closer to the goal of building missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland with nuclear warheads. The new missile is called the KN-14 by the Pentagon and is a longer-range variant of the KN-08 road-mobile ICBM first made public in 2012. Both the KN-08 and the new KN-14 have not been flight tested. But defense officials familiar with reports on the weapons said both systems have been tested in all other aspects of their development. "It's a KN-08 on steroids," said one official of the new KN-14. No details about the KN-14's capabilities, such as its range, warhead carrying capacity, or the number of missiles were disclosed by the officials, who said reports of the missile were circulated by U.S. intelligence agencies within the past two weeks. The new KN-14 missile was first displayed during an October 10, 2015 military parade in Pyongyang. Its main external difference from the KN-08 is a shorter length and blunt nose cone. Rick Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center who has studied the two missiles' Chinese launchers, said Russia has estimated the KN-14 could have a range between 5,000 and 6,200 miles. "From the far northern corner of North Korea, [6,300-mile] range is sufficient for the KN-14 potentially to reach Chicago and Toronto," Fisher said. "It may be a stretch to fulfill North Korea's recent propaganda video called 'Last Chance' depicting a nuclear strike on Washington, D.C." Fisher, however, said the rapid development of the KN-14 from the KN-08 indicated Pyongyang could be capable of building even larger missile variants that would have sufficient range to strike Washington. North Korean missile analyst Scott LaFoy, writing in NKNews.com, said the KN-08 shown in October appears similar to the Russian SS-N-18 submarine-launched ballistic missile. "It is apparent that North Korea is continually researching and upgrading its ballistic missile designs," he said, adding that the differences are so significant that the new missile should be given a different designator from the KN-08. Based on photo analysis, the KN-08 appears to have been modified from a three-stage missile to a two-stage missile with a warhead or a three-stage missile with more compact stages. "Comparison of the old and new KN-08 bodies indicates that either the third stage has been eliminated entirely to house the original [reentry vehicle] or that, by using a certain type of post-boost vehicle, the third stage has been reduced in visible length," he said. Data cables on the missile changed from two on the sides of the KN-08 to one on what is now known as the KN-14. The Pentagon's most recent annual report to Congress on the North Korean military said the KN-08 was first displayed on six mobile launchers during military parades in 2012 and 2013. "In October 2015, North Korea paraded four missiles on KN-08 [transporter erector launchers]," the report said, adding that they were "noticeably different from those previously displayed on these TELs." The KN-08, if successfully designed and developed, "likely would be capable of reaching much of the continental United States, assuming the missiles displayed are generally representative of missiles that will be fielded," the report said, adding that ICBMs are extremely complex and require multiple flight tests to correct design and manufacturing defects. "Without flight tests, the KN-08's current reliability as a weapon system would be low," the report said. However, days after the KN-14 was shown in the October 10 military parade in Pyongyang, the commander of the U.S. Northern Command, Adm. William Gortney, told Congress he believes North Korea currently is capable of hitting the United States with a nuclear missile. "I agree with the intel community that we assess that they have the ability, they have the weapons, and they have the ability to miniaturize those

weapons, and they have the ability to put them on a rocket that can range the homelands," said Gortney, who is in charge of missile defense of the continental United States. The Obama administration has not taken action against China for its significant contribution to the KN-08 and KN-14, namely the Chinese-made transporter erector launchers that carry the missile and appear to have been exported in violation of United Nations sanctions. A U.N. panel of experts on North Korea stated several years ago that China claimed that the launchers were sold to North Korea as timber haulers. That claim has been dismissed by arms proliferation experts who say the truck launchers are too wide to travel on most logging roads. Fisher, the China military affairs expert, said the administration recently praised China for its nuclear security cooperation. Fisher said this praise was misplaced. In addition to providing North Korea with road-mobile nuclear missile launchers, similar Chinese-made, 16-wheel missile launchers were recently shown in news reports carrying Pakistan's Shaheen III medium-range ballistic missiles. "China clearly has no intention of stopping its technology transfers that for decades have enabled North Korea's and Pakistan's nuclear missile capabilities," Fisher said. American efforts to gain Chinese support for curbing the smuggling of nuclear material are useful, he said, but the administration has so far taken no action against the missile launcher's producer, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. (CASIC). "It is a profound contradiction for the administration to fail to sanction CASIC and to fail to publicly criticize Chinese leaders for allowing CASIC to enable Pakistan's [medium-range ballistic missiles] to target all of India and to allow North Korean ICBMs to target American cities," Fisher said. (Bill Gertz, "Pentagon Confirms New North Korean ICBM," *Washington Free Beacon*, March 31, 2016)

On a cold afternoon in February, several former American officials hurried to the Hilton Hotel in Berlin, a city long known for its Cold War spies and intrigue. They had traveled there for a private meeting with senior representatives from North Korea, the most reclusive government in the world. Over the next two days, the Americans gathered in one of the hotel's modern conference rooms and listened to a surprising new proposal. Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, the North Koreans said, wanted to resume negotiations in hopes of ending decades of hostility between the two countries. The timing was significant. A month earlier, the U.S. had agreed to talks to formally end the Korean War, but that effort collapsed when Washington demanded the North's nuclear weapons program be part of the discussions. A few days later, the Hermit Kingdom, officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), set off what it claimed was a hydrogen bomb at an underground site in the country's rugged northeastern mountains. That nuclear test, the country's fourth, left U.S. officials scrambling for new ways to deal with the threat from one of the world's last communist regimes. After the Berlin meeting, the former U.S. officials promptly returned to Washington to report to the White House. Sitting at a conference table in the Situation Room, they told the president's top national security advisers that Pyongyang was prepared to stop testing nuclear weapons for a year. In exchange, the U.S. and South Korea would have to suspend their annual joint military exercises that the DPRK found provocative. The offer was similar to one North Korea had made a year earlier, and the White House rejected, largely out of anger over Pyongyang's alleged hacking of Sony Pictures. This time, however, North Korea wanted to talk about officially ending the

Korean War (it technically stopped with an armistice in 1953). And Kim was now willing to wrap the nuclear issue into the discussions. The president's advisers listened closely without comment. Ending the Korean War has long been a priority for North Korea's young dictator. Analysts say he regards it as a way to remove the threat of tens of thousands of U.S. forces based in Japan and South Korea. His nuclear arsenal, experts believe, is both his leverage and his deterrent against an American-led attack. "The H-bomb test was a self-defense measure to protect the sovereignty of the nation from the nuclear threats and blackmail of the hostile forces that are growing daily," Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency announced in January. The news agency went on to say that North Korea would abandon its nuclear program only if "the U.S. rolls back its outrageous hostile policy toward the DPRK and the forces of imperialist aggression stop infringing upon our sovereignty." Once you cut through the old-style communist rhetoric, some analysts say the Obama administration missed an important signal there: Kim may be ready to cut a deal with the U.S. The White House declined to comment on the new North Korean proposal, which has never been made public before now. But a growing number of analysts and former officials say the Obama's administration's North Korea policy could prove to be a dangerous failure, largely due to misinformed assumptions about Pyongyang's fragility, China's outsized political and economic influence with the North and a perception of Kim as little more than a cartoon villain. They're urging the administration to accept North Korea's latest offer and restart negotiations. At the very least, they say, Pyongyang's proposal could slow the country's nuclear program and begin talks to defuse more than 60 years of tension on the Korean peninsula. At best, it could produce another legacy agreement like the one President Obama reached with Iran and his diplomatic openings to Cuba and Myanmar. But if the White House sticks to its current policy, critics warn the DPRK could have as many as 100 bombs by the beginning of this decade. As James Church, the nom de plume of a former CIA operative and expert on North Korea, puts it: "Every time they test, they learn so much more." Despite the recent muscle flexing, when asked to state current U.S. policy toward Pyongyang, a senior administration official indicated the White House is still prepared to begin a dialogue with North Korea before it demonstrates it's ready to give up its nuclear weapons. Combined with North Korea's offer in Berlin, Church and other experts believe Obama's softer position on negotiations could mean renewed talks. But he suspects any such move could only occur after the latest U.S. and U.N. sanctions have had enough time to hurt the Kim regime. "We have to prove how tough we are," he says. If some new diplomatic initiative is brewing, Church and other experienced Asia hands stress the White House will need to show a much better understanding of North Korea. That's no easy task when dealing with one of the world's most impenetrable countries. "It's a consequence of the mythology that has built up around [North Korea]," says Church. "It's so easy to accept the conventional wisdom: they're duplicitous, you can't deal with them, they cheat on every agreement they make, Kim is crazy...." All, he claims, are incorrect. Few would challenge Kim's reputation for brutality. After succeeding his father in 2011, Kim Jong-Il, the freshly minted dictator, then just 28, ruthlessly purged suspected opponents, executing his uncle and former mentor, Jang Sung-taek, plus all of Jang's relatives. Human rights abuses under Kim's rule have prompted a United Nations commission to demand his investigation for crimes against humanity. "So he's cruel," Church shrugs. "Show me a dictator that isn't." Church isn't the only one who

thinks the U.S. needs to re-assess its views of the eccentric North Korean leader. Despite his strange haircut and over-the-top rhetoric, "Kim's not crazy," says Joel Wit, a former State Department Korea analyst. His threats to vaporize New York and Seoul are disturbing, Wit notes, but he calls them a "predictable response" to his—and his predecessors'—fears of being toppled. Other analysts dismiss the conclusion that North Korea is staggering toward collapse, as Obama has suggested. While famine reportedly killed thousands in 2011 and life in the North Korean countryside remains grim, Kim has stabilized the economy, and for now, the nation is self-sufficient in food, says Brown, the CIA analyst. Meanwhile, visitors to Pyongyang describe a fledgling nightlife, with a growing number of restaurants, bars and karaoke rooms. Private taxis cruise the streets, demanding payment in dollars, and millions of North Koreans now own cell phones. These, Brown says, are signs of North Korea's growing middle class, who have prospered under Kim's limited free market reforms. North Korea is somewhat isolated, but Brown says Kim has diversified the country's trading partners to include not only neighboring China, but also countries in Africa, Asia and Europe. Increasingly, he adds, people from these countries visit Pyongyang and North Koreans are traveling to study and work. "A lot is going on," Brown says. Former officials also say that Kim isn't the only one who cheats on accords. Wit notes that a 2005 nuclear agreement collapsed because Bush slapped the North with new economic sanctions "before the ink was dry." Likewise, Obama's short-lived 2012 agreement restricting nuclear and missile tests fell apart when North Korea insisted the long-range missiles for satellite launches was exempt. And Wit, who served in the State Department at the time, says Pyongyang was right. "North Korea," he says, "never agreed not to conduct the space launch tests." Another major misconception is the administration's conviction that China will use its clout to make North Korea give up its nuclear arsenal. China opposes the DPRK's nukes and supports the latest round of U.N. sanctions, but Beijing shielded its fuel shipments to North Korea and Pyongyang's coal and iron exports from the resolution. The reason: China views North Korea as a buffer against democratic South Korea, which hosts 29,000 American troops. Beijing worries that stronger sanctions would destabilize Kim's regime, send millions of North Korean refugees streaming into China, and perhaps even bring U.S. and South Korean soldiers right up to its border. "For China, the sanctions are meant to get the North Koreans back to the negotiating table," says James Person, a Korea expert and historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. "The last thing China wants is for the North Korean state to collapse." Some analysts, including many former administration officials, still believe China remains the key to getting North Korea to give up its nukes, even if it takes considerably more time. So far, Chinese authorities have stopped several banks near the DPRK border from handling any more transactions with Pyongyang, according to China's state-controlled media. The reports say Beijing has also inspected the cargoes of ships passing through its territory to and from North Korea. Over time, as the Chinese increasingly apply tougher sanctions, "the North Koreans are going to have fewer and fewer options," says Michael Fuchs, until recently the administration's deputy assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. "The noose is tightening." David Straub, former director of the State Department's Korea desk, agrees. "We've really reached the point of no return," he says. "Either our gradually ratcheted-up pressures will eventually persuade the North Korean leaders that this is not working the way they had expected, or the tensions will become so great in North

Korea that there will be some change within the regime itself." Skeptics maintain that peace talks with Pyongyang are the only way to resolve the nuclear issue. But it won't be easy. Any comprehensive peace negotiations with the DPRK would make the talks that produced the Iran deal look simple. For starters, the two sides remain far apart on the nuclear issue, with North Korea now demanding recognition as a nuclear power and the United States still insisting on denuclearization. Any negotiations would obviously have to take into account the security concerns of South Korea and Japan, both of which have defense treaties with the U.S. Perhaps the biggest hurdle to any peace talks: U.S. insistence on human rights reforms. Experts say Kim almost certainly would resist, declaring the issue an internal matter. That would require the administration to calculate how important North Korea negotiations are compared to other issues Obama wants to deal with in his remaining nine months in office. Human rights advocates would slam any talks that sidestep the issue. Experts also caution that a deal could take years, which would hand responsibility for their final accord to Obama's successor. In the meantime, U.S. negotiators could expect plenty of misunderstandings, tantrums and setbacks. And of course there would be no guarantee that even the savviest diplomats could convince North Korea to cash in its nuclear insurance policy. But as Kim's latest bomb test demonstrates, the alternative to diplomacy will be a regime with no incentive to halt its nuclear buildup. There's also a danger that North Korea would sell its nuclear technology to terrorists and other outlaw regimes. In 2007, for instance, Israeli warplanes destroyed a nuclear reactor in eastern Syria that had been built with help from the North Koreans. At a time when Obama is stressing the importance of nuclear security, the latest overtures from the DPRK may offer the last best opportunity to achieve peace, or at least greater stability, on the hair-trigger Korean peninsula. As Wit puts it, "The administration has nine months left." (Jonathan Broder, "A Nuclear Deal with North Korea?" *Newsweek*, March 31, 2016)

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North Korea launched a surface-to-air missile into waters off its east coast, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said, a move seen as a show of defiance against mounting pressure to give up its nuclear program. The North fired off the anti-aircraft missile toward the East Sea at around 12:45 p.m. from South Hamgyong Province in the country's northeastern area. Seoul, earlier thought the North fired a ballistic missile, but on close examination of the trajectory picked up by its radar said it was a surface-to-air missile. The missile flew some 100 kilometers. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Launches Surface-to-Air Missile: JCS," April 1, 2016) North Korea has unveiled its new surface-to-air missile "KN-06" suspected to have a range of 150 kilometers with higher accuracy and mobility than earlier missiles. According to 10 photos revealed in *Rodong Sinmun*, the missile consists of three pods on top of a vehicle and uses "cold launch," a technology that allows missiles to start the engine after being launched from the pod. North Korea is also suspected of using the same technology to a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that is being developed. KN-06 was revealed in October 2010 on the 65th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea, but this is the first time the military state has shown the missile being fired. (Lee Han-soo, "Pyongyang Reveals New Surface-to-Air Missile," *Korea Times*, April 4, 2016)



Amid increasing threats of provocations by North Korea, the United States will deploy an additional 12 F-16 fighter jets and 200 pilots and airmen in South Korea. According to the U.S. Seventh Air Force, 12 F-16s from the Minnesota Air National Guard base in Duluth will be deployed at the Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province. The F-16 is the U.S. Air Force's main fighter. Currently, the U.S. Air Force has three squadrons with 60 F-16s deployed in South Korea. The additional fighters will be subordinated to the 179th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron under the U.S. Pacific Air Forces Command to check their joint operational capabilities with the South Korean Air Force and provide deterrence against North Korean provocations. An official at the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) said the additional deployment is part of the U.S. Pacific Command's regular reinforcement measures to help maintain a deterrent against threats to regional security and stability. Since the withdrawal of the USFK's Apache attack helicopters from South Korea in 2009, the United States has deployed F-16s, F-15s and A-10s to South Korea on a rotational basis. (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "U.S. to Deploy Additional 12 F-16 Fighters to S. Korea," April 2, 2016)

When the United Nations adopted tougher sanctions against North Korea this month to punish it for its nuclear weapons program, it was understood that they would have little effect without strong cooperation from China, North Korea's largest trading partner. If recent trade here is any indication, that cooperation has been spotty at best. Cross-border trade, legal and illegal, flows pretty much as usual, and seems to be largely unhindered by the new rules, traders and local officials said. One of the toughest components, a requirement that countries inspect all cargo entering or leaving North Korea for banned goods, is not enforced here. Before he drives the beat-up taxi into North Korea, Qin does two things. He packs a bribe, often something as simple as fresh apples or bananas, or sometimes as much as \$200. And he snips the car's radio wires. "They always want the wires to the car radio cut so the North Koreans can't listen to the Chinese programs," he said. Then, as he does on many mornings, he drives the car over a single-lane iron bridge across the border, where there is steady demand for secondhand taxis. On many days, Qin's secondhand taxis cross the bridge in a convoy of more than 100 vehicles, including trucks loaded with containers draped in shabby tarpaulins and secondhand minibuses for North Korea's rickety transportation system. Few are ever inspected by the Chinese authorities. Virtually everything that keeps the North Korean economy afloat passes through here: Coal and iron ore come in, violating the sanctions, and crude oil flows out, exempted from them. Smuggling is rampant. The export of North Korean rare earth minerals and gold, banned under the new rule, is one of the more lucrative revenue sources for the North Korean government, traders said. That business continues on privately owned 200-ton ships belonging to Chinese smugglers based here, they said. The United Nations rules put the onus on customs inspectors here to judge which goods may help the nuclear program or the military, which are banned, and which are intended for civilians, which are allowed. On a recent day, the customs checkpoint, a large outdoor parking area adjacent to the bridge, held a collection of China's castoffs: cheap four-wheel-drive Haval passenger vehicles, discount medicines for hepatitis and tuberculosis, old solar panels to brighten dark houses. But the customs office here lacks the staff to open all the containers, a local government official said. Like most people interviewed for this article, he spoke on condition of anonymity since there are risks to speaking candidly

to foreign media about trade with North Korea. At peak times, up to 200 trucks a day cross the Yalu River to Sinuiju, North Korea. Before departing, only about 5 percent of the containers they carry are inspected, the official said. China and the United States worked closely on the new sanctions, and both countries said ridding North Korea of nuclear weapons was a shared concern. When President Obama and the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, meet in Washington, Obama is likely to press China to enforce the new measures. But if China is exasperated with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, it is even more worried about political instability, and the possibility that economic deprivation could send millions of North Koreans fleeing into China. So China insisted on an exemption stipulating that the "livelihood" of ordinary North Koreans must not suffer, a loophole that sanctions experts say is big enough to drive an 18-wheeler through. That exemption left the oil pipeline from Dandong to North Korea open, but seems to have been applied to a wide variety of merchandise. One salesroom here boasted a brisk business in secondhand Japanese pianos, selling for \$1,500 to \$8,000 for fastidious, well-off North Koreans who sneer at the sound of Chinese instruments. North Koreans like Yamaha pianos, a salesman said. Smuggling along the nearly 900-mile border, perfected through methods ranging from tucking wads of cash into truck drivers' seats to operating small boats in the dead of night, is winked at for the same reason. "We don't want the North Korean regime to collapse," explained Wang, a government official. Demand has fallen for some items, traders said, but that was more a function of North Korea's increasingly feeble economy and a lack of cash, than the sanctions. There is, however, evidence of some enforcement in one important area: North Korea's sale of coal and iron ore, two of its most important exports. Port authorities here have been fairly vigilant in enforcing the new ban on North Korea's ragged fleet of more than two dozen cargo ships, two local officials said. The coal they carry earns North Korea as much as \$1 billion a year, according to the United States Treasury. But that ban has been circumvented by smuggling ships and by the transfer of 12 North Korean ships to Chinese ownership, allowing them to dock at Chinese and other ports, a longtime trader, Yu, said. A few traders interviewed here said the new rules had crimped their business. Zhang, a trader who does tens of millions of dollars a year in business with North Korea, said customs officials had just impounded a big secondhand excavator he had bought from a coal mine in Shanxi Province and sold to a North Korean coal mine for more than \$60,000. Customs inspectors asked how he knew the equipment would not be transferred to the North Korean military. "We didn't know how to answer," he said. But traders and officials expect that after some initial minor squeezing, whatever enforcement there is will be relaxed. Liaoning Province, where Dandong is a prominent city, ranked at the bottom of China's 31 provinces for economic growth last year, and there was political pressure not to weaken the economy further. "Whenever there are provocations, the traders say that the higher-ups call for enforcement, and then a few months later there is no systematic implementation," said Andrea Berger, a proliferation expert at the Royal United Services Institute in London. On the street, North Korean men are ubiquitous, walking in pairs or in groups – never alone – and wearing severe black jackets and pants, the signature uniform of government officials. They are North Korean trade officials who were sent to Dandong as purchasing agents, and whose jobs were largely untouched by the new United Nations restrictions. Their presence has created tensions with the Chinese, many of whom regard their needy neighbors with contempt. Just as the new

sanctions were imposed, a new North Korean trader came to work at Zhang's company, where he would earn kickbacks on each purchase and then pay some of that money to his government, Zhang said. The trader expected to be treated to a plush apartment for him and his family, schooling for his son, an imported car, and a loan of more than \$50,000, Zhang complained. "How they spend money is way too extravagant," he said. (Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, "A Hole in North Korean Sanctions the Size of China's Border" *New York Times*, April 1, 2016 p. A-4)

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DPRK FoMin spokesman "answer to a question put by KCNA as regards the fact that the UN Security Council is ignoring the complaint about the ongoing U.S.-south Korea joint military drills": The DPRK demanded the UNSC convene an urgent meeting in connection with the aggressive joint military drills Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 kicked off by the U.S. despite the DPRK's warning and the international community's unanimous condemnation. ...The DPRK filed the complaint as the largest-ever saber-rattling is disturbing international peace and security and wantonly violating the principle of respect for sovereignty stipulated in the UN Charter in its scale and nature, adding: The action taken by the UNSC to disregard the complaint about the above-said joint war drills brought into bolder relief that it has been reduced to a political tool loyal to the U.S. as it discarded its mission of preserving peace and security and the impartiality which keeps alive its activities as an international organization. It is the UNSC which seconds the U.S. high-handed and arbitrary practices, failing to bring up for discussion its war for aggression, genocide and state-sponsored terrorism. The UNSC has lost political and legal justification or moral decency to slap any sanctions against the DPRK as it has turned a blind eye to the U.S. nuclear threats to the DPRK caused by the joint military exercises for over a half a century. **The DPRK will continue exercising its legitimate right to self-defense by its own efforts now that the U.S. doesn't discontinue the nuclear war games, a vivid manifestation of the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK**, and the UNSC disregards it though it is obliged to protect global peace and security. **The DPRK has already had access to self-defensive deterrent capable of frustrating any U.S. nuclear threat, blackmail and provocation and will further bolster it up both in quality and quantity as the days go by.** (KCNA, "FM Spokesman Accuses UNSC of Ignoring Complaint about U.S.-S. Korea Joint Military Drills," April 2, 2016)

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National Defense Commission (NDC) spokesman's statement "in connection with the fact that the U.S. and other hostile forces are making last-ditch efforts to attack the former in a flock to swallow it up: The U.S. and hostile forces' frantic racket to stifle the DPRK has reached an unprecedented phase. The Leningrad blockade which struck terror into the hearts of people as a pronoun of the harshest sanction in the world history of wars and the Caribbean crisis in the Cold War era can hardly stand comparison with the situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula at present. What is ridiculous is that the U.S. is still not aware that the hostility it has persistently pursued towards the DPRK for over a century since the start of its stand-off with the latter is so anachronistic and suicidal one that it precipitates its self-destruction. It is a hard reality that the U.S. illegal "high-profile sanctions" reinforces the persevering will of the servicepersons and people of the DPRK, the former's outrageous military pressure makes them hold more tightly Songun as an all-powerful treasured sword to annihilate

the enemies and the former's terrible moves to "bring down the social system" prompt the latter to make a giant leap forward in the drive to build the greatest power in the world. Those, who blindly yielded to the brigandish demands of the U.S. which lorded it over our planet through high-handed and arbitrary practices, domination and hegemony and backed it in its hostile moves against the DPRK veiled with "UN resolution," made a mess of their precious legacy and tradition for which nothing can compensate. The NDC of the DPRK would like to tell the whole world what consequences the U.S. and its followers' reckless hostile moves against the DPRK have brought to this land through a fierce uncompromising confrontation between independence and subjugation, justice and injustice and progress and reactionary. The brigandish U.S. imperialists and their allies' barbarous "harshest sanctions" to completely stifle the DPRK economically turned Juche Korea into a matchless great power based on the principle of independence, self-reliance and self-development. The U.S. imperialists' unprecedented moves for a war of aggression against the DPRK to stifle it militarily created the worst crisis in which it may make a retaliatory nuclear strike at the U.S. mainland any moment. The U.S. and its allies' moves to "bring down the social system of the DPRK" by splitting and destabilizing it are entailing the consequences of reducing the rotten and ailing capitalist system to dregs of history as it has lived out its days. Though all hues of hostile forces in the world come in attack on the DPRK with desperate efforts, they can never hold in check the dynamic advance of the great Paektusan nation along the Songun highway of sure victory under the leadership of the peerless Songun brilliant commander. Mankind will be pleased to see how the great Paektusan nation will remain shining as a beacon of independence and symbol of justice and truth." (KCNA, "Nobody Can Block DPRK's Advance: Its NDC Spokesman," April 3, 2016)

*Chosun Sinbo*, making reference to interviews granted by North Korean officials in New York and Geneva, interpreted the NDC statement as follows: "Looking at the current situation that is dangerously spreading, public opinion has widely formed that maintaining stability is the urgent priority, rather than unilateral 'sanctions'; that arranging negotiations is the fundamental resolution, rather than reckless military pressure; and that unconditional recognition and cooperation is the way out, rather than the useless 'overthrow of the system.'" The statement confirms an important detail on Chinese diplomacy: "Regarding the agenda that could come up, if the current phase of confrontation turns into a phase of negotiations, China is spreading a so-called 'theory of seeking denuclearization and a peace agreement at the same time.'" This formula is firmly rejected in favor of Pyongyang's "peace regime first" approach, but at least the Chinese proposal is confirmed by a quasi-official North Korean source. (Stephan Haggard, "Diplomatic Moves," *North Korea: Witness to Transformation*, April 14, 2016)

North Korea described "establishing negotiations" as a "fundamental solution" to issues surrounding its nuclear and missile programs. The statement came on April 3, a month after the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 sanctioning the North for its recent nuclear test and missile launch. It also showed a very different approach from the various shows of force with military exercises and threatening statements from Workers' Party, government, the military and other organizations over

the month since the resolution's adoption. It could be a sign that Pyongyang is preparing for a change in the climate after its seventh party congress in early May. KCNA reported the content of a National Defense Commission "spokesperson's statement" on Apr. 3. "There is widespread opinion now that maintaining stability is a more urgent priority than unilateral sanctions, establishing negotiations is a more fundamental solution than reckless military pressure, and unconditional acknowledgement and cooperation are better ways out than futile attempts at overturning of systems," the statement was quoted as saying. While the statement emphasized the pointlessness of sanctions and included threatening references to "retaliatory warfare," it also had a less confrontational tone than previous statements. In particular, it included a number of conciliatory references to "rational thinking," "stability," and "negotiations." So Se-pyong, the North's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, was quoted in an April 1 interview with Reuters as saying, "If the United States stops their hostile policy towards the DPRK and comes to the peace treaty, then something [in terms of Pyongyang's position that denuclearization is no longer on the negotiating table might be] different." In an April 2 interview with the BBC, North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom Hyon Hak-bong said, "The United States' hostile policy [and] nuclear threat pushed the DPRK Korea into developing the nuclear weapons." (Kim Jin-cheo, "N. Korea Defense Commission Mentions Negotiations as 'Fundamental Solution,'" *Hankyore*, April 4, 2016)

It was Mar. 24, 2014, and the discovery of a crashed drone in Paju sparked an investigation by a team composed of the Defense Security Command (DSC), National Intelligence Service (NIS), and local police. The DSC served as secretary, and NIS agents agreed with its assessment that the drone showed "nothing to raise North Korea-related suspicions." A few days later on Mar. 28, the investigation resumed under a central joint interrogation team, this one with the NIS - which had collected the drone - as its secretary. On Mar. 31, another drone crashed on Baengnyeong Island in the West (Yellow) Sea, and the team concluded that it had been sent by North Korea to spy on the South. Nobody at that time could have predicted what would come next: that a tiny, crudely functioning drone measuring just over one meter would trigger a furor jeopardizing the security of the Republic of Korea. While it wasn't reported in the media, forward units had routinely collected several North Korean drones since September 2013, the time when the North first began using them intensively. Sometimes the drones were carried by currents on the seas around South Korea after failing to return home; many were found in the hills. Military units that found them typically kept them in storage - or just tossed them away. Technical analysis of the drones by the Republic of Korea Defense Intelligence Command (KDIC) had shown no particularly threatening performance features worthy of attention, and the military simply wasn't that interested. Then-Minister of National Defense Kim Kwan-jin and the Joint Chiefs of Staff didn't even receive a report on the NIS investigation until April 2. The NIS held a monopoly on the information. Around the same time, the release findings finding from the prosecutors' investigation into the NIS's apparent forging of evidence falsely implicating a Seoul city contractor in espionage. Cases of false espionage charges had surfaced a few times in the past, and each time the Blue House tried to get NIS director Nam Jae-joon to verify whether the evidence had been forged. Each time, Nam swore it had not. Once it emerged that it had indeed been

forged, the Blue House began to worry - that Nam didn't have his organization fully under control, and that the public's distrust of the Park administration's security policies could end up growing. The NIS's anti-communist investigation bureau and second deputy director Seo Cheon-ho found themselves under fire, and it looked like Nam might be implicated as well. But just as clouds of worry threatened to engulf the NIS, a North Korean drone carrying a video file of images from the skies over Seoul - including the Blue House - emerged as a new political weapon. Some of the central interrogation team's information was leaked to the media, feeding a growing drone panic. It was at this point that Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Kim Min-seok flatly turned down reporters' requests on April 2 for images photographed by the drone. To do so, he said, "would be to confirm to North Korea what kind of video performance its drones have." "The images cannot be disclosed for national security reasons," Kim declared. But the leaking of footage to *Chosun Ilbo*, a right-wing newspaper, around the same time would not have been possible without some involvement by the office of the NIS's second deputy director and/or the Blue House. The next day on April 3, a large aerial photograph of the Blue House taken by the drone appeared in a front-page story in the *Chosun Ilbo*. The fact that the same pictures called "unreleasable" the day before were now in print was enough to raise suspicions that the media was colluding with either political or intelligence authorities. The DSC pointed to the NIS second deputy director's office as the source of the leak, and even hinted at a possible investigation for leaking military secrets. Even the ruling Saenuri Party's lawmakers on the National Assembly National Defense Committee exhorted the DSC director to carry out a search and seizure on the newspaper at a session just after the report; the DSC said it "absolutely would" investigate. After that, the situation became less about investigation and more about spreading drone fears. Speaking at a meeting of Blue House senior secretaries on the morning of April 7, President Park Geun-hye said it "appears that suspected North Korean drones have been spying on this country extensively" and pointed to the Defense Ministry's failure to establish the facts as "indicating problems in our air defense network and ground reconnaissance system." The mainstream media subsequently went to work whipping the public into a panic over three small aircraft that had crashed because of their poor flight capabilities, and weren't even able to transmit images in real time. In the space of a week, the drones became agents of mass destruction carrying biochemical weapons, suicide bombers targeting the Blue House and government complexes, terrifying weapons directed at nuclear power plants. Crude aircraft of the kind made by African countries where many people have no access to clean water turned into fearsome political weapons designed to fan perceptions of catastrophic security failures and excite a mass psychology enslaved by fear. Doing so required those drones to be transformed into terrifying nuclear weapons capable of raining bombs weighing 20 to 30 kg from the skies over the Blue House, as *Chosun Ilbo* suggested in its report. They had to be monsters cruising along Gangnam skyscraper windows peering in on us. A search for this period shows 5,410 articles about drones, most of which started with conservative news outlets. The political opposition also did its part. A day before Park's pronouncement, Ahn Cheol-soo, then co-chairperson of the New Politics Alliance for Democracy (now the Minjoo Party of Korea), added to the fear-mongering by saying at a supreme council meeting that "unmanned aircraft invaded our territorial skies and crashed three times - that we know of - in the past six months" and that "there could be

hundreds or even thousands of drones that have come through here." "There's nothing the administration can really say to accusations that it's been incompetent when it comes to security," Ahn declared. As the tiny drones turned into a major political issue, CNN jokingly referred to the North Korean "toy airplanes" that had penetrated South Korea's security. But in South Korean politics, it was taboo to suggest that North Korean drones did not present a serious threat. Indeed, South Korea's opposition parties were trapped in a narrative that gave them no choice but to take part in manufacturing fear by bashing the government for its failure to do anything about the supposedly serious threat of the drones. When Park Geun-hye addressed the issue, the situation got even weirder. High-ranking officers at the Joint Chiefs of Staff - including Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin - began hurrying to prepare countermeasures, describing the North Korean drones as a "serious threat." With pressing demands for the immediate creation of a new surveillance system that could defend against North Korean drones, there was no more time to wait for the development of a low-altitude local anti-air radar system that was supposed to be operated by the army. Since the North Korean drones could not be detected on South Korean equipment, the military would have to purchase low-altitude radar from overseas. But there is probably no radar in the world that can pick up tiny objects flying at low altitudes, and so ultimately the ROK Army Training and Doctrine Command had to look for a new approach. And thus, the military frittered away the past two years. It finally came to a single conclusion: it was impossible to catch North Korean drones. Fast forward two years to Mar. 20. This was the day that Yonhap reported the outcome of a test carried out by the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) on its re-creation of the drone from two years ago. Researchers concluded that the drone could at the most carry 400 to 900 grams, about the weight of a single grenade - basically meaning that the drone had no value as a weapon. The camera on the drone, ostensibly for information gathering, turned out to be an old model from the 1980s that could not even transmit information automatically. Just as bizarre was the military's claim that it had spent two years analyzing the North Korean drone, which the foreign media had regarded as a worthless contraption from the very beginning. As a result, we have already invested an enormous amount of resources in a threat that ought to be low on our list of priorities. But this kind of irrationality does not only apply to this drone. Every time we learn that the North Koreans have something unusual, it provokes an unhealthy response that entails enormous waste and chaos. After a certain point, such responses have become engrained and habitual - and habits are never easy to fix. Generally speaking, this habitual response consists of three stages. First, there is a hubbub about some new North Korean threat. This threat must be something unfamiliar that appears unexpectedly. Even a weapon that the North Koreans already had can create fear if it is being used in a new way. One example of this was in 2014, when North Korea launched one of its mid-range Nodong missiles at a high trajectory, reducing the missile's range. After the launch, the commander of US forces in Korea abruptly claimed that this represented a new signal of North Korea's intention to attack. Another example was when North Korea moved its long-range artillery from tunnels in front of the hills to the area behind the hills, which supposedly transformed them into a new and invincible threat. In this manner, existing weapons can create fear if they are put to a new use. Second, the media portrays a threat as being nothing less than the destruction of the country - and nothing can be done to stop it. This portrayal must be

lurid, showing society disintegrating into chaos in an instant, alongside scenes of a giant mushroom cloud rising over Seoul. The claim that nothing can be done must be given particular emphasis in articles such as these. At this point, The South Korean military has to be downgraded into an unprepared and disorganized organization in order to provide political groups with the rationale to involve themselves in the national defense for their own purposes. Political groups that must manufacture fear in order to more easily control the masses always want to meddle in military matters. In reality, the drone incident was a peripheral issue that could have been dealt with by a single department at the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the ROK Army Training and Doctrine Command. But the incident escalated abnormally to the point where the president, government ministers and the director of the NIS were all stepping forward to give instructions. For politicians to be able to reinforce their prestige by alerting the public of problems that the military cannot solve on its own and by going on to solve those problems themselves, the military must remain a rather incompetent organization. It must never have any solutions. Third, at this point the military must insist (as if on cue) that it needs to buy a weapons system from overseas and create a program to acquire some specific weapon. Weapons purchased for large amounts of money in the past, to be sure, are always useless against North Korea's latest threat. This three-stage response culminates in the creation of a cycle of greed involving a ballooning military budget, in which weapon systems must always be upgraded to the newest available version. We need to pay attention to the fact that the majority of corruption scandals in the defense industry occur when a decision is suddenly made to purchase some weapon system without taking the time to carry out project feasibility studies or to manage the product with sufficient care. Recently, President Park instructed the entire army to increase its alertness, just as she did two years ago. In a meeting that was convened to address a series of threats Pyongyang has made to Seoul, commanders from across the spectrum of South Korea's armed forces redoubled their resolve to respond to an imminent attack from the North. The political groups that dramatically revealed South Korea's vulnerabilities by pointing out that it does not have anti-terror legislation or measures to defend against cyberattacks have developed new national security solutions and are waiting for the next threat from North Korea. (Kim Jong-dae, "Like Hits of a Drug' - Drones and the Government's North Korea Fear Mongering," *Hankyore*, April 3, 2016)

4/4/16

Daniel Russel: "Understanding where we are today requires context. So with the advantage of having been present at some important moments of Korea diplomacy in the last quarter-century, I'll try to provide that context. As a young Foreign Service Officer, I worked under the extraordinary scholar and diplomat Jim Laney (who has been recognized by ICAS) and who was then Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. In the summer of 1994, we helped prepare former President Jimmy Carter for his trip across the demilitarized zone. Tensions at that moment were extremely high. The International Atomic Energy Agency had discovered two years earlier that North Korea was lying about its plutonium program. The U.N. Security Council demanded access for inspectors to the North's nuclear facilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement and was preparing a resolution to impose sanctions. The DPRK warned that sanctions would be treated as "an act of war," started the process to withdraw from the NPT, and began unloading its reactor in order to reprocess the



spent fuel into weapons-grade plutonium. It is not hyperbole to say that it felt like the brink of war. In briefing Jimmy Carter the day before he entered North Korea, I made two main points: first, that face-to-face diplomacy is an essential tool for influencing the DPRK's behavior; it is a mistake to think of dialogue as a reward for good behavior. Second, Carter's goal should be to persuade Kim Il-Sung to break the escalatory cycle and end the nuclear crisis through substantive negotiations - the terms of which were already largely understood. Ultimately, Carter secured a commitment from Kim for a complete and verified freeze of his nuclear program and to grant necessary access to the IAEA inspectors. The immediate crisis was averted, and the U.S. and the DPRK began negotiations in Geneva led by Bob Gallucci, a good friend of mine, and then-Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk-ju. I was a member of the U.S. team that negotiated the Agreed Framework, which was signed in October of 1994. The Agreed Framework was straightforward: North Korea committed to a nuclear weapons-free Peninsula and agreed to stop producing plutonium, to shut down its reactors, and submit its entire program to IAEA safeguards and inspections. As part of a face-saving fiction that the DPRK's nuclear program was for civilian power generation, we agreed to provide heavy fuel oil and, with Japan and South Korea, build proliferation-resistant light water reactors to make up for the "lost electricity." We also established a path toward broader rapprochement. The text spelled out that as progress was made, we would fully normalize diplomatic and economic relations and, quote, "work together for peace and security." This was the path to finally putting the Korean War behind us. The Agreed Framework achieved its immediate goal - plutonium production stopped and IAEA monitoring resumed. The agreement held over the following eight years, **although there were implementation problems on both sides** - we had difficulty getting full funding for heavy fuel oil and for the light water reactors, and the exchange of diplomatic liaison offices never took place. Looking at the big picture, **the North squandered the opportunity to open to the world. Instead, it sought another path to the bomb - uranium enrichment.** When we discovered this program in 2002, the Agreed Framework was over and the North resumed plutonium production. The following year marked the beginning of the Six-Party Talks hosted by China. One of the key lessons we had learned was the necessity of staying coordinated with North Korea's neighbors - South Korea, Russia, China, and Japan - so the North couldn't play us off against each other. And after four rounds of these Six-Party negotiations over two years, we all agreed to the Joint Statement in September 2005. The Joint Statement covered the same main areas as the Agreed Framework - the North would abandon its weapons programs and resume inspections "at an early date." We agreed to revisit providing light water reactors. The Joint Statement also expanded on the Framework. Because it was plurilateral instead of bilateral, it included provisions for strengthened engagement and economic cooperation between the North and each of the other five parties, including a commitment by Japan to move toward normalization. The Joint Statement included a "negative security assurance" - essentially that the U.S. would not attack the North. And it said the relevant parties "will negotiate a permanent peace at an appropriate separate forum." But you know where the story goes. The North said they wouldn't turn off their reactors until the new ones were ready, and as diplomacy tanked, they detonated their first nuclear weapon on October 9<sup>th</sup>, 2006. After heroic efforts by my predecessor Chris Hill, and our current Special Representative Sung Kim, North Korea walked out of the Six-Party Talks and declared

the process "dead." And soon after the fourth American President to deal with North Korea's nuclear program, Barack Obama, took office, he was greeted with a ballistic missile test in the form of a "satellite launch," and the North's second nuclear detonation. Why am I rehashing ancient history? **Because the record makes it clear that the United States has consistently made a good faith effort to reach a denuclearization deal through diplomacy.** [?] We have always accepted that there would be give and take in a settlement and that *legitimate* concerns of the DPRK would need to be addressed. We *want* a negotiated solution! President Obama came into office promising an outstretched hand to any foe that would unclench its fist. The first proof of this was engaging Ambassador Stephen Bosworth as our Special Representative for North Korea Policy. As you well know, he was truly a great diplomat, and we all mourn his recent passing. Sung Kim and I accompanied Steve to Pyongyang in December 2009 to try to resume progress towards denuclearization, but the North Koreans would not engage. As if to underline the point, three months later they ambushed and sank the *Cheonan*, a South Korean naval vessel, killing 50 ROK sailors. Notwithstanding our efforts, and the efforts by Seoul and Beijing, the DPRK has been unwilling to engage in serious dialogue or real negotiations on the nuclear issue. Washington has made important headway with Myanmar, with Iran, with Cuba. But although the door is open, Pyongyang has refused to knock. Now, analysts say that to advance the paramount goal of regime survival, the DPRK is pursuing "*byungjin*," the notion that they can develop their economy and nuclear weapons simultaneously. But North Korea will not be accepted as a nuclear state. There is complete agreement on this, not only in the U.S., but in China, Russia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and many other countries. **Neither will we be diverted by their claims that their actions are justified -- because the United States has "hostile policy" toward them -- and that what's needed is a Peace Treaty. These are diversionary tactics to shift the international community away from denuclearization.** So how is North Korea's *byungjin* policy going? I think the answer is: not well. First, internal stability: Kim's latest provocations might have gained him domestic popularity points in the short run, especially given the strength of his propaganda machine. But there is no doubt that his policies will cost him at home over time, as sanctions reduce his ability to keep buying off the military and elites. Second, security: Pyongyang's strategic posture is weakened - China and Russia are no longer interested or willing to defend this increasingly erratic and outlying regime, and are supporting tough sanctions in the Security Council. Third, economically: the North continues to face fundamental, systemic problems. They can alleviate suffering a little by allowing a black market for food and basic goods and solar panels, but apparently they deem the political risk too great to open the economy more. And biting sanctions mean that if Kim doesn't redirect his shrinking resources, things are just going to get worse. Fourth, diplomatically: the North has never seen such a level of opprobrium and isolation, with so few diplomatic and economic partners. The international community refuses to drop denuclearization, much to the dismay of North Korea's Foreign Ministry. Pyongyang's dependence on China has increased even as its relations with Beijing grow worse. President Xi's travel to Seoul to meet with President Park Geun-hye, before meeting with the leader of the North, was unprecedented... as was Park's decision to close the Kaesong industrial complex, the last economic link between the two countries. This was a dramatic demonstration that when President Park says "no more business as usual," she means it. Furthermore, the

North's so-called diplomatic "charm offensive" has failed to stop the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva. Last week, it again condemned the North's abuses by consensus, meaning that even "old friends" like Iran and Cuba have no interest in burning political capital on the North. **All in all, Kim Jong-un has nothing to show for all of his intransigence. He has made splashes in the ocean with missiles and detonated nuclear devices underground ... but it has gotten him exactly nothing in terms of respect, security, economic support, or diplomatic recognition.** So, that's Kim's strategy. What's ours? It's simple: we will continue to take away his paths to *byungjin* through diplomacy, pressure, defense, and deterrence. Diplomatically, as I've explained, we've united the world so that the North is more isolated than any country has ever been. But simultaneously, we are constantly reminding the North that we are ready, at any time, to engage in credible negotiations to reverse the situation. **The point is not to close doors to dialogue, it's to close inauthentic ones that lead to dead ends.** Because only then will the light shining through that last door of serious negotiations on the nuclear issue be fully visible. And if the North walks through that door to authentic negotiations that result in freezing, rolling back, and permanently ending its nuclear program... it will find the international community waiting for it in good faith - the other five parties, ASEAN, the EU - everyone. The second prong is pressure - we have, with our partners, enacted and enforced some of the toughest sanctions in history on the North. We've enlisted greater Chinese cooperation, and Beijing has been constructive in pressuring the North on the nuclear issue. As we encourage China to do more, implementing their commitments to enforce the tough new U.N. sanctions is the next step. If denuclearization is the last thing on earth that North Korea's leaders want to do, we need to make it the last thing on earth that they *can* do to secure their future. The goal of sanctions is *not* to destroy North Korea, but to bring its leaders to their senses. The constriction on the DPRK's access to foreign currency and foreign markets means a shortfall in funds for the nuclear program, for the missile program, for the Army, for the State Security apparatus, for industry, for electricity generation, and for the gold watches and luxury cars that help keep the elite cadres loyal. The goal of sanctions is *not* to harm the North Korean people - although the DPRK has regrettably prioritized offensive weapons over their livelihood. The goal is to bring North Korea's leaders to the realization that there is no viable alternative to negotiations. And mindful of the plight of the North Korean people, we have mobilized the international community to highlight the North's human rights abuses through U.N. resolutions, the landmark Commission of Inquiry, and opening a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights field office in Seoul. The third prong, as I mentioned, is deterrence. Even as we pursue diplomacy, we can't let down our guard. Over the last several years, we've taken major steps to modernize our security alliances, and that work is ongoing. With the Republic of Korea, we've updated the framework governing the transfer of wartime operational control of alliance forces, and the Special Measures Agreement through which the ROK provides economic and other support for our presence. After this year's nuclear and missile tests, we've jointly decided to begin consultations on the potential deployment of the THAAD missile defense system to South Korea. And a few weeks ago, we held the largest joint defensive military drills our two nations have ever done. We have also modernized our alliance with Japan, another frequent target of North Korea's threats. Notably, we've refreshed defense guidelines which hadn't been updated in over 17 years. The new guidelines prepare us

to work more closely together to counter any threats that arise. So, how is our strategy going? Consider the facts: The U.N. Security Council has rejected North Korea's attempts to sidestep their obligation to denuclearize. The U.N. Human Rights Council has rejected North Korea's attempts to hide from the horrors it perpetrates on its own people. The five nations most directly involved in working towards denuclearization are more closely coordinated than ever, and the North is more isolated. International resolve to fully enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270 is firm. And it is clear to all that America is rock-solid in our resolve to stand by our allies and achieve the goal of denuclearization. What should be clear to you by now is that the United States and our partners have not given up on diplomacy – we'll keep trying to find a way forward. **And that way forward isn't hard to imagine. It starts with North Korea freezing all its nuclear activities, like Iran did while it negotiated. And it starts with a credible declaration of the North's past activities and IAEA inspection of its nuclear sites as a first step.** Meeting basic international obligations is not a lot to ask. Then we'd resume work where the Six-Party talks left off – based on the 2005 Joint Statement. All of North Korea's stated concerns can be dealt with on the basis of that agreement -- as long as it will take the necessary steps towards full denuclearization. We have not walked back on our willingness to provide assurances and assistance to North Korea: with progress toward denuclearization we can promote economic cooperation and build a permanent peace. President Park has laid out a vision for reintegrating North Korea and its people with the world – a vision based on the belief that all Koreans want to overcome division and build a better future. We share that goal and support that vision. The United States strongly supports peaceful unification. We want to see a Korea that is whole, growing and at peace. This can be achieved. We mustn't give up. I have a vivid memory of sitting in the East Room of the White House last year as President Obama stood alongside President Park after their summit. I heard President Obama state clearly that as we have shown with Cuba and Iran, the United States is prepared to engage nations with which we've had a troubled past. But Pyongyang needs to understand that it cannot cling to nuclear weapons." (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel R. Russel, "North Korea: How to Approach the Nuclear threat, Institute for Corean-American Affairs, Rayburn House Office Building, April 4, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's answer to the question put by KCNA on Monday accusing the U.S. of vociferating about "nuclear threat" from the DPRK at the 4th "Nuclear Security Summit": The 4th "Nuclear Security Summit" took place in Washington recently to discuss the issues of nuclear terrorism, prevention of nuclear proliferation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. During the summit the U.S. worked hard to stir up the atmosphere of sanctions and pressure upon the DPRK by prodding Japan, south Korea and other followers into creating impressions that the "nuclear threat" from the DPRK is the biggest problem facing the international community. This is nothing but a crafty artifice to cover up the U.S. true colors as the world's biggest nuclear criminal and evade the blame for the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize for advocating "a world without nuclear weapons" from the beginning of his office but became a swindler who has done nothing till now close to its end as he has been engrossed in modernizing nuclear weapons and posing a nuclear threat to the world. The above-said summit has taken

place four times but the prospect of denuclearization of the world is becoming gloomier. On the contrary, nuclear weapons are posing a greater threat to global peace and security. It is by no means fortuitous that the international community is claiming Obama is chiefly to blame for this. Upset by this, the Obama group is trying hard to evade the accusations by taking issue with the DPRK, a trite method. But this is a foolish act. The atrocities the U.S. perpetrated by dropping A-bombs on mankind are the thrice-cursed monstrous crimes. The U.S. is the world's nuclear criminal who has worked hard to maintain its hegemonic position by recklessly wielding a nuclear stick, regarding nuclear threat and blackmail as the tenet of its foreign policy. This is an undeniable historical fact hard to hide and a stark reality. It is well known that the Bush administration had posed a nuclear threat to the DPRK since it designated the anti-U.S. independent states including the DPRK as "axis of evil" and targets of preemptive nuclear attack.

The Obama administration has squandered a fabulous amount of funds for modernizing nuclear weapons, far from doing anything for denuclearization quite contrary to its advocacy of building "a world without nuclear weapons." After adopting a preemptive nuclear attack on the DPRK as its policy, it is staging madcap drills under the simulated conditions of a nuclear war by introducing all type strategic nuclear strike means into the Korean peninsula. Since the Obama administration took office, the U.S. strategic nuclear strike means introduced into south Korea have increased several times, far from decreasing in their scope and number, and its nuclear war drills have become more provocative in their nature. The U.S. is, at the same time, escalating the hostile moves against the DPRK to the maximum, openly revealing its intention to screw up the political and economic pressure on the DPRK by setting in motion its followers and allies for the implementation of the UN "resolution on sanctions" cooked up against the DPRK's inevitable choice for self-defense. This is the truth about the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and the cause of escalating tension.

Confrontation and danger of a war are escalating in Northeast Asia as the U.S. is seeking to tighten the U.S.-Japan-south Korea triangular military cooperation and, furthermore, form a new military bloc for aggression under the pretext of "threat" from the DPRK. The prevailing situation more urgently requires than ever before the DPRK to bolster the nuclear deterrent for self-defense as it serves as a treasured sword to ensure the sovereignty and prosperity of the country and protect the global peace and security. **The DPRK's bolstering up of its nuclear deterrent in every way is an inevitable choice and a legitimate exercise of the right to self-defense to cope up with the U.S. extreme nuclear threat and blackmail and nuclear war moves.** As already clarified, **the DPRK will take decisive toughest countermeasures against the U.S. ever-escalating nuclear war threat and pressure in the future, too.**" (KCNA, "DPRK FM Spokesman Slams 'Nuclear Security Summit,'" April 4, 2016)

Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) prepared in accordance with paragraph 25 of resolution 2270 (2016): "On 2 March 2016, the Security Council, by its resolution 2270 (2016), decided to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and resolution 2270 (2016) through the designation of additional goods, and directed the Committee to undertake its tasks to that effect and to report to the Council within 15 days of the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016). In order to fulfil those tasks, the Committee

considered a list of weapons of mass destruction-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be identified and designated as sensitive goods. All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in the following list are only for the purpose of implementation of resolution 2270 (2016) and shall not be considered as setting precedents for international and multilateral mechanisms, regimes, instruments, principles and practices in the spheres of non-proliferation and export control. On 29 March 2016, the Committee acted in line with the Security Council's directive and approved the following:

Items, materials, equipment, goods and technology

A. Nuclear- and/or missile-usable items

(1) Ring magnets: permanent magnet materials having both of the following characteristics:

(a) Ring-shaped magnet with a relation between outer and inner diameter smaller or equal to 1.6:1;

(b) Made of any of the following magnetic materials: aluminum-nickel-cobalt, ferrites, samarium-cobalt or neodymium-iron-boron.

(2) Maraging steel having both of the following characteristics:

(a) "Capable of" an ultimate tensile strength of 1,500 MPa or more at 293 K (20°C);

(b) In bar or tube form, with an outer diameter of 75 mm or greater.

(3) Magnetic alloy materials in sheet or thin strip form having both of the following characteristics:

(a) Thickness of 0.05 mm or less; or height of 25 mm or less;

(b) Made of any of the following magnetic alloy materials: iron-chromium-cobalt, iron-cobalt-vanadium, iron-chromium-cobalt-vanadium or iron-chromium.

(4) Frequency changers (also known as converters or inverters) having all of the following characteristics, and specially designed software therefor:

(a) Multiphase frequency output; S/2016/3083/516-05424

(b) Capable of providing power of 40 W or greater;

(c) Capable of operating anywhere (at any one point or more) within the frequency range between 600 Hz and 2,000 Hz.

Technical notes: Frequency changers are also known as converters or inverters. The functionality specified above may be met by certain equipment described or marketed as electronic test equipment, AC power supplies, variable speed motor drives or variable frequency drives.

(5) High-strength aluminum alloy having both of the following characteristics:

(a) "Capable of" an ultimate tensile strength of 415 MPa or more at 293K (20°C);

(b) In bar or tube form, with an outer diameter of 75 mm or greater.

Technical note: The phrase "capable of" encompasses aluminum alloy before or after heat treatment.

(6) Fibrous or filamentary materials and prepregs as follows:

(a) Carbon, aramid or glass "fibrous or filamentary materials" having both of the following characteristics: a "specific modulus" exceeding  $3.18 \times 10^6 \text{m}$ ; a "specific tensile strength" exceeding  $76.2 \times 10^3 \text{m}$ ;

(b) Prepregs: thermoset resin-impregnated continuous "yarns," "rovings," "tows," or "tapes"

with a width of 30 mm or less, made from carbon, aramid or glass "fibrous or filamentary materials" controlled in (a) above.

(7) Filament winding machines and related equipment as follows:

(a) Filament winding machines having all of the following characteristics:

Having motions for positioning, wrapping and winding fibers coordinated and programmed in two or more axes; specially designed to fabricate composite structures or laminates from "fibrous or filamentary materials;" capable of winding cylindrical tubes of diameter of 75 mm or greater;

(b) Coordinating and programming controls for filament winding machines specified in

(a) above;

(c) Mandrels for filament winding machines specified in (a) above.

(8) Flow-forming machines as described in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 and S/2014/253

(9) Laser welding equipment

(10) 4- and 5-axis CNC machine tools

(11) Plasma cutting equipment

(12) Metal hydrides, such as zirconium hydride S/2016/30816-054244/5

B. Chemical/biological weapons-usable items

(1) Additional chemicals suitable for the production of chemical warfare agents:

Aluminum chloride (7446-70-0); Dichloromethane (75-09-2); N,N-Dimethylaniline (121-69-7); Isopropyl bromide (75-26-3); Isopropyl ether (108-20-3); Monoisopropylamine (75-31-0); Potassium bromide (7758-02-3); • Pyridine (110-86-1); Sodium bromide (7647-15-6); Sodium metal (7440-23-5); Sulfur trioxide (7446-11-9); Tributylamine (102-82-9); Triethylamine (121-44-8); Trimethylamine (75-50-3)

(2) Reaction vessels, reactors, agitators, heat exchangers, condensers, pumps, valves, storage tanks, containers, receivers, and distillation or absorption columns that meet performance parameters described in S/2006/853 and Corr.1-

Single-seal pumps with manufacturer's specified maximum flow rate greater than 0.6 m<sup>3</sup>/h and casings (pump bodies), preformed casing liners, impellers, rotors or jet pump nozzles designed for such pumps, in which all surfaces that come into direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed are made from any of the following materials:

(a) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 per cent nickel by weight; (b) Alloys with more than 25 per cent nickel and 20 per cent chromium by weight; (c) Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35 per cent fluorine by weight); (d) Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enamelled coating); (e) Graphite or carbon-graphite; (f) Tantalum or tantalum alloys;

(g) Titanium or titanium alloys;(h) Zirconium or zirconium alloys; S/2016/3085/516-

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(i) Ceramics; (j) Ferrosilicon (high silicon iron alloys); or (k) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

(3) Conventional or turbulent airflow clean-air rooms and self-contained fan-HEPA filter units that could be used for P3 or P4 (BSL 3, BSL 4, L3, L4) containment facilities (U.N. Security Council, S/2016/308, Annex to the Letter from the Chairman of the Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) to the President of the Security Council, April 4, 2016)

Robert Carlin: "Everyone has a pet thesis about what is going on and what will happen on the North Korean issue over the next several months. In mid-January, I laid out what seemed to be six likely possibilities to keep in mind. Ten weeks later, I think we can winnow the choices down to two. The first possibility is that we are in the middle of a

giant North Korean deception operation, and that the Korean People's Army (KPA) will attack at 4 a.m. on Tuesday, April 28, but doesn't want anyone to figure that out. That's only a guess, and not even a good one, but it is pretty much as good as most of the speculation that is going around about sanctions, their effect and how the North is responding. The second possibility, essentially one of the original six, is that Pyongyang knew where it was going from the point at which it decided on the fourth nuclear test—probably by late November last year; it signaled the goal immediately after the test in a *Chosun Sinbo* article on January 7; and it has continued along that path with remarkable consistency ever since. What are those signals, and what is the endpoint? Stripped of most of the qualifiers and weasel words, there is now reason to conclude that at some point—and the upcoming seventh party congress would be as good a venue as any—Kim Jong Un plans to declare the success of his *byungjin* policy and that, having achieved what Pyongyang is portraying as an overwhelmingly strong nuclear deterrent force, to claim that it is now possible for the regime to begin to shift its focus from the military to the civilian economy. The idea of a declaration of such a shift of resources is not an analytical chimera. It is not a judgment on whether or not the North will actually be able to make such a shift. The key is not whether such a strong North Korean deterrent force is a reality, not even whether Kim believes it, but whether he will set out this position as the philosophical basis for a new direction in policy. It needs to be borne in mind that Kim Jong Il used a similar public rationale in 2000 as the foundation for what became his modest July 2002 economic reforms. In other words, the question is whether the idea that enough has been done on national defense will become an engine for new policies that cannot be justified under old concepts. In preparation for such a break with previous policy, ever since the vote in the UN Security Council on the new DPRK sanctions resolution in early March, Kim Jong Un has acted according to what he seems to consider a successful playbook, one he used last August. The essence of that was: a crisis erupts; Pyongyang issues harum-scarum statements but essentially cordons them off from the population at large, other than to use them as rallying points to encourage the population to work harder on economic goals; finally, Kim declares a victory “without having fired a shot,” and credits that success to the North's possession of nuclear weapons. To put things in the current context, despite a steady stream of high-level, bombastic North Korean statements threatening all manner of mayhem on the South, the North's domestic media have not rallied the population for anything other than working harder for economic goals in preparation for the upcoming party congress. Rather than military preparations, the focus has been on what has been termed the “70-day campaign” as the lead up to the congress. Over the past month, there have been several waves of mini-propaganda campaigns against Washington and Seoul designed to get the population's blood boiling. Each time the emotional level has reached a peak the regime has flipped the switch and brought the focus back to the economic tasks at hand. As a result, unless there is other evidence of concrete preparations to follow through on any of Pyongyang's frequent threats about preemptive strikes and reducing Seoul to ashes, this does not, at the moment, look like a country preparing for significant conflict. Simply put, Kim is focused on creating an atmosphere that will support a successful party congress. That congress, not getting into a dangerous escalation with the US, is what will cement his rule. A successful congress, of course, requires, in equal measure, demonstration of an effective shield against external pressure while accomplishing a



long list of tangible achievements domestically. For outside observers, the former tends to overshadow the latter, but inside North Korea, there would seem to be no mistaking which has priority. The pattern of signals the regime has been sending to the domestic audience is by now consistent and unmistakable. Below are a few examples. (1) On February 28, DPRK media carried a lengthy letter under Kim's name thanking "1.5 million students and workers" for expressing the will to join the KPA in response to a KPA Supreme Command "crucial statement" several days earlier that had threatened Washington and Seoul with crushing strikes for their plans to launch decapitation operations against the North. The key to Kim's letter was not the windup, however, but the pitch. The letter ended with the admonition that students should stay in school and workers at their posts in order to "achieve greatest successes conducive to building a prospering country by waging an unprecedented labor struggle and intensive studying at their workplaces and schools with the feeling that they are in the same trench as the service personnel." (2) On March 16, the "government, political parties, and organizations of the Republic" issued a joint statement expressing outrage, again at US-ROK decapitation exercises, and promising to "pulp and bury" those attempting to harm Kim Jong Un. The statement spelled out, "The state law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea specifies that, should the supreme dignity of the country be put in danger, all strike means, including nuclear strike means, must be fully mobilized to preemptively wipe out the countries and objects which have been involved in it directly or indirectly." The statement ended, however, not with a call to arms but with the by now familiar theme that the way for the people to "protect and defend" Kim was "with a great victory of the 70-day battle. . ." (3) If there were any doubt which way Pyongyang wanted the domestic winds to blow, two days later, on March 18, North Korean media reported that Kim had appeared at the opening of construction of a major new building project—Ryomyong Street—in Pyongyang. The project was described as developing an area across from Kim Il Sung University for apartment houses for "scientists and researchers including educators of Kim Il Sung University, nursery, kindergarten, laundry, post office and other public buildings and public service amenities. Kim was cited as making a "passionate appeal" to complete construction of the street within this year, noting that: Construction of the street is not merely for formation of a street but serves as a political occasion of clearly showing the spirit of the DPRK standing up and keeping up with the world, despite all sorts of sanctions and pressure by the U.S. imperialists and their followers, the appearance of the country advancing to realize the great ideal of the people and the truth that the DPRK is able to be well-off in its own way and nothing is impossible for it to do. Completing the construction, Kim said, would enhance optimism "about sure victory and once again demonstrate our strength . . ." (3) Perhaps the closest things have come so far to real mobilization-type rhetoric was a carefully scripted but very short campaign that began on March 26 with the "long-range artillery force of the large combined unit of the KPA on the front" issuing an "ultimatum" to Park Guen-hye to apologize and punish those responsible for decapitation planning or face annihilation. That ultimatum (with no deadline specified) was followed up by salvos of supporting statements in the media. Students were said to be "petitioning for military service rather than admission to universities"; workers and farmers were quoted as wanting to join the army to "wipe out the provokers." Yet just as this campaign seemed to reach a peak, on March 28, the regime let the air out of the balloon with media reports that

Kim Jong Un had appeared at a store and health complex with his wife, hardly an image designed to foster a military mobilization. (4) On March 28, *Rodong Sinmun* carried a political essay employing, as these essays do, typically poetic and emotional expressions of sacrifice and allegiance to the leader. Its main message, however, did not waver from the economic priority. "Today's 70-day battle toward the Seventh Party Congress is indeed a furnace of struggle that verifies the millions of soldiers and people's loyalty toward the party and the leader." The hot imagery continued—"the sweat of increased production dropped amid trials" is "speechless eloquence that proves the life of a peacetime human-bomb warrior who responds to the leader's call not with words but by presenting his heart. In other words, essentially picking up Kim Jong Un's instructions from his letter on February 28, the essay's message was stay at the machines, work hard and produce. With about a month to go until the US-ROK exercises end, we still have to go over hill and dale, more posturing, and possible missteps on either side. Concern about miscalculation, of course, is the bane of our existence in these situations, and each time it seems to get more worrisome. Maybe this time it is worse. If Kim Jong Un is dancing on the edge of the precipice, he must realize that the drop is steeper than it has been before. He also knows, however, that once through the joint exercises, the way could be open for him to move into stage two. Kim's declaration of a "bloodless and warless" victory at the end of the US-ROK exercises will not be a surprise to anyone who has read the March 28 political essay, which notes that is exactly what happened last summer. "In August 2015 again, was it not the same invincible faith that turned the harsh waves of war into nothing and achieved bloodless and warless great victory?" Here is a new working hypothesis to keep on the table. One can never be sure of the timing of a specific North Korean proposal, nor the vehicle in which it will be presented. In essence, these will be the opening moves: (1) Kim declares *byungjin* a success, i.e., a sufficiently strong nuclear deterrent to allow concentration on the economy and, potentially, reduced spending on the military (the latter were, in fact, part of the original *byungjin* concept as explained in Kim's March 31, 2013 plenum speech); and (2) Pyongyang makes a major proposal on replacing the armistice, linking progress on a peace agreement to movement on the nuclear front. This would be put under the umbrella of the need for the "peaceful environment" Kim has several times said was required for economic growth. Once again, as at the beginning of this drama in early January, *Chosun Sinbo* was used to send an important signal. On March 15, the same day as reports in central DPRK media of Kim Jong Un guiding a test of a missile warhead, the *Chosun Sinbo* carried the third of a three-part series. The article cited the March 9 offer advanced by the Chinese foreign minister for holding **"denuclearization negotiations and the discussion of a peace agreement at the same time,"** the first time the North has acknowledged the Chinese idea, and seemingly a step back—albeit a small one—from earlier, harsh North Korean criticism in a March 4 government statement of the "big powers" monopolizing the United Nations, "including the United States and fools who follow them." Equally, if not more important, the article singled out Kim Jong Un's remarks from March 9 that, "the real 'enemy' that North Korea's nuclear force has to deal with is nuclear war itself." It implied that this quotation should be read in the context of a June 2013 National Defense Commission (NDC) statement—which the article went out of its way to note was released only a few months after the declaration of the *byungjin* line—which had proposed high-level talks with the US, stating that, "The

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the behest of our leader and our general, and it is the policy task that our party, state and millions of soldiers and people must accomplish without fail." A month later, in July 2013, in a private meeting with an American delegation of former government officials, DPRK officials expressed consternation that Washington did not seem to grasp the importance of the NDC statement. Tactically, Pyongyang might well imagine at the point of a new DPRK proposal for talks, Beijing stepping in and declaring that this was exactly the purpose of the UN sanctions, and, not coincidentally, the essence of China's proposal for parallel peace and nuclear talks. Indeed, PRC media accounts of Xi Jinping's meetings in Washington last week with President Obama and Park Guen-hye at the Nuclear Security Summit might be read approvingly by the North. Rather than just indicate full Chinese support for sanctions, they imply that Beijing will also insist that "fully and strictly" carrying out relevant UN resolutions includes efforts to achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through dialogue. That's the card Kim Jong Un has left to play at a time of his choosing." (Robert Carlin, "Pulling the Rabbit Out of the Hat: Kim Jong Un's Path out of the Nuclear Crisis," *38North*, April 4, 2016)

Mugford and Bermudez: "Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates suspicious activity at the Yongbyon Radiochemical Laboratory complex used to produce plutonium for building nuclear weapons. Whether that activity—exhaust plumes from a steam plant used to heat the main plant—means reprocessing additional plutonium is underway or will be in the near future remains unclear. However, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence recently stated that the North Koreans could be ready to do so in weeks or months. Pyongyang continues to make slow, steady progress in completing the transformer yard associated with the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR). Whether that means the ELWR will finally become operational in 2016 remains unclear, particularly since previous estimates have proven optimistic. During the past five weeks, exhaust plumes on two, possibly three, occasions were observed at the Radiochemical Laboratory's Thermal Plant (e.g., steam plant). (The laboratory is Yongbyon's main reprocessing installation to produce plutonium.) This activity is unusual since exhaust plumes have rarely been seen there and none have been observed on any examined imagery this past winter. The plumes suggest that the operators of the reprocessing facility are heating their buildings, perhaps indicating that some significant activity is being undertaken, or will be in the near future. Whether that activity will be additional separation of plutonium for nuclear weapons remains unclear, although in recent testimony, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, stated that the North Koreans could be ready in the coming weeks or months to do so. Recent commercial satellite imagery from March 21 indicates continued work at the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) transformer yard that has been the focus of activity for most of this year. At the end of 2015, a second transformer was installed in the yard. More recently in February, a small truck and what appears to have been a double bucket crane were present. This equipment is common in the United States, and is used in urban areas for repairing or installing power and/or communication lines. The "buckets" on the top of the crane arms appear to be out over the transformer yard and are probably being used to install electrical cables. There is a second vehicle immediately south of the crane and two vertical poles have been installed 60-70 feet southeast of the yard. In Late March, they were still present,

probably completing their work. Imagery from March 21 also shows that a road has now been built around the eastern and southern sides of the transformer yard (Figure 2). A bulldozer or similar type of equipment was probably used to build the road as there is a pile of earth all along the outer edges of the new road. Certainly, this activity is a clear sign of further progress towards completion of the ELWR. However, whether it means that the ELWR will finally become operational in 2016 remains unclear. Previous estimates have proven optimistic. It still remains unclear if the North Koreans have been able to surmount other potential hurdles, such as mastering the production of fuel bundles for this reactor. During the first three months of 2016 there has been no evidence of steam generation or cooling water exhaust at the 5 MWe reactor. However, there was evidence of continued activity with vehicles of various sizes and numbers being moved around the rear of the 5 MWe reactor hall. What the exact purpose of this activity is remains unclear. One possibility is continued maintenance. This activity appears to indicate that the reactor is being worked on, perhaps to bring it back into service. Recent imagery shows a continued high level of activity in the southeastern corner of the uranium enrichment complex. While it has been suggested that the new buildings under construction here are an Isotope Separation Facility, it is unclear whether there is sufficient evidence from imagery alone to draw that conclusion. The two largest buildings appear to be almost externally finished, although it could require years to complete installation of equipment. Construction on a third large building that has existed for months as a framework has now restarted. There are at least three, possibly four, additional buildings in the early stages of construction (e.g., frameworks, foundations or excavations). The southeast corner of the Fuel Fabrication Complex is served by a rail spur, which is being used for delivering materials and components to the new facility. Among the items that have been observed arriving was a large (10-meters by 3-meters) tank car that has remained parked on a rail siding for the past three months. In the March 21 image, however, the tank car is no longer present. The contents and purpose of this tank car remain unclear. While CO<sub>2</sub> production is neither an overly complex process, nor does it require extensive equipment, work at an industrial scale requires support, production and delivery infrastructure. Satellite imagery of the Tohwa-ri facility from 2010-2016 shows no production equipment (e.g., storage tanks—large or small, fans, compressors, etc.), identifying characteristics (e.g., roof penetrations for exhaust stacks or ventilation, large bay doors, presence of steam or smoke, etc.), or other activity (e.g., presence of shipping materials, tank or flat-bed stake trucks, etc.) typically associated with CO<sub>2</sub> production facilities. Additionally, the internal construction of almost all the buildings at Tohwa-ri is simply not conducive to the installation of anything but the very smallest CO<sub>2</sub> production equipment. In short, there are no indications of CO<sub>2</sub> production at the Tohwa-ri facility. Rather, it appears to be a small livestock husbandry facility similar to many others dispersed throughout North Korea. Moreover, there are no readily apparent reasons why the North Koreans would want to produce CO<sub>2</sub> at the Tohwa-ri facility when just 12 kilometers to the southwest is the Namhung Youth Chemical Factory—one of the largest chemical production complexes in North Korea—which has been refurbished and modernized during the past 10 years." (William Mugford and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Suspicious Activity at Yongbyon Radiological Laboratory; Progress toward Completing the Experimental Light-Water Reactor," *38North*, April 4, 2016)

South Korea's unification ministry said it has slapped five pastors with 2 million won (\$1,740) fines each for meeting North Koreans without the government's approval. The pastors belonging to the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCCK) met with their North Korean counterparts in China in late February without receiving the ministry's approval for their contact. The fines mark the first time Seoul has penalized the NCCCK for breaking rules regarding the meeting of North Koreans. South Korean nationals need the government's approval when meeting people from North Korea. The government has not allowed South Koreans to visit North Korea or contact North Koreans in response to the North's January nuclear test and long-range rocket launch in February. The pastors said that they notified the ministry of their contact with the North Koreans after reaching China, a move which they said did not lead to any problems in the past. They said that they are considering lodging a lawsuit against the government and stage a protest against what they called the government's hostility against inter-Korean reconciliation. "The group is seeking to help turn a confrontational mode on the peninsula into reconciliatory one," Noh Jong-sun, an honorary professor at Yonsei University, told reporters. Noh was one of the five pastors. But the ministry rejected their claims, saying that its punitive actions were made as they clearly violated a law on inter-Korean exchanges. The government said that the group met the North Koreans despite its warnings. "A submission of a report of contact with North Koreans afterwards is only allowed when there is an accidental encounter," said a ministry official. "This case is different as they pushed ahead with the meeting with North Koreans despite the government's decision not to allow it." (Yonhap, "S. Korea Slaps 5 Pastors with Fines for Unauthorized Contact with N. Koreans," *Korea Times*, April 4, 2016)

A British banker who spent two decades living in communist North Korea set up a secret offshore finance company allegedly used by the Pyongyang regime to help sell arms and expand its nuclear weapons program. Nigel Cowie - a fluent Korean and Chinese speaker, who studied at Edinburgh University - was behind a Pyongyang front company, DCB Finance Limited, registered in the British Virgin Islands, papers show. He says DCB Finance was used for legitimate business and that he was unaware of any unlawful transactions. Cowie moved to North Korea in 1995 when Kim Jong-il was in power, and went on to become head of its first foreign bank, Daedong Credit Bank. Initially operating out of a ramshackle Pyongyang hotel with a staff of three, Cowie led a consortium that in 2006 bought a 70% stake in the bank. Giving his address as Pyongyang's International House of Culture, he registered DCB Finance Limited, an offshoot of the bank, in the BVI in summer 2006, with a senior North Korean official, Kim Chol-sam. The Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca incorporated the company, despite North Korea being an obvious high-risk destination. That July Kim Jong-il signaled his defiance of US sanctions by firing seven ballistic missiles. In October, North Korea carried out its first nuclear weapons test with a controlled underground explosion. The ensuing diplomatic crisis saw the UN impose asset freezes and travel and trade bans. In 2013, the US imposed sanctions on Daedong and Cowie's front company, DCB, as well as on Kim Chol-sam. It alleged the bank provided "financial services" to North Korea's main arms dealer, the Korea Mining Development Corporation, and its main financial arm, Tanchon Commercial Bank, which were subject to sanctions for the "central role they play supporting North Korea's illicit

nuclear and ballistic missiles programs." The US Treasury claimed that since "at least 2006, Daedong Credit Bank had used its front company, DCB Finance Limited, to carry out international financial transactions as a means to avoid scrutiny by financial institutions avoiding business with North Korea." Kim was suspected of facilitating transactions worth hundreds of thousands and managing millions of dollars in North-Korean-related accounts. Before moving to North Korea Cowie worked for HSBC in Hong Kong. From Pyongyang he gave several interviews to visiting foreign journalists, extolling North Korea as an under-appreciated investment opportunity. He told the Wall Street Journal he was part of an "effort to try to get the country going again". Asked if he might prefer to work out of New York or Hong Kong rather than under an oppressive Stalinist dictatorship, he told the paper: "This is a lot more fun." The Panama Papers reveal Mossack Fonseca failed to notice Cowie's companies were linked to North Korea - even though he gave an address there. The banker also used Mossack Fonseca to register another company, Phoenix Commercial Ventures Limited. In a joint venture with Pyongyang's ministry of culture, the firm made CDs and DVD players. It was only in 2010 that Mossack Fonseca realized it had been dealing with North Korean entities, and resigned as agent. The discovery came after the law firm got a letter from the British Virgin Islands' Financial Investigation Agency asking for details of Cowie's company. The next year, Cowie sold his share in the bank to a Chinese consortium. The Panama Papers include acrimonious emails between Mossack Fonseca's BVI office and its head office in Panama. In 2013, a member of the firm's compliance department admitted Cowie's North Korean address "should have been a red flag". She wrote: "It is not the ideal situation and it is not gratifying issuing a letter highlighting the inefficiencies of Mossack Fonseca BVI." The US sanction against DCB was issued in June 2013, but it referred to a period from 2006, when Cowie was running Daedong. Cowie responded that he had left banking in 2011 to focus on other business commitments. In a letter, his lawyer said: "My client was a shareholder in DCB Finance Ltd, a company set up to enable DCB to continue to operate after correspondent banks had closed its accounts. The name was specifically chosen in order to reflect the historical connection with DCB. DCB Finance Ltd was used for legitimate business. My client was, and still is to this day unaware of any transactions being made with any sanctioned organization or for any sanctioned purpose, during his tenure." (Juliette Garside and Luke Harding, "British Banker Set up Firm 'Used by North Korea to Sell Weapons,'" *The Guardian*, April 6, 2016)

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South Korea has determined that North Korea is capable of mounting a nuclear warhead on its medium-range Nodong ballistic missile, which could reach all of South Korea and most of Japan, a senior government official said. The government's assessment, shared in a background briefing with foreign news media representatives in Seoul, followed a recent claim by North Korea that it had "standardized" nuclear warheads small enough to be carried by ballistic missiles. South Korean officials, like their American counterparts, have said that the North has made progress in miniaturizing nuclear warheads, but have been reluctant to elaborate. But after four recent nuclear tests by the North, the latest on January 6, some nongovernmental analysts in South Korea have said that they believe the North has learned how to fit its medium-range Nodong missile with nuclear warheads. The senior government official echoed that assessment, but did not provide any evidence of how the government has

made its determination. He did not say if the North had actually built such a warhead or simply had the technology to do so, but said the government did not have any evidence that the North had actually fitted miniaturized warheads onto a missile. Even if such advances have been made for medium-range missiles, most analysts in the United States and South Korea say the North may still be years away from building a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile that could target the continental United States. There has been a continuing debate about how close North Korea has come to acquiring nuclear-tipped missiles. The country has never flight-tested a long-range missile. After the North's recent claims, the South Korean Defense Ministry said on March 9 that it did not believe the North had achieved the miniaturization of a nuclear warhead, but it did not clarify whether it meant long-or short-range missiles. The Pentagon has also voiced skepticism. But one senior United States military commander, Adm. William E. Gortney, said at a Senate hearing last month that it was a "prudent decision" to assume that the North "has the capability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and put it on an ICBM." The South Korean official who talked to reporters on Tuesday said that North Korea still needed "several years" before mastering the technology to build a nuclear warhead small and sophisticated enough to be mounted on an intercontinental ballistic missile. (Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea Can Mount Warheads, South Says," *New York Times*, April 6, 2016, p. A-6)

DPRK FoMin paper: "The whole world is watching very closely the dangerous situation on the Korean Peninsula with great concern and unrest. The ever-worsening danger of war between arms and between nukes is being created amidst acute confrontation between the nuclear armed DPRK and the U.S. forces. The U.S. no longer bothers to disguise its military exercises as "defensive" and "annual," but is waging ferocious offensive maneuvers, openly advocating a "decapitating operation," "inland occupation" and "advance towards Pyongyang" exercises targeting our supreme headquarters and the toppling of our system for which the hugest amount of troops, strategic nuclear striking means and the special forces have been mobilized. The DPRK is demonstrating its modern military means like nuclear warheads and ballistic rockets against such maneuvers, declaring that it will deliver a preemptive nuclear strike to thoroughly frustrate the special operation of the U.S. and south Korean troops in advance if any slightest sign is detected. It poses a realistic threat, clear to everyone, that a tiny spark can lead to an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula, which will escalate into the thermonuclear war that will set the whole world on fire. There are some simple and prejudiced views that the current touch-and-go situation is attributable to the first hydrogen bomb test and the launch of an artificial satellite conducted by the DPRK. Such views will make the issue much more complicated, far from being of any help to its settlement. In order to solve the issue, it is of vital importance to gain a deep insight into the root cause of the deterioration of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and to also have a correct understanding of our nuclear possession and the launch of artificial (sic) satellites. **What made the DPRK to possess nuclear weapons?** The U.S. nuclear threat toward the DPRK is, by no means, an abstract notion but a reality. The DPRK is the country that was directly under nuclear threat and blackmail, persistent and intense, for the longest period. Only recently, the world is seriously concerned about the danger of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula; however the DPRK had already been placed on the threshold of a nuclear war as early as in the 1950s. On November

30, 1950, at the height of the Korean War, the then U.S. President Harry S. Truman publicly stated about the use of an atomic bomb and following his statement McArthur, the then-commander of the U.S. Forces in the Far East, worked out the plan in the following December to use dozens of A-bombs and to set up the radioactive corridor in the northern part of Korea that would cover the area between the east coast and the west coast and attempted to put that plan into practice. The U.S. no longer bothers to disguise its military exercises as 'defensive' and 'annual.' Furthermore, the U.S. had planned the use of atomic bombs six times during the period of the Korean War including the exercise of B-29 strategic bombers of the U.S. Air Force simulating atomic bomb drops in the skies of Pyongyang in September and October 1951. The issue of separated families and relatives, the longstanding issue between the north and the south of Korea is none other than the tragic result of the U.S. nuclear blackmail during the Korean War. Even after the conclusion of the Korean War Armistice Agreement, the U.S. has ceaselessly increased nuclear threats against the DPRK by bringing the first tactical nuclear weapon into south Korea in 1957 as a start, and since then, around 1,720 nuclear weapons had been deployed combat ready by the mid of 1980s. The deployment of various kinds of nuclear weapons ranging from the backpack nuke to the neutron bomb, the so-called "devil's weapon of the 20th century," literally turned south Korea into an exhibition hall for U.S. nuclear weapons. It was only too clear who is the target of those vast amount of nuclear weapons deployed in the southern part of the not-so-large Korean Peninsula and for the DPRK it was a serious threat indeed, endangering the existence of the country and nation itself. The U.S. not only brought nuclear weapons into south Korea but also made the actual threat of nuclear attack against the DPRK. Every year since 1954, the U.S. has been mobilizing a huge amount of nuclear weapons in and around south Korea to wage nuclear war exercises against the DPRK, changing their titles from "Focus Lens" to "Fool Eagle" and to "Team Spirit" and so on, and it has persistently increased the nuclear threat towards the DPRK. According to state documents declassified by the U.S., the Pentagon worked out three offensive plans in 1969 when the spy plane EC-121 incident broke out; the plan of striking 12 places within the DPRK with nuclear weapons with the destructive force of 0.2-10kt TNT, the plan of destroying our air forces by striking sixteen airfields with 10-70kt nuclear weapons, and the one of neutralizing most of the striking ability of the DPRK. At the time of Panmunjom incident in 1976, strategic bomber fleets flew in the skies close to the DMZ putting the world under nuclear fear, and a nuclear strategic bomber B-52 was put into the skies over the Jik Islet in the west sea to conduct the training of dropping nuclear bombs in February 2014. It was also disclosed that the F-16 Fighter-Bomber fleet of the U.S. 8th combatant flight corps at the U.S. Air Force Base in Kunsan underwent the training of attacking the DPRK with B-61 nuclear bombs. The U.S. Bush Administration labeled the DPRK as an "Axis of Evil" at the State of the Union address on January 30, 2002, and made public the Nuclear Posture Review Report in March same year, which included our country on the list of nuclear preemptive strike targets. The report made the nuclear preemptive strike against us as an established fact by clarifying that the U.S. could deliver the nuclear preemptive strike against 7 countries including our country even if those countries did not possess nuclear weapons and the U.S. was not put under the direct nuclear attack. Today, they are making a fuss about the announcement of our position to deliver a nuclear preemptive strike. However, in fact



15 years ago, the U.S. first declared the nuclear preemptive strike against the DPRK. The U.S. policy of a nuclear preemptive strike against the DPRK has remained completely unchanged even after that. The U.S. Obama Administration excluded our country from the list of countries to which it will not use nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Posture Review Report released on April 6, 2010, clearly showing that nothing had changed from the previous policy pursued by Bush Administration, which designated us as a target of a nuclear preemptive strike and made it their business to make the nuclear threat against us. The U.S., the biggest nuclear power as well as the only country to actually use nuclear weapons in a real situation, established the policy of a nuclear preemptive strike against us and persistently increased the nuclear threats to the extent that can no longer be overlooked. That is why we had no other choice but choose the mode of a nuclear preemptive strike. The U.S. has mobilized a huge amount of aggression troops together with various kinds of nuclear war equipment including the "John C. Stennis" nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, B-52, B-2 nuclear strategic bomber, F-22A stealth fighters for the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 joint military exercises, and it is even conducting the training of "Decapitating Operation" in the way of fighting an actual war pursuant to the extremely risky OPLAN 5015. What's more, the U.S. does not bother to disguise the fact that their recent launch of ICBM "Minuteman-3", one of the major nuclear strike means, is aimed at the DPRK and the U.S. is running amuck to install the antiballistic missile system using our "threat" as a good excuse. The U.S. labeled us as an "Axis of Evil" and designated us as a target of a nuclear preemptive strike. At any moment the U.S. missiles or stealth bombers carrying nuclear weapons may attack us and their special forces may launch a surprise attack against our major facilities even at this very moment. This is the military situation on the Korean Peninsula. It is said that the deployment of THAAD in south Korea by the U.S. will destroy the strategic balance in the region, however, from our point of view, the balance of military strength on the Korean peninsula had already been destroyed long time ago due to the U.S. nuclear threat. Only thanks to our possession and continued development of self-defensive capability and strong nuclear deterrence, the balance could be achieved and barely maintained up to now. **Efforts by the DPRK to remove the U.S. nuclear threat** At any moment the U.S. missiles or stealth bombers carrying nuclear weapons may attack us and their special forces may launch a surprise attack. The DPRK, the security of which has been exposed to serious danger posed by the constant U.S. nuclear threat, has taken every possible measure and made every possible effort to prevent the U.S. nuclear threat. We took the initiative of creating the Asia Peace Zone in 1959, and made a proposal of creating the Nuclear-Free Zone in Northeast Asia in 1981, and the proposal of creating the Nuclear-Free Zone on the Korean peninsula in 1986. We declared at home and abroad in July 1991 that we were fully prepared to take all the necessary measures to turn the Korean peninsula into the nuclear-free zone, and directed our positive and sincere efforts for the implementation of "Joint Statement on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" adopted between the north and south in January 1992. For the purpose of removing the daily increasing U.S. nuclear threat, we had direct dialogues with the U.S., participated in the tripartite conference and even made a courageous decision of accepting the U.S. proposal to hold the 6 party talks. We had acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), underwent inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), held talks on denuclearization in bilateral

and multilateral negotiations and discussed the issue of denuclearization and the conclusion of peace agreement comprehensively at the same time. However, nothing was solved in the end. We declared at home and abroad in July 1991 that we were fully prepared to take all the necessary measures to turn the Korean Peninsula into the nuclear-free zone. Our efforts through dialogue and the attempts relying on the international laws and organizations all ended in a failure. Nothing and no one could stop the U.S. nuclear threat towards us. The only and last choice left was to counter the nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the DPRK took the resolute and self-defensive measure of completely quitting the NPT on January 10, 2003 by effecting the force that had been suspended for 10 years, and proceeded to the legitimate road of manufacturing the nuclear weapons and conducting the nuclear test without any restrictions from the treaty. As a result, the unbalanced status of nuclear weapons was redressed in the Northeast Asia where only the DPRK remained a blank space in the terms of nuclear weapons and a nuclear umbrella. The 2013 March Plenary Meeting of Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea put forward the new line of simultaneously and ceaselessly developing the national self-defense capabilities with nuclear weapons as a backbone. Hence, today, the DPRK has become the full-fledged power possessing the hydrogen bomb by concentrating its efforts on the building of nuclear weapons and realized the miniaturization and standardization of nuclear warheads mountable on a ballistic rocket. We successfully developed the reentry technology of ballistic rockets by dint of self-reliance, which is of great significance in developing the ballistic rocket technology, dynamically pushed forward the diversification of means of delivering nuclear warheads and now we have embarked on the new higher stage of getting ready to make nuclear strikes against the enemies from anywhere on the ground, in the air, at sea and underwater. The U.S. nuclear threat is the motive force driving the DPRK to further strengthen the nuclear forces. If we had lived in a peaceful environment without any nuclear threat from the U.S., we would not have needed even a single nuclear weapon. The extreme U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK and its nuclear threats are the root cause and the force which drove us to the current stage of possessing and strengthening the nuclear weapons. With regard to this issue, Sergey Markov, the director-general of the Research Institute of Politics in Russia, commented that the purpose of the U.S. is to topple the system of Pyongyang and that is driving the DPRK to further enhance its nuclear deterrence. We have embarked on the new higher stage of getting ready to make nuclear strikes against the enemies from anywhere on the ground, in the air, at sea and underwater. The Associated Press also reported that the DPRK's claim on the rights of possessing nuclear weapons to protect itself from the nuclear super power - that persistently seeks to change the DPRK government continuing the state of ceasefire since the Korean War in the 1950s - should not be differentiated from those of other powers. Neither "sanctions" nor pressure can reverse our efforts to strengthen the nuclear deterrence. That is because "sanctions" itself is a form of hostile acts towards us and we have possessed nuclear weapons to protect ourselves in the light of such hostile acts. The hostile forces headed by the U.S. try to stifle our economy and weaken our military strength by applying various kinds of "sanctions." Their ultimate goal is to destroy our ideology and system by force of arms. As we are fully aware of such sinister purpose, the more severe the hostile forces' sanction maneuver become, the further we consolidate our military strength and nuclear deterrence. Under the

current situation where the nuclear armed DPRK and the U.S. stand in an acute confrontation, nothing can be more absurd than to tell us to give up the war deterrence unilaterally as it is quite like putting down a hunting gun in front of a fierce beast. Neither 'sanctions' nor pressure can reverse our efforts to strengthen the nuclear deterrence. The U.S. is not a country which will give up its wild ambition for the aggression even if the other party puts down the weapon and makes a concession. It has been clearly proven by the case of Iraq, which showed its "good faith" of leaving the president's palace under the search by the inspection team yielding to the pressure from the U.S. and the West, and also by the one of Libya, which gave up nuclear development and tried to seek for "reconciliation." On March 8, Al Jazeera commented as follows: The DPRK still remembers the miserable end of Gaddafi who gave up nuclear plan, and it has not forgotten what happened in Ukraine that did not preserve the USSR nuclear weapons in its territory in return for receiving the guarantee for territorial integrity in 1994. Neither hardships nor trials could change the policy of the DPRK. As of now, there is no reason for the DPRK to change its attitude, and it will be impossible to achieve the desired result by resorting to sanctions. In the end, we came to a conclusion that the only way to defend the nation's sovereignty and its right to existence is to further enhance the nuclear forces both in terms of quantity and quality and keep the balance of force in today's extreme situation where the U.S. unhesitatingly forces wars and calamities upon other countries and nations by wielding its military high-handedness." (Kim Chol Min, "The U.S. Nuclear Threat and Encroachment upon the Sovereignty of DPR Korea Is the Root Cause of the Aggravation of the Situation on the Korean Peninsula, DPRK's Institute for Disarmament and Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *NKNews*, April 5, 2016)

China banned imports of gold and rare earths from North Korea as well as exports to the country of jet fuel and other oil products used to make rocket fuel, a move in line with new United Nations sanctions on Pyongyang. The ministry said it would also ban coal shipments from North Korea, although it made exemptions consistent with sanctions, including uses intended for "the people's well-being" and not connected to nuclear or missile programs. North Korea delivered around 20 million tonnes of coal to China last year, up 27 percent on the year, overtaking Russia and Mongolia to become China's third biggest supplier, behind Australia and Indonesia. An exception was made for coal originating in third countries and supplied via North Korea's port of Rason. Landlocked Mongolia, looking for alternative supply routes for its commodities, has already signed an agreement with the port that gave its exporters preferential treatment. Export bans on jet and rocket fuel included exemptions for "basic humanitarian needs" in conjunction with inspections, and for civilian passenger jets flying outside of North Korea. Other restricted minerals include vanadium and titanium, both used in steel alloys. (Michael Martina and David Stanway, "China Announces Restrictions of Trade with North Korea," Reuters, April 5, 2016)

South Korea's ICT ministry said North Korea's disruptions of GPS signals, which started March 31, continued to affect local airplanes and ships on April 4. The Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning said the GPS disruptions have been repeating at intervals, impacting Seoul's adjacent city of Incheon, and the surrounding Gyeonggi and Gangwon provinces. The ministry said 746 airplanes and 621 vessels experienced

disruptions, but no significant damage has been reported so far. The disruptions can cause mobile phones to malfunction, and affect planes and ships that rely on GPS for navigation. (Kang Yoon-seung, "Pyongyang's GPS Disruptions Continue for 5<sup>th</sup> Day," Yonhap, April 5, 2016) The Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning said the GPS disruptions that began Thursday were no longer detected as of 12:00 p.m. April 6. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Halts Jamming GPS," April 6, 2016)

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DPRK FoMin Disarmament and Peace Institute spokesman's statement: "The U.S. is advertising that its forces' occupation of south Korea and joint military exercises are "legal" as they are pursuant to the "mutual defense treaty" with south Korea and it is observing the Korean Armistice Agreement. ...This is sheer sophism and a crafty artifice to cover up the U.S. aggressive nature and mislead world public opinion. ...The U.S.-south Korea "mutual defense treaty" which the U.S. cites as a ground claiming the "legality" of the joint military drills, is an illegal document quite contrary to the Korean Armistice Agreement. The AA stipulates the articles calling for holding a political conference within three months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective and negotiating the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. However, the U.S. concluded the "mutual defense treaty" with the south Korean puppet forces before the period for convening the political conference stipulated in the AA. The U.S. has persistently staged joint military drills aiming at the invasion against the DPRK with south Korean puppet forces after freezing its military occupation of south Korea in violation of the AA. This is not only the total abrogation of the key paragraph of the armistice agreement which calls for insuring a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved but an open declaration of a war against the DPRK. The U.S. stands against the DPRK's proposal for concluding a peace treaty, an illegal act in wanton violation of not only the paragraph dealing with ensuring the peaceful settlement of the Korean question but also the purpose and principle of the UN Charter which calls for bringing about by peaceful means ... adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. The purpose sought by the U.S. is to keep the "mutual defense treaty" which it signed with the south Korean puppet forces and put the whole Korean peninsula under its control with the treaty as a legal ground and thus realize its hegemonic Asia-Pacific strategy. The U.S. claims the arms buildup in south Korea and joint military exercises are also to protect the U.S. forces in case of contingency but it is just a far cry. If the U.S. is truly concerned about damage to be done to its forces in case of a war on the peninsula, it can just **withdraw** them from south Korea. The removal of cancer-like U.S. forces would create a peaceful environment as it would clear the Korean peninsula and the region of the source of war. But at present there is no institutional mechanism for checking a thermonuclear war on the Korean peninsula and the U.S. nuclear threat to the DPRK is steadily increasing. Under the prevailing situation **the DPRK will further bolster its nuclear deterrence both qualitatively and quantitatively** and exercise with dignity its right to self-defense as a sovereign state. The statement said the U.S. reckless nuclear war exercises are a suicidal act little short of digging its own grave." (KCNA, "U.S.-South Korea 'Mutual Defense Treaty' Dismissed as Illegal," April 6, 2016)

North Korea said it is sticking to its stance to seek dialogue with South Korea with the aim of improving inter-Korean ties in what may be a peace gesture in the face of tougher U.N. sanctions.

The North's comments came two days after it said that pursuing stability and talks, rather than unilateral sanctions and military pressure, will become fundamental solutions to easing heightened tensions on the peninsula. "There is no change in our stance that we seek to open the path toward dialogue with South Korea and better ties," KCNA said in a commentary. It said that North Korea made a series of offers that can bring big change to inter-Korean ties last year in a bid to end distrust and confrontation between the two sides. (Yonhap, "No Change in Stance on Seeking Dialogue with S. Korea: N. Korea," *Korea Herald*, April 6, 2016)

North Korea could deploy a new rocket system late this year at the earliest that would expand its ability to strike South Korean and American military forces in the South, South Korea's defense minister Han Min-koo said. South Korea has been closely monitoring the North's development of the 300-millimeter multiple-rocket launcher system, which the country has tested frequently in recent years. The weapon has alarmed officials because it is believed to have a range long enough to strike major American and South Korean military bases, including those near Pyeongtaek, about 60 miles south of Seoul, the capital. The North developed the weapon because it is cheaper than its short-range, Scud-type ballistic missiles and allows it to fire far more projectiles, Han said in an interview with South Korean reporters. Han said South Korea and the United States had been preparing for the new threat by upgrading their surveillance and counterattack abilities. The North has thousands of 240-millimeter multiple-rocket launchers near its border with South Korea, according to the Defense Ministry. Those rockets have an estimated range of 37 miles, putting Seoul and its 10 million people in reach. The new system has an estimated range of up to 124 miles, South Korean defense officials have said. Last month, North Korea said it had tested fragmentation-mine shells and underground penetration shells for the new system, which it said had already entered serial production. In October, the North displayed an eight-tube version of the so-called KN-09 launcher during a military parade in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. (Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea May Roll out Rocket System with Greater Reach, South Says," *New York Times*, April 6, 2016)

North Korea has sent leaflets and compact discs criticizing President Park Geun-hye and the ruling Saenuri Party to South Korea, police said, the latest move in its propaganda campaign. Police retrieved some 20,000 leaflets and 40 CDs from Goyang, Gyeonggi Province, just northwest of Seoul, at around 5 a.m. Earlier in the day, dozens of leaflets criticizing South Korea's military and its joint exercise with the United States were found in central Seoul at around midnight, according to police. Later today, a group of defectors in South Korea sent 300,000 leaflets with messages criticizing the communist regime and 4,000 sheets of local newspapers over the border from Paju, Gyeonggi Province. The same group had sent another 300,000 leaflets to the North last month. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Sends Propaganda Leaflets, CDs to S. Korea," April 6, 2016)

Kevin Leech became a billionaire through a series of investments in pharmaceutical and technology companies after selling his family's 38 funeral parlors across England. After losing everything when his company, an internet incubator named Ci4net.com collapsed, Leech emerged from bankruptcy in 2005 and engineered a series of mining deals with North Korea. This "cowboy capitalist" deals with Pyongyang raise serious questions about potential violations of economic sanctions on a global scale. Announcements made by companies linked to Leech claimed to possess the rights to mine and sell North Korean gold, silver, lead, coal and rare earth minerals for 25 years. One company linked to him, Pacific Century Rare Earths Limited, even claimed to have discovered the largest deposit of rare earth elements in history in Jongju, just north of Pyongyang. That discovery, if confirmed, would potentially make North Korea a powerhouse in the global rare earth industry. There was even an attempt to list two other Leech-linked mining assets on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Documents filed by the company that would have held the asset, however, seemed to reveal that the asset was ultimately linked to the Natural Resources Development and Investment Corporation (NDIC), a North Korean entity designated under UN sanctions for its involvement in weapons proliferation. Other documents that are part of this investigation show that Leech's relationship to the NDIC dates back to at least 2009. To date, none of the individuals involved in these dealings with the NDIC have been convicted of any crime because of their operations in North Korea. Nor does the mentioning of any individual in this report necessarily suggest that they have broken any law or violated sanctions. Dr. Louis Schurmann, an Australia-based South African geologist contracted by Leech to work on mining projects in North Korea, is one of the few names publicly associated with the British tycoon's mining ventures in North Korea. Publicly, he was listed as the head of a number of firms involved in Leech's North Korean gambit. However, Schurmann does not appear to have a stake in any North Korean mineral assets-and it may be that Schurmann's expert reputation was used to merely advance the credibility of otherwise dubious operations. In fact, there is a long list of companies and investors in half a dozen countries involved in the North Korean deals tied to Leech-linked companies, many of whom, until now, have been able to remain unnamed through the deft use of anonymous shell companies in opaque financial jurisdictions like the British Virgin Islands and United Arab Emirates. In April 2016, however, the veil of anonymous shell companies was pierced. A deluge of 11.5 million documents became available from a law firm in Panama called Mossack Fonseca that revealed the identities of owners and directors of many previously hidden offshore companies. In the course of a parallel investigation, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) gained access to some of these documents. They provide new details about many-but not all-of the firms and individuals involved in Leech's operations. The documents reveal that a group of men who have engaged in a number of controversial business transactions with one another over the course of a decade hold positions in virtually every company linked to Leech's mining ventures. One of the hidden directors revealed by the Panama Papers has been implicated in multi-million dollar securities fraud in the United States. This investigation also found that Leech's operations are linked to one of the most bizarre episodes of foreign investment in North Korea's mineral sector dubbed by the media as "the trillion dollar con." In that case, a Jersey-based convicted fraudster named Russell King reportedly engineered the takeover of a British investment bank called First London by claiming

to manage the assets of deep-pocketed Middle Eastern royalty. Kevin Leech and several of his close associates became shareholders and directors of the bank and a letter of guarantee from First London helped King and his associates persuade the owners of Notts County FC, a professional English soccer team, to hand the team over for only £1. In order to recruit renowned coach Sven-Goren Eriksson, Notts County offered him millions of dollars' worth of shares in Swiss Commodity Holding, a Kevin Leech-led company that claimed to possess lucrative mineral rights in North Korea. King, Eriksson and others linked to Notts County even travelled to North Korea together. When the deals were exposed as a ruse in 2010, First London imploded, Notts County fell into enormous debt and Swiss Commodity Holding's North Korean mineral deals were cancelled by the NDIC. Various reports and experts have questioned the viability of the deals linked to Schurmann and Leech. Moreover, a number of businessmen involved in the deals now claim that none of their agreements in North Korea have borne fruit. Despite numerous prior assertions by individuals and companies involved in these dealings that progress had been made toward mining and exporting North Korea's minerals, several individuals linked to the deals now state that none of the mines are operational. (Schurmann does, however, stand by his geological assessments and reports of North Korea's mineral potential.) The questions about the validity of the claims made by these companies combined with the involvement of several individuals previously involved in securities fraud should trigger a thorough examination of the deals by securities regulators and law enforcement. International sanctions imposed upon North Korea because of its nuclear and missile programs-even the more far-reaching sanctions recently imposed by the UN Security Council-are obviously only effective if adequately enforced. Efforts by international companies and individuals to acquire mineral assets from a UN-designated entity should trigger investigations of sanctions violations taking place on a global scale. Moreover, the results of this investigation highlight the need for countries like Australia to strengthen their sanctions enforcement efforts and institutions. The United Kingdom recently set up an office specifically charged with sanctions implementation; other countries should follow suit. The findings of this investigation also highlight the degree to which unscrupulous investors and other criminals are able to abuse anonymous shell companies to conceal their operations and potentially evade sanctions. Eliminating this loophole should be a major priority for governments seeking to bolster sanctions implementation. Curbing the abuse of these entities will require every country-especially major financial hubs-to establish low-cost, searchable public registries that contain basic information about the owners of any company formed in their territory. Reform-minded governments could take steps to shift the burden of compliance responsibility onto incorporation services firms themselves. Like banks, these firms should be required to undertake customer due diligence measures so that they know the identities of individuals who benefit from the companies that are formed. These firms should be held accountable for instances in which they have either knowingly provided services to entities under sanctions or failed to undertake the proper checks. (J.R. Mailey, "Hiding in Plain Sight: Cowboys, Conmen and North Korea's \$6 Trillion Natural Resource Prize," *38North*, April 6, 2016)

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While acknowledging some of the assessments that related countries have made about North Korea's nuclear capability, China is trying to take the lead in resuming

negotiations with related countries about the North Korean nuclear program, even including North Korea. "North Korea has made substantial progress in its efforts to complete its development of hydrogen bombs. The North's missile and nuclear technology is at a considerable level," Wu Dawei was quoted as saying by Japanese media. Wu, China's special representative for Korean Peninsula affairs and its chief envoy to the six-party talks, made the comments when he met with Tanigaki Sadakazu, secretary-general of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, during a trip to Japan. "Wu seemed to think that North Korea could carry out another provocative action around the time of the Korean Workers' Party Congress [next month]," *Mainichi Shimbun* reported. While China has confirmed its opposition to North Korea's nuclear program through numerous channels, it is highly unusual for a high-ranking official to make an assessment of North Korea's nuclear capability. "The assessments that South Korea and the US have made about North Korea's nuclear capabilities represent preconditions for the North Korean nuclear issue," said Zheng Jiyong, director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University. "China appears to be acknowledging the facts in line with what South Korea and the US are discussing with the aim of resuming the Six-Party Talks about North Korea's nuclear program." Wu's comments coincide with a statement by South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-goo on April 6 that "North Korea is believed to have reached a considerable level in its miniaturization technology." Nevertheless, China is drawing the line at claims that North Korea's nuclear capability poses a real threat to the US. "The US is aware that North Korea's nuclear weapons cannot reach the US mainland," said Xiakedao on Apr. 7. Xiakedao is a social media account operated by the *People's Daily*. "Considering that the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty is still in effect, China will guarantee that North Korea is not invaded from the outside," the newspaper said. "If North Korea has nuclear weapons, the legality of its regime cannot be approved, and it must give up its nuclear weapons in order for its legality to be approved." Even while taking a proactive stance toward the sanctions against North Korea that South Korea and the US have been insisting on, China has continued to push for a parallel campaign for denuclearization and a peace treaty. On April 5, China's Ministry of Commerce officially announced that it was banning North Korean imports and exports of coal, iron and jet fuel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 2270. In regard to items connected to North Koreans' livelihood - which are classified as exceptions to the resolution - China has decided to review applications submitted by its customs authorities.

The US State Department welcomed the announcement, noting that China had made clear its commitment to implementing the resolution. (Kim Oi-hyun, "China Taking the Lead of Addressing North Korean Nuclear Issue," *Hankyore*, April 9, 2016)

State propaganda machines of North Korea and China have recently vented their discontent about each other in harsh words, demonstrating an aggravated relationship between the two allies since the North's nuclear and missile provocations. *People's Daily* said today that should instability occur on the Korean Peninsula caused by nuclear problems, it would pose a bigger threat to China's national security than what's happening in Syria. The newspaper, while noting that the North's nuclear strategy can throw the regime into danger, called for Pyongyang to rethink the strategy, *South China Morning Post* reported. It was North Korea that made the first



strike. On April 1, KCNA carried a thorny article targeting China, although it did not mention Beijing explicitly. "Even some large countries, which allege they take honor and cause very seriously, have bowed to the mean pressures and demands of the United States, and are committing unthinkably cheap acts of dancing to the tune of others (President Park Geun-hye's demands for sanctions)," the news agency stated. The KCNA article, written by a researcher at a state think tank, expressed the North's complaint about China more directly, by saying, "Some countries are throwing away longstanding friendship won jointly by blood allies, and never mind about it." *Global Times* said in an editorial, "Promoting China-North Korea friendship and implementing sanctions on North Korea strictly are not contradictory to each other, and it is an exaggeration to say China's stance toward the North has drastically changed." Lamenting that North Korea is seeking to develop its own nuclear programs while not trusting security guarantees provided by China and Russia, the commentary said, "If the North violates international norms and isolates itself from the international community, China will find it very difficult to maintain stability in Northeast Asia." *People's Daily* said in another article that North Korea's military threats against South Korea are "all rhetoric aimed at strengthening their bargaining leverage." "North Korea has neither the ability nor the will to carry out war but is only making the most of anti-U.S. sentiments to unify its people," it said. "The moments when danger seems most real and crisis appears at hand are actually the moments when the possibility of war is smallest." Choi Sung-jin, "War of Words Between N.K., China Reveals Frayed Ties," *Korea Times*, April 9, 2016)

A group of 13 North Koreans working at a restaurant in a foreign country [China] defected en masse to South Korea this week, Seoul's unification ministry said Friday, as the U.N. Security Council has slapped tougher sanctions on the North. The defectors -- one male manager and 12 female employees at a restaurant in an unidentified nation -- arrived in South Korea today, the ministry handling inter-Korean affairs said. The government declined to reveal the route of their defection or detailed personal information about them. "It marked the first time that a group of North Koreans at the same restaurant has opted to come to South Korea at once," Jeong Joon-hee, a ministry spokesman, told a regular press briefing. "The government has accepted their request to come to South Korea on humanitarian grounds." Jeong said that the North Koreans have recently decided to defect to Seoul as they have realized the reality of South Korea and been disillusioned with the North's ideological campaigns by watching South Korean TV dramas and movies. It is unusual for South Korea to publicly confirm North Koreans' defections, as Seoul usually keeps a low-key stance about the issue. Overseas restaurants operated by North Korea are known to be facing difficulties in doing business after the U.N. Security Council's (UNSC) imposed sanctions on Pyongyang for its January nuclear test and long-range rocket launch in February. Such restaurants have served as one of the main sources of hard currency for North Korea, which is suspected of bankrolling the North's nuclear and missile programs. South Korea has restricted its nationals from using North Korean restaurants in China and other nations to cut off a source of hard currency for North Korea. (Yonhap, "13 N. Koreans from Oversea Restaurant Defect to S. Korea: Seoul," April 8, 2016) A North Korean senior colonel in charge of conducting intelligence operations at the North's reconnaissance bureau defected to South Korea in 2015, Seoul's

defense ministry said June 11, as the North's leader is tightening his grip on the regime. The North's Reconnaissance General Bureau deals with intelligence-gathering and espionage operations in foreign countries and is also responsible for cyberwarfare. The bureau is known to be behind Pyongyang's alleged cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014. Kim Yong-chol, a new party secretary handling inter-Korean affairs, had served as the head of the bureau since 2009. "(The North Korean military official's defection) is a fact, but we cannot make public detailed information (about him)," Moon Sang-gyun, a Unification Ministry spokesman, said at a regular press briefing. A source familiar with North Korean affairs said that the officer is viewed as an elite among North Koreans who have defected to the South. "He is believed to have stated details about the bureau's operations against South Korea to authorities here," the source said. South Korea's unification ministry said that the ranking official's defection can be seen as an example of cracks in the North's leadership. A number of North Korea's working-level officials based in foreign nations have sought asylum apparently to avoid Kim's so-called reign of terror, according to various sources. In a separate case, a North Korean diplomat stationed in an African country and his family members defected to South Korea in May last year, said another source with knowledge about North Korea. A series of defections by senior North Korean officials and elites indicate that a growing number of North Koreans have become fed up with the North's iron-fist rules, experts say. Last week, a group of 13 North Koreans who used to work at an overseas restaurant defected en masse to South Korea, the first mass defection since 2011. North Korean-run restaurants in foreign nations have long served as a source of hard currency for Pyongyang. Another source familiar with North Korea said that the defectors worked at a restaurant in the Chinese eastern port city of Ningbo and entered the South last week via Thailand. The government has not given details and declined to comment on the defection route. There are more than 28,000 North Korean defectors in South Korea, with some 1,280 North Koreans entering the South last year, according to Seoul's unification ministry. (Yonhap, "N.K. Military Intelligence Officer Defected to S. Korea Last Year: Seoul," April 11, 2016) Some South Korean news outlets quoted unidentified government sources as saying that the colonel had been involved in running spy operations against South Korea while working in the North, indicating that his defection could have handed a potential trove of intelligence to the South Korean authorities. It has been rare for South Korean officials to publicly confirm the defections of North Koreans, especially those of high rank. Even when they have, they usually waited until after the government had thoroughly debriefed the defectors and was reasonably sure that announcing their defections would not jeopardize family members left in the North. Opposition political parties accused the conservative government of President Park Geun-hye of advertising the high-profile defections in recent days to help attract votes in parliamentary elections set for Wednesday. During news briefings, local journalists bombarded the spokesmen of the Defense and Unification Ministries with questions about why the government had announced or leaked the news of the high-profile defections just ahead of the elections. The government denied that the announcements were politically motivated. Jeong Joon-hee, a spokesman for the Unification Ministry, said the defections of 13 North Koreans last week were significant enough to be announced because they occurred while the North was being punished with United Nations sanctions. He also said the colonel's defection could be seen as a

sign that some of the North Korean elites were not happy under the supreme leader, Kim Jong-un. Park's government has championed the vigorous enforcement of sanctions against North Korea, citing the recent defections as evidence that the sanctions were working. But Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute, said the isolated defections did not prove that the sanctions were working or that Kim's grip on power in the North was weakening. North Korea created the General Bureau of Reconnaissance in 2009 by combining various party and military agencies in charge of collecting intelligence abroad and infiltrating the South with spies. In recent years, the spy bureau expanded its saboteur and spy operations to cyberspace. The United States blacklisted the bureau last year after North Korean hacking attacks were blamed for wreaking havoc on the computer network of Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014. (Choe Sang-hun, "North Korean Spy Officer Has Defected, Seoul Says," *New York Times*, April 12, 2016, p. A-7) A restaurant manager known to have orchestrated a recent group defection of employees at an overseas North Korean restaurant reportedly left his co-worker wife behind in China when he arrived in South Korea. Sources alleged that the 36-year-old manager, identified by the initial "H," fled with 1.5 million yuan (US\$232,000) embezzled from the Chinese owner he partnered with. The circumstances, along with evidence that the manager and 13 employees had long planned their flight before suddenly leaving in a hurry, are raising questions over whether the defection - the subject of a surprise announcement by the South Korean government ahead of the general elections - was a planned operation with National Intelligence Service (NIS) involvement.

*Hankyore* reporting on April 12 found a total of 20 employees affiliated with North Korea's Foreign Culture Liaison Committee, including the manager, to have been working at the Ryukyung restaurant in Ningbo, a city in China's Zhejiang Province. Thirteen were involved in the defection, while the other seven remained behind in China, including the wife of H, who organized the South Korea journey, sources said. All seven are reportedly still in China at present. A local source familiar with the situation said H and the other 12 employees fled while the other seven employees, including H's wife, were out buying daily necessities. The couple had reportedly been married for around eighteen months. H had been in charge of managing the passports of the female employees he defected with, and the circumstances of their departure while his wife was out suggest an emergency situation rather than a planned move. "It doesn't make a lot of sense that a manager with enough power to manage passports would have planned a defection where he was leaving his wife behind," said a North Korean defector with experience working at a restaurant in China. At least one source has alleged that H left with 1.5 million yuan in money belonging to the restaurant owner, a Chinese national. "My understanding is that the Chinese partner alerted security authorities after the manager disappeared with 1.5 million yuan of his money," the source said. The proprietor of a store near the restaurant said the restaurant "was closed for a day and night, and there were rumors that the manager had taken a large sum from the Chinese owner." "There's been talk about this creating a lot of trouble for the owner," the proprietor added. Some have suggested the money may have been a factor in H's decision to organize the defection. An inter-Korean relations expert familiar with defector-related cases explained, "In most cases with people working at overseas North Korean businesses or in trade, their defection had to do with money issues." If H's situation was the factor behind the group defection, it would mean South

Korean authorities were incorrect in ascribing it to Seoul's own North Korea sanctions, which included measures to discourage people from eating at North Korean restaurants. "Usually the [South Korean] government does assist with the defection process, but not in this way," said a former senior official in the areas of unification, foreign affairs, and security. "There's a lot here to suggest they were trying to manufacture a 'group defection' and went overboard." The group of 13 restaurant workers, including H, reportedly traveled from Ningbo to Shanghai over land on April 5 before traveling to Malaysia the next morning and arriving at Incheon International Airport on April 7. Malaysia allows North Korean nationals to enter without a visa. Processing of documents there for the defectors' arrival in South Korea appears to have happened much more quickly than in previous cases. "When you're traveling from a third country to South Korea, the document preparations can take quite a long time, sometimes several months," said a man from North Korea who defected while dispatched to China. "If [the defectors] did just stop briefly in Malaysia before coming in, then it looks as though the South Korean intelligence organization had everything prepared in advance." Private South Korean and overseas groups involved in defections said they only found out about the group departure after Seoul's announcement. In the past, such groups have typically assisted defectors by finding routes while South Korean authorities assisted - even in cases with support from the NIS and other state institutions. This time, the groups were reportedly unaware of the situation. "The group defection was made public with the North Korean human rights groups knowing anything about it," said a source familiar with the North Korean situation. "That couldn't have happened unless the NIS was planning and orchestrating the defection." North Korean authorities immediately reported the employees missing to Chinese authorities on Apr. 6, and the authorities began an investigation into the possibility of a crime against the Chinese owner the following day, local sources said. The circumstances further suggest the Chinese government may have had no prior knowledge of the restaurant employees' departure. (Kim Jin-cheol and Kim Oi-hyun, "NIS May Have Been Involved in North Korean Group Defection," *Hankyore*, April 13, 2016)

4/9/16

KCNA: "The DPRK succeeded in the ground jet test of a new type high-power engine of inter-continental ballistic rocket designed and produced by the scientists and technicians in its field of national defense. Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, issued an order to conduct the ground jet test of a new type high-power engine of inter-continental ballistic rocket and personally came to the Sohae Space Center to guide the test. He gave an order to start the test. The moment the engine spewed out huge flames with deafening boom. The results of the test proved that the high-power engine, designed and manufactured by the scientists and technicians in the field of national defense with their own efforts and technology in the Korean style, satisfied all scientific and technological indexes. He was greatly pleased with the results of the test and highly praised the scientists and technicians for having brought about another epochal event in demonstrating the dignity and the inexhaustible power of the great Paektusan nation by putting into practice the intention and will of the party to adorn the Seventh Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea as a golden age in bolstering up the Juche-oriented national

defense. The great success made in the test provided a firm guarantee for mounting another form of nuclear attack upon the U.S. imperialists and other hostile forces and made it possible to have access to more powerful means capable of reacting to nukes in kind, he noted, adding: This is an eye-catching event which demonstrated our national defense capability before the world and another great victory achieved by our people in the drive for glorifying the Seventh Congress of the WPK with unprecedented successes. Now the DPRK can tip new type inter-continental ballistic rockets with more powerful nuclear warheads and keep any cesspool of evils in the earth including the U.S. mainland within our striking range and reduce them to ashes so that they may not survive in our planet, he said, stressing the need to diversify nuclear attack means at a higher level to cope with the ever-more increasing nuclear threats and arbitrariness of the U.S. imperialists and thus decisively counter nukes in kind. He expressed great expectation and belief that scientists and technicians in the field of national defense would give full rein to their inexhaustible creative efforts true to the party's line of simultaneously developing the two fronts and its plan for building the nuclear force and thereby bring about manifold changes in the development and production of Juche-oriented weapons and bombs capable of firmly guaranteeing the ever-lasting future of Kim Il Sung's nation and Kim Jong Il's Korea and remarkably reinforce the nuclear arsenal of the Supreme Command. He was accompanied by Ri Man Gon, department director of the C.C., the Workers' Party of Korea, Jo Yong Won, Hong Yong Chil and Kim Jong Sik, vice department directors of the C.C., the WPK, and General Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the Strategic Force of the KPA." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Guides Ground Jet Test of New-Type High-Power Engine of Intercontinental Ballistic Rocket," April 9, 2016)

4/11/16

Kerry: **Q:** Given all the activity we've seen from North Korea, not only its nuclear tests but it's threats to use a nuclear weapon, don't you think the prospect of a world without nuclear weapons is becoming more distant, despite your efforts at a nuclear-free world? **KERRY:** ...What I got here was a firsthand sense of what happened in Hiroshima, and what happens with a nuclear weapon particularly in terms of its types of destruction. But I've also seen that because when I served in the United States Navy, I went to Nuclear Chemical Biological Warfare School, and for better or worse I learned a lot about throw-weights of nuclear weapons and radiation sickness and all the other issues. So for me, what today really was a moment of connecting to this place and to the feelings of the Japanese people and the terrible events of that day in a very personal and special way. And of course, whenever you see the firsthand effects of a terrible moment in a war, I think it reinforces in someone the reasons why we have to try to avoid that. And am I confident that we're doing enough or need to get tougher to stop it? We are tougher now. We fought, together with some of our closest friends and allies, to get China to sign on to a tougher UN Security Council resolution just a few weeks ago, and we now have stronger sanctions in place against DPRK. In addition to that, we have moved to discussions about the potential deployment of THAAD, which is a defensive - defensive system, as well as other steps that we are engaged in with respect to North Korea. So we're on a path that is constantly ratcheting up and toughening as their behavior grows more threatening and as they don't heed the prior steps that have been taken. I think China has determined that it is now going to implement - I mean, we're just in the beginning stages of this implementation, and

that's going to have a greater impact on, I think, the North. Now, we are also talking about what else we can do. But my sense is that there is a united five-party members of the Six-Party Talks who are absolutely determined to keep the pressure on, but to do so in a way that hopefully brings people back to the table rather than spills over in a way that gets more dangerous rather than less. So I think we're on track, though I would like to see a few measures that we weren't able to get into the resolution yet implemented over the course, perhaps, of the next months depending on what actions the North decides to take. So it is still possible that we will ratchet up even more depending on the actions of the DPRK. We are prepared to get back to talks. We have made it clear that we are prepared to negotiate a peace treaty on the peninsula. We are prepared to negotiate a non-aggression agreement. We are prepared to actually provide economic assistance and welcome the North back to the community of nations. We're prepared to provide aid and we're prepared to work with our colleagues on development and the long-term future. We're prepared to work with South Korea on the concept of reunification, if that's what they want. But it all depends on the North making the decision that they will negotiate denuclearization, which is the agreed-upon policy of China, the United States, Japan, Korea, Russia, and we are waiting for that opportunity obviously to have a real negotiation. With respect to the nuclear threat overall and does what's happening in North Korea mean that we're more distant - no, I don't believe that in the least. No. Profoundly, no. We are prepared to negotiate with Russia for a further reduction in nuclear weapons after we have ratified - we did ratify the START agreement. I led that effort on the floor of the Senate. So we are now at the level of about 1,500 or so, and that is a far cry from where we were in the days of President Reagan and Gorbachev where there were 50,000 nuclear warheads in each hands, pointed at each other. So we've gone from 50,000 to 1,500 or so, and we're prepared to move even further down and have embraced the concept of a world without these weapons. We've just negotiated an agreement with Iran that gave up its path towards a nuclear weapon in a verifiable, transparent way that we will now have an IAEA able to certify each day, every week, all through the life of this agreement. And we have had a number of other nations - I think it's about 13 or so - have given up fissionable material, and we've reduced the number of people who have enriched materials lying around, and we have increased the number of countries that are participating in the nuclear threat reduction process and opening themselves up to greater, better practices for accountability for any medical radiation material and so forth. So there's an enormous amount that is happening now. North Korea remains the single one hard spot with respect to that policy, but as I just said to you, we have toughened up and ratcheted up the sanctions with respect to North Korea, and it is very much at the top of our priority list with respect to this endeavor. So I think we're moving in the right direction, notwithstanding North Korea. And my hope is that together with China particularly, because China obviously has such an important connection to North Korea - it's the supplier of all of their fuel for trucks, planes, cars; it's a supplier of food; it's their banking connection to the world - China has an enormous ability to send a message to and have an impact on North Korea. And China, we are pleased, joined us in doing some things that have an impact on China and its economy. And we have to go step by step and continue to build as we go forward, and that's what we're going to do." (Secretary of State John F. Kerry, Press Availability for G-7, Hiroshima, April 11, 2016)

4/12/16

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry urged North Korea to forgo any provocative actions, warning the U.S. is ready to impose even harsher sanctions than the latest U.N. resolution on the communist nation. Kerry issued the warning at a news conference during a landmark visit to Hiroshima, Japan, amid concerns that Pyongyang could conduct another nuclear test, its fifth, ahead of the birthday of founding leader Kim Il-sung on April 15. Kerry said that "a few measures" were left out of the latest U.N. sanctions resolution, but could be enforced in the coming months "depending on what actions the North decides to take." He didn't elaborate on what those measures are, but they're believed to be sanctions deemed too tough for China to agree to. "So it is still possible that we will ratchet up even more, depending on the actions of the DPRK," he said. Despite the pressure, however, Kerry said that the U.S. is ready for peace talks with Pyongyang and to provide the impoverished nation with economic aid and other assistance, but the North must first demonstrate its commitment to give up nuclear programs. "We are prepared to get back to talks. We have made it clear that we are prepared to negotiate a peace treaty on the peninsula. "We are prepared to negotiate a non-aggression agreement. We are prepared to actually provide economic assistance and welcome the North back to the community of nations," Kerry said. "We're prepared to provide aid and we're prepared to work with our colleagues on development and the long-term future. We're prepared to work with South Korea on the concept of reunification, if that's what they want. But it all depends on the North making the decision that they will negotiate denuclearization," he said. A senior State Department official, speaking during a background briefing in Japan, said that the U.S. and other members of the six-party nuclear talks with the North are ready to honor a 2005 deal that calls for providing the North with normalization of relations, security guarantees and economic aid. "But all of that was then and is now conditioned on North Korea moving irreversibly and credibly along the path of full denuclearization. And the sooner that North Korea comes face to face with that, the better for all concerned, including them," the official said, according to a State Department transcript. The official also said that there is "a widespread belief" that the new U.N. sanctions "will start to bite on North Korea in a significant way over the coming weeks and months." He added that there is a "considerable amount of work underway about what further options could be deployed, either with or without additional North Korean provocations." (Yonhap, "Kerry Warns North Korea of Harsher Measures in Event of Additional Provocation," *Korea Herald*, April 12, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's "answer to the question raised by KCNA Tuesday over the absurd story about dialogue being floated around the DPRK. A touch-and-go situation is now prevailing on the Korean peninsula due to the moves of the U.S. for a nuclear war. Nevertheless, **some countries are talking about the six-party talks, simultaneous pushing forward of denuclearization and the conclusion of a peace treaty and the like.** Even a mere child knows well that **dialogue is impossible under the present tense situation on the peninsula.** There is only the danger of nuclear clash on the Korean peninsula due to the unprecedented U.S.-south Korea joint military drills for aggression and the entirely just measures taken by the Korean People's Army to cope with them. Dialogue should be based on mutual respect and equality among its parties. **The DPRK doesn't oppose dialogue** but categorically rejects any unequal dialogue. **It is the DPRK's consistent and principled stand not**

**to have a dialogue under unilateral pressure.** Dialogue and military threat, dialogue and sanctions can never go together. Such logic that the purpose of imposing sanctions is to have a dialogue can never work on the DPRK. Due to the ever-escalating hostile acts of the U.S., the nuclear issue of the DPRK has long been away from its negotiating table. **The DPRK's proposal that it would put a moratorium on its nuclear test in return for the U.S. halt to the joint war drills would no longer be valid as the latter turned it down.** As already clarified by **the DPRK**, it **will steadily and dynamically push ahead with its line of simultaneously pushing forward the two fronts until the world is denuclearized.** The **urgent issue to be settled on the Korean peninsula is to put a definite end to the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK**, the root cause of all problems. Whether the issue would be solved through dialogue and negotiations or through other methods entirely depends on the attitude of the U.S." (KCNA, "Spokesman of DPRK Foreign Ministry Refutes Absurd Story about Dialogue," April 12, 2016)

DPRK Red Cross Society Central Committee statement: "The south Korean authorities, on April 7, reporting about the "group defection" of DPRK's employees of a restaurant in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province of China, claimed "they accepted the employees from a humanitarian stand by respecting their will." They are also building up public opinion to give impression that the case of "group defection" is a "substantial effect" of the implementation of "UN resolution on sanctions against the north" and a reflection of the "skepticism and aspiration of the northerners for south Korean society." Refuting it as an unprecedented group abduction committed by the gangsters of the puppet Intelligence Service, the statement clarified the following stand: We sternly denounce the group abduction of the citizens of the DPRK as a hideous crime against its dignity and social system and the life and security of its citizens. The recent case of "group defection" cooked up by the puppet group is a crucial provocation against the DPRK which can never be tolerated as it is an unbearable insult to the people of the DPRK. 2. The puppet group should apologize for the hideous group abduction and immediately send all of the abductees back to the DPRK. The puppet group has to ferret out criminals and the back-stage manipulators who took the citizens of the DPRK to south Korea by employing all sorts of appeasement, deception and gimmicks and bring the criminals to justice in the DPRK. We have detailed information of how the gangsters of the puppet Intelligence Service lured and appeased the citizens of the DPRK to south Korea and which country connived it and which country in Southeast Asia they were taken through as well as the method used for the purpose. The south Korean puppet forces should not keep the citizens of the DPRK away from contact with outside under the pretext of "protection of safety" and appease and pressurize them in the back room but unconditionally accept our demand and send back those innocent nationals of the DPRK without delay. In case the puppet group does not send them back, it will have to pay a high price for the serious consequences to be entailed by its action. The south Korean authorities should bear in mind that unless they apologize for the hideous abduction and send those abductees back, they will face unimaginable serious consequences and severe punishment." (KCNA, "Spokesman for C.C., DPRK Red Cross Society Demands S. Korean Authorities Send back DPRK Abductees," April 12, 2016)



John Schilling: "North Korea's April 9 test of a large liquid-fuel engine is a disturbing development that not only highlights the growing threat posed by Pyongyang but should also put to rest, once and for all, all claims that the North's WMD programs are a hoax. In fact, the test demonstrated that North Korea has an even greater capability at a more advanced state of development than previously anticipated. Specifically, three important conclusions can be reached based on this test: 1. The North Korean test involved a tightly-coupled pair of propulsion units from an old Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), known as the R-27 or the SS-N-6 "Serb." North Korea has long been believed to possess this technology, but it was never confirmed before now. This engine uses high-energy propellants that would give a missile greater range than Pyongyang's traditional mix of kerosene and nitric acid. 2. Using this technology, North Korea's road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the KN-08 or the KN-14 modification, could deliver a nuclear warhead to targets at a distance of 10,000 to 13,000 km. That range, greater than had previously been expected, could allow Pyongyang to reach targets on the US east coast, including New York or Washington, DC. 3. If the current ground test program continues and is successful, flight tests of a North Korean ICBM could begin in as little as a year. Moreover, Pyongyang may be able to deploy this delivery system in a limited operational capability by 2020. For more than a decade, experts have had reason to believe North Korea had obtained from Russia the technology for an old Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile—the R-27 "Zyb," or to old-school Cold Warriors, the SS-N-6 "Serb." But until recently, the evidence was circumstantial: Russian engineers traveling to Pyongyang, parade models that look like the old Soviet missile, a discrepancy in the accounting of ex-Soviet hardware after the Cold War, but never any clear proof such as a North Korean test of Soviet hardware. We had begun to wonder if maybe some enterprising Russian schemers had sold the North Koreans a warehouse full of rusty hardware that could never fly again. And from the day the KN-08 road-mobile ICBM first paraded through the streets of Pyongyang, there was speculation whether it might use this technology. The KN-08 is a much larger missile than the R-27, and while elements of the R-27 might be a good match for the upper stages, the R-27's Isayev 4D10 engine was simply too small to lift the missile. It was possible that the North Koreans might be able to scale up the 4D10 engine, or cluster two or three of them together, but that would have proved challenging for their engineers. The simplest hypothesis was that they would use their old Scud or Nodong missile engines for the first stage—the same approach that had taken with the Unha satellite launch vehicle (SLV). For months, the North Koreans had been modifying their vertical rocket engine test stand at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station for testing larger rocket engines. They completed that effort last month and there were some signs that a test might be in the works. Conveniently, the North reported this test on the day I was attending a conference of American rocket experts, some of whom had worked with America's old liquid-fueled ICBMs. The immediate consensus was that this was no Nodong or any other engine reflecting North Korea's traditional missile designs. But it was a very good match for a pair of 4D10 engines clustered together into a propulsion unit for an ICBM. This ICBM would be more capable than previous thinking on what the North could build, and also possibly closer to deployment than had been anticipated. Looking at a close-up of the test, what appears from a distance as a single engine shows two exhaust plumes almost adjacent to one another, emerging from a hemispherical dome at the base of a stubby cylinder.

The engines themselves are not visible. As the R-27 missile was designed for use in the tight confines of a ballistic-missile submarine, critical space is saved by putting the 4D10 engine inside the missile's fuel tank with only the end of the nozzle projecting below. The Soviet Union went on to use this feature in more advanced submarine-launched missiles, some of which remain in service to this day. North Korea appears to be retaining the submerged-engine configuration, but with two engines instead of one. As the 4D10 engine normally includes a complex assortment of pumps, valves and other plumbing wrapped around the nozzle and thrust chamber, this isn't a simple matter of putting two stock engines side by side, but rather indicates a substantial modification of the original design. Possibly some components are now shared between the two tightly-coupled engines. It would still be better to use a single, larger engine—one small bit of good news in this test is that it seems to indicate that North Korea still lacks the ability to design (or buy) engines any larger than the 4D10. Also visible are the exhaust plumes of smaller rockets on each side of the main nozzles, another feature of the 4D10 engine. The most efficient way to steer a missile is to mount the main engine on gimbals allowing it to swivel a few degrees in any direction, but that's not really practical if the engine is inside the fuel tank. Instead, Soviet designers gave the 4D10 an independent pair of vernier engines on gimballed mounts outside the tank. Those smaller engines appear here in about the same place as they would on stock 4D10 engines. Perhaps the most spectacular difference between this test and anything previous ones conducted by Pyongyang is the clean, translucent orange exhaust. Scud and Nodong missile engines burn kerosene fuel, which almost inevitably produces soot and thus an intense, solid orange flame. The plume from these engines retains the orange hue, indicating carbon in the fuel but without the soot. Some of the internal detail of the plume as it leaves the engine and interacts with the surrounding atmosphere is visible. In the longer views, there's no sign of the black, smoky exhaust we would expect from a kerosene-burning engine. There are several fuels that could produce this sort of flame, but the only one we've had any hint of from North Korea is something called unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH), which in combination with nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer is believed to power the small third stage of North Korea's Unha SLV. These propellants are more efficient than the crude kerosene and nitric acid of the Scud and Nodong missiles, which is why the Soviets adopted them for the R-27. Until now, there was no sign that the North Koreans were using them in any large rocket engine. In short, the North Koreans have demonstrated something we only suspected them of working on and have done it on a larger scale than anticipated. Moreover, these test images are sufficiently precise, accurate and detailed that Photoshopping or other fakery can be ruled out. The exact scale is difficult to discern, but the relative dimensions and geometry at least are consistent with a pair of closely-coupled 4D10 engines packaged in the base of a KN-08 or KN-14 missile fuel tank. And while still photos don't tell us how long the test ran, the engines appear to have achieved a steady-state operating condition. The recent test helps solve a minor puzzle that was raised when North Korea teased us with a carefully-cropped photo of the base of a KN-08 missile last month. That photo suggested two closely-coupled engines, but with nozzles a bit over 50 cm in diameter—too large for a Scud, and too short for a Nodong. True, a Nodong engine could have had its nozzle cut down to fit the KN-08 engine bay, but that seemed unlikely and inelegant. The nozzle of the 4D10 engine is just about right for what we saw. So are the positions of

the vernier engines. And while we've never seen the base of the KN-14 missile (the Pentagon's new name for what we had called the KN-08 Mod 2, the external configuration of the first-stage engine bay is identical so it probably uses the same twin-pack 4D10 engine. Since the KN-08 and KN-14 are almost three times the weight of the old Soviet R-27, would two 4D10 engines be sufficient to power it? Three would certainly be better, but might be an impossibly tight fit. With only two 4D10 engines the missile would climb away from the launcher with an acceleration more suitable for an airliner than an ICBM. But unlike the airliner, the ICBM's performance would increase dramatically as the fuel load burned away. The slow initial acceleration will cost the North Koreans a bit of performance, but unless they wind up launching with American missiles literally seconds from hitting the launch site, it won't matter in the end. In the end, the 4D10 engine is about 15 percent more efficient than North Korea's kerosene-burning Scud and Nodong engines. And the submerged installation allows for bigger tanks carrying more propellant. Even with the lumbering initial climbout that will give the North substantially longer range. With a 500 kg warhead, the KN-08 is now estimated at having a range of over 11,500 kilometers, compared to 9,500 km using Scud-technology engines in the first stage. That's enough to reach New York City or Washington, DC from North Korea. Even the two-stage KN-14 can reach over 10,000 kilometers with a light warhead, enough to cover all of the US west coast. The only good news from the recent test is that it didn't include a complete first stage. Analysis of commercial satellite imagery suggests that the Sohae test stand was recently modified to use new propellants, so this may have been the first full test of the dual-engine ICBM power plant. But Kim Jong Un himself was present, and given the likely penalty for embarrassing Kim with a failed test, it is reasonable to suspect the engineers had high confidence from earlier testing of single 4D10 engines. The most recent *38 North* assessment of the status of North Korea's ICBM program assumed an additional two to three years of ground testing would be required before North Korea would be ready to conduct the first flight of a new ICBM. However, based on last week's engine test, and recent video of Kim Jong Un observing reentry vehicle ground testing, North Korea might be far enough along to conduct flight tests in as little as a year. It won't happen tomorrow—they still have to actually build the first stage, and will almost certainly want to test the complete stage on the ground before it is launched. If the North Koreans can launch an experimental ICBM early next year, chances are it will not work as planned. (North Korean missiles almost never work the first time.) But the timeline has moved up, and an initial operational capability for the KN-08 or KN-14 of about 2021 rather than 2023 is entirely possible. There is a small chance that the missile could enter limited service by the end of this decade. Large-scale deployment would require the ability to manufacture complete 4D10-class engines from scratch when they may still be using ex-Soviet hardware for key components like turbopumps and injector plates. But while this requirement may result in some delay, it is an obstacle that the North Koreans can overcome in time. Whether the increased pace and visibility of North Korea's WMD activities across the board will continue remains unclear. Certainly, Pyongyang has pulled back the veil normally surrounding research and development activities to give the international community a glimpse of its efforts. That should put to rest the reoccurring argument by some experts that the North's nuclear and missile programs are a hoax or are fake, as Pyongyang clearly intended these actions to add credibility to their threats. This behavior may continue, may be a

reaction to the current joint US-ROK military exercises or could be part of the run-up to the coming Party Congress. Whatever the reason, North Korea is clearly moving full-steam ahead with its threatening programs. (John Schilling, "North Korea's Large Rocket Engine Test: A Significant Step Forward for Pyongyang's ICBM Program," *38North*, April 11, 2016)

4/13/16

U.S. intelligence satellites have spotted signs that North Korea may be preparing for an unprecedented launch of a mobile ballistic missile which could potentially hit portions of the U.S., CNN has learned. Two U.S. officials told CNN that if the regime proceeds with a launch, the latest assessments are the most likely scenario is the launch of the so-called Musudan missile, which the U.S. believes could potentially hit Guam and perhaps Shemya Island in the outer reaches of Alaska's Aleutian chain. However, officials are strongly saying there are two other scenarios that are possible: North Korea could launch either its KN-08 or KN-14 mobile ballistic missiles which would have a longer range and could potentially hit the Pacific Northwest of the United States. The KN-14 is thought to be a more precise version of the KN-08, and it is believed the regime showed it for the first time at a military parade in 2015, officials say. But U.S. officials also caution the regime could still decide to do nothing. North Korea is well aware U.S. spy satellites keep constant watch and the moves could be part of a deception effort to persuade the U.S. the North is about to take action. If the North Koreans proceed, it would be the first time North Korea has launched a longer range ballistic missile from a mobile launcher and the first time any of these three missiles have flown. South Korea's military is closely monitoring for the possibility of a fifth nuclear test by North Korea, according to a South Korean military official. The official told CNN the military has been monitoring it since March 15, when North Korean leader Kim Jong Un gave orders to test a nuclear warhead and a ballistic rocket capable of launching a nuclear warhead. The official said this includes the Musudan missile, the KN-08 and others that are said to be capable of reaching parts of the U.S. It's not clear if the missiles would work and how precise the guidance systems might be, but the estimated ranges of these missiles cause growing concern. Shemya Island, for example, houses an early warning radar installation that monitors space and missile activities. If there is a launch, it's not clear if the missiles would carry any kind of simulated warhead. But if the North were, for the first time, to launch a mobile missile with these types of ranges, it would be a significant military advance and a change in the North Korean calculus for the U.S., military officials say. In a conflict, mobile launchers can quickly shoot and move to a new position making it very difficult for satellites or spy planes to track them. It would also be a violation of U.N. resolutions banning North Korea from ballistic missile tests. As North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's public rhetoric has escalated in recent weeks, concern has grown inside intelligence circles that he has made progress on several fronts. "He is determined to prove his doubters wrong," one U.S. official told CNN, even as uncertainty remains about how much progress he has actually made in his quest for nuclear missiles. Recent photos showing Kim standing next to what the North Koreans claim is a miniaturized nuclear device are still being scrutinized by U.S. analysts for any indication of progress, officials said, declining to provide additional specifics. U.S. officials who endorse the notion that Kim probably has a nuclear warhead still note that they don't know if the device would actually work. The North Koreans believe it would. U.S. commanders have said

they assume for war planning purposes that North Korea has a functional warhead but have stopped short of outright declaring it exists. "It's the prudent decision on my part to assume that he has the capability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and put it on an ICBM," Adm. William Gortney, head of U.S. Northern Command, recently told Congress. But the Pentagon has taken pains to downplay the possibility. Pentagon press secretary Peter Cook acknowledged that "the commanders who are responsible for these activities" are "doing the prudent, appropriate, proper" thing by assuming the North Koreans possess this capability. (Barbara Starr, "U.S. Sources: Signs of North Korea Mobile Ballistic Missile Launch," CNN, April 13, 2016)

South Korea's general election opened a three-party political framework by downsizing the ruling party and expanding two opposition parties in the parliament. The Saenuri was not only booted from majority status but also tumbled down to second-rank party, giving way to the Minjoo Party of Korea. The 20th parliamentary race ended with the Minjoo Party taking 123 seats, followed by the Saenuri with 122, the People's Party's with 38, and the Justice Party with six, in addition to 11 independents. By constituencies, the Minjoo party acquired 110 out of 253 seats nationwide, followed by the Saenuri with 105 and the new opposition People's Party with 25. The far-left minority Justice Party claimed two. The opposition camp claimed a parliamentary majority for the first time in 16 years, posing tricky challenges to the Park Geun-hye administration and the ruling party in the remaining 22 months until the next presidential election. Party chairman Kim Moo-sung and other leaders offered to step down early in the morning taking responsibility for factional fighting and nomination debacle blamed for its unexpected setback. Kim, who scored an easy victory in his Busan constituency, was seen to lose ground in the party and his potential presidential bid, following the election debacle. It was in the Seoul-Gyeonggi belt, which comprises almost half of the nation's constituencies and the largest number of swing voters, that the opposition swept a majority, even in districts considered to be unwavering strongholds of the conservative. Saenuri won only 35 out of 122 seats in the Seoul metropolitan area to Minjoo's 82 and the People's Party's five, a humiliating defeat in the key region, while struggling in its traditional stronghold of South Gyeongsang Province, surrendering 17 out of 65 seats to opposition or independent candidates. Minjoo, however, lost in the Gwangju-Jeolla area. The rising star People's Party, co-chaired by Rep. Ahn Cheol-soo rejoiced in its newfound status as the third-largest parliamentary bloc with strong casting vote power. Despite the skepticism that had prevailed over its identity, the party managed to secure 38 seats, over the 20-seat minimum required to constitute a parliamentary bargaining body and even exceeding its hopeful target of 35. The People's Party will hold the tie-breaking vote in the upcoming legislature. (Bae Hyun-jung, "Ruling Party Reels from Electoral Defeat," Korea Herald, April 14, 2016) The final voter turnout for the parliamentary election hit 58 percent, slightly lower than the originally anticipated 60 percent mark, but the highest since 1996, with a noticeable jump among 20- and 30-somethings. The National Election Commission said 24.4 million out of 42.1 million eligible Korean voters cast their ballots, the highest in 20 years when 63.9 percent of voters turned out. It was also 3.8 percentage points higher than 54.2 percent in the 2012 general election. According to NEC, the higher-than-expected voter turnout can be credited to an increased number of voters aged between 20 and 40, as well as some 5.1 million

voters who showed up during the two-day early voting period last week. The early voting system introduced for the first time in the general election also encouraged more of the younger voters to cast their ballots, the NEC said. By age, 20- and 30-somethings recorded 49.4 percent and 49.5 percent turnout, respectively, which together jumped 12.1 percentage points over 2012. Those in their 40s and 50s marked 53.4 percent and 65 percent, respectively, while those aged 60 and above reached 70.6 percent. The turnout rate of senior voters went up by 0.4 to 3.1 percentage points compared to 2012. (Kim Da-sol, "voters' Turnout Rises by Double Digits," *Korea Herald*, April 14, 2016)

4/14/16

DPRK FoMin Disarmament and Peace Institute "answered the question raised by KCNA on Thursday in connection with the fact that U.S. State Secretary Kerry again pulled up the DPRK as follows: During the G-7 foreign ministerial meeting held in Hiroshima, Japan, shortly ago, the U.S. State Secretary created the atmosphere of pressure on the DPRK while describing the DPRK's bolstering of nuclear deterrence as "challenge" and "provocation" and went so shameful as to give impression that the U.S. is concerned for worldwide dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Far from apologizing to the victims and their departed soul in the world's first region stricken with A-bomb dropped by the U.S., Kerry pulled up the DPRK, a shameful act of concealing the true nature of the U.S. as the world's biggest nuclear criminal state. Outwardly, the U.S. is talking about building a "world without nuclear weapons" but, in actuality, it spends a colossal amount of fund for the modernization of the nuclear weapons and stages ceaseless nuclear war exercises. These are a crafty trick to divert international criticism of it to the DPRK. The U.S. is trying to convince the public that the nuclear threats increase worldwide and the situation on the Korean peninsula is rendered tense due to the DPRK but it is no more than a wild act that can never be understood by persons of reason. The DPRK's access to nuclear weapons is not a threat but an inevitable option for self-defense to defend the country and the nation from the nuclear disaster that may be caused by the U.S. If the DPRK had not opted for their access to the nuclear weapons and not bolstered them up steadily, it would have fallen victim to a nuclear attack by the U.S. more than a hundred times just as Japan. This is clearly proven by the nuclear war exercises targeting the DPRK being staged in south Korea as well as the plan for nuclear attack and the moves for deployment of nuclear weapons ceaselessly committed by the U.S. against the DPRK for more than half a century. Kerry went impudent as to talk about efforts for worldwide dismantlement of nuclear weapons but had it not been for the existence of the U.S., the nuclear threat would not have been posed to the earth and the issue of building "a world without nuclear weapons" would not have cropped up. It is the U.S. which made the nuclear weapons for the first time in the world and it is again the U.S. which dropped A-bombs on mankind and it is also the U.S. which is stepping up the modernization of nuclear weapons after designating sovereign states as targets of a preemptive nuclear attack. It is also the U.S. which persists in escalating the tension on the Korean peninsula in a bid to invent a pretext for keeping hegemonic status in the Asia-Pacific region. That the DPRK is getting itself fully ready for nuclear attack to react to the U.S. attack in kind is not only to defend its right to existence but to safeguard the regional and world peace and security from the nuclear threats of the U.S. which is brandishing its nuclear stick at random. This time the Japanese prime minister, far from wresting an apology from the

U.S., an assailant which inflicted the nuclear disaster on his own nation, chimed in with the U.S. while reading its face. This is a senseless act. Japan, the only and the first victim country of nuclear bombs in the world, went so servile to the U.S., assailant country, in the A bomb-stricken region, a clear expression of the poor plight of Japan as a political dwarf who has no other way but to pursue the U.S. line blindly. The more desperately the hostile forces escalate the racket for reckless pressure on the DPRK, the more sharply it will whet the nuclear treasured sword for self-defense to stamp out the root cause of nuclear disaster threatening humankind, holding high the banner of the line on simultaneously pushing forward the two fronts. (KCNA, "U.S. State Secretary Accused of Trying to Shift Blame for Tension on Korean Peninsula onto DPRK," April 14, 2016)

In the first quarter of this year, when the U.N. Security Council launched sanctions against North Korea, the North Korea-China trade volume has increased by 12.7 percent year-on-year. China, which started sanctions against the North on April 5, has cautioned stretching of the meaning saying that the figures were made before China launched the sanctions. However, the country refused to open up trade figures for March when U.N.'s sanctions started. This raises speculations that China, which is saying it is pressuring North Korea, is acting in an opposite direction. Hwang Sungping, spokesman of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, said Wednesday at a press briefing to explain about trade statistics, that North Korea-China trade reached 1.2 billion dollars in the first quarter, which is an increase of 12.7 percent year-on-year. Exports to North Korea reached 611 million dollars, up 14.7 percent, and imports from North Korea were 591 million dollars, down 10.8 percent year-on-year. (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "N. Korea-China Trade Rises 12.7% in First Quarter," April 14, 2016)

North Korea's road-mobile KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile is believed to be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the continental U.S., the U.S. northern commander said, amid growing concern Pyongyang could soon conduct its first mobile missile test. "I assess that he has the ability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and range the homeland with that warhead," Adm. William Gortney said during a House Armed Services Committee hearing in response to a question about the KN-08 missile, referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Though the intelligence community assesses the probability of the North fielding a successful road-mobile ICBM with a miniaturized nuclear device capable of reaching the U.S. as low, Gortney stressed that as commander responsible for homeland defense, he chooses to assess the North has the capability. "I think it's the prudent course of action. It's what I think the American people would like me to base my readiness assessment and be prepared to engage it. So we are prepared to engage it today, 24 hours a day and 365 days out of the year," he said. Gortney made a similar statement in yesterday's Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, saying that even though the KN-08 remains untested, "modeling suggests it could deliver a nuclear payload to much of the Continental United States. Concerns have grown in recent weeks that Pyongyang could undertake yet another provocation, such as a nuclear test and a long-range missile launch, to mark Friday's birthday of founding leader Kim Il-sung, grandfather of current leader Kim Jong-un. South Korea's Defense Ministry said yesterday that the North has deployed one or two Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles near the

eastern port city of Wonsan for a possible launch, and a launch could come on the occasion of the late leader's birthday. U.S. officials have been quoted as saying that the North could attempt to test the longer-range KN-08. The Guam Homeland Security and Office of Civil Defense said in a statement that it is closely monitoring the possibility of a North Korean missile launch. But it added that "no definitive reports of an immediate threat to Guam or the Northern Marianas (have) surfaced at this time." A launch of either Musudan or KN-08 would mark the first time that the North has tested a mobile ballistic missile. The communist nation has displayed the KN-08 and other mobile missiles in military parades in recent years, but has never test-launched them. U.S. officials have voiced strong concerns about the North's mobile missiles, especially the KN-08, as they can be fired from mobile launchers and are harder to keep an eye on. The U.S. has steadily strengthened its missile defense system to guard against such threats. In today's hearing, Gortney also spoke about challenges associated with a mobile missile. "They're mobile and they're very easy to conceal. Previously, when North Korea assembles a rocket, we have intel that we can detect through all forms of intel. When you get into a road-mobile target, it's very very difficult to be able to track, quickly set up and shoot," the commander said. "Most of my career I dropped bombs for a living and mobile targets would always cause me pause, and that's exactly why this is a tough challenge for us," he said. (Chang Jae-soon, "N.K.'s KN-08 ICBM Capable of Delivering Nuclear Warhead to U.S.: Northern Commander," Yonhap, April 15, 2016)

4/15/16

A North Korea missile launch meant to celebrate the birthday of the country's founder has apparently failed, South Korean and U.S. officials said, an embarrassing setback in what was reportedly the inaugural test of a new, powerful mid-range missile. The U.S. and South Korean officials provided few details, including the type of missile. But Yonhap carried an unsourced report that a "Musudan" missile, which could one day be capable of reaching far-off U.S. military bases in Asia and the Pacific, exploded in the air a few seconds after liftoff. A U.S. official speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters told The Associated Press that it appeared to be a Musudan missile but no definitive conclusion had been reached. Despite the failure, the North has another Musudan loaded on a mobile launcher and Pyongyang will likely fire it, according to South Korean and U.S. authorities, Yonhap reported. U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter, speaking to reporters during a stop on the USS John C. Stennis aircraft carrier in the South China Sea, said that while the U.S. deemed the launch to be unsuccessful, it "was nonetheless another provocation by North Korea in a region that doesn't need that kind of behavior." (Foster Klug and Hyung-Jin Kim, "Seoul, U.S. Say North Korean Missile Apparently Failed," Associated Press, April 15, 2016)

Joseph Bermudez: "Recent commercial satellite imagery shows new developments at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center indicating that North **Korea has already begun or plans to commence a reprocessing campaign** to separate additional plutonium for nuclear weapons. This activity consists of the presence of a loaded railroad flatcar at the Radiochemical Laboratory, excavation alongside the old "Building 500" used to store waste from earlier reprocessing campaigns and excavation work at the Experimental Light Water Reactor's (ELWR) cooling water cistern. Such a conclusion is consistent with a February 2016 statement by US Director



of National Intelligence, James Clapper that North Korea "... could begin to recover plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel within a matter of weeks to months." Imagery also indicates that there is continuing and expanding work at the ELWR still under construction. However, it remains unclear when that facility will become operational. Following *38 North's* April 4 report that exhaust plumes were present at the Radiochemical Laboratory's Thermal Plant in February and March, recent imagery spotted a railroad flatcar at the Radiochemical Laboratory's receiving building. The flatcar is loaded with what appears to be four rectangular tanks or casks. Such tanks or casks could be used to supply chemicals used in a reprocessing campaign intended to produce additional plutonium, haul out waste products or a number of other related activities. Loaded railcars have only been observed here on a few rare occasions in the early 2000s—all associated with a reprocessing campaign. The presence of a loaded flatcar, together with the earlier presence of exhaust plumes, suggests that North Korea is preparing or conducting a reprocessing campaign to separate more plutonium for weapons. This analysis is reinforced by indications in April 11 imagery that sometime after March 22, North Korea built a new dirt access road and began excavating parallel to and a few meters east of Building 500, located approximately 180 meters east of the Radiochemical Laboratory. The lower level of this structure was used in the past to hold liquid waste from reprocessing in large tanks and solid waste in its main level. It is generally believed that the building has not been used since the early 1990s when North Korea shifted its waste storage to two other areas at Yongbyon. While the purpose of the excavation is unclear at this time, and since it is within the security perimeter around the building, possibilities include: 1) expanding the building's storage capabilities or improving its design features in order to reactivate the facility for a new reprocessing campaign; 2) a reprocessing campaign is already underway and Building 500 has been reactivated for waste storage; or 3) in combination with either of the above, a defect in construction or leak was discovered. False-color infrared imagery, however, does not indicate any damage to surface vegetation; if there is a leak, it would be deeper underground or has not spread out far enough to affect surface vegetation. The operational status of the 5 MWe reactor is uncertain. While several vehicles are noted adjacent to the 5 MWe reactor, there are no indications of steam generation or cooling water exhaust. This activity is similar to that noted in *38 North's* April 4 report and suggests that the reactor is not operating or is doing so at an extremely low level. Should this be the case, it would support the above indications of a reprocessing campaign as the 5 MWe reactor would typically have to suspend operations to unload the spent fuel rods to be sent to the Radiochemical Laboratory. Imagery from April 11 indicates work is continuing and expanding at the ELWR. Most notable is the extensive grading around the cistern located approximately 150 meters southwest of the reactor. This cistern is part of the cooling system for the new reactor. Work is also continuing in the transformer yard adjacent to the ELWR and equipment is seen laid out on the ground. It appears that steady progress is continuing towards completion of the ELWR although it is unclear when that facility will become operational. Previous estimates and statements have proven overly optimistic as the North Koreans have likely encountered typical engineering, construction and programmatic challenges. Imagery from April 11 also shows that construction is continuing at a steady pace at a new facility, the purpose of which remains unclear, in the southeastern corner of the uranium enrichment complex.

While the two largest buildings appear to be externally complete, construction is continuing on both the east and west sides of the largest building. Notably, on the east side, a new foundation appears to be under construction. The fact that the chimney from the razed thermal plant was not demolished and is adjacent to this new excavation suggests the possibility that the foundation is for a new plant. The rail yard that serves this area remains active with the presence of an engine, several rail cars and material on the ground. (Joseph Bermudez Jr., "More Evidence of Possible Reprocessing Campaign at Yongbyon; Progress at Experimental Light-Water Reactor," *38North*, April 15, 2016)

Albright, Heinonen, and Kelleher-Vergantini: "As of April 2016, there are growing indications that North Korea has separated, is separating, or will soon be separating plutonium from irradiated fuel at the Radiochemical Laboratory, a process commonly referred to as reprocessing. The irradiated fuel is from the 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor, which restarted in 2013. As highlighted in a previous report, a government official who monitors the situation closely stated to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) that it is possible that North Korea may have already started reprocessing the spent fuel from the reactor. ...The absence of clear external signatures makes it difficult to confirm plutonium separation activities with commercial satellite imagery alone. In addition, the few plutonium separation signatures that exist can be hidden from visual observation. An important signature often associated with reprocessing activities at the Radiochemical Laboratory is the status of the nearby coal fired steam generation plant. This coal plant is not a source of heat for the buildings at the Radiochemical Laboratory, as some have suggested; rather it is the source of industrial steam for the reprocessing activities taking place at the plant. According to Ri Hong Sop, the then Director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Center interviewed in Pyongyang by David Albright in 2007, North Korea "does not like to let others know when we are reprocessing." Therefore, he said North Korea took steps to hide activities related to plutonium separation, making it even more difficult to determine when such separation took place. Ri explained that the coal plant is rarely operational. He said that little steam is needed in the processes to separate plutonium. However, he also said that a large amount of steam is needed when the plant processes liquid radioactive wastes, which occurs after plutonium is separated. One of the main uses of the steam is to generate heat for nuclear waste minimization and solidification. Thus, the steam is mainly used to address the aftermath of plutonium separation. A historical analysis of a large archive of commercial satellite imagery shows that this plant rarely operates, as would be expected if its main function is to provide heat to reprocessing operations. During the last 15 years, the Radiochemical Laboratory has rarely processed irradiated fuel. The imagery shows that the coal plant was active in January 2003, September 2005, and February, March, and April 2016. Both the January 2003 and September 2005 dates coincide with moments in which North Korea was suspected of reprocessing spent fuel from the 5 MWe reactor. ..." (David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, "Correlating the Operation of the Coal Plant to Reprocessing Activities at Yongbyon," Institute for Science and International Security, April 15, 2016)

4/17/16

South Korea has recently detected a sharp increase in vehicle and human activities at North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site and concluded the country is likely to carry out an additional nuclear test before early May, officials said. "Compared to last month, the frequency of vehicle, workforce and equipment movements increased two- to threefold recently" at the nuclear test site in the country's northeast, multiple government sources said. "Related officials concluded that it is a convincing sign that North Korea is preparing for its fifth nuclear test, and they are keeping close tabs on the situation," the sources said. They said vehicles were seen moving in and out of the site's North Portal tunnel, and they may be carrying nuclear technicians. One of the sources indicated that since the start of April, there has been a growing increase in the movements of cars and humans, adding that, "If they are signs of nuclear test preparations, it seems (the preparations) are in the final stages." Concerns have been growing in recent weeks that Pyongyang could undertake additional military provocations like a nuclear detonation test as the country will hold its first congress of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea in more than 30 years in early May. South Korea's officials are now closely monitoring the nuclear site to detect if North Korea is preparing to test a miniaturized nuclear warhead as the country has claimed. "If North Korea goes ahead with a fifth nuclear test, it may announce (after the test) a success in testing a miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be loaded onto an ICBM," another source said. (Yonhap, "Seoul Officials Say Busy Movements at N. Korea's Nuke Site Indicate Imminent Detonation," April 17, 2016)

4/19/16

A fifth North Korean nuclear test could trigger new sanctions including an effort to choke off hard currency earnings by its workers abroad, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Danny Russel told Reuters. "Like a regimen of medicine, the dosage can be upped when the effects fall short of what's required," on Tuesday. Russel made clear he was speaking about the possibility of fresh sanctions by the U.N. Security Council, by the United States on its own, or by a group of like-minded states from the European Union and Southeast Asia, along with the United States. Estimates of North Korean workers abroad vary widely but a study by the South's state-run Korea Institute for National Unification put the number as high as 150,000, primarily in China and Russia, sending back as much as \$900 million annually. North Koreans are known to work abroad in restaurants and on construction sites, and also as doctors. If the North were to test a fifth nuclear device, the United States and its allies South Korea and Japan could also take unspecified "defense-related measures," Russel said. "As the threat grows, then our defensive capabilities need to adjust as well," he said, stressing that there was also a diplomatic route that the North could take by reviving long-dormant negotiations on curbing its nuclear program. South Korean Unification Ministry spokesman Jeong Joon-hee downplayed the prospect that an upcoming visit to New York by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong to attend a U.N. climate conference would create an opening for engagement. "At a time when the North is talking of more provocation, I think it's time to put more weight on sanctions rather than dialogue," Jeong told a briefing in Seoul on April 20. Russel laid out what he called the possible "universe" of how the U.S. government and others might respond to a fifth test and he acknowledged that sanctions have failed to deter North Korea, which tested its first nuclear device in October 2006. He stressed that no decisions had yet been made and said he could not preview a response to an event that has yet to

occur. Russel said it would take time to judge how well the latest sanctions were being enforced, but Beijing had "exhausted traditional options of encouraging and cajoling and persuading the North Koreans and they have clearly shifted to the application of pressure." "There is an argument to be made that serious and sustained pressure on North Korea has never before been undertaken," he said. "The degree to which the North Korean economy depends on China and access to China is such that this stated resolve on the part of China, I think, constitutes something of a new ball game." (Arshad Mohammed and David Brunnstrum, "U.S. Says North Korean Remittances at Risk If It Conducts Nuclear Test," Reuters, April 20, 2016)

4/21/16

North Korea's foreign minister said in a New York visit this week that Pyongyang had no choice but to "answer nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons." The message from minister Ri Su-yong is a rejection of Washington demands that the North take steps toward denuclearization before bilateral dialogue can take place, suggesting that a breakthrough in the current sanctions against Pyongyang is unlikely for the time being. Ri delivered his remarks during member state speeches at the High-Level Thematic Debate on Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030, which took place at the UN headquarters in New York. "Even now, the largest-scale nuclear war exercises in history are taking place on the Korean Peninsula, with a vast force of 300,000 troops and the US's nuclear strategy assets," Ri said. "We have tried dialogue and efforts through international law to eliminate the nuclear threat, but all of it has come to nothing," he continued. "There is now only one [approach] left, which is answering nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons," he added. While it is unclear whether Ri's remarks mean North Korea plans to conduct another nuclear test soon, they indicate that it will continue developing its nuclear program unless a window for negotiations opens with Washington. Ri also described the sanctions and economic blockade spearheaded by Washington as "an expression of ignorance." "The US will earn its due reward for impeding our continued development. I stand here now to demand that it put an end to its anachronistic policies of hostility against North Korea," he said. "It is the political will of our National Defense Commission First Secretary Comrade Kim Jong-un that we will be the ones who laugh last," he continued. Speaking at a regular briefing, White House spokesperson Josh Earnest said the US was "open to engagement with North Korea if they are serious about meeting their past commitments and moving towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." "North Korea, frankly, just has not indicated any degree of seriousness about denuclearization," he added. The positions from Pyongyang and Washington suggest the two sides have yet to find any common ground in their tense divisions. (Yi Yong-in, "North Korean Foreign Minister Says Pyongyang Must 'Answer Nukes with Nukes,'" *Hankyore*, April 23, 2016)

Blinken: "I had a very good and productive day here in Tokyo ... Tomorrow I'll have the opportunity to go to Seoul with my Japanese counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Saiki, to conduct another meeting among Japan, the United States and Korea, and that will focus on many things, but it will certainly focus on our common efforts to deal with the provocations from North Korea. ... **Q:** Hi, I'm Fifield from the Washington Post. On North Korea, obviously you've got these meetings going on. We've got these sanctions in place and yet we still hear all of these threats from North Korea, and today we heard

there were signs of preparations for a further test. So is there anything practical that you think the three of you can be doing to try to stop that test from happening?

**BLINKEN:** Yeah, I think - look - what's critical is the implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolution, because it has real teeth in it, and if it is fully and effectively implemented, it has the possibility at least of changing the calculus of the leadership in North Korea, but it takes some time not just to implement it, but for the effects to become obvious. But **we're looking very carefully at the provisions that would cut North Korea off from the international financial system** and that would go in particular to critical trade for North Korea, the export of things like coal, gold, rare earth materials the proceeds from which fuel the nuclear and missile programs, as well as the supply of things like jet fuel to North Korea. So the test will really be in the implementation and in the effect that it has, and that's going to play out over the next weeks and months. That's what we're looking at. At the same time there are measures that countries can take both in support of the Security Council resolution and indeed in addition to it that will further sharpen the choice for North Korea. Japan, for example, has said that ships that dock in North Korea will not be able to dock here in Japan. And South Korea is doing the same thing. Measures like that can have an impact as well, again in sharpening the choice for the DPRK. But I think it will come down to implementation of the resolution, and there China has really a lead role to play because of its unique relationship with North Korea, but the evidence that we've seen to date suggests that China is taking its responsibility seriously. But we'll know better in the weeks ahead as the implementation really takes effect. **Q:** So far you approve of the way China is implementing the resolution? **BLINKEN:** It's our sense that China is taking this seriously, that it is very frustrated with the actions that North Korea has taken. It shares the common objective that we have of denuclearization, and for those reasons - first of all it supported the Security Council resolution. That in and of itself was very important, and now it seems to be taking steps to implement it, but I think we won't know for sure for a little bit more time. Again, in the weeks ahead we'll see if the implementation is taking place, if it's sustained - that's very important - and what impact it has. **Q:** Minami from Reuters News. I have two questions. The first one is on the trilateral meeting with Japan and Korea, and the recent national elections in South Korea. It could diminish the prospects for cooperation between Japan and South Korea, both diplomatic and military. I was wondering if you shared this view. And the second question is, there was an apparent missile launch last week, and Pyongyang watchers have warned that North Korea will conduct another test. If that does happen, what will the U.S. response be? What is your general analysis? **BLINKEN:** ...It's very hard to predict what will result from the elections. All I can tell you is, I think you saw on the margins of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, President Obama, Prime Minister Abe, President Park together - that in and of itself is very strong evidence of the determination of our three countries to work together on a trilateral basis, and now the work that I've been charged with, with my counterparts, is to turn that commitment into practical steps, both in the security area but also beyond in many other areas of potential cooperation. ...**Q:** So just to clarify, what you're saying contradicts what ...**BLINKEN:** Well, I think it's always hard to predict the political implications of a particular election, so I'm not in the business of doing that. From my perspective, the responsibility that I have is, we saw the three leaders very clearly state the intent and desire to deepen our trilateral cooperation in the meeting they had in Washington,

and now those of us in the respective administrations are working to make that concrete and to look at very practical areas of cooperation. So that will be the test. With regard to further provocations from North Korea including another nuclear test, I think the fact that the international community came together so strongly in the Security Council resolution should be evidence to North Korea that there will be a very strong response to further provocations, and it will simply be digging a deeper hole than it's already in. And I hope that it has taken very careful note of the very strong response from the international community with the latest Security Council resolution, and factors that into its thinking about any further actions. But certainly there would be an additional strong response in the event of another nuclear test. ... (DoS, Deputy Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, Press Roundtable, Tokyo, April 18, 2016)

Sung Kim: "I just had a very productive session with Ambassador Wu Dawei, my counterpart. I won't go into details about the session, but I can tell you that the U.S. and China remain united in firm opposition to North Korea's provocative and inappropriate behavior and on the importance of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2270 fully and faithfully, and of course our common pursuit of the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. ... **Q:** How do you assess the latest round of sanctions - are they being effective? **KIM:** Well, you know 2270 is quite unprecedented in the robustness and the depth of its sanctions, and I think all of us have a responsibility to implement those sanctions fully. China worked very closely with us in coming up with this resolution. Frankly, it's as much China's resolution as it is the United States' or the Security Council's. So we expect and we hope the China and other countries will fully implement all provisions of the resolution. ... **Q:** China has insisted several times that these sanctions are not an end in themselves, and China insists on resuming the Six-Party Talks. I wonder if you have had any conversations with your Chinese counterparts about how bring back North Korea to the negotiations? **KIM:** We, and in fact I think other members of the Six-Party process, have made very clear that we remain open to credible and meaningful diplomacy. We all want that. Unfortunately, North Korea has shown no interest in working with us on **some credible and meaningful effort towards denuclearization**. I think right now we all have to focus on implementing 2270, and hopefully that will define choices more sharply for North Korea and that they will make some positive decisions on the way forward on whether they will engage with us on a serious effort towards denuclearization. **Q:** In light of these reports of a possible nuclear test in sometime early next month, is the U.S. military or U.S. government going to ratchet up its presence around the area to monitor for a nuclear test? **KIM:** As you know, we have our annual military exercises still going on in the Korean Peninsula, so there is robust presence already on the peninsula. And we're continuing to use all available assets to monitor the developments in North Korea, and that we do daily. ... **Q:** At this point, how far do you think you are from getting into any direct bilateral talks with them? **KIM:** Again, Nami, I think that we have made clear to them that we are open to productive diplomacy about the nuclear issue, about how we might work together towards complete denuclearization and that has not changed. (DoS, Sung Kim, Special Representative for North Korea Policy, Remarks, Westin Hotel Beijing, April 21, 2016)

4/23/16

North Korea launched what appeared to be a ballistic missile from a submarine in the East Sea, the South Korean military said. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korea fired a projectile that it believes was a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) around 6:30 p.m. The JCS said it is keeping close tabs on the North Korean military while maintaining its readiness posture. According to a South Korean government source, the SLBM's engine ignited after it was ejected from a 2,000-ton Sinpo-class submarine, but the missile only traveled a short distance. "This projectile, which is believed to be an SLBM, was airborne for a couple of minutes," the source added. (Yonhap, "N.K. Apparently Fired Ballistic Missile from Submarine: S. Korean Military," Korea Herald, April 23, 2016) North Korea on April 24 claimed it had successfully test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile, after which the South Korean military said Pyongyang has made "considerable progress" in developing the advanced weapon system, which could be deployed within the next three to four years. The Seoul government condemned the SLBM launch, and called it a clear violation of the U.N. Security Council resolution. "The (South Korean) government has warned multiple times that North Korea will face a more powerful and firm response from the international community, should it continue to carry out further provocations," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement. "In addition to dedicated implementation of the UNSC resolution, the international community will strengthen the sanction and pressure against the North." KCNA said the underwater test-firing conducted Saturday was "a complete success" under the supervision of state leader Kim Jong-un. "We (North Korea) now have another powerful means to deliver a nuclear strike, in accordance to the (state) party's strategic plans. ... Our navy's operational capacities have been extremely enhanced," Kim was quoted as saying. South Korea's Defense Ministry said the North is hastening the development of the SLBM, which has the distinct advantage of being stealthier when fired from a submarine. "Compared to other countries with SLBMs, the actual deployment of the SLBM is expected to be 3-4 years. But there is also a possibility that it may take less time if they (Pyongyang) concentrate efforts on this issue," said ministry spokesman Moon Sang-kyun. The launch was assessed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have flown 30 kilometers, far less than the known minimum range for the KN-11 SLBM at 300 kilometers. While experts doubt Pyongyang's claim of a successful flight and detonation, it is presumed to have at least successfully conducted a "cold launch," which refers a missile being expelled first from a platform and then igniting in midair. This is crucial in submarine launches to prevent damage to the vessel. KCNA claimed the latest test verified the stability of the cold launch system at maximum depth. Military experts view a depth of at least 20 to 30 meters to be significant in deeming the test launch's success. The depth of today's launch is presumed to be far less, at 10-15 meters. (*Korea Herald*, "Test Indicates Improved N.K. SLBM Technology," April 24, 2016)

KCNA: "Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) Kim Jong Un, first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK, guided on the spot the underwater test-fire of strategic submarine ballistic missile. At the observation post he was briefed on the plan for the test-fire and gave an order for it. As soon as the order was issued, the submarine submerged as low as the maximum depth of waters for launching and fired the ballistic missile. The test-fire was aimed to confirm the stability of the underwater ballistic

launching system in the maximum depth of waters, flying kinetic feature under the vertical flight system of the ballistic missile powered by the newly developed high power solid fuel engine, the reliability of the phased heat separation and the working accuracy of nuclear detonating device of warhead at the preset altitude. **It fully confirmed and reinforced the reliability of the Korean-style underwater launching system** and perfectly met all technical requirements for carrying out the Juche-based underwater attack operation. He noted with great satisfaction that Juche Korea had access to **one more means for powerful nuclear attack as required by the strategic intention of the Party Central Committee**. He highly praised the officials, scientists and technicians in the field of national defense science and munitions factories for having successfully rounded off the technology of underwater launching of ballistic missile from a strategic submarine at a higher level. The successful test-fire would help remarkably bolster up the underwater operational capability of the KPA navy, he said, adding that **it is now capable of hitting the heads of the south Korean puppet forces and the U.S. imperialists anytime** as it pleases. This eye-opening success constitutes one more precious labor gift the defense scientists and technicians are presenting to the great leaders and the motherly Party. He called on the reliable defense scientists and technicians to uphold through scientific practices the Party's strategic intention to react to nuclear weapons in kind. He urged them to step up the project for bolstering the nuclear force to mount nuclear attacks on the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet group of traitors any time when the Party is determined to do. He had a photo session with the defense scientists and service personnel of the navy who took part in the test-fire in celebration of the successful day." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Guides Underwater Test-Fire of Strategic Submarine Ballistic Missile," April 24, 2016)

Kim Jong Un hailed a submarine-launched ballistic missile test as an "eye-opening success," state media said, declaring Pyongyang has the ability to strike Seoul and the United States whenever it pleases. The United States, joined by Britain, said yesterday's apparent test was a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and called on North Korea to refrain from further moves that could destabilize the region. South Korea's Defense Ministry said the launch appeared to have failed as the missile, fired from a submarine in the Sea of Japan, flew just 30 kilometers. However North Korea's state-run KCNA news agency insisted that the test, which it said was personally the defense scientists and technicians are presenting to the great leaders and the party," it added. Still images broadcast on state television showed Kim on the deck of the submarine before watching the test through binoculars from shore and meeting the crew and scientists afterward. Pictures showed the missile, with "The North Star" emblazoned on it, soar out of the water and fly into the sky, leaving a massive plume of smoke above the sea surface. State TV also showed what it claimed were underwater images of the missile being ejected from the submarine, using key "cold launch" technology. (AFP-JJI, "DPRK Hails SLBM Test; Seoul Sees As Failure," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 24, 2016)

North Korea is ready to halt nuclear tests if the United States suspends military exercises with South Korea, Pyongyang's Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong was quoted as saying in a rare interview with The Associated Press while on a visit to New York for U.N. meetings. "Stop the nuclear war exercises in the Korean Peninsula, then we



should also cease our nuclear tests," Ri said, according to AP. The communist nation made the same proposal in the past, but the U.S. has rejected it as an "implicit threat," stressing that the North is banned from nuclear tests under U.N. resolutions and that joint military exercises with South Korea are purely defensive. Ri also told AP that "new opportunities" could come for the two countries if the exercises are suspended, but otherwise, the situation will "lead to very catastrophic results, not only for the two countries but for the whole entire world as well." Ri also said that sanctions against the North won't work. "If they believe they can actually frustrate us with sanctions, they are totally mistaken," he was quoted as saying. The foreign minister said that it's good to see that Cuba and Iran have improved relations with the U.S., but such cases are totally different from relations between Washington and Pyongyang. (Yonhap, "N. Korea FM Offers to Halt Nuclear Tests If U.S. Suspends Military Exercises with S. Korea," April 24, 2016)

John Schilling: "North Korea has revealed images of a submarine-launched ballistic missile test indicating that it has abandoned the liquid-fuel design that has consistently failed in the past and switched to a more robust solid-propellant system that will have a better chance of actually working in an operational environment. The new design is still in the earliest stages of testing, and much work, including development of a full-scale motor, needs to be done. Nevertheless, the simpler design is likely to be less troublesome to develop and could be ready by 2020. The solid-propellant missile would have reduced performance, with a range of 900 km compared to 1600 km for a liquid-propellant version, but is still likely to meet North Korean requirement to pose a challenging threat to US allied defenses, primarily in Northeast Asia. On April 23, North Korea tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) for probably the fifth time and shown us pictures for the third time. They're clearly learning from their mistakes. Unfortunately, part of what they are learning is to carefully frame the pictures they release so that we can't be sure what they might have been hiding. The last time the North showed the world an SLBM test, it accidentally let slip a few frames of video that suggested the test was from a submerged barge rather than a submarine, and a few more showing that the missile had exploded shortly after launch. Pyongyang then made a clumsy cut to stock footage of a completely different missile flying into the heavens. This time, the pictures show what seems to have been a successful launch, but without enough detail to verify more than a few basic facts. The US Strategic Command has confirmed that it detected a launch on April 23, with South Korean sources indicating that the missile had achieved a range of only 30 km. If all three governments say the missile was launched, we can conclude that a missile was launched. Almost certainly the US would detect and track such a launch by satellite, and it is possible that the South Korean Navy would have had a ship in place to track it by radar. But what are we to make of the short range? In order to fly even 30 km, a ballistic missile has to not only launch successfully but accelerate well past the speed of sound. For a single-stage missile, those are the hard parts—once accomplished, the safe bet is that the missile will continue to accelerate until it runs out of fuel, and coast on a ballistic arc to its maximum range. There's still the matter of arranging for the warhead to come down intact and close to the intended target, which isn't trivial. But if the missile flew 30 km, there is a good chance it was only carrying fuel for 30 km. To be fair, after four failed test launches, one can understand the test crew not wanting to

have a full 10 to 20 tons of rocket fuel falling on their heads, expensive barges or submarines. Looking at the pictures we have, in last year's test, the exhaust plume emerges from the nozzle in a narrow and almost translucent state that only 2 to 3 meters downstream develops into the classic yellow-orange streak of fire. The plume never expands much wider than the missile's body, and dissipates about 20 meters downstream. This is a classic liquid-rocket plume, probably from an engine burning kerosene, and from the size, very likely North Korea's Nodong engine. The most recent test shows an almost incandescent white plume emerging fully-formed from the missile's base, expanding significantly, and ultimately leaving a trail of light grey smoke. **This looks like the same missile, but they clearly are not the same engines.** It is very much like a classic solid rocket motor exhaust plume. And guess what? Just last month, North Korea showed the world a ground test of a solid-fuel rocket motor. Note the similar shape and color of the plume. The motor from last month's test, about 1.25 meters in diameter and 3 meters long, is too small for this missile. The KN-11 SLBM is 1.5 meters in diameter and a bit over 9 meters long, probably weighing almost 15 tonnes. This motor, as far as we know, the largest solid-fuel rocket motor North Korea has ever built, would probably get the KN-11 into the air, but it wouldn't get it very far. A quick calculation suggests that such a combination would have a maximum range of about 30 km. So why the switch, and what is the point of testing a missile with such a short range? To begin with, let's note that the original configuration with the Nodong engine was perhaps the worst possible way to build an SLBM. It is what North Korea had when they began this program. If the North Koreans had kept at it, they would have probably found a way to make it work. The Russians, eventually made something similar work back in the 1960s, and we know the North Koreans hired some of the Russian engineers who did that. But liquid-fuel rockets and submarines are a bad mix, and the Nodong was never designed for that application. In particular, when a missile is ejected from a submarine launch tube, any liquid propellant is going to slosh violently in the tanks, possibly with enough force to tumble the missile or rupture the tanks. And if the fuel inlet is uncovered for even an instant, the high-performance fuel pump of a typical liquid-fuel rocket will overspeed and destroy itself trying to suck air. Very likely, the rocket will explode shortly after igniting the engine. We have seen that at least once in the case of North Korea and it may have happened several other times we haven't seen. It is possible to overcome these challenges, as the Russians did with their R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. There is evidence that the North Koreans obtained this technology, and maybe even surplus missiles, from Russia. Earlier this month, the North displayed footage of a ground test of what appeared to be a pair of R-27 missile engines clustered together. And the R-27 missile was almost exactly the right size to fit in the launch tubes of North Korea's GORAE-class missile submarine. So why not just use that missile the way it was meant to be used? The obvious answer is that the last of those missiles were built over 30 years ago, and any that might have reached North Korea have probably endured some rough handling and careless storage along the way. While Pyongyang has never successfully flown a missile based on the R-27., there were reports of a failed launch earlier this month, which may have been a North Korean derivative called the Musudan. So, even if the North Koreans can make the engines work in a test stand, there's still a lot of engineering to be done before the missiles can fly. There may also be a limited supply of ex-Soviet hardware to work with. And Kim Jong Un may want to show his submarine

launching missiles this year, not 5 or 10 years from now. Which brings us to what sensible engineers have been doing for years—if you want to launch ballistic missiles from submarines, it is almost certainly best to use solid-propellant motors. And not just because of the propellant slosh problem. Storable liquid rocket propellants are intensely corrosive, and if they leak, the fumes are extremely toxic—not a good combination in an enclosed space. Only the Russians ever made liquids work in that context and even they are now using solid propellant on their latest submarine-launched missiles. North Korea presumably started down the path of making liquid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missiles because, at the time, it couldn't make solid-propellant motors big enough for the job but it did have Russian technical expertise in liquid-propellant missiles. But the North hasn't had much success with the liquid-propellant option, and over in another corner of the DRPK's arms industry, other scientists seem to have been making real progress in solid-fuel motors. So the North made the sensible engineering decision to cut its losses, stop trying to do things the hard way and go back to the drawing board with a new propulsion system, if not an entirely new missile. What does this mean in terms of capabilities? First, if the North is switching from liquid to solid propellant, the missile is pretty entirely new even if it looks the same from the outside. Therefore, much of the progress the North has made so far will have been wasted effort. And second, the North Koreans probably still don't have a motor that is really suitable for this missile. But they have likely already been working towards such a motor, because the one tested last month was clearly meant to be part of a two-stage system. So North Korea will lose some ground redesigning the missile, and may have to wait a year or two for a full-sized motor. But if it is already at the point of using the small motor to test the launch system, Pyongyang will probably be able to catch up pretty quickly. Last time I looked at North Korea's SLBM program, I estimated they might have an operational system by 2020. If they've gone back to the drawing board, but settled on a simpler configuration and are already in early testing, that's probably still a reasonable estimate. In terms of performance, they probably will lose a bit. Liquid-propellant rocket engines, when they work, are lighter and more efficient than solids. And the KN-11 is probably not long enough to incorporate a second stage to make up the lost performance. In short, a liquid-propellant KN-11 missile would have probably flown 1600 km with a 650 kg warhead. A single-stage solid-propellant version will probably be good for only 900 km. This range is still enough to reach all of South Korea and parts of Japan from North Korean territorial waters. If the boat ventures even a little ways into the Sea of Japan, it can reach targets anywhere in Japan. And the ability of North Korea's submarine force to reach targets further afield has always depended on the ability of the submarines to reach the open sea, not on the range of the missiles. If a North Korean submarine can escape the Sea of Japan and come within 1600 km of Guam, or Hawaii, it can almost certainly cover an extra 700 km. As with some of the other new technologies and systems North Korea has been introducing, a solid-propellant KN-11 SLBM is more likely to work reliably in an operational environment. Today, North Korea has an experimental testbed that reliably launched to a range of 30 km, maybe from a submarine or a submerged barge. We don't know. But it is increasingly clear a real, albeit limited, submarine missile threat from North Korea will probably emerge by the year 2020. (John Schilling, "A New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile for North Korea," *38North*, April 25, 2016)

4/24/16

Obama: "MR. EARNEST: The second U.S. journalist that we'll recognize is Colleen McCain Nelson from the Wall Street Journal. Q. Thank you, Mr. President. North Korea launched a ballistic missile from a submarine on Saturday. Later, North Korea's foreign minister told the AP that they will halt its nuclear tests if the U.S. suspends its military exercises with South Korea. Do you view that as a serious overture? And at this point, how do you assess North Korea's nuclear capabilities? ... OBAMA: So, with respect to North Korea, we're still analyzing and assessing with precision the activities that North Korea engaged in over the last several days. So I'll let the Pentagon and our intelligence community debrief everyone once we have precise information. What is clear is that North Korea continues to engage in continuous, provocative behavior; that they have been actively pursuing a nuclear program, an ability to launch nuclear weapons. And although more often than not they fail in many of these tests, they gain knowledge each time they engage in these tests. And we take it very seriously. And so do our allies, and so does the entire world. And it's for this reason why we have continually mobilized the international community to isolate North Korea, to crank up the sanctions that impose a cost on Kim Jong-un and Pyongyang, and why we've cultivated cooperation with the Chinese to put more pressure on North Korea. And although it is not where we would completely like it to be, I will say that we've seen the Chinese be more alarmed and take more seriously what North Korea is doing, and they have been willing to be more forward-leaning in exacting a price on North Korea's destructive behavior. In terms of overtures, **we don't take seriously a promise to simply halt until the next time they decide to do a test these kinds of activities. What we've said consistently, dating back to the six-party talks, is that if North Korea shows seriousness in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, then we will be prepared to enter into some serious conversations with them about reducing tensions and our approach to protecting our allies in the region. But that's not something that happens based on a press release in the wake of a series of provocative behaviors. They're going to have to do better than that. And until they do, we're going to continue to emphasize our work with the Republic of Korea and Japan, and our missile defense mechanisms, to assure that we're keeping the American people safe and we're keeping our allies safe.**" (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and Chancellor Merkel, Schloss Herrenhausen, Hannover, Germany, April 24, 2016)

4/25/16

President Barack Obama said his country has the military means to destroy North Korea but it will not do so due to the humanitarian cost and the impact on neighbor South Korea. Obama was interviewed by CBS presenter Charlie Rose during a trip to Germany. Obama said North Korea is "erratic enough" and the country's leader, Kim Jong-un, is "irresponsible enough that we don't want them getting close." "We could, obviously, destroy North Korea with our arsenals... But aside from the humanitarian costs of that, they are right next door to our vital ally," South Korea, he added. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "Obama on Why U.S. Won't Destroy N. Korea," April 27, 2016)

4/27/16

*DPRK FoMin spokesman's answer to a question raised by KCNA on April 27 as the US has come out with new 'sanctions doctrine':* Officials of the US administration including those of the Treasury Department have suggested so-called "sanctions doctrine" to ratchet up the sanctions and pressure on other countries. Throughout history the US,

regarding sanctions as a major means for pursuing its foreign policy for aggression, deliberately wielded a sanctions stick against those countries and people disobedient to it in defiance of international law, thereby inflicting untold pain and misfortune upon them. The "sanctions doctrine" advocated by the US is the evil "doctrine" that can be produced only in the US, the hotbed of high-handed and arbitrary practices, as it is a collection of mean methods for bringing into submission those countries and their people courting its displeasure. The gap between the rich and the poor is widening and the social inequality and conflict are festering with each passing day and people suffer from unemployment and economic difficulty. Moreover, innocent people fall victim to shooting sprees for the mere reason that they hurt one's feelings. This is daily occurrence in the US. It is ridiculous for the US to invent the "sanctions doctrine" to impose pain on others, far from minding its own business. It is foolhardy for the daily declining US to resort to sanctions against other countries. What matters here is that the US sanctions have become a root cause of unreasonable pressure, inequality, tensions and stand-off in the international relations. Countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America hit by U.S. sanctions stick should destroy the cesspool of high-handed and arbitrary practices in unity in order to stop the bigger disaster that may be caused by the evil "doctrine." (KCNA, "DPRK Foreign Ministry Blasts U.S. New 'Sanctions Doctrine,'" April 27, 2016)

4/28/16

North Korea test-fired what appeared to be two intermediate range ballistic missiles, but both failed, the U.S. military said, in a setback for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ahead of next week's ruling party congress. The first launch, at about 6:40 a.m. local time (05:40 p.m. EDT Wednesday) from near the east coast city of Wonsan, appeared to have been of a Musudan missile with a range of more than 3,000 km (1,800 miles) which crashed within seconds, a South Korean defense ministry official said. Later, at around 7:26 p.m., the North shot a similar intermediate range missile from the same area, but the launch was also understood to have failed, the official added. The U.S. military's Strategic Command said it tracked two attempted launches, neither of which posed a threat to North America. "Initial indications reveal the tests were not successful," said Lieutenant Colonel Martin O'Donnell, a STRATCOM spokesman. Some experts had predicted that North Korea would wait until it figured out what went wrong in the previous launch before attempting another, a process that could take months. Yang Uk, a senior research fellow at the Korea Defense and Security Forum and a policy adviser to the South Korean navy, said the North Koreans appeared to be in a rush to demonstrate a success head of the party congress. "They need to succeed but they keep failing," he said "They didn't have enough time to fix or technically modify the system, but just shot them because they were in a hurry." (Ju-min Park and David Brunnstrom, "North Korea Test-Fires Two Missiles, Both Fail: U.S.," Reuters, April 28, 2016) Today's first missile appears to be the same model that North Korea tried to launch on April 15, according to the insider. "The missile, presumed to be a Musudan, was fired around 6:40 a.m. from the vicinity of Wonsan, but it appears to have crashed a few seconds later," the official said. "It is highly likely that the launch failed. With that in mind, South Korea and the United States are conducting a detailed assessment," he said. Others said the missile seems to have plunged into the coastal area, and the failed launch was caught by a U.S. surveillance satellite. The first missile fired earlier in the month exploded a few seconds after liftoff, even before entering its flight phase,

reportedly due to engine problems. The other one had since been on standby before Pyongyang launched it earlier in the day. "After the first missile launch ended in failure on April 15, we thought they might take some time to fix the defects, but they seem to have decided to go out of their way to attempt a second launch within a short period of time," the official said. (Yonhap, "N. Korea's Launch of Musudan Ends in Failure: Military," April 28, 2016)

4/29/16

North Korea has sentenced a South Korean-born American citizen to 10 years of hard labor for subversion and espionage, a North Korean official told CNN. Prosecutors were seeking a 15-year hard labor sentence for Kim Dong Chul for committing "offenses in a scheme to overthrow the socialist system of the DPRK," according to KCNA. The defense asked that Kim's sentence be commuted, arguing "the crimes by the accused are very serious but he is old and may repent of his faults." Today's verdict was handed down by North Korea's Supreme Court. The State Department said it is aware of the media reports about Kim's sentence. "The welfare of U.S. citizens is one of the Department's highest priorities," State Department spokesman John Kirby said in an emailed statement. "In cases where U.S. citizens are reported detained in North Korea, we work closely with the Swedish Embassy, which serves as the United States' Protecting Power in North Korea. We have no further comment due to privacy considerations." (Tiffany Ap and Chandrika Marayan, "North Korea Sentences American to 10 Years Hard Labor," CNN, April 29, 2016) KCNA: "The Supreme Court of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 29 held a trial on Kim Tong Chol, a Korean-American who was arrested while perpetrating the state subversive plots and espionage against the DPRK. Attending the trial as observers were citizens from different walks of life. The trial examined the case of Kim, accused of violations of Articles 60 and 64 of the DPRK Criminal Code. And a written indictment confirming his crimes was submitted before inquiries into the facts of the case. In the course of the inquiry, the accused confessed to all crimes he had committed to overthrow the social system of the DPRK while viciously slandering the dignity of its supreme leadership and its political system and gathered and offered information on its party, state and military affairs to the south Korean puppet regime, which are tantamount to state subversive plots and espionage. Then, witnesses made statements and evidence was presented to prove the crimes of the accused. The prosecutor demanded 15 years of hard labor to the accused, contending that he is bound to face a stern punishment under the DPRK law as he committed the said offenses in a scheme to overthrow the socialist system of the DPRK. The defense counsel asked the court to commute the demanded penalty, arguing that the crimes by the accused are very serious but he is old and may repent of his faults, witnessing for himself the true picture of the prospering DPRK. The court sentenced him to ten years of hard labor. (KCNA, "Korean-American Sentenced to 10 Years of Hard Labor," April 29, 2016)

4/30/16

DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement: "Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 joint military drills staged by the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces against the DPRK for 50 odd days were the worst-ever military provocations that pushed the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of a nuclear war. ...The war rehearsals were the largest-ever maneuvers hostile to the DPRK as it was manifested in the drills that the U.S. scenario and moves to physically eliminate the DPRK reached an extremely dangerous phase. It is tantamount to an open declaration of war against the DPRK that the U.S.,

kicking off the drills, undisguisedly revealed its attempt to mount a preemptive attack on the DPRK after discarding even the spurious mask of "defensive drills." We didn't overlook it but countered it with measures for self-defense in a just manner. **It is the pivot of the DPRK's counteractions for self-defense to counter the enemy's nuclear threat with its own nuclear weapons.** It is the legitimate right of a sovereign state specified also in the UN Charter for the DPRK to react to the enemy's declaration of war and threat with its own steps for self-defense, and even the UN Security Council is not entitled to infringe upon the right. **By opting for undisguised military hostile acts and threats to the DPRK, the U.S. intentionally and completely reneged on the promise specified in the September 19 joint statement as its keynote that it would respect the sovereignty of the DPRK and co-exist with it peacefully and has no intent to attack or invade it with nuclear or conventional weapons. So, the statement was finally scrapped.** The U.S. no longer has legal foundation or moral justification to urge the DPRK to "be true to its commitments" and the like. The DPRK will as ever remain unchanged in its stand of countering any war of aggression to be provoked by the enemy with its just war and react to the threat of a nuclear war posed by them with its bolstered nuclear deterrent. **Whenever the enemy stage war drills, the nuclear attack capability of the DPRK will be bolstered up remarkably."** (KCNA, "DPRK Will Counter Enemy's Threat of Nuclear War with Its Bolstered Nuclear Capability: FM Spokesman," April 30, 2016)

The new chief commander of the 28,000-strong U.S. soldiers stationed in South Korea, Gen. Vincent Brooks, took command in the U.S. Forces Korea's Yongsan garrison in central Seoul with a pledge to continue to be "ready to fight today" as he assumed the position amid unrelenting tension on the Korean Peninsula. Brooks, previously the commanding general of the U.S. Army Pacific, graduated from West Point in 1980 and served with United States Forces Korea in the 1980s. In the ceremony, Brooks took over from Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, who had been the USFK commanding general since October 2013. Scaparrotti will assume his new position as the commander of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). (Yonhap, "New USFK Chief Takes Command," *Korea Times*, April 30, 2016)

5/1/16

Elleman: "In January 2011, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates mused that "North Korea will have developed" an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2016, with the caveat that the arsenal would be small with limited operational capability. Five years later, in 2016, there still is hope that the United States and its Asian allies can prevent North Korea from developing a nuclear-capable ICBM. Pyongyang, however, is not cooperating. North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January, with Kim Jong Un boasting that it had exploded a hydrogen bomb. A month later, it successfully lofted a satellite into orbit using a large, long-range rocket. Then in March, North Korea unveiled a mock-up of a miniaturized nuclear bomb and performed two separate missile-related ground tests. The first test simulated the conditions a warhead would experience during re-entry into the atmosphere to evaluate the thermal protection technologies. The other was a stationary firing of a large, solid-fueled rocket motor. In April, North Korea tested a previously unseen liquid-propellant engine. In response to Pyongyang's provocative actions, the UN Security Council enacted the most stringent sanctions to date on North Korea. Perhaps most importantly, China seems to have lost

its patience with the Kim regime and has promised to enforce export controls along its heretofore porous border with North Korea. At this point, it is not clear if these actions would be enough to forestall the North's development of long-range missiles. The international community might need to be more creative and proactive. North Korea has limited experience developing ballistic missiles. Its Scud and Nodong missiles were likely imported from Russia. The Unha satellite launcher is an indigenous design and was assembled in North Korea, but its main engines were likely imported. If North Korea builds its own ICBM, it will probably rely on engines fabricated elsewhere. If Pyongyang is already in possession of the engines needed for an ICBM, then political restraint, money, and time are the only hurdles standing in the way of a capacity to threaten the U.S. mainland, short of military action by a foreign power. Fortunately, North Korea's inexperience with missile development will slow its progress, leaving the international community with an extra year or two to identify and implement new policies aimed at slowing Pyongyang's pursuit of new nuclear delivery capabilities. North Korean efforts to acquire ballistic missiles likely began in the mid-1970s, when three parallel routes were initiated. One pathway sought to clone the Soviet-designed FROG, or Luna, long-range artillery rocket. The second program explored adapting surface-to-air missiles for use as ballistic missiles. Both approaches were abandoned when it became clear that neither would yield the short- and medium-range ballistic missile systems Pyongyang desired. On the third route, North Korean engineers joined a Chinese initiative to develop a liquid-propellant ballistic missile called the Dongfeng-61 that was to have a range of 600 kilometers. Domestic politics in Beijing caused China to abandon the project in 1978, after just one year. Having failed to develop the necessary technologies, North Korea turned to foreign sources from which it could import ballistic missile technology. The effort focused on acquiring Soviet-built, short-range Scud-B missiles and the accompanying support vehicles and equipment. Poor diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and Moscow during the mid-1970s drove North Korea to seek an alternative supplier of Scud-B technology. Egypt proved willing and delivered to North Korea missiles, equipment, and transporter-erector launchers (TELs) sometime between 1976 and 1981. The history of North Korean ballistic missile development after the initial acquisition of Scud-B technology has become a source of debate. Conventional wisdom argues that North Korea began the process of reverse-engineering Scud missiles acquired from Egypt and, in April 1984, test-launched a Scud-B, which was rebranded as the Hwasong-5. After this initial flight test, North Korea launched up to five additional Hwasong-5 missiles; three of these launches were successful. The Hwasong-5 can carry a 1,000-kilogram warhead a distance of 300 kilometers. In the late 1980s, North Korea began to develop a modified Hwasong-5 missile, the Hwasong-6, which is a clone of the Soviet-designed and -built Scud-C. Just as the Scud-C has technological similarities with the Scud-B, the Hwasong-6 uses the same engine, guidance and control systems, and fuel-oxidizer combination as the Hwasong-5. The two versions are identical in length and diameter, but the warhead mass of the Scud-C/Hwasong-6 is approximately 270 kilograms less than that of the Scud-B/Hwasong-5. Furthermore, the Scud-C/Hwasong-6 uses a common bulkhead to fit additional propellant into the airframe, which, when combined with the lighter warhead, increases the range to 500 kilometers. The limited number of flight tests during development of the Hwasong-5 and -6, the near perfect replication of the Scud-B and -C performance and reliability



characteristics, and the rapid deployment of the Hwasong systems cast doubt on claims that they were reverse engineered from a few sample missiles acquired from Egypt or elsewhere. Available evidence argues convincingly that North Korea more likely purchased Soviet-made Scud-B and -C missiles or acquired a licensed production line to manufacture them. Mock-ups of the large rockets North Korea would eventually use in its attempts to loft satellites into low-earth orbit were first spotted by U.S. intelligence in February 1994 at the Sanum-dong research center outside Pyongyang. A little more than four years later, in August 1998, North Korea used the Taepo Dong-1, a three-stage rocket launched from Musudan-ri. The launch failed shortly after the third stage separated from the second. Eight years after the Taepo Dong-1 firing, in July 2006, North Korea launched a much larger rocket, the Taepo Dong-2. The rocket exploded just 42 seconds into its flight; its intended mission therefore remains a mystery, as does its configuration. There are no publicly available photographs or videos of the launch. Then, on April 5, 2009, North Korea attempted to boost a small satellite into orbit using a three-stage Unha-2 rocket from the Musudan-ri launch facility. It failed after second-stage burnout, with remnants of the satellite and third stage of the rocket falling into the ocean roughly 3,200 kilometers from the launch site. North Korea again attempted a satellite launch on April 12, 2012, using the Unha-3, a slightly modified version of the Unha-2. The new rocket was fired from the Sohae facility, situated on the western shores of the Korean peninsula. It failed roughly 100 seconds into first-stage operation. Finally, on December 12, 2012, the Unha rocket successfully placed a satellite into orbit, although the satellite did not operate as designed. North Korea successfully repeated the launch in February 2016, when it placed the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite into orbit. The new satellite reportedly weighed 200 kilograms, about twice as much as the previous one. The satellite continues to orbit the Earth at an altitude of roughly 500 kilometers. With the exception of the Taepo Dong-2 test-fired in July 2006, which exploded too soon after liftoff to determine its trajectory and mission, all of the large rockets launched by North Korea were designed to maximize performance as a satellite launcher. In each case, the Taepo Dong-1 and Unha rockets flew on trajectories fully consistent with a satellite launch. Furthermore, all employed low-thrust engines in the upper stages, which would not provide sufficient power if the rocket were to fly on a ballistic missile trajectory. Gravity losses resulting from the long-burning, low-output engines would rob the Unha rocket of 1,000 kilometers or more of range if used as a surface-to-surface missile. The Unha-2 or -3 could serve as a springboard for the development of an ICBM, but the history of long-range missile development by other countries, including the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and France, indicates that satellite launch activities have limited impact on missile programs. No country has converted a satellite launch rocket into a long-range ballistic missile. China ran parallel programs, but it still conducted a full set of flight tests to validate the performance and reliability of the long-range missiles that are part of the Dongfeng series. Nonetheless, North Korea could attempt to transform the Unha rocket into a long-range missile. **A militarized version of the satellite launch rocket would require a significant redesign, including new second and third stages.** If done with existing options available to North Korea, the resultant missile could deliver a 1,000-kilogram warhead to a range of 10,000 kilometers. The transformation, however, would entail many challenges. First, the new missile would have to be flight-tested along a ballistic missile

trajectory to include a warhead that survives re-entry into the atmosphere at speeds of roughly seven kilometers per second. A single flight test would not be sufficient; a series of tests would be required to verify the reliability and performance of the missile operating under a variety of conditions. If North Korea succeeded in developing an ICBM based on the Unha rocket, it would find that the ICBM would be too cumbersome for deployment on mobile platforms. In principle, Unha-based ICBMs could be placed in silos, but unlike China, Russia, and the United States, North Korea is small, making it more difficult to hide silo locations from U.S. surveillance satellites. Furthermore, the long preparation and fueling times would leave the missile exposed to pre-emption for extended periods. Nonetheless, North Korea could pursue this option as a more feasible alternative to developing a mobile ICBM. Western observers would receive advance notice of a new capability because the flight trials would take several years and would be detected by intelligence agencies. The Musudan, as it is named by U.S. intelligence agencies, had been rumored to be under development in North Korea since the mid-2000s. Some reports contend that the missile was initially deployed by North Korea as early as 2003, with others suggesting 2006. The missile reportedly appeared in a military parade in April 2007, but no photographs were made public. In October 2010, a handful of Musudan mock-ups carried on TELs were unveiled during a parade broadcast by state-run television. The mock-ups show a missile similar in appearance to the Soviet-era R-27 (SS-N-6, Serb) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) although the North Korean version is longer. Other minor differences, such as the change in the position of the cable duct that runs along the missile's outer frame, are visible. The technologies used by the Soviet R-27 are quite sophisticated relative to the Scud missiles North Korea has maintained and operated for the past three decades. The R-27 airframe and propellant tanks are made using a chemical etching process to provide it with considerable strength while remaining lightweight. It is unclear if North Korea has the technical knowledge, experience, and industrial infrastructure to replicate the processes needed to fabricate the airframe. Even if Pyongyang's production engineers have mastered the etching process, additional structural elements would be needed to accommodate the added length of the Musudan and to ensure that the missile, which was designed to be housed in the relatively benign, temperature-controlled environment of a submarine launch tube, survives the rigors of deployment on a road-mobile TEL. Finally, the R-27 engine is a closed-cycle, high-pressure system, very different from and far more advanced than the low-pressure, open-cycle engines North Korean engineers have employed to date. If North Korea has struggled to replicate the Scud or Nodong engines, it would be almost impossible for it to master production of the R-27's main engine. Although mock-ups of the Musudan have been seen on numerous occasions, there is no public evidence that North Korea has conducted test flights of this missile. Yet, reports continue to suggest that the Musudan has been deployed to missile bases in Yangdok in South Pyongan province and Sangnam-ri, in North Hamgyong province. The Musudan missiles showcased during parades in Pyongyang are not copies of the original R-27 design, suggesting that North Korea has incorporated some changes. Like any new system, it therefore must be flight-tested to validate reliability and performance. Without undertaking the necessary developmental tasks, including flight trials, North Korea must accept considerable risk that it will not work if launched. China, Russia, the United States, and other countries would not deploy a strategic weapon

without first verifying its capabilities. Even Iraq, in the midst of its war with Iran in the 1980s, conducted 10 flight tests of a modified Scud-B, the al-Hussein missile, over approximately two years before firing them on Tehran and other cities. That North Korea has not test-flown the Musudan hints that Pyongyang either does not possess R-27 missiles and its major components or that it is willing to accept very poor reliability of the modified missile. The April test-firing of what appears to have been a pair of main engines from the R-27 at the vertical stand at the Sohae facility suggests that Pyongyang possesses some Soviet-made R-27 engines. If North Korea has such engines, its limited experience developing missiles indigenously and the typical imperfections contained in any new missile design will present challenges. Without flight-testing Musudan missiles, North Korea would run the risk that fewer than half of those missiles would reach their assigned targets. During an April 2012 military parade in Pyongyang, North Korea unveiled a three-stage missile carried on a 16-wheel TEL. A more detailed and slightly modified mock-up appeared in another military parade a year later. Dubbed the KN-08 and sometimes referenced as the Hwasong-13, the missile is very likely powered by liquid-propellant engines, as evidenced by the small fueling and draining ports positioned along the airframe's length. Engineering reconstructions of the missile by Western experts suggest that the KN-08 first stage employs a cluster of four Scud engines with four small steering engines used to control the missile's flight. The second stage is powered by the main and steering engines of the R-27, if indeed North Korea has them. Steering engines, which are also employed by the Unha rocket, are likely found on the third stage. If this reconstruction is accurate, the KN-08 could have a range of 7,500 to 9,000 kilometers when carrying a warhead and re-entry vehicle weighing between 500 and 700 kilograms. In principle, it could reach the west coast of the United States. There is little doubt that North Korea has ambitions to field a viable ICBM fleet. The KN-08 and KN-14 currently are likely candidates to fulfill Pyongyang's aspirations. Yet, neither missile has been flight-tested, and North Korea has not developed and tested a re-entry vehicle capable of withstanding the thermal and mechanical rigors of re-entry into the atmosphere at ICBM velocities. Engineers might have taken a first step toward the development of the technologies capable of facilitating re-entry by placing a nosecone replica under the exhaust plume of a Scud engine to simulate re-entry conditions. Such tests, however, are not a substitute for testing under real conditions. Further, the dimensions and geometry of the nosecone tested do not match those of any of North Korea's long-range missile mock-ups. During a 2015 parade, North Korea unveiled what appears to be a two-stage, long-range missile, subsequently identified as the KN-14. The KN-14 mock-up shares many of the external features found on the Soviet R-29R SLBM. The R-29R (SS-N-18 Mod 1, Stingray) is a product of the Makeyev Design Bureau, the Russian entity with which North Korea allegedly has worked in the past. It is unclear, however, when and how the R-29R would have been transferred from Russia to North Korea because the missile is still deployed on Russia's Delta III (667BDR) submarines and was test-fired by the Russian navy as recently as October 2012. It is difficult to imagine that Russia would export a strategic weapon that is currently serving on active duty. The range-payload capabilities of KN-14 are unknown or highly speculative. Regardless of the authenticity or success of the re-entry technology test, the fact that it was performed indicates that North Korea is pursuing the engineering activities needed to develop a functional ICBM. North Korea will need more than a handful of years of

additional developmental actions, including multiple flight tests, before it has a viable, long-range nuclear capability. Satellite launches using the Unha rocket are not a substitute for KN-08 or KN-14 tests. Unha flights will contribute to the development of an ICBM but not decisively. As with the Musudan, North Korea could elect to use an unproven missile under emergency conditions. The failure rate of first- and second-generation, long-range missiles developed by other countries during initial flight trials was greater than the success rate, and each of those countries had far more experience designing and developing ballistic missiles prior to their respective long-range missile flight trials than North Korea now does. It is safe to assume that the KN-08 and KN-14 will not succeed more than half the time without test flights. More likely, only one-third to one-quarter of all launches under emergency conditions will succeed. One or two test launches would improve North Korea's odds of success but not substantially. In addition to its quest to develop a long-range nuclear strike capability, North Korea has initiated two new programs aimed at diversifying its strategic delivery options. The first project was initially detected in late 2014 by Joseph Bermudez and the *38 North* website when they spotted equipment commonly used to develop an SLBM at a navy yard in Sinpo, North Korea, on commercially available satellite imagery. Months later, on May 9, 2015, North Korea aired photographs of Kim Jong Un witnessing first hand a test of a sea-launched missile. Photographs from the test show a missile emerging from underwater and its main engine igniting, although the engine did not operate for more than a few seconds. Shutting down the engine shortly after ignition is a common practice when the primary test objective is focused on the launch-tube ejection system. Prudently, North Korea did not use a submarine for the test, instead electing to employ a submergible barge with a launch tube, towed by a surface ship. From its outward appearance, the missile appears to be a variant of the Musudan, although the exhaust plume seen in the photographs is not consistent with the propellant combination employed by the R-27 and the presumed Musudan. Additional tests of the system have been reported in the media, a clear indication that North Korea aspires to develop an SLBM capability. If North Korea pursues the engineering steps at a healthy pace, it could have an operational system in about five years. Historically, however, projects undertaken by other countries to develop an SLBM have encountered unanticipated technical challenges that extended the timeline, sometimes more than doubling or tripling the development schedule. North Korea's limited experience developing missiles domestically likely will prolong the developmental program beyond what other countries have encountered. The added time needed by North Korea to operationalize the capability provides the Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. navies a cushion in time to hone their respective anti-submarine warfare skills to be able to confidently detect and track North Korea's underwater systems. The second developmental effort appears to be focused on mastering the production of large, solid-propellant rocket motors. In late March 2016, North Korea released photographs of Kim attending a ground test of such a motor. Although the size of the motor is difficult to determine using the available pictures, it is likely about 1.25 meters in diameter and roughly three meters long. Its size indicates that it is designed to be the upper stage of a larger missile. Several possibilities for its planned use come to mind. North Korea might be attempting to develop a solid-fueled version of the Nodong missile, much like what Iran has attempted to do with the two-stage, medium-range Sajjil. Solid-fueled missiles are easier to deploy on road-

mobile platforms than liquid-fueled missiles are, and they require less logistical support for mobile operations. Because they do not require fueling prior to launch, they can be fired more quickly than their liquid-propellant counterparts. Moreover, the greater density of solid propellants reduces the overall size of the missile, which is preferable for mobile deployment. If this is what North Korea has in mind, it will require many years to perfect and field a medium-range missile powered by a solid propellant. Iran has been developing the Sajjil for more than a decade, with an initial ground test of the first-stage motor taking place in 2005. Flight tests began in 2008. Yet, technical difficulties appear to have slowed the Iranian effort, as it has not launched a Sajjil since 2011. North Korea will likely encounter many challenges as well, suggesting that it will not begin deploying a mature design to the military before 2022 at the earliest. The upper-stage motor might also be intended for use as the third stage of a militarized version of the Unha rocket. The current configuration of that rocket is optimized for satellite launches, not as a ballistic missile. North Korea might seek to replace the second and third stages of the Unha with higher-thrust, shorter-action time stages that would improve the range capabilities of the rocket by avoiding the gravity losses, and thus range reductions, resulting from the use of underpowered stages. The modification would require flight testing, although the flight trials could be shortened marginally because of North Korea's experience working with the first stage, which is not likely to undergo significant modifications. Even so, a flight-test program would likely take at least two years and more likely three to five. In the near to medium term, North Korea will not benefit hugely from using solid-propellant technologies. In the longer term, however, the strategic significance could be consequential. Mastering the technology would enable Pyongyang to field reliable and capable long-range missiles on road-mobile launch platforms, making them more difficult to destroy before they are fired. On the other hand, mastering the art of producing a solid-propellant motor is expensive and time consuming. North Korea will struggle mightily to produce a flight-proven, solid-fueled ICBM before 2030. Activities over the past five years and perhaps much longer suggest that North Korea is edging toward the goal of creating a nuclear-armed ICBM. Underground nuclear tests, satellite launches, and the launching of Nodong missiles demonstrate capabilities, a key pillar of a deterrence posture. Unveiling mock-ups of the Musudan, KN-08, and KN-14 during military parades and showcasing a mock-up of a small nuclear device are more suggestive than real for now. It should be remembered, however, that North Korea placed mock-ups of the Taepo Dong-1 and -2 rockets in the open for U.S. intelligence satellite to see in 1994. Four years later, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong-1 rocket in an attempt to orbit a small satellite. It took a dozen years before a Taepo Dong-2 was test-launched and 18 years until the Unha, a variant of the Taepo Dong-2, successfully lofted a satellite into orbit. It seems reasonable to project that North Korea could test-launch a KN-08 or KN-14 before 2020 and have it available for emergency operations. In other words, it could be available for use if the Kim regime's hold on power is directly threatened by a foreign government. More-recent revelations, including ground tests of re-entry technologies and solid-propellant motors, appear to serve as a warning to Pyongyang's adversaries that North Korea is serious about its pursuit of a viable strategic deterrent capacity. These tests also provide preliminary technical data to support full development of the capability. The strategic significance of these tests is incremental at best. Yet, North Korea undeniably is inching forward and will likely

succeed in fulfilling its ambitions over the long term. The United States and the international community have a limited capacity to inhibit North Korea's aspirations to build an ICBM. Two immediate actions, however, could impede Pyongyang's endeavors with regard to long-range missiles. First, if North Korea can be dissuaded or prevented from flight-testing the KN-08 or KN-14 or a variant of the Unha that has been optimized for ballistic missile missions, the reliability of any of these missiles will remain marginal. If North Korea fields only a dozen or so ICBMs of marginal reliability, the U.S. national missile defense system has a more than decent chance of blocking an attack. Dissuading Pyongyang could come in the form of negotiations or coercion. Prevention would be more difficult, as it could require military action. Ashton Carter and William Perry proposed a similar option in a 2006 op-ed, which argued for destroying a North Korean missile on the launch pad. Today, somewhat less-provocative measures are possible, including the use of Aegis Standard Missile-3 interceptors to destroy a missile in the boost, or ascent, phase of flight. Such steps, however, carry greater risk today than in 2006 because North Korea now has nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the option deserves careful study. Second, strict adherence to trade sanctions would slow North Korea's development of large, solid-fueled motors that could be used for long-range missiles. If North Korean engineers and motor producers are unable to establish a reliable and consistent supply of basic solid-propellant ingredients—for example, high-quality aluminum powder and ammonium perchlorate or a similar oxidizer component—from the same manufacturer, they will be severely challenged to master the production of large motors. Iran's efforts to develop fully the Sajjil medium-range missile appears to have been hampered by UN sanctions that disrupted its supply line of ingredients. How much sanctions will set back North Korea's solid-fuel program depends primarily on China's willingness to enforce them along its border with North Korea. Another variable is North Korea's determination to gain an ICBM capability. If Pyongyang is determined to achieve that goal and is willing to accept the likelihood its long-range missiles will suffer from a high failure rate, the success of either of these two policy options, or anything less than the fall of the Kim regime, will likely be minimal." (Michael Ellemann, "Reverse Engineering: Reality of Myth?" *Arms Control Today*, May 2016, pp. 16-24)

Ellemann: "Scud-B missiles exported by North Korea, some as late as 2002, are identical in appearance to those produced by Russia. Further, Scud-B missiles said to be of North Korean origin have performance and reliability characteristics that duplicate perfectly those of the Russian versions. The tightly compressed timeline associated with the development of a reverse-engineered missile, the immediate success achieved during the initial flight tests of the replicated Scud, and the domestic deployment and foreign sales of newly produced systems prior to the completion of performance and reliability testing conflict with the common view that North Korea established a self-sufficient manufacturing line. Historical evidence indicates that North Korea would have faced extensive challenges reverse-engineering the missiles. There is no confirmed instance of a country successfully reverse-engineering an entire ballistic missile system. After five years of effort, the Soviet Union's attempts to copy the German A-4 (V-2) ballistic missile yielded the R-1, which underperformed in comparison to the original. Furthermore, unlike the North Koreans, the Soviets had access to the original design and production documentation, the German

manufacturing line, and many of the German engineering experts. Similarly, China tried to reverse-engineer the Soviet-built R-2 and R-5 missiles. Even with access to design and production documents and collaboration with Soviet scientists, China needed more than five years to successfully flight-test prototype missiles, all of which exhibited inferior performance when compared to the original R-2 and R-5. In another example, Iraq's effort to duplicate the engine used by the Soviet-built SA-2 air defense missile largely failed, despite having used between 50 and 100 reference engines to extract measurements and other key design features. North Korea possessed only a small collection of Scud-B missiles from which to derive the necessary information. As another hypothetical route to development of the Hwasong-5 and -6, North Korean acquisition of a licensed production line for Scud-type missiles also is belied by available evidence, according to skeptics. The Soviet experience in trying to leverage the German manufacturing equipment for the A-4 missile indicates that replicating a production line can prove difficult. The paucity of flight tests to validate the missiles produced in North Korea is also at odds with experience elsewhere. Random testing of missiles being produced is one of the hallmarks of any new or even existing manufacturing line. As with the reverse-engineering hypothesis, some experts argue that North Korea scaled up the Scud-B to create the Nodong, a medium-range missile, in the late 1980s, possibly in collaboration with technicians from the Makeyev Design Bureau, the Soviet company responsible for production of the Scud-B and the developer of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for the Soviet navy. Media reports that Makeyev scientists were detained in late 1992 en route to Pyongyang are consistent with this hypothesis. The role these scientists were to play in North Korea is not known with certainty. They might have been sent to aid in the design of a larger missile and help commission a production line, but this conflicts with the history of events in North Korea. Indeed, North Korea is believed to have attempted a flight test of the Nodong in 1990, although scorch marks left on the launch pad suggest the launch failed badly. Moreover, Pyongyang initiated discussions with possible foreign buyers of the Nodong in 1991 and hosted delegations from Pakistan and Iran in May 1993, where they witnessed a successful launch of a Nodong. Although one cannot discount the possibility that the Makeyev experts detained in 1992 were preceded by others, the rapid pace of development; a flight-test program limited to two firings, one of which failed; and the confidence Iran and Pakistan indicated by their commitment to make the purchase suggest otherwise. So too does the basic design of the Nodong. As noted by German missile experts Robert Schmucker and Markus Schiller, the Nodong's dimensions are identical to those of the nuclear version of the Scud-B, not the conventional version. The nuclear version of the Scud-B is roughly 20 centimeters longer than the version designed to carry a conventional, high-explosive warhead. The additional length is found at the base of the nuclear warhead, where it is connected to the missile's airframe. The Nodong shares this feature with the nuclear Scud-B, but North Korea never had access to that version of the missile. Available evidence from the North Korean program, when combined with the history of missile development elsewhere, indicates that arguments offered by skeptics of the reverse-engineering process are likely correct. If this is the case, North Korean engineers accumulated very little experience designing, developing, and producing new missiles indigenously prior to the mid-1990s. Recent satellite launches, which employ a three-stage rocket of domestic design, albeit with engines of Soviet design and likely Russian manufacture,

indicate that North Korea has begun the process of establishing the skills needed for indigenous design, development, and assembly of more-capable missiles. Yet, contrary to popular concerns, these satellite launch activities will not provide North Korea with a shortcut for developing a viable and reliable long-range ballistic missile." (Michael Ellemann, "Reverse Engineering: Reality of Myth?" *Arms Control Today*, May 2016, pp. 18-19)

5/4/16

During his secretive two-day visit to Seoul, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper is said to have inquired about South Korea's position on the possibility of Washington negotiating a peace treaty with Pyongyang, according to multiple government officials here May 6. "South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies have made contact with each other numerous times to discuss assessments of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the cooperation needed for information exchange," a senior Korean foreign affairs and security official told the *JoongAng Ilbo* on the condition of anonymity. "In particular, there was discussion of the possibility of North Korea taking an aggressive stand following its seventh Workers' Party congress, which started on May 6." Clapper made a visit to South Korea on May 4 and held closed-door talks with defense, military and Blue House officials to discuss the latest situation in North Korea, including its ruling Workers' Party's first congress in 36 years, which began on Friday and will last through the weekend, as well as the possibility of further nuclear provocations. "There was also an inquiry into how much South Korea is willing to concede in case the United States begins discussions [related to a peace treaty] with North Korea," the Korean official said. A peace treaty would officially bring an end to the Korean War, which started in 1950 and concluded with an armistice agreement in 1953. Seoul has maintained the position that the denuclearization of North Korea should be a priority for any sort of dialogue. However, China has pushed to move forward with the denuclearization of North Korea in tandem with transitioning from an armistice to a peace treaty earlier this month, amid international pressure to impose stronger sanctions on Pyongyang. (Jeong Yong-soo and Sarah Kim, "U.S. Asks South about Peace Talks for Koreas," *JoongAng Ilbo*, May 7, 2016)

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump said that South Korea should pay for all costs related to U.S. troop presence in the country. Trump made the remark in an interview with CNN, reiterating his long-running argument that the U.S. should be prepared to let allies defend themselves unless they pay more for American defense support. "Why not a 100 percent?" Trump said as the interviewer pointed out that Seoul already shoulders about 50 percent of the cost. Asked if he meant that countries like South Korea, Japan and Germany should pick up all the expenses, Trump said, "Of course they should pick up all the expense. Why are we paying for this?" Trump also said the U.S. should be "prepared to walk" unless allies pay more, referring apparently to the potential troop withdrawal. In that case, the countries should defend themselves "against North Korea (where) we have a maniac." "If they don't take care of us properly, if they don't respect us enough to take care of us properly, then you know what will have to happen? Very simple, they're going to have to defend themselves," he said. (Chang Jae-soon, "Trump: S. Korea Should Pay All Costs for U.S. Troop Presence," *Yonhap*, May 5, 2016)



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CPRK spokesman's statement " in connection with the fact that the Park Geun Hye group of south Korea is now crying out for pressurizing the north into "denuclearization" through "firm security" and "harsh sanctions," to begin with, whenever an opportunity presents itself ... Park Geun Hye is making such odd remarks as the necessity to seek what she called "creative interpretation" aimed to make the north understand that "definite dismantlement of nukes is the only way to live," admitting herself before the riff-raff that there is a limit to "sanctions and pressure" and "threat and warning." She went the lengths of deliberately asserting that the historic Seventh Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea would become the congress to have its access to nuclear weapons recognized and declare it. What she uttered is not worth even a passing note, but we cannot but say a few words as she took issue with the DPRK's access to nukes and even with the WPK Congress. ... If the Park group truly wishes to seek "a creative solution" to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, they would be well advised to have the following proper elementary common sense at least: Firstly, they should study again the main reason why the nuclear issue was spawned on the peninsula, to begin with. To fairly resolve any issue one should know its origin well, to begin with, and it is hard to find any solution without knowing it. Secondly, Park Geun Hye should properly understand why the DPRK had access to nuclear weapons. **The DPRK has got everything desired and acquired everything required by rapidly achieving a high level of nuclear capability.** In the final analysis, the DPRK did so because of the U.S. and its followers' open nuclear threat to the DPRK. Thirdly, **the Park group should have the idea of dealing with the DPRK, well aware that it will remain unchanged in its status as a nuclear weapons state possessed of even H-bomb, regardless of whether one recognizes it or not.** We would like to re-clarify that the DPRK's nuclear weapons are the deterrent means for defending the nation and the country but not those for getting recognition and approval by someone. The DPRK's status as a full-fledged nuclear weapons state is a stark reality regardless of **whether one recognizes or not.** Fourthly, the Park group would be well advised to roll back their policy of toeing the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK and that of pursuing confrontation with the fellow countrymen if they are to truly seek "the creative solution" to the nuclear issue, and find it in facing a stern judgment by the public. The Park group should seek the most realistic "creative solution" to the "north's dismantlement of nukes" in definitely terminating the existence on this earth of the gangster-like U.S. imperialists keen on high-handed and arbitrary practices while brandishing nuclear weapons. The Park group had better stop deliberately grumbling any longer about the DPRK's nuclear deterrent, treasured sword common to the nation, properly facing up to the reality, if they wish to prolong their remaining days even a bit before meeting their miserable doom." (KCNA, "Park Geun Hye Group Had Better Stop Recklessly Grumbling about DPRK's Nuclear Deterrence Any Longer: CPRK Spokesman," May 6, 2016)

5/6/16

Kim Jong Un: "...Comrades, The Seventh Congress of the WPK has been convened at a historic time when the phase of leap forward in implementing the cause of the Juche revolution is being opened up. The last decades since the Sixth Congress of the WPK were characterized by grim struggle and glorious victory on the part of our Party and people. During the period under review the situation of our revolution was very grave

and complex. In the unprecedentedly hard times when the world socialist system collapsed and the allied imperialist forces concentrated their anti-socialist offensive on our Republic, our Party and people were compelled to fight against them single-handed. The imperialists strained the situation constantly for decades to keep our people from living at peace even for a moment and blocked all the pathways to economic development and existence through all manner of blockade, pressure and sanctions. In the face of harsh and manifold difficulties and ordeals and the hardships and sufferings worse than those during a war, our Party and people were united more firmly around the Central Committee of the WPK, holding the President and the General in high esteem as the center of unity and leadership, and made strenuous efforts to defend and advance the socialist cause, following only the revolutionary line of Juche put forward by the great leaders as they braved the storm of history without the slightest hesitation or vacillation. As there were the wise leadership of the President and the General and the might of single-hearted unity of the WPK, the army and the people around the leader, we were able to etch proud victories in history, smashing the schemes of the allied imperialist forces to stifle the Republic at every step and safeguarding the red flag of socialism and the gains of the revolution to the last. During the period under review, the WPK embodied the Juche-oriented line of party building of General Kim Jong Il to become a powerful body, ideologically pure and organizationally integrated, in which oneness has been achieved in ideology and leadership and to develop into a motherly party assuming the responsibility for the destiny of the masses of the people, an ever-victorious party with seasoned and sophisticated art of leadership and a steel-strong and promising revolutionary party.

**This year when the Seventh Congress of the WPK is held, our service personnel and people achieved great successes in the first hydrogen bomb test and the launch of earth observation satellite *Kwangmyongsong 4* which served as landmarks in the nation's history** spanning 5 000 years, thus raising the dignity and might of Juche Korea to the highest level possible; in high spirits, they conducted a dynamic 70-day campaign of loyalty to perform great feats and make unprecedented labor successes in all fields of socialist construction. All the service personnel and people throughout the country displayed the spirit of carrying out the policies of the WPK to the death in response to its militant call for launching the 70-day campaign, thereby making the greatest successes and leap forward in all sectors of the national economy and achieving the brilliant result of exceeding the targets of the campaign set by the WPK. During the campaign, the electric-power, coal-mining and metallurgical industries and rail transport sector strove hard for increased output and transport to bring about a surge in production, and many units in different sectors of the national economy including the machine-building, chemical, building-materials and light industries and agriculture raised a strong wind to ensure modernization and domestic production of our style and bring about an upswing in production, thus making the distinguished achievement of carrying out the first half-year and yearly national economic plans ahead of schedule. Our heroic working class of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, scientists and technicians waged an unyielding struggle on the principle of giving priority to self-development to develop and manufacture new machines and equipment based on local efforts and technology, thereby presenting them as gifts to the Congress of the motherly Party. Others across the country wonderfully completed lots of major construction projects, which will be highly

conducive to developing the economy and improving the people's living standards, in a short span of time before the Congress to send reports of loyalty to the Central Committee of the WPK. Those in the national defense science sector that played a magnificent prelude to this meaningful year with a thrilling explosion of Juche Korea's first hydrogen bomb went on to create momentous miracles in defending our national dignity and sovereignty, thus topping off the 70-day campaign and opening wide the door to the Seventh Congress of the WPK, full of pride in being victors. All sectors and all units, burning their hearts with ardent loyalty to the WPK and extraordinary patriotic enthusiasm, sped up the grand revolutionary march to celebrate the Seventh Congress of the WPK as a glorious meeting of victors. This fully demonstrated the firm faith and will of our service personnel and people who are triumphantly building a thriving nation before the eyes of the world by smashing the hostile forces' vicious maneuvers geared to sanctions and strangulation, and displayed to the world the indomitable spirit, daring grit and inexhaustible strength of heroic Korea. ..." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un: Opening Address at the Seventh Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," May 6, 2016)

North Korea's sole trade union called for a working level meeting with South Korean counterparts to arrange the inter-Korean football match, KCNA said. A letter sent to the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and Korea Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) suggested holding a meeting in late May in China. The North's General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea (GFTUK), however, said the date and place for the contact can be set by the FKTU and KCTU. The letter said that this year's football friendly should take place on August 15 in Seoul and that this is supported by the North organizing committee in charge of pushing forward the sports event. August 15 marks liberation from Japanese colonial rule. The latest report comes after the North's main propaganda website Uriminzokkiri said earlier in the week that a South Korean civic group has proposed holding friendly football matches between workers from the two Koreas to promote cross-border civilian exchanges. (Yonhap, "N.K. Trade Union Calls for Working Level Talks on Inter-Korean Football Match," May 6, 2016)

KCNA released a report on the successful conclusion of the 70-day campaign with a great victory to be specially recorded in the history of the Korean nation under the guidance of Marshal Kim Jong Un. According to the report, the capabilities for self-defense including the capacity of nuclear attack of Juche Korea have been remarkably bolstered and the campaign plan has been over-fulfilled 44 percent in terms of industrial output value, and industrial production has grown 1.6 times as against the same period last year. Signal successes have been achieved in the development of Korean-style smaller nuclear warhead, simulated test of atmospheric re-entry of a ballistic missile, test of high-power solid-fuel rocket engine and stage separation, test of high-power engine of inter-continental ballistic missile. Workers in the four vanguard fields have performed labor feats in the van of day-and-night campaign. Those in the field of power industry honored their 70-day campaign quotas at 110 percent. ... The gross industrial output value in the field of light industry has been over-fulfilled 54 percent and the index-specific performance has shown a marked jump over the period before the campaign. A number of consumption goods producers have hit their goals for the first half of the year or the yearly ones. Some of them even set a

record by fulfilling two-year production quotas. ... (KCNA, "KCNA Report on Conclusion of 70-Day Campaign in DPRK," May 6, 2016)

Ireson: "Last week, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) released an updated estimate of DPRK agricultural production for the 2015-2016 farming year,<sup>1</sup> indicating a modest decline in food production compared with recent years that was largely attributed to the early season drought in 2015. As a result, food resources were once again not adequate to meet minimum nutritional requirements in North Korea. However, a closer examination of the data reveals evidence of substantial resilience in the farm sector not previously seen. The prolonged drought in early 2015 was significant, but not catastrophic. Rainfall amounts were well below average in most parts of the country through June, but recovered in July and August. Comparing the rainfall and vegetation maps in the recent FAO report with a similar report for the 2014-2015 farm year shows that in early 2014, rainfall was actually lower than in 2015, though by May it had picked up. Similarly, vegetation cover in July/August of 2014 was less than in 2015. The difficulty for 2015 was that the early drought extended well into the planting months of May and June, making it hard to get crops established in time. Rice was especially affected by the early drought, as substantial amounts of water are required to flood and prepare the fields for transplanting. A June 2015 FAO update reported around 32,000 hectares (ha) of paddy had not been transplanted. That proved to be an underestimate, as overall rice area fell by twice that amount—by 22 percent compared to 2014—and production fell by around 25 percent. However, farmers adapted by increasing the area planted to corn (by 5 percent) and especially to soybean (by 11 percent), crops which require much less water both to plant and to grow through the season. Yields were also affected, but not by as much as might be expected given the poor weather: rice averaged 4.2 MT/ha compared with 5.0 MT/ha in 2014, and maize fell from 4.4 to 4.1 MT/ha. Figure 1 shows the yields of various crops by year. The FAO reports an overall 10.8 percent decline in production, but when rice is converted to grain equivalent (based on a 66 percent milling recovery rate) and the 2015 spring production estimate (primarily wheat and early potato) is revised down by 36,000 MT to the actual drought-affected harvest, the overall decline is closer to five percent year on year. Figure 2 illustrates the food production trajectory since 1990. Still, when one is living on the margin, even a five percent decline in production is significant, and the national food shortfall doubled between 2014 and 2015 to around 600,000 MT grain equivalent. Other factors contributing to reduced production are a 17 percent decline in available fertilizer (including a drop in phosphate fertilizer by over half compared with recent years), and chronic lack of fuel and equipment for timely field preparation in the spring. Nonetheless, considering how the year began, this was a good performance by an under-resourced farm sector. Farmers adapted to the weather conditions in intelligent ways, and clearly worked hard to produce a reasonable crop, well in line with recent production performance. The substantial increase in area planted to soybean and the recovery of yields to around 1.4 MT/ha, more in line with the 2009-2013 period, is noteworthy and hopefully a sign that greater attention will be paid to this important crop in the future. One glaring issue remains—the high level of post-harvest crop loss. The 2014 FAO update reported results of a collaborative study which estimated post-harvest losses in the DPRK at between 15 and 17 percent for cereal crops, validating the estimates that had long

been used in the annual FAO/World Food Program Crop and Food Security Assessment Reports. These losses are a consequence of a lack of fuel and proper harvesting and grain handling equipment leading to crops being left in the field for long periods after harvest and spoiling because they are not properly dried, as well as losses from other causes. Access to simple and inexpensive harvest and processing machinery would go a long way to solving this problem. A recent UNDP project to reduce post-harvest loss achieved a 50 percent reduction in losses. If similar results could be extended nationwide, the savings would amount to over 300,000 MT of grain, equal to half this year's food deficit. One must question why government policies and priorities have not addressed the technically simple and economically modest investments that would raise food availability by five to ten percent overnight. Despite last year's production decline, we can expect stable, if not improved, performance this year. Rains in March and April have been mostly above average in the farming areas of the country, and the above average rainfall in the latter half of 2015 has largely, though not entirely, refilled the irrigation reservoirs. Thus, even if there is a short-term decline in precipitation this year, there is probably enough stored water to accomplish most of the rice planting, which was not the case in 2015. There is continuing debate regarding the extent and consequences of policy changes in agriculture which have given more autonomy to small, family-sized production units, but at present the results are at the very least not negative, and may have facilitated the adaptive response at the farm level to adverse weather conditions last year. The agriculture sector in the DPRK is still not dynamic, but it appears at least able to respond to short-term challenges. Farmers have evidently learned to manage production with limited resources, and are no longer dependent on the inordinately high use of fertilizer and chemicals that characterized the pre-crisis period. Additionally, the small sub work teams may be both more nimble and more motivated to adopt cropping methods suited to annual conditions. Should the role of the market in the DPRK continue to expand, and if farmers are able to purchase supplies and production-enhancing equipment with their profits, the next goal will be to move from robust stagnation to sustainable growth." (Randall Ireson, "Why Headlines about DPRK Agricultural Production Miss the Point," *38North*, May 6, 2016)

5/7/16

KCNA: "The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un made a report on the review of the work of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) at its 7th Congress. He said: The period since the 6th Congress of the WPK was the one of the unprecedentedly grim struggle in its long history and years of glorious victory which witnessed great changes. During the period under review a signal victory has been won in the socialist construction and an eternal foundation for accomplishing the revolutionary cause of Juche has been laid thanks to the great Juche idea, Songun politics of the WPK and the devoted struggle waged by the army and people of the DPRK intensely loyal to the party. ... **As required by the prevailing situation** and the developing revolution, the WPK advanced the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and worked hard for its implementation. Thanks to the dynamic struggle waged by the army and people of the DPRK to carry out the strategic line of the party, a sure guarantee was provided for finally concluding the confrontation with the imperialists and the U.S. and accelerating the final victory of our cause. The WPK organized and waged an all-

people general onward movement for building a thriving people's paradise as planned and desired by the great leaders and thus ushered in the new era of the prosperity of the country. The entire party and all the people have achieved the single-minded unity of the whole society in which they are united closely around the leader in thinking and purpose and sense of moral obligation. This is the great success and feat achieved by our party during the period under review. Regarding it as its strategic line to attach importance to youth throughout the period of leading the revolution, the WPK has trained the young people as successors to the revolution who carry forward the blood line of Juche, thus building the youth power without an equal in the world. A spectacular success made by the WPK is that it has implemented the Songun revolutionary line, the military line of self-defense, thus turning the country into an invincible military power. Our party and people dynamically waged the drive to implement the strategic line of socialist economic construction to lay firm material and technical foundations of self-supporting national economy and provide a springboard from which to build an economic giant. ... It is imperative to carry through the five-year strategy for the state economic development from 2016 to 2020. It is necessary to **further increase the might of the politico-ideological power and military power.** Kim Jong Un specified the tasks of achieving the national reunification after recalling that the WPK has made positive efforts to reunify the country during the period under review. He continued: The WPK aroused all the Koreans to the struggle for national reunification based on the idea and line on independent reunification and the proposal for founding the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo initiated by Kim Il Sung. In the crucible of the nationwide struggle for the great unity of the nation the Pan-national Alliance for Korea's Reunification was formed comprising broad patriotic forces in the north and the south and abroad, reunification events took place one after another to demonstrate the wisdom of the nation and the movement for national reunification further developed into a nationwide one. The noble patriotic will for reunification of Kim Jong Il and his bold decision resulted in two rounds of north-south summit and the adoption of the June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration, its action program, guided by the idea of By Our Nation Itself, the first of their kind in the history of national division. This was an epochal event that provided a historic milestone for independent reunification and opened up a turning phase for national reunification. Thanks to the wise guidance of the great leaders, the cause of national reunification could advance along the orbit of national independence for decades despite the complicated situation where the separatist forces at home and abroad got all the more frantic in their moves, and the driving force of national reunification could steadily grow stronger to prevail over the anti-reunification forces. **We should consistently keep a firm hold on the three charters for national reunification** which comprehensively deal with the will and requirements of all the Koreans and whose vitality was proved in practice and should pave the road for reunification. Noting that in the period under review, the DPRK's relationship with other countries has developed despite of the persistent hostile policy of the U.S. and its followers and their intensified moves for isolating and stifling it, Kim Jong Un set forth the tasks for the victory in the cause of global independence. Independence, peace and friendship are the invariable foreign policy tenet of the WPK and the principled stand to be maintained in the efforts for accomplishing the cause of global independence. It is our Party's goal to build a peaceful world free from war and it is

the constant stand of our Party and the DPRK government to struggle for regional and global peace and security. **As a responsible nuclear weapons state, our Republic will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes, as it had already declared, and it will faithfully fulfill its obligation for non-proliferation and strive for the global denuclearization. The WPK and the DPRK government will improve and normalize the relations with those countries which respect the sovereignty of the DPRK and are friendly towards it, though they had been hostile toward it in the past.** ... He called for rallying closer around the Party Central Committee under the revolutionary banner of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and dynamically advancing toward the strengthening of the Party, the accomplishment of the socialist cause, the independent reunification of the country and the realization of the cause of global independence." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Makes Report on Work of WPK Central Committee at Its 7<sup>th</sup> Congress," May 7, 2016)

After years of trying to separate fact from propaganda about North Korea's nuclear program, American and South Korean intelligence officials say they have concluded that the country can now mount a small nuclear warhead on short- and medium-range missiles capable of hitting much of Japan and South Korea. The United States and its allies have sought for nearly a decade to prevent the North from gaining such capabilities, ever since it detonated its first atomic device a decade ago. Their failure is likely to raise new questions about the effectiveness of the policy toward North Korea, while ushering the long-simmering nuclear standoff with the North into a more perilous phase under its combative young leader, Kim Jong-un. The assessment of the North's new capabilities is not based on direct evidence from inside its nuclear program, senior officials said, but draws on intelligence gleaned from high-level defectors, analysis of propaganda images and data collected from North Korean missile and nuclear tests, which have accelerated over the past six months. While some intelligence agencies suggested as early as 2013 that the North had learned enough about rocket engineering and the miniaturization of nuclear warheads to mount one on a shorter-range missile, there is a new consensus and greater confidence in that view in both Washington and Seoul, the officials said. Given the years of research North Korea has devoted to the program, experts do not consider the conclusion particularly surprising. But the politics of the assessment, which means the North can target American bases in South Korea and Japan, are delicate, both in the region and in the midst of a presidential election in the United States. The Obama administration and the South Korean government are reluctant to discuss the North's new capabilities publicly. Stung by the fiasco over whether unconventional weapons existed in Iraq 13 years ago, American intelligence officials say they no longer advertise conclusions about other nations' capabilities, and a senior South Korean government official who described the assessment to foreign reporters insisted on anonymity. The officials said the public silence reflected an effort to avoid strengthening and encouraging Kim, who has doubled down on the nuclear program begun by his grandfather and father and has used it to tighten his grip on power. Publicly acknowledging the North's advances would play into Kim's narrative that only he can protect his nation, by defying its enemies and building a nuclear arsenal, the officials said. Victor Cha, who was a senior official on President George W. Bush's National Security Council, said American policy

had been “concerned about not overreacting to every North Korean provocation, and that made sense when their capabilities were not all that formidable.” “But now they have been in a spiral of escalation,” he said, “and we are underreacting when their capabilities are accelerating.” Park Ji-young, a nuclear policy analyst at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, said officials did not want to discuss the North’s new capabilities “because they don’t know exactly how they can stop them, and because they don’t want to scare the people.” A master of bombast, Kim appears increasingly volatile during his fifth year in power. In a speech yesterday to the first congress of his Workers’ Party in 36 years, he boasted that his nuclear weapons and missile programs brought his country “dignity and national power.” A few weeks ago, he posed with what appeared to be a mock-up of a small nuclear warhead, and his government released a video depicting a nuclear strike on the Lincoln Memorial. But experts say North Korea is years away from deploying an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the mainland United States with a nuclear payload, and even then no one sees the backward nation taking the enormous strides needed to build a much more destructive hydrogen warhead, capable of leveling cities. Still, the North’s new capabilities have prompted a rethinking of American military strategy in Asia. “We know they have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them,” Gen. Robert B. Neller, commandant of the Marine Corps, said on Tuesday at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. “If that’s where they are going, that changes the calculus.” Obama has pursued a policy of “strategic patience” – not overreacting to the North’s missile and nuclear tests, while using sanctions to press it to negotiate. But North Korea has refused to accept his demand that it commit to denuclearization as a goal before talks begin. Instead, it has accelerated its nuclear effort, conducting tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013, and in January. The two most recent tests took place under Kim, and South Korean officials say the North may attempt a fifth nuclear test soon, perhaps to mark the party congress. In March, Kim specified that the next test should involve a “nuclear warhead explosion.” Analysts said that suggested that the North might be on the verge of demonstrating progress in making a smaller device, building on previous tests that were perhaps more focused on the basics of detonation. Shrinking a nuclear weapon is important because the smaller it is, the easier it will be for a missile to lift it and the farther the missile can fly. American and South Korean officials said they believed that North Korea could make a nuclear warhead small enough to mount on its midrange Nodong missile, which usually carries a 1,500-pound payload but can carry as much as 2,200 pounds over shorter distances. “Given the time that has elapsed since its first nuclear test, we believe that North Korea has achieved a significant level of miniaturization,” Han Min-koo, South Korea’s defense minister, said in March. He also noted that North Korea had conducted more missile tests under Kim than during his father’s entire 17-year rule. But, Han said, the North has not mastered the complex technology needed to protect a nuclear warhead from destruction as an intercontinental ballistic missile re-enters the atmosphere. Soon after Kim took power, American satellites began picking up pictures of mobile missile launchers, which are harder to find and to target. The missile launchers were of Chinese design, and the missiles resembled Russian weaponry. John Schilling, an expert on North Korea’s missile program, has estimated that the North may have an operational system by 2020. But its current submarines are old and noisy, must surface frequently and cannot make it across the Pacific to North America. The question now, for both President



Obama and his successor, is whether to set new red lines beyond which the North Korean nuclear program cannot go – or whether drawing those lines will only encourage the North to step over them, as it has done before. Gary Samore, Obama's top nuclear adviser in his first term, said the policy of "strategic patience" had failed to change the North's calculations. "But that doesn't mean you just build more missile defenses and walk away," he said. "We need some kind of process to begin to freeze what they are doing." The more progress North Korea makes, though, the less willing it may be to stop. Robert J. Einhorn, a leading expert on proliferation, said a crucial question was whether Kim would dig in and "refuse to cap their capability before they are able to deliver an ICBM with a warhead to the homeland." There are concerns aside from missile capabilities. "Should developing a long-range nuclear missile be the next red line? Or does that make less sense when the North could sell a bomb to a terror group, or put one in a basement in a big city?" asked Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. For now, the new American response looks a lot like the old American response, with the same weakness: China's fear of destabilizing its neighbor with sanctions that hurt too much. "So far we have Kim Jung-un to thank for driving the Chinese in our direction," Samore said. "But they are still primarily worried about a collapse in the North" that leaves South Korean and American forces on the Chinese border. (David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, "Reckoning with a Nuclear Peril," *New York Times*, May 7, 2016, p. A-1)

5/8/16

KCNA: "A decision "On the review of the work of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea" was adopted at the third-day meeting of the Seventh Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) held on May 8. The decision accepted the report on the review of the work of the Party Central Committee made by the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un as the immortal banner which indicated the bright road for the WPK and the developing revolution and a great program that paved the path to be taken by the Juche revolution for all ages and fully supported and approved it. The Seventh Congress of the WPK expressed the steadfast resolution to accelerate the victory of the cause of modeling the whole society on Kimilsungism and Kimjongilism, national reunification and the cause of global independence under the guidance of Kim Jong Un, holding President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il as the eternal leaders of the WPK in high esteem.... We will work out the phased strategy for the national economic development in a scientific and realistic manner and carry it out without fail and carry through the five-year strategy for the state economic development from 2016 to 2020 for the present.... We stand for national reunification by federal formula and will make every possible effort for peace and reunification. But if the south Korean authorities opt for a war, persisting in the unreasonable "unification of social systems", we will turn out in the just war to mercilessly wipe out the anti-reunification forces and achieve the historic cause of national reunification, long-cherished desire of all the Koreans. We will make positive efforts to ensure durable peace on the Korean peninsula and reunify the country by federal formula under the banners of national independence and great national unity and thus build an independent and prosperous reunified country, the common desire of all Koreans, as soon as possible. We will regard the idea of independence, peace and friendship as the steadfast guidelines of our external activities, **develop the good neighborly, friendly and cooperative relations with those countries which respect the**

**sovereignty of the DPRK and remain friendly to it, and strive for regional peace and security and global independence.** The WPK and the DPRK government will take to the invariable path of independence, Songun and socialism no matter how the situation and relationship with neighboring countries may change, and play a vanguard role as the defender of independence and justice in the struggle for global independence. We will wage a vigorous struggle to put a definite end to the danger of a nuclear war, imposed by the U.S., with a powerful nuclear deterrence and defend the regional and global peace. **We will consistently take hold on the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and boost self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity as long as the imperialists persist in their nuclear threat and arbitrary practices. As a responsible nuclear weapons state, the DPRK will not use a nuclear weapon first unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by hostile aggression forces with nukes, as it had already declared, and it will faithfully fulfill its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation it made to the international community, and strive for the denuclearization of the world.** The WPK and the DPRK government will get united and cooperate with all the countries and nations aspiring after independence and loving justice, irrespective of differences in ideology and social system, and improve and normalize the relations with those countries that respect the sovereignty of the DPRK and are friendly towards it, though they had been hostile toward it in the past. We will steadily develop the WPK into the party of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and increase its leadership role in every way and thus bring about a fresh turn in the historic struggle for modeling the whole society on Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism. The WPK would lead with confidence our people's revolutionary struggle and construction work along the road of victory, holding Kim Jong Un in high esteem at the top post of the Juche revolution. The Seventh Congress of the WPK expressed the belief that the entire party and all the people would get firmly united around Kim Jong Un and courageously wage the general offensive and general charge for the development of the party, accomplishment of the socialist cause, independent reunification of the country and global independence under the revolutionary banner of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism." (KCNA, "Decision of Seventh Congress of WPK Adopted," May 8, 2016)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said his country will not use nuclear weapons as long as the country's sovereignty is not threatened and called his regime "a responsible nuclear state" at the seventh congress of the Workers' Party in Pyongyang. "Our republic will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes," Kim was quoted as saying by KCNA today. Kim made the remark in a report on the achievements of the Workers' Party during the congress. Kim's address was broadcast by the Korean Central Television at 3:30 p.m. today. In a black suit and with horn-rimmed glasses, Kim made the speech interrupted by frequent applause by a somber-looking audience, some in military uniforms. The country's biggest political event opened two days ago in the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang for the first time in 36 years, drawing some 3,000 party delegates elected at lower party meetings across the country to showcase and solidify Kim's leadership. In what was seen as a jab at the international community, particularly South Korea and the United States, Kim said his nuclear-armed country would "faithfully fulfill its obligation for non-proliferation and strive for the global

denuclearization." Kim's pledge to work toward global denuclearization was an obvious rejection of international demands that he abandon nuclear weapons. South Korea's Unification Ministry saw Kim's non-proliferation pledge as a clear signal that he would continue to build up his nuclear arsenal. "There is no way the international community will accept North Korea (as a nuclear state) talking about its responsibility as a nuclear state or global denuclearization. It must present a resolution for denuclearization and dispel its illusions about nuclear weapons," said Jeong Joon-hee, ministry spokesman, in a statement released today. "Kim's remark on non-proliferation has the premise that his country is already nuclear-armed," said a South Korean official who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "If you don't have a nuclear weapon, why would you care about non-nuclear proliferation?" The official added the South Korean government would continue its pressure and sanctions on the North. "Kim's message about global denuclearization is tantamount to saying he has no intention whatsoever to give up his nuclear arms," said Ko Yoo-hwan, a North Korea studies professor at Dongguk University. "The underlying message is that he would throw in his nuclear card only when the world as a whole is free of nuclear weapons, which is hardly feasible." Kim emphasized his so-called *byungjin* policy, a dual-track emphasis on both economic improvement and nuclear weapon development. He said the policy had safeguarded the country, calling it "a sure guarantee" that ended "confrontation with the imperialists and the U.S." "The *byungjin* line is not a temporary policy track but a strategic one that should be sustained eternally for the sake of the revolution with nuclear deterrent as the bedrock of our military defense," said Kim, who called the dual-track the "most justified and revolutionary policy to make of a powerful socialist country." Kim's *byungjin* policy is another rejection of calls from Seoul and the international community that he prioritize his economy by dropping his nuclear ambitions. Kim also indicated he would continue to honor the military-first policy of his father, calling it a "fundamental principle of socialism" that would "bolster revolution with the armed forces at the center of the drive." On inter-Korea relations, Kim said improving the South-North relationship was an urgent mission facing the two Koreas and demanded Seoul change its attitude toward his regime. "The South government should discard its confrontational approach with the North and take a fresh attitude in dealing with us," demanded Kim. He argued the two sides were capable of improving ties through talks. "The North and South should together get rid of legal and institutional hurdles that stand in the way of unity between the two Koreas and take measures that will pave the way for improved ties." Kim's demand that Seoul change its attitude was seen as blaming the South for strains while at the same time signaling an intention for better relations. "The North's overture is nothing more than a masked campaign that carries no sincerity as manifested by its continuing nuclear threats that directly target the South and threaten the survival of the Korean people," said Unification Ministry spokesman Jeong.

Kim also proposed military talks between the two sides, saying such talks would reduce the possibility of an armed conflict at the border. He demanded Seoul and Washington end their joint annual military exercises and said the two Koreas should stop any forms of confrontational military tactics along the border such as psychological warfare through loudspeakers and launching of anti-North leaflets. A halt to the annual joint military exercises is a longtime demand by Pyongyang, which it sees them as an existential threat to its regime. On the economic front, Kim declared a

"five-year strategy for state economic development" from 2016 to 2020, which aims to upgrade various sectors including electricity, light industry and agriculture, though he did not elaborate on details. The Blue House did not issue a statement on Kim's address. But some officials expressed skepticism over any sign of significant change. (Kang Jin-kyu, ""Kim Jong-un Thumbs Nose at World at Party's Congress," *JoongAng Ilbo*, May 9, 2106)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's message to South Korea in a Central Committee business summation report at the seventh Korean Workers' Party (KWP) congress on May 6-7 was more specific and forward-thinking than experts had predicted. One part in particular stressed the need for dialogue and negotiations between the North and South Korean militaries - a passage that amounts to a public proposal of inter-Korean intergovernmental talks by the North's leader. Indeed, Kim went as far as to say that "the current disaster can be overcome to some extent through dialogue and negotiation" and to propose that Seoul "join us in mutual respect as a partner in reunification." The proposal for intergovernmental talks comes amid a steep slide in inter-Korean relations since the North's fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6, with the complete shutdown of the Kaesong Industrial Complex - considered by many to be the last "safety valve" between the two sides - and statements from Pyongyang singling President Park Geun-hye by name with abusive language. The proposal itself came in the context of a message by Kim stressing the need to "relax military tensions." "Channels for communications between the North and South Korean militaries are completely closed," he stated. "An armed conflict could occur at any place or time, and it would be impossible to stop it from escalating into war." "We must proceed with practical measures to reduce military tensions and the risk of clashes, broadening their scope as a climate of military trust is formed," he continued. Kim also suggested "actively expanding upon dialogue and negotiations at various levels in different areas and reducing mutual misunderstandings and distrust" as a subsequent approach once intergovernmental military talks take place. In stressing the need for such talks to prevent clashes, Kim noted the current complete suspension of the inter-Korean emergency contact network, including meetings with liaison officers at Panmunjom and connection through military communication lines. While this can be read in part as consistent with Pyongyang's traditional emphasis on military issues, it is also notable because of the practical and urgent circumstances cited as a reason for the necessity of dialogue. At the same time, the actual prospects for intergovernmental talks appear dim for the moment, with Kim emphasizing Pyongyang's continued adherence to its approach of two-track economic and nuclear development and the North experiencing sanctions in the wake of its fourth nuclear test. Kim also stressed the need for Seoul's "faithful implementation" of the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration, and the October 4 Declaration of 2007 - both products of past inter-Korean summit that he described as cornerstones and blueprints for improvement and development of inter-Korean relations. At one point, Kim described the "three principles of unification of the fatherland, June 15 South-North Joint Declaration, and the October 4 Declaration, which were agreed upon by North and South and declared before the rest of the world" as "the people's shared framework for consistent efforts to develop North-South relations and solve the problem of reunification of the fatherland." The "three principles" in question refer to autonomy, peace, and national solidarity, as stated in

the Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972. Kim's statement did not include any new plans for reunification. Kim went on to address predictions of an imminent collapse in Pyongyang and calls for "unification by absorption" from the South.

"Acknowledgement of and respect for the other side are starting points and prerequisites for North and South to reconcile and trust one another," he said. Kim applied the same reasoning to call for an immediate halt to the South's loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet balloon launches. "We must stop hostile activities that provoke the other side," he declared. Kim's message to South Korea may be seen as taking into consideration not only the current administration of President Park Geun-hye, but also the next administration that takes office after the Dec. 2017 presidential election. (Kim Jin-cheol and Lee Je-hun, "Seeking Dialogue as Way out of Inter-Korean Morass," *Hankyore*, May 9, 2016)

The United States and China have been holding behind-the-scenes discussions on bringing North Korea back to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) to enable a return to dialogue, according to a high-level source familiar with foreign affairs and security matters here. "Recently, China has been feeling out the United States' stance on [getting North Korea to agree] to freeze its nuclear program and rejoin the NPT as a condition for negotiating a peace treaty between North Korea and the United States," the source told *JoongAng Ilbo*, "in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue." A peace treaty would officially bring an end to the Korean War, which started in 1950 and concluded with an armistice agreement in 1953. The source said Beijing's proposal was "a more concrete" step than a peace agreement idea discussed between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry during bilateral talks over the adoption of a United Nations Security Council resolution on stiffer economic sanctions on Pyongyang in Washington on February 23. "This shows that the first step toward nuclear disarmament is a nuclear freeze," he continued. In a joint press conference, Kerry said that Pyongyang "can actually ultimately have a peace agreement with the United States" if it is willing to "come to the table and negotiate the denuclearization." Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the NPT, which it first joined in 1985, in January 2003. The treaty, which took effect in 1970, requires non-nuclear weapons states to forswear the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Diplomatic activity surrounding Pyongyang usually refers to its past pledges to dismantle its nuclear weapons program completely. It is a drastic change to consider asking Pyongyang to freeze its program rather than dismantle it and forswear weapons of mass destruction. Another source said that Washington "has not agreed to China's proposal" and is sticking to its demand for the scrapping of Pyongyang's nuclear program. "However, China is proposing to the United States through many different channels the resumption of the six-party talks, which could include discussions of a peace treaty on the condition of North Korea's nuclear freeze, a return to the NPT and accepting inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency," the source said. "China's proposal is based on its discussions with North Korea." "North Korea's development of nuclear weapons in itself is a violation of the NPT, so it is questionable that other countries will allow North Korea to rejoin the treaty as if nothing happened," said Choi Jong-gun, a political science and international studies professor at Yonsei University. "Even if there is progress in some negotiations, a considerable amount of backlash can be anticipated." The U.S. Department of State,

through a spokesman Sunday, called on Pyongyang to “suspend all activities related to its nuclear and ballistic missile programs” and repeated its position to “abandon them in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.” (Jeong Yong-soo and Sarah Kim, “U.S., China Discuss North Freeze,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, May 9, 2106)

5/9/16

The full text of a business summation report from North Korea’s seventh Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) congress was published on May 9 in *Rodong Sinmun*. In it, North Korea states its plans to “permanently adopt a strategic two-track course of building of the economy and nuclear capabilities and further strengthen defensive nuclear arms,” as per the policy course stated by leader Kim Jong-un in his congress decision statement from a meeting during the congress’s third day on May 8. But the decision statement also includes the proviso that the two-track course is to be strengthened “as long as the imperial nuclear threat and tyranny continue,” along with a pledge to “achieve miniaturization and diversification of nuclear weapons . . . to meet the demands of the two-track course.” As directed by Kim, the decision statement also says North Korea “must produce and launch more working satellites.” The content amounts to an official decision at the congress to continue, develop, and expand the two-track course. In a briefing the same day by spokespersons for the Ministries of Unification and National Defense, the South Korean government said, “It is the unanimous position of South Korea and the international community that North Korea cannot be acknowledged as a nuclear state.” It added, “Intensive sanctions and pressure from us and the international community will continue until North Korea abandons nuclear weapons.” In response to *Hankyoreh’s* request for comments following the announcement of the content of Kim’s business summation report, the US government issued a statement in the name of Ory Abramowicz, spokesperson for the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. “We are aware of the comments and continue to call on North Korea to focus on taking concrete steps toward fulfilling its commitments and international obligations,” the statement read, referring to Pyongyang’s pledges in the Joint Statement from the Six Party Talks on Sept. 19, 2005. “U.N. Security Council resolutions [including UNSCR 2770] require North Korea to suspend all activities related to its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to abandon them in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner,” it added. (Lee Jehun, staff reporter, Gil Yun-hyung and Kim Oi-hyun, “At Congress, North Korea Reaffirms Two-Track Approach,” *Hankyore*, May 10, 2016)

North Korea named Kim Jong-un as chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), in a move to further cement his grip on power. Kim’s appointment came on the last day of the Communist country’s biggest political gathering, held for the first time in 36 years and four years and five months after he took power following the death of his father, Kim Jong-il. His grandfather Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea, and father Kim Jong-il ran the party with the title of general secretary. Kim Il Sung was posthumously given the title of “eternal president,” while his son Kim Jong-il was named “eternal general secretary” after his death. In 1949, Kim Il Sung did use the title chairman. Other than Kim’s new title, the WPK promoted the party secretary, Choe Ryong-hae, and the cabinet prime minister, Pak Pong-ju, to the presidium of the WPK central committee’s political bureau, which used to have three members: Kim Jong-un, Kim Yong-nam and Hwang Pyong-so. Choe’s restoration to the highest decision-

making body of the party is seen as his return to the power circle after a period of hardship last year. He was reported to have been sent to the countryside for ideological re-education late last year in a tumble from power. Lee Woo-young, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, said Choe's entry shows the North's continuing sharing of power with descendants of the first generation of North Korean guerilla fighters, known as partisans. Choe is the son of Choe Hyon, a Kim Il Sung loyalist who fought alongside Kim as a guerilla fighter against the Japanese. "Choe's promotion is an affirmation of the strong position still maintained by sons of North Korean partisans in the power circle," Lee said. Kim Yo-jong, the younger sister of Kim Jong-un, was placed on a 129-member roster for the WPK's central committee, in what is seen as her debut on the central political stage at age 29. She has been serving as vice director of the Propaganda and Agitating Department under the WPK, which is responsible for the cult of personality surrounding her brother and for showcasing the isolated country. "The sister Kim Yo-jong's debut into the political process was expected," Lee said. "A power structure centered around one person like Kim's requires a backup plan [in case of an emergency], and the task of executing such a plan usually falls on a relative." Lee noted that Kim Jong-un would not bestow any official position on his older brother, Kim Jong-chul, whose name was not seen on any roster made public Tuesday. By virtue of his age alone, he could emerge as a potential challenger to Kim Jong-un's authority. North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong was named one of 19 political bureau members under the WPK central committee. Ri is known as a former guardian of Kim Jong-un and his sister Kim Yo-jong during their study-abroad years in Switzerland in the 1990s. With the addition of Ri and eight other members, the number of political bureau members of the party's central committee rose to 19 from 10. Nine officials were named alternate members of the WPK central committee's political bureau, including Ri Yong-gil, a former chief of the North Korean Army's general staff who was said to have been executed on charges of corruption earlier this year by South Korean officials. Ri was also named to the party's central military commission. A government official said May 10 an earlier assessment that Ri had been executed appeared to have been incorrect. "There are many types of purges [in the North], and it appears that Ri was given a new task after some time off [in some kind of purge]," the official said on the condition of anonymity. Kim Kyong-hui, the aunt of Kim Jong-un and wife of Jang Song-thaek, who was executed by his nephew in late 2013, was not on the roster of the 19-member political bureau of the WPK central committee. Kim Kyong-hui was part of the political bureau as late as 2013, when it had 10 members. She was last seen publicly in September 2013, shortly before Jang's death in December 2013. The party's central military commission accepted three new faces, including the cabinet prime minister, Pak Pong-ju, who was also named as one of the five presidium members of the political bureau of the party's central committee. The North, however, excluded seven existing members from its roster and made the commission a 12-member body. The fact that Pak entered the party central military commission raises speculation that its status and influence within the party will increase. The party changed its charter to declare its dual-track policy on the last day of the congress, as expected by analysts. "The decision adopted by the party added a clause in the party charter affirming the dual policy for nuclear defense and economy development," *Rodong Sinmun* reported May 10. While Kim made a conciliatory gesture toward Seoul at the congress by proposing military talks to ease tensions

along the border, the South Korean government brushed it off as “lacking sincerity,” citing Kim’s avowal of his nuclear ambitions. “The government sees it as nothing more than a propaganda campaign to make such overture while it remains unchanged on the nuclear issue,” a South Korean government official said Tuesday. The official said the government saw Kim’s proposal for military talks not as an official proposal but rather as Kim’s general position on future inter-Korean relations. KCNA reported May 10 that Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a message of congratulations for the event. Xi remarked that the traditional friendship between the two allies had been “cultivated by the leaders of the elder generation of the two countries with great care” and called it a “precious asset common to the two countries.” Some observers saw Xi’s message as a sign of approval from Beijing that Pyongyang did not go ahead with a fifth nuclear test, which the North was expected to carry out to mark the congress. (Kang Jin-kyu, “Kim Jong-un Is Made Chairman of Workers’ Party,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, May 11, 2016)

*Rodong Sinmun*: “An official report of the First Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) was released on Monday. According to it, the First Plenary Meeting of the C.C., the WPK was held here on Monday. Chairman of the WPK Kim Jong Un guided the plenary meeting. Present at the meeting were members and alternate members of the C.C., the WPK, and members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK. The plenary meeting elected the Presidium of the Political Bureau and the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK. Presidium of the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK: Kim Jong Un, Kim Yong Nam, Hwang Pyong So, Pak Pong Ju and Choe Ryong Hae. Members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK: Kim Jong Un, Kim Yong Nam, Hwang Pyong So, Pak Pong Ju, Choe Ryong Hae, Kim Ki Nam, Choe Thae Bok, Ri Su Yong, Kim Phyong Hae, O Su Yong, Kwak Pom Gi, Kim Yong Chol, Ri Man Gon, Yang Hyong Sop, Ro Tu Chol, Pak Yong Sik, Ri Myong Su, Kim Won Hong and Choe Pu Il. Alternate Members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK: Kim Su Gil, Kim Nung O, Pak Thae Song, **Ri Yong Ho**, Im Chol Ung, Jo Yon Jun, Ri Pyong Chol, No Kwang Chol and Ri Yong Gil. The plenary meeting elected vice-chairmen of the Party Central Committee and organized the Executive Policy Bureau and the Party Central Military Commission. The Executive Policy Bureau of the Party Central Committee: Chairman of the WPK Kim Jong Un, Vice-Chairmen of the Party Central Committee Choe Ryong Hae, Kim Ki Nam, Choe Thae Bok, Ri Su Yong, Kim Phyong Hae, O Su Yong, Kwak Pom Gi, Kim Yong Chol and Ri Man Gon. The Party Central Military Commission: Chairman Kim Jong Un, Members Hwang Pyong So, Pak Pong Ju, Pak Yong Sik, Ri Myong Su, Kim Yong Chol, Ri Man Gon, Kim Won Hong, Choe Pu Il, Kim Kyong Ok, Ri Yong Gil and So Hong Chan.” (*Rodong Sinmun*, “Official Report of First Plenary Meeting of 7<sup>th</sup> WPK Central Committee Issued,” May 10, 2016)

Before its four-day session ended today, the congress bestowed Kim Jong-un with a new top title, chairman of the Workers’ Party. The announcement was made during the 10 minutes that a small group of foreign journalists was allowed, for the first time, to watch the meeting. The A.P. reported from Pyongyang, the North’s capital. North Korea expelled a BBC reporting crew for what it deemed a disrespectful portrayal of the country and its leader, Kim Jong-un, as Kim used a rare Workers’ Party congress to cement his grip on power. More than 100 foreign journalists were granted visas to visit



North Korea for the duration of the seventh congress of the Workers' Party, the first such political gathering in 36 years. But the authorities there blocked those journalists from actually covering the event, forcing them to rely on state-run, propaganda-filled domestic news media to glean details of the meeting. The BBC reported that its correspondent, Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, who had arrived with a delegation of Nobel laureates before the congress, was detained on May 6 and questioned for eight hours before being made to sign a statement. O Ryong Il, the secretary general of the North's National Peace Committee, said that Wingfield-Hayes's coverage had distorted facts and "spoke ill of the system and the leadership," The Associated Press reported. A producer, Maria Byrne, and a cameraman, Matthew Goddard, were also being expelled, the BBC said. They, along with Wingfield-Hayes, were stopped on May 6 as they were trying to leave the country. In one of his reports, Wingfield-Hayes said that his team was "in trouble" after shooting a segment in front of a statue of the North's founding president, Kim Il-sung, in which he said something on camera that he said government minders deemed disrespectful. He said the officials demanded that the video be erased. Wingfield-Hayes did not elaborate on what he had said. Wingfield-Hayes described North Korea in one report as "one of the most isolated, impoverished and repressive places on earth." He later expressed frustration that North Koreans he wanted to interview ran away when he approached and that "everything we see looks like a setup." (Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea Expels Crew from BBC over Coverage," *New York Times*, May 10, 2016, p. A-9)

North Korea has replaced more than half of the ruling party's central committee at the recent party congress, a dramatic change which mirrors the country's ongoing effort to cement leader Kim Jong-un's power, South Korean government data showed May 13. A total of 129, or 54.9 percent, of the Central Committee's 235 members and member candidates were replaced, with 106 retaining their membership, according to the Unification Ministry's analysis of the congress' results. According to the list released by the North on May 10, Kim's younger sister made it onto the committee along with Jo Yong-won, a deputy head known to be among an emerging generation of leaders. The change "seems to be part of North Korea's efforts to pave the way for the buildup of Kim Jong-un's loyalist group" and to promote harmony among different generations, the ministry report said. During the congress, the membership of the party's Central Military Commission had been cut to 12 members from 17 in a bid to "simplify the military's chain of command," according to the document. Premier of the Cabinet Pak Pong-ju's election to the military body as a member from a non-military background reflects "an intensified role of the party as well as the dwindling of the military's role," it also claimed. (Yonhap, "Recent N. Korean Congress Replaces over Half of Party's Central Committee," May 13, 2016)

Bermudez: "Despite predictions by the South Korean government that a nuclear test appeared imminent to coincide with the DPRK's 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, that gathering is now ended and there are no apparent signs that a detonation will occur in the near future. Recent commercial satellite imagery of North Korea's Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site from May 8 shows low levels of activity at the test site, but vehicles previously observed at what is believed to be the Command Center in imagery from May 5 are no longer present. This level of activity throughout the facility

suggests that it remains capable of supporting additional tests once a decision to move forward is made in Pyongyang. (Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Update on Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: No Indications That a Nuclear Test Is Imminent," *38North*, May 10, 2016)

5/11/16

North Korea's long-time de-facto chief diplomat and negotiator in stalled six-party nuclear talks Ri Yong-ho has officially become foreign minister. Ri (62), who is not to be confused with a purged military hardliner of the same name, replaces Ri Su-yong (76), who has been promoted to a senior party post. Ri Yong-ho is a career diplomat like his predecessor and the son of Ri Myong-je, a crony of former leader Kim Jong-il. He studied English at Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies and served as the North's ambassador to the U.K. and Ireland. He was promoted to vice foreign minister in 2010 and represented the North during six-party talks. Whether the appointments signal a shift away from hardline military domination in the upper echelons remains to be seen. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "N. Korea Nuke Talk Envoy Becomes FM," May 11, 2016)

South Korea will put sanctions and pressure ahead of dialogue in its efforts to denuclearize North Korea, the country's point man on Pyongyang said as Seoul dismissed Kim Jong-un's offer for military talks. "For now, sanctions and pressures are needed more against North Korea," Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo said during a lecture to a forum organized by the Korea Future Foundation. "Now is not the right time for talks," he said. North Korea is behaving "abnormally," Hong said, referring to what he said were threats of nuclear tests and strikes on Seoul made during the congress. "I don't mean we rule out talks. There's a time for talks," the minister said, adding that inter-Korean dialogue at a time like now will only allow North Korea to gain time. "South Korea will go for dialogue if it thinks that's necessary, but (for now) it will concentrate on applying pressure to denuclearize North Korea," he stressed. Hong also said international sanctions on North Korea appears to be taking effect, citing the absence of foreign delegations to the recent party congress as evidence of his assessment. Earlier in the day, the Unification Ministry's spokesman Jeong Joon-hee also dismissed the possibility of any dialogue with North Korea. "It does not constitute a proposal toward South Korea," said Jeong said during a press briefing, referring to Kim's mention of inter-Korean dialogue. The government is aware of Kim's remarks on military talks, but "they are only an expression of North Korea's perception of the current reality and its position on it," he said. Jeong then said if the North makes an official proposal for talks, Seoul will make a decision to accept or reject it based on thorough examination. He said for now, Seoul views any talk offers as a propaganda ploy that lacks sincerity. (Yonhap, "Sanctions, Pressure Needed More Than Talks with N.K.: Minister," May 11, 2016)

5/12/16

South Korea's military conducted an artillery exercise in the hotly-contested maritime sea border with North Korea, mobilizing its K9 self-propelled howitzers. "Marine Corps conducted a maritime firing drill on Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong Islands for one hour from 4:00 p.m. under a scenario in which North Korea has launched fresh military provocations," a military official said. Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong are among a group of South Korean-controlled islands sitting along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea. About 400 artillery rounds were fired from K9 howitzers and the

Kooryong multiple rocket launch system into the southern side of the sea demarcation line, according to the military. "The latest maritime exercise is defensive in nature and part of regular trainings," the military official said. "In the training, Marine Corps checked up on its readiness posture to retaliate resolutely in the event of North Korea attacking the northwestern islands." (Yonhap, "S. Korea Carries out Military Exercise near Sea Border," May 12, 2016)

North Korea is in the process of deploying mobile ballistic missiles with a maximum range of 12,000 km at three or four frontline bases along its border with China, a government source here said. Signs of KN-08 deployment at the bases have been spotted over the past year or two. South Korean and U.S. intelligence believe the KN-08s come in two versions, one measuring 18 m and having a range of 12,000 km and one measuring 17 m with a range of 9,000 km. But the second version can carry heavier payloads and is thought to be more accurate. The North is apparently deploying both versions of the KN-08 that have been unveiled since 2012. The South Korean military believes North Korea has put together a KN-08 brigade with a total of six mobile launch vehicles. All are modified special-purpose trucks smuggled in from China. There is also intelligence suggesting that North Korea may have developed its own launch vehicles. A government official here said, "North Korea appears to be deploying KN-08 missiles that have yet to be tested in order to give the impression that it is capable of launching a nuclear strike against the U.S." North Korea has merely conducted several engine combustion tests for the KN-08 at its test site in Tongchang-ri, North Pyongan Province. South Korean and U.S. officials have reassessed the capability of the KN-08 following the failed tests of the Musudan missile. (Yu Yong-won, "N. Korea Deploys Missiles along Chinese Border," *Chosun Ilbo*, May 13, 2016)

The new commander of the United States forces in South Korea said he expects resumption of talks and coordination with North Korea during his first visit to the frontline region separating the two sides. The Joint Security Area (JSA), the inter-Korean truce village where South and North Korean soldiers are standing face-to-face, was the choice for Gen. Vincent Brooks' first field inspection as the top commander of the 28,000-strong U.S. Forces Korea. "Each time I come back (here), it reminds me of how quickly things can change on the Korean Peninsula and why it is that we must be ready all the time and remain strong," Brooks, who took command last month, said in front of an observation post inside the JSA. The officer had served in South Korea in the past during his long military career. "It also reminds me that as we are in the military armistice controlled areas, there's a need to continue dialogue and coordination (with North Korea)," the general, clad in a combat uniform, noted. "We look forward to the time that (talks) can resume again," he said, expressing hopes on talks with the North on the context of the armistice which ended the 1950-53 Korean War. He also reasserted his pledge to maintain strong combat readiness against North. "In this position, I am certainly committed to maintaining strength of the alliance and also protecting the armistice as well as we can," the four-star general said. Accompanying Brooks on the inspection, Gen. Lee Sun-jin, the chief of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, ordered the troops to "maintain perfect readiness posture in the spirit of their blood alliance." (Yonhap, "USFK Chief Says He Expects Dialogue with North on Armistice," May 12, 2016)

KCNA: "The U.S. keeps making absurd accusations against the DPRK's just measures for self-defense. Of late mandarins of the White House and the U.S. State Department spouted out the gibberish that the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons and their delivery system were a provocation causing regional instability and it should honor its commitments and duties. This is just like a thief shouting "Stop the thief!" No matter how noisily the U.S. may trumpet about "north Korea's threat and provocation," the U.S. can never deny the justice of the DPRK's measure of bolstering up the nuclear force as it is a just measure to protect the sovereign right of the country and nation from the U.S. moves to stifle it. The U.S. singled out "toppling the social system" in the DPRK" as one of the major phases for carrying out the strategy for world domination already several decades ago and has since worked hard to implement it. In 2000 the U.S. drew up a timetable for virtual "collapse," predicting the Korean peninsula would be unified by south Korea in 2015 and has since extremely escalated the nuclear threat to the DPRK. Last year Obama made the provocative remarks that it was necessary to bring down north Korea as soon as possible and pushed the situation on the peninsula to the brink of a war. This was a direct product of the U.S. hostile policy to enslave the DPRK. The U.S. moves to stifle the DPRK have reached such a dangerous phase as openly disclosing the scenarios for aggression and preemptive attack on the latter by staging the largest-ever joint military drills Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16. As seen above, the U.S. is the chieftain of aggression and disturber of peace and security as it has gravely violated the sovereignty and vital right of the DPRK and the Korean nation for the past several decades. It is quite natural for the DPRK to cope with the U.S. nuclear war moves by bolstering up its nuclear force both in quality and quantity as the U.S. is focusing all its forces on bringing down the DPRK by physical means. It is none other than the U.S. which should be brought to justice for reneging on its commitments and duties. The DPRK has made every possible effort to realize the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, pursuant to the September 19 joint statement adopted at the 4th round of the six-party talks. On Oct. 15, 2008 the U.S. magazine *Newsweek*, referring to the DPRK's efforts for denuclearization, said that one may say that the sincerity on the part of north Korea was proven for sure. The U.S., however, resorted to undisguised hostile military acts and threats to the DPRK, totally breaching the basic idea of the September 19 joint statement in which the former promised to respect the sovereignty of the DPRK and peacefully co-exist with it and it declared it has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons. Moreover, the U.S. categorically refused to fulfill all its commitments such as provision of light water reactors and energy to the DPRK and promise to opt for building **lasting peace-keeping mechanism on the peninsula. The September 19 joint statement much touted by the hostile forces was thus finally scrapped by the U.S.** Even at this moment the U.S. is busy massively introducing all types of modern military hardware into south Korea and its vicinity to stifle the dignified DPRK at any cost and getting frantic with the "human rights" and "sanctions" rackets. The DPRK will react to the U.S. hostile moves with tougher countermeasures. The hostile forces' desperate moves against the DPRK would only cause it to remarkably bolster up its nuclear attack capability." (KCNA, "KCNA Commentary Slams U.S. Absurd Accusations against DPRK's Just Measures for Self-Defense," May 12, 2016)

Forty-nine percent of Japanese respondents answered that they support a deal reached in December last year between Japan and South Korea on the issue of so-called comfort women, while 21 percent of South Korean respondents gave the same answer, according to a joint survey by *Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Hankook Ilbo*. The percentage of those who replied that they do not support the deal was 38 percent for Japanese and 73 percent for South Koreans. This strong dissatisfaction with the deal on the South Korean side could influence the future implementation of the deal by the two governments. There was also a discrepancy in how they assessed the content of the deal between the two countries. Those who answered that the issue of comfort women should be completely resolved by the deal were 74 percent for Japanese, but only 23 percent for South Koreans. As to the statue of a girl symbolizing comfort women set up in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, Japan has demanded that it be removed. Sixty-two percent of Japanese respondents said the statue should be removed, while 87 percent of South Korean respondents answered that there is no need to do so. When asked about North Korea's continuing nuclear and missile development, those who think that the international community will not be able to make Pyongyang abandon its nuclear development were 67 percent for Japanese and 61 percent for South Koreans. The percentages of those who feel North Korea's continuing nuclear development poses a threat were 84 percent for Japanese and 72 percent for South Koreans. Those who said that the defense cooperation between the two countries should be strengthened was more than half of the respondents on both sides – 59 percent for Japanese and 52 percent for South Koreans. Concerning the present Japan-South Korea relationship, 29 percent of Japanese respondents answered that it is good, while 66 percent answered that it is bad. Among South Korean respondents, 15 percent said it is good and 82 percent replied that it is bad. The joint survey was conducted from April 22 to 24 with telephone numbers randomly selected. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, "49% of Japanese, 21% of S. Koreans Back 'Comfort Women' Deal," May 12, 2016)

North Korea will refrain from testing nuclear weapons if China and the United States engage Pyongyang in talks to improve ties and ultimately sign a peace treaty, experts said. "It's certain North Korea will continue to strengthen its nuclear program, but it's also certain the North will come forward if the international community proposes talks on the conditions necessary for its survival and development," Paik Hak-soon, senior fellow at the private think tank Sejong Institute, said during a forum on the party congress. "In that situation, the North won't test (nuclear weapons), although it may if the talks go awry." Paik stressed the need for dialogue, saying it opens more opportunities to resolve the nuclear impasse than an absence of talks. For North Korea, the top item on the talks' agenda would be the discussion of a peace treaty with Washington to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War, Paik said. "If the U.S. shows an eager attitude toward a peace treaty, that will be the surest way to draw North Korea back into talks on its denuclearization," the expert said. Cheong Seong-chang, another senior fellow at the Sejong Institute, said an improvement in ties with China could also stop the North from conducting a nuclear test. "Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory letter (to Kim over his new title as chairman of the Workers' Party), seemingly creating a mood for dialogue between the North and China, whose ties have been strained," he said. "If that develops, the North won't test (its nuclear

weapons)." However, if such talks don't materialize, Pyongyang may launch a provocation toward the end of the year before the U.S. presidential election in a bid to increase its leverage in negotiations with the outside world, Cheong added. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Won't Test Nukes If Peace Treaty Talks Open: Experts," *Korea Herald*, May 12, 2016) "For the near future, North Korea is likely to use its suspension of nuclear tests as bargaining cards to promote its peacemaking overtures to the United States, especially on issues like the suspension of South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises and the signing of a peace treaty," Koh Yoo Hwan, a professor at Dongguk University, said in a forum arranged by the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation. "North Korea has said it is open to talks and negotiations with South Korea and demanded they begin with military talks first," the professor said, quoting the North Korean leader. "It was an offer to talk with South Korea in preparation for negotiations with the U.S. for a peace treaty," he claimed. (Yonhap, "N. Korea May Warm toward Dialogue Following High-Profile Congress: Experts," May 13, 2016)

5/15/16 President Park Geun-hye appointed Lee Won-jong, who led the presidential committee on regional development, to be her new chief of staff. Lee, 74, who served as the Seoul mayor and North Chungcheong governor in his 50 years of public service, will replace Lee Byung-kee, who is stepping down following the ruling Saenuri Party's defeat in the April 13 polls. He also led the Korea Institute of Local Finance and the Seoul Institute, a local think tank, before joining Park's administration in July 2013 as the chief of the Presidential Committee on Regional Development. The presidential office Cheong Wa Dae also said that Park tapped her senior presidential secretary for economic affairs An Chong-bum as her chief policy aide. Kang Seog-hoon, a Saenuri Party lawmaker, has been named the chief economic adviser to succeed An. An, an economist-turned-lawmaker who was a member of Park's presidential transition committee after the 2012 election, had been secretary for economic affairs since June 2015. Kang, a former economics professor at Sungshin Women's University in Seoul, served on the transition committee and is viewed as possessing not only expert knowledge but also admirable drive. (Yonhap, "President Park Name's New Chief of Staff, Reshuffles Top Aides," May 15, 2016)

5/16/16 The United States, South Korea and Japan will, for the first time, jointly test their ability to detect and track North Korean missiles, a South Korean Defense Ministry official said. The drill will be conducted on June 28 – shortly before Japan and South Korea are scheduled to join the American-led Rim of the Pacific Exercise in waters off Hawaii – and will involve destroyers equipped with the Aegis radar system, said the official, who briefed reporters. During the drill, the ships will test their ability to collect signs of North Korean missile launches, as well as data on missile trajectories, and they will share the information through a common channel operated by the United States, the official said. The United States regularly holds separate military exercises with South Korea and Japan and shares military intelligence with them under bilateral treaties. But South Korea has been extremely wary of direct military cooperation with Japan, other than conducting search-and-rescue drills. Japan ruled Korea as a colony in the early 20th century. Washington has been trying to persuade the two countries to work more closely to better cope with China's rising military power, as well as with the North Korean nuclear threat. Such efforts bore fruit in 2014, when Washington, Seoul and

Tokyo signed an agreement to **share intelligence** on the North's nuclear and missile programs. Even in that pact, South Korea and Japan agreed to share their military secrets only through the United States. Washington must obtain permission to share intelligence it has received from one country with the other. (Choe Sang-hun, "U.S. and Allies to Test Missile-Tracking Systems," *New York Times*, May 17, 2016, p. A-6)

One of Hillary Clinton's top priorities as president would be to use sanctions to pressure North Korea to negotiate limits on its nuclear program, according to Clinton's top foreign policy adviser. The strategy would mimic the Obama administration's approach to Iran. Jake Sullivan, the head of the Clinton campaign's foreign policy advisory team, was one of two officials who began secret negotiations with Iran in 2012 that eventually resulted in the nuclear agreement that Iran struck last summer with six world powers. He told an audience this evening at the Asia Society in New York that Clinton is planning a similar strategy to deal with North Korea's nuclear program. "This is a paramount security challenge of the United States. It will have to be right at the top of the agenda for the next president to deal with," he said. "It's hard for me to underscore how important it is that we place urgency behind this." The only way to get North Korea to negotiate in good faith about its nuclear program, he said, will be to drastically increase pressure on the already heavily sanctioned regime. The international sanctions imposed on Iran before negotiations provide a rough model. "Those negotiations were set up by a comprehensive, highly tailored, highly resourced effort that involved basically every significant economy in the world getting together and putting real pressure on that regime in a concentrated, sustained way," Sullivan said. Like in Tehran, the North Koreans' "expectations and understanding of their choices need to be reshaped." While she was secretary of state, Clinton actually opposed several of the sanctions that Congress passed to increase pressure on Iran, including the sanctions on Iran's central bank, which are widely credited with crippling Iran's economy. Clinton actively supported United Nations sanctions against Iran at that time. She often takes credit on the campaign trail for building the sanctions regime that eventually brought Iran to the table. Clinton and Sullivan are skeptical that North Korea will ever give up its nuclear weapons program completely. North Korea has conducted four nuclear tests since 2006. The regime is amassing nuclear weapons material and could have enough for 79 nuclear bombs by 2020, according to leading nuclear experts. The Iran deal that Sullivan helped negotiate has been criticized for leaving a significant portion of Iran's nuclear infrastructure intact. China will have to be part of the strategy to increase pressure on North Korea, Sullivan said. He did not say directly that Clinton would use sanctions to pressure China to pressure Pyongyang, but he noted that the Obama administration recently signed an executive order that allows for sanctions on countries that do business with North Korea, known as "secondary sanctions," and that Congress passed a bill this year that authorizes sanctions against any entity that aids North Korea in nuclear, trade or human rights abuses. "This has to be one of the first and most important pieces of business in the first summit between the next president and Xi Jinping," he said. (Josh Rogin, "Clinton Plans to Use Iran Playbook on North Korea," *Foreign Policy*, May 17, 2016)

5/17/16

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump said on Tuesday he is willing to talk to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to try to stop Pyongyang's nuclear program,

proposing a major shift in U.S. policy toward the isolated nation. In a wide-ranging half-hour interview with Reuters sitting at his desk with an expansive view of Central Park, Trump spoke at length about his economic and foreign policy ideas in the half-hour interview. The presumptive Republican nominee declined to share details of his plans to deal with North Korea, but said he was open to talking to its leader. "I would speak to him, I would have no problem speaking to him," he said. Asked whether he would try to talk some sense into the North Korean leader, Trump replied, "Absolutely." North Korea's mission to the United Nations did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Trump's remarks. Trump, 69, also said he would press China, Pyongyang's only major diplomatic and economic supporter, to help find a solution. "I would put a lot of pressure on China because economically we have tremendous power over China," he said in the interview in his office on the 26th floor of Trump Tower in Manhattan. "China can solve that problem with one meeting or one phone call." A Chinese official said dialogue was needed to resolve issues on the Korean peninsula. "China supports direct talks and communication between the United States and North Korea. We believe this is beneficial," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters. (Steve Holland and Emily Flitter, "Trump Would Talk to North Korea's Kim, Renegotiate Climate Treaty," Reuters, May 17, 2016)

5/18/16

The United States is prepared to engage with North Korea if Pyongyang demonstrates its denuclearization commitment, the White House said, after Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump expressed his willingness to speak to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. "The United States has worked effectively with the international community, including countries like Russia and China, to isolate North Korea because of their failure to abide by their international obligations when it comes to their nuclear program," White House press secretary Josh Earnest said. "Pressure can be relieved, and the international community is prepared to engage with North Korea as soon as they make clear their commitment to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and ending the kind of provocative rhetoric and acts that are so destabilizing to the broader region," he said. (Yonhap, "U.S. Says N. Korea Should First Demonstrate Denuclearization Commitment before Talks," May 18, 2016)

Switzerland has joined the United Nations-led efforts to impose toughened sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test and other provocative actions earlier this year, Radio Free Asia (RFA) said in a report posted on its website. The sanctions, which also included halting financial transactions related to the North, were enforced by the Swiss federal government as of 6 p.m. local time. Under the action, all assets directly and indirectly owned by the Workers' Party of Korea and its other state agencies through Swiss banks will be immediately frozen. Swiss banks are not allowed to open their branches or offices in the North, and if they have any, they should be shut down by June 2, according to the report. North Korea's overseas bank branches and offices should also be closed by that date. All exports bound for the North should be approved by the Swiss government in advance before being shipped to the country. Such products as luxury watches, snowmobiles, and golf and ski equipment are prohibited from exports, the report said. North Korean students in Switzerland will not be allowed to take classes on advanced physics, and computer and nuclear engineering, while any military drills previously carried out for North Korean officials



will also be banned. Financial resources needed for the North to run its diplomatic missions in the country, however, were excluded from the sanctions, the report noted. (Yonhap, "Switzerland Joins Toughened Global Sanctions on N. Korea," May 19, 2016)

5/19/16

Babson: "...North Korea's adoption of the formal five-year economic development plan is itself a significant feat that required disciplined technocratic preparation and careful formulation for political acceptability. With announcement of the plan, Kim Jong Un established his commitment to economic development as a cornerstone for his legitimacy, providing North Korea's most objective scorecard in decades for measuring the performance of one of its leaders. The regime may have signaled an important change on the last day of the Party Congress by appointing Pak Pong Ju, Premier of the Cabinet, as a new standing member of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Political Bureau. This move appears aimed at strengthening ties between key overseers of the economy. Kim Jong Un has consistently emphasized the Cabinet's lead role in developing a national economic development strategy and supervising its implementation, and by naming Pak to the WPK's top leadership body, the supreme leader gave the Cabinet an economic voice at the senior political level. Pak's position could empower the Cabinet to execute the new plan with the support of the WPK's national political apparatus. This alignment may be relevant for pursuing a range of economic development goals, but it will be essential if the five-year plan ultimately embraces an acknowledged role for markets in its implementation, similar to policies adopted in China and Vietnam. The specifics of the plan remain largely undisclosed, but Kim offered a crucial insight into the rationale behind the goals: "It is necessary to further increase the might of the politico-ideological power and military power." By asserting that economic development is essential for the country's strength, Kim's wording goes beyond his oft-repeated pledge to improve the livelihoods of ordinary North Koreans and establishes a new formulation of the economy's relationship to regime stability and national defense. The remark can be seen as part of Kim's ongoing break with his father's "military-first" politics: in the opinion of the current government, it is growing harder to sustain guns without butter. Kim's language tacitly recognizes that as sanctions increasingly target economic resources that directly support North Korea's armed forces, the military can no longer operate a viable parallel economic system comprised of its own foreign exchange-earning enterprises, trading companies and banks. As such, his words suggest that it is preferable to build a resilient and dynamic "people's economy" and pass income to the military through the budget process. To pursue this economic vision, Kim Jong Un said that "It is necessary to expand and develop external economic relations." Endorsement of integrating an outward-oriented component of the economic development strategy may appear inconsistent with *Juche* ideology, but it is a realistic response to North Korea's need for foreign exchange to develop its economy, support its military and extend patronage to its elite. However, Kim's uncertain ability to reconcile this goal with increasing sanctions pressure casts doubt on the credibility of his *byungjin* policy. Moreover, it highlights vulnerabilities in key economic interests that foreign partners may be able to exploit in eventual political negotiations. While his stated priorities of developing the energy, agriculture and light industry sectors are not new on a superficial level, each area is a potential avenue for the international community to address North Korea's interests in light of the greater linkage that the country now perceives between those

interests and its economic future." (Bradley Babson, "After the Party Congress: What to Make of North Korea's Commitment to Economic Development?" *38North*, May 19, 2016)

5/20/16

KCNA: The National Defense Commission (NDC) of the DPRK in an open letter on Friday said that its proposal for the north-south military authorities' talks is the best and greatest realistic way for ensuring peace of the country and the security of the nation. The letter went on: But the south Korean authorities categorically denied the DPRK's proposal for the military authorities' talks, terming it "propaganda offensive bereft of sincerity" and "camouflaged peace tactics." They went the lengths of crying out for "strong counteraction" while talking about such unreasonable logic as "denuclearization first and dialogue next." The NDC of the DPRK solemnly urged the south Korean authorities as follows to put under control the prevailing catastrophic situation created in the north-south relations through dialogue and negotiations: The south Korean authorities should immediately respond to the DPRK's proposal for jointly paving the way for ending all the hostile acts, stumbling blocks fostering mistrust and confrontation and hindering the improvement of relations between the north and the south, and for building military confidence. All kinds of hostile acts rattling the nerves of the opposite side and slandering it including psychological broadcasting and leaflet-scattering operations being waged in frontline areas are by no means unrelated to the responsibilities of the military authorities of both sides. The continued grim situation under which both sides level their guns at each other with the Military Demarcation Line imposed by outside forces and the hotspot waters in the West Sea in between would inevitably lead to armed conflict and the outbreak of a war. Fostering trust and dialogue, not mistrust and confrontation, is the best way and urgent and pressing task for paving a wide avenue to peace and prosperity under the touch-and-go situation. The south Korean authorities should clearly bear in mind that the prospect for improving the north-south relations can be opened only through dialogue and negotiations. **The south Korean authorities should positively respond to the DPRK's proposal for opening bilateral military dialogue at the earliest date for settling all the problems arising in easing military tension on the Korean peninsula and improving the north-south relations.** Army, be it in the north or the south, has the mission to safeguard the peace and security of our country and nation. It is the responsibility and duty of the military authorities in all aspects to remove the danger of a war and defuse tension on this land. It is neither possible to achieve peace through the recourse to arms nor possible to ensure security through mud-slinging and hostility. It is for this reason that we wish to put all matters of concern on the military negotiating table and settle them through frank discussion. The south Korean authorities have to clearly understand that they cannot have any reason or pretext to deny this if they have intent to improve the present north-south relations. The south Korean authorities should meet the great expectation of all Koreans by actively supporting the bold and practical measures that would help ensure peace of the country and the security of the nation. Now is the time when a single action speaks louder than hundreds of words. No matter how dear peace may be, talking is not enough to ensure it. The nation may be get inveigled in the whirlwind of war and suffer from a horrible disaster in the end. It is necessary to decisively break with the inglorious past and make a fresh start. The north and the south should join hands and

take a giant stride forward to defuse military tension and the danger of conflict on the Korean peninsula and to open a new chapter for the improvement of the north-south relations and for the movement for national reunification. There is nothing to be afraid of and nothing impossible if all members of the resourceful and homogeneous Korean nation pool their intention and efforts. The south Korean authorities should behave with discretion as members of the Korean nation, not misjudging the warm sincerity and great magnanimity of the DPRK. **All the Koreans will soon be able to see bold and practical measures to be taken by the DPRK to defuse confrontation and the danger of conflict on the Korean peninsula** and achieve the sacred cause of national reunification, the most cherished desire of the Korean nation." (KCNA, "NDC Urges S, Korea Authorities to Actively Respond to DPRK's Proposal," May 20, 2016)

*Rodong Sinmun*: "The north-south military authorities' talks which were proposed at the historic 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) as the greatest and the best realistic way of defusing military tension and ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula have commanded unanimous support and approval from not only the Koreans in the north and the south and abroad but from the peace-loving people of the world for their urgency, validity and realistic nature. Steadfast is the will and resolution of the army of the DPRK to resolutely meet challenges of all separatists at home and abroad and ensure lasting peace and security on the Korean peninsula true to the noble intention of the WPK to seek negotiated settlement of all issues including practical measures for defusing military tension and the danger of conflict in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line and in the hotspot in the West Sea. The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK Saturday [May 21] sent the following notice to the south side's military authorities: It is an urgent matter directly related to the existence of the Korean nation to defuse the military tension and prevent in advance the second June 25 Korean war on the Korean peninsula at present. **We think that it is necessary for the military authorities of the north and the south to discuss in an honest and candid manner the outstanding issues related to any possible military conflict and agree on and implement institutional and legal measures essential for taking practical steps for building confidence between militaries.** We **propose to hold working-level contact for opening the north-south military authorities' talks** at the date and place both sides deem convenient in late May or early June in order to defuse the military tension on the Korean peninsula and create confidence-building atmosphere between the military authorities of the north and the south. All the Koreans in the north and the south and abroad will closely watch whether the south Korean authorities truly stand for peace on the Korean peninsula and the security of the nation." (*Rodong Sinmun*, "Ministry of People's Armed Forces of NDC Proposes Working-Level Contact to South Side's Military Authorities," May 23, 2016)

Sung Kim, the special representative for North Korea Policy, has been nominated as the next U.S. ambassador to the Philippines. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "Sung Kim Nominated as U.S. Envoy to Philippines," May 20, 2016)

Kang Sok Ju, who led North Korea's talks with the United States over the Asian country's nuclear-weapons program for most of the last quarter century, has died of

cancer. He was 76. Kang, who served as North Korea's first vice minister for the foreign ministry and vice premier of the cabinet, died of esophageal cancer on May 20, KCNA reported. (Heejin Kim and Sam Kim, "Kang Sung-ju, North Korea Diplomat in Nuclear Talks, Dies at 76," Bloomberg, May 20, 2016)

Michael Madden: "...The major organizational change announced at the 7th Party Congress was the reinstatement of the WPK chairmanship, to which Kim Jong Un was elected, and several WPK vice chairmanships. The re-establishment of these 1960s-era titles took place alongside the dissolution of the Secretariat—previously the WPK Central Committee's apparatus for policy implementation and enforcement—and its replacement by a new central party power organization called the Executive Policy Council. As such, secretaries (i.e., members of the Secretariat) were retitled as chairman and vice chairmen from the central party all the way out to basic party organizations. As at previous national party gatherings during the last six years, these changes were effected on the sidelines of a WPK Central Committee plenary meeting. It remains to be seen whether or how the Executive Policy Council will differ from the Secretariat in its role, function and effectiveness. Every senior official who held the position of WPK Central Committee Secretary at one point eventually became a WPK Vice Chairman, while former Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong and WPK Central Committee Munitions (machine-building) Industry Department Director Ri Man Gon assumed additional roles. No additional changes to the composition of the former Secretariat are apparent. Two trends emerged in elections held at the 7th Party Congress for the WPK Central Committee and two of its power organizations, the Political Bureau and Central Military Commission. First, the WPK Central Committee saw a modest expansion from 2010 of its total membership and number of alternate members. Over half of its membership (54.9%) is new, with 129 new members and 106 old ones, according to the ROK Ministry of Unification. A cursory examination of the body's alternate or candidate members reveals some generational change in the WPK leadership; the alternates include members in their 30s and 40s—the next generation of DPRK political elites—as well as individuals who were elected as full members in 2010 and have since retired. ...Meanwhile, the smaller Political Bureau and Central Military Commission (CMC) each saw its membership contract, leaving a cohort of core senior party officials. The number of uniformed officers of the KPA and internal security services decreased within the organizations, both of which are subordinate to or organized by the WPK Central Committee. The first meeting of the 7th Term WPK Central Committee on May 9 elected a total of 28 Political Bureau members and candidate members, giving the office its smallest elected membership since it was revived as an active political body in 2010. Though its total membership has dropped, it has gained additional full (or regular) members. Some additional changes in Political Bureau composition included: Only six Political Bureau members and alternates are uniformed officers of the armed forces and internal security services, indicating the KPA's waning influence in the WPK. The Political Bureau Presidium (standing committee) has only one armed forces representative. Senior party officials now appear ahead of KPA officials in the state media's print and broadcast coverage of the Political Bureau, including a photo array published in the May 10 edition of *Rodong Sinmun*. Balancing out perceptions of diminished KPA political influence, three officials with Political Bureau status (one full member and two alternates) are senior party

officials who migrated from the KPA to the WPK apparatus within the last two years. Every WPK Vice Chairman now has full member status on the Political Bureau. Prior to the 7th Party Congress, some in this cohort were WPK Central Committee Secretaries but not full Political Bureau members. This crossover, in which all WPK Vice Chairmen are also full Political Bureau members, creates a core power cohort at the top of the WPK's body politic, enhancing (at least superficially) party authority in the regime. Nearly every Political Bureau member and alternate has traveled outside the DPRK on official business, either as a head or member of an official delegation or as part of Kim Jong Il's entourage during his 2010 and 2011 unofficial visits to China and Russia. These individuals, with their international experience form a significant bench, to dispatch higher-level and more diverse delegations on visits abroad. Fourteen Political Bureau members and alternates had prior experience as WPK Central Committee Department Directors, Senior Deputy or Deputy Directors; this gives the cohort practical experience in shepherding policies at the heart of the regime from formulation to execution. As in 2010, the Political Bureau has three total members (two full members and one alternate member) tasked with external relations and foreign policy and commensurate career experience therein. At least seven Political Bureau members and alternates have familial or social ties to Kim Jong Un's parents, Kim Jong Il and Ko Yong Hui. The most notable CMC personnel appointment, as some observers previously noted, is that of DPRK Premier Pak Pong Ju, who can now argue for Cabinet interests in how resources are allocated. One of the CMC's primary functions is to authorize defense and munitions spending and product orders, and to determine how natural resources and products from military-controlled production units are earmarked and distributed domestically and for sale abroad. With sanctions affecting what the DPRK can and cannot export, Pak Pong Ju's presence on the CMC creates a chance that some natural resources normally sold abroad by KPA elements will be redirected and used in domestic economic development. If Kim Jong Un intends to adopt "self-development first" as a practical policy line, then he might do so by supporting Pak in redirecting into state development the natural resources that the KPA can no longer sell abroad. The CMC shrank to 12 members from a membership that previously ranged between 15 and 20. The position of Vice Chairman and a number of positions historically occupied by the directors or commanders of key KPA organizations were eliminated. The incumbent members of the CMC removed on May 9 were re-elected to the WPK Central Committee, and some attended the 7th Party Congress as either platform participants or delegates. Unlike previous CMCs, the current commission contains no low first-tier commanders or directors, only uniformed personnel who are all top members of the KPA high command or leading officials of the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of People's Security. This exclusion of lower-level officers reflects the removal of a whole group of senior officials with equivalent positions in the DPRK national security community. Meanwhile, crossover between memberships of the CMC and Political Bureau has created a small population of officials who can exert significant influence over policy decisions (and who would assume additional responsibility for perceived blunders)." (Michael Madden, "Deciphering the 7<sup>th</sup> Party Congress: A Teaser for Greater Change?" *38North*, May 20, 2016)

5/22/16

Kerry: "Q: Madam Foreign Minister, David Sanger from the New York Times. ... Since you entered office, what have you learned about an effort that the United States was concerned a few years ago that the military government, it seemed to be, was involved in to obtain nuclear weapons technology, including from the Russians and the North Koreans? And Mr. Secretary, you've already addressed the first issue, but on the second, in 2011, the State Department did turn out a report concerning that Myanmar was not in compliance with its NPT responsibilities because of this effort. Later you said that those have been partially allayed, but I'd like to know whether you believe right now that problem is solved. FM AUNG SAN SUU KYI: ... The United States actually didn't push us on this. Secretary Kerry mentioned it in passing. I know that it was a sensitive issue two years ago. I have not yet heard it discussed publicly in recent years. Of course, we understand, we know, everybody knows that Thailand and Burma are two of the countries which have not yet signed the anti-nuclear proliferation agreement, and perhaps this is a matter of concern to some, but then you'd have to ask the Thais the same question: Why have they not yet signed this agreement? And it does not mean that we don't intend to sign it. I think we are all working towards a world where there will be no need for nuclear weapons. Q: Do you believe you had a program at one point, or the government, the previous government, had a program? SUU KYI: Well, if they did, they haven't said anything about that to me. The previous government was not in the habit of informing me of what they were doing. (Laughter.) KERRY: Let me just say that, as the minister mentioned, that I did raise the issue with her, and (inaudible). And I am satisfied that with respect to the DPRK, clearly, Myanmar has taken the steps to address that issue and we're satisfied that we're on the same page." (DoS, Secretary of State **John Kerry, Joint Press Availability with Burmese Foreign Minister Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Naypyitaw, May 22, 2016**)

5/23/16

South Korea dismissed a North Korean proposal for military talks as "a bogus peace offensive" and said it was formally rejecting the overture because it lacked a plan to end the North's nuclear program. North Korea's proposal on the weekend for talks between the two Koreas, a repeat of a call by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at a congress of his ruling party this month, came after a period of heightened tension on the peninsula. "The dialogue proposed by the North does not mention its nuclear program, which is the fundamental issue for peace on the Korean peninsula and South-North ties," South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Moon Sang-gyun told a briefing. "Proposing dialogue without an expression of its position on denuclearization is a bogus peace offensive for bogus peace that lacks sincerity." Moon said the South had sent a message over a military hotline today expressing regret over the North's proposal and asking it to state its position on denuclearization. South Korea's Unification Ministry, which handles political ties with the North, said Pyongyang's intention may be to sow discord among the public in the South and create a rift in the international commitment to sanctions. "Let me repeat: Now is not the time for dialogue," said ministry spokesman Cheong Joon-hee. (Jack Kim, "South Korea Rejects North Korea Talks Proposal as 'Bogus,'" Reuters, May 23, 2016)

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Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump's proposal to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is a "kind of propaganda or advertisement" in his election race, a

senior North Korean official said. Trump, in a wide-ranging interview with Reuters in New York last week, said he is willing to talk to the North Korean leader to try to stop Pyongyang's nuclear program, proposing a major shift in U.S. policy toward the isolated nation. "It is up to the decision of my Supreme Leader whether he decides to meet or not, but I think his (Trump's) idea or talk is nonsense," So Se Pyong, North Korea's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, told Reuters on return from Pyongyang after attending the first ruling party congress in 36 years. "It's for utilization of the presidential election, that's all. A kind of a propaganda or advertisement," he said. "This is useless, just a gesture for the presidential election." So added, "There is no meaning, no sincerity." "As a responsible nuclear state ... we will never use them first," So said. "If the United States uses their nuclear weapons first, then we have to use also that one." "If the United States gives up their hostile policies and changes their attitude, then we also (can) have relations as a normal country," So said. "To South Korea, we proposed high-level military talks but South Korea refused now." (Stephanie Nabehey, "North Korean Envoys Rejects Trump's Overture to Meet Leader," Reuters, May 23, 2016)

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Kim Jong Un is looking to one of North Korea's more experienced technocrats -- who once narrowly escaped being purged -- to revive the economy in the face of punishing international sanctions. Kim this month named prime minister Pak Pong Ju, 77, to the five-man standing committee of the ruling Workers' Party, making him the highest-ranking official to lead a new five-year economic plan. The regime's leader announced the blueprint at the first full party congress in 36 years, held as he seeks to tighten his grip on power. Pak has had a rocky past, sacked as premier by Kim's father, Kim Jong Il, about a decade ago and demoted to supervisor of a chemical factory. His policy of encouraging free enterprise while increasing wages and consumer prices to help the country cope with the rise of unofficial markets had unnerved die-hard socialists. Pak returned three years later as a party official handling light industries, but it was not until Kim Jong Un took over after his father's death in late 2011 that he became premier again. He has since kept North Korea's economy growing -- if marginally. South Korea's central bank estimates North Korea's growth ranged from 0.8 percent to 1.3 percent in recent years, and Pyongyang doesn't release its own data. "No one in North Korea understands the economy better than Pak," said Kim Young Hui, a North Korean defector who researches the country's economy for Seoul's Korea Development Bank. "Feeding the people has paramount importance in Kim's campaign to legitimize his power and he is relying on Pak to do that." Pak is by no means a capitalist. But he understands how a dose of capitalism can underpin an otherwise isolated socialist economy, and advises Kim on how to meet his 2012 promise never to let his people again "tighten the belts." Keeping that pledge will be difficult. North Korea's food production probably fell last year for the first time since 2010 and food security is expected to worsen, the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization said in a report last month. Most households were already estimated to have poor or borderline food consumption, it said. Kim has allowed greater private enterprise since taking power and faced the question of how to deal with markets that have grown more influential. But details of his new five-year plan have been scant. Pak's role in the plan could please China, an ally that hopes to see North Korea reform and open, as it did itself under Deng Xiaoping. Pak visited China in

2005, meeting then-leaders Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao and visiting industrial sites in Beijing and Shanghai, including a Nokia factory. His elevation contrasts with the fall of Jang Song Thaek, Kim's uncle and one-time deputy, whose boldness in opening North Korea's economy to China created tension within the regime and saw him executed in late 2013 on charges of graft and factionalism. Pak and Jang led an economic delegation to South Korea in 2002, backing speculation that they were close. Both came from humble backgrounds, with Pak starting out managing a food factory near the border with China. Pak denounced Jang publicly when the leader's uncle was dragged away for trial and then executed. At the congress this month, Pak replaced Jang as a member of the party's Central Military Commission overseeing the 1.2-million-strong Korean People's Army. (Sam Kim, "North Korean Official Who Survived Purge Now Leads Kim's Economic Plan," Bloomberg, May 23, 2016)

5/24/16

KCNA: "The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK sent a notice to the south side's military authorities on May 21, proposing holding a working-level contact for opening the north-south military authorities' talks. It was the proposal of the Korean People's Army to ensure durable peace and security on the Korean peninsula at an early date, true to the noble intention of the Workers' Party of Korea to solve all the issues through dialogue and negotiations such as practical step for defusing military tension and the danger of clash between the north and the south. However, the south side's military authorities are giving impression that the situation on the peninsula remains tense due to the self-defensive measure taken by the DPRK including the step for bolstering the nuclear force and spreading such absurd assertion that the DPRK's proposal for dialogue is aimed to weaken international cooperation for "sanctions against the north" and create "discord in the south," far from actively responding to the broadminded proposal. They are even making such provocative remarks that "precedence should be given to denuclearization", chilling the desire of all Koreans to open a broad avenue to the improvement of inter-Korean relations through national reconciliation and unity. The service personnel and people of the DPRK remain unchanged in their will to settle the present catastrophic inter-Korean relations through dialogue and negotiations, not by military standoff and clash. For this reason the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces of the DPRK sent again the following notice to the south side's military authorities Tuesday [May 24]: The purpose of the military authorities' talks is not to call in question what is the principal reason for creating the military tensions on the Korean peninsula and who is to blame for them. The opening of the inter-Korean military authorities' talks reflects all Koreans' expectation and desire for immediate discussion and solution to pressing issues such as the danger of military clashes along the Military Demarcation Line and in the hotspot of the West Sea which may spark physical confrontation right now. A spark of clash is bound to spill over to a war between the north and the south and it is the Korean nation who will fall victim to it. Nothing can be a prerequisite or excuse for denying dialogue and shunning negotiations, the best way of settling all issues. To refuse to meet, misusing an important issue decisive of the rise and fall of the Korean nation for achieving an absurd political purpose is nothing but a far-fetched assertion that convinces no one. **The DPRK remains unchanged in its stand to hold a working-level contact for opening the north-south military authorities' talks late in May or early in June.** The south Korean authorities should immediately respond to



the DPRK's proposal for ensuring peace of the country and security of the nation by deescalating the acute military tensions between the north and the south." (KCNA, "Ministry of People's Armed Forces Again Sends Notice to South Side's Military Authorities," May 24, 2016)

Barack Obama's planned trip to Hiroshima, a gesture aimed at reconciliation, has sparked dissension in South Korea, Washington's other main East Asia ally, where fears are mounting that the US president will endorse a version of wartime history that presents Japan as a victim. A South Korean group representing Hiroshima survivors argues that tens of thousands of their countrymen were exposed to the American nuclear attacks on the city and the southern port of Nagasaki because they had been conscripted by the Japanese military or forced into hard labor. "We hope that your visit to Hiroshima will not be used to further the Abe government's intention of portraying Japan merely as a victim," the group said in a letter addressed to Obama.

Underscoring the overlapping sensitivities, Obama, who will be in Japan to attend the G7 summit, will face renewed protests in the southern island of Okinawa following the alleged murder of a 20-year-old woman, whose body was found last week. Speaking in an interview with NHK, Obama said he would not be apologizing when he visits Hiroshima alongside Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on Friday. It will be the first visit by a sitting US president. "I know as somebody who has now sat in this position for the last seven and a half years, that every leader makes very difficult decisions, particularly during wartime," Obama said. Seoul's concern is not about the decision to use the bomb but rather that the focus on Japan's suffering from the nuclear attacks ignores the pain of Korean citizens. In its letter, the South Korean group asked Obama to pay respects at a monument in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park dedicated to the tens of thousands of Korean victims. About 70,000 South Koreans – 50,000 in Hiroshima and 20,000 in Nagasaki – were killed or affected by the atomic attacks, according to the group. A final possible flashpoint will be when all the G7 leaders visit the Ise shrine – the most sacred site in Japan's Shinto religion – on Thursday. Although there has been little controversy over Ise so far, Michael Cucek, an adjunct professor at Waseda University in Tokyo, says the visit has political significance. Ise is the house shrine of Japan's imperial family and Abe has taken to visiting every year. Cucek argues he is using it as an alternative to the controversial Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, which commemorates Japan's war dead, including war criminals. "It's a way to honor the imperial legacy without the South Koreans and Chinese being able to react," said Cucek. "It's all dog-whistle politics to Abe's rightwing base." (Robin Harding and Song Jung-a, "Hiroshima Visit Sparks Anger in Seoul," *Financial Times*, May 24, 2016, p. 4)

5/25/16

NDC Policy Department statement: "The U.S. which has imposed misfortune and pain upon the Korean people for the last several decades should roll back its anachronistic hostile policy toward the DPRK which ranked itself among the advanced nuclear powers, facing up to the latter's strategic position and the trend of the times. ... The above-said principled stand of the DPRK represents the thunder of justice heralding the final ruin of the U.S. and the final warning by Songun Korea. ... The U.S. is not aware of its impending miserable end, still seized with an anachronistic Cold War-minded way of thinking. Odd views that in any case it is impossible to change the principle of "north Korea's denuclearization first and halt to the pressure on it next" are heard from

the U.S. political camp including the White House to mislead the public opinion. And a litany of such provocative invectives that "a switchover in the U.S. government's policy towards north Korea entirely hinges on its changes" is reeled off. The warmongers of the Pentagon are openly talking about their plan to stage the U.S.-Japan-south Korea joint drills under the simulated conditions of an actual war for coping with the "threat" from the DPRK's ballistic missiles for the first time in history as part of the scheduled large-scale RIMPAC exercises. The cunning U.S. is taking such double-dealing attitude as hurling the U.S. imperialist aggressor troops present in south Korea under the mask of "UN force" into the Military Demarcation Line in Panmunjom for the farce of "informing" over loudspeaker the KPA side of its wish to restore the severed DPRK-U.S. military hotline and resume contact, afraid of punishment in case it turns down the DPRK's principled demand. The statement clarified once again that the hostile policy persistently pursued by the U.S. towards the DPRK is a product of its anachronistic and unreasonable one lacking understanding and self-ruinous policy. The first reason is that the above-said policy is a product of the anachronistic dream as it is insisting on its unilateral brigandish demand, disregarding the changed reality and the trend of the times. Early in the 1950s, the U.S. invaded the north, brandishing A-bomb against rifle but it is standing against the irresistible entity possessed of even tremendous H-bomb called "absolute weapon" on our planet at present. Tragedy is that the U.S. is ignoring not only the changed reality but the trend of the times. The longer the U.S. is carried away by the hallucination of aggression and war, disregarding the worldwide trend, and the more reckless moves it pursues to isolate and stifle the DPRK, the bitterer disgrace it will suffer and the dearer price it will have to pay. The second reason is that the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK is a product of ignorance based on the theory of the jungle law bereft of any elementary understanding of its rival. The DPRK-U.S. confrontation has lasted for 71 years amid an extreme hostility. But the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK remains unchanged as it has been consistently pursued by the most hostile and outrageous methods. The U.S. would be well advised to realize that it is the best way of escaping the nightmare and misfortune to properly understand who its rival is, though belatedly, recognize the reality, though painful, and reshape its foolish Korea policy. The third reason is that the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK is a product of a self-ruinous policy as it only precipitates its most miserable final doom by itself. The history of the DPRK-U.S. confrontation clearly records the immutable law that certain victory is the tradition of Songun Korea and the brigandish U.S. is fated to sustain a defeat. The U.S. should foresee what the DPRK-U.S. relations will be in future in case it insists on its hostile policy toward the DPRK in the light of the past and present realities. For the U.S. to roll back its anachronistic hostile policy toward the DPRK as early as possible, though belatedly, would only offer it an opportunity of escaping a miserable fate." (KCNA, "NDC Policy Department Urges U.S. to Roll back Its Anachronistic Hostile Policy toward DPRK," May 25, 2016)

"Even as we continue to put pressure on North Korea, we need to use humanitarian aid to get the ball rolling, and we need to try to engage in dialogue and relax tensions," UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said during an address to the Kwanhun Club at the Lotte Hotel in Seogwipo, Jeju Island. Ban had come to the island to attend the Jeju Forum. "The atmosphere is troubling because of issues including [North Korea's] nuclear weapons and missiles, but the inter-Korean issue is our destiny," Ban said. "There are only seven months left in my term as secretary-general, but I'll keep working

on it," he added. Ban's remarks - which represent both an appeal and a pledge - are thought to be an attempt to criticize the unbalanced hardline policy toward North Korea adopted by the administration of South Korean President Park Geun-hye as well as to distance himself from that policy. (Lee Je-hun, "Ban Ki-moon Speaks in Favor of Dialogue with North Korea," *Hankyore*, May 26, 2016)

5/26/16

President Barack Obama took aim at North Korea, calling it a "big worry" after a meeting with his G7 counterparts, as tensions escalate following Pyongyang's series of nuclear tests. Obama made the remark at a briefing on the sidelines of Group of Seven talks in Japan. "North Korea is a big worry for all of us," Obama said. "It is not the thing that poses necessarily the most immediate risk. (But) when you have such an unstable regime that is so isolated, that poses the kind of medium-term threat that we have to pay a lot of attention to." Also today, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged a return to talks with North Korea, during a visit to South Korea that has fueled speculation of his presidential ambitions in his home country. "We must find the path back to dialogue," Ban said at a peace and security forum. (AFP, "North Korea 'Is a Big Worry for All of Us': Obama at G-7," May 26, 2016)

Obama: "Q . Mr. President, eleven of your predecessors decided against going to Hiroshima. What do you know that they didn't? What were they worried about that you aren't? And just sort of generally on nonproliferation -- because I think that's your focus and that's obviously a priority for you -- how do you communicate risks and concerns about this in a way that would do more to get it resolved? Because it seems to be getting worse. I mean, Americans worry a lot about terrorists with suicide vests, which are unlikely events that can kill dozens. Do they worry enough about the risks of nuclear mishaps or attacks, which are unlikely events that could potentially kill millions instead of dozens? In short, are we paying enough attention to Kim Jong-un and Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons, these sorts of things that you know are going on? OBAMA: Well, it's a terrific question. First of all, I won't characterize how other Presidents were thinking about these issues. I can tell you how I'm thinking about it, and that is that the dropping of the atomic bomb, the ushering in of nuclear weapons was an inflection point in modern history. It is something that all of us have had to deal with in one way or another. Obviously, it's not as prominent in people's thinking as it was during the Cold War, at a time when our parents or grandparents were huddling under desks in frequent drills. But the backdrop of a nuclear event remains something that I think presses on the back of our imaginations. I do think that part of the reason I'm going is because I want to once again underscore the very real risks that are out there and the sense of urgency that we all should have. So it's not only a reminder of the terrible toll of World War II and the death of innocents across continents, but it's also to remind ourselves that the job is not done in reducing conflict, building institutions of peace, and reducing the prospect of nuclear war in the future. In some ways, we've seen real progress over the last several years. The Iran nuclear deal is a big piece of business -- because without us having to fire a shot, we were able to persuade a big, sophisticated country that had a well-developed nuclear program not to develop nuclear weapons. The START II Treaty that I negotiated in my first couple years in office with the Russians has reduced our respective stockpiles. The Nuclear Security Summit and all the work that we've done on that score has made it less likely that nuclear materials fall into the hand of terrorists or non-state actors. And although

we have not seen the kind of progress that I would have liked to have seen with respect to North Korea, what we have been able to do is mobilize the international community so that their proliferation activities are scrutinized much more carefully, and they have far fewer countries that are tolerant of potential actions by North Korea outside of their own program. Having said that, **North Korea is a big worry for all of us. They're not at the point right now where they can effectively hit U.S. targets, but each time that they test -- even if those tests fail -- they learn something. And it is clear that ideologically they are still convinced that -- and Kim Jong-un in particular seems to be convinced that his own legitimacy is tied up with developing nuclear weapons.** You pointed out the continuing tensions that exist in South Asia. That is still a concern. And we know that terrorist organizations would have no compunction about using a weapon of mass destruction if they got their hands on it. So we've got a lot of work to do. I think we've built up an architecture during the course of my presidency that has made a difference--that has focused attention on some key points of vulnerability. But we're not where we need to be yet. And obviously we haven't achieved all the goals that I set when I spoke in Prague at the beginning of my presidency. Of course, I noted at the time that I didn't expect to be able to achieve all those goals during the course of my presidency or even in my lifetime. And this is going to be an ongoing task, but it's one that I think we have to be paying a lot of attention to. Q. One follow-up. Mr. Kerry, your Secretary of State, called the North Korean nuclear program the biggest threat in the world right now -- the gravest threat. Do you agree with that? Do you see this nuclear program as the worst thing going on? OBAMA: Well, it is not the thing necessarily that poses the most immediate risk. Obviously, ISIL using rifles and crude bombs can kill a lot of people in a Paris or a Brussels. And people are rightly insistent that the world community stamp out ISIL. So there's a reason why we are focused on that. But this is not a situation where we can afford to just focus on the short term. Over the long term, when you have such an unstable regime that is so isolated, that generally flouts international norms and rules more than perhaps any other nation on Earth, that is also devoting enormous national resources hell-bent on getting nuclear weapons that they can fire long distances -- that poses the kind of medium-term threat that we have to pay a lot of attention to. And I assure you it's something that my administration has paid a lot of attention to. It's something that I think has been at the center of the trilateral work that we've done with our close allies in the region. It's something that we've put at the center of our discussions and negotiations with China. And as I said before, what we've seen actually is improved responses from countries like China, countries in the region, like Vietnam and Burma taking these issues much more seriously because of our engagement. And so that may reduce the risks of North Korea selling weapons or fissile material to other countries, or putting it out on the black market. But it does not, so far at least, solve the core problem of North Korea continuing to develop its program. And we're going to have to continue to work in a concerted way. In the meantime, I've been working with the Pentagon for several years now on making sure that we can develop the kinds of defense architecture that can protect the United States and our allies from an unexpected escalation." (President Barack Obama, Remarks in Press Availability, Ise-Jima, Japan, May 26, 2016)

Security researchers have tied the recent spate of digital breaches on Asian banks to North Korea, in what they say appears to be the first known case of a nation using

digital attacks for financial gain. In three recent attacks on banks, researchers working for the digital security firm Symantec said, the thieves deployed a rare piece of code that had been seen in only two previous cases: the hacking attack at Sony Pictures in December 2014 and attacks on banks and media companies in South Korea in 2013. Government officials in the United States and South Korea have blamed those attacks on North Korea, though they have not provided independent verification. The Symantec researchers said they had uncovered evidence linking an attack at a bank in the Philippines last October with attacks on Tien Phong Bank in Vietnam in December and one in February on the central bank of Bangladesh that resulted in the theft of more than \$81 million. **"If you believe** North Korea was behind those attacks, then the bank attacks were also the work of North Korea," said Eric Chien, a security researcher at Symantec, who found that identical code was used across all three attacks. "We've never seen an attack where a nation-state has gone in and stolen money," Chien added. "This is a first." The attacks have raised alarms in the global banking industry because the thieves gained access to Swift, a Brussels-based banking consortium that runs what is considered the world's most secure payment messaging systems used by 11,000 banks and companies to move money from one country to another. Swift has warned publicly that the attacks are part of a broad coordinated assault on banks, though it has not assigned blame. The latest spate of attacks on banks in Bangladesh and Southeast Asia would be the first time, security researchers say, that a nation has used malicious code to steal purely for financial profit. The idea that Pyongyang had turned to digital theft would not be surprising. North Korea's economy has been ravaged by sanctions, food shortages and other deprivations. Pyongyang does not publish economic data, but estimates have put North Korea's gross domestic product between \$12 billion and \$40 billion, tiny when compared with South Korea's economic output of more than \$1.4 trillion. In the attack at Bangladesh's central bank in February, the thieves tried to transfer \$1 billion in funds from an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Fed officials became suspicious of some of requested transfers and released only \$81 million to accounts in the Philippines. **"If you presume it's North Korea,** \$1 billion is almost 10 percent of their G.D.P.," Chien said. "This is not small change for them." Symantec researchers said it was possible that the bank in the Philippines containing the North Korean code was also involved in the Bangladesh bank scheme and the attempted breach on the Vietnamese bank. The researchers would not identify the Philippines bank and did not say whether the thieves had been successful in transferring funds. Researchers were able to confirm only that the attackers had managed to breach the bank and install identical code strings on the bank's computer systems – the same code that they discovered in Bangladesh, Vietnam and the two previous attacks at Sony in 2014 and South Korea in 2013. Chien noted that the attackers not only used identical numbers but wrote the code in the same, unusual sequence across all three attacks. Chien said the evidence pointed to all three attacks being the work of the "Lazarus Group," a name his team gave to the attackers behind the Sony and South Korean attacks. "North Korea is hurting for money," said Herb Lin, the senior research scholar for cyberpolicy and security at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation and a fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution. "They've been cut out of the financial system because of sanctions. They had been among the best counterfeiters in the world, and only recently have they been stymied in the counterfeiting of superdollars. If it's true that

we've cut them off from that, then it's not at all surprising that they would turn to something else." (Nicole Perlroth and Michael Corkery, "North Koreans Tied to Attacks at Asian Banks," *New York Times*, May 27, 2016, p. A-1) Symantec linked the tools used in the bank attacks to a hacking group known as "Lazarus" rather than explicitly point to North Korea. **"We don't have evidence of that,"** Said Chien. "All we can claim is that it's the same attacker behind all of these attacks." David J. Lynch, "Swift Hacks: Whodunnit Questions Are Hard to Answer," *Financial Times*, June 2, 2016, p. 6)

5/27/16

Two North Korean vessels crossed the de facto western maritime border Friday amid heightened tensions in inter-Korean relations, Seoul's military said. The Navy fired five warning shots at the North Korean vessels -- a fishing boat and a patrol boat -- as they trespassed across the maritime border in the Yellow Sea, widely known as the Northern Limit Line, at around 7:30 a.m., according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They returned to the northern side about eight minutes after they entered South Korean controlled waters, it added. This marked the second time that a North Korean vessel crossed the western sea border. On February 8, a day after Pyongyang conducted its long-range missile test the provocation, a North Korean patrol boat crossed into the South Korean territory but retreated after the Navy fired warning shots. But the North claimed that the South has made a military provocation by attacking its Navy vessels. "We repeatedly warned that they (the North) should retreat, but they didn't... The South made a military provocation and we are ready to attack (the South)," North Korea's Central TV Station reported citing a statement by the North's Army. A report submitted by the Defense Ministry to parliament earlier this month showed that the number of fishing boats from North Korea and China operating in the sea around the NLL have doubled in 2016, compared with previous years. Military officials said that the NLL intrusion might be intended to test their combat readiness, adding that they are staying alert and keeping a close eye on any strange movement in the North. (Yonhap, "N. Korean Patrol, Fishing Vessels, Cross Western Sea Border," May 28, 2016)

5/28/16

KCNA: "As reported, the puppet military gangsters of south Korea sent many armed ships into the territorial waters of the DPRK from 5:53 on Friday [May 27] to wait for a chance of provocation and then fired, without any prior warning, 40 mm rocket gun shells at an unarmed ferryboat of the Navy of the Korean People's Army, which was towing a boat. This reckless military provocation was evidently prompted by a premeditated sinister plot to bedevil the north-south relations and further aggravate the tension on the Korean peninsula. It is the wicked intention of the provokers to drive the situation of the hotspot in the West Sea of Korea to the worst phase by inciting the KPA to take a self-defensive counter-action against their escalated naval intrusion and reckless gunfire and then let the reactionary reptile media build up such wrong public opinion that the DPRK is chiefly responsible for "provocation" and "threat" and thus spoil the climate for dialogue between the north and the south. It is well proved by the fact that soon after the military provocation, the south Korean puppet military issued an order to put its combat air division based in Suwon on standby for emergency sortie, pushing the situation in the said waters to an unpredictable extreme phase. In this regard, the KPA General Staff on Saturday sent the following notice to the south Korean authorities who let the puppet military gangsters make a preemptive attack, defying the DPRK's good faith and magnanimity: Firstly, the backstage manipulators of

the case should apologize to the entire nation for the puppet military gangsters' reckless military provocation. They will not escape a stern punishment by the nation as they invented the case and put it into practice to drive the situation in the volatile hotspot to the brink of explosion. Secondly, **from now on we will open direct fire on any warship of the south Korean puppet forces without warning, if it intrudes into the extension of the Military Demarcation Line of our side even 0.001 mm in the hotspot of the west sea.** The south Korean authorities are responding to our earnest call for dialogue with such reckless military standoff as naval intrusion and preemptive attack and to our efforts for detente with dangerous anti-DPRK war games. This action can never be pardoned. They should be mindful that they would face our merciless retaliatory strikes anytime and at any place and in any way for such provocative action as responding to the just efforts for dialogue with reckless military confrontation. If they dare challenge our self-defensive retaliatory strike, they will meet more powerful and successive counterattacks. The future developments depend on their behavior." (KCNA, "KPA General Staff Sends Notice to S. Korean Authorities," May 28, 2016)

KCNA: "The Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army released the following crucial report on May 27: Today the south Korean puppet military gangsters committed such grave military provocation as intruding into the southwestern sea under our side's control and firing 40 mm rocket gun shells at our navy's ferryboat on a routine duty. They started their premeditated military provocation by making three speedboats of the puppet navy's 2nd Fleet and a vessel of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries sail 6.4 km across the extension of the Military Demarcation Line in sea waters west of Paekryong Island and southwest of Yeonphyeong Island four times between 05:53 to 07:00. Our side gave several warnings, but they refused to withdraw their ships, asserting that they were on a routine duty in the waters under their control. Then they fired in succession 40 mm rocket gun shells straight toward the ferryboat of our navy, which was towing a wrecked boat in the waters under our side's control. The ferryboat is an unarmed vessel which is for mail delivery and liaison. This reckless military provocation is the revelation of the south Korean puppet group's vicious intention and hackneyed trick to inveigle our side into a provocation case by driving the situation to an extreme phase and then let the reactionary media mislead the public opinion with propaganda that the case was provoked by our side. The puppet military ran amuck to escalate the provocation, issuing an order to put its combat air division based in Suwon on standby for emergency sortie. After all, the situation in those waters is inching to the unpredictable extreme phase. Under the prevailing situation, the KPA units on the southwestern front are waiting for an order to launch an annihilating attack, ready for making retaliatory strikes." (KCNA, "KPA Supreme Command Releases Crucial Report," *Uriminzokkiri*, May 30, 2016)

*Rodong Sinmun*: "To defuse military tensions is the basic condition for creating the atmosphere of confidence and improving the north-south relations. The Korean peninsula is the hottest spot in the world incomparable with any region in the light of acute military standoff and density of armed forces deployment. In order to save the Koreans from the danger of war and make a new breakthrough in improved inter-Korean relations and national reunification, it is necessary to defuse military tensions without delay. **What is the most important is for the north and the south to take**

**practical steps for defusing military tensions and reducing the danger of clash in the area along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and the hotspot in the West Sea.** The north and the south should expand the scope of steps for defusing military confrontation and tension and preventing clash, depending on the creation of the atmosphere of military confidence. Dialogue and negotiations are the basic ways of settling the issues arising in the inter-Korean relations according to the desire and will of the fellow countrymen. **In order to achieve peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula, it is, first of all, necessary to hold dialogue and negotiations between the military authorities of the north and the south. If the north-south military authorities' talks are to be open, they will be able to seek a negotiated settlement of a package of issues of mutual concern including the issues of defusing the danger of clash and easing tensions in the area along the MDL.** Now is the time for the north and the south to work hard for detente and peace on the basis of the practical proposal for improving the relations. If the south Korean authorities have the true willingness to improve the north-south relations, they should not seek a sinister purpose any longer but come out for dialogue and negotiations with a sincere and honest attitude. It is the steadfast stand and will of the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK government to improve the north-south relations through dialogue and negotiations, not by confrontation and war, and achieve independent reunification, peace and prosperity." (*Rodong Sinmun*, "Practical Proposal for Radically Improving North-South Relations," May 28, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman gave the following answer to question put by KCNA "as regards the fact that Obama pulled up the DPRK over its bolstering of nuclear force: With the recent G-7 Summit in Japan as an occasion, Obama repeatedly made remarks slandering the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He said the DPRK "commits such provocation as not only development of nuclear weapons but also their proliferation" and it is "the biggest obstacle to building a world without nuclear weapons ". He also criticized the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs as a "threat to the region, the U.S. and the world." The remarks are a revelation of his wicked intention to cover up the true colors of the U.S., a criminal that inflicted nuclear holocaust on mankind, and evade the world community's strong accusations against him persistently seeking a world domination based on nukes while making a mockery of the world with the deceptive signboard of "nuclear-free world." It is the height of shamelessness for Obama to talk about denuclearization in Japan where the U.S. dropped nuclear bombs. The plan for a "world without nuclear weapons," taken up by him after coming to power, was prompted by his intention to weaken other countries' military muscle while bolstering up the nuclear war means of the U.S. But, such cunning double-dealing tactics of the U.S. have faced a failure, being rejected by the world society. **If the U.S. had been truly interested in the global denuclearization, it should have dismantled its nukes before others and stopped its nuclear threat and blackmail against other countries and nations.** The U.S. expects nuclear dismantlement from the DPRK while persisting in its hostile policy toward the latter with a nuclear stick. This is no more than a daydream just like wishing for a chicken from a boiled egg. As already declared, the DPRK will bolster up its self-defensive nuclear force in quality and quantity, constantly holding fast to the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear



force, **as long as the imperialists continue their nuclear threat and arbitrary practices.** It will also honestly implement its non-proliferation duty before the world society as a responsible nuclear weapons state and strive for the global denuclearization. No matter what false propaganda the U.S. may resort to, it cannot deny the position of the DPRK, a nuclear weapons state for independence and justice.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman on DPRK’s Bolstering of Nuclear Force,” May 28, 2016)

5/30/16

The South Korean Military is developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), a high-ranking military official said. “On the 3,000-ton Jangbogo-III submarine, which is currently under production, we are installing a vertical launching pad,” said the official. He added, “The installation of a vertical launching pad indicates that the SLBM is already under development.” The official also went on to say that the SLBM is being developed under the aegis of the Agency of Defense Development and is expected to be completed by 2020. The South Korean Navy’s arsenal currently includes the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). However, as North Korea’s endeavor to develop SLBM technology has almost reached completion, the need within the South Korean military to initiate a response has become urgent. “Although the SLBM may lack the accuracy of the SLCM, which is equipped with a guidance system, its velocity and destructive capability are significantly greater,” said Kim Hyeok-soo, first commander of a submarine flotilla and now-retired rear admiral. “The deployment of the speedy and stealthy SLBM will allow the South Korean Navy to deliver a blow to North Korea before the situation even escalates to emergency levels.” Another official said, “The military has already deployed surface-to-air missiles that use cold-launching mechanisms - a technology used by the SLBM, in which the engine fires after the missile reaches a certain altitude. We are trying to apply that mechanism so that the missiles can be fired underwater.” “North Korea, however, is applying the technology of the Russian surface-to-air missile, the S300, to its SLBMs,” Lee Choon-geun, senior researcher at Korean Institute of Science and Technology, said. “As far as I know, South Korea uses more stable technology by taking the S400 that was obtained from Russia as a repayment of its debt to South Korea.” The S400 is a technologically superior missile with embedded cold-launching technology. If the development of SLBMs finishes as scheduled, South Korean military authorities plan to equip the Jangbogo-III submarine with SLBMs, as this submarine which will have been turned over to the Navy by 2020. Meanwhile, military authorities have decided to upgrade the second version of the Jangbogo-III submarine from 3,000 tons to 3,400 tons. (Jeong Yong-soo, “South Will Develop Its Own SLBM: Source,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, March 30, 2016)

Uganda said that it will cut all security and military cooperation with its longtime ally North Korea, a victory in the South’s diplomatic effort to isolate Pyongyang and curb its nuclear and missile programs. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni held a summit with visiting South Korean President Park Geun-hye in the capital city of Kampala and discussed the North’s continuing efforts to develop nuclear and missile programs in defiance of international condemnation, including United Nations Security Council resolutions. “President Museveni ordered the relevant government departments to sever all security, military and police cooperation with North Korea,” said Kim Kyou-hyun, the presidential senior secretary for foreign affairs and security. Uganda is one of

the few allies of the isolated North. After taking office in 1986, Museveni visited North Korea in 1987, 1990 and 1992 and met with Kim Il Sung, the North's late founder and grandfather of the current ruler Kim Jong-un. Park was the first South Korean president to visit Uganda since the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1963. At the summit, Park requested Museveni to join the international community's efforts to end North Korea's nuclear program, saying it not only threatens the Korean Peninsula but also the entire world. Museveni vowed to faithfully implement UN resolutions and ordered his government to "disengage" all security, military and police ties with the North, Kim said. UN Security Council resolutions, imposed after the North's fourth nuclear test in January, bar the country from having any military links with foreign countries, including weapons trade and training deals. The South Korean government, however, said about 50 North Korean military and policy training officials were staying in Uganda as of February 2016. A UN Panel of Experts report submitted to the UN Security Council on Feb. 24, 2016, also confirmed that Uganda until recently had police and military cooperation with the North. According to the report, Uganda confirmed that until last December, North Korea provided training for 45 of its police officers, including 19 security instructors for paramilitary police. Blue House sources said the North Korean trainers were believed to be ordered to leave at the order of Museveni. "It is a major accomplishment of the summit that Uganda, which had long been a close partner of the North, changed its attitude to support us," Kim said. "Uganda's shift will also encourage other African countries to implement UN resolutions." Kim said Uganda appeared to have decided to cut its security cooperation with the North because it values more substantial exchanges with the South, including a defense cooperation memorandum of understanding signed during Park's visit. Economic cooperation with the South also played a key role, he said. Meanwhile, a minor hiccup occurred after the summit. After South Korea announced that Museveni ordered the cutting of security and military ties with the North, AFP reported that Ugandan authorities denied it. "That is not true. It is propaganda," deputy government spokesman Shaban Bantariza told AFP. "Even if [such an order] was to be made by the president, it cannot be public. It cannot be therefore true and it can't happen. That is international politics at play." But Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa confirmed Monday that the country decided to sever all military ties with the North. "We disengaged cooperation we are having with North Korea as a result of UN sanctions," he said in an interview with Uganda's NBS Television. (Ser Myo-ja, "Uganda Chooses Ties with Seoul over Pyongyang," *JoongAng Ilbo*, May 31, 2016)

South Korea's defense ministry said it had detected signs that North Korea was preparing a ballistic missile launch, as Japan reportedly put its military on intercept alert. "We are tracking signs that North Korea is preparing a ballistic missile test and are maintaining combat readiness," a defense ministry official told AFP. In Tokyo, public broadcaster NHK said the Japanese government had put its military on alert for a possible launch, with orders to intercept any missile that threatened Japanese territory. Under the order, the Self-Defense Forces will deploy Aegis destroyers equipped with missile interceptors offshore and PAC-3 surface-to-air anti-ballistic missiles, NHK said. A Japanese defense ministry spokeswoman declined to confirm the news reports. (AFP, "S. Korea Detects Signs North Preparing Missile Launch," May 30, 2016)

5/31/16

North Korea launched a Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile early this morning, but the launch ended in failure, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and military sources said. "North Korea attempted to launch an unidentified missile from Wonsan, Gangwon Province, at around 5:20 a.m., but it is presumed to have been unsuccessful," the JCS said in a brief text message. Official sources said the launched missile was a Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The sources said the missile may have exploded on the mobile launcher immediately after the fire button was pushed. They said the explosion is presumed to have inflicted serious injuries on personnel in the immediate vicinity. JCS spokesman Jeon Ha-kyu said in a press briefing that North Korea seems to be pushing for a continued string of ballistic missile launches following leader Kim Jong-un's orders for such tests to be carried out on March 15. "The military is keeping open the possibility that the North will conduct additional provocations," he said. The latest launch marks Pyongyang's fourth failed attempt to launch its Musudan mid-range ballistic missiles in two months. (Yonhap, "N. Korean Missile Launch Appears to Have Failed: S. Korean Military," *Korea Times*, May 31, 2016)

Senior party officials from North Korea and China held talks during which they agreed to boost cooperation, the Chinese Communist Party said, in a fresh sign that the traditional allies are trying to mend soured ties due to the North's nuclear weapons program. Ri Su-yong, vice chairman of the North Korean ruling party's central committee and the party's chief of international relations, arrived in Beijing earlier in the day for a three-day visit. He held talks with his Chinese counterpart, Song Tao, minister of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, and they agreed to "strengthen exchanges and cooperation between the two parties," the Chinese Communist Party said in a brief statement posted on its website. Ri and Song also agreed on the "promotion of regional peace and stability," according to the statement. Ri is the highest-ranking North Korean official to visit Beijing since North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January. (Kim Deok-hyun, "Senior Party Officials from N. Korea, China Agree to Boost Cooperation," Yonhap, May 31, 2016)

Russel: **Q:** Just two very brief ones. One as it relates to North Korea, Danny. This concept the Administration has had for years now of strategic patience with the North Koreans, which I guess the Chinese have been on board with and may even have encouraged. I'm just wondering, given the latest missile test even though it failed, if you guys - you and China - think that it's worthwhile pursuing that. ...**ASSISTANT SECRETARY RUSSEL:** Well, I'll start on North Korea, Matt. You're reaching pretty far back into the history of our North Korea policy in the first term to come up with strategic patience. I think that was at the time a badly misunderstood concept. And right now I think the phrase that captures our strategy most succinctly is UN Security Council Resolution 2270. ...China is a coauthor of the toughest sanctions ever levied on North Korea, and by its own declaration is determined to implement them fully. One of the things that we will and do talk about, and the S&ED provides a platform for that, is the practical question of how to ensure that the pressure that is built on an international basis on North Korea culminates in the outcomes that we want, which is, as I've said, not to bring North Korea to its knees but to its senses. And the outcome that we're looking for is North Korean agreement to negotiate the denuclearization of

the Korean Peninsula. That's not unconditional surrender. That is a reasonable and consistent objective of ours. We have a vastly improved chance of getting there with China's full cooperation, and we intend to use the S&ED to game out how we can speed up the outcome that we're both working to achieve." (DoS, Special Briefing Previewing the Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China," Catherine A. Novelli, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, and Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, May 31, 2016)

Bermudez: "Recent commercial satellite imagery shows new evidence that North Korea is preparing to commence or has already begun conducting a reprocessing campaign to separate more plutonium for nuclear weapons at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. This activity consists of the presence of two loaded railroad flatcars at the Radiochemical Laboratory loaded with casks or tanks that may be associated with chemicals used in a preprocessing campaign, a small exhaust plume at the facility's thermal plant, the replenishing of the coal stockpile for that plant and the likelihood that the 5 MWe reactor is operating at a low level of power or not at all. Also, the North appears to have halted work at Building 500, a facility used to store liquid and solid waste in the past from reprocessing campaigns. Exactly how much new plutonium Pyongyang can produce if such a campaign is underway remains unclear given uncertainties about the level of operations at the 5 MWe reactor which restarted in 2013. At maximum capacity, the reactor could produce approximately 6 kilograms of plutonium per year, probably enough for two nuclear weapons. Recent commercial satellite imagery shows exhaust plumes present at the Radiochemical Laboratory's Thermal Plant on May 12 and 22 in addition to plumes observed during February and March of this year. Moreover, coal piles at the thermal plant began to be slowly replenished during February and as of May 22, appear to be at capacity. Imagery also shows two railroad flatcars present at the facility's receiving building from May 13 to May 22. Similar flatcars have previously been associated with reprocessing campaigns in the early 2000s, and seen periodically at the facility since earlier this year, are loaded with what appears to be rectangular tanks or casks that could be used to supply chemicals for a reprocessing campaign, haul out waste products or a number of other related activities. Recent imagery shows two large trucks present on the east side of the 5 MWe reactor, the exact purpose of which remains unclear. Moreover, there are no indications of steam generation or cooling water exhaust. This activity is similar to that noted in most previous 2015 imagery and, when taken in concert with the activity at the Radiochemical Laboratory, suggests that the reactor is not operating or is doing so at an extremely low level." (Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "New Evidence of Probable Plutonium Production at the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility," *38North*, May 31, 2016)

Carlin: "Well, did Kim Jong Un pull a rabbit out of his hat, or didn't he? More specifically, in his work report delivered at the 7th Workers' Party Congress held May 6-8, did Kim use the flexibility inherent in *byungjin* to begin to shift his emphasis from developing the country's nuclear weapons program to building the economy? ...Bottom line, I think Kim did give us a glimpse of the rabbit. I'm bound to say, though, I'm not sure he brought it entirely out of the hat. We got a look at its ears, but we can still only guess at the size of its feet. Let's review. It was never in the cards that Kim was

going to proclaim the **end** of *byungjin*, and he was certainly not at this juncture going to announce that the North accepts denuclearization, or anything approaching that. The issue is more nuanced than that. It has to do with relative emphasis **within** *byungjin* and—if it is not immediately obvious, it should be—whether Kim’s approach suggested any openings that could be explored in eventual negotiations. The current South Korean catechism is that “now” is not the time for negotiations. Perhaps so (I say “perhaps” to be polite), but eventually we will have to get back to talks. We might as well begin reviewing the broad landscape of North Korean policy—beyond simply the nuclear part—sooner rather than later. To begin, it is worthwhile noting what Kim did not say. He did not repeat the promise from his April 2012 speech that North Koreans could look forward to the future “without tightening their belts any longer and fully enjoy wealth and prosperity under socialism.” In fact, a year later, in his March 2013 plenum speech introducing the *byungjin* line, Kim had clearly stepped away from that position when he noted: “Great difficulties are prevailing before us, who **had intended** to concentrate our efforts on the economic construction so as to enable the people to enjoy the wealth and honor of socialism without having to tighten their belts any longer on the basis of the war deterrent for self-defense, which the great generalissimos provided by dedicating their whole lives.” In his work report to the recent congress, however, Kim seems to have tiptoed back toward his 2012 position. Pointing to an unspecified past, he proclaimed that, “in the very difficult conditions and environment, our party, army, and people, by tightening their belts and by waging an arduous struggle, **have built** an invincible military power, amazing the world.” That formulation would seem to leave open whether the days of sacrifice are over, or are still to be endured. If we pay close attention to what else Kim said at the party congress, that is likely produce groans from some readers. “It’s only words,” many will complain. Admittedly, we all realize that extensive textual analysis often leads to dense, Talmudic prose. You can’t tweet it. Nevertheless, the same people who dismiss exegesis are happy enough to lift Kim’s words on the nuclear issue from the speech, and seriously argue that his assertion that the North has become a “responsible nuclear state” tells us virtually all we need to know. To the contrary, based on a reading of the full text of Kim’s lengthy speech, there is much more to examine. In particular, three other sections in the work report need to be considered. 1. Where things stand. Not surprisingly, Kim’s review of the decades since the last congress in 1980 was couched in positive terms—all accomplishments, all conquered high peaks from which to survey the future. That opening section is not, however, merely the confetti of self-congratulations; it provides a basis for understanding the starting point for the current policies outlined later in Kim’s work report. Most important, Kim’s remarks at the congress differ from those at the March 2013 party plenum, where he clearly signaled that the defense sector, and very specifically the nuclear sector, needed to be bolstered before it would be safe to concentrate on economic matters. In 2013, Kim asserted there was work yet to be done, and that was why he had instituted the *byungjin* line. The deterrent had to be built up to make it possible to “concentrate our efforts on economic construction and improvement of the people’s living standards without any worries.” By contrast, in his work report at the congress, Kim several times suggests that with the nuclear shield in place, the country is now strong enough to focus on the economy. One of his clearest statements that a key goal of *byungjin* has been met—i.e., that the defense shield is now strong enough to allow the focus to shift

to the economy—is this: “Before the might of the chuch’e-oriented national defense industry which has reached a cutting-edge level, the enemies are shivering with fear, **and our people, under the protection of the formidable national defense capabilities and war deterrent, are turning out in socialist construction with overflowing faith in sure victory without any concern about their lives.**” (Emphasis added.)

2. Economy vs military. Having established that the country’s defense is strong, Kim then advances the formulations that, in effect, let us begin to see the rabbit, i.e., the signal that a shift in priorities is underway. Before we get to that, however, there is the matter of what some might see as contrary evidence: “The entire country is regarding military issues as the most important state affairs and is **subordinating everything to military issues**, and all of the people are making the blood of their hearts afire with a do-or-die resolve to complete the sacred cause of the fatherland’s reunification through an all-people resistance and war, when the time has come for a decisive battle.” (Emphasis added.) I didn’t ignore the above passage. But it is not advanced as a goal; rather it is a description of the current state of affairs. As for the future, Kim describes that in starkly different terms. He begins with the setup, the drumroll of accomplishment: “As the politically, ideologically, and militarily powerful country has been excellently built, the main force of our revolution has strengthened beyond comparison.” Note that one drum is missing in the above—the economy. And so Kim turns his attention to that. “The building of an economically powerful state is the basic front where our party and **state must concentrate all efforts at the present period. Now, our country has proudly climbed to the status of a politically and militarily powerful state, but the economic sector has yet to reach its deserved height.**” (Emphasis added.)

In 2000, a formulation noting that the economy lagged behind the political and military development was the opening salvo for Kim Jong Il’s new economic policies, and became the banner under which the regime’s reformers rallied. It is no mistake that Kim Jong Un has revived it.

**3. New economic policy.** Kim does list goals for the defense sector, but having established the relative priority of the economy, the core of his comments are directed at the party and the government’s tasks in that sphere. Again, this is considerably different from his 2013 plenum speech, where he put clear emphasis on the developing the defense sector over the economy. To reinforce his focus on the economy, Kim singles out the role of the cabinet. References to the cabinet and the “cabinet responsibility system” have popped up here and there for several years, but in the work report, Kim gives the cabinet more than a passing reference. By doing so, he emphasizes that the practical steps, the “realistic” steps, for new economic policies are to be in the hands of those who are supposed to be trained and experienced in such things. “The Cabinet, which serves as the country’s economic command, must make a resolute break with the tendency to cut corners, as well as formalism and defeatism; realistically establish state economic development strategies and stage-by-stage plans based on the party’s line and policy; methodically put together economic organization work for their implementation; and make a stubborn push to the finish as the master put in charge of economic work in front of the party and the people. The country’s overall economic work must be centralized in the Cabinet in accordance to the demands of the cabinet responsibility system and the cabinet-centric system, and the discipline and order of all economic sectors and units operating in sync with the Cabinet’s unified operations and command must be strictly established.” And what is one of the key policies that the

cabinet is to implement? In his 2013 plenum speech, Kim had emphasized the “socialist enterprise responsibility management system.” At this year’s congress, Kim’s work report makes clear this initiative remains a priority, and his language is meant to disabuse anyone who thinks this system is meant to allow fuller initiative at the enterprise level is tentative or experimental. “Factories, enterprises, and cooperative organizations must **establish management strategies adequately in line with the demands of the socialist enterprise responsibility management system; conduct enterprise activities proactively and creatively; and thereby normalize, expand, and develop production. Sufficient conditions must be provided on the state level for enterprises to smoothly take advantage of the management rights assigned to them.**” (Emphasis added.) At the congress, Kim laid out the philosophical foundations and broad priorities on which specific policies were to be based. A March 26-28 joint meeting of officials of the party, state, economic and armed forces on carrying out the new economic strategy signals that the task of moving from the general to the specific is already underway. The preliminary indications are that, at least at the conceptual level, the regime understands that infusing the economy with life will be a long term, multi-stage proposition, and that the current “five year strategy for state economic development” that Kim discussed in vague terms at the party congress is only a first step. One of the first hurdles the new push on the economy faces may be foot dragging, or even outright opposition, by those who see in the five-year economic strategy a threat to the long-established primacy of the defense industry sector. Premier Pak Pong Ju certainly remembers that during his first appointment to the premiership, under Kim Jong Il, a debate surfaced in the media in 2003 and 2004 over the wisdom of a reallocation of resources away from the defense sector to the civilian sector. The reformers lost that round. Whether they are in a better position this time remains to be seen.” (Robert Carlin, “Some Rabbit! Some Hat!” *38North*, May 31, 2016)

6/1/16

Senior North Korean official Ri Su-yong met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, signaling a thaw in icy relations between the two nations. Xi and Ri talked for around 30 minutes, and the Chinese leader said that he “hopes related countries can stay calm and exercise restraint and through dialogue and communication safeguard peace and security in the region.” This is the first time Xi held talks with a high-ranking North Korean official since May 2013. Ri, vice chairman of the central committee of the North’s Workers’ Party, proposed a summit between Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. He may have also kicked off a surprise three-day visit to China yesterday, accompanied by a delegation of some 40 officials in what appeared to be Pyongyang’s attempt to patch up diplomatic relations with its longtime ally and benefactor. Later that day, the seasoned North Korean diplomat held talks with Song Tao, minister of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department, during which they agreed to bolster bilateral cooperation. Ri’s visit is the first by a senior North Korean official since Pyongyang carried out its fourth nuclear test in January. Last month, North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party held its seventh congress. Xi sent a congratulatory message to mark the party congress, which was interpreted as an indication that North Korea would not conduct a fifth nuclear test, despite its threats to do so. “Communist countries, after they hold a party congress or important party event, send a delegation to other Communist nations to explain it,” a South Korean Foreign Ministry official said

on Ri's visit to Beijing. "North Korea has done this in the past, and since this was the first congress in 36 years, it is natural to do so." North Korea has shown through its seventh party congress its intent to escape isolation, the official added, pointing to recent overseas trips by Pyongyang officials. This includes Kim Yong-nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, who visited Equatorial Guinea; Kim Yong-chol, a vice chairman of the Workers' Party central committee, who went to Cuba; and Ri's current visit to China. "This is a reflection of North Korea's diplomatic crisis," the South Korean official said. "However, no matter how much North Korea makes diplomatic efforts, if it continues to possess nuclear arms and continues to attempt to enhance its nuclear capability, it will only become further isolated, and we plan to make it so." Ri, a former foreign minister and former guardian to Kim Jong-un and his sister Kim Yo-jong during their studies in Switzerland in the 1990s, is believed by South Korean intelligence to be in charge of Pyongyang's diplomatic affairs, following the death of chief diplomat Kang Sok-ju. It is not unusual to see a pattern of Pyongyang conducting a nuclear test, followed by China's participation in sanctions against North Korea, a period of strained relations, and then a special envoy being sent to China as the tension eases. This can lead to a revival of bilateral relations and resumption of dialogue. Such was the case following North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009, followed by then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Pyongyang in October 2009, where he met with the late leader Kim Jong-il and marked the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two countries. In May 2013, Choe Ryong-hae, now part of the five-member presidium of the political bureau of the Workers' Party central committee, visited China as Kim Jong-un's special envoy and met with Xi, conveying a letter from the North Korean leader. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying told reporters yesterday on Ri's trip, "As important neighbors to each other, we hope to develop normal, friendly and cooperative relations with the [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]." Ri's visit also comes ahead of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue June 6 and 8, during which Washington plans on encouraging Beijing to exert pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Daniel Russel, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, told reporters Tuesday that the United States would like to discuss with Beijing "the practical question of how to ensure that the pressure that is built on an international basis on North Korea culminates in the outcomes that we want." This outcome, he said, is "not to bring North Korea to its knees, but to its senses." He elaborated that Washington is looking for a "North Korean agreement to negotiate the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." "That's not unconditional surrender," Russel said. The bilateral strategic dialogue, the eighth of its kind, Russel said, will serve as a platform to "speed up" such an outcome. (Sarah Kim, "North's Top Envoy Meets with Xi," *JoongAng Ilbo*, June 2, 2016) KCNA reported that Ri Su-yong told the Chinese that it was the "permanent" policy of the North to try to expand its nuclear arsenal while striving to rebuild its economy. Hours before Ri's arrival, North Korea tried unsuccessfully to fire an intermediate-range Musudan ballistic missile. During a meeting with Song Tao, who heads the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party in Beijing, KCNA said Ri had "stressed" that it was the Workers' Party's "principled" stance to stick loyally to Kim's policy, known as byungjin, as a "permanent strategic line" and use it as a base to "defend peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region." Although the byungjin policy was hardly new, the



meeting between Ri and Song was significant in that North Korea formally told China through a high-level governmental channel that it had no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons program. The news agency quoted Song as saying that the Chinese Communist Party and government supported North Korea's pursuit of "a path to development that suits its reality." It did not specify what Song had said about the North's nuclear weapons program. Kim may have ordered yesterday's missile test to coincide with Ri's visit, as a way of signaling to the Chinese that he would continue to cause trouble if Beijing did not help North Korea, according to Evans J. R. Revere, a former senior State Department official in charge of North Korea affairs. Such a tactic might not be advised given that China has shown increasing impatience with North Korea, Revere said. Even so, he added, "over the years, the North Koreans have shown themselves nothing if not skillful in manipulating the Chinese." The attempted missile launching would almost certainly rule out an audience with Xi, said Cheng Xiaohu, an associate professor of international relations at Renmin University. "China would seem without principle if he is allowed to meet with President Xi after they launched that missile," Cheng said. (Jane Perlez, "North Korea Tells China of 'Permanent' Nuclear Policy," *New York Times*, June 1, 2016, p. A-7) In the meeting with Ri, Xi seemed to strike a positive tone, telling him that China "attached great importance to developing a friendly relationship with North Korea" and was seeking "calm" on the Korean Peninsula, China's state-owned news agency, Xinhua, said Wednesday evening. Xi, according to the Xinhua report, did not mention the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a phrase often used by China to stress that it would like North Korea, along with South Korea, to be free of nuclear weapons. The surprise meeting is believed to have been the first encounter between Xi and a senior North Korean official since 2013. (Jane Perlez, "President of China Meets With N. Korean Envoy," *New York Times*, June 2, 2016, p. A-7) Chinese president Xi Jinping met with high-level visiting North Korean party officials, in a sign that the two sides are seeking to bolster their longtime amity amid continued tensions over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions. The meeting came a day after Ri Su Yong, the senior official in the delegation and one of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's top lieutenants, arrived in Beijing, where he reaffirmed his country's commitment to its nuclear program, the main source of a rift between the socialist allies in recent months. Ri met with Xi and delivered a short message from Kim, according to Yonhap. Xinhua also reported on the meeting, saying both sides expressed their mutual determination to strengthen the relationship and protect stability in the region. Yesterday, Ri met with Song Tao, a top Chinese Communist Party official and briefed him on North Korea's recent ruling party congress, its first in 36 years. According to KCNA, Song sent greetings to the North Korean leader through Ri, describing the relations between the two countries as "the precious treasure provided and brought into bloom by the leaders of the elder generation of the two parties and two countries." The report also said that Ri also told his counterpart that Pyongyang planned "to protect peace and security on the Korean peninsula" by developing the isolated country's economy and by "the building of nuclear force," echoing the signature dual-development policy that Kim has espoused since his elevation to North Korea's leadership. The two sides appear to be working hard to at least retain basic formalities. After North Korea's Workers' Party Congress in May, for instance, Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory note to Pyongyang. Beijing also sent its Olympic basketball team to Pyongyang this past weekend for a

friendly basketball game with a North Korean team, which was attended by Kim. For its part, North Korea has studiously avoided pinning the blame on Chinese authorities for the disappearance of the restaurant workers, which Pyongyang state media has portrayed as a mass abduction by South Korean intelligence agents. By dispatching Song, the head of the Chinese Communist Party's International Liaison Department, to meet with the North Korean official, Beijing appears to be sending a message that it still considers North Korea a close friend within its traditional circle of ideological allies, says Adam Cathcart, a North Korea expert at the University of Leeds in the U.K. Unlike China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which handles regular state-to-state affairs, the International Liaison Department manages relations with other socialist allies on a closer, party-to-party basis, he said. "Party-party relations are starting to get back on track," Cathcart said. Ri, a longtime senior official who served most recently as North Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs, was promoted to the Politburo of the central committee of North Korea's ruling party last month. "The party-to-party link traditionally is the friendlier one, and particularly in the past few years China's foreign ministry has played the 'bad cop' role toward Kim Jong Un," says John Delury, an expert on Chinese and Korean issues at Yonsei University in Seoul. "Welcoming this large delegation led by Ri Su Yong shows Beijing's will to work with, not against, Pyongyang." Last October, Beijing sent Liu Yunshan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, to stand next to Kim during a parade to mark a Korean Workers' Party anniversary. Song was also present on that trip. Even so, Cathcart warned, "I would be careful about labeling the visit a breakthrough. If anything, it is a return to quasi-normal between two neighboring Leninist parties who need to talk." (Jonathan Cheng, "China and North Korea Seek to Mend Ties Tested by Nuclear Ambitions," *Wall Street Journal Asia*, June 1, 2016)

With private cybersecurity firms linking North Korea to recent computer attacks that absconded with at least \$81 million, the Treasury Department moved to choke off Pyongyang's remaining access to the global financial system, designating the country a "primary" money launderer. The Treasury, employing sanctions techniques that helped pressure Iran to give up much of its nuclear program, said it would seek to impose what are known as secondary sanctions against the reclusive communist country. That means that it could cut off from the American financial system any bank or company that conducts banking transactions with Pyongyang. As a practical matter, that would largely affect Chinese banks, which facilitate North Korea's financial transactions with Beijing, its largest trading partner. It could also affect some institutions in the nominally autonomous Chinese regions of Macau and Hong Kong, as well as in Singapore, where Pyongyang has often gone to hide the true nature of its banking activities, and to pay for missiles, nuclear fuel and the huge infrastructure it has built around those programs. The designation, officials said, was in the works long before evidence emerged linking the country's aggressive hackers to the bank thefts, which involved stealing the credentials that banks use to access the Swift system, a global network that thousands of financial firms use to authorize payments from one account to another. In interviews, administration officials said they were still sorting through the evidence that North Korea was involved, and left open the possibility that the thieves deliberately left evidence implicating the country to throw investigators off their trail. It could be months, the officials said, before they reach any conclusions, and in the end the

perpetrators of the attack may not be definitively known. Only once – in the case of North Korea’s attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, which was promoting a movie depicting the assassination of Kim Jong-un, the country’s unpredictable young leader – has President Obama publicly accused another country of using computer code to wreak havoc in the United States. In this case, the sanctions were proposed most immediately because of a Treasury investigation that concluded North Korea uses hard currency to finance its nuclear and missile programs. The department invoked a section of the Patriot Act to ban banks from processing any banking transaction that runs through North Korea. It is hard to assess how much the action will hurt North Korea. Such sanctions against financial institutions doing business with Iran proved effective because Tehran had billions of dollars in monthly oil and other energy exports that could be choked off; North Korea has none. Oftentimes Pyongyang deals in cash. Until a few years ago it was one of the largest counterfeiters of \$100 bills. But that once-lucrative fraud was largely cut off by the redesign of the \$100 bill. The key test will be the reaction of the Chinese. American officials will have a chance to find out next week: Secretary of State John Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew are traveling to Beijing for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, where the isolation of North Korea will be a major subject of discussion. China voted for the latest United Nations sanctions, but Beijing’s fears of provoking a collapse of North Korea’s government still outweigh its desire to rein in Kim’s government. Underlying the financial action was the United States’ desire to respond to North Korea’s third nuclear weapons test, conducted in January, which the country said was its first test of a hydrogen bomb. (There is no evidence that it was, in fact, a hydrogen weapon, which increases the magnitude of the blast.) More recently Pyongyang has attempted, and failed, to launch a Musudan intermediate-range missile. It is based on an early Soviet model, which was launched from a submarine, but the repeated failures have embarrassed Kim and undermined his effort to convince the world that his nuclear missile program is steaming ahead quickly. The bigger mystery is whether Kim is also trying to show that he can undermine the global financial system, his best way of getting back at the West and his Asian neighbors for their support of sanctions. Two cybersecurity firms identified Pyongyang as the culprit behind a series of cyberattacks against Asian banks, including the theft that spirited \$81 million from the central bank of Bangladesh’s account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Private security researchers analyzing those thefts say that unique digital fingerprints in the attackers’ code match those of the code used in cyberattacks against Sony in 2014 and South Korean banks and broadcasting companies in 2013. The Sony hack destroyed 70 percent of the firm’s computers. South Korea has blamed North Korea for the attacks on its firms. Elements of the code in those attacks closely track some of the code found in the more recent bank thefts. Banks in the United States are already prohibited from doing business with financial institutions in North Korea. But the recommended rules would require them to perform additional due diligence to ensure they are not inadvertently transacting with North Korean financial institutions or the Pyongyang government through shell companies or other fictitious entities. The rules are the result of a months-long effort by the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to determine whether North Korea is a haven for money laundering. With that designation established, the Treasury secretary is able to take aggressive measures to cut off the country’s access to the United States financial system. Other countries have

also been stepping up efforts to isolate North Korea. In March, the United Nations Security Council said its members had 90 days to sever banking relationships with North Korean financial institutions. The recent attacks on Asian banks exposed new vulnerabilities in the way banks move money around the world. North Korea's possible involvement in those cyberattacks has raised alarms about Pyongyang's ability to exploit Swift, the global bank messaging network. But the attack did not go to the core of the Swift system; instead, it was analogous to stealing a credit card number to post a phony transaction in the Visa or MasterCard system. (David E. Sanger and Michael Corkery, "Treasury Imposes Sanctions on North Korea," *New York Times*, June 2, 2016, p. A-7)

Treasury Department: "Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced a Notice of Finding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) is a jurisdiction of "primary money laundering concern" under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Treasury, through its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), also released a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) recommending a special measure to further isolate North Korea from the international financial system by prohibiting covered U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts with North Korean financial institutions, and prohibiting the use of U.S. correspondent accounts to process transactions for North Korean financial institutions. Section 311 gives the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to identify a foreign jurisdiction to be a primary money laundering concern. Once identified, the Secretary can require U.S. financial institutions to take appropriate countermeasures. The special measure proposed in today's NPRM would impose the most significant measure available to the Secretary under Section 311. "The United States, the UN Security Council, and our partners worldwide remain clear-eyed about the significant threat that North Korea poses to the global financial system. The regime is notoriously deceitful in its financial transactions in order to continue its illicit weapons programs and other destabilizing activities," said Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. "Today's action is a further step toward severing banking relationships with North Korea and we expect all governments and financial authorities to do likewise pursuant to the new UN Security Council Resolution. It is essential that we all take action to prevent the regime from abusing financial institutions around the world - through their own accounts or other means." **Reasons for This 311 Determination** Treasury is taking this action consistent with the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, enacted on February 18, 2016, which requires Treasury to determine within 180 days whether reasonable grounds exist for concluding that North Korea is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern, and if so, to propose one or more special measures. In addition, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 on March 2, 2016, which in part requires UN Member States to sever correspondent banking relationships with North Korean financial institutions within 90 days of the adoption of the resolution. North Korea is proposed for action under Section 311 because (1) North Korea uses state-controlled financial institutions and front companies to conduct international financial transactions that support the proliferation and development of WMD and ballistic missiles; (2) North Korea is subject to little or no bank supervision anti-money laundering or combating the financing of terrorism ("AML/CFT") controls; (3) North Korea has no

diplomatic relationship, and thus no mutual legal assistance treaty, with the United States and does not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement and regulatory officials in obtaining information about transactions originating in or routed through or to North Korea; and (4) North Korea relies on the illicit and corrupt activity of high-level officials to support its government. **Impact of the 311 Notice of Finding and the NPRM Special Measure** While current U.S. law already generally prohibits U.S. financial institutions from engaging in both direct and indirect transactions with North Korean financial institutions, this NPRM, if finalized, would require U.S. financial institutions to implement additional due diligence measures in order to prevent North Korean banking institutions from gaining improper indirect access to U.S. correspondent accounts. While North Korea's financial institutions do not maintain correspondent accounts with U.S. financial institutions, North Korean financial institutions frequently conduct transactions on behalf of the North Korean government and state-controlled corporations. The NPRM, if finalized, would prohibit the use of third-country banks' U.S. correspondent accounts to process transactions for North Korean financial institutions." (U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Takes Further Actions to Restrict North Korea's Access to U.S. Financial System," June 1, 2016)

UN Security Council: "The members of the Security Council strongly condemned the most recent failed ballistic missile launches of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 31 May and 27 and 28 April. These repeated attempted launches are in grave violation of the DPRK's international obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council deplore all DPRK ballistic missile activities, including these multiple failed launches, noting that such activities contribute to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension. The members of the Security Council further regretted that the DPRK is diverting resources to the pursuit of ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have great unmet needs.

The members of the Security Council expressed serious concern that the DPRK conducted this series of further ballistic missile launches after the April 15 and April 23 launches, in flagrant disregard of the repeated statements of the Security Council. The members of the Security Council reiterated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall refrain from further actions, including nuclear tests, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and comply fully with its obligations under these resolutions. The members of the Security Council called upon all Member States to redouble their efforts to implement fully the measures imposed on the DPRK by the Security Council, particularly the comprehensive measures contained in resolution 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council directed the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to intensify its work to strengthen enforcement of resolution 2270 (2016) and assist Member States to comply with their obligations under that resolution and other relevant resolutions. The members of the Security Council also called on Member States to report as soon as possible on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of resolution 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large, expressed their commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political

solution to the situation and welcomed efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue. The members of the Security Council agreed that the Security Council would continue to closely monitor the situation and take further significant measures in line with the Council's previously expressed determination." (U.N. Spokesman, Security Council Press Statement on DPRK Failed Ballistic Missile Launches," June 1, 2016)

Donald J. Trump's proposals for upending American policy toward the Korean Peninsula have found a receptive audience in at least one place: North Korea. The official newspaper of the ruling Workers' Party published a commentary today praising Trump's threat to pull American troops out of South Korea if elected president, unless Seoul pays more for their presence. It said the threat had shocked South Korean policy makers, who it characterized as servants of America, a standard theme of the North's propaganda. "The tragedy is that the South's authorities are incapable of feeling any national shame, no matter how their American masters subject them to an unbearable humiliation," read the commentary in the newspaper, *Rodong Sinmun*. "Their attitude is best shown by the way they got scared by Trump's comments and groveled." Yesterday, a lesser propaganda outlet, the website DPRK Today, carried what it called an opinion piece submitted by Han Young-muk, whom it identified as an ethnic Korean scholar in China. Such articles are seen as having less authority than official commentaries in *Rodong Sinmun*, which hew closely to the party line. Han wrote that Trump had a greedy, "wolf-like mind," and accused him of trying to secure America a "free ride" by having South Korea pay for the troops' presence. But he said the policy would be a godsend for the North, if South Korea refused to pay more and the troops were pulled out. "Leave now! Hurry!" Han wrote. "Who knew that the 'Yankee Go Home' slogan we shouted so enthusiastically could come true so easily like this? The day that the 'Yankee Go Home' slogan becomes reality would be the day Korea is unified again." Neither of the North Korean articles this week mentioned Trump's suggestion in the March interview with the *Times* that Japan and South Korea should have their own nuclear arsenals so they would be less dependent on the United States for protection. In the *DPRK Today* article, Han praised Trump's apparent willingness to talk to Kim, saying the real estate mogul had proved to be a "wise politician" and comparing him favorably with Hillary Clinton, his likely Democratic opponent. "The candidate the Americans must choose is not the thickheaded Hillary, who tries to apply an Iranian model to solve the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula, but Trump, who says he will try to solve it through direct dialogue with us," Han said. Still, the writer said American policy toward the North was unlikely to change regardless of who was elected in November. Trump's "reckless campaign promises," he wrote, were just "a ploy to win the election." (Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea Applauds Trump's Threat to Pull American Troops From South," *New York Times*, June 2, 2016, p. A-15)

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China said it opposes unilateral sanctions by a certain country against North Korea, reacting coolly to a U.S. decision that designated North Korea as a "primary money laundering concern" with the aim of blocking the North's access to the global financial system. "China opposes any country's unilateral sanctions," China's foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told reporters. (Yonhap, "China Opposes Unilateral Sanctions as U.S. Designates N. Korea Money Launderer," June 2, 2016)

CPRK statement: "in connection with the fact that the situation of the country is getting worse due to the frantic confrontational racket of the south Korean authorities. The army and people of the DPRK earnestly called on the south Korean authorities to tide over the prevailing difficult situation and open up a path to improving the relations through the publication of the joint statement of the DPRK government, political parties and organizations and the proposal to hold the talks between military authorities of the north and the south, pursuant to the new line and policy for national reunification set forth at the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea. But **the first answer** given by the south Korean authorities to it was far-fetched assertions such as "denuclearization first and dialogue next", "propaganda offensive devoid of sincerity" and politically-motivated vicious provocation and the first practical response made by it was reckless firing with the mobilization of military gangsters. Even at this moment the south Korean authorities are reacting to the DPRK's just call for rejecting foreign forces and pooling efforts in the idea of By Our Nation Itself with shameful servile attitude towards the U.S. and sordid racket for confrontation with the fellow countrymen. They are misleading the public opinion while challenging the broadminded proposal made by the DPRK with intolerable provocations and vicious vituperations against the dialogue partner. Denouncing this as an unpardonable mockery of the patriotic measure taken by the DPRK and a vicious challenge to the desire and wish of all the fellow countrymen, the statement clarified the following principled stand: **If the south Korean authorities act without discretion, far from clearly studying the deep meaning of the patriotic appeal and proposal made by the DPRK and making responsible option, our response to it will be the toughest offensive aimed to push them deeper into the abyss and lead them faster to self-destruction.** We already warned the south Korean authorities that if they join hands with the DPRK with an intent to solve the reunification issue first, they can be our partner but if they turn their back on us, the result will be miserable. We would like to stress that this warning is by no means an empty talk. **If the south Korean authorities respond to our just proposal for defusing tension and ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula with reckless military action, our response to them will be merciless physical option.** We will settle accounts by force only with those who find their way out only in confrontation with the fellow countrymen and war, indifferent to the improvement of the north-south relations and peace on the Korean peninsula. This is our stand. We have already clarified that we are ready both for a peaceful way and for non-peaceful way in which all the bases of evils will be blown up in a moment in order to achieve the reunification of the country. The south Korean authorities should clearly be aware that the physical reaction by non-peaceful way will bring us great victory in the war for reunification but miserable defeat to them. Those who ceaselessly spout out provocative invectives against the DPRK will not be able to evade miserable fate, being branded as confrontation maniacs and traitors to the nation. They should bear in mind once again the meaningful advice and serious warning served by the DPRK that evil words already made cannot be recollected and the tongue used for making those words will turn into a dagger cutting off one's own neck. All the Koreans and the international community are closely following the attitude of the south Korean authorities while hoping for the improvement of the relations and for the advent of detente on the Korean peninsula. The south Korean authorities should not forget that if they persist in frantic confrontation with the fellow countrymen while going against the

desire and wish of the nation and the trend of the times, they will not be able to evade the stern punishment by the times and history." (KCNA, "CPRK Statement Warns S. Korean Authorities Not to Go Reckless," June 2, 2016)

6/3/16

Huawei, a major electronic and communication product maker in China, has received a formal request from the U.S. Department of Commerce that the company submit all information about technologies and products that the company exported to North Korea and other nations sanctioned by the U.S. government. (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "U.S. Investigates Alleged Trades between Huawei and N. Korea," June 4, 2016)

Chinese banks that do business with North Korea stand to lose several billion dollars in the wake of new United States Treasury Department sanctions on all such foreign institutions, analysts said. The new sanctions were announced days before a visit to Beijing by Secretary of the Treasury Jacob J. Lew and Secretary of State John Kerry for an annual meeting on economic and security issues that starts on Monday and whose agenda this year includes North Korea. The Chinese banks most affected by the sanctions will be comparatively small regional ones that facilitate the bulk of North Korea's business in China, the analysts said. Major banks in China suspended their North Korean accounts in 2013 after the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, criticized a nuclear test conducted by the North that year, the analysts said. The Bank of China, for example, which has been expanding its operations in the United States and did not want its American business tainted by cooperation with North Korea, closed the account of North Korea's most important financial institution, the Foreign Trade Bank, in May 2013. The smaller banks in the northeast area of China that borders North Korea would probably not want to risk continuing to do business with the North because the cost of sanctions by the United States would far outweigh the benefits of such commercial ties, said Jin Qiangyi, dean of the institute of Northeast Asian Studies at Yanbian University in Yanji. Under the new designation, non-American banks and other entities are banned from conducting dollar transactions on behalf of North Korea, a prohibition intended to crimp the North's economic activities and its ability to further expand its nuclear program. The Chinese government said on yesterday that it opposed the Treasury action, although Beijing signed onto a tough new round of United Nations sanctions imposed on North Korea in March as punishment for a nuclear test it conducted earlier this year. "We consistently oppose imposing unilateral sanctions on other countries based on one's domestic laws," said a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying. Instead of creating new sanctions, countries should "fully implement" the United Nations sanctions established in March, she said. The United Nations resolution called on member states to terminate "joint ventures, ownership interests and correspondent banking relationships" with banks in North Korea within 90 days. The Treasury move goes a step further with its prohibition against United States banks' allowing North Korea access to the American financial system via third-country banks. If China were committed to enforcing the United Nations sanctions it agreed to, then the Treasury move would not affect it. The Foreign Ministry spokeswoman's pointed use of the word "unilateral," however, raised questions about Beijing's commitment to the March sanctions. The collective impact on the regional Chinese banks by the Treasury action will probably be much greater than the losses incurred by Banco Delta Asia, a bank based in the Chinese special



administrative region of Macau, when it was designated a money-laundering concern in 2005 because of its dealings with North Korea, said Cho Bong-Hyn, an analyst at the Industrial Bank of Korea's Research Institute in Seoul. "The impact would amount to approximately a few billion U.S. dollars, considering most of North Korea's foreign bank accounts are in China," Cho said. Even so, he said, few of these banks are entirely dependent on North Korea's business. He doubted that many banks had North Korean deposits amounting to more than 10 percent of the bank's total deposits. "I don't think these Chinese banks will be shaken by the said losses," he said. "They may, however, worry about loss of future transactions." Most of them are in the major trading cities of Dandong and Hunchun on the border with North Korea, he said. These banks will now have to ensure that North Korea does not open bank accounts with them by using conduits. "If such illegal accounts are detected, it could be fatal for these banks," he said. "So both Korean and Chinese banks will have to do their best to prevent North Koreans from opening these irregular bank accounts with them." The main banks in China were unnerved by what happened to Banco Delta Asia, and by 2013, after a nuclear test by the North earlier that year, they stopped doing business with North Korea, said Andray Abrahamian, associate research director of Choson Exchange, a nonprofit group based in Singapore that provides training for entrepreneurs in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. "The writing was already on the wall then," Abrahamian said. Even if a Chinese bank processed transactions for North Koreans in the Chinese currency, the renminbi, that bank's dollar trade would remain at risk, he said. It is not clear where North Korea might seek alternative places to conduct financial transactions outside the normal banking systems, the analysts said. Recently, North Korean businesspeople have mentioned Cambodia and Indonesia as possible channels, said a Singaporean analyst who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter. Soon after the United Nations sanctions were imposed in March, Chinese traders in Dandong, the main gateway for transportation of Chinese goods into North Korea, were using alternatives to the Chinese-run Bank of Dandong. In order to receive payments from North Korea, one major trader in Dandong said in April that he would receive a 50-percent down payment before a shipment. The money would be deposited in the Dandong office of the Korea Kwangson bank. That bank is North Korean and does business out of unmarked offices on the 13th floor of an office tower on the banks of the Yalu River. It was described as the last North Korean bank operating in the city. The trader would pick up the remaining 50 percent payment once the goods arrived in North Korea, he said. The transactions would usually be in renminbi, although sometimes they were in dollars, he said. In March, the Treasury singled out the Korea Kwansong bank for using front companies to gain access to the United States financial system and process transactions that supported weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Previously, the Treasury had said that North Korean leaders had used one of the bank's front companies to open accounts at a major Chinese bank under the names of Chinese citizens and to deposit millions of dollars in 2013. (Jane Perlez, "Chinese Banks Brace for U.S. Sanctions on North Korea," *New York Times*, June 4, 2016, p. A-3)

6/5/15

The number of North Korean defectors arriving in South Korea has rebounded this year after showing a steady decline under the rule of the North's incumbent leader, government data showed.

A total of 590 defectors from the North came to South Korea in the first five months of this year, posting a 16 percent hike from the same period last year, according to the data obtained from the Ministry of Unification in Seoul. It is the first time that the arrival of North Korean defectors has increased at such a noticeable pace since North Korean leader Kim Jong-un rose to power in late 2011. In 2009, the number of North Korean defectors to the South was as high as 2,914. Then the number gradually fell since Kim's inauguration, largely due to the North's economic recovery and brutal retaliation against the defectors. According to the ministry data, the number of defectors fell to 2,706 in 2011, 1,502 in 2012, 1,514 in 2013 and 1,397 in 2014. In 2015, the number shrank to 1,276. (Yonhap, "Number of N. Korean Defectors Rises Again This Year," *Korea Herald*, June 6, 2016)

The ruling bloc supporting Okinawa Governor Takeshi Onaga has increased its majority at the prefectural assembly election by winning 27 seats of the 48-member assembly, three more than before the start of the official election campaign. The result will likely bolster support for Onaga's confrontational stance toward the central government over the relocation of a U.S. base within the prefecture. (*Asahi Shimbun*, "Pro-Onaga's Convincing Win Strengthens Case against U.S. Base," June 6, 2016)

6/6/16

North Korea appears to have reopened a plant to produce plutonium from spent fuel of a reactor central to its atomic weapons drive, the U.N. nuclear watchdog said on Monday, suggesting the country's arms effort is widening. "Resumption of the activities of the 5 megawatt reactor, the expansion of centrifuge-related facility, reprocessing, these are some of the examples of the areas (of activity indicated at Yongbyon)," IAEA chief Yukiya Amano told a news conference during a quarterly IAEA Board of Governors meeting. "There are indications the reprocessing plant at Yongbyon has been reactivated," an IAEA spokesman said later on Monday. "It is possible that it is reprocessing spent fuel." (Francoise Murphy, "North Korea Apparently Reopened Plant to Produce Plutonium: IAEA," Reuters, June 6, 2016)

KCNA: "The warmongers of the south Korean puppet military infiltrated ships again into the territorial waters of the DPRK side in the West Sea of Korea at around 4:30 on Sunday [June 1]. The puppet forces infiltrated 19 fishing boats based in waters off Yeonpyeong Island deep into the DPRK side across the extension of the Military Demarcation Line. This has rendered the situation in the hotspot waters in the West Sea of Korea tense again. The south Korean media report that the advance northward of a group of fishing boats under "allowance by the military" created the "touch-and-go situation" in which those boats could be "seized" by the army of the north or could be "attacked by its coastal artillery pieces." The recent case is a product of the sordid intention of the puppet forces to cause a shocking case in the above-said waters, lead the Korean People's Army to the just counteraction and then brand it as "threat" and "provocation" as it is just an extension of the reckless provocation of artillery shelling by the puppet forces against a ferryboat of the Korean People's Army on May 27. What is different is that the past provocation of firing by artillery pieces was directly committed by the gangsters of the puppet military but this time they used innocent fishermen as a sacrificial offering for confrontation with fellow countrymen in fear of merciless punishment by the Korean People's Army. The true aim sought by the recent

provocation is to render the situation in the waters tense and chill the atmosphere of dialogue for the north-south relations on one hand and to maintain the illegal and gangster-like "northern limit line" at any cost on the other hand. In order to conceal their crimes the puppet forces are even floating sophism that the fishing boats in waters off Yeonpyeong Island entered the waters of the north side to capture two Chinese fishing boats which were under illegal operation. It is a childish farce that can be cooked up only by the south Korean puppet forces to claim that fishing boat seizes fishing boat. Such an act aimed at escalating confrontation with fellow countrymen will only make the provokers pay a dear price." (KCNA, "S. Korean Military Warmongers Infiltrate Fishing Boats into Hotspot Waters in West Sea Again," June 6, 2016)

6/7/16

North Korea has restarted production of plutonium fuel, a senior U.S. State Department official said, showing that it plans to pursue its nuclear weapons program in defiance of international sanctions. The U.S. assessment came a day after the U.N. nuclear watchdog said it had "indications" that Pyongyang has reactivated a plant to recover plutonium from spent reactor fuel at Yongbyon, its main nuclear complex. The U.S. official said that Washington is worried by the new plutonium reprocessing effort, but he offered no explicit word on any U.S. response. "Everything in North Korea is a cause for concern," the official told Reuters. "They take the spent fuel from the 5 megawatt reactor at Yongbyon and let it cool and then take it to the reprocessing facility, and that's where they've obtained the plutonium for their previous nuclear tests. So they are repeating that process," the official said. "That's what they're doing." IAEA chief Yukiya Amano told a news conference in Vienna on Monday that there have been indications of renewed plutonium reprocessing activities at Yongbyon. Reprocessing involves extracting plutonium from spent reactor fuel, one route to obtaining bomb fuel other than uranium enrichment. "I would agree that there are indications," the U.S. official said. (Jonathan Landay, David Brunnstrom, and Matt Spetalnick, "Exclusive: North Korea Restarts Plutonium Production for Nuclear Bombs - U.S. Official," Reuters, June 8, 2016)

6/8/16

The annual joint military drills by South Korea and the U.S. are not always assessed to be "100 percent defensive and deterrent" as the Seoul government has claimed, a Swiss delegation head stationed at the inter-Korea border said. Major Gen. Urs Gerber, the Swiss delegation head of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom truce village, told reporters that the NNSC has not always reached a decision that the drills are exclusively designed for defensive purposes against North Korea. "In the past, sometimes it has not been deterrent, and quite often we come to the conclusion that we have not enough evidence to give a conclusion," he said. "What we certainly do not do is to follow mainstream and say, 'OK, you are nice guys. Hence, it's okay.'" North Korea has claimed that the annual drills are the main source of inter-Korea tensions and that its nuclear program is a mere means of self-defense. The Allies conduct joint military drills each year as a countermeasure against the North, namely the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercise from March to April and the Ulchi-Freedom Guardian held around August. South Korea's Defense Ministry said that this year's KR and FE drills have been the largest ever in terms of size and military assets deployed. In April, North Korea said that it is ready to give up nuclear testing if the allies discontinue the drills. As one of the NNSC's function is to ensure that the joint drills stay on the

defensive end, its latest remarks are expected to spark some backlash from Pyongyang. Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean Studies at Dongguk University, said it put the Unification Ministry's explanation on the legitimacy of the drills in a new light, provided the comment itself checks out. "North Korea is now likely to use the accusation (of the drills not always being defensive) as a weapon to verbally attack the allies and question the U.N. Command's actions," he said, adding that the North may also say that its claims of the drills being a threat have been correct. Cheong Seong-chang, a senior fellow at the Sejong Institute, pointed out that the content of the joint drills has been progressively becoming more aggressive since the previous Lee Myung-bak administration and as tension with the North soared. This year's drill included a direct strike on the North's leadership. "The very nature of the drills themselves will become a hotly contested issue between the Koreas and the U.S. in the years to come," he said. Gerber also revealed that South Korea, U.S. and the neutral observer states had all reached different conclusions upon investigating North Korea's shelling attack on the South's western front in August, 2015. The incident had sparked exchange of fire between the Koreas, after which Seoul's military issued its highest "Jindogae 1" alert status. No casualties occurred. "That's one of the cases where we did not come, completely, to the same conclusion. There were basically three different conclusions. The South Korean conclusion, U.S.', and NNSC's," Gerber said. He explained that in many occasions, the difference in the parties' reports is rooted in the lack of access to parts of investigation. "Because everything we (the NNSC) do is based on invitation only," he said. While South Korean military has firmly stated that the North's first strike was responsible for the incident, its refusal to reveal evidence related to the incident had caused speculation regarding Seoul's initial report. Gerber did not elaborate on the specifics of the report. (Yoon Min-sik, "Allied Drills against North Korea Not Always Defensive: NNSC," *Korea Herald*, June 9, 2016)

KCNA: "The south Korean warmongers tried to capture fishing boats of the DPRK in the open sea beyond the East Sea of Korea at about 3 a.m. on June 8. At that time the two fishing boats were finding the net which had been cut away during the fishing. The south Korean puppet navy warship Kyongbuk secretly appeared near the fishing boats and tried to stop them. When the fishermen of the DPRK strongly resisted as it was clear that the south Korean bandit-like naval forces were attempting to seize them, they called even a copter and blinded the fishermen by exploding smoke grenades in a bid to block their way. 30 minutes later, another south Korean puppet navy warship Andong join in the operation. Though the fishermen notified them repeatedly that their boats were returning to their port after fishing operation, the puppet forces attempted to abduct the fishermen at any cost by letting high-speed boats encircle the fishing boats and the copter fly 15 to 20 meters above the sea surface and by firing hundreds of automatic rifle bullets over 20 times. In the end, they infiltrated even the third warship of the puppet navy in a bid to siege our fishing boats on the three sides and realize their criminal attempt at any cost. As our fishermen shouted that the brigandish act by the puppet forces was reported to the homeland and the People's Army was coming to save them, while fighting it out against the barbarous military violence by the puppet military gangster, they took to flight. As their atrocities sparked off the resentment of all fellow countrymen, the south Korean puppet forces went so impudent as to spread a false story that a fishing boat of the north crossed over the

extension of the Military Demarcation Line in the waters off Kojin, Kosong of Kangwon Province due to navigation error, and that they "made sure that the fishing boat went back to the north from the humanitarian view point" at around 07:10 a.m. as the fishermen were confirmed to have had no intention to defect to the south. It is none other than the Park Geun Hye group of traitors which unhesitatingly commit ferocious gangster-like act to take to south Korea the fishermen of the north who were conducting peaceful fishing operation in the sea in the wake of the allurements of DPRK citizens in broad daylight in a third country. The south Korean puppet forces have escalated confrontation with fellow countrymen in the waters of the East Sea of Korea this time, not content with escalating military provocations in the ground, seas and air including the areas along the Military Demarcation Line and in the southwestern hotspot waters in a bid to push the north-south relations to the phase of confrontation and conflict. Their hair-raising atrocities can never be pardoned." (KCNA, "S. Korean Warmongers Try to Capture Fishing Boats of DPRK in East Sea," June 11, 2016)

North Korea's former vice marshal Ri Yong-ho was possibly purged for mobilizing troops without leader Kim Jong-un's permission, NHK has reported. The report was at odds with the North's public announcement in 2012 that the former army chief was relieved of duties due to an unspecified illness. NHK said it had obtained a USB that contained 12,000 pages of confidential documents about the North Korean leadership in 2014. The USB came from a North Korean trading company executive who was affiliated with the Korean People's Army. After analyzing the documents, the broadcaster found they strongly condemned Ri. Part of the papers stated: "Some troops were under pressure from orders of 'the counter-revolutionary bastard' Ri, who defied the ideology of our supreme leader Kim Jong-un." The documents said Ri and the troops' hesitant move under Ri's order caused "a great harm to the People's Army." (Kim Da-hee, "N. Korean Army Chief Purged for Unauthorized Troop Mobilization: NHK," *Korea Times*, June 8, 2016)

6/9/16

Army General Pak Yong Sik, minister of the People's Armed Forces of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK, statement: "According to the statement, the 2016 Asia Security Conference was held in Singapore recently. If the objective of the conference had been to ensure security in Asia, it should have discussed and solved necessary practical measures. But the defense chiefs of the U.S., Japan and south Korea held a confab irrelevant to the conference at which they cried out for "thoroughly enforcing the sanctions against the north" and boosting "cooperation," claiming that the DPRK's fourth nuclear test and missile launch are a "violation" of the UNSC's "resolution" and international law. In the end, they blustered that they would not hastily opt for dialogue before the DPRK clarifies its "will to dismantle its nukes" and discussed the issue of boosting military cooperation in the efforts to cope with the "threat from the north" including the increased "sharing of military information about the north" by kicking off a missile warning drill in July. It is the height of shamelessness for them to mislead public opinion by terming the DPRK's dignified nuclear force for self-defense and Strategic Force a "threat" even at the international security conference. ...The U.S. is the only nuclear criminal state in the world and the largest nuclear weapons state in the world. Japan is a militarist state which is vociferating about a military giant and nuclear weaponization after throwing away even the showy

"Pacifist Constitution" and "three non-nuclear principles." The south Korean puppet forces are crying out for even "nuclear weaponization to counter the north's nukes," not content with getting frantic with confrontation while conducting Hyonmu missile launching test with the firing range of 800 km they claimed capable of putting all areas of the DPRK in the striking range at the prodding of their masters U.S. and Japan. Openly revealed at the tripartite confab was the scenario to further intensify new hostile acts against the DPRK while taking issue with its nukes and missile "threat." It is preposterous for those wholly responsible for ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula to justify their attempt at aggression, blaming others. Availing ourselves of this opportunity, we reiterate our stand that nuclear deterrent for self-defense is an all-powerful treasure sword tightly held by the DPRK to cope with the hostile forces' moves for invading it. Our warning is by no means an empty talk. Any force hostile to the DPRK is bound to go to ruin. This is proved by history. (KCNA, "DPRK Minister of People's Armed Forces on Nuclear Deterrent for Self-Defense," June 9, 2016)

Toloraya: "growing number of policymakers and experts in South Korea, the United States and other countries now presume that the best solution in principle for the North Korean nuclear problem and the larger "Korean issue" is unification, implying a peaceful takeover of the North by the South. This has been especially true in the latter half of Park Geun-hye's presidency; where since her Dresden speech, this issue has been at the forefront of government and public discussion. Some commentators in Seoul have concluded that unification is not only desirable but also quickly achievable, as evidenced by indications that the North Korean regime is about to collapse. Though I see no signs of brewing instability as I write this in Pyongyang, South Korea's only reasonable course of action is to prepare for the possibility that international pressure will someday bring the North to its knees, as analysts assess the plausibility and desirability of such a scenario. Expert predictions about unification belie the inevitable complexities that the process would entail. Pundits argue that the international community could locate North Korea's nuclear weapons and materials, and a nuclear power—likely the United States—or a multilateral organization such as the International Atomic Energy Agency would take charge of the assets with the ultimate aim of destroying them. They suggest that North Korea's population would welcome South Koreans—including the flood of South Korean soldiers who would arrive first—and North Koreans would eagerly adapt to their new reality (though they would likely have limited freedom to move to South Korea or elsewhere). In a matter of years, natural resource development and labor-intensive production facilities would help to integrate North Korea into the larger Korean economy, giving a tremendous boost to the undivided country's economic performance in the global market. The international status of the unified Korea would become qualitatively different, probably making it a new Asian power center. At the same time, such a development would benefit Asian security by removing a major military threat, eliminating the proliferation danger and helping all parties to generally feel safer. The Korean people's dream to unify their country is understood and supported around the world, but the above scenario appears unlikely. Negative fallout from even a "peaceful" regime collapse could be significant, far outweighing any benefits and potentially exceeding the burdens that the global community has endured from regime change in Iraq and Libya. This

preliminary analysis will consider several caveats that planners must take into account. The consequences of Korean unification may include, but are not limited to, the following:

- o One or more rogue countries or non-state actors could illicitly obtain North Korean-origin weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles or related production technologies. An exodus of fighters and refugees may facilitate a massive, uncontrolled outflow of conventional arms.
- o A civil conflict or even a guerilla war may take place in the North, with subversive activities spreading to the South and supporting countries. It is naïve to expect that North Korea's entire population would welcome the "liberation from tyranny" that unification offers; such an expectation is simply not based on a sober analysis of what North Korea's existing social strata would gain or lose from the arrival of South Korean governance. The elite and the middle class—possibly about 1 million people or roughly 5% of the population, including members of the party, security apparatus, military and a considerable portion of their brainwashed supporters and families—would have no exit strategy and no place in a South-dominated Korea. Moreover, they could reasonably expect repercussions for their roles in the previous regime. If even a portion of this group (including trained personnel) resorted to armed resistance, the results could be disastrous. This is not just speculation: the regime has spent decades preparing for a guerilla war, and it likely has a network of well-equipped bases concealed throughout its territory for use by dedicated fighters.
- o A possible massive refugee exodus, especially in the event of a prolonged simmering conflict, could extend not only to neighboring China and Russia but also to other countries along sea routes. In addition to the humanitarian catastrophe that may follow, longer-term consequences from a mass refugee migration could include the appearance of transnational organized crime rings with North Korean connections. Such organizations could pursue business in areas such as arms sales, human trafficking, drug smuggling and counterfeit currency production.
- o If significant civil conflict ended quickly or were completely avoided (which is doubtful), new social tensions would emerge from a growing sense of inequality. North Koreans would likely come to be seen as second-rate citizens, or as "servants" to their South Korean "masters" (or, at best, as "pupils" to their South Korean "teachers"). The present "haves" in North Korea would be relegated to the lowest social status if not direct prosecution, fueling resentment and opposition. Even members of North Korea's working class might in time grow dissatisfied with their subservient position and their inequality to South Koreans.
- o South Korea would suffer a huge drain on its resources as it reformed the North Korean economy, virtually building it anew. Meanwhile, North Korea's population would face a difficult period of adaptation to new market realities. (To understand the magnitude of this adjustment, consider the difficulties that past North Korean refugees have encountered after voluntarily immigrating to the South.) These economic and cultural transitions would likely slow any increase in productivity from the introduction of modern technology and management practices.
- o The collateral damage to South Korea's economy may be significant enough to reduce its international competitiveness. A unified Korea could prove less attractive to foreign investors, and it would face the impossibility of swiftly re-educating the North Korean labor force. As a result, Korea could cede its place in global value chains to newly emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere. The resulting change of fortune for South Koreans may in turn lead to a growing social dissatisfaction in the South and contribute to a political crisis.
- o The DPRK's

spontaneous submission to the ROK could severely damage or disrupt the existing system of international security governance, with the supposed central role of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It is difficult to imagine that China and Russia, with their respective geopolitical interests and roles in implementing international law as permanent UNSC members, would approve the de facto, involuntary takeover of one sovereign state and UN member by another. While the ROK Constitution considers the whole Korean peninsula to be ROK territory,<sup>1</sup> that view does not correspond with international law. The UNSC would set a dangerous precedent if it approved South Korea's annexation of the North but a lack of international approval would cause the new state to be "illegal" for at least some time. o In the unlikely event that China allowed such a takeover, Beijing would face a transformed geopolitical situation. Korea's unification under the ROK would likely result in the deployment of allied US troops close to its border with China, a development that would be seen in China as a major strategic defeat. "Giving away" its former ally, for which thousands of Chinese soldiers sacrificed their lives during the Korean War, would be widely perceived in Asia as a sign of China's weakness and indecisiveness. It would undermine China's position not only in Asia, but also as an emerging superpower. o In addition, this outcome may produce a totally new stage of confrontation between China and the United States. Beijing would have to upgrade its military in Northeast China in order to counter the grave challenge to its military-security interests. It could act in response to a perceived US strategy of "encirclement," similar to Russia's post-Cold War behavior in Europe. o In an alternate scenario, China could react to an impending unification by taking preventive measures, potentially seizing North Korean border territories and/or installing a pro-Chinese government in Pyongyang. Such steps would generate a tremendous geopolitical shift, leading to a lasting geopolitical confrontation between "continental" and "maritime" powers. The ensuing militarization of China and deepening conflict with the United States would encourage arms buildups throughout the region in response to the threat that many countries would see in an increase in Chinese capabilities. An arms race with new blocs could result, causing inconceivable damage to the global economy. In short, the strategy of bringing down North Korea's regime could backfire to the world's ultimate detriment, no matter how much nuisance the country's WMD programs currently pose. A comprehensive analysis is necessary before any application of more sanctions, which in fact are meant to suffocate the Pyongyang regime, not change its behavior. A new US administration should conduct a fundamental policy review of this nature. Koreans may well have to wait to pursue unification until more opportune times, when new generations can reconcile on mutually agreeable terms and seek out an eventual national convergence of one form or another. (Georgy Toloraya, "Preparing for Korean Unification?" *38North*, June 9, 2016)

6/10/16

South Korea and the United Nations Command (UNC) sent in troops to crack down on illegal Chinese fishing boats in neutral waters around the mouth of the Han River between the two Koreas. The military operation marks the first of its kind to have taken place in the estuary region, where the Han River meets the Yellow Sea, after its designation as a no man's land in the armistice agreement following the 1950-53 Korean War. Seoul recently formed a 24-strong military police team with four speed boats to combat an increasing number of Chinese vessels illegally coming to and



fishing in the neutral waters, a military buffer zone, said an official at the defense ministry. "The troops carried out their first crackdown operation in the estuary area earlier in the day," a military official told reporters. He said the operation marks the first time South Korea and the United States-led UNC stationed in the country have taken joint action to drive out foreign vessels in the military buffer zone. Illegal Chinese fishing has soared in the area since last year. Until 2014, illegal Chinese fishing in the area was scarce, with only two to three incidents being reported every year. This number shot up to about 120 last year, and in the first five months of 2016 Chinese fishing boats have already been detected on around 520 occasions, the ministry official said. No Korean or foreign ships are allowed to sail in the area except those that are officially registered with the military armistice commissions of either South or North Korea, according to the armistice agreement's annex governing civil shipping in the neutral waters. The subsidiary agreement allows each side to deploy a maximum of four patrol boats and 24 military police officers armed with pistols and rifles in the region to maintain order and enforce the law. In accordance with the agreement, the South Korean crackdown team has been staffed with military policemen and coast guard officers, translators and members of the UNC commission. They will also fly UNC flags from the four rigid-inflatable boats, according to the ministry official. The personnel have been authorized to use force against Chinese fishing boats if they do not comply with an initial verbal warning to leave, the official said. South Korea will have warships and choppers standing nearby to be deployed in the event of any skirmishes that could take place with North Korea in the process of the crackdown operations, he also said. On June 8, the South Korean armistice commission notified North Korea of the crackdown plans, the official also added. In efforts to prevent a diplomatic row with China, South Korea informed its larger neighbor of the operation in advance. "Despite our government's multifaceted diplomatic efforts, illegal fishing by Chinese boats has continued to the extent (that South Korea) has come to realize its diplomatic measures have reached their limits," the official said. "Under this view, South Korea decided to launch its troops in cooperation with the UNC." He then said the crackdown operations will be carried out in accordance with the armistice agreement with North Korea. (Yonhap, "S. Korea, UNC Cracks down on Illegal Chinese Fishing in Neutral Waters between Koreas," June 10, 2016)

KCNA: "The participants in the joint conference of the DPRK government, political parties and organizations sent an open letter to the United States of America on Friday. The letter said that it is the invariable desire and wishes of the Korean people to achieve the eternal prosperity of the nation in a peaceful world and build a reunified prospering country. The new line and policies for national reunification laid down at the historic Seventh Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea held recently are the historic declaration of weighty significance in settling the issue of the Korean peninsula and ensuring global peace, it noted. If one has a right thinking and judgment, one cannot but sympathize with the stand of the DPRK that the issue of national reunification should be settled in line with the will and wishes of the Korean nation responsible for the issue by its concerted efforts and recognize its validity, the letter said. But only the U.S., far from properly complying with the due demand of the DPRK, is persistently stemming the trend of history toward peace and reunification through its dishonest assertions and belligerent acts and also drawing its followers into its moves,

the letter charged. The joint conference of the DPRK government, political parties and organizations held on June 9 as regards the prevailing situation decided to send an open letter to the U.S., reflecting the following principled stand of the DPRK: Firstly, the U.S. should make a bold decision to roll back its hostile policy toward the DPRK which should not be pursued any longer. The U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK which has been pursued since its founding is a blatant challenge to the aspiration, desire and just cause of the Korean people to protect their ideology, social system, sovereignty and vital rights. Though belatedly, the U.S. should make a reasonable judgment for itself and make a political bold decision to valiantly root out its hostile policy toward the DPRK which was wrong from the outset and whose fatal consequences can hardly be counted. The U.S. would be well advised to choose a new way of thinking and opt for new practice, away from the old framework of its anachronistic hostile policy toward the DPRK which has shackled its thinking and practice for a long period. This would be the wisest attitude which it can take and which can be welcomed. Secondly, the U.S. should immediately stop arms buildup and the exercises for a war against the DPRK in south Korea, the root cause of escalating tension, and take the new road of ensuring genuine peace and security on the Korean peninsula. It is not the U.S. but the DPRK, which has emerged victorious in political, military and moral terms in the confrontation that has lasted century after century and won laurels as the strong. The U.S. has anxiously waited for what it called "collapse" while channeling all efforts into the campaign for isolating, blockading and putting military pressure on the DPRK and for provoking a war. Now it might have realized how ignorant and foolish it has been. The way of settling an issue with a rival possessed of nuclear weapons should be shown by the U.S. itself. The U.S. had better think twice over the lesson of history reflected in the bitter confession made by a defeated general that he fought a wrong war with a wrong rival in wrong time in wrong place and frankly accept the DPRK's just peace initiative and proposal before missing an opportunity. Thirdly, the U.S. should refrain from the foolish act of meddling in the internal affairs of the Korean nation, fostering confrontation and blocking its independent reunification any longer. The U.S. is the main stumbling block in the way of settling the issue of Korea's reunification as it is stoking hostility and stand-off between the north and the south and escalating tensions by interfering in the internal affairs of the nation. The desire, wishes and demands of the Korean nation serve as the standard and yardstick for settling the issue of the destiny of the Korean nation, the matter of reunification, under any circumstances and the U.S. neither has anything to do with this nor has any right to meddle in it. **The U.S. should give a clear answer to the Korean nation's solemn question as to whether it will be shamefully driven out of Korea after facing a stern punishment in the world's eyes or take hands off the Korean issue and quit south Korea of its own accord as befitting "American gentleman."** It should no longer stem the strong trend of the history of the nation advancing toward independence, peace, reconciliation, unity, reunification and prosperity but stop the foolish act of hurling a handful of pro-U.S. stooges into sowing seeds of discord among Koreans and fostering confrontation. History and time will clearly prove that this warning served by the DPRK to the U.S. is by no means an empty talk. Taking this opportunity, we would like to express the conviction that the fair-minded and sensible figures and people of broad strata in the U.S. would positively respond to the fair and

aboveboard, peace-loving and sincere appeal of the DPRK." (KCNA, "U.S. Urged to Make Bold Decision, Facing up to a Trend of Times," June 10, 2016)

North Korea offered to host an inter-Korean meeting to discuss ways to bring about reunification, the latest in the communist country's dialogue proposals to Seoul since a high-profile ruling party congress in early May. "We propose opening a nationwide grand meeting for reunification on the occasion of the 71st anniversary of Korea's liberation, prompted by the ardent desire ... (in) improving the inter-Korean relations and accomplishing the cause of national reunification by the concerted efforts of all Koreans," the North said in an appeal addressed to "all Koreans," which was carried by KCNA. The appeal was adopted during a joint conference of government and party officials in Pyongyang a day earlier, according to the media outlet. "Now is the crucial time for all Koreans to turn out as one and dynamically advance to pull down the barrier of hostility and confrontation and bring earlier the bright day of reunification," the appeal read. "We ardently call upon all Koreans in the North, the South and abroad once again to turn out as one in the sacred struggle to fling the gate of the reunified power open," it also said. The call is the latest dialogue offer by the North after its leader Kim Jong-un called for military talks with South Korea during the Workers' Party of Korea congress. Besides urging talks, the North, in addition, called on compatriots to engage in an "anti-U.S. sacred war," demanded the halt of all Seoul-Washington military drills and outlined the benefits of North Korea's "nuclear sword" for self-defense. In regards to the latest proposal, South Korea's Ministry of Unification immediately turned down the offer, again saying that it is just a propaganda ploy. "It's only an obsolete propaganda offensive and repeat of its previous demands to suspend joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises, which came without any attitude change in the nuclear weapon issue, the most critical obstacle to the peace and reunification of the Korean Peninsula," ministry spokesman Jeong Joon-hee said. Pyongyang should first declare denuclearization and follow it with action if the country wants to improve ties and reunify with South Korea, Jeong noted. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Offers to Host Inter-Korean Reunification Meeting," June 10, 2016)

North Korea did not stipulate itself as a nuclear-armed state in its recently revised set of ruling party bylaws, an analysis of the document showed Friday, spawning speculation that Pyongyang has left open the possibility of negotiations over its denuclearization. Yonhap analyzed the 52-page document after having recently obtained it. The analysis found no reference to the communist state as a nuclear power contrary to widespread expectation. The set of party bylaws, which is regarded as being superior to the Constitution in the party-centric state, was amended during the 7th party congress last month. Kim Yong-hyun, a North Korea expert at Dongguk University, noted that Pyongyang might have signaled its intention to engage in negotiations over its nuclear program amid its deepening isolation stemming from its nuclear and missile provocations. "If North Korea had stated itself as a nuclear power in the bylaws, this would have posed a great impediment to its efforts to hold talks and negotiations with the United States (over its nuclear program)," he said. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Does Not Stipulate Itself as Nuclear Power in Ruling Party By-Laws," *Korea Times*, June 10, 2016)

The U.S. has brought out the human rights issue in North Korea by putting sanctions and designating a "primary money laundering concern." U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Tom Malinowski (photo) visited Korea unofficially today to meet officials from the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and the UNHCR Seoul Office. In an interview with *Dong-A Ilbo*, Malinowski and stated, "The purpose of my visit to Korea is to discuss how to use the sanctions to improve the human rights state in North Korea and how to provide North Korean civilians with external information." Malinowski once worked for a non-governmental organization, "Human Rights Watch," before serving a senior director on the National Security Council at the White House, where he was in charge of proofreading Bill Clinton's foreign policy speeches. Prior to his Seoul visit, he visited Beijing to participate in the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Malinowski noted, "Our focus is to identify those who violate human rights in North Korea. We aim to change actions of hit men, defector chasers, and concentration camp managers by giving them this message: 'We know who you are and what your name is. Your future will be bleak'." When asked if Kim Yo Jong can be a target of the U.S. sanctions, he answered, "I will not reveal the names of the targets but no one can be an exception. We will make a list of sanction targets based on facts regardless of their political positions." Kim Jong Un's younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, is the de facto leader of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, which the U.S. Treasury Department found responsible for censorship and applied the sanctions to. "The U.S. government is using various methods to directly supply external information to North Korean civilians," Malinowski noted. "We are working with NGOs and the Korean government to send movies, weather forecast, and Korean news via radio channels and high-tech devices such as smart-phones." One North Korean defector testified that he first thought about the meaning of life after watching the movie Titanic in which the male main character sacrifices himself for his love. The movie gave him a chance to look back his life of struggles for survival. About the Korean government's emphasis on forbidding North Korean laborers from working overseas, Malinowski stated, "We do need to stop North Korea from earning foreign money. However, we do not want a complete forbiddance as while working overseas, North Koreans can experience life outside North Korea." He added that the focus will be on protecting their human rights by making sure that they will not be detained in factories or isolated from the outside world. "They say that the North Korean government does not care about human rights issues, but they are wrong. In fact, North Korea is very sensitive about it," Malinowski argued. "Whenever the UN brings up the issue, North Korean diplomats lose their temper. The nation insists that they do not have concentration camps, but still they seem embarrassed whenever the issue is stated." (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "U.S. Will Sanction Whoever Violates Human Rights in N.K., No Exceptions," June 11, 2016)

6/13/16

KCNA: "The DPRK Foreign Ministry on June 13 conveyed a letter adopted at the joint conference of the Government, Political Parties and Organizations of the DPRK held on June 9 to the UN Secretariat. The letter said: The will of the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK government is rock firm and the struggle already began to resolutely wide open a new path of addressing the inter-Korean relations and the issue of reunification, upholding the line and policies for national reunification which were

advanced by Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea. The question is what attitude and position will be taken by the UN, which is deeply involved in the division of Korea and the reunification issue, and therefore should play an important role. In fact, the UN assumes a historical, legal and moral responsibility for the reunification issue of Korea, from which it cannot turn away. Indelible are all its crimes that brought misfortunes and sacrifice to the innocent Korean people by its unjust meddling in the issue of Korea, freezing inter-Korean division as well as sending multinational forces in abuse of the UN name to the war of aggression ignited by the United States in the 1950s of the last century. If it remains true to the mandate and duty of safeguarding peace and security of the humanity and orienting toward global independence and justice, the UN should, though belatedly, duly compensate for the damage it caused by sincerely helping the Korean people achieve national reunification independently and peacefully. However, the UN is badly treating the DPRK, a legitimate sovereign state and a member state of the UN backed by the U.S. that seeks the permanent division of the Korean peninsula, not its reunification. The UN should not put pressure on the DPRK and other small countries with its double standards and rules centered on one single country and create countless obstacles to their independent aspiration and development but should screen the essence of the issues from a fair and objective angle and make due contribution to addressing issues. When it comes to the issue of the reunification of Korea, the UN should neither connive at nor side with the U.S. which has pursued permanent division, meddling in the reunification issue of our country, but it should consistently adhere to the principle of respect for sovereignty and self-determination of our nation. The genuine process for peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula can kick off only when the United States' hostile policy towards the DPRK is rolled back and the former unconditionally ceases extremely dangerous military provocations by the U.S. aggression troops who are occupying the southern part of Korea under the abused name of the United Nations. The UN should have a fair handed look at and actively support the DPRK's will and desire for establishing a lasting peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula and creating favorable environment and climate for the reunification of Korea. If the UN is sincerely interested in peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region, it should exercise its influence upon the U.S. so that it may give up its unjust aggressive ambition and hostile policy against the DPRK. The UN will be disgracefully dubbed as a feeble international organization which is played by the dishonest and dirty trick if it is not able to correctly see the unjust and dangerous theory of unilateral "reunification under one regime" which has been obstinately pursued by the south Korean authorities ignoring the current realities on the Korean peninsula where different ideologies and systems have existed for decades. And especially if the UN Secretary General and other senior officials move to the tune of the U.S. who is used to acts of arbitrariness and high-handedness, while expressing their willingness to mediate the issues for the improvement of inter-Korean relations and reunification, the UN will be branded an organization void of justice and fairness and its senior officials as figureheads lacking own vision and power. Now is critical in deciding the destiny and future of our nation and we remain rock firm in our will to make significant progress in inter-Korean relations and fling the door of independent reunification open. The UN should pay due attention to the aspiration of the Korean nation and the trend of times, and put into practice what it has to do as an organization mandated with ensuring

international peace. **We hope that leading figures of the UN Secretariat including the Secretary-General would be recorded in the history of the United Nations for their positive contribution to easing tension on the Korean peninsula and the settlement of reunification issue which still remain the greatest concern for the world.** ((KCNA, "Participants in Joint Conference of DPRK Government, Political Parties and Organizations Send Letter to UN Secretariat," June 15, 2016)

North Korean hackers stole over 42,000 documents, mostly defense-related, after breaking into the networks of South Korean conglomerates such as SK Group and Hanjin Group, the National Police Agency revealed. The agency concluded from its investigation that North Korea began hacking the networks in July 2014 and continued for over a year and a half until February, gaining access to over 130,000 computers. Police said North Korea took advantage of security vulnerabilities in the networks and siphoned a total of 42,608 documents. This included those from 17 affiliates of SK Group, including SK Networks, and 10 affiliates of Hanjin Group, including Korean Air. The materials Pyongyang's obtained from the long-term penetration of these networks included photos of South Korea's medium-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle, blueprints for the wings of the U.S. F-15 fighter jet, as well as maintenance manuals, and various materials related to research and development projects. SK Networks said its stolen materials included data on the communications network in army barracks. The compromised material included 958 defense-related documents and 5,162 industry-related documents from SK Group and 32,913 defense-related items from Hanjin. KT also had 3,575 documents taken but the attack on its network was thwarted early on. Police and defense officials denied that any top-secret information that could pose a security threat was taken by Pyongyang. Other key data, such as the interior blueprint of the UAV or blueprints to the more advanced F-15K fighters, was not taken, police emphasized. However, what could have been Pyongyang's largest-scale cyberattack on Korea was thwarted as South Korean police began an investigation in February after suspecting malicious codes to have been distributed by Pyongyang, which conducted its fourth nuclear test in January. The agency concluded that North Korean hackers affiliated with its Reconnaissance General Bureau used an IP address traced to Pyongyang's Ryugyong-dong to attack the two major conglomerates. It added that the IP address was identical to the one Pyongyang used in the March 20, 2013 cyberattack against South Korean financial institutes and media. (Sarah Kim, "North Korean Hackers Strike Again," *JoongAng Ilbo*, June 14, 2016)

Garth McLennan: "At the Workers' Party of Korea's 7th Congress last month, Kim shed greater light on what sort of scenario could trigger a DPRK nuclear strike. He stated that North Korean sovereignty would have to be threatened by "invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons." Given the regime's behavior, however, this should hardly be taken as gospel. Just what exactly would constitute a violation of DPRK sovereignty is unclear, as is how Pyongyang might classify the terms "hostile" and "invasive." In a sense, this is reminiscent of Russia's "escalate to deescalate" concept - the nuclear posture Moscow adopted in the wake of NATO's 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia. The doctrine essentially revolves around the premise that Russia reserves the option to execute a first-strike nuclear attack in a limited fashion against an opponent that has overwhelmed its conventional capacities, but it does not specify the kind of live setting

that would fall within the doctrine's framework. Unlike Russia, however, the North Korean nuclear posture is not particularly diversified. Asymmetric escalation options for the DPRK leadership are somewhat limited; North Korea has not concentrated on advanced tactical nuclear weapons and that in turn limits how it might actually fight a nuclear war. At the same time, and against the backdrop of the largest ever joint US-ROK military exercises that took place throughout March, which were said to focus on Special Forces-led decapitation strikes aimed at the DPRK leadership, North Korea also unveiled its new multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), not seen since Pyongyang's military parade last October. Although Pyongyang has not released any information pertaining to the system's capabilities other than photos it is believed to be able to fire a number of rockets at one time, presenting challenging obstacles for anti-missile systems. Jeffrey Lewis has pointed out the similarities North Korea's new MLRS's rocket bears to the Pakistani Hatf-IX/Nasr 300mm rocket, which Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division has publicly said has the capability to be armed with nuclear warheads. Pyongyang has also made the notable shift to solid-fueled submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) testing from its previous liquid-fuel designs. The last test, conducted in April, featured a range of just 30 km, after four failed tests. This, along with an examination of the DPRK's offensive nuclear posture, quite possibly sheds some light on North Korean strategy should conflict ever escalate to the nuclear sphere. While the North has conducted four nuclear tests since 2006, the exact size of its arsenal is largely unknown, and it has not been yet proven to have a secure, second-strike retaliatory capability of the kind that acts as a lynchpin for larger nuclear powers. It does, however, possess large quantities of ballistic missiles, something the regime has been anything but shy in displaying of late. On March 9, Kim visited an unnamed factory, believed to be Chamjin Missile Factory near Pyongyang, where he posed behind what appeared to be a globe model of a miniaturized nuclear device. Also included in the photograph were two KN-08 ballistic missiles, the as-yet-untested intercontinental-ballistic missile (ICBM) feared by some as being able to reach US shores. The accompanying release issued from North Korean state news agencies claimed that the DPRK had succeeded in mating miniaturized nuclear warheads to its ballistic missiles, which, if accurate, would represent a major breakthrough. On March 14, Kim publicly pondered future nuclear and missile tests, saying that North Korean scientists had deciphered how to shield a warhead mounted on a ballistic missile from the heat of re-entry. While the speed of North Korean nuclear advancements, and the persistent absence of independent or outside verification of such achievements, is certainly a cause for concern, a very large ballistic missile inventory of varying ranges, along with a much smaller but growing nuclear arsenal estimated to contain between 10-16 weapons today appears likely. This raises the frightening possibility of so-called haystacking in the event of actual nuclear war. In this scenario, Pyongyang would attempt to saturate a given battlefield with conventionally armed ballistic missiles; the catch comes in that a small number of these missiles would be armed with nuclear warheads. Such a strategy would greatly challenge American and South Korean missile defense networks while also comporting with the DPRK's wider nuclear posture; in lieu of reliable intelligence as to which incoming missiles have nuclear capabilities and which do not, anti-missile batteries would be forced to shoot down as many as possible, greatly lowering the efficiency and effectiveness of any possible defense. Such a dispersed strategy would address the serious deficiencies North Korea faces in

opposition to advanced American and allied missile defense systems, but it would also result in efforts to stiffen those systems. Indeed, the near-constant talk surrounding the possible deployment of THAAD anti-missile batteries to South Korea already suggests such an endeavor is being openly contemplated, to the great annoyance of Beijing. The THAAD system is built to defend against short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. And while the ROK already has formidable missile defense capabilities, including a large arsenal of Patriot-2 short-range missiles that are to be upgraded to the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3s, the same kind recently installed on the home isles by Japan) interceptor sometime in the next year or two, the addition of one or more THAAD units would no doubt provide South Korea with a more layered defensive posture. THAAD would not, however, serve as an effective tool in countering a North Korean nuclear strike if such an attack were haystacked among a barrage of conventional warheads. The THAAD system is a powerful anti-missile tool, one that forms a central part of defending America's military base in Guam, but in this case, it would not serve as a bulletproof measure against a North Korean nuclear attack. At present, such a system does not exist. If THAAD were deployed to the Korean peninsula, it would hardly be a stretch for Pyongyang to immediately and aggressively increase their production of ballistic missiles and their assorted delivery systems. THAAD, for all it can do, has limits that can be overcome by high volume missile stockpiles and SLBM capabilities. The ROK's current ability to counter a saturation-based ballistic missile attack from the DPRK is limited. The Patriot radars currently employed by South Korea have the ability to track between 40-50 incoming projectiles. The doctrine attached to missile interception calls for a two-to-one ratio for every missile fired; if Pyongyang were to launch a haystacked barrage, it would almost immediately tax Seoul's capacity to repel it. At the same time, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles would almost certainly confront the ROK with the problem of leakage in any attempt to intercept them. An unorthodox nuclear doctrine like haystacking may be the most suitable doctrinal framework for Pyongyang, but such an approach would greatly increase the risks of nuclear combat becoming a reality considering the close geographic proximity of Pyongyang to all of its likely enemies and the forward-deployed missile posture that results from that, it would not take too much of a stretch of the imagination to see that the number of nuclear-related crises could rise. Such an absence of distance could, as the DPRK has already alluded to, lead to higher states of alert and warning, less time to fully discern the nature of an incoming projectile and develop an appropriate response, and more devolved structures of command-and-control. The biggest takeaway from this developing scenario is a lowering of the nuclear threshold, where the chances of a triggering incident escalate dramatically. It also stands in stark contrast to the accepted strategic balance that existed throughout much of the Cold War. While truly terrifying moments in which both Washington and Moscow were pushed to the nuclear brink have occurred, they were relatively few and far between. Even if command of North Korea's nuclear arsenal remains tightly controlled by the central leadership, the danger of a lowered threshold will increase. If command-and-control of nuclear assets are given to North Korean generals at or near the battlefield because of fears of decapitation, every incident of dispute could see its stakes raised immediately. With a stated North Korean doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that hardly inspires confidence for stability, an escalatory scenario could arise quickly if tensions ratchet up. This should not be viewed as impossible. Moreover, the



expected continued growth of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, both in terms of numbers and possibly sophistication, along with the possible expansion of its ballistic missile delivery force, will only heighten the danger. The contemplation of how Pyongyang could put its nuclear arsenal into action requires the realization that there is no magic-bullet solution to the problem while also thinking beyond early air-atomic theory and the horrors of MAD through scenario-based analysis that is fully cognizant of the above factors." (Garth McLennan, "Needle in a Haystack: How North Korea Could Fight a Nuclear War," *38North*, June 13, 2016)

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China has banned exports to North Korea of a range of technologies that could be used to build weapons, the latest move to deter Pyongyang's internationally condemned nuclear program. Prohibited goods include ring magnets, high strength aluminum alloys, laser welding equipment, and an array of compounds that can be used to produce nuclear and chemical weapons, the Ministry of Commerce said in a statement listing restricted "dual use" items. (AFP, "China Bans Exports of Nuclear-Use Technology to North Korea," June 15, 2016)

The Japanese government held a cabinet meeting and appointed Kanasugi Kenji (56) as director-general of the Asia-Pacific bureau at the foreign ministry, who will serve as the chief negotiator of the six-way talks for denuclearizing North Korea. Kanasugi, who is hailing from Tokyo, studied law at Hitotsubashi University before joining the foreign ministry in 1983. After serving as minister at the Japanese Ambassador to Korea in 2014 and 2015, he has been serving as director-general of the economic bureau at the ministry since October last year. Earlier, he had served as a secretary for the Prime Minister at the Noda Yoshihiko administration under the Democratic Party of Japan. Kanasugi will also serve as the chief negotiator of the Korea-Japan director-generals' meeting, and will discuss pending issues between the two countries, including comfort women for the Japanese military, with his Korean counterpart Chung Byung-won, director-general of the Northeast Asia bureau at the Korean foreign ministry. Ishikane Kimihiro (58), who was named director-general of the Asia Pacific bureau in October last year, has been promoted to director-general of the general diplomatic policy bureau, which is effectively the chief director-general of the ministry, eight months after assuming the previous job. Saiki Akitaka (64), deputy vice minister of the ministry who is retiring, has been succeeded by Sugiyama Shinsuke (63), deputy director-general for foreign affairs. (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "Kanasugi Named Japan's Chief Negotiator for Six-Way Talks," June 15, 2016)

ISIS: "Indications of plutonium separation, or reprocessing activities, at the Radiochemical Laboratory, have reportedly been observed by the United States government. ... With more evidence that North Korea has separated plutonium at the Radiochemical Laboratory, it is important to ask: How much plutonium for nuclear weapons could North Korea have produced and separated at Yongbyon since the 5 MWe reactor restarted? The amount of plutonium separated will depend on the amount of plutonium produced in the 5 MWe reactor since it restarted in mid-2013. ISIS previously estimated that the reactor produced roughly 3-4 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium between the summer of 2013 and the end of the summer of 2014. During this one year period, the reactor appeared to run continuously, although perhaps not at full power. Since mid-2014, the reactor has operated intermittently or at

relatively low power, based on analyses of satellite imagery and interviews with government officials who monitor the plant closely. These officials have stated that the reactor has not been shut down during the past two years. Analysis of commercial satellite imagery supports this assessment. During this roughly 21-24 months period of intermittent operation, the 5 MWe reactor could have produced an additional 2.5-4 kilograms of plutonium. In total, the reactor could have produced an estimated 5.5-8 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium since its 2013 restart. This amount of plutonium is enough for one to four nuclear weapons, assuming 2-4 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium per weapon, or a central estimate of 2.5 nuclear weapons equivalent. The number of weapons could increase if North Korea uses weapon-grade uranium in combination with the plutonium, but that scenario is not considered in this report. Estimating the amount of plutonium separated during the last three years is complicated by the absence of public information on the amount of fuel that North Korea has unloaded from the 5 MWe reactor. The first indications of fuel being unloaded after the 2013 restart dates back to the end of 2014, but these indications were ambiguous. Moreover, North Korea's fuel re-loading strategy for the reactor may have changed in the last several years. North Korea may no longer operate the reactor for a period of time, shut it down, and then unload all the fuel in the core before reloading fresh fuel, as it has done in the past. Instead, North Korea may be capable of refueling the reactor online. This entails unloading part of the fuel in the core and replacing that portion with fresh fuel while the reactor continues to operate, e.g. is online. This type of on-line fuel reloading was part of the original design of this reactor. In any case, the Radiochemical Laboratory is oversized for the fuel discharges of the 5 MWe reactor. It was built to handle not only spent fuel from the 5 MWe reactor but also from a 50 MWe reactor North Korea never completed. The plant is thus capable of processing all the irradiated fuel in the 5 MWe reactor core within 3 to 6 months. If reprocessing in the Radiochemical Laboratory started near the beginning of this year, North Korea could have finished separating most of the estimated 5.5-8 kilograms of plutonium produced in the 5 MWe reactor since it restarted in 2013. It could certainly finish reprocessing all this plutonium during this summer. In estimating the number of nuclear weapons North Korea has produced, the key plutonium value is the amount separated (see below). While the plutonium is in irradiated fuel, it cannot be used in nuclear weapons. ...In 2015, the Institute conducted a comprehensive estimate of the amount of separated plutonium, weapon-grade uranium, and numbers of nuclear weapons in North Korea. The central estimate was that North Korea had 10-16 nuclear weapons, as of the end of 2014. Although a comprehensive update is not done in this report, it is useful to consider a partial update, based on recent activities at the Yongbyon Plant and on central estimates only. Since the end of 2014, North Korea likely further increased its stocks of separated weapon-grade plutonium and weapon-grade uranium. How much more could it have produced and how many more nuclear weapons could it have built, based only on activities at Yongbyon? As discussed above, separated plutonium is considered because only in that form can the plutonium be used in nuclear weapons. So, even though the reactor produced plutonium since 2013, its separation was within the last year and thus adds to the total separated plutonium stock that existed at the end of 2014. This analysis does not include the additional contribution post-2014 of a possible second centrifuge plant to the weapon-grade uranium stock. Moreover, this report does not fully address the

uncertainties in estimating the production of separated plutonium and weapon-grade uranium in North Korea, as was done in the Institute's earlier comprehensive estimate of nuclear explosive materials and nuclear weapons as of the end of 2014. Nonetheless, this report provides a rough indication of the potential growth in North Korea's nuclear weapons stockpile during the last 18 months or since the end of 2014. Considering only activities at the Yongbyon site, North Korea may have produced enough additional nuclear explosive material for roughly another 5.1-9 nuclear weapons equivalent from the end of 2014 until now (central estimate). Not all of this material would likely end up in weapons. If 70 percent did so, then the increase would amount to about 3.6-6.3 nuclear weapons, rounded to 4-6 weapons. Adding this range to the end of the 2014 estimate of 10-16 weapons results in an estimate of approximately 14-22 nuclear weapons as of June 2016. One weapon should be subtracted from this total to reflect the underground test in early 2016, resulting in a final estimate of 13-21 nuclear weapons as of today. It should be noted again that the upper bound, or 21 weapons, is expected to be greater in a comprehensive estimate because this report does not include the effect of any weapon-grade uranium produced in a second centrifuge plant. Nonetheless, this exercise, despite not being comprehensive, shows that North Korea could be significantly increasing its nuclear weapons capabilities. Most of this increase since 2014 can be attributed to the production of weapon-grade uranium." (David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergentini, "Plutonium, Tritium, and Highly Enriched Uranium Production at the Yongbyon Nuclear Site," Institute for Science and International Security, June 14, 2016)

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DPRK FoMin spokesman "in an answer to a question raised by KCNA as regards a plan for 'precision air raid operation' against the DPRK: We will further bolster up in quality and quantity the nuclear deterrence for self-defense in face of the U.S. reckless war moves and thoroughly foil any slightest military provocation of the enemies with the Korean-style mode of merciless counteraction. A strategic information consulting company of the U.S. recently worked out and made public a report titled 'Military counteraction to the nuclear issue of north Korea.' The five-chapter report envisages "precision air raid operation" against nuclear and military facilities in the DPRK to disable its nuclear capabilities. The report chose nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, construction site of an atomic power plant, uranium mines and enrichment facilities as targets of air raid, and envisions making a simultaneous precision air raid on ballistic missiles of the strategic force, bombers of the air force and facilities of making submarines in the DPRK to destroy them at one blow. To this end, scores of B-2 nuclear strategic bombers and F-22 stealth fighters loaded with large underground penetration bombs are supposed to be mobilized and several Ohio-class nuclear submarines and destroyers are to launch hundreds of Tomahawk cruise missiles. ...The open discussion of 'precision air raid operation' against the DPRK in the U.S. reveals its undisguised ambition for a war of aggression against the DPRK that has entered an extremely reckless phase. The publication of the extremely provocative report on precision air raid on nuclear facilities and nuclear force of the DPRK is a clear proof of the fact that the surprise preemptive attack and armed invasion against the DPRK are in the full-dress process of examination and preparation as it is just an extension of the U.S. administration's extreme sanctions and pressure on the DPRK and moves for a nuclear war against it. ...What should not be overlooked is that the dangerous "war

scenario" against the DPRK was made public with the U.S.-south Korea joint military exercises due in upcoming August just at hand. The gravity of the situation lies in that the U.S. is just about to fight a large-scale war for militarily stifling the DPRK, foreseeing that its 'precision air raid operation' will inevitably spill over to an 'all-out war.' The U.S. aggressive war moves which are becoming a reality on the Korean peninsula clearly prove once again the validity and the inevitability of the line of the Workers' Party of Korea on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force." (KCNA, "DPRK FM Spokesman Blasts U.S. Plan for 'Precision Air Raid Operation,'" June 15, 2016) In late May, Stratfor published a report titled "Removing the Nuclear Threat" that elaborates on major targets to neutralize the North's nuclear development capabilities and weapons and the means to strike them with. According to the scenario, two to four U.S. Ohio-class nuclear-powered submarines could fire some 300 Tomahawk missiles from the East Sea to destroy the North's missile and air bases, while the U.S. Air Force focuses on striking nuclear facilities. The scenario envisages pulverizing the North's nuclear and major military facilities once and for all. The scenario also elaborates the expected retaliatory response from the North and ensuing damage.

The report predicts that the North would launch a retaliatory attack on South Korea and Japan with long-range artillery, biochemical bombs and short-range missiles, commandos and a cyberattack.

But it speculates that the artillery on the border would itself be exposed to attack, "limiting potential civilian casualties to thousands of dead rather than tens of thousands." It claims that the U.S. military could destroy the North's nuclear facilities based on its material superiority, but suggests that because of the possibility of escalation, the U.S. military should also prepare for a large-scale war in which to neutralize all the North's major combat capabilities at once. Others have dismissed the scenario as pie-in-the-sky. They say that contrary to the report's claims there could be several unknown nuclear facilities, including an underground uranium enrichment facility, which South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies have failed to spot. "The North's nuclear capacity has already crossed the red line," said Prof. Park Won-kon of Handong Global University. "It's safe to say that the North would retaliate with nuclear weapons if the U.S. launches precision strikes with conventional weapons." (*Chosun Ilbo*, "N. Korea Slams Stratfor Scenario for Precision Strikes," June 17, 2016)

Presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump said he would attempt to negotiate a deal to curb North Korea's nuclear weapons program, though he said the odds are low he could succeed. "There's a 10% or 20% chance I could talk him out of having his damn nukes, because who the hell wants him to have nukes?" Trump told supporters at a rally in Atlanta. "Who the hell cares? I'll speak to anybody. Who knows?" Trump said. Trump said any such negotiations with Kim or the North Korean military would not include formal state relations. "I wouldn't go there, that I can tell you. If he came here, I'd accept him, but I wouldn't give him a state dinner like we do for China and all these other people that rip us off when we give 'em these big state dinners," Trump said. "We give them state dinners like you've never seen. We shouldn't have dinners at all. We should be eating a hamburger on a conference table, and we should make better deals with China and others." (Eric DuVall, "Trump Would Host Kim Jong Un to Discuss Nuclear Program," UPI, June 15, 2016; Maxwell Tani,

"Donald Trump on North Korean Dictator Kim Jong Un: 'If He Came Here, I'd Accept Him,'" *Business Insider*, June 15, 2016)

South Korea's Defense Minister Han Min-koo and his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian plan to delve into how they could jointly act to tighten the screws on a defiant North Korea as well as ways to boost bilateral collaboration when they meet for talks today, the defense ministry said. The defense ministers are scheduled to hold a meeting from 4:30 p.m. in Paris at the headquarters of the French defense ministry, the first full-length defense ministers' talks between the nations in nine years. The ministers briefly met in Singapore earlier this month, but only on the sidelines of the regional security forum Shangri-La Dialogue. (Yonhap, "S. Korea, France Defense Chiefs to Discuss Joint Sanctions Efforts against N. Korea," June 15, 2016)

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DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement: "On June 13 the U.S. nuclear submarine Mississippi entered Pusan Port, south Korea, its first appearance in Asia-Pacific. The sub which was put into commission in 2012 is an up-to-date attack nuclear submarine of the U.S. Navy with the mission of attack and special operations, being equipped with lots of torpedo and cruise missile launching devices. During the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 joint military exercises which it staged in south Korea for over 50 days since March, the U.S. mobilized Stennis nuclear carrier, B-52 and B-2 nuclear strategic bombers, F-22A stealth fighters and other huge strategic nuclear attack means, creating a touch-and-go situation. ... Two U.S. nuclear subs are constantly cruising in waters in Asia-Pacific around the Korean peninsula and "precision air raid operation" against the nuclear facilities and nuclear force of the DPRK is in the process of open preparation in the U.S. The entry of Mississippi to south Korea against this backdrop is a direct threat to the security of the DPRK and peace of the region. The U.S. ceaseless introduction of strategic assets of various kinds to and around the Korean peninsula is rendering the already unstable situation all the more uncontrollable. The best way of averting a war and ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula, the world's biggest hotspot where there is constant danger of a nuclear war due to the U.S. ceaseless provocations for a new war, is to bolster the DPRK's nuclear deterrence for self-defense in every way. The line of the Workers' Party of Korea on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force is the most just line for fundamentally removing the danger of a nuclear war created by the U.S. and ensuring peace and security in the region and the rest of the world by dint of the powerful nuclear deterrence. It is sophism for the U.S. to trumpet about making denuclearization a priority while persistently resorting to nuclear blackmail and nuclear war exercises against the DPRK. **The U.S. has to make a policy decision to roll back its anachronistic hostile policy toward the DPRK and withdraw its aggression troops and war means from south Korea, clearly understanding the strategic position of the DPRK that has ranked itself among the nuclear powers** and facing up to the trend of the times." (KCNA, "FM Spokesman of DPRK Assails Entry of U.S. Nuclear Submarine to S. Korea," June 16, 2016)

The South Korean Navy kicked off a three-day maritime exercise to defend the western sea border from possible North Korean provocations, the military said. The exercise came as North Korean fishing and patrol boats often show up near the western maritime border, widely known as the Northern Limit Line (NLL), in June, the peak

season for catching blue crabs. "About 200 North Korean fishing vessels are operating in waters near the NLL," said a military official, adding that the figure is 1.7 times higher than last year. The drill will involve around 20 warships including the 7,600 ton Aegis-equipped destroyer and other military assets such as the P-3 surveillance plane and Lynx antisubmarine helicopters, according to military officials. "We are keeping full combat readiness to swiftly respond to the enemy's possible provocations in waters off the west coast," the Navy said in a statement. (Yonhap, "Navy Kicks off Exercise to Defend Western Sea Border," June 16, 2016) North and South Korea are increasing the number of patrol boats at a disputed maritime border, heightening tensions. Pyongyang had already dispatched a total of five patrol boats near the Northern Limit Line, South Korean news network MBN reported. North Korea recently added another boat, most likely to protect fishing rights during crab season, a South Korean military official said. The presence of patrol boats has increased with the number of North Korean fishing boats. North Korean fishermen may be stepping up activity in response to an ordinance from Kim Jong Un to raise productivity, South Korean news service News 1 reported. Pyongyang is also monitoring the South from Ari Island, located less than eight miles from the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, which was shelled in 2010. A South Korean military official said Seoul has confirmed the installation of radar on the island, according to News 1. (Elizabeth Shim, "North Korea Increases Patrol Boats at Disputed Maritime Border," UPI, June 16, 2016)

North Korea has been providing just 360 grams of daily food rations to each of its citizens in the second quarter of this year, far below the United Nations' recommendation. Citing the report by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, the Voice of America said the daily ration is 12 percent less than last year during the same period which was 410 grams, and 10 grams less than the previous quarter's 370 grams. This is far less than the U.N.'s recommendation of 600 grams as well as the North Korean government's target of 573 grams. According to the FAO's recent report on the North's food supply and demand for the grain in 2015-2016, the country's grain production in 2015 was 5.42 million tons, a 9 percent decrease from the previous year. The report said North Korea's rice harvest dropped 26 percent to 1.95 million tons last year from a year earlier, while its corn harvest contracted 3 percent to 2.3 million tons during the same period. FAO said that North Korea's food shortage this year will be 694,000 tons which has to be filled either by external assistance or by imports from other countries. (Yonhap, "N. Korea's Food Rations Remain at 60% of U.N. Recommendation: Report," *Korea Herald*, June 16, 2016)

Lawmakers in the House are pushing to change that with legislation to have North Korea designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, alongside Iran, Sudan and Syria, eight years after it was taken off the list to smooth the way for aid-for-disarmament negotiations that collapsed soon after. A bill approved by a House committee today calls for the State Department to report to Congress within 90 days on whether a list of purported acts by North Korea, including assassinations of dissidents and weapons sales to militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, constitute support for international terrorism. It's the most serious effort yet by lawmakers to get North Korea redesignated, but the legislation still has to clear the full House and Senate, and there's little time left in the congressional calendar for passage. Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, who introduced the bill, said North Korea had been taken off the list for

"completely diplomatic reasons" and had "conned" the U.S. He said it was time to put the country back on. Rep. Eliot Engel of New York, the committee's top-ranking Democrat, said the bill would press the administration to conduct a review of the evidence against North Korea. He described the North as "reprehensible" but added, "there's a fine line as to whether they may or may not be a state sponsor of terrorism." (Associated Press, "U.S. Lawmakers Take Aim at North Korea over Terrorism," June 16, 2016)

6/17/16 A suspected fragment of a North Korean missile believed to have been fired in February has been found today on a beach in the town of Yurihama on the Sea of Japan in Tottori Prefecture, according to the prefectural government. The cylindrical object with a conical shaped head has distinctive markings and is 1.8 meters in length and 1.2 meters in diameter. It closely resembles a South Korean-recovered object believed to be a fragment of a long-range missile that fell in the East China Sea after flying over Okinawa Prefecture on February 7, the Tottori government said. The fragment "definitely looks like a 'nose fairing half' from a rocket" and is likely "to be from a North Korean launch," said Jonathan McDowell, astronomer at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics in the United States. Separately, Tal Inbar, head of the Space Research Center of the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies in Israel, stressed that he has "no doubt" the fragment is the fairing of the North Korean missile. "South Korea found just one half of the fairing from the February 7 launch, and this is the second part," he said. (JIJI, "North Korean Missile-Like Object Washes up on Tottori Beach," *Japan Times*, June 18, 2016)

6/18/16 Lawmakers from the U.S. House and Senate have introduced legislation calling for suspending civil nuclear cooperation with China if Beijing is found to have failed to enforce U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea. The bipartisan legislation, titled the "U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation and Nonproliferation Act of 2016," was introduced late last month in the House by Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) and Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE) and in the Senate by Sen. Edward Markey (D-MA) and Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL). The bill requires the president to determine within six months if China has engaged in various proliferation misbehaviors, including re-transferring any U.S. nuclear items to a third country without the permission from the U.S. government or diverting or attempting to divert U.S. nuclear items to military use. It also requires the president to determine whether China failed to prevent transfer of proliferation-sensitive items to countries of concern, or "failed to undertake measures to enforce the sanctions provided for in U.S. Security Council Resolution 2270," adopted in March in response to the North's fourth nuclear test. Should such violations be found, the legislation requires immediate suspension of all cooperation under the bilateral agreement, including any transfers of nuclear technology or materials, until such issues are addressed. The bill also expresses concern about China's pursuit of commercial reprocessing of nuclear fuel. "China's plans to reprocess United States-origin spent fuel raise the risk that China could divert plutonium to military purposes, enabling it to produce additional nuclear weapons that threaten the United States and its allies," the bill said. "China's pursuit of commercial plutonium reprocessing will increase the likelihood that Japan expands its commercial reprocessing program and that South Korea will increase efforts to initiate a similar program of its own." (*Korea Times*, "U.S.

Bill Calls for Suspending Nuclear Cooperation with China if Beijing Fails to Sanction N. Korea," June 18, 2016)

6/19/16

DPRK FoMin spokesman "answer to the question raised by KCNA as regards the foolish moves of the U.S. to block economic exchange and cooperation between the DPRK and African countries: An assistant secretary of the U.S. Department of State during the recent visits to some African countries talked rubbish that "the nuclear threat from north Korea is not far away" and "the period that a nuclear weapon may be used again has come after the lapse of 70 years because of north Korea." Moreover, he reportedly claimed that African countries should break off all their relations with the DPRK if they are to evade the "nuclear threat." As known to the world, the U.S. is the world's first country that made a nuclear weapon, the only user of it and the very one hell-bent on committing high-handed and arbitrary practices through nuclear threat and blackmail. Such a country, masking its criminal colors, has gone so impudent as to groundlessly assert that the DPRK is posing "nuclear threat" to far-off Africa. The DPRK's nuclear weapons are targeting not African countries but the U.S. persisting in its hostile policy toward the DPRK and serve as a treasured sword of justice to blow up the U.S., the den of all evils in the world. It is no more than a clumsy trick that the U.S. seeks to tarnish the image of the DPRK and sow discord between the DPRK and African countries through all sorts of paradoxes and estrangement moves. The traditions of friendship and cooperation between the DPRK and African countries are long-standing and historical ones that were forged and have developed since the early period of the struggle for independence and the building of new society in those countries. They are being further consolidated through mutually beneficial cooperation based on independence, equality and mutual respect. As for the DPRK's cooperation with Uganda, it started at the request of the Ugandan government long ago and has given substantial help to the country. As a relevant contract has expired, the personnel of the DPRK are now withdrawing themselves from the country according to an agreement between the two countries. Nevertheless, the U.S. is giving an impression that Uganda has ceased its cooperation with the DPRK under the pressure of the former. This is indeed ridiculous. The U.S. act of openly instigating African countries to sever relations with the DPRK is bound to go belly-up under strong denunciation of the countries in the region as it is a blatant interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states standing for independence. The government of the DPRK will as ever invariably boost its traditional friendly and cooperative relations with African countries in the idea of its foreign policy--independence, peace and friendship." (KCNA, "Spokesman for DPRK FM Raps U.S. Moves to Block DPRK's Economic Cooperation with African Countries," June 19, 2016)

NDC spokesman's statement: "These days the situation of the Korean peninsula is being rapidly pushed to the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. A formation of nuclear strategic bombers B-52H under the 8th Air Force of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces on Guam was busy with a nuclear bomb dropping drill under the pretext of the exercise for long-range flight and air-strike at strategic targets on June 17. The U.S. introduced the nuclear-powered submarine Mississippi capable of mounting a nuclear attack on the rival side into Pusan Port of south Korea on June 13. ...The recent long-range flight exercise was a preparation for rapidly flying into the air



over the Korean peninsula and the exercise for air-strike at strategic targets was a mobile rehearsal for making a surprise strike at the nuclear facilities, etc. of the DPRK. The introduction of the nuclear-powered nuclear submarine into south Korea from other waters is aimed at examining the actual possibility of hurling a nuclear force in case of the second Korean war. The U.S. imperialists are none other than the gangsters who do not hesitate to ignite nuclear and other wars to carry out their sinister ambition to shake the DPRK's will and resolute decision by wielding a nuclear stick. This is the true colors of the present U.S. administration loud-mouthed about "a world without nuclear weapons" and an ulterior aim of forcing the DPRK "to dismantle its nukes first." The reality goes to prove that the banner of simultaneously developing the two fronts held high by the service personnel and people of the DPRK is the best one to protect peace of the country and security of the nation from the disaster of a nuclear war. Peace is dear to the DPRK. But, it does not wish to achieve peace by begging and sympathy. Our way of achieving peace is to mount a prompt and merciless preemptive attack of our style on any enemy no matter from where it is coming to disturb peace which is so dear to us. The Korean People's Army has long put into the range of its precision strike the U.S. bases and logistic bases for invading the DPRK, including the Anderson Air Force Base on Guam where B-52Hs are deployed and naval bases for nuclear submarines. The U.S. should stop running amuck to realize its anachronistic daydream. **The U.S. must know better about the capability of nuclear counter-attack of the DPRK**, a nuclear power in the East. Rash actions disregarding reality would only invite a serious disaster. The service personnel and people of the DPRK will dynamically advance to win a great victory, decisively foiling the "sanctions" of all hostile forces against the DPRK and their moves to stifle it and nuclear threats and blackmail against it. The final victory is in store for the great Workers' Party of Korea and service personnel and people of the DPRK." (KCNA, "NDC Spokesman Warns U.S. of Nuclear Counter-Action," June 19, 2016)

6/20/16

KCNA commentary: "Korean American Bae Jun Ho (Kenneth Bae) is now cursed and censured by public for renewing his false propaganda about the DPRK. As already reported, Bae was arrested in the DPRK for spreading subversive religion and working hard to build "a religious state" hostile to the DPRK. For his hostile activities he was sentenced to hard labor. But thanks to the humanitarian measure taken by the DPRK out of magnanimity and good faith he was deported to the U.S. after spending nearly two years in jail. People say that habit is a second nature. Bae is accustomed to hostile acts against the DPRK. Recently Bae released an anti-DPRK book peppered with "stories" about what happened during his hard labor. At a book releasing ceremony sponsored by the south Korean puppet forces, Bae talked rubbish that "he is planning to set up a non-governmental organization for the fellow countrymen in the north and carry out projects helpful to the poor people in the north and defectors from the north." It is ridiculous, indeed, for Bae to be busy with the moves for establishing a non-governmental organization for some people as if he were a big philanthropist. In other words, he revealed his intention to persist in his hostile acts against the DPRK. At a meet-the press with U.S. congressmen he unhesitatingly spouted sheer sophism that he witnessed how could a country be a huge prison and that north Korea is a "huge prison." It is less than two years since he begged for sparing his dirty life in tears. He is now in such poor position as to appear as a member of a shock brigade in slandering

the DPRK, clinging to the coattails of the U.S. and south Korean puppet forces. It is worth recalling what he wrote in the letter of apology and letter of thanks done in hot tears before being deported to the U.S. The following is what he wrote in his letter of apology and letter of thanks: "I sincerely thank the DPRK government for all humanitarian measures and treatment for me. I will always remain thankful to the Korean people and the DPRK and take the lead in the work for national reunification and prosperity, never forgetting benevolence bestowed upon me. I will make efforts to play the role of a bridge of friendship linking the Western world with the DPRK." In fact, the DPRK provided everything to Bae during his prison life from humanitarian point of view. Whenever he did not feel well, we took him to a hospital to be treated several times. We arranged his meeting with his mother and let him exchange hundreds of correspondences. There is a saying one's kindness should be repaid. However, Bae returns evil for good. He has not built a bridge of friendship but erected a bridge of distrust and confrontation. Is it morally right? Bae is the felon who betrayed not only human conscience but also religious devotion. Before flying to the U.S., he told officials concerned of the DPRK that he is the churchman saying truth and religionist's devotion to God is sacred and he can never betray it. But upon returning to the U.S., he made a U turn, going busy hatching plots with the group of Satan falsifying facts. He is none other than Judas. Bae Jun Ho has no option but to commit suicide. We have nothing to say more of Bae waiting for the day of death after being branded as a despicable bete noire. What matters is the double-dealing nature of the U.S. government as it promised to prevent the recurrence of such behavior while conducting "rescuing operation" of American criminals under the signboard of "humanitarianism" but it gives a shot in the arm of those guys as soon as its representatives went back. It is the American society where different anti-DPRK organizations are strutting about, prodding such human scum and halfwits as Bae Jun Ho into taking the lead in the false propaganda to mislead public opinion. It is a hard fact that the U.S. government is behind these organizations. It is the true picture of the American society where there is profound confusing of right and wrong, injustice beats justice and human rights are wantonly abused. **The U.S. government should bear in mind that if it resorts to the anti-DPRK propaganda under the signboard of "human rights," the fate of the U.S. citizens now serving jail terms in the DPRK will become more miserable. The DPRK will neither make any compromise nor conduct negotiations with the U.S. over the issue of American criminals nor take any humanitarian measure as long as Bae Jun Ho keeps spouting invectives against the DPRK. Then American criminals now in custody in the DPRK will never be able to go back to the U.S.** The DPRK's clarification of this stand is not just a warning." (KCNA, "KCNA Commentary Refutes Korean American Bae June Ho's False Propaganda," June 20, 2016)

DPRK FoMin Institute of Disarmament and Peace: "Recently there was another spark of flames in the hotspots in the West Sea of Korea. **The south Korean military ships intruded into the territorial waters of the DPRK in the West Sea and fired machine guns at a navy ferryboat of the Korean People's Army (KPA), which was on routine duty.** It is a quite dangerous and provocative military maneuver that directly challenges the DPRK's positive and sincere efforts. In his historic report made at the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), the respected **Chairman Kim Jong Un** has advanced fair and realistic proposals for peace and security on the Korean

peninsula and improvement of inter-Korean relations. **He pointed out that the north and the south should take substantial measures to remove military tension and danger of conflict, particularly along the Military Demarcation Line and in the hotspots of the West Sea. As military trust builds up between the north and the south, the scope of this measure can be expanded.** The proposal gives great hopes to the whole fellow countrymen and the international community who aspires to peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Why was there another spark of flames on the hotspots of the West Sea of Korea against the wishes for peace cherished by the Korean people and the international community? What makes this area the hottest spot for more than half a century? That is due to the existence of illegal "Northern Limit Line" ("NLL") in the West Sea of Korea unilaterally drawn by the U.S. in the 1950s. Whole process of fabrication of the "NLL" The Korean War ignited by the U.S. in 1950 was temporarily suspended with conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA) on July 27, 1953. However, at the time of its conclusion the KAA stipulated the military demarcation lines on the ground and in the East Sea of Korea whereas the agreement failed to stipulate the military line in the West Sea of Korea. Paragraph 13-b, Article II of the KAA stipulated that "All the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae Province and Kyonggi Province shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, except the island groups of Paengyong Island, Taechong Island, Sochong Island, Yeonpyeong Island, and U Island." As stipulated in the KAA, the jurisdiction over the five islands was clearly stated but not a military demarcation line in the sea. Accordingly, "Map 3", which is one of 22 Maps attached to the KAA, marked only the control over the five island groups but did not draw a demarcation line in the sea. On August 30, 1953, 40 days after conclusion of the KAA, Mark W. Clark, the then Commander-in-chief of the "United Nations Command", defined as "NLL" the line of linking 11 coordinates which were to set the stage for U.S. warships and planes to conduct a patrol mission and declared it in his own name, and he informed it only to the south Korean navy as part of the internal rule of its military operation. This was how the 150-mile "NLL" from the mouth of the Han River to Paengyong Island was unilaterally drawn. The "NLL" does not hold any ground of international law and it is an illegal line, which was unilaterally drawn by the U.S. The "NLL" totally goes against the KAA's Paragraph 13-b, Article II and even the U.S. and the south Korean authorities admit the illegitimacy of this "NLL". Nevertheless they still insist that this "Line" has contributed to the prevention of military conflicts between the north and the south and that the north has so far connived at it without raising any claims for decades. On the contrary the DPRK has never recognized the illegitimate "NLL," which was covertly drawn in the other's sea without getting any approval from the very owner. The DPRK declared 12 nautical miles as its territorial waters on March 5, 1955, one and half years after the US had drawn the illegitimate "NLL". The DPRK also declared 200 nautical miles as its economic waters on July 1, 1977 and has never tolerated any attempts by south Korea to enter it. The DPRK solemnly announced its establishment of the Military Demarcation Line in the West Sea of Korea through a Special Report of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA) in September 1999. The DPRK, strictly based on the KAA and the UN Convention on the Law of Sea, declared the demarcation line in the West Sea by extending the "Ka-Na" demarcation line between Hwanghae Province and Kyonggi Province from the Point "Ka" stipulated in the KAA to the point of intersection of the sea boundary line to

be confirmed between the DPRK and the PRC. The line would be connected by the points of equidistance between the DPRK's Tungsan cape at the tip of Kangryong peninsula and the Kulyop Island under the jurisdiction of the U.S., the DPRK's Ong Island and the Sogyokryolbi and Sohyop Islands under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Armed Forces. At the same time, the DPRK declared null and void the arbitrary "NLL" drawn by the U.S. in the former's territorial waters. Since the Korean War, the south has been desperate in sticking to the U.S.-drawn "NLL" and the north has been resolute in opposing the south's maneuvers, thus turning the area around the "NLL" into a flammable hotspot inviting confrontation and conflict in the West Sea of Korea. Seriousness of military provocations in the area is well proven by the fact that the first meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) convened after the conclusion of the KAA listed as its top agenda the issue of military provocations in some areas including the military provocations in the West Sea of Korea. Escalation of military provocations by the south Korean authorities has continued in the area for several decades. Entering 1990s it reached the uncontrollable level, thus bringing about armed conflict. Having failed in making the first naval battle a tinderbox to ignite a full-scale war in June, 1999 in the West Sea, the south Korean military authorities provoked another armed conflict in this zone in 2002 to be followed by another one in 2009. Even after those conflicts, the cases of intrusion into the DPRK's territorial waters by the south have greatly increased. In 2010 alone, the cases of intrusion numbered over 600, all of which were conducted under the pretext of interdicting fishing vessels and countering normal moves of the KPA's navy ships. The most typical example was the artillery fire provocation from Yeonpyeong Island, which occurred in November, 2010. At that time, Joint Military Staff of south Korea drew up a plan of artillery firing onto the DPRK's territorial waters for two days in the sea near Yeonpyeong Island during the "Hoguk" military exercise. The KPA sent a telephone message to south Korea in advance at 8 a.m. on November 23 to prevent a military conflict in the sensitive area and ensure peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. But the latter ignored the former's warning and went on firing to the DPRK's territorial waters using their artillery units stationed in the Yeonpyeong Island. Unfortunately, the Yeonpyeong Island, being the miserable base of military provocation against the DPRK, could not escape from due punishment. Even after that, due to the stubbornness of the U.S. and the south Korean authorities in sticking to the "NLL," a danger of conflict and full scale war have never been removed. All the facts show that the "NLL" drawn by the U.S. arbitrarily in the sacred waters of the DPRK is nothing but the root cause of conflict and tension and as long as it remains peace and stability can never be ensured on the Korean peninsula. The most pressing issue in improving the inter-Korean relations is to take substantial measures to ease the military tension and danger of conflict, particularly along the Military Demarcation Line and on the hotspots in the West Sea as Chairman Kim Jong Un made clear at the 7th Congress of the WPK. As the inter-Korean military confidence matures, such scope should be expanded. Today's reality shows that military conflict is unavoidable between the north and the south as long as the "NLL" exists. Of course, the best way lies in elimination of the illegal "NLL" and establishment of a fair and reasonable military demarcation line in the West Sea of Korea without delay. The reason is that the "NLL" is a ghost line in regard to the context of the UN Convention on the Law of Sea, the principle of respecting the other's 12 nautical miles of waters, the KAA and south Korea's Law of the Sea as well as the fact that it was

unilaterally drawn. Once the U.S. delegate distributed the Korean maps to the participants in a UN meeting on the Law of Sea that took place in the U.S. Even those maps marked a north-south "imaginary border line" far below south from the "NLL" on the principle of equidistance. A U.S. expert on the Korean affairs held that it was quite simple to solve the West Sea conflict, asserting that the U.S. could reset the "NLL" a little southward. However, the U.S., out of its strategic interests, is continuing to support the "NLL". The U.S. has strategic interests in maintaining military tension on the Korean peninsula and thus the "NLL" is indispensable for them to keep the physical factors of inter-Korean military conflicts. The U.S. needs an excuse for its military station in south Korea and that is periodical aggravation of tension, not durable peace and security. **The reason why the U.S. is against a peace treaty is that it needs a thorn in Koreans' flesh such as the "NLL."** Such being the case, it is difficult to immediately define a new military demarcation line in the West Sea. With full considerations, the DPRK has been magnanimous enough to propose an establishment of peaceful waters until a new military demarcation line is defined in the West Sea of Korea. This would make the West Sea an area of national prosperity but not an area of confrontation between the countrymen. **The October 4 Declaration**, adopted at the 2007 north-south Summit Meeting carries the common will of the nation. The declaration **reflects the inter-Korean agreement to establish a special zone for peace and cooperation in the West Sea** as a way to activate and sustainably expand the economic cooperation based on the principle of promoting common interest and prosperity and filling each other's wants. Had the special zone, a joint fishing area and a peace area been established in the West Sea as agreed upon by the north and the south in the Declaration, the hotspots thickly covered with smokes of guns would have been replaced with a rainbow of peace. As stated by Chairman Kim Jong Un at the 7th Congress of the WPK, the inter-Korean relations would not have undergone twists and turns and a great stride would have been registered in the cause of national reunification if the north-south agreements had been implemented faithfully. All the facts prove that only when the both sides of the north and the south respect and implement the agreements common to the nation in a consistent manner, could they ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula, improve the inter-Korean relations and open up an avenue of national reunification." (Jong Kil Song, "Peace on the Korean Peninsula and the 'Northern Limit Line,'" DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Institute of Disarmament and Peace, *NKNews*, June 20, 2016)

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Pyongyang carried out its fifth and sixth intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) tests at 5:58 a.m. and 8:05 a.m. from the eastern coast city of Wonsan in Kangwon Province, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported. "The first one disappeared after it was detected by radar while the second one flew about 400 kilometers," said a Joint Chiefs of Staff official who asked not to be named. He added that the South Korean and U.S. militaries were assessing the trajectories of the two missiles. If successful, Pyongyang's IRBMs would be capable of hitting any part of Japan and as far as Guam with a range of around 3,500 kilometers. Because they are launched from mobile launchers, it is difficult to detect their origin. The South Korean military believes the first missile exploded in midair after flying about 150 kilometers. The second missile fired two hours later appeared to have exploded or crashed into the sea after flying 400

kilometers. The exact causes of the failures are still being determined by Seoul and Washington. It is possible that North Korea intended its sixth Musudan missile to fall after flying 400 kilometers to prevent it from going over Japan, which would have prompted the country to respond militarily. "Both of the two missiles launched today were detected by radar, which indicates that the two rose above the horizon and flew at a steady altitude," another military official said, also speaking on the condition of anonymity, "We have yet to confirm whether North Korea intentionally had the [second] missile explode in mid-air or whether there were technical glitches that caused the failure." (Kang Jin-kyu and Jeong Yong-soo, "Two Musudan Missiles Reveal Technical Advance," *JoongAng Ilbo*, June 22, 2016) A day after North Korea launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile into high altitude – after five consecutive launch failures – the country's state-run media proclaimed the test a success and quoted Kim Jong-un, North Korea's leader, as boasting that his arsenal could strike United States forces in the Pacific. The projectile took off from Wonsan, a port city east of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, and flew about 250 miles over the sea between North Korea and Japan, South Korea's Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement. According to the North's media reports, it attended the launch of the Hwasong-10 missile, known to the outside world as the Musudan. The reports included photographs of the blastoff from a mobile launch vehicle. The test, confirmed and condemned by the United States and its allies, demonstrated that North Korea was making progress at posing a direct threat to Japan, South Korea and American troops in the Pacific. Kim said the test "marked an important occasion in further strengthening the nuclear attack capacity" of his country, according to KCNA. "We have the sure capability to attack, in an overall and practical way, the Americans in the Pacific operation theater," Kim said, calling for his country to continue increasing its "pre-emptive nuclear attack capability." North Korea said that the missile accurately landed in targeted waters 250 miles away after reaching an altitude of 878 miles, and that it had fired the missile at a sharper angle to demonstrate its potential to reach the estimated full range of more than 2,000 miles – far enough to reach American military bases in the Pacific – without actually covering that distance. The high altitude also gave North Korea's engineers an opportunity to test the heat-resistance capability of their warhead, the country's media reports said. The test was the first for the Musudan that was not immediately dismissed as a failure by the United States or South Korea. Establishing that the missile can work is essential, both politically and strategically, to Kim. As he has solidified his hold on power, he has made the nuclear and missile programs – and the threat they pose to much larger powers in the region – a key element of his claim to rule. Last month, American and South Korean intelligence officials said they had concluded that North Korea could now mount a small nuclear warhead on short- and medium-range missiles, a category that includes the Musudan. The Musudan is a road-mobile missile, meaning it can move around the country, making it a harder target to hit in a pre-emptive strike. The Musudan is the North's only intermediate-range ballistic missile able to reach United States military bases in Guam, a major launching pad for American reinforcements should a war break out on the Korean Peninsula. Analysts say the North has been struggling to master the so-called warhead re-entry technology needed to build longer-range projectiles known as intercontinental ballistic missiles. The progress the North demonstrated with its sixth test was disconcerting enough for South Korea to convene a meeting of its top security

officials to discuss the growing missile and nuclear threats. But such meetings rarely generate more than a promise to tighten sanctions. Jeong Joon-hee, a spokesman for the South Korean government, called the launch a "clear provocation" that violated United Nations Security Council resolutions banning the North from developing ballistic missile technology. Samantha Power, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, on her way to a Security Council session Thursday night to discuss the missile tests, called the latest launch "unacceptable." She said, "It's worthy of Council unity, which I expect, and it's worthy of prompt condemnation." Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan said the latest missile test was "a clear violation of United Nations resolutions." He said, "We cannot tolerate it and have protested firmly." The Japanese Defense Ministry said it believed the test showed that the North's missile technology was advancing. South Korean analysts said that North Korea appeared to have launched the second missile at a sharper angle to achieve a higher altitude and prevent it from flying over Japan. They said such an altitude was required to test technology that protects a nuclear warhead from the extreme heat and friction encountered upon breaching the earth's atmosphere. The altitude reached on Wednesday was the highest achieved by any North Korean missile, and close to heights reached by intercontinental ballistic missiles, analysts said. "The test appears to have been fully successful," said Jeffrey Lewis, an analyst at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California. He said that if North Korea had launched the missile on a normal trajectory, it would have flown the full range of about 2,480 miles. Lewis said the development of the Musudan is especially worrisome because it also advances the North's KN-08 program – the development of its first intercontinental ballistic missile with a range to reach the continental United States. The first stage of the KN-08 missile comprises a pair of Musudan-type engines, he said. (Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea's Successful Missile Test Shows Program's Progress, Analysts Say," *New York Times*, June 23, 2016, p. A-4) North Korea's latest test of its Musudan mid-range missile indicates that the country is capable of firing a missile with a range of 3,500 kilometers, South Korea's military officials said June 24. In the latest test fire of the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) which the North calls the Hwasong-10, one of the two that were launched soared to an altitude exceeding 1,000 km and flew some 400 km before hitting the East Sea. The military officials said the launch was likely to be aimed at testing the IRBM's engine performance or its maximum flight range. It said the latest test showed tangible gains vis-a-vis the past. "In terms of engine performance, the country seems to have verified (engine) credibility to some extent," an official said, asking not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue. The test has also shown that the missile could have a maximum flight range of 3,000 to 3,500 km, the official said, citing the military's calculation results based on the recent flight performance. South Korea's military has said North Korea fired the sixth Musudan at a deliberately high angle so it would achieve its maximum altitude rather than flying far, which experts attribute to North Korea's hesitation to inflame its neighbors. It said the move can help the North see if the missile can reach a high altitude without any problems. Reaching a very high altitude can allow Pyongyang to test its warhead re-entry technology, a crucial part of any long-range nuclear-tipped missile that flies through space before re-entering the earth's atmosphere to hit its target. The military needs more time to confirm whether the latest test provided meaningful results in terms of re-entry technology. North Korea had five back-to-back

launch failures with Musudan before finding success on the sixth launch, "Seeing from our standard, (Musudan) lacks credibility as a weapon," the official said. "It seems like (North Korea) may need additional test launches down the road." **Other officials, on the other hand, said the latest North Korean launch result showed Musudan is beyond South Korea's current missile interception capability.** The sixth Musudan missile is presumed to have flown at a speed and altitude that clearly surpasses the capacity of South Korea's Patriot missile interception system, the officials said. He said that it is because of such threats that South Korea and the United States began negotiations on deploying the advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense on South Korean soil. The North's IRBM is about 12 meters long, weighs between 18 and 20 tons and can reach speeds of up to Mach 16. North Korea deployed Musudans with its forces in 2007, but the IRBM had never been tested before the North conducted its first trial launch on April 15, the birthday of North Korea's founding father Kim Il-sung. (Park Boram, "Latest test Reveals N. Korean Missile Capable of Flying 3,5000 Km.: Military," Yonhap, June 24, 2016) THAAD is believed to be capable of intercepting North Korea's intermediate-range ballistic missiles if it is deployed in South Korea, Seoul's defense chief said. "The deployment of THAAD will help South Korea's move to counter (the North's missile threats)," Defense Minister Han Min-koo told reporters. The minister said that more information is needed to check THAAD's capability to intercept the North's mid-range missiles, but generally, the system is believed to be up to the task. (Yonhap, "THAAD Seen as Capable of Intercepting N.K. Mid-Range Missile: Defense Minister," June 24, 2016) North Korea's Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile reached space and then re-entered Earth's atmosphere in its sixth test attempt last week, a U.S. defense official confirmed June 27, saying the launch would be a success if Pyongyang had designed the test that way. "We saw the missile launch. We saw it go up into space and come back down 250 miles away in the Sea of Japan. If that was their intent, then it was a success. But you'd have to ask them," Pentagon spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis told reporters. "This might have been, but it's really their test and they knew what the parameters are and only they could say if it met those objectives or not," he said. The official also stressed the U.S. is ready to counter the threats as it always tries to outpace them. "Long before they ever tested this system, we were already doing things to make sure we are postured in the region. We have Aegis cooperation we do with Japan. We have TPY-2 radars in Japan. Long before they ever paraded out a KN-08, we had already put in ground-based interceptors in Alaska and Hawaii. We've got THAAD in Guam. We have things that we're doing. We're making sure we're outpacing this threat constantly," he said. Commenting on the Pentagon assessment, however, South Korea's defense ministry spokesman Moon Sang-gyun said the North's latest missile launch does not mean the North has secured re-entry technology. Asked whether the fired missile or its payload has re-entered Earth's atmosphere without damage, Moon said a joint analysis between South Korea and the U.S. is still underway to verify the matter. (Chang Jae-soon, "U.S. Confirms N. Korea's Musudan Missile Reaches Space," June 28, 2016) Bermudez and Ahn, "While the exact location of the June 22 Hwasong-10 (Musudan) ballistic missile test was not reported by North Korean state media, comparison of the ground photos published and recent commercial satellite imagery indicate that the test took place on the east side of the Kalma International Airport. This airport is in the final stages of being converted from the Wonsan Airbase to modern civilian facility, but also includes a recently constructed



firing position for heavy missile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). It is likely that North Korea will continue to use both this location and its companion facility on the Hodo Peninsula for live-fire artillery, rocket and missile tests, with the Kalma location being used primarily for highly publicized events and the Hodo facility for more routine testing and training". (Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Sun Young Ahn, "Geolocating the June 22 Hwasong-10 Test: The Kalma Firing Position," *38North*, August 5, 2016)

KCNA: "Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, first chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, guided the test-fire of surface-to-surface medium long-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-10. At a watch post he gave an order to conduct the test-fire after hearing a report on its plan. The test-fire of Hwasong-10 was carried out by the high-angle fire system under the simulation of its maximum range. The ballistic rocket took off a self-propelled launching pad and accurately landed in the targeted waters 400km away after flying to the maximum altitude of 1 413. 6km along the planned flight orbit. The test-fire confirmed the flying kinetic feature of Korean-style ballistic rocket with an updated system and its safety and control as well as the technical specifications of newly-designed rocket structure and its dynamic system. **It also verified the heat-resistance capability of warhead in the re-entry section and its flight stability.** It provided a sure sci-tech guarantee for developing the system of strategic weapons. The test-fire was successfully conducted without affecting the security of a surrounding country even a bit. Expressing great satisfaction over the test results, he said with joy that this happy news would give the conviction in sure victory and optimism to the army and people of the DPRK and that it was a great event as it strikingly demonstrated again the invincible might of Juche Korea. Not only the enemy but also the whole world may properly assess the capability of the DPRK's medium long-range strategic ballistic rocket by watching its flight track only, he said, declaring with conviction: We have the sure capability to attack in an overall and practical way the Americans in the Pacific operation theatre. To reliably defend the security of the country and its people from the constant threats of the U.S and other hostile forces, we should have the powerful offensive means capable of posing a constant threat to the enemy, he said, adding: It is necessary to increase in a sustained way our preemptive nuclear attack capability and continue the study and development of diverse strategic attack weapons. The real foe our nuclear force has to confront is a nuclear war itself, he said, stressing that the nuclear attack capability should be steadily bolstered up to protect the country and its people and the Korean revolution from the U.S. imperialists' nuclear threat. The current test-fire marked an important occasion in further strengthening the nuclear attack capability of our state, he said, stressing the need to more thoroughly establish the unitary leadership and management system over the strategic nuclear force. In congratulation of the successful test-fire of surface to surface medium long-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-10, he had a photo session with the defense science soldiers involved in the test-fire." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Directs Test-Fire of Hwasong-10," June 23, 2016)

A North Korean nuclear envoy attending a security forum in Beijing said that the long-stalled negotiations on the North's nuclear weapons program are "dead," dashing

hope that Pyongyang might change its course on its nuclear ambition. Choe Son-hui, deputy director for North American affairs at North Korea's foreign ministry and the North's deputy chief nuclear envoy, made the remarks during the closed-door forum, according to a diplomatic source who attended the forum. "The six-party talks are dead," Choe was quoted as saying by the source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the forum was not open to the public. It was not the first time that North Korea, which has conducted four nuclear tests since 2006, said the six-party talks were all but dead. Pyongyang has said the country's nuclear program is not a bargaining chip. However, the remarks by Choe further complicate diplomatic efforts by South Korea, the United States and China to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. During a question-and-answer session at the forum, Choe reaffirmed that North Korea will not give up its nuclear ambition. "We could not give up our nuclear (weapons program), unless the world gives up nuclear (weapons)," Choe was quoted as saying. Participants at the forum were "frustrated" by the North Korean envoy's remarks, the source said. Among those attending the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), which began its two-day run on Wednesday, are Ambassador Sung Kim, a top U.S. envoy on North Korea policy; Kim Gunn, South Korea's deputy chief nuclear envoy; and Wu Dawei, China's chief nuclear envoy. The forum opened hours before North Korea test-launched two intermediate-range ballistic missiles, in the North's latest violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban Pyongyang from using ballistic missile technology. The annual forum allows diplomats and scholars from six nations involved in the six-party talks -- South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia -- to exchange views on how to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula. During the forum, however, representatives from South Korea, the U.S. and Japan strongly criticized North Korea for launching the missiles, according to the source. The North Korean envoy did not make any remarks on the missile tests, the source said. "This conference again displays a big gap between North Korea and the five nations over denuclearization of North Korea," the source said. (Yonhap, "N. Korean Envoy Says Six-Party Talks Are 'Dead,'" June 22, 2016) China called for North Korea to comply with U.N. resolutions that ban Pyongyang from using any ballistic missile technology a day after Pyongyang test-fired two medium-range Musudan missiles. During a regular press briefing, China's foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the issue of the North Korean ballistic missile launch is stipulated in U.N. Security Council resolutions. "China hopes that the relevant party can act with caution and refrain from taking actions that may elevate tension on the Korean Peninsula," Hua said, without mentioning North Korea by name. In Beijing on June 23, a North Korean nuclear envoy told reporters that Pyongyang has no intention of returning to long-stalled talks on the North's nuclear weapons program. "We built nuclear weapons because of threats from the U.S. Now, I think that we have a delivery vehicle. So, we have no notion of returning to the talks that discuss the denuclearization of North Korea," said Choe Son-hui, deputy director for North American affairs at North Korea's foreign ministry and the North's deputy chief nuclear envoy. **"Under these circumstances where the U.S. hostile policy is still there, the DPRK is not in a position to talk about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,"** she said. (Kim Deok-hyun, "China Urges N. Korea to Comply with U.N. Resolutions," June 23, 2016) It was after the meeting on the first afternoon, just when it was time to head to dinner, that Choe Son-hui, deputy director of the American affairs

bureau in the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs she raised her hand and was allowed to speak. "Is this how the South leaks things to the press?" She was attending the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) in Beijing on June 22. She called attention to the Chatham House Rule - named after the Royal Institute for International Affairs in the United Kingdom. The rule, which governed responses to the press for the meeting, essentially states that parties are allowed to share what is said at meetings, but that the identity of the person who made the remarks cannot be revealed. Choe's complaint concerned a South Korean news article that had gone online that morning. In it, a "Beijing source" was cited as saying that she had not protested when Kim Geon, head of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs North Korean Nuclear Affairs Bureau, denounced Pyongyang's recent Musudan missile launch. In fact, Choe was visibly holding back from speaking on the first day of the conference. She kept quiet even as representatives from different countries tried repeatedly to confirm Pyongyang's position on the Six-Party Talks. When finally compelled to respond, she simply said, "The spirit of the September 19 Joint Statement [from the Six-Party Talks in 2005] has been compromised. We need to find a new framework." It is not difficult to imagine why she went out of her way to be allowed to speak at the end of the first day of meetings: she had most likely been given orders from Pyongyang to actively respond after the leaders there saw the South Korean article online. It was the first time in the four years since 2012 that a government representative attended from North Korea. In the case of the US, the senior Six-Party Talks representative was present for the first time since 2006. The question of whether a bilateral meeting would happen was an inevitable focus of attention. "He did not meet with him," said US State Department spokesperson John Kirby when asked on June 23 about whether US special representative for North Korea policy Sung Kim had met with Choe. (Both Kirby and the journalist who asked the question misidentified Choe as male.) In fact, Kim and Choe were seated next to each other at the head table during a June 22 dinner and were seen conversing during the meal. Choe did not attend the conference's final session on June 23. She left her lodgings at the Yanqihu international conference site at 9:10 am, and convened a press conference in front of the North Korean embassy in Beijing at 10:40 am. "Under the current circumstances with the US's policies of antagonism, it is not a situation where North Korea can discuss the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," she said, adding that Pyongyang was "very happy" with the successful Musudan launch. For those hoping to see a negotiated resolution to the nuclear issue with a resumption of the Six-Party Talks, the remarks were disappointing. But why would Choe have felt compelled to hold a press conference to restate the North's standard position - while qualifying that remarks about the Six-Party Talks being "dead" were "not something that I said"? It seems unlikely that it was not a response to front-page articles in the South Korean press the night before citing "North Korea sources" as saying Choe had declared, "The Six-Party Talks are dead." Visiting the National Assembly the following day, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se made the most of Choe's press conference remarks as a shield against pressure from opposition lawmakers to combine sanctions with efforts toward dialogue and negotiation. There is no way of knowing whether Choe would have called the press conference had it not been for the two South Korean press reports on June 22 citing an "unnamed Beijing source." We know that Choe accused the South Korean representatives of a "show for the press," and Seoul has blamed

Pyongyang for the lack of dialogue. But the seeds of dialogue and negotiation can't be sown and grow into coexistence and peace as long as the two sides continue condemning each other. Life is hard enough as it is without mindlessly blaming everything on North Korea. (Lee Je-hun, "N. Korea Asks, 'Is This How the South Leaks Things to the Press?'" *Hankyore*, July 4, 2016)

KCNA Commentary: "Immediate withdrawal of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces and various nuclear war hardware from south Korea presents itself as a more urgent issue at present. As already reported, the U.S. introduced latest nuclear attack submarine *Mississippi* into south Korea on June 13. Not content with this, it staged a nuclear bomb dropping drill in south Korea on June 17 with a formation of B-52H strategic bombers involved. After creating a touch-and-go situation on the Korean peninsula through the largest-ever anti-north nuclear war racket which lasted for more than 50 days from March last, the U.S. again kicked up war hysteria by hurling its major nuclear strike means into south Korea. This reveals its sinister scenario to mount a nuclear attack on the DPRK any moment. As proved by the situation, there can neither peace nor security on the Korean peninsula as long as the U.S. pursues a criminal hostile policy toward the DPRK and keeps its troops in south Korea, its vivid expression. The U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK and U.S. forces' presence in south Korea are aimed not only to bring down the ideology and social system in the DPRK but to dominate Asia and the rest of the world. As already blustered by Brzezinski, heavyweight of the U.S. conservative hardliners, the East Asian region including the Korean peninsula is one of the major war theaters set by the U.S. for its world supremacy. The Korean peninsula, in particular, is a strategic vantage to which the U.S. attaches the greatest importance to contain China and Russia after designating the two big powers as potential rivals. For this reason the U.S. is working with bloodshot eyes to carry out its Korea strategy by staging large-scale nuclear war exercises targeting it every year with three services of huge aggression troops present in south Korea involved. But for the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK, military tension and the danger of war would not have been created on the Korea peninsula and in the region. For the U.S. to roll back its hostile policy toward the DPRK and pull its forces out of south Korea is the top priority task for achieving peace and security. Nevertheless, the U.S. and other hostile forces are absurdly claiming that "the north's dismantlement of its nukes is the top priority task" for denuclearizing the peninsula and ensuring regional security. This is no more than sheer sophism intended to pass the buck for strained regional situation to the DPRK and cover up their ambition for domination. The nuclear force of the DPRK serves as a self-defensive means of justice for protecting the security of the country and the nation from the U.S. imperialists' outrageous moves for aggression. That is why the DPRK's nuclear force can never be a source of deteriorating the situation. The U.S. had better stop reeling off the above-said sheer sophism and pull back its aggression troops from south Korea before anything else." (KCNA, KCNA Commentary Demands Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from S. Korea," June 22, 2016)

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Schilling: "North Korea's latest Musudan (Hwasong-10) missile test finally demonstrated the full performance of the missile's propulsion system, and at least a minimally functional guidance system. The trajectory was not representative of an

operational launch, and so leaves open questions about the performance of the reentry vehicle. Perhaps more importantly, two launches only a few hours apart and with one missile breaking up in flight, gives the North Koreans little chance of understanding what went wrong. The Musudan is not a reliable weapon, and Pyongyang does not seem to be trying to make it a reliable weapon. But even if this is just a propaganda stunt and the Musudan is to be quietly abandoned, this partial success increases the likelihood that North Korea's KN-08 and KN-14 road-mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) will reach operational status early in the next decade. ... As a test, this isn't as useful as launching the missile on its more usual ballistic arc. It gives the engines a full workout, but makes it harder to verify the performance of the guidance system. It also provides a different reentry environment, and testing the reentry vehicle is going to be critical to North Korea. Their older missiles entered the atmosphere at no more than half the Musudan's speed. The North Koreans probably now know, for the first time, what happens when one of their warheads enters the atmosphere at roughly 10,000 miles per hour, but at an abnormally steep angle which will give a shorter but more intense heating load and do most of its deceleration lower in the atmosphere than it would in an operational launch. They might still not know whether the warhead would survive in an operational flight. Why would they have tested a missile in such a manner? Examining a map of the region shows that there is really no way to launch a missile from Wonsan to a range of more than 1,000 km without overflying some foreign country, most likely Japan. The Japanese take a dim view of North Korean missiles flying over their country, and they have Aegis-equipped warships capable of shooting down missiles. Pyongyang apparently didn't want to take that provocative risk. They could have launched the missile from their Sohae Satellite Launching Station, which has clear range to the south as far as the Philippines. North Korea's orbital launches have used this site and this trajectory, and it would have made for a more realistic test of the Musudan. Given that the Musudan is a mobile missile, they could have launched from any paved road along the southeast coast for the same effect. But North Korea's engineers almost certainly would have wanted the support of powerful tracking radars and other infrastructure associated with a permanent launch site, and the Sohae site has only been used for North Korea's nominally civilian satellite launches. There may have been some internal politics involved in the decision to loft the missile high over the East Sea and bring it down at such a short range. The bigger limitation of this test is the decision to launch two missiles only a few hours apart. That decision greatly limits what can actually be learned from the test. There is no possibility, in that timeframe, of figuring out what went wrong with the first missile and fixing it. As with the earlier Musudan tests, this isn't so much an engineering program so much as an exercise in tossing a coin or rolling a die until it comes up with the result they like. If North Korea's sixth and latest Musudan launch counts as a success in their minds—and it well might—the one before it was still clearly a failure. Do they now have a reliable missile that had a spot of bad luck, or a dud that got lucky and worked once? We don't know. Neither do they. And they knew from the start that they wouldn't know if they had a reliable missile in the end. So we should probably assume they don't really care, that this was about propaganda and image rather than engineering and weapons development. They have achieved something that is as close to a win as possible without overflying Japan, and if they try again there's a good chance that Musudan #7 will be an embarrassing

failure just like Musudan #5. Best case, they declare victory and go home, and make a quiet note to never actually trust the Musudan in wartime. Worst case, they tell their engineers to go back to their ground test facilities and turn this one-shot stunt into a useful weapon. The engineers in question would probably be quite happy to know they still have jobs, and turning the results from this spurt of unreasonably fast testing into a reliable weapon, would occupy them for a year or two at least. If they come back a year from now, testing Musudan missiles one at a time and with three to six months between tests, then we can start worrying about an operational Musudan. But we should also consider worrying about an operational KN-08 or KN-14. These missiles use the same ex-Soviet engine as the Musudan, but in a clustered and multi-stage configuration capable of reaching much of the US mainland. We have seen them test this engine on the ground, but until now they had never successfully flown one. Even if North Korea retires the Musudan as too unreliable for anything but propaganda stunts, they will presumably ship any test data to the engineers building the ICBMs. And those engineers don't seem to be under any pressure to rush into premature flight testing. Regardless of the ultimate fate of the Musudan, the credibility of the KN-08 and KN-14 road-mobile ICBMs has increased a few notches. The North Koreans have the engines they need, and they can at least sometimes make them work in flight. There is still a great deal of work for them to do. The clustered twin-engine installation in particular will likely give them a few surprises on its first flight, and it will likely take them several tries to get the complete system right. We still don't expect them to have those missiles operational before 2020, but early flight testing by that date is increasingly likely." (John Schilling, "A Partial Success for the Musudan," *38North*, June 23, 2016)

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The top North Korean official for U.S. relations told The Associated Press that his country is now a nuclear threat to be reckoned with, and Washington can expect more nuclear tests and missile launches like the ones earlier this week as long as it attempts to force his government's collapse through a policy of pressure and punishment. "It's the United States that caused this issue," Han Song Ryol, director-general of the department of U.S. affairs at North Korea's Foreign Ministry, said in his first interview with an American news organization since assuming the post three years ago. "They have to stop their military threats, sanctions and economic pressure. Without doing so, it's like they are telling us to reconcile while they are putting a gun to our forehead." Han defended the North's test-launching on June 22 of two medium-range ballistic missiles, which were quickly condemned by Washington, Tokyo and Seoul as a "provocation" and a violation of United Nations resolutions. Han dismissed the criticism, saying North Korea has no choice but to build up its military deterrent as long as the world's largest superpower – and the country that first developed nuclear weapons – remains an enemy. He noted that the U.S. recently deployed nuclear-powered submarines and strategic bombers capable of dropping nuclear weapons on North Korea to the region, and earlier this year conducted training for precision airstrikes on North Korea's leadership, along with simulations of an advance into the capital, Pyongyang, with the South Korean military during joint annual exercises. "This launch was a significant and novel step that my country must take to produce a powerful nuclear deterrent," Han said. "The real provocation is coming from the United States. ... How can my country stand by and do nothing?" Han said North Korea has never recognized a longstanding United Nations Security Council ban on its testing of

nuclear weapons or long-range missiles. "The United States must see correctly the trend of the times and the strategic position of (North Korea) and must withdraw its hostile policy," he said in the hour-long interview at the Foreign Ministry, located next to Kim Il Sung Square in central Pyongyang. "My country is a nuclear state. In the past, my country has been threatened by the United States with its nuclear weapons, but I can now say proudly that the United States is being threatened by my country's nuclear weapons." He held out the possibility of dialogue with the United States, but only if Washington agrees to "drop its hostile policies," replace the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War with a lasting peace treaty, and withdraw its troops based in South Korea. Han, who formerly served at North Korea's United Nations mission and lived in New York, said it would require "political resolve" in Washington to change its policies toward North Korea. **"There are many measures that the United States can take,"** he said. In response, he said, North Korea is willing to follow suit, regardless of what has happened in the past. But until that happens, he said, there are "clouds of nuclear war" on the Korean Peninsula. Han said North Korea has only grown stronger under the "strategic patience" policy of the Obama administration, which focuses on sanctions and military pressure to weaken and isolate North Korea and has brought talks between the two countries to a virtual standstill. "Day by day our country is becoming stronger, especially the military capacity," he said. "It is natural that many Americans, including the critics, say that strategic patience is a failure. It gave a lot of time to my country to strengthen. So if the United States does not change its policy, which is based on the collapse and overturn of my country, without accepting it as a nuclear state, any policies in the future are fated to fail as well." He said he is not optimistic the election of a new U.S. president in November will bring much change. "Since the founding of our country the United States has refused to accept our country as a sovereign state," he said. "My country will be focusing on the new administration. But we don't think it will change its policy, so we are preparing ourselves to deal with its policy to overturn our country ... I can see dark clouds hanging over the sky of the Korean Peninsula." He said that as long as those dark clouds remain, Washington can expect more nuclear tests and missile launches. (Associated Press, "North Korea: We Won't Abandon Nukes with U.S. Guns to Our Head," June 24, 2016) The U.S. strenuously denied any meeting between its senior representative for the Six-Party Talks and the head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry's American affairs bureau during their recent visits to Beijing. During a regular briefing on June 23, US State Department spokesperson John Kirby responded to questions from reporters asking for confirmation after North Korean envoy Choe Son-hui's curiously remarked that she might have met with the department's special representative for North Korea policy Sung Kim. "[Kim] did not meet with [Choe]. I can confirm that," Kirby replied. When asked why the two had not met, Kirby said, "There was no planning to have that meeting." In response to additional questions on whether Kim and Choe may have exchanged greetings, Kirby curtly replied, "There was no meeting, and as I understand it, there was no group meeting at which the two were equally present." Washington's denial not only of any unofficial meeting but also of any communication at all with the North Korean envoy appears motivated by concerns that it could send to wrong signal to Pyongyang and other countries on its intentions regarding dialogue. Earlier this year, North Korea carried out a fourth nuclear test in the face of objections from the international community. On June 23, Choe gave a curious reply when asked by

reporters before the North Korean embassy in Beijing on whether she had met with Kim. "Ask the US about that. I will not comment on any sensitive matters," Choe said. Despite the strenuous denial from Washington, *Asahi Shimbun*, citing an unnamed source, reported on June 24 that Kim and Choe had had an unofficial meeting during the dialogue on June 22. (Yi Yong-in and Gil Yun-hyung, "U.S. Firmly Denies Any Meeting with North Korean Representative at Dialogue in Beijing," *Hankyore*, June 25, 2016)

6/25/16

NDC Policy Department "in a detailed report on Saturday disclosed and denounced the thrice-cursed crimes committed by the sworn enemy given the prevailing situation in the hot spot waters in the West Sea which can be called the epitome of the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK and the south Korean puppet forces' policy for confrontation with the DPRK. The report disclosed the sinister nature of the gangster-like U.S. which turned the West Sea of Korea into the hottest spot waters. The military tension in these waters that does not subside despite the passage of time is the extension of the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK and its direct product. ...Back in 1953 when the June 25 war ended in truce, the U.S. moved desperately to create a starting point for a new war. On many occasions such as the 346th meeting of the Military Armistice Committee in December 1973, the DPRK-U.S. general-level talks in Panmunjom in August and September 1999, the U.S. categorically ignored the efforts made by the DPRK side to set the maritime military demarcation line in the West Sea and prevent the military conflict there. The U.S. has been without exception behind the vicious moves of the puppet forces of south Korea to escalate the military tension in the hot spot waters in the West Sea into the estuary of the River Han. Lots of artillery live-shell firing drills in the said waters and the ceaseless intrusion into the territorial waters and air of the DPRK after the fabrication of the "northern limit line" in the West Sea of Korea clearly prove that the U.S. is the arch criminal ratcheting military tension and the danger of conflict in these waters. The report also disclosed the moves of the south Korean puppet forces, a group of hideous warmongers who turned the sea common to the nation into the hot spot waters of confrontation and conflict. ...The puppet Command for the Defense of Northwestern Islands of south Korea which regards the hot spot waters in the West Sea as its operational theatre held a "memorial service" for those who met deaths while running riot in the forefront areas for confrontation with the fellow countrymen and also has been hell-bent on another round of provocation while crying out for "punishment." This was timed to coincide with the farce for taking a posture for putting an end to the "north's provocation" within 24 hours by task forces of the puppet navy and marine corps commissioned in May. From 16th to 18th, dozens of large combat warships of the puppet navy and coastal police staged marine mobile drills with fighters with different missions involved. They also staged air defense drill, exercises for defending the area they are stationed and exercises for countering underwater infiltration while crying out for turning the hot spot waters into the "grave" of someone and escalating military stand-off for the purpose. In fact, the military situation in the hot spot waters in the West Sea has gone beyond the phase of control. **A clear proof of it was the reckless military actions committed by the puppet military gangsters on May 27. The provocative marine infiltration is without exception supported by the puppet air force and ground artillery pieces with the involvement of the fully-armed marine groups made up of puppet**



**warships.** The sinister aim sought by the south Korean puppet forces is to deliberately invade the inviolable territorial waters of the DPRK and make a preemptive strike and thus compel the Korean People's Army to take counteraction for self-defense and then paint the DPRK as the chieftain of "provocation" and "threat" by setting in motion reptile reactionary media and push the situation in the hot spot waters in the West Sea to the brink of war. The most urgent task for ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula at present is to put the situation in the hot spot waters in the West Sea under control. ...The increasing military tension has to be deescalated and the daily mounting danger of military conflict has to be defused at an early date. Traitor Park Geun Hye and her group finding themselves at risk in the face of the worst "administrative" crisis are pushing the situation in the sensitive hot spot waters in the West Sea to the point of explosion at the zealous instigation of their American master. **The hot spot waters in the West Sea made us keenly realize in practice the truth that talking would never help achieve peace and only matchlessly powerful arms will ensure genuine peace.** Steadfast is the will of the army and people of the DPRK to prevent the danger of conflict in the hot spot waters in the West Sea, improve the north-south relations and defuse tension on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces should admit their criminal responsibility for turning the southwestern waters into the world's hottest spot waters and immediately stop their reckless military provocations." (KCNA, "DPRK NDC Policy Department Blasts U.S., S. Korea for Turning Southwestern Waters in West Sea into Hottest Spot Waters," June 25, 2016)

6/27/16

KCNA: "The north side preparatory committee for the joint conference of political parties and organizations and individual personages in north and south of Korea and overseas for peace and independent reunification of the Korean peninsula Monday sent an open letter as regards the holding of a great national conference for reunification on the occasion of the 71st anniversary of Korea's liberation to the south Korean authorities including chiefs of offices of Chongwadae, the prime minister, ministers and vice-ministers, officials concerned of the south Korean National Assembly including Chairman Jong Se Gyun, Vice-Chairmen Pak Ju Son and Sim Jae Chol, leading officials of the Minju Party, the Saenuri Party, the Party of People and the Party of Justice of south Korea, chief vice-chairman of the Advisory Council for Democracy and Peaceful Unification of south Korea, the president of the Red Cross of south Korea, heads of local autonomous bodies of south Korea, the South Side Committee for Implementing the June 15 Joint Declaration and other reunification movement organizations, religious and civic and public organizations, socio-cultural and economic cooperative organizations, Ri Hui Ho, Rim Tong Won, Pak Ji Won, Jong Se Hyon, Jong Tong Yong, Ri Jong Sok, Ri Jae Jong and others related to the Pyongyang meeting, more than a hundred of famous individuals and overseas compatriotic organizations and personages. The open letter said that the new line and policies for national reunification set forth at the Seventh Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea reflected the firm faith and will to put an end to the 70 odd-year-long history of separation and open up a new era of reunification and prosperity for glorifying the dignity and honor of the Korean nation over the world. The letter noted that it is the steadfast will of the north that whoever is keenly aware of the value of destiny and future of the nation should accept the north's sincere and innovative

initiative and proposals to put an end to the extreme confrontation between compatriots, achieve peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and independently open up a way for national reunification by the concerted efforts of the nation. It is the invariable stand of the DPRK that anyone who cherishes national conscience even a bit, even if he or she used to oppose reunification, can turn over a new leaf as a companion on the road of reunification, the letter said. It noted that the DPRK's opinion is to hold in Pyongyang or Kaesong a great national conference for reunification to be participated in by the authorities of the north and the south and representatives of the political parties and organizations and figures of various strata at home and abroad before and after August 15 this year, the 71st anniversary of Korea's liberation, and call it a joint conference of the political parties, organizations and personages in the north and the south and abroad for peace and independent reunification of the Korean peninsula. If the south side offers a constructive opinion on the matters concerned such as the period, place, participants and agenda item for discussion of the joint conference, the DPRK has full will to examine them without reserve and accept them, the letter said. Regarding that it is an urgent task to form preparatory committees for practically pushing forward the holding of a joint conference in every region and form a joint national preparatory committee on the basis of it, the DPRK hoped that the work for implementing them would be soon started in the south side and abroad and made a proposal for holding a working-level contact related with the formation of the joint national preparatory committee comprising delegates from the north and the south and abroad within July at a place to be agreed upon, the letter noted. The letter expressed belief and expectation that the south Korean authorities, and political parties, organizations and reputed figures at home and abroad would positively respond to the DPRK's sincere proposals and measures, being well aware of their duty before the era and nation in the present crucial phase." (KCNA, "Open Letter to Authorities, Political Parties, Organizations and Individuals of S. Korea and Overseas," June 27, 2016)

A North Korean agent arrested by Chinese authorities earlier this month for circulating counterfeit \$100 banknotes in Dandong was a former member of the Operations Department responsible for major espionage missions against Seoul, a source with knowledge of North Korea exclusively told *JoongAng Ilbo*. The source said that the information was passed down from a businessman involved in trade with North Korea, adding that the arrested agent was going to pay that businessman for trade goods but could not do so apparently because of his arrest. According to the source, "That businessman asked North Korean officials where the arrested agent came from and the answer was the Operations Department." The revelation came after initial reports last week that the North Korean agent was arrested in the border city of Dandong in Liaoning Province, northeastern China, for having distributed counterfeit U.S. dollars. It was reported that the agent brought \$5 million in cash into China from North Korea in order to make payments for household goods and home appliances. These goods were supposedly distributed to North Koreans during the April 15 celebration of the birthday of the country's late founder, Kim Il Sung, as well as during its ruling Workers' Party's seventh congress held in early May, the first of its kind in nearly four decades. But a number of the notes were found to be counterfeit when they were run through banknote counters by bank employees, so Chinese authorities ordered the relevant account frozen and arrested the North Korean agent. The Operations Department, the

agent's former employer, was responsible for intelligence and espionage operations inside South Korea and in a third country. The special-purpose department is considered by South Korean intelligence to have been responsible for a submarine infiltration near Sokcho in Gangwon in 1998. All nine North Korean agents inside the submarine committed suicide to avoid capture and were all found dead. The clandestine bureau was later expanded to become the current General Bureau of Reconnaissance run under the Workers' Party of Korea by merging with the party's Office No. 35 and the Ministry of People's Armed Forces' Reconnaissance Bureau in 2009. After years of circulating counterfeit \$100 banknotes, North Korea's so-called supernotes seemed to have disappeared in recent years. Pyongyang's nearly flawless counterfeit notes were a major source of slush funds for the regime and date back to the 1970s. But a major crackdown by U.S. authorities and new security features on banknotes led to a decline in the trade. (Kim Hyoung-gu and Kang Jun-kyu, "North Korean Supernotes Were Made by a Former Spy," *JoongAng Ilbo*, June 27, 2016)

6/28/16

South Korea rejected North Korea's offer to hold a meeting involving both sides' political parties and social organizations in August, saying that denuclearization should be prioritized as a precondition for dialog. South Korea's unification ministry said that the North's offer lacks sincerity as its peace offensive came amid North Korea's ceaseless pursuit of nuclear and missile tests. "It is North Korea's traditional way of conducting a propaganda campaign against South Korea," the ministry said in a statement. "North Korea's vow to stick to nuclear and missile tests clearly shows that its dialog offer is just a bogus proposal." South Korea's point man on unification said Tuesday that as long as North Korea sticks to its nuclear weapons program, Seoul cannot hold meaningful dialogue with North Korea. "Now is the time that we have to focus on making the North give up its nuclear program, rather than seek dialogue and exchanges with the North," Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo told a forum on North Korea's finance. (Yonhap, "S. Korea Rejects N.K. Offer for Joint Meeting Involving Parties, Key Figures," June 28, 2016)

DPRK FoMin Disarmament and Peace Institute spokesman's "answer to the question put by KCNA as regards the military provocation perpetrated by the U.S. against the DPRK together with Japan and south Korean puppet forces: On Tuesday[?] the U.S. staged a missile warning drill in the waters near Hawaii together with Japan and the south Korean puppet forces under the pretext of coping with "nuclear and missile threat" from the DPRK. The drill staged in the Pacific Ocean was another military provocation against the DPRK and a revelation of their hegemonic scenario for disturbing regional peace and security. The U.S. recently opened to the public the hideous plan for "precision air raid operation" aimed to "disable" nuclear facilities and strategic means of the DPRK and introduced nuclear-powered submarine Mississippi and a formation of B-52H strategic bombers into south Korea. The anti-DPRK joint military drill staged in the wake of these military moves clearly proves once again who is chiefly to blame for the tense situation on the Korean peninsula. What should not be overlooked is that the U.S., Japan and south Korea openly started the provocative triangular joint military exercise, the first of its kind in history. The U.S. missile defense system which is being translated into reality in the Asia-Pacific region and the appearance of NATO of Asian version with the U.S.-Japan-south Korean triangular

military alliance as a mother body are not a long way off, and it will inevitably spark off a new arms race and a new Cold War in Northeast Asia surrounding the Korean peninsula. Herein lies the danger of the above-said drill. The reality goes to prove that very just are the line and policy of the Workers' Party of Korea and the state on further bolstering up the self-defensive nuclear deterrence both in quality and quantity. It is the consistent stand of the DPRK to defend the peace and security in the region and the rest of the world by dint of Songun. Now that the U.S. and other hostile forces are posing constant threat to the security of the DPRK and the region by frequently staging joint military exercises, the army and people of the DPRK will bolster in a sustainable manner the capabilities for preemptive nuclear attack to pose a constant threat to the enemies, and put spurs to research and development of diverse strategic attack weapons." (KCNA, "U.S.-Japan-S. Korea Missile Warning Drill Another Military Provocation against DPRK," June 28, 2016)

North Korea's extended-range Scud missiles are capable of reaching the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture. "We previously assumed the Scud-ER, a modified version of the Scud-C, could fly about 700 km. But our joint assessment with U.S. intelligence indicates that it can fly more than 1,000 km," a senior South Korean military official told *JoongAng Ilbo*. If launched from a frontline unit on a mobile launch pad, the Scud-ER, also known as the Hwasong-7, could hit the Yokosuka Naval Base to prevent deployment of U.S. 7th Fleet assets based there to the Korean Peninsula, the report said. According to the Defense Ministry's latest white paper, North Korea has managed to extend the range of the Scud-ER by extending the body of the ballistic missile while reducing the weight of its warhead, among other factors. "The range of a Scud ER is estimated to reach 1,000 km, and it is possible that a part of Japan falls within this range," it says. (Kyodo, "North Korea's Long-Range SCUD Can Reach U.S. Yokosuka Base: Seoul Daily," *Japan Times*, June 29, 2016)

6/29/16

North Korea has created a new ruling organization in an apparent continuation of efforts by leader Kim Jong Un to shift political power away from the military and spur economic revival. A meeting of Pyongyang's rubber-stamp parliament June 29 approved the formation of the State Affairs Commission to replace the National Defense Commission as the highest branch of government, according to a report from North Korea's state news agency. The military-dominated NDC has for years been the supreme governing authority in North Korea. Under the "military-first" policy of Kim Jong Il, North Korea's ruler from 1994 to 2011 and father of the current leader, the NDC directed policy in areas such as the economy and foreign relations as well as national defense. During that period, military figures took control of projects such as trade and mining, funneling resources to the armed forces. Kim Jong Un has sought to revive the role of the ruling Workers' Party by asserting his own authority over the military and emphasizing the party in decision-making. Since taking power, Kim has rotated out or purged dozens of generals, widely interpreted as measures to rein in military authority. The majority of members of the new State Affairs Commission named in the state media report are political figures. Kim was given the title of chairman, while Premier Pak Pong Ju, who is responsible for economic policy, was named one of three vice chairmen. The Supreme People's Assembly, which meets once or twice a year, focused heavily on economic development, according to the

state media report. Pak gave a speech about a recently announced five-year economic plan that largely called for renewed efforts to raise industrial output, according to a separate state media dispatch. North Korea recently started a campaign exhorting its citizens to work harder to increase economic output during a 200-day period. Among other personnel changes announced at the parliament meeting, Ri Ryong Nam, an official responsible for foreign trade, was named one of two vice premiers. The move shows North Korea's hope to increase international trade, said Michael Madden, an expert on the North Korean leadership and editor of the website North Korea Leadership Watch. (Alastair Gale, "North Korea Creates New Ruling Branch to Reduce Military Role," *Wall Street Journal*, June 30, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement: "The U.S. persists in its hostile acts to create the atmosphere of putting pressure on the DPRK over its step for bolstering defense capabilities for self-defense. It is pulling up the DPRK over its test-fire of surface-to-surface medium long-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-10, terming it a "provocation", "threat" and "violation." But it is the U.S. which is perpetrating provocations and posing threat to the DPRK in wanton violation of international law. Its introduction of many strategic assets including nuclear-powered submarine *Mississippi* and B-52H strategic bombers into south Korea and its vicinity is the provocation and the ceaseless nuclear war drills staged by it for attacking the DPRK, trumpeting about "beheading operation" targeting its headquarters and "operation for occupying Pyongyang," are threats to it. As the DPRK has already clarified in its letter to the UN secretary general, where is international law which says nuclear tests and ballistic rocket launches are threats to global peace and security? It is quite natural and just self-defensive measure for the DPRK to take a series of steps for bolstering nuclear deterrence to cope with the U.S. constant nuclear threat and ceaseless provocations to the former which are a wanton violation of the UN Charter and international laws. For this reason, the White House and State and Defense departments have made much fuss but failed to evoke international response and is cold-shouldered. Much upset by this, the U.S. is prodding its satellite countries into staging an international campaign of expressing "concern" over the DPRK's test-fire of the surface-to-surface medium long-range strategic ballistic rocket. It is deplorable to see some weak-willed countries shamelessly behaving without any principle, taken in by the above-said campaign, and staging the farce of "expressing their stands." This is a behavior contrary to the position of a sovereign state and action nothing helpful to the peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK will closely watch the pitiful behavior of these countries and the U.S. and its followers will be held wholly accountable for the ensuing catastrophic consequences. It is preposterous for the U.S. to give lip-service to dialogue while persistently pursuing an international campaign to isolate and stifle the DPRK. **The U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK can never go with any kind of dialogue.** This is the stand of the DPRK. **The DPRK will continue taking a series of steps for bolstering up the nuclear deterrent for self-defense both in quality and quantity to cope with the ever-escalating U.S. hostile acts** against the former." (KCNA, "FM Spokesman Slams U.S. for Its Moves to Create Atmosphere of Putting Pressure on DPRK," June 29, 2016)

Japan, South Korea and the United States held an unprecedented trilateral missile defense exercise, aimed at countering the growing threat from nuclear-armed North Korea, which denounced it as a "military provocation." The drill in waters off Hawaii came less than a week after North Korea flight-tested a powerful new medium-range ballistic missile that leader Kim Jong Un hailed as a strike threat to U.S. military bases across the Pacific. The trilateral exercise included a ballistic target tracking operation to test the Aegis anti-missile systems used by the U.S. and its two key Asian allies. "While there were no missiles fired, all participants strengthened interoperability, communication channels, data collection and capabilities assessments," the U.S. Pacific Command said in a statement. The drill was significant for the participation of both South Korea and Japan, who are still emerging from an extended diplomatic freeze that had undermined U.S. efforts to present a united front against Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. (AFP-JIJI, "U.S., South Korea, Japan Hold First Anti-North Korea Missile Drill," *Japan Times*, June 29, 2016)

Chinese President Xi Jinping urged South Korea to pay attention to China's concerns about the deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system to the country and "cautiously" address the plan. South Korea should "attach importance to China's legitimate concern on security and cautiously and appropriately address the United States' plan" to deploy THAAD in South Korea, Xi told visiting South Korean Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, Xinhua reported. North Korea's drive to develop a nuclear weapons capability has angered China, Pyongyang's sole major diplomatic and economic supporter. But Beijing fears THAAD and its radar have a range that would extend into China. Xi added that China and South Korea should continue to work for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, work together to maintain peace and stability and solve problems through dialogue and consultation. (Ben Blanchard, "China's Xi Urges Caution over U.S. Missile Deployment in South Korea," Reuters, June 29, 2016)

7/1/16

DPRK FoMin spokesman "answer to the question put by KCNA on Friday as regards the U.S. vicious moves to create an international atmosphere of escalating sanctions and pressure upon the DPRK: The U.S., Japan and the south Korean puppet group held a briefing on the enforcement of illegal sanctions against the DPRK at the UN office on June 30. The briefing held by the U.S. together with its followers without any authorization of the UN Secretariat and the UN Security Council was a mean action unprecedented in the UN history and a mockery of the international community. As the DPRK has already clarified more than once, the UNSC "resolutions on the anti-DPRK sanctions" are nothing but criminal documents from A to Z bereft of impartiality, legality and morality as they serve the sinister political purpose of a power and wantonly infringe upon the independence and vital rights of a sovereign state. For this reason, though the U.S. left no means untried to stir up the atmosphere of sanctions by prodding some satellite states, many countries are turning their backs on this move and the UN Secretariat itself is shunning the explanation about the legal ground for "resolutions on the anti-DPRK sanctions." As the illegal "resolutions on sanctions" against the DPRK cooked up by the U.S. at the UNSC proved unworkable, the latter put into force its unilateral harsh sanctions against the former. In the meantime, it is staging such despicable farce as egging Japan, south Korea and other vassal forces on to visit

various countries in a bid to pressurize and appease them to sever normal economic and trade ties and even diplomatic relations with the DPRK. It is quite natural that this mean and disgusting behavior only invites international sarcasm. They are sadly mistaken if they calculate any sanctions and pressure will work on the DPRK making a leaping advance on the principle of giving priority to self-development. The ever-escalating U.S. nuclear threat and sanctions would prompt the DPRK to bolster up its nuclear deterrent both in quality and quantity." (KCNA, "DPRK Foreign Minister Spokesman Accuses U.S. of Stirring up Atmosphere of Escalating 'Sanctions' against DPRK," July 1, 2016)

Following North Korea's latest nuclear test, in January, trade over the China-North Korea border dropped dramatically, according to newly released satellite imagery. The revelation has led experts to conclude that Beijing has been quietly punishing Kim by cutting off the flow of funds to his regime. "It is apparent that shortly after North Korea did the fourth nuclear test in January, China took unilateral measures to drastically curtail trade interaction along their border," said Victor Cha, director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration. Cha, now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), led a team of researchers that procured and analyzed the new satellite imagery as part of their project Beyond Parallel, a website and database dedicated to demystifying what's going on inside the world's most secretive state. Cha's conclusion, that Beijing decided to punish North Korea after the nuclear test but didn't disclose that to the world, is backed up by anecdotal reports of Chinese officials telling Western interlocutors that President Xi Jinping had decided to "take action" against the Kim regime, behind the scenes, out of anger over the nuke test. "It shows that China pursues things in their own way when it comes to North Korea, not because the U.S. or the U.N. tells them to," said Cha. "The good news is that they are squeezing them more than we were led to expect." CSIS worked with imagery analysts at the commercial satellite firm DigitalGlobe to collect and examine satellite photos of several key trade-related areas on both sides of the China-North Korea border, including the Sinuiju railroad station and customs area on the North Korean side, the Dandong railroad station and customs area on the Chinese side, and the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge that links the two countries. They compared activity at the sites year over year, first by examining imagery from January and March of 2015 and then comparing that with imagery collected this February, just after the latest nuclear test. The images showed a "substantive reduction of economic activity on the Sino-North Korean border" as evidenced by a huge drop in the number of rail cars at the stations, trucks in customs areas, trucks on the bridge and undocked boats in the Yalu River. At the Sinuiju rail station, most of the train cars appeared to be in storage early this year, with no engines attached to the freight cars. In the Sinuiju customs area, there were 111 trucks shown in the satellite image from January 2015, but in the February 2016 image, there were only five. On the Chinese side, there were 32 trucks spotted in the Dandong customs area in March 2015, but by this February there were only six. Official trade data regarding North Korea is notoriously unreliable, and Cha said comprehensive data on economic activity over the China-North Korea border does not really exist. But his team has been briefing U.S. and South Korean government agencies on what they found, and he said both governments have shown interest in pursuing the research. "The Chinese don't feel like they need to get credit

for punishing North Korea and they don't want to be seen as [if] they are being pressured by the U.S. to do it," said Cha. (Josh Rogin, "Satellite Imagery Suggests China Is Secretly Punishing North Korea," *Washington Post*, July 1, 2016)

7/4/16

DPRK FoMin Institute for American Studies: "As well known, Northeast Asia is a very sensitive region in geo-political terms in which there exists fierce competition between world powers as well as long-running, serious disputes and confrontation structure in terms of territorial and historical issues. On top of it, the Korean peninsula, which is yet to see an end to the war and is faced with another round risk of war all the time, has become the world's biggest hotspot. The Armistice Agreement (AA) was concluded in 1950s to bring 3 years' Korean war to a halt. Armistice is not meant for once-and-for-all end of the war, but a temporal cease-fire. Ever since then, for more than 60 years, instable cease-fire situation has prevailed over the Korean peninsula which is neither in a state of war nor peace. The above mentioned 60 years' history should not be simply regarded as the one of maintenance or sustenance of the AA. It is the history in which the US, the belligerent party and the world's nuclear power, has kept threatening the DPRK, the other warring party with its nuclear arsenal and aggressor forces. It is also the history in which the DPRK has safeguarded its national sovereignty and right to existence with its self-defensive counter measures. The US's persistent nuclear threats pushed the DPRK to join the advanced ranks of the nuclear weapons states and accordingly, turned the belligerent relation between the DPRK and the US into the one between the nuclear powers. Times have changed and so has the DPRK's strategic status. **The DPRK's successful test-fire of surface-to-surface intermediate strategic ballistic rocket "Hwasong-10" is a clear declaration that the US's unilateral nuclear threats to the DPRK has come to the end.** The powerful DPRK which has possessed even H-bomb, displays its might as a full-fledged, responsible nuclear weapons state which is striving for just international order while deterring the US's nuclear threats, blackmailing, high-handedness and arbitrariness. Today, the belligerent relation between the DPRK and the US has fundamentally transmuted and the strategic structure in northeast Asia surrounding the Korean peninsula has also dramatically changed. Such a reality requires the replacement of the AA with the peace agreement and establishment of the long-lasting peace-keeping regime more urgently than ever. **Peace agreement and Confidence-Building** Recently **at several multilateral stages such as "Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on NEA security" and "North East Asia Cooperation Dialogue,"** some argued that it could be desirable for both **the DPRK and the US to take confidence-building measures first as the perspective on the conclusion of peace agreement seems far-off.** In confidence building efforts, **it is prerequisite for the parties concerned to forge mutual trust that they could peacefully co-exist and cooperate** to achieve co-prosperity. It is the most basic and fundamental factor in confidence building to have trust in the other party's will for peaceful co-existence. Without trust that relevant party would neither invade nor do harm to the other party, it is unthinkable to build confidence among parties. **It is the first and foremost issue in confidence building on the Korean peninsula that the DPRK and the US should conclude the peace agreement in order to put a definite end to the state of war.** The conclusion of a peace agreement presents itself as an urgent matter to be tackled without delay in the light of the present situation on the peninsula where a war may break out at any moment due to



the nullification of the Korean Armistice Agreement (AA). The AA was adopted as an international legal document which envisaged the establishment of lasting peace-keeping mechanism on the Korean Peninsula, not a temporary halt to belligerence. However, the U.S. has desperately blocked the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue while reinforcing aggressor forces in South Korea and introducing all sorts of war hardware including mass destructive weapons into South Korea from abroad in systematic violation of the AA. The AA was nullified a long time ago due to the U.S.'s persistent violations and consequently, the relation between the DPRK and the U.S. turned into de facto belligerent state of war from the mere technical one. The current belligerent relationship between the DPRK and the US on the Korean peninsula is no longer the same with the previous one where the DPRK confronted the nuclear arms of the US with the rifles. It is now the belligerent relation between the nuclear-armed states. At the 7th congress of the Worker's Party of Korea, DPRK's supreme leader Kim Jong Un clarified that the US should roll back its anachronistic hostile policy towards the DPRK and replace the AA with the peace agreement with clear understanding of the strategic status of the DPRK which has proudly joined the advanced ranks of nuclear weapons states and general tendency of the times. **The stand of the DPRK government and people remains unchanged to put an end to the state of war on the legal basis and to establish lasting peace-keeping mechanism on the Korean peninsula on the legal basis by signing the peace agreement with the US.** However, **if the US persistently sidesteps the DPRK's demand for conclusion of peace agreement and keeps posing extreme nuclear threats, the DPRK would physically root out the war state on the Korean peninsula with the powerful nuclear deterrent.** It is urgent requirement coming from the grave situation of Korean peninsula - the world's biggest hotspot and the site of showdown between nuclear powers - to conclude the peace agreement and establish durable peace keeping regime. Conclusion of peace agreement is prerequisite for the sake of legal and institutional guarantee and groundwork for confidence building between the DPRK and the US as well. A string of agreements had been made between the DPRK and the US in the past through negotiations on confidence building measures. However, those measures remain unimplemented due to the absence of legal groundwork to guarantee its implementation and in particular, due to the US's persistent hostile policy toward the DPRK. **Legal and institutional guarantee is also required to prevent any possible nullification of agreements between parties caused by every change of the US administrations.** It is a **good example that Agreed Framework** under the Clinton administration and some measures taken by both parties became nullified and went in vain as new Bush administration vilified the DPRK as an "axis of evil" and designated it as the target of nuclear preemptive attack. Establishment of institutional mechanism for peaceful co-existence legally backed by the conclusion of peace agreement would make it possible for both parties to agree on and implement practical measures for confidence building, based on trust in each other's will for peaceful co-existence. **The DPRK's sustained efforts for conclusion of peace agreement** Since the conclusion of the AA, the US, the world's nuclear power, has been threatening the DPRK's sovereignty and its right to live while blocking the latter's economic construction for peaceful development. The Korean peninsula is located at a strategic stronghold in northeast Asia. If military confrontation and conflict continue to prevail and eventually a war break out here, it would, in turn, plunge the situation in

the whole area of NEA into extreme tension and could be a fuse of a nuclear war worldwide. The DPRK has made sincere efforts to get peace agreement concluded, out of long-cherished desire to put an end to the state of war and achieve peaceful development free from any serious threat as well as its responsibility of defending peace and security on the Korean peninsula and NEA. However, the US systematically violated core provisions of the AA such as Paragraph 60 which stipulates the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the peaceful and fundamental settlement of the Korean issue by the concerted efforts of the Koreans. The AA which should serve as a clear legal ground for concluding a peace agreement was nullified by the US in less than one year's time after it was signed. In response to the US's breach of the AA and ever-increasing danger of war, the DPRK repeatedly proposed the conclusion of peace agreement on various occasions. The DPRK made such proposals to the US and parties concerned in April, 1956 and to the US congress in March, 1974. As the cease fire regime turned out to be no longer in effect due to the US in early 1990s', the DPRK repeatedly proposed talks on establishment of a new peace regime and in 1996, initiated the conclusion of provisional agreement to be replaced with the AA in order to prevent armed conflict between two parties. It again proposed talks on peace agreement to the AA signatories in January, 2010 on the occasion of 60th anniversary of the outbreak of Korean war. The DPRK proposed talks again on peace agreement at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly and on various other occasions, as required by the dramatically changed recent situation on the peninsula. Nonetheless, our fair proposals and sincere efforts have led nowhere so far due to the challenge and opposition of the US who is main party concerned and holds the actual commanding power over the military in South Korea. **The US's aim lurking behind sidestepping Conclusion of Peace Agreement with DPRK** Since 1950's the US administrations have persistently refused to respond to the DPRK's fair proposal for conclusion of peace agreement and establishment of durable peace-keeping regime on the Korean peninsula and resorted to its war maneuver and escalation of tensions. It is rooted in the US's hostile policy towards the DPRK and its strategy for domination of the world. The US's noisy fuss about the DPRK's alleged threat is none other than a mean excuse for justifying its hostile policy and ambition for dominating the world. The US has enforced aggressive hostile policy towards the DPRK across the spectrum of politics, economy and military from the outset of the latter's founding. The US has denied recognizing the DPRK as a sovereign state because the latter has a different political system from its own one. It has imposed various economic sanctions on the DPRK to block its development and today those sanctions have become all the tougher to the full extent to bring down the DPRK's system. In military terms, the US stations its aggressor forces of odd 28,000 in South Korea, and worse still, it has kept threatening the DPRK with nukes by way of calling in all sorts of strategic assets in and around the peninsula. **In recent days, the US is driving the situation of Korean peninsula to the brink of outbreak of a nuclear war by openly conducting a "precision air raid operation" aimed at scorching down the nuclear facilities and nuclear arsenal of the DPRK while introducing its strategic assets into South Korea such as nuclear-powered submarine "Mississippi" and a formation of nuclear strategic bombers B-52H.** The US-South Korea joint military exercises against the DPRK are provocative and intrusion-oriented and as such, are most vivid and specific evidence of a hostile policy towards the DPRK.

The US seeks to justify those exercises as annual and defensive ones, but no country will overlook its warring party's military exercises taking place before its eyes. This year, the US staged "The Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16" joint military exercises on the largest-ever scale with utmost hostility to the DPRK. Those exercises involved strategic assets and huge forces enough to fight a full war and **extremely adventurous "operational plan 5015" - an integration of different operational plans such as "decapitation raid operation,"** a "precision strike drill" and "operation of storming Pyongyang" targeted at our supreme leadership was launched under the simulation of an actual war. The US's persistent denial of the conclusion of a peace agreement with the DPRK is also prompted by its ulterior ambition for domination over the world through holding hegemony over Asia. It is believed that the US estimates that relaxation of the situation and subsequent advent of peace on the Korean peninsula would make it lose a good excuse for its military presence and reinforcement of forces in the region and it would lead to having adverse implications for reigning in big powers in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula. For this reason, the US categorically denies concluding a peace agreement and seeks to intentionally strain the situation on the Korean peninsula in an attempt to reinforce its justification for restraining and gaining military superiority over big powers in the region. The US exercised a Missile Warning joint drill, the first of its kind off Hawaii together with Japan and South Korea in late June this year under the pretext of protecting against the DPRK's missile attack. It clearly reveals the US's desperate attempt to lay the groundwork for forging tripartite military alliance by pushing South Korea to join the US-Japan Missile Defense system and to rationalize its THAAD deployment plan and gain military upper-hand in the region. **It is the US's real intention to contain military expansion of China and undermine the strategic balance with Russia** through staged establishment of Missile Defense System in East Asia as it did in Europe and formulation of Asian version of NATO built on tripartite military alliance of the US, Japan and south Korea. The US's claim that denuclearization should take precedence over a talk on a peace agreement is nothing but a mean trick to conceal its deep-rooted hostile policy towards the DPRK and its ambition for domination over the world. The issue of conclusion of a peace agreement between the DPRK and the U.S. is not new one raised recently and the belligerent relationship between the DPRK and the US was not spawned by the former's nuclear deterrent. It is well known that the DPRK has called for its conclusion long before its access to a nuclear deterrent force. It dates back to the post war time in 1950's that the DPRK raised the issue with the US and the international community. Thanks to the DPRK's proactive and stubborn efforts, a resolution was adopted at the 30th session of UN General Assembly which called for withdrawal of all foreign troops out of south Korea and conclusion of peace agreement between the DPRK and the US. However, it has not been implemented yet due to the US's desperate opposition. **Some argues that "simultaneous discussion" on the peace agreement and denuclearization could be a fresh solution to breaking the existing deadlock. But, it is an impracticable theory drawn from negligence of history and essence of confrontation between the DPRK and the US. A "simultaneous discussion" formula is the failed one tried in previous dialogues long before the DPRK has become a full-fledged nuclear weapons state as of today.** Six parties had already tried simultaneous discussion on the issues of peace agreement and denuclearization in 2000's, **but those efforts ended up with failure because of belligerent**

**relationship between the DPRK and the US and ever-increasing US hostile policy towards the DPRK.** As vividly demonstrated to the world, the DPRK has proudly joined the advanced ranks of nuclear powers today. **The DPRK's access to nuclear weapons is the outcome of US hostile policy and it is not intended for a political bargaining chip or an economic deal to be put on the table of dialogue or negotiations.** Conclusion of a **peace agreement could be the first step in terms of withdrawal of US hostile policy towards the DPRK, but never be the last step.**

Even if the state of war comes to an end through conclusion of a peace agreement, **dangers of a nuclear war could not be eradicated completely as long as the US hostile policy and its ambition for world domination remain unchanged.** The **DPRK's nuclear deterrence should be considered in the context of complete withdrawal of the US hostile policy and global denuclearization.** It is unthinkable to place in parallel the DPRK's nuclear deterrence and a peace agreement which is long overdue. The DPRK's access to a nuclear deterrent force shall never be any kind of bargaining chip unless the US hostile policy fundamentally comes to an end. ※ ※ ※ How to approach the peace agreement is a touchstone to distinguish the peace-loving forces from trigger-happy ones. Once a legal guarantee for peaceful co-existence between the DPRK and the US is provided by the conclusion of a peace agreement, not only the DPRK-US relations but also issues of DPRK-Japan and the North and the South relations could be resolved. The supreme leader Kim Jong Un said the DPRK would improve and normalize relations with countries that respect its sovereignty and be friendly with the DPRK even if they were in hostile relations with the DPRK in the past. If the US rolls back its hostile policy towards the DPRK and makes a bold decision to conclude a peace agreement without any excuse or precondition, then the DPRK-US relationship could mark dramatic improvement on the basis of trust and it will give impetus to confidence building efforts in NEA." (Ri Yong Phil, "Conclusion of a Peace Agreement Is the Most Pressing Issue to Be Settled down," DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Institute for American Studies, July 4, 2016)

The United States is looking for the first time at imposing sanctions on North Korean officials for violations of human rights, and the blacklist may include the regime's leader Kim Jong-un. Multiple U.S. and South Korean sources told *JoongAng Ilbo* that Washington will submit to Congress as early as this week a report detailing North Korean human rights violations and a blacklist of 15 officials in the North Korean leadership and 10 agencies involved in infringement of human rights, including sending people to prison camps. Contrary to speculation that the sanctions would focus on officials of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, tasked with generating the regime's propaganda and controlling the people's thinking, according to a source, "Kim Jong-un makes a surprise appearance on the list." Individuals included on the sanctions list are expected to face a freezing of funds within the United States and a prohibition of entry into the country. One key source said: "The submission of a human rights violation report that includes Kim Jong-un, and the announcement of sanctions on North Korea's human rights issue - unlike sanctions for its nuclear tests or missile launches - permanently labels North Korea as 'a country in violation of human rights' and Kim Jong-un as 'a criminal who perpetrated the human rights violations.' Thus, this holds very significant meaning." The source continued, "This is the first time [the United States] is imposing unilateral sanctions for the North Korean human rights issue

in itself. Including Kim Jong-un on the sanctions list will have explosive force." Another official pointed out, "Targeting North Korea's leader in itself can cause a huge ripple effect in North Korea-U.S. relations and as a consequence in inter-Korean relations." The North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act, or H.R. 757, signed by President Barack Obama on Feb. 18, includes a section on the promotion of human rights. It requires a report by the State Department that identifies those involved with severe human rights abuse in North Korea, using the UN COI report as a basis.

Sec. 303 of the act goes on to say that "the Secretary of State... shall make specific findings with respect to the responsibility of Kim Jong-un, and of each natural person who is a member of the National Defense Commission of North Korea, or the Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers' Party of Korea, for serious human rights abuses and censorship." The U.S. State Department on June 30 also released its "Trafficking in Persons Report 2016" in which it described that "forced labor is part of an established system of political repression" in North Korea. It added that there are "an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 prisoners in political prison camps in remote areas of the country." The State Department's list of North Korean human rights abusers also is expected to include Kim Ki-nam, director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, and Jo Yon-jun, a first deputy director of the ruling Workers Party's Organization and Guidance Department. Kim has been referred to as Pyongyang's Joseph Goebbels, referring to the Nazi Germany's propaganda chief. Jo controls human resources of state agencies and is responsible for commanding who is detained in prison camps and sent to forced labor. (Kim Hyun-ki and Sarah Kim, "U.S. Mulls Sanctions on Pyongyang for Rights," *JoongAng Ilbo*, July 5, 2016)

7/5/16

North Korea blasted the United States for its recent joint training exercise with Japan in KCNA, which said that the U.S. forces sent a pair of B-52 strategic bombers to fly over the skies near South Korea last month. It added that planes belonging to the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force took part in the maneuvers that targeted North Korea, the media outlet claimed. According to South Korean officials, the U.S. strategic bombers from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam conducted flights in skies near the Korean Peninsula and Japan between June 13 and 20 along with other U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps units. It said that the U.S. used the B-52s to conduct a "nuclear bomb-dropping drill" on June 21, saying that the "nuclear maniacs" in Washington worked out a scenario for a "precision air raid operation" against the nuclear and military facilities of North Korea. North Korea said that "a formation of nuclear strategic bombers B-52H under the 8th Air Force of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces on Guam was busy with a nuclear bomb dropping drill in South Korea on June 17 under the pretext of the exercise for long-range flight and strike at strategic targets." (Yonhap, "N. Korea Blasts U.S. Deployments of B-52s around Korean Peninsula," July 5, 2016)

KPA Panmunjom mission's open letter "disclosing the gravity of military provocations and confrontation acts being made by the warmongers in the area along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) to ignite the second Korean war. The demilitarized zone of the MDL has turned into the biggest hotspot where a fuse of a total war may be ignited any moment. ...Such military provocations as the "invasion of Mt. Songak," a prelude to the June 25 war in the 1950s, are escalating and acts of stoking confrontation and

conflicts that may spill over into a total war in a moment are being perpetrated in an unbroken chain every day. The heinous moves of the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces to reduce the demilitarized zone into an outpost for invading the north and a theatre of confrontation with the compatriots in the north are baffling human imagination. **The puppet forces have already modified their combat rules and regulations in the zone to facilitate their military provocation.** The gravity of the situation is that the desperate and undisguised military provocations are all being committed in the whole area along the MDL under the direct control and command of the south Korean puppet Defense Ministry and Chongwadae. It is no exaggeration to say that the prevailing situation in the zone has reached a brink of war against the DPRK. Psychological warfare being staged in the whole area along the MDL has reached an extreme pitch. The puppet forces are staging their anti-socialist, anti-DPRK "loudspeaker propaganda" for more than 16 hours a day. According to data opened to the public alone, tens of millions of leaflets peppered with rubbish malignantly slandering the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK and its social system and people's living were scattered in recent few months. The south Korean war maniacs are using the demilitarized zone of the MDL and its vicinity as an anti-communist propaganda theatre to incite confrontation with the compatriots in the north by mobilizing not only ordinary citizens but also youngsters of south Korea. Revealing the wicked design sought by the south Korean puppet regime in escalating military tensions in the area along the MDL, the letter went on: In fact, such dangerous military provocations and confrontation moves in the demilitarized zone of the MDL were launched as soon as the war in the 1950s ceased. Far from drawing a lesson from their bitter defeat in the three-year war of aggression, the south Korean puppet forces have been hell-bent on the adventurous military provocations, regarding the MDL demilitarized zone as an advanced post for their "single-handed north expedition." Their escalated military provocations in the zone would cause a grave phase that might lead to a war on the Korean peninsula. Such actions throwing the whole area along the MDL into a crisis of confrontation and conflict are ascribable to the U.S. rude hostile policy toward the DPRK. As its scheme to turn the Korean Armistice Agreement (AA) provisions on the MDL demilitarized zone in its favor led to naught, the U.S. started to systematically scrap the already concluded AA. It is a trite method of the U.S. to zealously patronize the frantic anti-DPRK war games frequently staged by the puppet warmongers in the frontline areas in land and sea, under the mask of the defunct Military Armistice Commission of the "UN Command," as "just drills" complying with the "legal procedure" pursuant to the AA. It was just the U.S. which staged a weird act of sending a "message" through loudspeaker in Panmunjom to explain about the justness of puppet military warmongers' provocative "operation for removing" illegal fishing boats at the mouth of the Han River and engaged itself in it. The MDL is a symbol of grudge and tragedy that should be removed by dint of arms of Songun at an early date, the letter said, adding: It is the invariable will of the DPRK army and people to remove the MDL, little different from a time bomb against the north, as early as possible and ensure durable peace and security on the Korean peninsula and achieve the great cause of national reunification. In this planet there are not a few places where bloodbath, turbulence, dispute and close combat are witnessed, but no such place can be seen as the demilitarized zone of the MDL where the danger of a nuclear war persists all the time. Any member of the nation with patriotism should resolutely smash

the reckless moves of the warmongers getting frantic to reduce the MDL into an ignition point for the second Korean war. The letter warned that the war hysteria of the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet group seeking to unleash the second war against the DPRK, oblivious of their bitter defeat from the past Korean War, would certainly meet a due punishment." (KCNA, "KPA Panmunjom Mission on Gravity of Military Provocations in MDL Area," July 5, 2016)

7/6/16

The Obama administration announced that it was imposing sanctions on North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un, personally, blacklisting the unpredictable ruler and top officials in his reclusive government for human rights abuses as he aggressively presses forward with his nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The State Department took the unusual step of naming Kim and 14 other senior officials it said were responsible for grave human rights abuses in a five-page report detailing repression in North Korea. The report singled out top figures inside its intelligence and security ministries, which the department said had engaged in practices including extrajudicial killings, forced labor and torture. The Treasury Department, imposing its first human rights sanctions on any North Korean official, designated them on a list of people whose assets are frozen and who are barred from transactions with any American citizen. The actions were mandated by Congress as part of a law enacted in February that required the administration to report on human rights abuses in North Korea and to impose sanctions on anyone found to be responsible. But senior administration officials said they had long planned to take more aggressive action that would move human rights violations – until now on the periphery of the United States' efforts to isolate and punish North Korea for its bad behavior – to a more central position in the administration's strategy. That involved a painstaking, months-long process of identifying the officials inside North Korea's secretive system who were the worst offenders. "The report represents the most comprehensive U.S. government effort to date to name those responsible for or associated with the worst aspects of the North Korean government's repression, including serious human rights abuses and censorship in the D.P.R.K., and we will continue to identify more individuals and entities in future reports," John Kirby, the State Department spokesman, said in a statement accompanying the report. D.P.R.K. is an abbreviation for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, another name for North Korea. The new sanctions are the latest evidence that President Obama is determined to heighten the repercussions North Korea would face for its provocative actions, after the country conducted its fourth nuclear test in January. In March, the Obama administration pressed for and won stringent new economic sanctions at the United Nations. Last month it sought to further choke off North Korea's access to the world financial system by designating the country a "primary" money launderer. Victor Cha, Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the human rights sanctions reflected an escalation by Obama intended to force North Korea to rejoin talks to rein in its nuclear program should Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic nominee for president, win the election. "They basically made a decision that their best chance at ever getting a negotiation going with North Korea would be to basically follow the Iran template, which was to put as much pressure as they could on the regime with the hope that they would ultimately have to go back to the talks," Cha said. In the short term, he added, the sanctions could have the opposite effect, prompting North Korea – which has

behaved erratically ahead of American elections and during August, when the United States and South Korea have military exercises – to lash out further. “In August and September, we’re going to see a lot of belligerent activity by North Korea,” Cha said. “Remember how they reacted to the movie ‘The Interview’? That’s just fiction; this is real life, and they may react very negatively to the designating of basically their god.” Senior Obama administration officials said that while the new human rights sanctions were proceeding on a separate track from those related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, ultimately the two sets of actions should be mutually reinforcing. “There are those who will feel that this will make the task of negotiating that much more difficult, but the reality is that Kim Jong-un has shown no propensity and no willingness to pursue a negotiated solution,” said Christopher R. Hill, who was assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2005 to 2009, heading the American delegation to diplomatic talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. “It’s a kind of well-deserved punishment. To some extent, it’s a gesture on our part to signal our extreme displeasure with the guy.” Administration officials conceded that the action against Kim was largely symbolic – he is unlikely to change his behavior. But they argued that for lower- or midlevel officials who believe the political situation on the Korean Peninsula might shift during their lifetimes, the prospect of being blacklisted by the United States for torture or repression could be a deterrent. Among the other officials named was Cho Il-u, a senior official in the Reconnaissance General Bureau, North Korea’s top intelligence agency, who the Treasury Department said was in charge of hunting down defectors and “conducting operations to harm” them. Kim Kinam, the director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, which controls all media in North Korea, was also blacklisted. Also designated for sanctions was Choe Chang-pong, chief of investigations at the Ministry of People’s Security, identified by the administration as being responsible for monitoring residents on North Korea’s border with China and arresting defectors. The report said the ministry operated most of the country’s labor camps and routinely “uses torture and other forms of abuse to extract confessions, including techniques involving sexual violence, hanging individuals from the ceiling for extended periods of time, prolonged periods of exposure and severe beatings.” (Julie Hirschfield Davis, “Obama Places Sanctions on North Koreans Leaders for Human Rights Abuses,” *New York Times*, July 7, 2016, p. A-4)

Treasury Department: “The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today designated top officials of the North Korean regime, including North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, ten other individuals, and five entities, for their ties to North Korea’s notorious abuses of human rights. OFAC is taking this action in conjunction with the State Department’s issuance of a “Report on Serious Human Rights Abuses or Censorship in North Korea,” in accordance with the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, and to further our efforts to expose those responsible for serious human rights abuses and censorship in North Korea. OFAC has previously designated four individuals and three entities also highlighted in the State Department report. With today’s action, OFAC has designated all of the individuals and entities named in the State Department’s report. OFAC’s designations today were issued pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13722 and E.O. 13687. E.O. 13722 targets individuals and entities that, among other activities, have engaged in,



facilitated, or been responsible for an abuse or violation of human rights by the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea. E.O. 13687 targets agencies, instrumentalities, controlled entities, and officials of the Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea. As a result of today's actions, any property or interest in property of those designated by OFAC within U.S. jurisdiction is frozen. Additionally, transactions by U.S. persons involving the designated persons are generally prohibited. "Under Kim Jong Un, North Korea continues to inflict intolerable cruelty and hardship on millions of its own people, including extrajudicial killings, forced labor, and torture," said Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. "The actions taken today by the Administration under an Act of Congress highlight the U.S. Government's condemnation of this regime's abuses and our determination to see them stopped." Today's actions strengthen and expand sanctions on North Korea, consistent with the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, which was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Obama in February. E.O. 13722 Designations Related to Human Rights Abuses by the Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea OFAC designated North Korean leader Kim Jong Un pursuant to E.O. 13722 for having engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for an abuse or violation of human rights by the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea. Under the rule of Kim Jong Un, North Korea remains among the world's most repressive countries, with significant restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms and serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced labor, and torture. Kim Jong Un leads the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of People's Security. These ministries, along with the Ministry of People's Security Correctional Bureau and the Ministry of State Security Prisons Bureau, are also being designated today pursuant to E.O. 13722 for having engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for an abuse or violation of human rights by the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea. OFAC also designated three individuals pursuant to E.O. 13722 for having acted for or on behalf of the Ministry of People's Security or the Ministry of State Security. Choe Pu Il is the Minister of People's Security, Ri Song Chol is a Counselor in the Ministry of People's Security, and Kang Song Nam is a Bureau Director with the Ministry of State Security. The Ministry of State Security engages in torture and inhumane treatment of detainees during interrogation and in detention centers. This inhumane treatment includes beatings, forced starvation, sexual assault, forced abortions, and infanticide. According to the State Department report, the ministry is the lead agency investigating political crimes and administering the country's network of political prison camps or kwanliso, which hold an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 prisoners, including children and other family members of the accused. In addition, the Ministry of State Security's Prisons Bureau is responsible for the management and control of political prisoners and their confinement facilities throughout North Korea. It operates North Korean political prison camps where serious human rights abuses occur, including those involving torture, execution, sexual assault, starvation, slave labor, and other cruel extrajudicial punishment. The Ministry of People's Security operates a network of police stations and interrogation detention centers, including labor camps, throughout North Korea. During interrogations, suspects are systematically degraded, intimidated, and tortured. The Ministry of People's Security's Correctional Bureau supervises labor

camps (kyohwaso) and other detention facilities, where human rights abuses occur such as those involving torture, execution, rape, starvation, forced labor, and lack of medical care. The State Department report cites defectors who have regularly reported that the ministry uses torture and other forms of abuse to extract confessions, including techniques involving sexual violence, hanging individuals from the ceiling for extended periods of time, prolonged periods of exposure, and severe beatings. E.O. 13687 Designations of Agencies, Instrumentalities, Controlled Entities, and Officials of the Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea Pursuant to E.O. 13687, OFAC designated the Organization and Guidance Department as an agency, instrumentality, or controlled entity of the Workers' Party of Korea. OFAC also designated seven individuals - Cho Yon Chun, Kim Kyong Ok, Kim Ki Nam, Ri Jae Il, Choe Chang Pong, Cho Il U, and O Chong Kuk, pursuant to E.O. 13687, for being officials of the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea. The Organization and Guidance Department is a powerful body of the North Korean regime. According to the State Department report, it is instrumental in implementing the DPRK's censorship policies. It directs key personnel appointments for the Workers' Party of Korea, the North Korean military, and the North Korean government administration. It also purports to control the political affairs of all North Koreans. Cho Yon Chun and Kim Kyong Ok are Vice Directors of this department. Kim Ki Nam is the Director and Ri Jae Il is a Vice Director of the Workers' Party of Korea Propaganda and Agitation Department. Under E.O. 13722, the Propaganda and Agitation Department was previously identified for being an agency, instrumentality, or controlled entity of the Government of North Korea. According to the State Department report, the Propaganda and Agitation Department controls all media in the country, which the government uses to control the public. Choe Chang Pong is the Director of the Investigations Bureau of the Ministry of People's Security. It has been reported that he is responsible for monitoring the residents on the North Korea-China border area and arresting and interrogating defectors. Cho Il U is the Director of the Fifth Bureau of the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). The RGB previously was designated pursuant to E.O. 13687 for being a controlled entity of the Government of North Korea and listed in the Annex of E.O. 13551. It has been reported that Cho is in charge of overseas espionage operations and foreign intelligence collection for North Korea. It has also been reported that he supported the arrest of North Korean defectors by monitoring and collecting information on their hideouts in China. Cho also reportedly reinforced organizations and personnel in charge of conducting operations to harm anti-North Korean defectors. O Chong Kuk is the Director of the First Bureau of the RGB. He is reportedly in charge of North Korea's infiltration operations into South Korea." (Department of the Treasury, "North Korea Human Rights Report Delivered to Congress This Morning," July 6, 2016)

North Korea discharged massive amounts of water from the Hwanggang Dam on the Imjin River. The reservoir was reaching capacity after days of heavy rains. Lying 42.3 km north of the demilitarized zone, the Hwanggang Dam has a capacity of 300 to 400 million tons. The sudden discharge could cause heavy flooding in the Yeoncheon area in South Korea at the lower reaches of the river, the government here warned yesterday. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "N. Korea Discharges Dam Water without Warning," July 6, 2016)

DPRK Government spokesman's statement: "The DPRK at the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea clarified its policy stand that it will remove the root cause of the threat of nuclear war created by the U.S. and safeguard peace in the region and the rest of the world by means of our powerful nuclear deterrent, it will not use nuclear weapons first, unless the hostile forces violate our sovereignty with their own nuclear weapons, and it will faithfully observe its commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, which it has made before the international community, and strive for global denuclearization. The DPRK has entered the new phase of its drive for implementing the stand. But the U.S., the south Korean authorities and other forces hostile toward the DPRK are spinning out sophism that the nuclear weapons of the DPRK are a "threat" to peace of the Korean peninsula and other parts of the world and that no problem can be settled unless the "denuclearization of the north is achieved first," misleading the public opinion at home and abroad. The U.S. has declined the DPRK's constructive proposal for replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty under such absurd preconditions as "north's dismantlement of nukes first" and squarely challenged the DPRK's sincere proposals and efforts for dialogue for the improvement of the north-south ties and Korea's reunification with such words as "north's denuclearization first." The Park Geun Hye group, in particular, is resorting to all sorts of despicable deeds to solicit cooperation for sanctions and pressure on the DPRK whenever an opportunity presents itself while busily going here and there with the "north's denuclearization first" as a cure-all pretext. In a statement on Wednesday a spokesman for the DPRK government denounced this as a foolish act of totally twisting the essence of the denuclearization issue on the Korean peninsula, and a ridiculous act of nuclear war criminals to cover up their true colors and force the DPRK to scrap its nuclear program. The denuclearization being called for by the DPRK is the denuclearization of the whole Korean peninsula and this includes the dismantlement of nukes in south Korea and its vicinity. The U.S. and the puppet forces have neither elementary qualifications nor face to talk about the "north's denuclearization" as they spawned and have complicated the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the statement said, disclosing how the U.S. and the puppet forces derailed the process for the denuclearization on the peninsula. If the U.S. and the south Korean authorities have an iota of interest in the denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, they should accept the principled demand of the DPRK before anything else, the statement said, and went on: Firstly, **all the nuclear weapons should be opened to public**, first of all, which the U.S. has neither acknowledged nor denied after bringing them to south Korea. Secondly, **all the nukes and their bases should be dismantled** and verified in the eyes of the world public. Thirdly, the **U.S. should ensure that it would never bring again the nuclear strike means to south Korea**, which the U.S. has frequently deployed on the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity. Fourthly, **it should commit itself to neither intimidating the DPRK with nukes or through an act of nuclear war nor using nukes against the DPRK** in any case. Fifthly, the **withdrawal of the U.S. troops holding the right to use nukes** from south Korea should be declared. If the U.S. and the south Korean authorities truly want to see the denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and build a "peaceful world without nuclear weapons", there will be no reason for them to turn down the just demand of the DPRK. **If such security guarantee comes true, the DPRK will also take steps in response to it and a decisive breakthrough will be made in realizing the denuclearization on the**

**Korean peninsula.** Taking this opportunity, the DPRK warns Park Geun Hye and other south Korean authorities not to play trickery any more to seek loopholes crying out for "denuclearization of the north" in collusion with their master but face up to the present reality. If they desperately defy the principled demand of the DPRK, the latter's nukes will be further bolstered up both in quality and quantity and its capacity will reach its maximum. They should bear this in mind. The denuclearization on the Korean peninsula entirely hinges on the attitude and behavior of the U.S. and the south Korean authorities." (KCNA, "DPRK Government Denounces U.S., S. Korea's Sophism about 'Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,'" July 6, 2016)

Carlin: "There was a train wreck last week, but not a lot of people noticed, swooning as they were over the July 6 announcement that the US Department of Treasury had designated Kim Jong Un by name on a new list of individuals sanctioned for human rights violations. In the dance of jubilation, few had the time or inclination (to borrow a line from Irma La Duce) to pay attention to a DPRK government spokesman's statement released earlier the same day. That statement made clear what the North Koreans have been hinting at for some time—yes, they were willing to talk about denuclearization. Notice I did not just say that the North has declared that it would completely give up its nuclear arsenal. Instead, Pyongyang has taken a major, long-term step of defining the scope of denuclearization in terms that potentially brings the discussion back down to earth, reintroducing concepts that both Seoul and Washington had previously accepted. Those concepts? At their core, they are not those of the September 2005 Six Party joint statement, but the January 1992 North-South Denuclearization Declaration. It is important to pay attention to the vehicle Pyongyang used to convey the latest position—a DPRK Government spokesman's statement, among the highest on the North's ladder of authority. Statements at this level are generally used to signal important new policies. They are not employed to spread pixie dust, but neither are they entirely straightforward. They need to be—dare I use this language in mixed company—parsed. Let us parse. **Definition.** Most fundamentally, the statement redefines "denuclearization," or to be more precise, revives a definition of "denuclearization" that the North had long used (going back as far as the 1980s) but had appeared over the past few years to abandon, or at least to posture as if it were abandoning, in favor of something much more sweeping and unattainable. Specifically, the statement says: "The denuclearization being called for by the DPRK is the denuclearization of the whole Korean peninsula and this includes the dismantlement of nukes in south Korea and its vicinity." For Pyongyang that definition provides a better, more realistic, more salable, and more defensible starting point—that is, if there is to be "denuclearization," it will pertain very specifically to the Korean peninsula. At this point, there is no need to stumble over what is meant by "and its vicinity." This is an accordion term, and will doubtlessly end up being expanded or contracted were negotiations ever to get started. If "vicinity" raises flags, that's only natural, and the North Koreans know it. **Pedigree.** To provide the firmest, most unassailable rationale for this stated willingness to consider the question of denuclearization, the statement recalls that denuclearization was the "behest" of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The last time central DPRK media mentioned this denuclearization behest of the leaders was in an important—but largely overlooked—June 2013 National Defense Commission statement. Actually, the current formulation

goes a step beyond that by specifically linking Kim Jong Un to the issue, asserting that denuclearization is “*the steadfast will of our party, army, and people who are advancing under the leadership of the respected and beloved Comrade Kim Jong Un.*” **Rationale.** The statement then wades into the tricky question of how to justify this new position. In recent years, the North has reserved wriggle room for itself. It has claimed that US actions and hostility had forced the DPRK finally to move to acquire nuclear weapons, while routinely hedging its stated determination to keep and develop these weapons with qualifiers such as “as long as,” e.g., as long as the US continued to threaten the North. Now, with a long-practiced ability to leap out of a corner, Pyongyang has switched the use of the qualifier from a barrier to a springboard. If the US caused the problem, then the US must also help resolve it, and here, precisely, are the things the Americans can do. But wait! In the middle of this discussion, up pops the following: “This is precisely the fundamental reason that the denuclearization of the North—which the United States, the puppet gang, and its other following forces are persistently demanding—can never work under any circumstances.” Read quickly, that sentence looks to be a negation of what the statement is otherwise supposed to accomplish. Read carefully, however, and in the context of what follows, it becomes clear that the argument in that passage that the North is not **retreating** into accepting the US definition of denuclearization but is **advancing** with its own. It is the particular definition of denuclearization that the US advances that “can never work,” but with change in the definition of denuclearization, the statement suggests, something can be accomplished. **Sequence.** The issue of sequence, which has always been key in US-DPRK talks, rears its head. “The United States, which is attempting to realize its ambition to invade our Republic at any cost by maintaining its nuclear superiority, and the puppet gang that has been completely following it, should seriously reflect on their past riddled with the crimes of systematically obstructing our struggle for the peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, before they talk about somebody’s nuclear abandonment. Instead of blabbering about the North’s unilateral denuclearization, while absurdly blaming us for making nuclear threats and provocations, they ought to take the path of using their own hands to untie the nuclear knot they made by their actions. That path should start with the complete elimination of the source of nuclear threats and blackmail against us, not with the North’s denuclearization first.” (Emphasis added.) A vexing problem in dealing with the North typically is not just who does what, but equally important, who goes first. For the North Koreans, sequence is a form of substance. It is organic to a solution, not simply for its practical implications but also for the deeper symbolism in a situation where neither side trusts the other, not one bitty iota. In the context of the July 6 statement, with the assertion that the US must go first, Pyongyang is opening the door to the expectation that theirs is a next move and, at least notionally, the North can take steps that it might previously have rejected. **Specifics.** In a number of ways, it is the specific demands the statement lays out that wake the ghosts of the January 1992 North-South denuclearization declaration. In broad terms, of the five demands, the US has previously met or at one time agreed in principle to four of them. Let’s take them as the North presents them: 1. “Firstly, all nuclear weapons of the United States, which it has neither confirmed nor denied after bringing them into South Korea, must be publicly disclosed.” (Comment: *This is similar to what the North called for in 1992. Since we don’t have, and the North Koreans know we don’t have, nuclear weapons in*

*the South, this first point would seem to be a stage-setter.)* 2. "Secondly, all the nukes and their bases should be dismantled and verified in the eyes of the world. (*Comment: In 1992, the US generally accepted—with trepidation on the part of some—the idea of opening a few of its bases in South Korea to North Korean inspections.*) 3. "Thirdly, the U.S. should ensure that it would never bring again the nuclear strike means to south Korea, which the U.S. has frequently deployed on the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity." (*Comment: By speaking of "nuclear strike means" and not just the introduction of nuclear weapons, this appears a step beyond what was in the 1992 declaration.*) 4. "Fourthly, it should commit itself to neither intimidating the DPRK with nukes or through an act of nuclear war nor using nukes against the DPRK in any case." (*Comment: The US already promised a negative security guarantee to the North in the 1994 Agreed Framework though never followed through, and finally gave it to Pyongyang in the September 2005 Six-Party joint statement.*) 5. "Fifthly, the withdrawal of the U.S. troops holding the right to use nukes from south Korea should be declared." (*Comment: The wording of this point would seem to touch few, if any, US troops. Even if it is actually meant to apply to all US forces, the formulation is tortured—why not simply say in the normal way that US troops be withdrawn; why say only that their withdrawal "should be declared"?*)

**Reciprocal steps.** The government spokesman's statement, not surprisingly only includes the North's demands, which if experience is any guide, are not Pyongyang's bottom line but rather an opening public position. Left for the future are those things the North will offer in return. Since reciprocity is a bedrock principle in DPRK negotiations, one might suppose that Pyongyang is signaling that it is prepared to discuss parallel (if not exactly identical) measures on its part. In fact, the statement asserts: "If such security guarantees are actually made, we will also take corresponding measures, and an epoch-making breakthrough will open in realizing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Of course, no one will know what "corresponding measures" might be unless someone asks. The obvious—and hardly accidental—similarities between the North's current proposal and the 1992 North-South denuclearization declaration are noteworthy, not least because Pyongyang knows that document included a ban on reprocessing and enrichment. That the 1992 N-S joint declaration didn't work is beside the point; in fact, it never even got through the stage of setting up implementation arrangements, the fault of both sides. The key point now is that someone in Pyongyang has apparently decided that the North's approach over the past several years has not given it the flexibility it needed to deal with the issue, whereas a more realistic concept, based on ground already plowed, might do that. Whether the July 6 proposal itself, or even just some of its key components, will survive to emerge again after the dust from recent US actions settles is impossible to say. It is often the case that when the North sets a new fundamental policy position, it may be temporarily obscured and seemingly abandoned, only to be reoccupied in the future (albeit sometimes in the very distant future). Of course, when they put this particular position together signaling a willingness to discuss denuclearization, it is unlikely that anyone in Pyongyang realized that just hours after its release, it would be flattened by an onrushing State-Treasury express going at full throttle into a dark and foggy night." (Robert Carlin, "North Korea Said It Is Willing to Talk about Denuclearization ... But No One Noticed," *38 North*, July 12, 2016)

7/7/16

DPRK FoMin statement "to denounce the U.S. for its unheard-of hideous hostility toward the DPRK. The U.S. dared pull up the supreme leadership of the DPRK on July 6 when announcing its State Department's report on the latter's "human rights issue", a report peppered with lies and fabrications, and the list of targets of special sanctions by its Treasury Department, pursuant to the report. ...What the U.S. did this time, not content with malignantly slandering the DPRK, is the worst crime that can never be pardoned. The supreme leadership of the DPRK its servicepersons and people have safeguarded at the cost of their lives while following with all sincerity represents the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK and the destiny of all its service personnel and people. But, the U.S. dared challenge the dignity of the DPRK supreme leadership, an act reminiscent of a new-born puppy knowing no fear of a tiger. This is the worst hostility and an open declaration of war against the DPRK as it has gone far beyond the confrontation over the "human rights issue." **Now that the U.S. has passed over the "red line" in the overall showdown with the DPRK by perpetrating such thrice-cursed crime, the DPRK came to have the legitimate rights to take all necessary countermeasures.** To cope with the prevailing critical situation, the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK states as follows: Firstly, the U.S. should immediately and unconditionally retract the recent step for sanctions which dared hurt the dignity of the DPRK supreme leadership. Secondly, **every lever and channel for diplomatic contact between the DPRK and the U.S. will be cut off at once in case the U.S. refuses to accept our demand.** From now that the U.S. declared a war on the DPRK, **any problem arising in the relations with the U.S. will be handled under the latter's wartime law.** Thirdly, **the DPRK will take the toughest countermeasures to resolutely shatter the hostility of the U.S.** as regards the fact that the latter's hostile policy has reached the worst phase of hurting the dignity of the former's supreme leadership. The U.S. ruling quarters will have to bitterly experience how foolish and reckless such deed was." (KCNA, "DPRK Foreign Ministry Hits U.S. for Hideous Crime," July 7, 2016)

Secretary of State John Kerry said he hoped China would continue to cooperate with the United States on sanctions on North Korea, a day after Beijing criticized new U.S. sanctions targeting North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. "China's engagement is critical," Kerry told a news conference during a visit to the Ukrainian capital Kiev, when asked if sanctions could be effective without China's help. Kerry said he spoke to China's foreign minister Wang Yi yesterday about cooperation on North Korea. "Our hope is that we continue to cooperate as we have been in the last months, particularly with the U.N. Security Council resolution that we passed in which China stepped up and significantly increased its own actions with respect to (North Korea)," he said. At the same time, Kerry said the United States stood "ready and prepared" to return to talks with North Korea aimed at convincing the country to abandon its nuclear weapons program. (Lesley Wroughton and David Brunnstrom, "Kerry Hopes for Continued Chinese Cooperation on North Korea," Reuters, July 7, 2016)

The administration of President Barack Obama is asking other nations to cut the employment of North Korean workers as a way to reduce Pyongyang's access to foreign currency, a U.S. official said. The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, spoke a day after the United States sanctioned North Korean leader Kim Jong Un for the first time, citing "notorious abuses of human rights" in a move that infuriated the

nuclear-armed country. The effort aims to increase economic pressure on the North, which angered the United States this year by conducting its fourth nuclear test and by carrying out a rocket launch that Washington said used banned ballistic missile technology. U.S. efforts to revive talks with North Korea on its nuclear program, seen as a threat to U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, have failed to gain traction, prompting U.S. officials to look at additional sanctions to influence its behavior. The U.S. official declined to name the countries approached about reducing their use of North Korean labor, though he said they did not yet include China and Russia, believed to be among the prime destinations for North Korean workers. It was not clear when the request was made. The United States said in April it was working to cut off revenue streams to North Korea by targeting remittances from its overseas workers. Asked if the United States was asking other nations to reduce the employment of North Koreans, a U.S. State Department spokeswoman noted that an executive order that Obama signed on March 16 provided tools under which Washington could target such labor. "The (executive order) includes the authority to target North Korea's exportation of labor in order to provide Treasury the flexibility to impose sanctions and ratchet up pressure as needed. At this time, we are closely studying the issue," said Gabrielle Price, spokeswoman for the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. North Korea reacted angrily to what it described as the United States' "declaration of war" by blacklisting Kim Jong Un for rights abuses, calling the move a "hideous crime," according to KCNA. U.S. officials said they acted in part because of a looming congressional deadline to report on human rights in North Korea. However, one State Department official described it as in large part an effort by the Obama administration to counter charges that it has been weak on other human rights fronts, including Saudi Arabia, China, Bahrain, Vietnam, and Iraq. This official said the move was not expected to have any effect on the regime's behavior and was largely "a legacy move" by the Obama White House. U.S. officials acknowledged that the immediate practical effect of yesterday's move was likely to be small because North Korean officials such as Kim and the 10 others sanctioned are not believed to have significant assets in the United States. Peter Harrell, a former State Department sanctions official, said that the drumbeat of sanctions over the past year had likely already driven away any North Korean government money in Western banks. But he said the sanctions against Kim could help to scare away banks in China or elsewhere that still may handle North Korean transactions. "It does shape business decision-making," he said. Analysts said North Korea's angry response to the sanctions could preclude future negotiations on the nuclear issue. However, John Sifton of Human Rights Watch defended targeting Kim, saying talks were dead. "This is an area where the administration is not acting politically or cynically," he said. "They are actually trying to do the right thing." (Arshad Mohammed and David Brunnstrom, "U.S. Asks Other Nations to Curb Use of North Korean Workers," Reuters, July 7, 2016)

7/8/16

South Korea and the United States announced that they have decided to deploy an advanced American missile defense system in the South, despite strong protests from China, which sees it as a threat to its own security. The two allies agreed to the deployment of the so-called Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, to better protect South Korea and the United States military in the region from North Korea's growing nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, a senior Defense Ministry



official, Ryu Jae-seung, said at a news conference. Ryu said that officials from both nations were in the final stage of recommending a site for a THAAD base to their defense chiefs. In a swift and sharp reaction against the deployment, China's Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the decision would change the strategic balance in the region and undermine China's security interests. "The Chinese side hereby expresses strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition," the statement said. China's leader, Xi Jinping, had spent considerable political capital trying to convince President Park Geun-hye of South Korea to reject the push by the Obama administration for the missile system. The new system was also likely to face resistance from residents in whatever part of South Korea is selected for the base. Villagers and politicians from towns that have been mentioned as possible sites have said they will oppose it, fearing that strong electronic signals from the radar might be harmful to residents' health, and that their towns would become an early target for North Korean missiles should war break out. South Korea's military has said that THAAD will bolster its defense against North Korean missiles, but its political leaders had been reluctant to commit to it because of China's objections. They have expressed fear that the deployment might prompt China to move closer to North Korea as a buffer against the United States and South Korea, and that China might retaliate economically. China is South Korea's No. 1 trade partner and sends more tourists than any other country. China is particularly concerned about THAAD in South Korea because its powerful radar could give the United States military the ability to quickly detect and track missiles launched in China, analysts said. (Choe Sang-hun, "South Korea Will Deploy U.S. System for Defense," New York Times, July 8, 2016, p. A-8) "The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States made an alliance decision to deploy THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) as a defensive measure to ensure the security of the ROK and its people," the Ministry of Defense and the USFK said in a joint statement. It said the deployment of the advanced U.S. missile defense system is to protect alliance military forces from North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats. The two are "working closely to ensure the swift deployment of THAAD" and will develop specific operational procedures, it said. Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy Ryu Je-seung expected that THAAD will begin operation by the end of 2017 at the latest. The defense ministry and USFK underscored that THAAD will pose no threat to regional neighbors. "North Korea's nuclear tests and multiple ballistic missile tests, including the recent intermediate-range ballistic missile launches, highlight the grave threat that North Korea poses to the security and stability of the ROK and the entire Asia-Pacific region," the joint statement read. "When the THAAD system is deployed to the Korean Peninsula, it will be focused solely on North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not be directed towards any third-party nations." The South Korean government also said it notified China and Russia of its decision in advance. Operated by the USFK, THAAD is designed to shoot down short, medium and intermediate ballistic missiles at a higher altitude in their terminal phase using a hit-to-kill method by detecting the enemies' missiles with land-based radar with a detection range up to 2,000 kilometers. A THAAD battery consists of six truck-mounted, highly mobile launchers carrying 48 interceptor missiles in total, an AN/TPY-2 radar, and fire control system for communication and data-management. There are a total of five batteries. Each costs 1.5 trillion won (\$1.29 billion), including 11 billion won for each missile. Under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), South Korea will be responsible for providing the

land and relevant facilities to host THAAD and the USFK will cover expenses for deployment and operations. Defense Minister Han Min-koo confirmed that it will not require extra money to bring THAAD. "All relevant expenses will be made from SOFA's defense-cost sharing program," Han said during a meeting with the minor opposition People's Party leaders at the National Assembly. (Yi Whan-woo, "Korea, U.S. Agree to Deploy THAAD," *Korea Times*, July 8, 2016)

7/9/16

North Korea fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) off its east coast, but the missile failed in its initial flight stage, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. The missile was fired from waters southeast of the coastal port city of Sinpo, South Hamgyong Province, at around 11:30 a.m., according to the military. "The SLBM was ejected from the submarine normally, but (we) estimate the initial flight was unsuccessful," the JCS said in a brief press release. "Our military strongly denounces such provocative acts by North Korea," the JCS noted. Military sources said the latest SLBM appears to have exploded at an altitude of some 10 kilometers after being fired from a submerged 2,000-ton Sinpo-class submarine. The missile flew only a few kilometers before the presumed explosion, they said. South Korea's military said that North Korea has achieved progress in the initial undersea ejection stage of its SLBM technology. The North is probably in the flight test stage of its SLBM before moving onto the final test phase that will require the missile to hit targets, the sources said. The North may be ready to deploy its SLBMs for service in about three years, according to the military. The latest launch came less than three months after the communist country's previous SLBM test fire ended in failure. The sea-based missile, launched on April 23 from the East Sea, broke into several pieces in mid-flight after flying some 30 kilometers, military officials have said. (Yonhap, "North Korea' Latest Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Test Unsuccessful: Military," *Korea Times*, July 9, 2016)

7/10/16

Sunday's Upper House election saw the ruling coalition score a sweeping victory. The LDP won 56 seats and Komeito took 14 seats. Together with Osaka Ishin no Kai, which won 7 seats, constitutional revisionists secured 77 seats of the 121 seats up for grabs this time. Together with four independents who are also thought to back revision, pro-revision forces hold more than 162 Upper House seats, which places Abe in a position to amend the Constitution. The voter turnout rate of Sunday's election was 54.7 percent for the constituency segment, the fourth-lowest record in the postwar years. Fresh from sweeping the polls, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on July 11 called the outcome an endorsement of Abenomics and pledged to expand spending, particularly in rural areas, despite soaring public debt. But he said nothing about whether and how he may push his long-held ambition to rewrite the postwar pacifist Constitution, now that lawmakers who support revision hold two-thirds of both houses of the Diet – enough to trigger a referendum on the question. "The nation has given me a powerful mandate to further accelerate Abenomics. I am grateful for this," Abe told a news conference at the Liberal Democratic Party's headquarters in Tokyo. During the news conference, Abe was repeatedly asked how he will push for constitutional revision. He replied that it is a matter mainly for the LDP and other political parties in the Diet, not the prime minister. "The (Diet) Commission on the Constitution should first discuss in detail which article should be revised and how," Abe said. "It is expected that discussion will be initiated, developed and narrowed

down there." Winning support of two-thirds in both chambers "is not an easy task," Abe said, adding that the final say will be given by ordinary voters and not lawmakers. Indeed, polls suggest the population is unlikely to support changing Article 9, which makes such an attempt risky. The support of two-thirds of lawmakers in both chambers is required for the Diet to initiate a national referendum, and support of more than half of votes is needed to revise any article of the Constitution. According to a poll conducted by *Yomiuri Shimbun* in March, 61 percent of respondents said the pacifist article should be left unchanged, while 35 percent called for revision. Critics say the LDP is likely to first propose a revision that creates an article empowering the prime minister with state-of-emergency-like powers in the event of a major contingency such as a large earthquake. They say LDP lawmakers may see an incremental series of revisions as likely to soften up the nation, leaving voters more amenable to revising Article 9 in the future. Moreover, parties calling for constitutional changes have yet to agree exactly which articles should be revised. In 2012 the LDP published a proposed rewrite of much of the Constitution, including Article 9. The party said the article should be changed to allow Japan to maintain "national defense forces" and to fully use the right of collective self-defense, or the right to engage in combat a country that is attacking an ally, even if Japan itself is not under attack. However, Komeito leader Yamaguchi Natsuo told a news conference Sunday he opposes immediate changes to Article 9. Instead, many Komeito lawmakers want the creation of a new article to enshrine the right of citizens to a healthy natural environment. Komeito's main backer is Soka Gakkai, the nation's largest lay Buddhist group, which has traditionally advocated moderate diplomatic policies. Osaka Ishin no Kai, which won seven seats in Sunday's election, said it is willing to initiate a national referendum, in particular to revise the Constitution so that local governments gain more autonomy. However, it remains unclear whether the party would support a revision of Article 9, as Ishin leaders may plan to use the party's position on the issue as a bargaining chip to secure LDP support for its own agenda on local government reforms. (Yoshida Reiji, "Abe Says Win Gives Him Mandate to Accelerate Economic Policies But Remains Mum on Constitution," *Japan Times*, July 11, 2016) A JIJI exit poll has highlighted a divide over changing the nation's pacifist Constitution, with 36.0 percent of voters who cast their ballots in Sunday's Upper House election saying they opposed revision and 29.6 percent voicing support. More than one-third of voters – 34.4 percent – also said they remain unsure on the issue. (JIJI, "Upper House Election Exit Poll Highlights Divide over Constitutional Revision," *Japan Times*, July 11, 2016) Experts say that Abe's governing coalition will not be able to push through constitutional revisions immediately, given that some of the partners have differing opinions on what needs to be amended and how. For example, the Liberal Democrats' main ally, a small Buddhist party, has said that it opposes changes to the clause that renounces war. At a news conference on July 11, Abe said that he intended to press for debate on constitutional revision, though he acknowledged that "it's not so easy" and added, "I expect the discussion will be deepened." Abe's party, in a draft proposal of a revised Constitution, has also recommended amendments to the clause on freedom of speech and the press that could limit these rights in cases deemed dangerous to the public interest. Another proposal would expand emergency powers for the prime minister. Any revision would need to be approved by a majority in a public referendum. But the party's victory on Sunday appears to have less to do with its proposals and more to do

with the disarray in the opposition Democratic Party. "The people's distrust towards the Democratic Party is very high," said Miura Lully, a lecturer on international politics at Tokyo University. "In 2009, the Democratic Party won the government, but they failed and failed and failed, and even once-supporters of the Democratic Party now distrust them." Some analysts said the opposition may have overestimated the public's worries about Abe's constitutional agenda at a time when so many remain concerned about Japan's weak economy. Abe, for his part, spent most of his time on the campaign trail exhorting voters to allow Abenomics to continue, and he barely mentioned the Constitution. "Probably the opposition parties pushed too much on the constitutional issue as a political agenda," said Murata Koji, a professor of international relations at Doshisha University in Kyoto who supports constitutional changes. "But people didn't care about the constitutional agenda in this upper-house election." Ogawa Toshio, an opposition candidate from Tokyo who narrowly won a seat, said voters might have had a hard time understanding how his party's economic plans differed from those of the Liberal Democrats. But, he said, "I knew that Abe's real goals were security and the Constitution. So I thought I had to point it out clearly." Critics said Abe's party deliberately played down its agenda on constitutional change. Some also accused the Japanese news media, particularly the public broadcaster, NHK, of conspiring to help the governing party and failing to air enough information about the issues at stake in the election. Voters seemed more interested in staying the course and giving Abe's economic policies more time to yield results than in the debate over rewriting Japan's pacifist policies. Opinion polls show a majority of respondents in Japan oppose Abe's security policies. But when the news media conducts these surveys, the questions are often vague. "The opinion polls ask whether there is a need to revise the Constitution at all," said Hasebe Yasuo, a constitutional scholar at Waseda University. "This is quite a strange question. People can't answer that question before knowing which clause and in what way this change will be made." The very language used to describe constitutional revision may also confuse voters. "In Japanese, the word for revise, 'kaisei,' gives an impression that something is improved or made better," said Saigo Minako, 28, a mother of three children in Kyoto who founded Mothers Against War last July to protest legislation that gave the military some powers to fight in foreign conflicts for the first time since World War II. (Motoko Rich, "Japan Election, landslide for Prime Minister, Could Allow a Bolder Military," *New York Times*, July 12, 2016, p. A-9)

7/11/16

KCNA: "The DPRK government sent the U.S. government a message on July 10 through the DPRK permanent mission to the UN in connection with the fact that the U.S. recently impaired the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK by releasing what they call "report on human rights" and "list of targets of special sanctions" related to the DPRK. The DPRK government in its message clarified its stand to take practical actions as already declared in the statement of the Foreign Ministry. The message vehemently denounced the recent U.S. sanctions measure which impaired the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK as the most hideous criminal act and a declaration of war against the DPRK. **Now that the U.S. refused to comply with the DPRK's demand for the immediate withdrawal of the sanctions measure, the DPRK government notified the U.S. that it would take practical actions against the U.S. stage by stage as already clarified and would totally cut off New York**

**DPRK-U.S. contact channel, the only official contact channel, at the first phase, the message said.** The DPRK government informed the U.S. government of its principled stand that **from now on it would deal with all the issues arising in the DPRK-U.S. relations under wartime law of the DPRK and the issue of detained Americans is no exception** and the U.S. is wholly to blame for the ensuing unpleasant things happening in the bilateral ties." (KCNA, "DPRK Government Sends Message to U.S. Government," July 11, 2016)

KPA General Staff Artillery Bureau "strong warning: The U.S. and the south Korean puppet group decided to deploy THAAD despite the unanimous opposition and rejection of the DPRK and many other countries.... The THAAD deployment is a direct product of the sinister ambition of the U.S. to dominate the world by holding its military hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and the south Korean puppet group's vicious moves to escalate the confrontation with the fellow countrymen in the north in a bid to invade the north, backed by its master. Under the pressure of the U.S. master the Park Geun Hye group decided to introduce the unfinished THAAD whose military effectiveness has not been verified and which may cause casualties by superpower radio waves by paying huge funds running into astronomical figures collected from the south Korean people as taxes. This clearly proves that the Park regime is a group of traitors without equals. The Artillery Bureau of the General Staff of the KPA serves the following strong warning to the U.S. and the south Korean puppet warmongers upon the authorization: Firstly, **the DPRK will take a physical counter-action to thoroughly control THAAD**, aggression means of the U.S. for world domination, from the moment its location and place have been confirmed in south Korea. The U.S. had better understand that the more massively it introduces war weapons to south Korea and its vicinity, the closer they will come into the firing range of the KPA and the more miserable end the U.S. will meet without even a moment to make a shrill cry. The KPA possessed of sufficient latest offensive strike means will take more merciless and powerful successive corresponding measures against the U.S. keen to ignite a war by deploying THAAD and will make the warmongers suffer from the nightmare of extreme uneasiness and terror. Secondly, the south Korean puppet forces' introduction of THAAD of the U.S. master would precipitate their miserable self-destruction due to the merciless strike of the KPA. Their attempt to ward off the KPA's strike of justice with THAAD only reveals military ignorance and amounts to mocking and deceiving the public and people's mindset. The KPA has long put not only all the aggressive war means of the enemies but even their attack and logistic bases against the DPRK in the precision sighting strike range. The desperate efforts of the Park Geun Hye group of traitors to keep offering south Korea as its master U.S. nuclear outpost would only result in cutting short its despicable remaining days by itself. We once again warn the enemies that it is the steadfast will of the KPA to make merciless retaliatory strikes to reduce south Korea to a sea in flames, debris once an order is issued. Thirdly, our revolutionary armed forces will as always bolster up its might in every way on the forefront for safeguarding the peace and security not only on the Korean peninsula but also in Northeast Asia and the rest of the world. It is the noble duty of the KPA to guarantee the peace and security of the world. Our powerful Paektusan revolutionary army will never pardon the aggressive war moves of the outrageous U.S. and its henchmen but continue taking bold military measures. The KPA will take ceaseless

self-defensive steps to punish all injustice in the world threatening justice till the gangster-like U.S. and other hostile forces are wiped out to the last man." (KCNA, "Artillery Bureau of General Staff of KPA Strongly Warns against U.S. and S. Korea's Decision to Deploy THAAD," July 11, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement "as regards the U.S. ever more undisguised military moves to render the situation on the Korean Peninsula extremely tense. The U.S. already introduced Stennis and Ronald Reagan nuclear carrier task forces, nuclear-powered submarine Mississippi, B-52Hs and other strategic assets into the vicinity of south Korea. Recently it announced a plan to conduct drills under the simulated conditions of striking major military facilities of the DPRK by transferring 12 F-16s under the 169th flying corps from the U.S. mainland to the Osan Air Force base in south Korea. This proves that the U.S. seeks to bring dark clouds of a nuclear war to hang over the Korean peninsula at any cost by staging joint military drills with the south Korean puppet forces in August and its scenario has entered into the phase of its implementation. The U.S., seized with an anachronistic hostile policy towards the DPRK and the daydream of carrying out its strategy for world domination, seeks to turn the peninsula into a theatre of a thermonuclear war and thus implement its aggressive pivot-to Asia-Pacific strategy in real earnest. The U.S. officially decided to deploy THAAD in south Korea to achieve this objective. It is the calculation of the U.S. to retain its military edge in the Asia-Pacific and realize its wild ambition for dominating it while staging aggressive war drills with the DPRK as its primary target and stepping up the arms buildup and the creation of a military bloc. Due to such U.S. saber-rattling, peace and security on the peninsula and in the region are seriously threatened and the danger of a nuclear war is becoming a reality. The DPRK will never remain a passive onlooker to the U.S. madcap moves to plunge the peninsula into a nuclear disaster but take stronger countermeasures to defend the sovereignty and dignity of the country and nation and peace. Should the U.S. provoke a nuclear war on the peninsula, it will inevitably face a baptism of nuclear strike before anybody else." (KCNA, "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Warns U.S. of Its Moves for Nuclear War," July 11, 2016)

*Rodong Sinmun*: "The U.S. and the south Korean puppet group are not entitled at all to talk about the "north's denuclearization" as they are the arch criminals who spawned and worsened the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. The noisy fuss being made by the U.S. and the Park Geun Hye puppet group in south Korea over the "nuclear threat from the north" under the pretext of the "north's denuclearization" is nothing but an act of giving vent to their anger at the situation where they have become unable to recklessly wield nuclear stick any longer in face of the DPRK's powerful nuclear deterrence. The U.S. has threatened and blackmailed the DPRK with nukes since the 1950s, spawning the nuclear issue on the peninsula and frantically staging nuclear war drills against the DPRK, and the south Korean puppet group has blindly toed the U.S. line, betraying the country and nation. They should seriously reflect on their past crimes and stop silly raising a hue and cry over the "north's denuclearization." Explicitly speaking again, **the DPRK has consistently maintained the stand that the whole peninsula including south Korea and its vicinity should be denuclearized.** It is absolutely intolerable for the U.S. and the Park Geun Hye regime to persistently spout sophism about the "north's denuclearization" in a bid to mislead the public opinion. If

the U.S. and the south Korean authorities waste time with foolish trumpeting about the "north's denuclearization," doggedly disregarding the DPRK's principled demand, they will only throw more hurdles in the way of the denuclearization of the peninsula. The denuclearization of the peninsula entirely hinges on the attitude of the U.S. and the south Korean authorities." (*Rodong Sinmun*, "Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula Is Entirely up to U.S. South Korean Authorities," July 11, 2016)

Bermudez: "Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates a high level of activity at North Korea's Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, specifically at the North Portal area where the DPRK conducted its 2013 and 2016 nuclear tests. Based on imagery alone, it is not possible to determine whether this activity is for maintenance, excavation or preparation for a fifth nuclear test. Nevertheless, it is clear that North Korea is ensuring that the facility is in a state of readiness that would allow the conduct of future nuclear tests should the order come from Pyongyang." (Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr, "North Korea: High Level of Activity at Nuclear Test Site Portal But Purpose Is Unclear," *38North*, July 11, 2016)

With Beijing's rebuke showing little signs of abating over the U.S.' envisioned THAAD stationing here, concerns are intensifying that China may take retaliatory steps that may take a substantial toll on the South Korean economy. Following last Friday's announcement, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and other officials have reacted with sharp criticism, urging South Korea and the U.S. to shelve the plan. Official media churned out editorials and articles calling for military action and economic countermeasures possibly together with Russia. President Park Geun-hye today sought to defend Seoul's decision, calling it a "matter of survival" and a "presidential duty to protect the people and the nation." "(The deployed THAAD) would not be directed at a third party nation nor intrude upon its security interests," she said during a meeting of senior presidential secretaries at Cheong Wa Dae. "To China and Russia, we have emphasized that the deployment was being considered from the aspect of exercising our right to self-defense in light of North Korea's expanding nuclear and ballistic missile programs," he said at a session of the parliamentary foreign affairs and unification committee. "We will take all necessary measures going forward to counter the threats." On June 9, China's state-backed *Global Times* suggested a cutoff of transactions with businesses involved in the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system and an import embargo on their products, as well as a travel ban on politicians who advocate the decision. On the military front, the newspaper said Beijing should formulate a solution to minimize threats that may be posed by the assets, such as technical disturbances and directing its missiles toward the battery. It also raised the need for Beijing to "reevaluate the long-term impact" of sanctions on North Korea because the THAAD system would tip the regional strategic balance -- a veiled guidance that China would not need to squeeze its isolated, impoverished neighbor as much now. Seoul officials and experts anticipate that China will likely take some tit-for-tat steps given past patterns and levels of resistance. Yet the consequences may amount to more than souring public sentiment there even if no official measure is put in place. The results could include a drastic fall in the sales of Korean goods and cultural products and the number of Chinese tourists here. Cheong Seong-chang, chief of unification strategy at the Sejong Institute, mapped out four

ways a Chinese backlash could occur: a plunge in the number of Chinese travelers; a freeze of the Korean Wave in China; a boycott of Korean products; and other "invisible" disadvantages for Korean firms in China such as tightened regulations. "They would probably be some kind of retaliation, not right now but once the deployment is complete. And it doesn't necessarily have to come from the government -- there is much to take a hit from in the private sector which can also go unnoticed," a senior Foreign Ministry official said, requesting anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter. (Shin Hyon-hee, "Jitters Rise over China's THAAD Reaction," *Korea Herald*, July 11, 2016)

7/12/16

South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se - one of the ministers in charge of responding to North Korea's nuclear and missile programs - was steadfastly opposed to the South Korean government's early decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system, a source said on July 12. South Korea's neighbors China and Russia, South Korean opposition parties, and a large number of experts had already expressed their disapproval of the announcement made by Seoul and Washington on July 8 to deploy THAAD with US forces in South Korea. Now it turns out that South Korea's own Foreign Minister, the main person responsible for dealing with North Korea's nuclear program and the fallout from the THAAD deployment, is in the ranks of the opposition as well. This is likely to raise serious questions about why President Park Geun-hye decided to deploy THAAD earlier than expected despite the strong opposition of the responsible Minister. Multiple sources in the government who are familiar with the discussion inside the government about deploying THAAD told the *Hankyoreh* on July 12 that Yun had been consistently opposed to the government pushing forward its decision to deploy THAAD. According to one government source, Yun voiced his opposition because South Korea needed to establish and strengthen international cooperation over sanctions against North Korea in response to the North's fourth nuclear test in January and its repeated ballistic missile launches and that a rushed decision to deploy THAAD could detract from international cooperation by provoking a backlash from China and Russia. "The Defense Ministry had always been in support of deploying THAAD. Immediately after North Korea launched the Musudan ballistic missile on June 22, the Defense Ministry's attitude became even more aggressive," another source said. "With the Foreign Ministry prioritizing international cooperation on sanctions against North Korea and the Defense Ministry emphasizing [the need] to strengthen the military's ability to respond to North Korea, the President apparently sided with the Defense Ministry," this source added. (Lee Je-hun, "Source: Foreign Minister Was Opposed to THAAD Deployment," *Hankyore*, July 13, 2016)

The main opposition Minjoo Party of Korea was split over the issue of the deployment of an advanced U.S. antimissile system in the country, as the liberal party struggles to establish a unified stance on this contentious issue. Some among the party's rank-and-file called for a collective stance against the recent decision by Seoul and Washington to deploy a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on South Korean soil, arguing it would "needlessly" hurt ties with Beijing and Moscow. Others, however, raised the need for the party to maintain a "strategic ambiguity," saying that in due consideration of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, the party should cautiously deal with the issue rather than categorically oppose it. The party failed to reach any consensus



on the issue during a closed-door meeting of some 60 lawmakers -- about half of its total legislators, although party officials said that "many" voiced opposition to the stationing of THAAD here. During the closed-door meeting, lawmakers such as Sul Hoon, Shim Jae-kwon, Kim Kyung-hyup and Kim Du-kwan voiced their opposition to the deployment plan, casting doubts over the effectiveness of THAAD in countering North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. They also pointed to the possibility of China's "economic reprisal" in the wake of the allies' decision to deploy a THAAD battery, which Beijing says would undermine its security interests and regional stability. But other lawmakers, including Rhee Cheol-hee, Jung Jae-ho and Choi Myung-ghil, said that rather than explicitly approving or disapproving of the deployment plan, the party should take a cautious stance to keep pressuring the government to properly address political, social and diplomatic issues stemming from the deployment plan. Kim Chong-in, the party's interim leader, remained opposed to the party taking a united stance against THAAD. "The party that seeks to take power (by winning the presidential election next year) should not do the same thing (other minor opposition parties do)," he told Yonhap News Agency over the phone. The party plans to further discuss the issue to build an intraparty consensus. (Yonhap, "Minjoo Party Split over THAAD Deployment," July 12, 2016)

7/13/16

South Korea and the United States picked the mountainous southern town of Seongju, 296 kilometers southeast of Seoul, as the location to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. "South Korea and the U.S.' joint working group have proposed the Seongju area, North Gyeongsang Province, as the optimal place for the deployment ... and the countries' defense ministers have approved it," the Ministry of National Defense's deputy minister for policy Yoo Jeh-seung said in a press conference. The placement of the THAAD system in Seongju would help "more firmly secure the safety of our people living in two thirds of South Korea's territory while dramatically increasing the capacity to defend key state facilities like nuclear power plants and oil storage areas as well as the South Korea-U.S. alliance forces," Yoo noted. In selecting the final location, the joint working group considered military effectiveness and resident safety as top priorities and conducted comparative studies, on-site inspections and simulations, according to the vice minister. The mountainous region of Seongju got high marks for its location which can provide protection for key South Korean and U.S. military headquarters including Camp Humphreys, the new U.S. military base to which most of the 28,500 American forces stationed in South Korea will move by next year. The town's relatively remote distance from China, which bitterly opposes the deployment, has also apparently played into the decision. The county is also located beyond the reach of North Korea's long-range multiple launch rocket systems which have a maximum range of 200 km. As the new missile system will be deployed in the southern part of the country, South Korea's military plans to increase the deployment of its own Patriot medium-altitude missile interceptors in the populous capital area, Yoo said. The medium-altitude Patriot interceptor system is more effective at countering North Korea's missiles that fly shorter distances, thus at a lower altitude, he said. The unexpected selection of Seongju sparked angry resistance from its residents who believe the THAAD installation could pose health risks and inflict damage on the town's oriental melon farming industry. Leading an angry delegation, Seongju county chief Kim Hang-gon traveled to Seoul earlier in the day to lodge a

protest with the defense ministry. Kim demanded the ministry call off the site decision at a press conference in front of the ministry. (Yonhap, "S. Korea, U.S. Pick Southern County of Seongju to Deploy THAAD," July 13, 2016)

KCNA: "Jong Nam Hyok, a researcher of the Institute for American Studies of the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK, released a commentary titled "U.S. ill-advised sanctions will cause catastrophic consequences" on July 13: ...The U.S. administration staged the farce of announcing a "human rights report" and the "list of targets of special sanctions" malignantly slandering the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK on July 6, the first of its kind in history. This is another serious strategic mistake made by the Obama administration whose tenure of office is to expire soon. This blatant encroachment upon the sovereignty of the DPRK is the most vivid expression of the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK and a product of its extremely self-opinionated point of view that anything favorable to its interests and taste should become a "just one," regardless of whether it is an act of violating international law or an immoral act. This is stunning the world public as it triggers off serious concern. It is one of the principles recognized by international law that all sovereign states can never become targets of domestic jurisdiction of other countries and this principle is explicitly specified in the "UN convention on exemption of a state and its properties from jurisdiction" adopted on Dec. 2, 2004. Paragraph 9 of Article 2 of the "code on crimes against human peace and security" written by the 6th United Nations Commission on International Law in 1953 clearly stipulates that if a country forces its will upon another country, takes steps to put political and economic pressure upon it and interferes in its internal affairs in a bid to seek interests, such acts are crimes against human peace and security. The respect for sovereignty among countries is an elementary international practice before being a requirement of international law. It is also a moral foundation for establishing international relations, which is vividly manifested through respect for the top representative of the dignity and interests of a country concerned. Even the Bush II administration which earned an ill-fame for frequent invectives and diplomatic gaffes against leaderships of other countries didn't perpetrate such acts beyond common sense as invoking the domestic act of the U.S. against the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK that represents the destiny of its service personnel and people. What the Obama administration did amounts to the self-acknowledgement of the total flop of its policy toward the DPRK. It became universally accepted understanding long ago that the present U.S. administration's "strategic patience" is, in essence, a hands-off approach and Obama and his staff had neither ability nor will to handle the Korean issue. When Obama bragged that he would "bring down" the social system of the DPRK, at the meeting with the YouTube video manufacturers in January last year, its subscribers in the U.S. aired their views that his careless words revealed his real intention and admitted to his failure in the policy towards the DPRK. The U.S. administration employed such a base method as hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK in a bid to conceal its failure in the policy towards the DPRK but it brought to light its strategic incompetence and awkward position. On July 6 a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department, when asked by a reporter if the recent sanctions measure would bring a boomerang effect, was reported to have answered that they took the step out of a lot of consideration. The U.S., however, failed to consider the catastrophic consequences to be entailed by the reckless action. The

DPRK government clarified its stand in the statement of the Foreign Ministry that the DPRK considers the U.S. act of hurting the dignity of the DPRK's supreme leadership as a declaration of a war and will take corresponding measures including the shut-down of all diplomatic contacts and channels with the U.S. The U.S. provocative sanctions have driven the rock-bottom DPRK-U.S. relations into an inescapable mire and marked a new starting point in further escalating the vicious cycle of tension on the Korean peninsula. **The DPRK is now left with no option but to take new tough measures to defend the dignity of the supreme leadership and interests of the DPRK** under the present situation in which the U.S. political and military provocations to stifle it have reached an extreme phase and there is the only way for it to settle accounts with the latter by force. **There is no guarantee that Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military drill** to be staged when the situation on the peninsula remains tenser than ever before and the DPRK-U.S. relations are at the lowest ebb **will not create another explosive situation.** The U.S. wrong option is bound to boomerang." (KCNA, "Washington's Ill-Advised Sanctions Will Cause Catastrophic Consequence: Researcher of DPRK Foreign Ministry," July 13, 2016)

7/14/16

KPA Panmunjom Mission spokesman answer to the question raised by *Joson Inmingun* newspaper "as regards the fact that the U.S. imperialist aggression forces in south Korea recently massively introduced various type heavy weapons into the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), pushing the situation there to the phase of conflict and war. On July 10 south Korean media made public the fact that the "UN Command" held a confab with the puppet Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 2014 **and revised the "UN Command Regulation 551-4" on allowing the introduction of not only firearms but heavy weapons into the DMZ** along the MDL and has begun implementing it **since September 5** of the same year. It is said that according to the new "regulation", 12.7mm-caliber machine gun, 40mm-caliber grenade launchers, 57mm-caliber recoilless gun, 81mm-caliber mortars and other heavy weapons were deployed into the DMZ, counting only those opened to public. ...Such undisguised breach of the Armistice Agreement has turned the DMZ into a "heavily armed zone" and pushed the situation to the phase of unpredictable military clash. This is a product of the ceaseless U.S. moves to ignite another Korean war. The U.S. imperialist aggression forces which are present in south Korea under the cloak of the "UN Command" are misleading the public opinion with sheer sophism that their shameless actions are "to cope with" the DPRK's "arms build-up." The U.S. has long wantonly and totally breached the Korean Armistice Agreement. It was the robber-like U.S. that began breaching the core provisions of the AA as soon as it was signed. Military tension has reached an extreme phase in the DMZ along the MDL, the line dividing the Korean peninsula recognized as the biggest hotspot in the world. This is attributable to the dangerous phase of confrontation and war created by the U.S. imperialist aggression forces in south Korea by massively introducing heavy weapons to the DMZ along the MDL in wanton violation of the AA. The massive introduction of heavy weapons into the DMZ along the MDL would render the DMZ which plays the role of military buffer zone defunct and turn it into an outpost for igniting a war. This is the aim sought by the chieftains of aggression and provocation. The U.S., the shameless robber and ferocious aggressor without an equal in the world, has paid lip-service to the "observance of the AA" and "detente" in a bid to hide its true colors. It is

trying to turn the DMZ into "zone flooded with heavy weapons," thus inciting the military confrontation between the north and the south and rendering the situation there extremely tense. By nature, it is the customary practice of the U.S. to abet and stoke dispute and conflict among nations and countries in a bid to achieve its aggressive purpose with ease. This is well illustrated by the fact that the U.S. is stepping up the "transfer of its aggressor bases to areas south of the River Han." The Park Geun Hye group of traitors is working with bloodshot eyes to escalate the confrontation with the compatriots in the north, zealously pursuant to this sinister scenario of the U.S. The increased efforts on the part of the criminals to falsify facts and distort the reality would only bring to light their despicable true colors. The KPA is now following with high vigilance the frequent ill-boding military moves of the enemy in areas along the MDL." (KCNA, "U.S. Forces Accused of Turning DMZ along MDL into Zone Flush with Heavy Weapons," July 14, 2016)

The House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a draft resolution on North Korea's nuclear program released Thursday, stated that Pyongyang has an estimated stockpile of nuclear materials that can be converted into 13 to 21 nuclear weapons. Previously, the committee presumed that North Korea could make 10 to 16 nuclear weapons. (Yi Whan-woo, "N.K. Can Produce 21 Nuclear Weapons," *Korea Times*, July 14, 2016)

Senior diplomats from South Korea, the US and Japan met in Honolulu, Hawaii, and promised to strengthen trilateral cooperation. It was the fourth such deliberation between deputy minister-level diplomats from the three countries. While the three countries agreed on the need to respond to North Korean nuclear weapons and to deploy the THAAD missile defense system with US forces in South Korea, there were some subtle differences in their position on how to resolve conflict in the South China Sea. US Vice President Joe Biden, who attended the meeting as a stop on his way to Australia, remarked that the three countries share fundamental values and a vision for the future of the Asia-Pacific region. He also said that the US was strongly committed to its policy of the Asia-Pacific rebalance and that it would strengthen its alliances with South Korea and with Japan, which provide an important foundation for this policy. The meeting brought together South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Sugiyama Shinsuke. In a joint press conference following the meeting, Lim said North Korea's nuclear program had been one of the key items on the agenda. The three diplomats promised to increase trilateral cooperation aimed at denuclearizing North Korea and to work together to continue their faithful implementation of UN Security Council resolutions. In regard to deploying THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, Blinken reiterated that THAAD is "not aimed at a third country" like China. But Lim did not mention THAAD during his introductory remarks in the press conference, perhaps out of concern about a possible backlash from the Chinese government. On the topic of the conflict in the South China Sea, the gap between the US and Japan on the one hand and South Korea on the other was evident once again. The Japanese Foreign Ministry stated that the Japanese and American diplomats - Blinken and Sugiyama - had confirmed their agreement on maritime security issues, including the South China Sea and the final ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in a dispute between the Philippines and China. During the press conference, Blinken mentioned the

importance of urging all members of the international community to obey the law, which can be seen as an indirect request for the South Korean government to join with the US in putting pressure on China. But Lim only expressed the hope that the issue of the South China Sea would be peacefully resolved through diplomatic effort, without expressing support for the court's ruling. (Lee Je-hun, "Senior Diplomats from South Korea, the US and Japan Meet in Hawaii," *Hankyore*, July 16, 2016)

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South Korea's prime minister was pelted with eggs and water bottles by angry villagers as he paid a visit to the rural county chosen as the site of a planned United States missile defense system. The visit by Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn to Seongju, about 135 miles southeast of Seoul, the capital, was meant to defuse continuing opposition to the missile range. Instead, he was forced to retreat as thousands of residents who had gathered in front of Seongju's government headquarters shouted, "Go away!" according to television footage. Facing the crowd, Hwang said South Korea needed the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, to defend against North Korean missiles. He also apologized for not having explained the rationale for the deployment before the county, which has a population of about 50,000, was named as the site for the missile base two days ago. Residents, many of them melon farmers, fear that the presence of the powerful radar system will threaten their health and their crops – fears that the government said were groundless. The government also promised economic aid to help assuage concerns that a new military base would undermine the local economy. None of these assurances appeased residents today. Confronted with a barrage of eggs, water bottles and boos, Hwang was forced to duck behind shields and umbrellas raised by bodyguards and retreat into the government building. Some people threw salt, a practice that rural South Koreans believe helps dispel evil spirits. Later, protesters blocked a minibus carrying Hwang and his entourage when it tried to leave through a back gate. They also parked a large tractor in front of the minibus. Scuffles erupted during a standoff between the police and demonstrators that lasted for hours. No major injuries were reported. Some people also refused to send their children to school in protest. The rally came a day after President Park Geun-hye appealed for an end to an "unnecessary debate" over the planned deployment. Activists have held small demonstrations in front of the Defense Ministry building in Seoul to protest or support the missile system. In a survey published today by Gallup Korea, 50 percent of 1,004 respondents said they supported the deployment, while 32 percent said they opposed it. According to the poll, those who supported the deployment said it would help protect South Korea and American forces in the country from the North's ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Those who opposed the plan said they doubted the effectiveness of THAAD as a defensive weapon or feared that it would only deepen the country's dependence on the American military and raise tensions with neighboring countries. (Choe Sang-hun, "South Koreans Pelt Premier with Eggs over Missile Site," *New York Times*, July 16, 2016, p. A-4)

DPRK FoMin spokesman answer to the question raised by KCNA "as regards the U.S. introduction of another nuclear submarine into south Korea: On July 13 nuclear-powered submarine Ohio, one of the major strategic strike means of the U.S., made an entry into Pusan Port of south Korea. The 18 000-ton class super large nuclear submarine is capable of mounting missile attacks with stealth function. In June the U.S.

brought to south Korea nuclear submarine Mississippi and the formation of B-52H strategic bombers. The U.S. introduction into the Korean peninsula of strategic nuclear strike means at a time when the DPRK-U.S. relations and the regional situation are growing extremely tense is a revelation of its hostile attempt to stifle the DPRK by force at any cost. Also lurking behind it is an ambition to contain other rival countries in the region by force and establish military hegemony in Northeast Asia. It is foolhardy for the U.S. not to properly understand the strategic position of the DPRK that has ranked itself among the nuclear powers and the trend of the times, but to try to bring down the DPRK through military pressure and threat. Not content with reckless arms buildup, war exercises and sanctions racket to retrieve its failure in its DPRK policy, the U.S. does not hesitate to hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK. This is rendering the situation on the Korean peninsula and in the region extremely tense and increasing the danger of a nuclear war. The present situation in which the U.S. has become hell-bent on encroaching upon the sovereignty and nuclear threat and blackmail while more openly pursuing its hegemonic strategy in reliance on military muscle clearly proves once again how just the DPRK was when it adopted the line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force. **Lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and in the region can never be realized by unilateral efforts of the DPRK and it is possible only when the military hostile acts of the U.S. which is chiefly to blame for the tension and its anachronistic hostile policy toward the DPRK are terminated.** The present situation in which the U.S. is more viciously pursuing its hostile policy toward the DPRK compels it to further bolster its nuclear deterrence for self-defense. **Unshakable is the will of the DPRK to fundamentally defuse in reliance on powerful nuclear deterrence the danger of a nuclear war being brought by the U.S. and safeguard peace on the Korean peninsula and in the region.**" (KCNA, "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces U.S. Introduction of Nuclear Submarine into S. Korea," July 15, 2016)

North Korea presented to media a man it alleges is a South Korean spy who tried to enter the North to kidnap children. During a Pyongyang news conference attended by The Associated Press and other foreign media, detainee Ko Hyon Chol said he apologized for a crime he called "unforgivable." Ko, 53, said he was born in North Korea but fled the country in early 2013 to resettle in the South. He said he was later recruited by South Korea's spy service for a mission to abduct children from the North. He said he was arrested May 27 on an island in the Amnok River which runs along the border between North Korea and China. (Associated Press, "North Korea Detains Person It Alleges Is South Korean Spy," July 15, 2016)

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South Korean and U.S. intelligence sources said they have detected increased activity at the North Korean nuclear test site in Punggye-ri and have beefed up surveillance. The allies said there has been an increase in activity particularly after Seoul and Washington on July 8 announced they planned to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. "There has been a noticeable increase in truck and personnel movement around the site in Kilju county," said an insider. "There has been suspicious movement in the area since the THAAD announcement and Seoul is examining all angles of the change, including the possibility of Pyongyang moving to detonate another nuclear device," he said, without going into too much

detail. (Yonhap, "Increased Activity Monitored at N. Korean Test Site: Allies," July 17, 2016)

- 7/18/16 South Korea's Ministry of Unification said that North Korea could conduct its fifth nuclear test whenever it wants, amid growing speculations that the reclusive country may be planning another detonation following increased activity detected at its underground nuclear site. "North Korea seems to be fully prepared to carry out a nuclear test at any time (when the order is given by its leader Kim Jong-un). South Korea is closely monitoring every move at the North's test site in close cooperation with the United States," unification ministry spokesman Jeong Joon-hee said at a regular press briefing. (Yonhap, "Seoul Says Pyongyang Is Ready for Nuke Test Any Time," July 18, 2016)
- 7/19/16 North Korea test-fired three ballistic missiles in an apparent "armed protest" against South Korea's decision to deploy an advanced U.S. anti-missile system in the country to deal with increasing threats from the communist country. The three ballistic missiles, two Scuds and one Rodong, were launched from Hwangju, North Hwanghae Province, between 5:45 a.m. and 6:40 a.m., with two flying some 500 to 600 kilometers across the country before crashing into the East Sea, Seoul's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said in a statement. The trajectory of the third missile still needs to be determined, it said. "Given the missile launches come after the decision (early this month by Seoul and Washington) to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in the southern county of Seongju, it can be interpreted as Pyongyang's clear message that it can attack Seongju and any other part of South Korea," JCS spokesman Jeon Hakyu said in a press briefing. The launches are in line with Pyongyang's earlier threats made last week when it warned of taking "physical counter-action" after the two allies announced the deployment of a THAAD battery in South Korea by the end of 2017 to better deal with evolving nuclear and missile threats from the North, Jeon said. The Ministry of National Defense said it is still in the process of analyzing what kinds of missiles were fired and the exact altitude of their flight. "When the answers are determined, the ministry will provide the details," he said. The United States Strategic Command said in a statement that the North launched two Scud tactical ballistic missiles and then one Rodong medium-range ballistic missile. The missile launches "didn't pose a threat to North America," it said. In an emergency question and answer session held at the National Assembly on Tuesday afternoon, Defense Minister Han Min-koo said the North's missile launches are aimed at fueling opposition against a THAAD in the South. He then called the missile launches a "sort of protest" against the planned THAAD deployment. Pyongyang's latest provocation, meanwhile, drew swift condemnation from all sides as it once again violated U.N. sanctions that prevent it from firing off ballistic missiles. The JCS strongly condemned North Korea's "rash" actions, saying such a move could pose a significant threat to the country's security and the safety of its people. (Choi Kyong-ae, "N. Korea Test-Fires Three Ballistic Missiles after THAAD Decision," Yonhap, July 19, 2016) The military judges that the North conducted a series of missile tests arcing at higher angles from last year, with the aim of circumventing South Korea's intercepting missile network and testing the North's capacity to mount miniaturized nuclear warheads on its missiles. Generally, small nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles measure 90 centimeters in diameter and

weigh less than 1 ton each. If warheads are made smaller, they can be sent farther. The North is believed to be developing nuclear warheads measuring 700 kilograms to 1 ton each. The Rodong missile carrying a warhead of this size can fly up to the maximum range (1,300 kilometers). It means Pyongyang is conducting diverse firing tests through combination of various nuclear warhead sizes and firing angles in order to launch an optimized nuclear attack with the Rodong missiles by breaking through the THAAD system to be deployed in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province, and the new Patriot missile (PAC-3). "The Rodong loaded with a two-ton nuclear warhead can strike the entire areas of South Korea when fired from near Pyongyang, even if the missile's range is cut in nearly half," a South Korean military source said. "The North seems to be constantly checking the results of progress in miniaturizing its nuclear warheads through test fires of the Rodong missile," another source added. (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "N.K. Conducts Missile Tests Arcing at Higher Angles,' Says Military," July 23, 2016)

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KCNA: Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, provided field guidance to the drill for ballistic rocket fire of the Hwasong artillery units of the KPA Strategic Force. He, together with General Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the Strategic Force, and other commanding officers, went round the firing sites to learn about the preparations for ballistic rocket firing. After hearing about its plan, he ordered to kick off the drill. **The drill was conducted by limiting the firing range under the simulated conditions of making preemptive strikes at ports and airfields in the operational theater in south Korea where the U.S. imperialists nuclear war hardware is to be hurled.** And it once again examined the operational features of the detonating devices of nuclear warheads mounted on the ballistic rockets at the designated altitude over the target area. It fully demonstrated the combat capability of the Hwasong artillery units. Kim Jong Un expressed great satisfaction over the successful drill, highly praising the artillerymen for keeping themselves fully ready to carry out any order issued all of a sudden and for being always exact and elaborate both in maneuverability and striking force. He assigned the leading officials of the WPK Central Committee, scientists and technicians in the field of research into nuclear weapons and commanding officers of the KPA Strategic Force accompanying him to the tasks of fully ensuring speed and security of the operation of nuclear attack system, rounding off the Juche-based firepower striking methods and developing diverse type ballistic rockets. He was accompanied by Ri Man Gon, Ri Pyong Chol, Hong Sung Mu, Kim Jong Sik and other leading officials of the WPK Central Committee and scientists and technicians in the field of research into nuclear weapons. (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Guides Drill for Ballistic Rocket Fire," July 20, 2016) One of the three ballistic missiles test-fired by North Korea likely exploded in the air during its initial stage of flight due to some sort of malfunction, military officials familiar with the matter said July 22. According to military sources, one of the three missiles blew up at an altitude of less than 30 kilometers, though two others flew 500-600 km from Hwangju, south of Pyongyang, across the communist country before hitting the East Sea early this week. "Pyongyang's claim to have used the missile launches to test a nuclear detonator device (on all the three missiles) could be false," a



military official said. (Yonhap, "One North Korean Missile Exploded in Initial Stage of Latest Launch," *Korea Times*, July 22, 2016)

The fallout from the US and South Korea's plan to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system was swift: hunger strikes and share price falls at home; ire and threats from North Korea and China. Designed to protect South Korea from an increasingly bellicose Pyongyang, the terminal high-altitude air defense platform – or THAAD – has become a lightning rod for tensions between Seoul, the US and China, which fears its own military may be compromised. That has spooked South Koreans, who fear retaliation from China, their biggest trading partner, in the form of sanctions – coincidentally or not, a Chinese car company has already ditched its use of South Korean batteries. They also fear that THAAD lacks the range to protect Seoul. "The THAAD deployment in the Korean peninsula would reinstate the cold-war era confrontation between South Korea, US, Japan versus North Korea, China and Russia," says Cheong Seong-chang, an analyst at Sejong Institute. China, he says, has previously been more willing to implement sanctions on Pyongyang, in part as a way of fending off THAAD. Now without that incentive, "China will likely ease its sanctions against North Korea, basically making the international sanctions powerless." The timing of the THAAD decision suggests that Seoul is focusing on its security alliance with Washington. But some analysts also see it as the result of dwindling faith in China's ability to curb North Korea's nuclear ambition and Beijing's potential economic retaliation against Seoul. Bong Youngshik, researcher at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, believes Park Geun-hye, South Korea's president, lost faith with Beijing when she was unable at the start of the year to reach Xi Jinping, her Chinese counterpart, after what Pyongyang called its first hydrogen bomb test. "She must have felt humiliated when she could not get hold of Mr Xi through the hotline, which might have convinced her that South Korea cannot rely on China any longer," he says. The location has also angered non-locals, as the Seoul metropolitan area, which contains about half of South Korea's 50m population, would be out of the system's 200km range – although it would help protect most US military bases and soldiers from a North Korean strike. "Many South Koreans are disappointed as they realise THAAD is not a universal sword that can destroy any incoming North Korean missiles as the government has promoted it," says Kim Dong-yeob, professor of North Korean studies at Kyungnam University. "They are now wondering for whom and for what the system is deployed." Nor are the economic repercussions lost on South Korea, where the export-oriented economy is wilting under waning demand from China and elsewhere. Alienating China, they fear, would lead to more economic distress. China signalled its displeasure when Wang Yi, Beijing's foreign minister, said THAAD had exceeded the Korean peninsula's defense requirements. A ministry spokesman added that China would take "relevant measures" to safeguard its interests. Political analysts see China responding in two ways: reducing pressure on Pyongyang, further undermining international sanctions, and raising tariff barriers on trade with South Korea. That would hurt South Korea. China buys one-quarter of South Korea's exports, making it the country's biggest economic partner. The value of South Korea's stock market dropped by nearly \$3bn in a single day after the THAAD announcement, with shares in cosmetics, casino and travel companies – heavily reliant on Chinese demand – bearing the brunt. "Deploying THAAD is a huge mistake on South Korea's part, and if the

pressure from South Korean civilians is not enough for South Korea to reconsider this decision, it could mean a historical low for China-South Korea relations," says Cui Zhi-Ying of the Tongji University Centre for Asia-Pacific studies. "China might take steps to introduce some sanctions against companies that were supportive of the decision, and once the missile is in place, the new norm will be missiles aimed at THAAD." Anhui Jianghuai Automobile, the Chinese carmaker, said it would cease production of an electric vehicle equipped with batteries made by South Korea's Samsung on fears the model could be disqualified from government subsidies. "China will not likely hurry with its economic retaliation. It will gradually strengthen non-tariff barriers against Korean products rather than taking outright retaliatory measures," says Bong. "But it is such a lopsided business partnership so South Korea will suffer greatly if China starts to squeeze the Korean economy just a little." (Song Jong-A, "Seoul's Acceptance of U.S. Missile System Escalates Fears over Sanctions Retaliation," *Financial Times*, July 20, 2016)

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South Korea's defense minister said that the planned deployment of an advanced U.S. anti-missile system is for self-defense and will not be incorporated into the wider U.S. missile defense (MD) system. Defense Minister Han Min-koo's remarks made at the National Assembly policy review session come after speculations that the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea will invariably lead to the country becoming part of the Washington-led MD system which is seen by some as a move to isolate China. The Seoul government has persistently said that it has no intention of joining the MD system and that it wants to build up its own "Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD)" system to deal with evolving North Korean missile and nuclear threats. "The government remains committed to not joining the MD shield, and this stance has not changed since the Kim Dae-jung administration," the minister pointed out. The late president led South Korea until February 2003. "In line with this policy, Seoul has stepped up efforts to build up KAMD," he said. He made clear that the THAAD to be employed in South Korea will not be sharing information with the wider MD network. (Yonhap, "Local THAAD Will Not Be Incorporated into Wider U.S.-Led MD System: Defense Chief," July 20, 2016)

**SANGER:** So what we want to do is pick up where we left off in March. We were listening to Speaker Ryan last night, and he presented a much more traditional Republican, engaged internationalist view of the world. One in which he said that the United States would never lead from behind. In our conversation a few months ago, you were discussing pulling back from commitments we can no longer afford unless others pay for them. You were discussing a set of alliances that you were happy to participate in. **TRUMP:** And I think, by the way, David, I think they will be able to afford them. **SANGER:** They may be. **TRUMP:** We can't. **SANGER:** But I guess the question is, If we can't, do you think that your presidency, let's assume for a moment that they contribute what they are contributing today, or what they have contributed historically, your presidency would be one of pulling back and saying, "You know, we're not going to invest in these alliances with NATO, we are not going to invest as much as we have in Asia since the end of the Korean War because we can't afford it and it's really not in our interest to do so." **TRUMP:** If we cannot be properly reimbursed for the tremendous cost of our military protecting other countries, and in

many cases the countries I'm talking about are extremely rich. Then if we cannot make a deal, which I believe we will be able to, and which I would prefer being able to, but if we cannot make a deal, I would like you to say, I would prefer being able to, some people, the one thing they took out of your last story, you know, some people, the fools and the haters, they said, "Oh, Trump doesn't want to protect you." **I would prefer that we be able to continue, but if we are not going to be reasonably reimbursed for the tremendous cost of protecting these massive nations with tremendous wealth** – you have the tape going on? **SANGER:** We do. **HABERMAN:** We both do. **TRUMP:** With massive wealth. Massive wealth. We're talking about countries that are doing very well. Then yes, I would be absolutely prepared to tell those countries, "Congratulations, you will be defending yourself." **SANGER:** That suggests that our forward deployments around the world are based on their interests – they're not really based on our interests. And yet I think many in your party would say that the reason that we have troops in Europe, the reason that we keep 60,000 troops in Asia, is that it's in our interest to keep open trading lines, it's in our interest to keep the North Koreans in check, you do that much better out away from the United States. **TRUMP: I think it's a mutual interest, but we're being reimbursed like it's only in our interest.** I think it's a mutual interest. **SANGER:** We were talking about alliances, and the fundamental problem that you hear many Republicans, traditional Republicans, have with the statement that you've made is that it would seem to them that you would believe that the interests of the United States being out with both our troops and our diplomacy abroad is less than our economic interests in having somebody else support that. In other words, even if they didn't pay a cent toward it, many have believed that the way we've kept our postwar leadership since World War II has been our ability to project power around the world. That's why we got this many diplomats — **TRUMP: How is it helping us? How has it helped us? We have massive trade deficits.** I could see that, if instead of having a trade deficit worldwide of \$800 billion, we had a trade positive of \$100 billion, \$200 billion, \$800 billion. So how has it helped us? **SANGER:** Well, keeping the peace. We didn't have a presence in places like Korea in 1950, or not as great a presence, and you saw what happened. **TRUMP: There's no guarantee that we'll have peace in Korea.** **SANGER:** Even with our troops, no, there's no guarantee. **TRUMP:** No, there's no guarantee. We have 28,000 soldiers on the line. **SANGER:** But we've had them there since 1953 and — **TRUMP: Sure, but that doesn't mean that there wouldn't be something going on right now. Maybe you would have had a unified Korea. Who knows what would have happened? In the meantime, what have we done? So we've kept peace, but in the meantime we've let North Korea get stronger and stronger and more nuclear and more nuclear, and you are really saying, "Well, how is that a good thing?" You understand? North Korea now is almost like a boiler. You say we've had peace, but that part of Korea, North Korea, is getting more and more crazy. And more and more nuclear. And they are testing missiles all the time.** **SANGER:** They are. **TRUMP: And we've got our soldiers sitting there watching missiles go up. And you say to yourself, "Oh, that's interesting." Now we're protecting Japan because Japan is a natural location for North Korea. So we are protecting them, and you say to yourself, "Well, what are we getting out of this?"** **SANGER:** Well, we keep our missile defenses out there. And those missile defenses help prevent the day when North Korea can reach the United States with one of its missiles. It's a lot

easier to shoot down from there — **TRUMP: We've had them there for a long time, and now they're practically obsolete**, in all fairness. **SANGER:** Relatively new missile defenses would allow us — **TRUMP:** I'm only saying this. **We're spending money, and if you're talking about trade, we're losing a tremendous amount of money, according to many stats, \$800 billion a year on trade. So we are spending a fortune on military in order to lose \$800 billion. That doesn't sound like it's smart to me.** Just so you understand though, totally on the record, this is not 40 years ago. We are not the same country and the world is not the same world. Our country owes right now \$19 trillion, going to \$21 trillion very quickly because of the omnibus budget that was passed, which is incredible. We don't have the luxury of doing what we used to do; we don't have the luxury, and it is a luxury. We need other people to reimburse us much more substantially than they are giving right now because we are only paying for a fraction of the cost. **SANGER:** Or to take on the burden themselves. **TRUMP:** Or, **if we cannot make the right deal, to take on the burden themselves.** You said it wrong because you said or — *or* if we cannot make the right deal for proper reimbursement to take on the burden themselves. Yes. **Now, Hillary Clinton said: "I will never leave Japan. I will never leave Japan. Will never leave any of our —"** **Well now, once you say that, guess what happens?** What happens? **HABERMAN:** You're stuck. **TRUMP: You can't negotiate.** **HABERMAN:** Right. **TRUMP: In a deal, you always have to be prepared to walk. Hillary Clinton has said, "We will never, ever walk." That's a wonderful phrase, but unfortunately, if I were on Saudi Arabia's side, Germany, Japan, South Korea and others, I would say, "Oh, they're never leaving, so what do we have to pay them for?" Does that make sense to you, David?** **SANGER:** It does, but we also know that defending the United States is a harder thing to do if you're not forward-deployed. **TRUMP:** By the way, and I know what I'm talking about is massive. If we ever felt there was a reason to defend the United States, **we can always deploy, and it would be a lot less expense.** ... **HABERMAN:** Can we switch to current events, recent events? **TRUMP:** You understand what — **SANGER:** I do, I do. **TRUMP: You always have to be prepared to walk. It doesn't mean I want to walk. And I would prefer not to walk. You have to be prepared and our country cannot afford to do what we're doing.** ... **SANGER:** President Obama, as you probably know, as you probably read, is considering a no-first-use pledge before he leaves office for **nuclear weapons.** We don't have one right now. Some other nations do, some don't. Would you consider that stabilizing? **TRUMP:** Depends on who we are talking about, it depends on who we are talking about. I would only make that commitment as the agreement is being signed. I wouldn't want to play my cards. I don't want to say that. **SANGER:** This would be a declaratory policy of the United States. **TRUMP:** I understand. I will do everything within my power never to be in a position where we have to use nuclear power because that's a whole different ballgame. That's very important to me. I will do everything in my power never to be in a position where we will have to use nuclear power. It's very important to me. **SANGER:** President Obama, as you know, has talked about reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the American arsenal and hopefully getting to the point, maybe not in our lifetimes, of no nuclear weapons. Do you believe at this point that we have sufficient forces that we could come down unilaterally? **TRUMP:** I only like that premise if nobody else has them. But that's never going to happen. **SANGER:** Do you think we have too many weapons than we actually need to

defend the United States? **TRUMP:** I think we have a lot of obsolete weapons. **SANGER:** We certainly do. **TRUMP:** We have nuclear that we don't even know if it works. We have nuclear where the telephone systems are 40 years old and they have wire that's so corroded that they can't call from one station to the next. **SANGER:** That's right. **TRUMP:** We have nuclear that their silos are rusted so badly that they don't even know if the rockets are going to pour out. **SANGER:** Well that raises the question whether we need that part of the triad? **TRUMP:** Yes. Yes, I think you need all three parts, but – but we have, much of what we have is obsolete. Now, Russia, if you look at what they're doing, they're building submarines, they're going to a level. ... (David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, "Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey's Coup Attempt and the World, *New York Times*, July 21, 2016)

Many more Japanese than South Koreans support the Tokyo-Seoul agreement described as a "final and irreversible resolution" on the issue of "comfort women," a survey has showed. While 47.9 percent of Japanese citizens give it a thumbs up, just 28.1 percent of South Koreans look favorably on the deal, concluded in December, the poll showed. The survey was released July 20 by the Genron NPO, a Japanese nonprofit group, and the East Asia Institute, a think tank in South Korea, and 37.6 percent of South Koreans expressed unfavorable views about the bilateral deal over comfort women. Just 20.9 percent of surveyed Japanese said they did not like the deal. The two groups conducted the survey in June and July, respectively, and received 1,000 valid responses in Japan and 1,010 in South Korea. Respondents were also asked about what is their impression of each other's countries. Those who said they have an unfavorable impression of South Korea accounted for 44.6 percent of all surveyed Japanese, 7.8 percentage points lower than the previous year. Although 61 percent of South Koreans said they had an unfavorable impression of Japan, it was down 11.5 points from 72.5 percent in the previous year. Asked to cite countries and regions important for their nations' future, most South Korean respondents, or 47.1 percent, said China is important, followed by 39.8 percent who cited the United States. While 65.9 percent of Japanese--the largest number--said the United States is important for Japan, only 8 percent said China is important. (Higashioka Toru, "Only 28% of S, Korean Back Deal on 'Comfort Women,'" *Asahi Shimbun*, August 6, 2016)

7/21/16

DPRK FoMin spokesman answer to a question raised by KCNA "in connection with the fact that the U.S. found fault with the ballistic rocket firing drill conducted by the Korean People's Army: Official figures of the White House and the State and Defense Departments of the U.S. are branding the ballistic rocket firing drill conducted by the Hwasong artillery units of the Strategic Force of the KPA as "violation of resolution" of the UN Security Council and "provocation." The U.S. action reminds one of a thief crying "Stop the thief!" as it took issue with the routine military rehearsal of the KPA. The U.S. has to look back on the fact that it is posing a grave threat to the DPRK with nuclear weapons after bringing to south Korea all types of strategic assets, before slandering others. The unceasing arms buildup and nuclear war drills of the U.S. are real threats to the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and a wanton violation of the UN Charter and international law. Just like a robber shaking his fist at the owner after breaking into his house, the U.S. is accusing the DPRK of its legitimate countermeasure for self-defense. This is an intolerable provocation against the DPRK.

With the joint military exercises Ulji Freedom Guardian scheduled in coming August at hand, the U.S. is steadily escalating the tension on the Korean peninsula. There is no guarantee that the saber-rattling which the U.S. plans to stage with the coming joint military exercises as an occasion would not lead to igniting the fuse of a nuclear war. The spokesman warned that the U.S. will be made to face a prompt, merciless and deadly nuclear retaliation if it plays with fire on the peninsula despite the repeated warnings by the DPRK. Some countries about to side with the U.S. should take unbiased stand with a clear understanding of the nature of the situation and contribute to ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the rest of the world, the spokesman stressed." (KCNA, "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Slams U.S. for Finding Fault with DPRK's Ballistic Rocket Firing Drill," July 21, 2016)

ISIS: "Recent information suggests that an early centrifuge research and development (R&D) facility was located at the Panghyon Aircraft Plant, at or near the Panghyon Air Base, which is located about 45 kilometers west of the Yongbyon nuclear site. This is a preliminary site identification and requires additional confirmation. An exclusive story by Reuters covers this report here. Determining the exact location of sites associated with North Korea's gas centrifuge enrichment program has been a persistent challenge over the years. However, geo-locating these sites is critical to any future nuclear agreements with North Korea. If negotiations resume and are successful, it will be critical to include all the major North Korean centrifuge plants in any plan for freezing, monitoring, and dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. After more than a decade of denying the existence of a gas centrifuge enrichment program, in November 2010 North Korea revealed the existence of a production-scale gas centrifuge plant at the Yongbyon site. However, at the time, it denied that there were other centrifuge plants, despite information to the contrary. It is widely assessed that North Korea's Yongbyon centrifuge plant is part of a larger gas centrifuge complex and that other facilities are located elsewhere. However, the location and nature of other sites have so far remained publicly unknown. Although unable to identify another production-scale centrifuge plant, the Institute may have identified the location of one of North Korea's early small-scale centrifuge enrichment plants. This plant would have served as an important facility in the development of North Korea's gas centrifuge program in the 1990s and early 2000s. The early stages of a gas centrifuge program typically involve relatively small research and development facilities to test individual centrifuges and a limited number of centrifuges connected together by pipes into cascades. Information about such a plant in North Korea emerged publicly on June 9, 2000, when the Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* reported that Chinese sources had indicated there was an enrichment plant located inside a mountain, listed in the article as Mount Chonma. For some time, the Institute was unable to confirm this information. However, it recently obtained additional information from knowledgeable government officials suggesting that this centrifuge development plant had existed and was associated with an underground aircraft spare parts manufacturing and assembly facility. We have learned from knowledgeable government officials, and found with the assistance of Joseph Bermudez of AllSource Analysis, that the most likely site of this facility is the Panghyon Aircraft Plant, near or part of North Korea's Panghyon Air Base, which is located about 45 kilometers west of Yongbyon. The underground aircraft manufacturing plant was first developed in the 1960s to manufacture spare parts for Soviet-supplied MIG fighter jets, according to

government experts. Based on analyzing commercial satellite imagery, the most likely site of the aircraft manufacturing plant and thus the centrifuge R&D facility is the underground complex located southeast of the air strip. Adding to the credibility of this determination, this plant is inside the Changgun-dae Mountain, which is part of the larger Ch'onma-gun mountain range. As figure 2 shows, the mountain has at least two tunnel entrances, one of which is wide enough for military aircraft (parked outside in figure 3). There are also likely hidden entrances into the mountain. There is another identifiable underground site adjacent to the airstrip. However, this one appears sized and oriented to store aircraft underground. The suspect site could have held up to 200-300 centrifuges, according to a knowledgeable official. We have no information suggesting that this site continues to function as a centrifuge plant. One government expert familiar with North Korea's nuclear program concurred that this underground site is a credible suspect centrifuge site. We are seeking additional confirmation.

Centrifuge research and development activities in North Korea, and possibly at this site, would date back to the late 1990s and early 2000s after North Korea received centrifuge aid from Pakistan. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, North Korea secretly developed its gas centrifuge enrichment program in parallel to its plutonium production program then frozen under the 1994 US/North Korean Agreed Framework. To do so, North Korea received significant centrifuge assistance from centrifuge experts at Pakistan's A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory, the headquarters of Pakistan's secret weapon-grade uranium centrifuge program near Islamabad. Under a joint military cooperation agreement, North Korean missile experts were training Pakistanis in the centrifuge workshops of the Khan Research Laboratory on how to build sensitive components of the Nodong ballistic missile. While working in these centrifuge workshops, the North Korean missile experts asked to learn about gas centrifuges. Pakistan subsequently agreed to transfer a significant amount of centrifuge assistance to North Korea, in essence providing the North Korean missile experts with a centrifuge starter kit. Based on this information, it is realistic that North Korean missile experts were the ones first in control of the development of centrifuges in North Korea. They would have had the direct experience in Pakistan building and operating centrifuges. The North Korean missile group would have already mastered several technologies similar to those needed in a centrifuge program. Aerospace and centrifuge technologies often overlap. For example, the missile program would have expertise in high strength metals which are needed in gas centrifuges. Thus, locating a centrifuge research and development plant inside a fighter aircraft manufacturing facility would make sense or at least be plausible. Moreover, the facility would already house machines and employ experts that could be more easily transferred to centrifuge efforts than Yongbyon nuclear reactor or uranium conversion equipment and experts. In addition, military control of the centrifuge technology at an existing underground military site could also better hide the program by isolating it from known nuclear-related sites, which were being monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Agreed Framework and subject to greater attention by foreign intelligence services. The identification of the air force manufacturing site as a potential past nuclear site is also consistent with information provided by a North Korean general who defected to China. In August 2001, a *Shin-Dong-A* article published the statements of General Chun Sun Lee who made claims about the location of a nuclear production site in North Korea. Although it is very difficult to

corroborate most of the information provided by General Lee, it is significant that he stated that the location housed a facility dedicated to refining uranium. Although not a typical way to refer to a centrifuge research and development site, a non-expert may refer to such a site in this way. For example, when the Iranian opposition group first identified the secret nuclear Natanz site in Iran in August 2002, it identified it as related to processing uranium fuel. A few months later our Institute determined that it was indeed a gas centrifuge plant. The North Korean defector further claimed that the facility was not located in Kumchang-ri, a location that had attracted considerable attention in 1998 when some in US intelligence claimed this site to be the location of an underground nuclear reactor or reprocessing plant (claims that turned out to be false based on a 1999 visit by US officials). Instead, the North Korean defector claimed that the nuclear site was 25 to 30 kilometers away under Mt. Chun Ma, near the Pyongahnbuk province. In fact, the Panghyon air force base is 27 km south of Kumchang-ri and is located in the North Pyongan Province, also known as Phyönganbukto. Although the matches in names and nuclear technologies are not exact, they are close enough to be suggestive. (David Albright, "North Korea's Suspect Former Small-Scale Enrichment Plant," Institute for Science and International Security, July 21, 2016)

In an era of sophisticated spycraft, North Korea appears to be returning to the days of shortwave radio. The North broadcast a series of seemingly random numbers on Pyongyang Radio twice recently, an eerie reminder of the days when the North encrypted messages to its spies in **South Korea**. In the latest episode July 15, an announcer read what she described as "a mathematics review assignment for investigative agent No. 27," engaged in a "distance learning" program. "Turn to Page 459, No. 35; Page 913, No. 55; Page 135, No. 86," she said, continuing to cite numbers for 14 minutes. Decades ago, it was not unusual for late-night radio listeners in the South to hear mysterious numbers arriving on static-filled signals from the North. The South Korean government in Seoul tried to block the signals and barred its citizens from listening. **Kim Dong-sik**, a former intelligence officer for North Korea, said he used to listen for such broadcasts at midnight each night to check whether his spymasters had a message for him. Kim was caught by the South in 1995 after a gun battle with South Korean agents and police officers. "When I arrived in the South, I had five different call signs assigned to me," said Kim, who now works as a senior analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank run by South Korea's National Intelligence Service. "Each night, I listened for my call signs." The June 24 and July 15 broadcasts, confirmed by the South Korean government on Wednesday, were the first such coded messages in 16 years, leaving intelligence officials and analysts puzzled by the North's motives. Jeong Joon-hee, a government spokesman for South Korea, has called the resumption of the broadcasts "seriously regrettable" but declined to comment on any motives. "The North should abandon its old ways," he said. Some analysts said the North's use of a bygone encryption tool was rekindling old fear among South Koreans of an escalation in psychological warfare. North Korea stopped sending out such coded messages by shortwave radio after the Koreas held a **summit meeting in 2000**, agreeing to de-escalate the Cold War-era intrigue on the divided peninsula. Since then, the North is believed to have adopted more sophisticated methods of communication. When the South's intelligence service announced the



capture of a spy ring in 2011, it said that the officers contacted the North through steganography, a technique for encrypting a message into a text, image or video file delivered online. Kim, the analyst and former spy, said the broadcasts should be taken seriously. He said the North appeared to be bolstering its espionage operations since 2009, when it created the General Bureau of Reconnaissance by merging various party and military agencies in charge of sending spies to the South. Washington blacklisted the bureau after North Korean hackers were accused of **wreaking havoc on the computer network** of Sony's movie studio in 2014. At a time when the counterintelligence authorities use sophisticated technology to monitor the digital communication of espionage suspects, "the old number broadcasts are still a dependable and preferable means of communication for spies," Kim said. "We should assume that the North is using the radio broadcasts to communicate with its agents here or is at least using them to train spies," he added. He recalled that when he was training in the 1980s, he spent countless hours listening to tape-recorded broadcasts and copying the numbers to master a so-called numbers station technique of encrypted communication. Kim said he and his handlers in the North used an agreed-upon book – "Whale Hunt," a popular novel in the South – to decipher one another's codes. As in the broadcast on Friday, a typical five-digit combination started with a three-digit page number. The remaining two digits pointed at two Korean characters in the text of the page. The two Koreas still accuse each other of spying. The North is holding at least four South Koreans, some of them sentenced to a labor camp for life, **on charges of espionage**. Last week, prosecutors said they arrested two South Korean men on charges of spying for the North. They released closed-circuit video of counterespionage officers **overpowering a suspect** at an internet cafe. The men used encrypted emails to contact their handlers in the North, the prosecutors said. Kim said that during his days as a spy, the radio was a main tool of communication. "If there was a certain song broadcast by Pyongyang Radio at an agreed-upon hour, that meant that there was something wrong and I should immediately abort my mission," he said. "If not, it was all clear." (Choe Sang-hun, "Pyongyang Radio Revives Coded Broadcasts for Spies," *New York Times*, July 22, 2016, p. A-6) Martyn Williams: "But the fuss in Seoul about the return of North Korean numbers on the airwave misses an important point: South Korea itself resumed its own numbers broadcasts back in February, although the National Intelligence Service isn't as keen to talk about those. South Korea has a much richer recent history of using numbers stations than its northern neighbor. After all, while the Internet and digital communications have made the radio stations obsolete in the rest of the world, North Korea stands alone in the almost complete absence of technological progress. So radio remains the best and safest way for South Korea to contact its agents in the north. South Korea's broadcasts ran for years with the same format: a Korean song and numbers: "Attention number 521, attention number 521, please receive a telegram..." This type of message was such a regular fixture that a community of radio monitors had given it a nickname, "V24," and one had worked out a detailed schedule of broadcast times and frequencies. You could consult the schedule, tune in and pretty much be assured it would be there. Until one day in June 2015 it wasn't. The station abruptly left the airwaves and wasn't heard of again until February 14, 2016, when regular broadcasts resumed. "V24 is less active today than it was 6 years ago, to be sure," a radio monitor who goes by the nickname Token, told me. He has closely monitored the station for years from his listening post in

the Mojave Desert. "However, the activity level today is roughly equal to what it has been at for approximately the last 2 years, slightly over 20 known transmissions per month," he said. The station is assumed to be operated by the National Intelligence Service, but that has never been confirmed. Radio monitors in South Korea have managed to pinpoint what they believe to be the transmitter site near Seoul, so it's a pretty safe bet it is an official South Korean government station. The site is shared with one of two South Korean propaganda radio stations that daily pumps out hours of propaganda aimed at North Korea. But these aren't the only mysteries in the airwaves above the 38th parallel. Another station started up in late 2015 and is currently monitored more or less on a daily basis. It has been dubbed "V28." "At first it appeared to be a typical 'spy' numbers station, but as time goes on, it appears more and more to be a military station, possibly for some kind of training," said Token, who has monitored it many times. "It is still being called a numbers station, however its function is somewhat in question." Radio monitors are convinced V28 is coming from North Korea, although the sometimes strange broadcasts have them stumped. Some have talked of hearing conversations, possibly a TV playing in the background, while the broadcasts often jump or drift in frequency—a possible indication of an old analog transmitter." (Martyn Williams, "Cold War Communications: The Two Koreas Resume Coded Radio Broadcasts," *38North*, August 9, 2016)

7/22/16

The North Korean economy experienced negative growth for the first time in five years, reaching its lowest level since 2007, recent estimates show. The gap in economic power between South and North Korea also widened further, with the difference in per capita income growing from 21.4 times in 2014 to 22.2 times last year. Estimates of the 2015 North Korean economic growth rate released by the Bank of Korea (BOK) on July 22 showed a real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 1.1% for last year. It was the lowest level since 2007, when the rate was tallied at -1.2%. North Korea last experienced a negative rate of economic growth in 2010, when the rate was -0.5%. The North Korean farming, forestry, and fishing sectors experienced a drop of 0.8% from the year before (1.2%), with large increases in livestock farming and fishing offset by declining yields for rice, corn, and other grains. Mining was down 2.6% amid falling iron ore and magnesite production, while manufacturing dropped by 3.4% with slack production in both light industries and heavy and chemical industries. The findings also showed a steep 12.7% decline in the electricity, gas, and water industry. "Production of steel, machinery, and other items experienced negative effects from a decline in North Korea's hydroelectric power owing to drought conditions last year," explained the BOK. At the same time, construction was up 4.8% amid rises in both building construction and public works, while services rose 0.8%, mainly in the areas of government services, wholesale and retail sales, and communications. North Korea's nominal gross national income (GNI) for last year was estimated at 34.5 trillion won (US\$30.4 billion), an increase of 300 billion won (US\$264 million), or 0.8%, from the year before. The result was a widening gap with the South Korean economy, with the North's economy falling to 1/45 the South's economy of 1.5658 quadrillion won (US\$1.38 trillion) from 1/43.5 the previous year. The gap also grew in terms of per capita GNI, with North Korea's level of 1,393,000 won (US\$1,226) rising slightly from 1,388,000 won (US\$1,221) in 2015 but falling to 1/22.2 the South's level of 30,935,000 won (US\$27,221), down from 1/21.4 the year before. North Korea's foreign trade with

countries other than South Korea totaled US\$6.25 billion, down 17.9% from US\$7.61 billion in 2014. Exports also fell 14.8% from the year before to US\$2.7 billion, while imports dropped by 20.2% to US\$3.56 billion. At US\$2.71 billion, inter-Korean trade rose 15.7% from 2014. **Exports from South to North rose 19.8%, chiefly in the form of electronics and chemical industry products. Imports from North to South jumped by 20.4% with major rises in most areas, including electronics and daily items.** Analysts interpreted the gains as coming from trade through the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which was closed in February. (Yu Sun-hui, "North Korea Has Negative Economy Growth for First Time in Five Years," *Hankyore*, July 23, 2016)

Noland: "The Bank of Korea has released its annual North Korean GDP estimates (link is external), and the BOK has concluded that the North Korean economy contracted by 1.1 percent. I will briefly discuss why these figures should be taken with large grains of salt, and then apply my own subjective smell test. On methodology: to compute GDP, which is a value-added concept, one needs information on the levels of all economic activities, information on the prices of inputs and outputs, and a recipe book that tells you how many widgets and hours of labor are needed to make, say, a car. In the case of North Korea, the existence and veracity of all this information is highly problematic. I want to make clear my comments are not a criticism of the BOK per se—their is a thankless task—but that the task of computing North Korean GDP is a hazardous exercise. On activity levels, my impression is that some things (the number of boxcars leaving the coal mine, for example) are amenable to counting via satellite photography. Similarly, there are ways to get a handle on crop production. But figuring out manufacturing is more challenging in part due to the issues of product variety and quality. Services are the most challenging—no boxcars to count, and more generally, it is hard to measure output apart from measuring inputs (we face this problem even in the West), and potentially huge differences in quality: think quality differences across American high schools. Like I said, take these figures with a grain of salt. Then, there is the issue of collecting price data to figure out how much the inputs cost to generate a particular value of output. Then, there is the recipe book used to aggregate all these figures. The BOK says it uses South Korean prices and value-added ratios. Those are surely wrong for the task at hand, but it is not obvious what alternative would be any better. Then, my understanding is that once these calculations are made they are subject to inter-ministerial bargaining, i.e. they are politicized. Like I said, take these figures with a grain of salt. So, what does the Noland informal smell test reveal? Agriculture is down (-0.8%) and that is consistent with analysis of the FAO—the reversion to the new normal after several good years of harvests. Mining is down (-2.6%), and it is conceivable that production is down as the report says. But it is almost surely the case that the value of output is down due to the ongoing fall in world mineral prices. The report has manufacturing (-3.4%) contracting by an even larger margin than agriculture or mining, however, with both light manufacturing and heavy industry down. The result for light manufacturing is surprising: apparel exports to China have been rising and KIC was still in operation. Put an asterisk by that one. Electricity production was down a whopping 12.7% due to diminished hydroelectric output because of the drought. I have no special insight into hydropower, so I will take them at their word, but it is curious that electrical power production could fall by 12.7% and overall GDP only fall by 1.1%. Construction and services were the only bright spots in the BOK's telling. And

here is where I think that the subjective assessments of observers and the BOK probably diverge most sharply. We know that a process of relaxation or decriminalization, or whatever you want to term it, is ongoing and this had led to a steady increase in private sector activity for lack of a better term. This growing non-state economic activity appears to be concentrated in services. And we know services are hard to measure. My guess is that the BOK has underestimated services activities, which even by their own analyses now account for nearly one-third of the economy, but this is just my guess. So, did the North Korean economy contract last year? I suppose it is plausible, but I would not be surprised that if we could properly calculate GDP we would find that it actually registered modest growth. The intriguing thing is that I suspect that the North Koreans themselves do not even know. (Marcus Noland, "The North Korean Economy Contracted Last Year. Maybe." *North Korea: Witness to Transformation*, July 25, 2016)

7/24/16

North Korea is in the midst of building a new naval base on the east coast to accommodate submarines capable of firing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), according to a report by IHS Jane's *Defence Weekly*. North Korea is currently building the new military facility at a location some 2.25 kilometers from Sinpo Shipyard, the homeport of North Korea's ballistic missile submarine program, in South Hamgyong Province. The existing shipyard currently houses 2,000-ton Sinpo-class submarines, which have been used by North Korea to test-fire SLBMs. The purpose of the new naval base is presumed to be housing submarines larger than the Sinpo-class, the report added. Sources earlier said Pyongyang is known to be developing a 3,000-ton submarine that can carry more than three SLBMs. The existing Sinpo-class submarine can hold only one SLBM at a time. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Said to Be Building New Base for SLBMs," July 24, 2016) Bermudez: "A number of construction activities have been spotted in the area of the Sinpo South Shipyard, the most important of which appears to be taking place on the point of the Yuktaeso-ri Peninsula, 2.3 kilometers south of the shipyard. While media reports have identified this new facility as submarine pens for a new large class of ballistic missile submarines under development by North Korea, that analysis is incorrect." (Joseph L. Bermudez, Jr., "Little Activity at North Korea's Sinpo South Shipyard: Recent Media Reports of New Submarine Pens Nearby Incorrect," *38North*, August 8, 2016)

7/25/16

Top envoys from China and North Korea held talks on the sidelines of a regional summit in Laos as tensions run high on the Korean peninsula over Pyongyang's nuclear program. North Korea's newly minted Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho, a former nuclear negotiator for the hermit state, and Chinese counterpart Wang Yi met in the capital Vientiane. It is the first time Ri has attended a major diplomatic gathering since his appointment in May. (AFP, JIJI, "China, North Korean Envoys Hold Talks in Laos," *Japan Times*, July 25, 2016) "We intend to work together for the sake of advancing China-North Korea relations," Wang Yi said in his opening remarks, which was unusually disclosed to South Korean reporters. "We plan to exchange our views on issues of mutual concern, including ties between the two countries." In response, Ri expressed his hope for better ties with Beijing and thanked Wang for sending a congratulatory message for the 55th anniversary of a friendship treaty between the two allies. After the meeting, an official who identified himself as a spokesperson for the

North said that both discussed "how to advance relations between North Korea and China." Expectations mounted for Wang-Ri talks even before their arrivals in Laos. Leaving Pyongyang for Laos, Ri was seen off by China's ambassador, and it turned out that he and Wang took the same flight which came to Vientiane via Kunming. They are also staying at the same hotel in central Vientiane, which added to the prospects that they could easily hold both official and unofficial talks at any time. After holding a press conference on his meeting with his ASEAN counterparts, Wang told Yonhap that the meeting with the North was "good," without elaborating further. In his talks with his South Korean counterpart Yun Byung-se late yesterday, Wang strongly blamed the Seoul government for hurting the foundation of trust between the two countries by pushing to deploy THAAD. He called for "practical" measures from the South to bring the ties back to normal. South Korea played down his criticism, saying that it is in line with what Beijing has been saying about the THAAD issue all along. It reiterated the stance that THAAD is aimed only at countering threats from the North, adding that it is part of its "national defense" effort. (Koh Byung-joon, "China, N. Korea's Top Diplomats Hold Talks during ASEAN Meetings," Yonhap, July 25, 2016)

Ramped-up international sanctions on North Korea have inadvertently disrupted the already challenging work of aid agencies there, those in the field say, with risk-averse banks refusing to transfer funds needed to keep operations running. Aid shipments have also been held up or blocked indefinitely at Chinese customs centers amid confusion over what is covered by the significantly upgraded U.N. sanctions imposed in March after Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test earlier in the year. "Importing goods – medicines, humanitarian supplies, materials for water and sanitation infrastructure – has become very difficult," said an official from an international humanitarian group with an office in Pyongyang. "What would happen if there were major floods tomorrow?" said the official, who declined to be identified because of the political sensitivity of the issue. "We have some supplies in-country, but we wouldn't be able to get emergency goods into the country within a short period of time." Specific examples of delays include a large shipment of water-purification tablets impounded by Chinese customs because their high chlorine content flagged up a "dual use" concern. And solar panels needed to provide a stable energy supply to a new TB diagnostic laboratory in Pyongyang were stopped after being designated "military grade." The sanctions on North Korea carry clear exemptions for aid work in a country where an estimated 18 million people need some sort of humanitarian assistance. But the international condemnation heaped on the North's nuclear program in recent years has badly shaken the agencies' support network, and a renewed sanctions-enforcement drive that accompanied the March measures has scared even more partners off. "Despite the humanitarian exemption, private-sector companies such as banks, shippers and other suppliers are increasingly declining or hesitating to provide services, which is affecting the ability of humanitarian agencies to operate," an aid agency working in the North said. "As time passes, and a solution is not found, the operational difficulties will increase," the agency said. Five U.N. agencies – FAO, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP and WHO – and four international NGOs including Save the Children have humanitarian programs in North Korea. The International Federation of the Red Cross and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation are among others present. The effort to find a stable conduit for cash to cover transport, salaries,

monitoring and other in-country costs has been taken up at the highest level at the U.N. headquarters in New York. "We are working on this issue," said Farhan Haq, deputy spokesman for the U.N. Secretary-General. Haq declined to give details, but a source with knowledge of the discussions said they were currently focused on a Russian bank that might be willing to handle U.N. transfers to North Korea, but only after receiving a green light from the U.N. sanctions committee. In June, the U.S. Treasury Department designated North Korea a "prime money laundering concern" – meaning any bank with links to the U.S. financial system could face sanctions if they do business with the North. This came on top of a U.S. presidential executive order in March that significantly increased sanctions and effectively served warning on Chinese and Russian banks providing services to their North Korean equivalents. The executive order was accompanied by a written exception for humanitarian assistance, but most foreign banks concluded that avoiding North Korea altogether was preferable to tip-toeing alone through the sanctions minefield with an exemption detector. Aware of the problem, the U.S. Treasury sent a letter to the United Nations in June seeking to clarify the situation. "We are deeply concerned about ... the recent challenges faced by the U.N. and its specialized agencies trying to transfer funds in support of their humanitarian assistance programs," a Treasury official said. (AFP, JIJ, "Sanctions Toss Monkey Wrench into Aid Agencies' Work in North Korea," *Japan Times*, July 25, 2016)

KPA Navy West Sea Fleet report: "The U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet military warmongers are these days massively increasing armed forces in the vicinity of the five islands in the West Sea and making adventurous military provocations against the maritime guard line of the KPA. The south Korean military decided to permanently deploy two commando teams of the puppet army on the Yeonphyong Island and is massively increasing naval forces including warships. Recently the south Korean military hurled spying means including drones into the air above the vicinity of five islands of the West Sea of Korea to spy the area of the KPA. The south Korean Navy let speedboats and guard ships intrude into the waters of the north side under the pretext of controlling Chinese ships' illegal fishing. Timed to coincide with this, brass hats of the south Korean army went to the forefront area of the West Sea to examine the readiness for coping with the possible "provocation" by the north. The south Korean military warmongers went the lengths of staging the farce of "creating fish-breeding reef." The "fish-breeding reef" structure weighing dozens of tonnes, is being set up in the sensitive waters which witnessed three skirmishes in the past, a fact clearly showing the provocative nature. Such military provocations escalating in the world's biggest hotspot waters are a revelation of the sinister intention to spark off a military conflict in the said waters and defend the illegal and brigandish "northern limit line" at any cost. The gravity of the developments has been augmented as the reckless moves of the puppet military warmongers are being perpetrated at the U.S. active instigation. The U.S. imperialist aggressor forces appeared at the Military Demarcation Line in Panmunjom at around 2:45 on Sunday [July 24] to inform the "creation of fish breeding reef" over loudspeaker. The U.S. went so ridiculous as to use the phrase "south of the northern limit line" when describing the site of creation, revealing its foolish attempt to give impression that the illegal and ghost line is the extension of the military demarcation line in waters of the West Sea of Korea. The KPA is clearly seeing through the enemies' scheme for military provocation. It is the black-hearted intention of the

aggressors and provokers to perpetrate a military provocation in the sensitive waters in a bid to induce the KPA into self-defensive counteraction and describe it as "provocation" and "threat." The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces had better behave themselves if they do not want to meet a dog's death in the waters. The KPA will mercilessly frustrate the dangerous military moves escalated by the enemies in the hotspot waters in the West Sea." (KCNA, "West Sea Fleet of KPA Navy Warns Enemies against Military Moves in Hotspot Waters in West Sea," July 25, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement: "The DPRK, who won a victory in the confrontation of rifles and A bombs in the war ignited by the U.S. in the 1950s thanks to the Juche-based war methods and leadership of President Kim Il Sung, has registered a series of victories in an all-out stand-off with the U.S., demonstrating its might as an invincible nuclear power, a power with elite army, under the Songun guidance of leader Kim Jong Il and Marshal Kim Jong Un. Much water has flown under the bridge since the hard-fought war in the 1950s but the U.S. remains unchanged in its wild ambition to invade the DPRK. The U.S. has persisted in its arms buildup, war drills and military provocations on the Korean peninsula, seized with its invariable scenario to stifle the DPRK and dominate Asia and the world, far from drawing a lesson from the serious political and military defeats it sustained in the past Korean war. It dared hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK, not content with escalating harsh sanctions and pressure upon it while massively introducing various strategic nuclear strike means and latest war hardware into south Korea. While stepping up the moves to deploy THAAD, the U.S. is busy staging ever more undisguised war drills. Despite the international community's concern and denunciation of the its saber-rattling pushing the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of a war, the U.S. is mulling staging Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military drills targeting the DPRK in August in league with the south Korean puppet forces. If the U.S. opts for igniting the second Korean war in defiance of the strategic position of the DPRK and the trend of the times, it will never escape its final doom with no one left to sign a surrender document." (KCNA, "U.S. Will Meet Doom If It Ignites Second Korean War: Spokesman for Foreign Ministry of DPRK," July 25, 2016)

U.S. Forces Korea will deploy new PAC-3 missiles with intercept altitude about twice as high as the current ones here next year, a source said. The move aims to quell criticism that the controversial Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense battery to be deployed here will only defend U.S. equipment and personnel but do little to keep Seoul safe. The source said the USFK will deploy PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement interceptors "in response to the mounting nuclear and missile threats from North Korea." The USFK currently has 64 PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles at its bases in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, Gunsan, North Jeolla Province, and Waegwan, North Gyeongsang Province. The PAC-3 MSE's intercept altitude is 40 km, twice as high as the existing PAC-3 missiles'. Its accuracy has also been improved with enhanced rocket engines and missile control fins. The U.S. Army signed a contract on the purchase of PAC-3 MSE missiles worth US\$611 million with Lockheed Martin in 2014. Once they are deployed, the USFK will have a three-stage missile defense system ranging from PAC-3 to PAC-3 MSE to the THAAD to intercept incoming ballistic missiles at altitudes of 40 to 150 km. (Yu Yong-weon, "USFK to Deploy New Patriot Missiles Next Year," *Chosun Ilbo*, July 26, 2016) South Korea and the United States will not share with

Japan the information they obtain from the radar of an advanced anti-missile system that will be set up by late 2017, a government source said. Their remarks come amid speculations that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to be deployed in South Korea is part of a wider move to integrate the South into the broader missile defense (MD) system operated by the U.S. and Japan. "Under the trilateral information-sharing agreement with the U.S. and Japan, South Korea is obliged to share the information it gets on North Korea's nuclear and missile tests with Japan through the U.S. But the information detected by the THAAD radar won't be going to Tokyo," a government official familiar with the matter said. Another official said it is "not effective" to share information on an incoming missile at its terminal phase of flight. This, he said, will not help as an early warning system. The THAAD battery to be deployed in Seongju, 296 kilometers south of Seoul, will be operated independently by U.S. forces in South Korea to protect U.S. military forces and its allied Korean forces, he added. Meanwhile, it takes about 4 billion won (US\$3.5 million) a year for U.S. Forces Korea to operate a THAAD battery here, twice the 2 billion won needed annually for a Patriot PAC-2 system, according to government sources. "There have been rumors that as it takes an astronomical amount of money to operate a THAAD system here, it will drive up the country's defense budget. But it does not demand a big budget," he said. THAAD, a core part of America's multi-layered missile defense program, is designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles at altitudes of 40 to 150 km after detecting the missiles with its component X-band land-based radar system. A THAAD battery consists of six truck-mounted launchers, 48 interceptors (eight per launcher), a fire control and communications unit, and the AN/TPY-2 radar. In the past two weeks since the July 8 decision by Seoul to allow a U.S. THAAD battery in the country, the South Korean government has tested the levels of electromagnetic waves emanating from the Patriot PAC-2 and Green Pine systems in Korea and a THAAD system in Guam to help allay health concerns among 45,000 Seongju residents. The test results showed that radio waves from all of the three antimissile systems didn't pose health risks. But Seongju residents have not accepted the results, raising the possibility that radar waves in the Guam THAAD battery were not gauged when the system was in full-scale operation. "The radar waves of THAAD are stronger than those of the PAC-2 system and weaker than those of the Green Pine system," Defense Ministry spokesman Moon Sang-gyun said in a briefing on Monday. "We will continue to make efforts to help Seongju residents understand the THAAD system won't pose any harm to their health and the crops they grow." (Yonhap, "Seoul, Washington Won't Share THAAD Radar Info with Japan," July 25, 2016)

7/26/16

North Korea warned the United States that it will pay a "terrifying price" if the Korean Peninsula sinks into deeper tensions, stepping up its rhetoric hours after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry blasted Pyongyang for its nuclear program. Kerry told the ASEAN Regional Forum hosted by Laos that North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons – when the world is trying to rid itself of them – is "very provocative and deeply concerning." He urged the country to follow the lead of Iran, which hammered out a deal to end its nuclear program in return for the lifting of sanctions. However, North Korea was slapped with new U.N. sanctions in March, and Kerry urged the international community to fully enforce those and previous sanctions. Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho, told conference that the country is ready to face any sanctions. It was mindful of all



possible sanctions when it took the "inevitable strategic decision" to develop nuclear weapons to counter the "never-ending nuclear blackmails of the U.S.," he said. "We are ready to show that even a (powerful) country will surely not be safe if it tries to torment and harm a small country," Ri said, according to the text of his speech released to the media. "The United States will have to pay dearly a terrifying price." But in later comments to reporters, published by Yonhap, Ri struck a slightly conciliatory tone. "As a responsible nuclear state, we will not carelessly use our nuclear weapons unless we come to face an actual threat, (or) a threat of invasion from another nuclear state," Ri was quoted as saying. Whether or not North Korea conducts another nuclear test will "entirely hinge on the United States' attitude." Kerry said if Iran can give up nuclear weapons so can North Korea. "But North Korea alone ... the only country in the world defying the international movement towards responsibility, continues to develop its own weapon, continues to develop its missiles, continues the provocative actions," he said. "North Korea in January did another nuclear test. In February, March, April, May, continually they have done missile tests," he said. "So together we are determined, all of us assembled here – perhaps with one exception assembled here – to make absolutely certain the DPRK understands that there are real consequences for these actions." Ri also questioned the legitimacy of the U.N. sanctions, saying there is no article in the U.N. charter that says nuclear or missile tests are threats to international peace. Had there been such an article, the Security Council should have taken action for every nuclear and ballistic missile test conducted by other countries, he said. (Associated Press, "N. Korea Warns U.S. of 'Terrifying Price' over Nuke Tensions," July 26, 2016) "Any additional nuclear test depends on the position of the United States," Yonhap quoted Ri as telling reporters on the sidelines of the meeting Ri added that North Korea was a responsible nuclear state and repeated its position that it would not use atomic arms unless threatened. "We will not recklessly resort to its use in the absence of substantive threat, unless we are threatened by invasion by another nuclear-power state," he said. Ri said North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had called for a peace treaty with the United States to replace the armistice at the end of the 1950-53 Korean War and the removal of all U.S. troops and equipment from the South. "This, we believe, is the only way," Yonhap quoted him as saying. In earlier remarks to the ASEAN conference, Ri said North Korea had made "an inevitable strategic decision that there is no other option but facing with nuclear deterrent the never-ending nuclear blackmails of the U.S." (Reuters, "North Korea Says Decision on Nuclear Test Depends on U.S. Actions, Yonhap Reports," July 27, 2016) North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho held a press conference at the International Convention Center in Vientiane. "[The opportunity to] denuclearize the Korean Peninsula seems to have been lost because of the US. Future nuclear tests depend entirely upon the US's stance," Ri said. The North is adopting a strategy of ambiguity as it refuses to either confirm or deny whether it will carry out a fifth nuclear test. It is also significant that Ri referred to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with the tentative expression "seems to have been lost" instead of the definite expression "has been lost." When asked why there were no talks between North and South Korea during the forum (which lasted from July 24 to 26), Ri said, "We made proposals to hold talks for working out inter-Korean relations through dialogue and negotiations, but they were all rejected. At the current time, I believe that South Korea is not prepared for talks." This apparently does not mean that Pyongyang proposed holding talks during this forum. It

is presumably a reference to the fact that South Korea has not accepted a number of proposals for dialogue that North Korea has made since its Workers' Party Congress, which took place from May 6 to May 9, including a proposal on May 21 for a working-level conference to prepare for inter-Korean military talks. (Lee Je-hun, "N. Korean Foreign Minister Says Denuclearization 'Seems to Have Been Lost,'" *Hankyore*, July 27, 2016)

South Korea warned its citizens in China and Southeast Asia of the risk of "dangerous acts" by North Korea after news reports said North Korea may have sent agents to those places to harm or abduct South Koreans. South Korean Christian missionaries, journalists and North Korean defectors to the South could be prime targets, Sun Nahm-kook, a deputy spokesman for the South's foreign ministry, told a news briefing. "The government has stepped up monitoring over the possibility of dangerous acts by the North against our citizens and has strengthened security measures for the safety of our citizens," Sun said. The warning came after South Korean media said the North had sent teams of agents to China and Southeast Asia to harm or abduct South Koreans in retaliation for the South's granting of asylum to workers from a restaurant run by the North in China. (Jack Kim, "South Korea Warns Citizens against Attack, Abduction by North," Reuters, July 26, 2016)

North Korean experts in Seoul engaged in a heated debate over whether South Korea should also pursue nuclear armament to counter Pyongyang's ever evolving nuclear and missile threats. Supporters for nuclearization argue that a nuclear-power status would enable the South to secure reliable deterrence by generating a balance of terror with the North. They added a nuclear armed South Korea can reduce its security reliance on the United States and forge a more balanced relationship with both Washington and Beijing. "Unless South Korea has nuclear weapons for self-defense purposes, it will have to spend more on its conventional military buildup to cope with growing military threats from the North," Cheong Seong-chang, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute, said at a forum hosted by the Citizen's Solidarity For Peace and Unification. If the South has nuclear weapons, it will have more say and be in a better position to represent its own interests in Northeast Asia as well as be able to maintain a more balanced approach in dealings with the United States and China. Rep. Won Yoo-chul, the floor leader of the ruling Saenuri Party, recently mentioned the "Trigger" strategy in which South Korea declares it will seek nuclear arms if the North conducts another nuclear test despite international sanctions and condemnation. Those against nuclearization said the pursuit of nuclear weapons would bring about a regional nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia and eventually hurt the national interests of all countries in the end. Chun Chae-sung, professor of political science and international affairs at Seoul National University, said, "If we move to become a nuclear weapons state, such a step will have an impact on the bilateral ties with the U.S. and may even cause Japan to go nuclear as well, escalating military tensions in Northeast Asia." (Yonhap, "Debate Heats up over S. Korea's Nuclear Armament," July 26, 2016)

Toloraya: "...While North Korea's leaders might contemplate policy changes, the potential destabilizing impact of reform makes them unlikely to do so in the open. In fact, some signs suggest Pyongyang has begun to implement limited reforms beneath

a guise of continuity, a gambit intended to obscure the structural changes now occurring throughout North Korean society. ... Authorities under Kim Jong Un have resorted to more daring "economic experiments," producing regulations that have relaxed restrictions on certain private activity and created room for some individual initiative. Such steps stoked hope that Kim would announce a new economic course at the 7th Party Congress in May, and observers were disappointed when he spoke about "building the powerful socialist state planned by the great leaders. ... a nation, bearing the hallmarks of a power in all the fields of politics, military affairs, the economy, science and technology, and culture," as well as "building an economic giant" in accordance with decades-old strategies. His only pronounced criticism of marketization at the Party Congress concerned "bourgeois liberalization and the line for reform and openness," a clear reference to China that was intended primarily to assert the DPRK's "spirit of independence." This rhetoric, which included calls to "depend on own forces" and adhere to "our style socialism," does not mean that North Korea will stop experimenting with "measures in economy." He also stressed the importance of "cooperation with the friendly countries," including attempts to attract foreign investment and expand exports, regardless of sanctions now in place. Though Kim unveiled no new initiatives at the Party Congress that reflect the growing influence of markets on the country's economy, there also was no indication of any decision that could slow or reverse the process of marketization now unfolding at the grassroots level. Kim Jong Un may have wrapped plans for new socioeconomic approaches in old trappings. He draws constantly on the legacy of his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, on matters ranging from wardrobe choice to official terminology—the concept of "parallel economic and defense construction" policy that preceded "*byungjin*" dates back to 1964—and the five-year economic development strategy he unveiled at the 7th Party Congress outwardly resembles a return to directive planning, when the state controlled economic enterprises to the highest degree possible. In fact, North Korea has never moved to revive directive planning since abandoning it in the mid-1990s, and the new multiyear policy is no exception. Rather, it is a long-term economic *strategy* that resembles, to an extent, the dirigisme of successful Asian economies. The most important component of this strategy is Kim's call to expand "our method of economic management," though what seems to be implied is broadening the use of market mechanisms that augment the command economy. While these two economic forces have tended to co-exist in a peculiar manner in the past, the mobilization economy is increasingly giving way to a normal process of production and distribution. One of the management system's most important, if underappreciated, elements is called the "responsibility system of socialist enterprises." North Korean economists explained to me that under the plan, industrial enterprises are now obliged to give the state only 20% to 50% of their output while securing raw materials and selling the balance in what is essentially a free market, using Korean won to carry out transactions with market-based prices. This system is now standard even for formal state-owned enterprises, while locally-responsible entities are even freer in their economic activity. Such a system probably also encourages real-sector investments by the "new rich" (*donju*). Under the management scheme, North Koreans have prioritized the energy, light industry and agriculture sectors with a combination of state investment and market incentives. Electricity generation combines medium-sized power plants and small-scale generators with nontraditional sources, such as solar batteries. A

prohibition on coal exports promises to improve heating and energy production. What is really important for “marketization” is the practice since 2012 when local agricultural communities received more rights to produce and distribute food for ensuring self-sufficiency. In an attempt to develop a “knowledge economy,” policymakers are paying more attention to technological and human resource development. The system’s agent of control is supposed to be the Cabinet, which is expected to unify strategic planning and determine rules for the most important sectors. However, its degree of involvement varies across different parts of the economy. Electrical energy and other “natural monopolies” are mostly controlled by state agencies under Cabinet oversight, (with the exception of the defense industry, governed separately). This division of responsibility makes it particularly notable that the Cabinet’s leader, Premier Pak Pong Ju, is now one of Kim Jong Un’s three deputies on the State Affairs Commission. His inclusion on the body reflects an apparent desire to elevate the status of economic governance. North Korea is thus streamlining its macroeconomic management, or at least displaying an intention to do so. After the breakdown of the centrally planned economy in the 1990s, rival bureaucratic clans emerged and used their administrative resources to create business structures. In particular, the military establishment succeeded under the “*songun*” (military first) policy at grabbing commanding positions in many lucrative sectors (such as exports and imports), and a majority of its new holdings were unrelated to defense needs, which also received attention. Kim Jong Un has made clear that the government will no longer tolerate the military’s economic preeminence; his decision to change the official party line from *songun* to *byungjin* can be interpreted as a “demilitarization” of economic priorities. At one recent meeting, North Koreans explained that restraining military expenditures was one aim of *byungjin*. At another recent meeting in Pyongyang in May, North Korean economists explained to me the underlying logic and implications of this change: the country has become a “strong power” in defense and ideology, and it now seeks the same success in developing its science and technology, its broader economy and a “civilized way of life.” While such lofty aims may sound like political pandering, they indicate that the government has at least shifted its official focus from the military to economic development since Kim Jong Un took power. It remains to be seen to what extent the military and other groups will resist ceding their economic positions. We might see a redistribution of power and inside fighting, potentially forcing Kim Jong Un to play the role of supreme arbiter. In the future, government and semi-government business corporations will probably appear to develop major branches of the economy, while smaller areas of business will be shared between state agencies at different levels and de facto private entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, the regime may act on its stated goal to curb corruption and illegal practices that it considers threats to society. The results of economic liberalization have so far been quite noticeable, especially in Pyongyang. New industrial facilities for agriculture, food and textiles have increased the market availability of locally produced foodstuffs and semi-processed food, at least in Pyongyang shops. However, the success of certain classes and territories has further distinguished such pockets of affluence from the rest of society. The situation in some provincial areas remains depressed, and energy and transportation difficulties are far from being solved. North Koreans will continue the careful search for their “own way” in economic policy by pursuing careful experiments and eliminating outdated elements of the planned economy. Their leaders

understandably fear that any loud announcement of “reform”—which is and will probably remain a taboo word—could endanger morals, weaken central control and cause factional strife. The country’s fundamental choice is whether to rely on directive planning or, alternately, market levers as a coordination mechanism. The regime must also confront the contradictory prerogatives of arbitrary political power and ownership protected by law. However, North Korea’s political absolutism and the external dangers it faces leave little space for any radical increase in economic freedom. Beneficiaries of political absolutism will continue to resist ceding power to the “invisible hand” of the free market, and their political “center” is likely to keep its grip on the major economic assets and resources. In coming years, if not decades, the government will probably stick to a conservative economic middle ground to preserve the existing political system and the power of Kim’s clan. International sanctions may play significant roles—both negative and positive—in this process. They could limit the market sector access to foreign currency and other financial and material resources and negatively impact investment. Another danger is the possibility of the authorities trying to channel the privately-managed resources into mobilization-type economy. However, the leaders might be wise enough not to impede the activities of non-state sectors and to overcome the hard times by giving more power to the market through sheer survival instinct. Thus, sanctions might become a blessing in disguise for further liberalizing the economy and unleashing the entrepreneurial spirit of North Koreans.” (Georgy Toloraya, “Deciphering North Korean Economic Policy Intentions,” *38North*, July 26, 2016)

7/27/16

South Korea and the United States agreed to make intensive efforts in the coming months to cut off cash flows into North Korea so as to limit Pyongyang’s ability to develop nuclear weapons, a top South Korean official said. The agreement was reached when South Korea’s deputy national security advisor, Cho Tae-yong, and Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken held the third round of high-level strategic consultations on North Korea policy in Washington. “We agreed on the need to further strengthen our efforts in order to change North Korea’s calculus. In particular, we shared the view that we should come up with effective ways to cut off cash flowing into North Korea,” Cho told Yonhap after the four-hour talks with Blinken. “It’s difficult to speak in detail, but as there is already a framework for implementing sanctions internationally, we agreed to make intensive efforts in the next two to three months ... to cut off cash flows into North Korea as much as possible so as to limit North Korea’s ability to continue nuclear development,” he said. The meeting came amid heightened concern that the North could carry out yet another nuclear test, which would be its fifth. Cho said that South Korea and the U.S. share an assessment that the North is ready to conduct a nuclear test at any time if it decides to. The two sides also agreed to put together “much more powerful sanctions” in the form of a U.N. Security Council resolution if Pyongyang conducts a nuclear test. “Though the current U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270 is a much stronger sanctions resolution than before, there are points that we need to supplement and there are areas that should be newly included in the scope of sanctions. Today, we exchanged views on the need to put together a strong sanctions resolution in case North Korea conducts a fifth nuclear test.” (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Agree to Make Intensive Efforts to Cut off Cash Flows into N. Korea,” *Korea Herald*, July 28, 2016)

Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump said "The man that we know so well who's always threatening everybody in the region, North Korea, if he all of a sudden gets a little more frisky than just words, we end up in a massive war protecting somebody," referring to Kim Jong Un. Once again displaying deeply negative views of U.S. security commitments to allies, Trump also said in a campaign speech today that the U.S. would find itself in "essentially World War III" if Japan comes under attack, arguing that the Asian nation does not have to do anything if the U.S. gets attacked. Trump has long argued that the U.S. should no longer be the "policeman of the world," claiming it makes no sense for the U.S. to pay to defend such wealthy allies as Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia in exchange for little. He says allies should pay 100 percent of the cost of stationing American troops, or the U.S. should be prepared to end their protection. He even suggested allowing South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear weapons for self-defense so as to reduce U.S. security burdens. "We don't want to be the stupid people anymore," Trump said. "Before I ran, did anybody know that we were protecting and paying for a large portion of the protection of Japan, which sells us cars by the millions, and Germany and Saudi Arabia and South Korea?" South Korea currently pays about half the costs, about US\$900 million a year, to help finance the troop presence, and U.S. officials, including new U.S. Forces Korea Commander Vincent Brooks, said it would cost more to keep those troops stationed in the U.S. than it does in Korea. Apparently referring to Brooks, Trump quoted "this general" as pointing out that Japan pays about 50 percent of the troop presence cost, and adding, "Why aren't they paying for 100 percent?" (Chang Jae-soon, "Trump: U.S. Could End up in 'Massive War' While Protecting Somebody Else," Yonhap, July 29, 2016)

North Korea has launched a total of 31 ballistic missiles in the past five years under Kim Jong-un, twice the number of missiles test-fired when his late father was in power, the defense ministry here said. North Korea has test-fired 16 short-range Scuds with a range of 300 to 1,000 kilometers, six mid-range Rodongs that can fly 1300-1500 km, six intermediate-range Musudans with a range of 3,500-4,000 km and three submarine-launched ballistic missiles since late 2011. The incumbent leader inherited the country from his father Kim Jong-il. "The junior Kim's focus on ballistic missiles is aimed at improving North Korea's capability to launch nuclear-tipped missiles," a ministry official said. The launches carried out under the current leaders are estimated to have cost more than 110 billion won (\$97 million) which is a large sum of money for the cash-strapped nation. In sharp contrast, during Kim Jong-il's 18-year-long reign, the communist country launched 16 ballistic missiles, the ministry estimated. When the three rounds of long-range rocket launches and the fourth nuclear tests conducted during the current regime is taken into account, the overall costs could reach hundreds of billions of won, local sources claimed. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Fired 31 Ballistic Missiles in Past 5 Years," *Korea Times*, July 27, 2016)

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Han Song Ryol, director-general of the U.S. affairs department at the North's Foreign Ministry, said in an interview with The Associated Press that Washington "crossed the red line" and effectively declared war by putting leader Kim Jong Un on its list of sanctioned individuals, and said a vicious showdown could erupt if the U.S. and South Korea hold annual war games as planned next month. Han said that recent

U.S. actions have put the situation on the Korean Peninsula on a war footing. Han says designating Kim himself for sanctions was the final straw. "The Obama administration went so far to have the impudence to challenge the supreme dignity of the DPRK in order to get rid of its unfavorable position during the political and military showdown with the DPRK," Han said, using the acronym for North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. "The United States has crossed the red line in our showdown," he said. "We regard this thrice-cursed crime as a declaration of war." Han took strong issue with the claim that it not the U.S. but Pyongyang's continued development of nuclear weapons and missiles that is provoking tensions. "Day by day, the U.S. military blackmail against the DPRK and the isolation and pressure is becoming more open," Han said. "It is not us, it is the United States that first developed nuclear weapons, who first deployed them and who first used them against humankind. And on the issue of missiles and rockets, which are to deliver nuclear warheads and conventional weapons warheads, it is none other than the United States who first developed it and who first used it." He noted that U.S.-South Korea military exercises conducted this spring were unprecedented in scale, and that the U.S. has deployed the USS Mississippi and USS Ohio nuclear-powered submarines to South Korean ports, deployed the B-52 strategic bomber around South Korea and is planning to set up the world's most advanced missile defense system, known by its acronym THAAD, in the South, a move that has also angered China. Echoing earlier state-media reports, Han ridiculed Mark Lippert, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, for a flight on a U.S. Air Force F-16 based in South Korea that he said was an action "unfit for a diplomat." "We regard that as the act of a villain, who is a crazy person," Han said of the July 12 flight. "All these facts show that the United States is intentionally aggravating the tensions in the Korean Peninsula." Han warned that Pyongyang is viewing next month's planned U.S.-South Korea exercises in this new context and will respond if they are carried out as planned. "Nobody can predict what kind of influence this kind of vicious confrontation between the DPRK and the United States will have upon the situation on the Korean Peninsula," he said. "By doing these kinds of vicious and hostile acts toward the DPRK, the U.S. has already declared war against the DPRK. So it is our self-defensive right and justifiable action to respond in a very hard way. "We are all prepared for war, and we are all prepared for peace," he said. "If the United States forces those kinds of large-scale exercises in August, then the situation caused by that will be the responsibility of the United States." Han dismissed calls for Pyongyang to defuse tensions by agreeing to abandon its nuclear program. "In the view of cause and effect, it is the U.S. that provided the cause of our possession of nuclear forces," he said. "We never hide the fact, and we are very proud of the fact, that we have very strong nuclear deterrent forces not only to cope with the United States' nuclear blackmail but also to neutralize the nuclear blackmail of the United States." (Eric Talmadge, "N. Korea: U.S. Has Crossed Red Line, Relations on War Footing," Associated Press, July 28, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's answer to the question put by KCNA "as regards the U.S. cunning moves at the ministerial meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum held in Laos to lay the blame for the escalating tension on the Korean peninsula at the door of the former, while taking issue with its self-defensive nuclear deterrent: U.S. Secretary of State Kerry

spouted out foolish remarks that the U.S. has no hostile intent against north Korea at the ministerial meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 26. Why is the U.S. resorting to reckless saber-rattling, openly vociferating about "beheading operation" and "occupation of Pyongyang" after introducing all kinds of strategic assets into south Korea if it has no hostile intent against the DPRK? The successive U.S. presidents personally made public appearances and openly included the DPRK, a dignified sovereign state, on the list of preemptive nuclear attack while terming it "part of an axis of evil" and "a country that has to be removed" and cried out for "collapse of system." How can this be understood? Kerry asserted the joint military exercises have never posed problems and the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework was concluded with joint military exercises going on. This is sophism enough to make even a cat laugh. As he holds the post of the U.S. Secretary of State, he should know the historical facts that once joint military exercises were suspended after the U.S. complied with the demand of the DPRK for it and that those exercises have been one of major causes that made the hard-won DPRK-U.S. agreements go bust. The U.S. joint military exercises on the Korean peninsula are not attributable to the DPRK's access to nukes but because the U.S. steadily increased nuclear threats while ceaselessly holding war exercises for aggression, the DPRK was compelled to opt for having access to nuclear deterrence and bolster it up. The true aim sought by the U.S. is to shift the blame for the tension on the Korean peninsula on to the DPRK, secure a pretext for its arms buildup and joint military exercises pursuant to its rebalancing strategy in Asia-Pacific for aggression, and dodge the neighboring countries' protest and criticism of its decision to deploy THAAD in south Korea as an immediate task. No one can predict what situation the U.S. reckless arms buildup and the upcoming August joint military exercises will create on the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity. The U.S. frantic hostile policy toward the DPRK will prompt the DPRK to do everything it can to defend its sovereignty and dignity, and the U.S. will be held accountable for all the ensuing consequences." (KCNA, "FM Spokesman Denounces U.S. Secretary of State's Reckless Remarks against DPRK," July 28, 2016)

North Korea has tried in vain to revise a statement issued at the end of a regional security forum that voiced concerns over its defiant pursuit of nuclear and missile development, a government source said June 29. On June 27, top diplomats and representatives of nearly 30 countries and organizations, including members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), wrapped up this year's ASEAN Regional Forum, the region's largest security gathering, held in Vientiane, Laos. It is a rare international event attended by the reclusive North. Laos, chair country for this year's ARF, issued a chair's statement the next day that summarized what was discussed and agreed upon among participants. It expressed "concern" over threats from the North's nuclear and missile development. "We know that the North expressed strong discontent with the ARF statement to Laos," the source said. "But Laos did not accept the complaint." He said that Laos, which has close ties with the North, tried at first to convene a meeting for a possible revision to the statement and actually contacted several major countries, including South Korea, this afternoon. "But after listening to opinions from those countries via phone and other various channels, it appears that Laos notified the North that it would be difficult to hold such a meeting," he said. "In the end, Laos held a meeting with officials from the North alone, where it



made clear that there will be no revision since the statement was what was agreed upon by all participants and issued by the chair country," he added. The North appears to have tried to include Pyongyang's long-held claim that its pursuit of nuclear weapons is in response to the U.S.' hostile policy toward Pyongyang and that it is part of efforts to defend itself from the outside world, the source said. This year's statement was the "strongest one ever issued by the security forum," a high-ranking diplomatic official said. "This is very meaningful given that such a tough-worded statement was issued after the North's fourth nuclear test and at an international debut stage for North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho." Ri, who was tapped as the North's top diplomat in May, stayed for two more days in Vientiane after the ARF was concluded for unconfirmed reasons. Observers speculate that he might have used the extra time to negotiate a revision to the statement. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Tried in Vain to Revise ARF Statement: Gov't Source," July 29, 2016)

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The South Korean police said that the North's main intelligence agency had stolen the personal data of more than 10 million customers of an online shopping mall in the South, in what they said was an attempt to obtain foreign currency. The online mall, Interpark, was subjected in May to an online attack on a server that contained customers' names, email addresses, telephone numbers and other personal data, the National Police Agency said. Interpark did not learn about the breach until July 11, when it received an anonymous message threatening to publicize the leak of personal data unless it paid the equivalent of \$2.6 billion in South Korea's currency, the won. After the attack was reported, thousands of Interpark customers threatened to sue for damages. Most of the customers whose data was stolen were South Koreans. The National Police Agency attributed the attack to the General Bureau of Reconnaissance, North Korea's main spy agency. It said the intrusion had used some of the same code and internet protocol addresses as in previous digital breaches attributed to the North. The message sent to Interpark also used vocabulary specific to the North Korean dialect, the police agency said. The United States blacklisted the General Bureau of Reconnaissance after North Korean hackers were accused of breaking into the computer network of Sony Pictures in 2014. It was unclear whether, or how, the hackers had exploited the stolen data, other than in their effort at blackmail. But it showed that the North, whose access to hard currency has been hampered by sanctions over its nuclear arms program, was "using computer hacking technology to try to steal our people's property in a criminal act of earning foreign currency," the police said in a statement. South Korea has blamed the North for a number of online attacks on banks, government websites and media companies since 2008. In March, its intelligence agency told lawmakers that North Korea had broken into the mobile phones of 40 national security officials. The North denied that accusation. In May, researchers working for the digital security firm Symantec said that they had found a potential link between North Korea and a recent spate of digital breaches of Asian banks, including one against the central bank of Bangladesh in February that resulted in the theft of more than \$81 million. They said the intrusions appeared to be the first known case of a nation using digital attacks for financial gain. (Choe Sang-hun, "North Korean Spy Agency Stole Data of 10 Million Consumers, South Says," *New York Times*, July 29, 2016, p. A-5)

7/29/16

The UN has appointed Tomás Ojea Quintana as the next Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) revealed today. Tomás Ojea Quintana will serve as the third UN special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, beginning on August 1. He will succeed the current special rapporteur, Marzuki Darusman of Indonesia, who has held the post since August 2010. Newly appointed Special Rapporteur Quintana previously served as Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar from 2008 to 2014. Prior to that, he worked as executive director of the OHCHR Program for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights in Bolivia. (John G. Grisafi, "UN Names Next Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in N. Korea," *NKNews*, July 30, 2016)

8/1/16

With North Korea making significant progress with its nuclear program, there are some calls here for South Korea to arm itself with nuclear weapons as part of the country's self-defense against the growing threat. But American diplomatic pundits say that it is not a good idea saying there would be a high price to pay in many areas, including the ROK-U.S. alliance, while doing little to improve security. Rep. Won Yoo-chul of the ruling Saeuri Party who is a long-term advocate for South Korea's nuclear armament said last Monday the nation should seek a "trigger strategy" that ensures the nation automatically goes nuclear once the North conducts such a test. "There is a need for a paradigm shift in dealing with the North's provocations including the launch of ballistic missiles," he said. Won and fellow lawmakers will open a nuclear forum on Aug. 4 to study a detailed action plan. They will hold a monthly meeting to discuss the development of a South Korean nuclear arsenal. But he has yet to reveal the other participants. Supporters for nuclear armament claim that nuclear-power status would enable South Korea to secure reliable deterrence by generating a balance of terror with North Korea. They also claim a nuclear armed South Korea can cut its security reliance on the United States and forge a more balanced relationship with both Washington and Beijing. "Unless South Korea has nuclear weapons for self-defense purposes, it will have to spend more on its conventional military buildup to cope with growing military threats from the North," said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute. Four decades ago, President Park Chung-hee, father of current President Park Geun-hye, considered developing a nuclear capacity because of perceived U.S. disinterest in South Korea's security, but the United States, its military protector, pressed him to drop the program. According to a Gallup Korea poll conducted in January, 54 percent favored developing nuclear weapons, with 38 percent against. "Developing its own nuclear weapons would require South Korea to withdraw from the NPT and it would likely face international condemnation for leaving the NPT, with possible economic repercussions that could damage its export-dependent economy," said Terence Roehrig, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College. "Most importantly, South Korea does not need nuclear weapons to improve its security. Deterrence at the strategic level has long been robust and the likelihood of North Korea launching an invasion or some other type of large scale military operation is very unlikely. "The ROK-U.S. alliance is strong and any North Korean action of this sort would trigger a devastating response by Washington and Seoul that would lead to the end of the regime." Others agree that the South's pursuit of nuclear weapons will bring about negative consequences for its partnership with the United States —

possibly the end of the ROK-U.S. alliance. "A nuclear armed South Korea will only intensify growing doubts in the U.S. public about the need for a U.S. troop presence in South Korea and call the alliance into question," said Leon Sigal, the director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York. The United States has about 28,500 service members stationed in South Korea. "While foreign policy makers may try to assuage those doubts, they may not succeed," he added. There are no ongoing discussions about allowing South Korea's nuclear armament there, according to analysts. "Other than some comments made by Donald Trump in the campaign, there is almost no support in the United States for South Korea to go nuclear," said Roehrig. Daniel Sneider, associate director of research at Stanford's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, said, "No serious foreign policy or security expert in the United States holds different views — and the fact that Trump has expressed his support for this is only evidence of his complete ignorance of the basics of national security policy." In the wake of North Korea's series of military provocations, including the launch of ballistic missiles, calls for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the South are re-emerging here. "There have been calls by some in South Korea to have the United States reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons removed or to have South Korea develop a nuclear weapons program. Both are extremely ill-advised ideas," said Bruce Klingner, a senior Korea expert at the Heritage Foundation. "Currently the United States provides an extended deterrence guarantee through tactical sea-, sub-, and air-based nuclear weapons in the Pacific Theater and strategic nuclear weapons bases in the United States. It makes no military sense to redeploy the tactical nuclear weapons from their hard to find sea, sub, and air platforms and put them into a bunker in South Korea. Doing so would decrease allied deterrence and defense capabilities by increasing the time needed to deploy them and by providing a high value target for North Korea to preemptively attack during times of heightened tension." According to the Congressional Research Service in April, the renewed calls for the return of nuclear arms to the peninsula reflect concerns that U.S. security guarantees are "fragile."

"The only reason South Korea needs nuclear weapons is if the strategic deterrence provided by the United States, and the extended deterrence offered as well, are no longer considered reliable," said Sneider, who does not believe the U.S. deterrence is in any way less reliable today than it has been in the past. "But I do agree that there is a perception of a lack of commitment and I think therefore the United States should make it very clear to Pyongyang, in private preferably but if need be, in public, that we will retaliate on a massive scale for any use of nuclear weapons." Given that a South Korean nuclear weapon would be counterproductive, dangerous, and self-defeating against the North's crude nuclear threats, Peter Hayes, the executive director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, said South Korea had better focus on building up conventional forces. "South Korea will do much better to develop its conventional force superiority as well as its ability to counter asymmetric capabilities such as cyber warfare and drones," he said. (Kang Seung-woo, "Calls for S. Korea's Nuke Armament Gaining Ground," *Korea Times*, August 1, 2016)

A group of presumably North Korean hackers have attempted to break into the emails of some 90 South Korean diplomats, security officials and journalists, and dozens of passwords have been leaked in the process, state prosecutors said. The Supreme

Prosecutors' Office said that between January and June the group attempted to hack into the emails of officials at the ministries of foreign affairs, defense and unification, and also those of the journalists posted at these ministries. The victims also include some researchers specializing in North Korean issues. During the attempts the passwords of 56 email accounts were compromised, the office said. The investigators acted on a report earlier this year that some hackers had attempted to launch "spear phishing" attacks to break into some government officials' emails. Spear phishing is a type of fraudulent email attack that targets specific individuals or organizations by appearing to be a legitimate email from another known person or organization and asking unauthorized access to their confidential data. Investigators are currently trying to ascertain whether any state secrets had been leaked during the hacking attempts. Prosecutors pinpointed North Korean hackers as the culprits in the latest attacks, as the method used mirrored North Korea's high-profile cyberattack in 2014. The prosecutors found that the hackers established some 27 phishing sites to carry out the schemes. In cooperation with the National Security Service and the Korea Internet and Security Agency, prosecutors have shut down the phishing sites. "It is important (for government officials) to refrain from using private email accounts for official work, and they should frequently change their email passwords," a prosecution official said. "When officials carry out important tasks, it is desirable for them to take some security steps such as temporarily shutting down the internet." In recent years, the North has repeatedly shown a willingness to use its cybercapabilities to not only pose security challenges to its potential adversaries, but also wring out financial gains -- as evidenced in its May attack on the server of online shopping mall Interpark, which resulted in the leak of the personal data of an estimated 10.3 million people, including their names, home addresses and email addresses. It then tried to blackmail the mall for profit. Seoul officials believe that the North's General Bureau of Reconnaissance (GBR), its premier military intelligence agency, has masterminded major online attacks on South Korea. Among the pivotal organs under the GBR is Unit 121, which is tasked with penetrating enemy computer networks to secure confidential documents or spread viruses. According to defectors and reports, the North selects cybersavvy students from across the country at an early age and sends them to Geumseong Middle School in Pyongyang to give them intensive hacking lessons. They are then enrolled into Command Automation University, Kim Chaek University of Technology or Moranbong University for further education. Upon graduation, they begin their career as elite cyberwarfare officers. (Yonhap, "Emails of Seoul Officials Hacked by N. Korea: Prosecutor," August 1, 2016)

8/2/16

Japan in its latest defense white paper puts an exceptionally high estimate on North Korea's nuclear capabilities, possibly to justify a push for rearmament. "Had the Taepodong 2-derived ballistic missile been used for its original purpose, its range would have possibly reached more than 10,000 km on the premise that the weight of its warhead was less than 1 ton," the white paper claims. That would place Los Angeles and Denver within the range of North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles. The ministry said North Korea "may" have succeeded in miniaturizing a nuclear warhead through technological developments achieved via four nuclear tests, and could conduct additional missile tests to prove the technology. "Changes in the balance of power" due to North Korea's provocations and China's military expansion are cited as

the biggest threats to security in Northeast Asia. The white paper refers to the North Korean threat as a "grave and urgent" while accusing China of attempting "unilateral and uncompromising" moves in the South China Sea. One diplomatic source said, "There is an implied view that the fundamental cause of tensions in Northeast Asia is Chinese hegemony, while North Korea has become a concrete and specific threat." Meanwhile, the paper repeats a flimsy colonial claim to South Korea's easternmost islets of Dokdo, an expansionist fantasy included every year since 2005. Dokdo is called "Takeshima" and a map shows a circle around the islets claiming the area as Japanese territory. (Kim Soo-hye and Lee Yong-soo, "Japan Stresses 'Urgent' Nuclear Threat from N. Korea," *Chosun Ilbo*, August 3, 2016)

A North Korean diplomat stationed in the United Nations has said that Pyongyang and Washington are in a very dangerous situation following the shutdown of their communication channel in New York, Voice of America reported. The diplomat made the remark in a telephone conversation with VOA, saying, "Now the situation is very dangerous due to the complete shutdown of the dialogue channel." According to VOA, the North Korean official, who declined to be identified, said he had previously kept contact with Mark Lambert, director of the office of Korean affairs at the U.S. State Department. The "New York channel," has been used as the main communication conduit between the two nations in the past. As to the shutoff of the New York dialogue channel, the North Korean diplomat said, "It is our strong determination not to forgive the U.S. sanctions on North Korea." The North denounced the U.S. move as "an open declaration of war." Asked about North Korea's intention to resume dialogue with the Obama administration, he said it is a matter to be considered after Washington apologizes and withdraws sanctions on North Korea. Related to this, a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau told VOA that Washington is open to dialogue with Pyongyang to resume sincere negotiations for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. (Yonhap, "N. Korean Diplomat Says Situation Surrounding N. Korea, U.S. Very Dangerous," *Korea Herald*, August 2, 2016)

The number of North Koreans who defected to South Korea from January to July reached 815, up 15.6 percent from the same period last year, the Ministry of Unification said. The figure was 2,706 in 2011 but dropped to 1,502 in 2012. It bounced back to 1,514 in 2013 but fell to 1,397 in 2014 and down to 1,276 last year. The official also said such an increase possibly indicates accelerated destabilization of the Kim Jong-un regime. The Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, a private research institute in Seoul, agreed. Citing its survey, the institute said there have been an increasing number of elites among the defectors recently. "A growing number of survey correspondents over the past few years said they were part of the middle- and upper-classes in the North," said Yoo Yeo-sang, the chief director of the institute. "Also, the number of defector cases involving North Korean workers who worked outside their country increased significantly this year." (Yi Whan-woo, "N. Korea Defections up by 15.6% from 2015," *Korea Times*, August 2, 2016)

8/3/16

North Korea shot a ballistic missile startlingly close to Japan, sparking stern condemnations from Tokyo, Seoul and Washington. If confirmed, this would constitute the first time a North Korean missile had landed within Japan's exclusive economic zone on the Sea of Japan side of the island chain. In 1998, North Korea fired a

Taepodong-1 missile over Japan and into its economic zone on the Pacific Ocean side. The medium-range Rodong missile splashed down inside Japan's exclusive economic zone, within 125 miles of the country's northeast coast, Japan's Defense Ministry said. In flight time, that meant the missile was only 20 or 30 seconds from Japan itself, said Euan Graham, who served as a British diplomat in Pyongyang. "It's a clear case of walking right up to the line and just putting a nose over it," said Graham, now an East Asian security expert at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney. "It's a provocative act." South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Strategic Command said they had detected two simultaneous launches of Rodong intermediate-range ballistic missiles from the North Korean launch site in the southwest of the country shortly before 8 a.m. local time Wednesday. One appeared to explode shortly after launch, they said. But the other appeared to have flown over the peninsula and, some 12 minutes later, to have landed 620 miles away in the waters off the Akita prefecture. (Anna Fifield, "North Korea Missile Lands Perilously Close to Japan," *Washington Post*, August 3, 2016) The missiles were launched from near the southwestern county of Eunyul at 7:50 a.m., South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said, adding that one of them flew about 1,000 kilometers before falling into Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). "The North test-fired two ballistic missiles earlier in the day, but one of them exploded shortly after launch," the JCS said. The South Korean military said that North Korea demonstrated its ability to target all of South Korea and neighboring countries by launching a missile that may be able to carry a nuclear warhead down the road. (Yonhap, "N.K. Fires off 2 Rodong Missiles; One Falls in Japan's EEZ: Military," August 3, 2016) In an apparent first, North Korea launched a ballistic missile Wednesday morning that fell into waters inside Japan's exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan, South Korean and Japanese authorities said. The missile was launched from South Hwanghae province in the southwest of the country at around 7:50 a.m., South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said. In Tokyo, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani told reporters that the missile flew around 1,000 km and appeared to have landed in Japan's EEZ 250 km west of Akita Prefecture's Oga Peninsula. If confirmed, this would be the first time for such a missile to land in Japan's EEZ, according to the Defense Ministry. In 1998, a piece of the nose cover of a Taepodong-1 missile that the North launched over Japan fell into the nation's EEZ in the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. Strategic Command said it detected the simultaneous launch by the North of two missiles in the morning, one of which exploded immediately after launch. "The second was tracked over North Korea and into the Sea of Japan," it said in a statement. (Kyodo, "In an Apparent First, North Korea Launches Ballistic Missile into Sea of Japan EEZ," *Japan Times*, August 3, 2016)

Signs of discord have emerged in international collaboration on North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations in the face of China's opposition to installing a U.S. antimissile system in South Korea. The allies faced Beijing's resistance as they pushed to issue a condemnation by the U.N. Security Council over Pyongyang's latest firing of two ballistic missiles, one of which fell into the Japanese waters for the first time. The 15-member council met behind closed doors for an emergency meeting upon the request of Seoul, Washington and Tokyo for a "strong, swift response." As the three sought to circulate a draft council statement condemning the launch, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi posed a stumbling block, saying "nothing should be done to

exacerbate tension" on the peninsula, though he acknowledged the North Korean risks. The council has usually released quick criticism following Pyongyang's nuclear and missile provocations, but failed to give any response after it tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile and three midrange ballistic missiles last month. U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power called for "strong condemnations across the board from individual member states," while South Korean Ambassador Oh Joon stressed that the communist state has carried out 13 rounds of ballistic missile experiments this year. Japanese Ambassador Bessho Koro also called the latest action "totally unacceptable" and a "grave violation" of UNSC resolutions. "So we have every reason to believe that the council will be able to come together in a swift and united way to condemn this, again, just the latest launches," Power told reporters. "Obviously by now, what they're doing is not just separate, random missile tests. I think they are doing all of this with the systematic, comprehensive purpose of upgrading and refining their missile technologies, which is not only a grave challenge to the global nonproliferation system but also poses a clear, present danger to the security of all countries in the region," Oh said. The U.N. spoke out against Pyongyang, with spokesman Stephane Dujarric saying the agency is "deeply troubled" and urging it to "reverse its course and return to the process of sincere dialogue." (Shin Hyon-hee, "THAAD Friction Derails U.N. Reaction to N.K. Missiles," *Korea Herald*, August 4, 2016)

Inada Tomomi, the hawkish chairwoman of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Research Council, will be named defense minister in a Cabinet reshuffle on August 3. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's expected appointment of Inada to the Cabinet has raised concerns within the Defense Ministry. "(If Inada becomes defense minister,) it could become difficult to deal with China and South Korea," a senior ministry official said. She argues that war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution should be revised to clearly define the Self-Defense Forces. The article currently reads, "Land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." On August 15, 2015, the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Inada visited Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, which honors Class-A war criminals along with the war dead. Abe and Inada share similar political ideologies and visions on what Japan should be as a nation. She will assume the post ahead of the full-fledged implementation of Abe's national security legislation. Although Inada has held high-level posts, she appeared taken aback after Abe informed her on the morning of August 2 that he plans to name her defense minister. "I feel like I've been hit in the head," she told her aides. "I had never expected to be appointed to the post." Inada is currently serving only her fourth term as a Lower House lawmaker. She held the Cabinet post of state minister in charge of administrative reform between 2012 and 2014 and has chaired the LDP Policy Research Council for two years since 2014. Although defense is not seen as her forte, Abe apparently plans to groom Inada as his possible successor by giving her experience in national security issues, such as the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture and revisions to the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. When Abe was an acting general-secretary of the LDP in 2005, he urged Inada to run in the Lower House election. At that time, Inada was a lawyer who also provided commentary and articles for conservative media. (Okamura Natsuke, "Abe to Appoint Protégé Inada as Defense Minister in Reshuffle," *Asahi Shimbun*, August 3, 2016) Japan's hawkish new defense minister singled out North Korean provocations

and Chinese use of "force" in territorial disputes on August 4) as she reviewed troops on her first day in the job. "North Korea is repeating militarily." "China has rapidly become active in waters and airspace surrounding (Japan) and it continues its attempt to change the status quo through force," Inada said. She wrote in 2011 that Japan - the only country in the world to suffer atomic bomb attacks - should consider acquiring nuclear weapons. Asked whether she planned to visit Yasukuni on Aug 15, the anniversary of Japan's World War II surrender, she declined to give a straight answer, saying that such a decision is a "matter of the heart." But she also told reporters that Japan "should not consider arming itself with nuclear weapons at this moment." In 2014, Inada and Takaichi Sanae, who was retained by Abe as internal affairs minister, were seen in separate photographs standing next to the leader of a Japanese neo-Nazi party. Spokesmen for both lawmakers acknowledged at the time that the photographs were genuine and had been taken in their offices over the previous few years, but denied any political affiliation. According to a Kyodo poll taken this week, 43.0 per cent of respondents opposed Inada's appointment as defense minister, while 32.1 per cent supported it. (AFP, "Japan's New Defense Minister Warns North Korea and China," August 5, 2016)

8/4/16

The government will try to find a different site in Seongju County, North Gyeongsang to operate a controversial U.S.-led antimissile system, President Park Geun-hye said. "Instead of the Seongsan artillery base, I will consider placing the Thaad battery in another area inside Seongju County," Park said in her meeting with the lawmakers. "If the military makes a recommendation of a new site inside Seongju based on concerns of the residents, we will conduct a thorough survey. And we will inform the Seongju residents in detail about the outcome." Park invited a group of lawmakers representing Daegu and North Gyeongsang to the Blue House and listened to complaints about the government's recent decision to deploy the THAAD system in Seongju County. Residents think it will make them a target of a North Korean attack and may also pose health hazards. Eleven ruling Saenuri Party lawmakers from the region - 10 first-term lawmakers and Rep. Yi Wan-young, a second-term lawmaker representing Goryeong, Seongju and Chilgok counties of North Gyeongsang - attended the meeting. Park was accompanied by her top secretaries including Chief of Staff Lee Won-jong. The talks lasted for nearly two hours. Rep. Yi, who represents Seongju, continued to protest the Thaad deployment in his district even after the meeting with the president. "I have told the president all about the strong protests in Seongju, because the Seongsan artillery base is located right near a village," Yi said. "And Park replied that a survey will be conducted if Seongju County's head requests an alternate site." Yi said Seongju residents do not want the deployment in their county at all. "They are even more agitated as the media reports about a new site," he said. "There is no alternate site in Seongju," Shin Jeong-geun, a 40-year-old resident of Seongsan-ri of Seongju, told the JoongAng Ilbo. "It makes no sense. The government is now saying it will place the Thaad in another area because there are many people living in Seongju. Initially, they said [the artillery base] was the best place, and now they are changing the words. We cannot trust anything." Lee Jae-bok, co-leader of a protest group, said the residents want the government to recant its decision. "All the residents of the county want no Thaad in Seongju," he said. Jeong Yeong-gil, another leader of the protest group, said the residents will hold a big rally on Aug. 15 in Seongju. "Hundreds of the county



people will shave their heads to protest," he said. "We will hold more candlelight vigils." Opposition parties ridiculed Park's comments and the defense ministry's volte-face. "The government has repeatedly stressed that the Seongsan artillery base is the best site," said Rep. Ki Dong-min of the main opposition Minjoo Party of Korea. "It must provide a convincing explanation if it will change that position." (Ser Myo-ja, "Park Says Shift in Location of THAAD Battery Possible," *JoongAng Ilbo*, August 5, 2016)

8/7/16

Food and fuel prices in North Korea have remained largely stable under leader Kim Jong Un, despite tightening international sanctions to punish the North for its nuclear and ballistic missile tests, rare data from inside the isolated country shows. The relative stability of both prices and the currency - in contrast to the volatility seen under his father Kim Jong Il - is partly attributable to the younger Kim's hands-off approach to an increasingly market-based economy and also, experts say, suggests some policy learning in Pyongyang. Once reliant on a Soviet-style centrally-planned economy, North Korea is now home to a thriving system of semi-legal but policed markets known as "jangmadang", where individuals and wholesalers can buy and sell privately-produced or imported goods. "Since Kim Jong Un came to power, there has been no control or crackdown on the jangmadang," said Kang Mi-jin, a North Korean defector who works at the Seoul-based Daily NK website and regularly speaks to market sources in the North. "Kim Jong Un is doing a lot of bad things, but keeping the markets open has had a positive effect on the people. He has no other option. He can't feed the people, and he can't completely shut the markets down." The data, compiled by Reuters based on information from the *Daily NK*, an organization staffed by defectors, showed the price of rice, corn, pork, petrol and diesel remained relatively stable over the last year, demonstrating resilience to domestic and outside events. The *Daily NK* obtains prices from its contacts in the capital Pyongyang and the northern cities of Sinuiju and Hyesan, which both border China. A calculated average of these prices shows the market cost of goods has not markedly increased as more North Koreans are allowed to buy and sell in the unofficial economy. The number of stalls in the jangmadang has grown by hundreds, defectors said. North Korea's centrally-planned rationing system never recovered from a devastating famine in the 1990s. From April to June this year the state handed out just 360 grammes of rations per person per day, the lowest amount for five years, according to a recent World Food Program (WFP) report. The market, however, has been able to make up the shortfall. Rice, an important staple in North Korea, cost on average 5,240 won per kg over the last year, or around 63 cents at unofficial market rates, according to the data. Corn, a cheaper and often more-readily available staple sold for an average of 2,022 won, or just 24 cents per kg. Pork prices were most volatile, dropping off sharply in the hot summer months. "They can't freeze pork. North Korea lacks refrigeration facilities. Pork meat turns bad quickly so merchants can't raise prices," Kang, the defector, said. The only notable spike over the last year was a sudden rise in the price of petrol and diesel in early March, just before the latest U.N. sanctions were imposed. A fear of shortages under sanctions pushed the average market price of petrol up by 45.1 percent in the space of a few days, according to the data. Diesel increased by 17.4 percent in the same period. Prices returned to normal after fears about sanctions calmed. The Korean People's Won, the official currency, is valued by the state at around 100 won to the dollar. Its real

worth, however, is around 8,300 won to the dollar, a value largely determined by the markets. That unofficial exchange rate has remained stable for the last few years, in contrast to its extreme volatility under Kim Jong Il following a botched currency reform in 2009. "The effective stabilization of the won which occurred over the last two years is a bit of a mystery to everyone," said Stephan Haggard, an expert on the North Korean economy at the University of California, San Diego. "It almost certainly involves some monetary policy learning after the currency conversion debacle." Under Kim Jong Un, North Korea has started to produce more domestically-made consumer items, from toothpaste to perfume, which could also have helped stabilize local prices. "North Korean knock-offs of Chinese products are more popular and cheaper than the original," said Seo Jae-pyoung, a defector who left North Korea in 2001 but regularly speaks to sources inside the country. For now, ordinary North Koreans are coping comparatively well despite their country's deepening isolation. "Despite the sanctions this year, ordinary people are doing fine," said Seo. "But the effects may slowly start to hit from next year." (James Pearson and Ju-min Park, "Despite Sanctions, North Korean Prices Steady as Kim Leaves Markets Alone," Reuters, August 7, 2016)

8/9/16

The United Nations Security Council has been unable to condemn the launch of a missile by North Korea that landed near Japan because China wanted the statement to oppose the planned deployment of a U.S. anti-missile defense system in South Korea. North Korea launched a ballistic missile August 3 that landed in or near Japanese-controlled waters for the first time. The 15-member council held a closed-door meeting on the same day, but has been unable to agree on a U.S.-drafted statement to condemn the launch, which was almost identical to two previous statements issued by the council on North Korea. China proposed that the statement also say "all relevant parties shall avoid taking any actions which could provoke each other and escalate tensions, and shall not deploy any new anti-ballistic missile stronghold in Northeast Asia with an excuse of dealing with threats of the DPRK nuclear and missile programs." Beijing has said Washington's decision last month to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system would only worsen tensions on the Korean peninsula. China's U.N. mission also did not want the statement to express concern that the missile landed near Japan, telling council diplomats in an email, seen by Reuters: "We believe that the response of the council is based on violation of Security Council resolutions, not the place where the missile impacted." Japan and the United States said they could not accept the proposed changes to the draft by China and today dropped the bid for a Security Council statement. "To propose that this council should criticize purely defensive steps that states have taken to protect their people from the DPRK's clear and repeated ballistic missile threats ... would be manifestly inappropriate and would send entirely the wrong message to the DPRK," the U.S. mission to the United Nations told council diplomats in an email. After the Security Council meeting last Wednesday, U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power rejected suggestions the decision to deploy the anti-missile defense system in South Korea had provoked ballistic missile tests by North Korea. Michelle Nichols, "U.N. Censure of North Korea Missile Thwarted," Reuters, August 9, 2016)

8/11/16 Recent commercial satellite imagery from August 4, 2016 shows continued activity at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, specifically at the North Portal, site of North Korea's fourth nuclear test conducted in January 2016. While supplies and/or equipment stacked on the ground south and southeast of the North Portal, as well as a small vehicle at the support building, visible in July are no longer present, a 6-meter by 9-meter net canopy has been erected immediately south of the support building. The canopy is not camouflaged, but does prevent accurate observation of the area it covers. (Jack Liyu and Joseph Bermudez, Jr., "Continued Unidentified Activity at Site of N. Korea's Latest Nuclear Test," *38North*, August 11, 2016)

8/12/16 North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is strengthening his reign of terror, publicly executing some 60 people as of August, sources said. They said such a number surpassed the annual average of 30 people who were killed before the public since Kim took power in December 2011. The executions this year come amid a series of defections among people from various social classes in the wake of the U.N. Security Council's harshest sanctions imposed against Pyongyang in March. The sources said the young leader uses the executions to control the North's people amid growing complaints over him pocketing their cash and mobilizing them as forced labor in state-run campaigns. The latter included the "70-day battle" and "200-day battle," which were both aimed at boosting production and enhancing loyalty to the Kim regime. Meanwhile, the sources said many of those executed included family members of defectors and brokers who helped North Koreans escape the country. Dozens of them were killed on charges of espionage in February. A separate group of 10 brokers were also shot in April after being arrested for helping defectors at Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, which borders China. "The defectors are considered a serious threat to the propping up of the regime, and North Korea has been frequently publically executing their family members as well as those who help them," a source said. Those who watch South Korean movies and soap operas as well as those who sell and buy drugs are also subject to execution. "People are complaining that such punishment for so-called ordinary crimes is too cruel," the source said. "The people also say Kim's reign of terror is making them too horrified to live there." In an annual report released in April, the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) said North Korea beefed up its border security while bolstering a crackdown on the use of mobile phones. The KINU, which operates under the Ministry of Unification said Pyongyang's State Security Department ordered soldiers to tighten security checks, and set up barbed wire and surveillance cameras on the border with China to prevent its people from defecting to South Korea. The latest cases of defections included a teenage math prodigy who sought asylum at the South Korean consulate in Hong Kong after participating in the International Mathematics Olympiad there in early July. A top military officer and three diplomats also fled from North Korea in July while a construction worker and two employees at a North Korean restaurant in Malta also defected to South Korea. (Yi Whan-woo, "N. Korea Leader Strengthening Reign of Terror," *Korea Times*, August 12, 2016)

56% of South Koreans support the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile system on the Korean Peninsula, survey results show. The findings published today from a regular survey by Gallup Korea also showed 31%

opposing the deployment. No major changes were found on opinions regarding China's importance in peace on the Korean Peninsula. A poll conducted by Gallup just after the official THAAD deployment announcement on July 8 showed support at 50% and opposition at 32%. "In the survey one month ago, 28% of women declined to give an opinion, but that percentage was down to 19% this time, while support [for the deployment] among women rose from 38% to 49%," explained Gallup. "The rise in support was especially larger among women sixty and older [from 44% to 64%]," it added. 83% of respondents who identified themselves as supporters of the ruling Saenuri Party expressed support for the deployment. Among People's Party respondents, support outweighed opposition by a margin of 51% to 44%. In contrast, among respondents identifying with the Minjoo Party - which has continued adopting a "strategic ambiguity" approach on the deployment issue - the deployment was opposed by 56% and supported by 34%. (Kim Nam-il, "Poll: 56% of South Koreans Support THAAD Deployment, 31% Opposed," Hankyore, August 13, 2016)

8/13/16

KCNA commentary: "The U.S. attempt to invade the DPRK is getting evermore reckless. While ceaselessly shipping nuclear strategic assets into the Korean peninsula, it forward-deployed four B-1Bs and three B-2As on Guam on Aug. 6 and 9. So, three missions of the U.S. strategic bombers including B-52, B-1B and B-2A have been deployed simultaneously for the first time. The U.S. warmongers blustered that their forward-deployment of B-1Bs on Guam would enable them to make a preemptive nuclear strike at the DPRK through a surprise flying over the Korean peninsula only in two hours. Moreover, they unhesitatingly let loose a spate of provocative remarks that the nuclear strategic bombers' forward-deployment implies the "advance warning" against the DPRK. The U.S. evermore undisguised reinforcement of the nuclear force goes to clearly prove that it is trying to make a preemptive nuclear strike at the DPRK a fait accompli. Guam, the U.S. strategic vantage point capable of supporting strategic weapons to the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asian region in a few hours in contingency, is an advanced base for invading the DPRK and now it has the THAAD battery to be deployed in south Korea. **The U.S. forward-deployed B-1Bs and B-2As one after another on Guam, where it used to permanently station only B-52Hs so far, after it decided to deploy THAAD** in south Korea. It is part of its scenario to invade the DPRK to put the DPRK under its militarily control at any cost through mobilization of all its lethal hardware for a nuclear war. The hard reality in which the Korean peninsula is turning into a nuclear war theatre by the U.S. eloquently shows how impudent the U.S.-touted "denuclearization" and "world without nuclear weapons" are. Just indeed are the DPRK's measures for bolstering up its nuclear weapons to cope with the U.S. and its followers' reckless rackets for nuclear threats. Today the DPRK which emerged as a nuclear weapons state in the East is pressing the U.S. with its powerful military muscle. The right to make a preemptive nuclear strike is not the monopoly of the U.S. **The DPRK's revolutionary armed forces switched from their existing mode of military counter-action to the mode of a preemptive strike** to cope with the enemy's ridiculous military hysteria to undermine its sovereignty and right to existence. All their operational groups are fully ready to deal a merciless and annihilating blow to the enemy if they make even the slightest provocation. The Korean People's Army is closely following the U.S. unusual military move. The U.S. had

better stop acting rashly." (KCNA, "Preemptive Nuclear Strike Is Not Monopoly of U.S.: KCNA Commentary," August 13, 2016)

8/14/16

South Korea's military will greatly increase the number of Hyunmoo missiles in its inventory to better counter North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile threats, sources said. Government insiders said the military is devising a plan to simultaneously take out missile bases all across North Korea in times of crisis. "To accomplish this, the South needs more ballistic missiles at its disposal," said an official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. He said that procuring more short-range Hyunmoo 2A and 2B ballistic missiles, which have maximum ranges of 300 kilometers and 500 km respectively, and 1,000 km Hyunmoo 3 cruise missiles can help Seoul "neutralize" Pyongyang's missile threat. South Korean missiles generally have shorter ranges but are much more accurate than their North Korean counterparts. The source said that next year's addition of a new type of ballistic missile to South Korea's arsenal with a range of 800 km will enhance Seoul's capability to cover all of North Korea. In October 2012, Seoul and Washington agreed to extend the maximum range of South Korean ballistic missiles. The remarks indicate that Seoul is aware that the North may launch its 1,000 missiles all at once against the South if it starts another war, and that it needs to destroy them before they get airborne if it has advance intelligence of a pending attack. This pre-emptive strike capability, coupled with South Korea's plan to build a Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and "kill chain" to detect, identify and intercept incoming missiles, should allow the South to counter the North's asymmetrical threats coming from its weapons of mass destruction. This "triple defense posture" was first mentioned by Defense Minister Han Min-koo on July 11. In a question raised by an opposition lawmaker, the minister said that Seoul is moving forward with its plan and that it has made considerable headway. Seoul's defense ministry has declined to reveal details of the triple defense plan, although it has said that the country is working with the United States to effectively deal with North Korean provocations. South Korea's military has identified three belts of North Korean missiles, with the first belt located some 50-90 km north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This belt has 500-600 Scud missiles that have ranges of 300-700 km. It said the North has some 40 transporter erector launchers (TEL) in this belt. TELs allow missiles to be moved about much more easily, making them hard to detect and destroy. In the second belt lying 90-120 km north of the DMZ, Pyongyang is known to have placed 200-300 Rodong medium-range missiles with a range of around 1,300 km with 30 TELs. In the third belt lying deeper inside the country, the North may have 30-50 Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles and 30 TELs, with the latest reports indicating the deployment of the North's KN-08 long-range missiles. The IRBMs could reach U.S. bases in the Pacific, such as in Guam. The North has fired off six Musudan missiles so far, with only one being viewed as partially successful. (Yonhap, "S. Korea to Greatly Increase Hyunmoo Missiles," August 14, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman answer "as regards Germany's projected delivery of attack missiles to south Korea: There are reports that Germany will deliver Taurus air-to-surface missiles capable of accurately hitting the strategic bases of the DPRK within this year. If it is true, Germany's projected delivery disregarding even its domestic law banning arms export to dispute-torn areas will disturb peace and escalate tensions on

the Korean peninsula, the biggest hot spot in the world. In the past Germany sold Patriot interceptor missiles and diesel engine submarines to south Korea. Its unhesitating delivery of even attack missiles to south Korea will only result in inciting the south Korean authorities getting desperate in confrontation with the compatriots in the north to a new war. Germany has talked more than any others that it hopes for "stability" and "peace" on the Korean peninsula as it made apologies repeatedly for inflicting untold disasters upon humankind by igniting two world wars and experienced the pain resulting from national division. However, it is now making no scruple of doing an action inciting a war. It is, indeed, preposterous for it to term the DPRK's self-defensive steps for defending its sovereignty, vital rights of the nation and regional peace "violations of resolutions" of the UN Security Council, while selling even attack missiles to south Korea in defiance of its domestic law. Germany will have to have courage to answer the question as to whether the UNSC's resolution terming weapon test "threat to world peace and security" is fair or not. If it wants to shoulder "heavier responsibility" in the international arena, it will have to discreetly behave with a right viewpoint on the situation on the Korean peninsula. The projected sale of missiles should be retracted at once as it will wreck peace on the Korean peninsula and other parts of the region. (KCNA, "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Hits out at Germany's Projected Sale of Missiles to S. Korea," August 14, 2016)

South Korea will impose punitive actions against local civic group members for their unauthorized contact with North Koreans in China last week, Seoul's unification ministry said. Without the government's approval, four high-ranking members from the South Korean Committee for Implementation of the June 15 Joint Declaration held a two-day meeting with their North Korean counterparts in Shenyang, China, starting August 11. Seoul's unification ministry earlier rejected the group's request to hold talks with their North Korean counterparts, citing the grave situation following Pyongyang's nuke and missile tests early this year. By law, all South Koreans are required to win Seoul's approval for either meeting with North Koreans in a third country or visiting North Korea. "It's incorrect to talk about peace and unification while ignoring North Korea's nuclear programs, which is the core problem on the Korean Peninsula," a unification ministry official said. "The North should show its strong commitment to abandoning its nuclear weapons program." The group was previously fined by the South Korean government in May after they made unauthorized contact with North Koreans also in Shenyang. The government then slapped fines worth less than 2 million won (\$1,700) each on the seven members. (Yonhap, "S. Korea to Punish Civic Group over Unauthorized Contact with N. Koreans," August 14, 2016)

President Obama's last-minute drive for a foreign-policy legacy is making U.S. allies nervous about their own security. Several allied governments have lobbied the administration not to change U.S. nuclear-weapons policy by promising never to be the first to use them in a conflict. The governments of Japan, South Korea, France and Britain have all privately communicated their concerns about a potential declaration by President Obama of a "no first use" nuclear-weapons policy for the United States. U.S. allies have various reasons for objecting to what would be a landmark change in America's nuclear posture, but they are all against it, according to U.S. officials, foreign diplomats and nuclear experts. Japan, in particular, believes that if Obama declares a

"no first use" policy, deterrence against countries such as North Korea will suffer and the risks of conflict will rise. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe personally conveyed that message recently to Adm. Harry Harris Jr., the head of U.S. Pacific Command, according to two government officials. U.S. allies in Europe have a separate, additional concern. They don't want any daylight between their nuclear policies and those of the United States, especially since Britain, France and the United States all are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. In the case of an emergency, those differences could cause real coordination problems. "While the goal of a 'no first use' policy is correct – to never be the first country to launch a cataclysmic nuclear strike – doing so unilaterally could run the risk of weakening our allies' confidence in our security guarantees. This would not be in our interest," said Joel Rubin, a former Obama administration State Department official. Diplomats from allied countries argued that if the United States takes a nuclear first strike off the table, the risk of a conventional conflict with countries such as North Korea, China and Russia could increase. Regimes that might refrain from a conventional attack in fear of nuclear retaliation would calculate the risks of such an attack differently. Moreover, allied governments don't believe that a unilateral "no first use" declaration would necessarily help to establish an international norm, because there's no guarantee that other countries would follow suit. They also believe that nuclear weapons play a role in deterring chemical and biological attacks. Republicans in Congress also strongly oppose the change and are already upset that the Obama administration plans to seek a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on all states to refrain from nuclear testing. They don't believe such moves are appropriate this close to the arrival of a new administration and without legislative advice and consent. Proponents of the new policy say concerns about the change are unfounded. "North Korea understands that any conventional attack will be met with a devastating response, but it doesn't have to be a nuclear response," said Arms Control Association executive director Daryl Kimball. "If we don't need to use nuclear weapons to retaliate against North Korea, why should we?" The same question could be asked the other way. If all U.S. allies believe a "no first use" policy weakens deterrence and increases the risk of armed conflict without producing any benefits, why should we do it? Advancing Obama's personal legacy isn't a good enough reason. (Josh Rogin, "U.S. Allies Unite to Block Obama's Nuclear 'Legacy,'" *Washington Post*, August 14, 2016) Prime Minister Abe has denied conveying to the head of the U.S. Pacific Command concerns about the United States adopting a "no first use" policy for its nuclear arsenal, as reported by the *Washington Post* last week. "We had no exchange whatsoever about no first use of nuclear weapons," Abe told reporters August 21 in Tokyo before boarding a plane to go to Brazil to attend the Rio Olympics closing ceremony. "I have no idea why it was reported that way." Abe, however, said he believed the issue remained undecided. "It's my understanding that the U.S. side has made no decision," he said Saturday, adding that Tokyo would maintain close contact with Washington on the matter. Abe and Harris met at the Prime Minister's Office in Tokyo on July 26. (Kyodo, JIJI, "Abe Denied Conveying Concern to U.S. Commander over 'No First Use' Nuke Policy," *Japan Times*, August 21, 2016)

8/15/16

Robert Einhorn and Duyeon Kim: "North Korea's fourth nuclear test in January led to renewed calls in South Korea for the country to build its own nuclear arsenal. Comments by high-profile politicians, conservative media outlets, and some

academics are a source of much concern in Washington and the international security community. But these highly publicized, pro-nuclear reactions from a small minority provide a misleading impression of the likelihood that the Republic of Korea will actually pursue its own nuclear capability. South Korean President Park Geun-hye and other senior officials have firmly rejected the pursuit of nuclear arms and, at least at the present time, few South Koreans believe their country will actually head down the military nuclear path. Nonetheless, even opponents of the nuclear option share much of the frustration and anxiety felt by the nuclear advocates; they believe that there is value in a public discussion of the nuclear weapons issue and warn that, unless Pyongyang's strategic programs are curbed and the US nuclear umbrella remains reliable, voices urging South Korea to go nuclear will only grow. To better understand the current debate in South Korea on its future nuclear options, we carried out an extensive series of interviews in April and May with a wide range of prominent South Korean leaders who support and oppose nuclear weapons: incumbent and former senior diplomats and government officials, serving and retired military commanders, National Assembly members in leadership positions, media commentators and editorial writers, leaders and emerging leaders of the business community, experts from South Korean research and academic institutions, and leaders in the South Korean civilian nuclear establishment. This assessment of the South Korean nuclear debate is based largely on those interviews, many of which were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis to encourage candor. North Korea's January 6 nuclear test reinforced concerns in the South about Kim Jong Un's provocative behavior and his apparent intention to maintain and expand the North Korean nuclear arsenal. As was the case following previous North Korean nuclear tests, this one triggered public comments in the South supportive of an ROK nuclear capability. But this time, according to several observers, the comments were stronger and more numerous than in the past. Politicians from South Korea's ruling Saenuri Party were especially outspoken, with party floor leader Won Yoo-chul, who has become a leading nuclear advocate in the party, asserting in an address to parliament: "We can't borrow [nuclear] umbrellas from next door every time it rains. We should wear a raincoat of our own." Saenuri Party members Kim Eul-dong, Kim Jung-hoon (who is party policy chief), Roh Chul-rae, and Hong Jun-pyo voiced similar pro-nuclear sentiments. Former Saenuri Party national assemblyman and former presidential hopeful Chung Mong-joon expressed in a blog post his long-standing frustration with being bound by the Nonproliferation Treaty. The *Chosun Ilbo*, the leading conservative newspaper, editorialized that "Seoul now faces a real need for public discussion of the development of its own nuclear weapons." And conservative academic Cheong Seong-chang of the Sejong Institute reportedly asserted, "In the face of North Korea's growing nuclear threats, [the] time has come for the South to consider the issue of nuclear armament for self-defense." Opinion polls released in February appeared to reflect the South Korean public's concern about the North Korean test. In a poll by the *JoongAng Ilbo* newspaper, 67.7 percent favored the South having nuclear weapons. A Yonhap News Agency poll reported that figure at 52.5 percent. Such polls have been conducted soon after every nuclear test since 2006 and have consistently shown majority support for nuclear arms. This flurry of pro-nuclear reactions to the latest North Korean test, however, provides a misleading picture. President Park Geun-hye, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, Defense Minister Han Min-koo, and other senior



government officials have all strongly and publicly opposed South Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons. So have the leading moderately conservative newspaper *JoongAng Ilbo*, key members of opposition political parties, and prominent experts outside the government, such as progressive Yonsei University professor Moon Chung-in. The Saenuri Party itself is divided on the issue, with influential ruling party officials taking issue with the pro-nuclear views espoused by their colleagues. Ruling Saenuri Party Chairman Kim Moo-sung claimed that advocates of nuclear arms do not have a deep understanding of nuclear issues. He advised us not to “waste any time” on the possibility that South Korea will pursue nuclear weapons and maintained that “there is nothing to worry about.” Opinion polls showing strong support for nuclear weapons are heavily discounted by many South Korean experts and officials. They argue that, when tensions are high, such as following a North Korean nuclear test, the public will naturally favor the nuclear option, especially if presented only with a simple binary choice between having or not having nuclear weapons. They maintain, moreover, that if a poll builds into its questions some of the expected adverse consequences of going nuclear, support for the nuclear option will drop sharply. Still, South Korean officials and pundits—including several opposed to an indigenous nuclear weapons program—advise that recent expressions of support for a South Korean nuclear capability should not simply be dismissed as the provocative views of a vocal minority. Those expressions of support, our wide-ranging interviews indicate, reflect deep concerns shared by many South Koreans, regardless of political ideology, and those concerns need to be taken seriously and addressed in Seoul and Washington to reduce the likelihood that the South will pursue a nuclear weapons option. Recent pro-nuclear comments by politicians, the media, and non-governmental experts are motivated by a wide range of concerns. *Seeking more credible deterrence.* At the core of many pro-nuclear voices are doubts about the US nuclear umbrella. For Kim Dae-joong, a senior columnist at the conservative newspaper *Chosun Ilbo* and longstanding advocate of the nuclear option, an indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons capability is essential to national security because the United States “will not push the [nuclear] button” if the Republic of Korea (ROK) is attacked. Just as France decided that an independent French nuclear deterrent was more credible than a US pledge to put its cities at risk by defending its European allies against Soviet attack, Kim pointed out to us that an ROK nuclear deterrent would be inherently more credible than relying on the US nuclear umbrella. While recognizing that Seoul could pay a very high price politically and economically for going nuclear, he maintains that, if nuclear weapons are considered essential to protecting vital national security interests, South Korea would have no choice but to absorb those costs. *Correcting asymmetry.* For some other South Koreans, an indigenous nuclear capability would serve the important political purpose of correcting a critical asymmetry between the North and South, an asymmetry that places Seoul in a highly disadvantageous position relative to Pyongyang. They told us that such a capability would neutralize the one area of North Korean superiority; force the North to deal with the South more seriously and respectfully; and strengthen South Korea’s bargaining position in any negotiation or confrontation with its northern neighbor. In this view, only by acquiring a countervailing nuclear weapons capability will the ROK have the leverage to negotiate with the North on the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear arms on the Korean Peninsula. *Pressuring Beijing and Washington.* In the case

of a significant number of South Korean politicians and pundits, expressions of support for the nuclear option do not reflect a genuine interest in pursuing nuclear weapons, but instead are intended to serve a tactical purpose: Putting pressure on China and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the United States to act with greater resolve to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. President Park Geun-hye's substantial investment in improved relations with China and President Xi Jinping has been based heavily on the expectation that it would pay dividends in terms of Chinese willingness to use its leverage to force a change in Pyongyang's nuclear policies. While China supported tougher sanctions in UN Security Council resolution 2270, South Koreans are disappointed that Beijing has been unwilling to exert decisive pressure against the North, and some believe that the threat of the ROK going nuclear would give China a strong incentive to act more forcefully on behalf of denuclearization. Saenuri Party floor leader Won Yoo-chul asserted in our meeting, "We need to send a clearer message to North Korea. I am discontent with China showing a lack of interest in applying strong sanctions, and instead is exercising too much power [in the region] and interfering with our own affairs, like the deployment of THAAD." THAAD is the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile defense system that China claims threatens its strategic deterrent. South Koreans are also disappointed by what they regard as the failure of the United States to give sufficient attention to addressing the North Korean threat. Many believe the United States, in assigning priority to preventing an Iranian nuclear capability, has put the DPRK problem on the back burner. They fear that Washington has abandoned the goal of denuclearization of the North as unachievable and too politically risky even to pursue. For some, public support for an independent South Korean nuclear capability could motivate the United States to re-engage and take a tougher approach, both directly with North Korea and with the Chinese to induce them to apply stronger pressures against the North. Expressions of support by South Koreans for nuclear weapons are not just aimed at China and the United States. The ROK public is also signaling frustration with its own government. As one senior government official explained to us, "They are asking us [South Korean government] to do something, saying that if we can't engage [the North to solve the problem], then what's left is the physical action of going nuclear or not."

*Playing to domestic constituents.* In the view of several South Koreans interviewed, the pro-nuclear statements by ROK politicians were less a carefully-considered assessment of the merits of the issue and more a way of demonstrating resolve to their largely conservative constituents in the face of the growing North Korean challenge. For politicians with little to offer in terms of practical proposals for overcoming the threat from Pyongyang, support for the nuclear option was a means of showing that they were "doing something." One influential pundit, *JoongAng Ilbo* editor-at-large Kim Young-hie, urged us not to pay attention to statements by politicians, who, in his view, were motivated primarily by a desire to score political points, especially in the run-up to the April National Assembly elections. A National Assembly staff member also confided that pro-nuclear statements by South Korean parliamentarians were often mostly political rhetoric to pressure North Korea and China—not reflective of genuine support for nuclear weapons—and designed to reassure South Koreans that the ruling Saenuri Party was sufficiently and actively concerned by the threat from the North.

*Widespread frustration and fear of abandonment.* Recent expressions of support for the nuclear option have a variety of specific explanations, as mentioned above. But

many of the South Koreans surveyed, whether conservative or progressive, offered an additional and more general explanation, not just for the pro-nuclear statements themselves but also for why those statements may strike a sympathetic chord even among many South Koreans who oppose their country's acquisition of nuclear weapons. In a word, that explanation is "frustration"—mainly frustration at the failure to rein in North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. South Koreans had hoped and expected that, with the help of the major powers, especially China and the United States, the North's strategic programs could be halted and reversed. But now, with North Korean programs advancing and prospects for productive negotiations remote, there is a growing apprehension that the threat may not be reversible. Former Prime Minister Lee Hong-koo, an opponent of nuclear weaponization, explained to us: "It's an expression of frustration with US and Chinese ambivalence because Korea lost its independence for decades and was forcefully divided, so they [South Koreans] see a lack of responsibility by major powers." Moreover, given the widespread perception that China and the United States are not sufficiently committed to dealing with the North Korean threat, South Koreans increasingly fear that they may be left alone to cope with the challenge from the North, and that they will be powerless to meet that challenge. A chairman of a small-to-medium-sized business claimed, "The US can always abandon or sacrifice South Korea for its own interest at decisive moments." This fear of abandonment, never far from the surface in South Korea, could lead to efforts to reduce its dependence on the United States for security, and to act more independently and assertively in its own interests. Koreans' desire for independence from major powers has deep historical roots, dating back to dynastic eras, and it explains arguments such as the following by a South Korean academic: "If we give up securing our own nuclear deterrent for fear of international opposition and depend unilaterally on the United States, we will become nothing but a chess piece manipulated by big powers." Despite this frustration with developments in the North, fear of abandonment, and desire for independence, South Korean interlocutors told us that, at least for the time being, these widespread feelings were unlikely to lead to a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. The recent up-tick in pro-nuclear statements can be attributed significantly to motivations other than the actual desire to acquire nuclear weapons, including motivations of a tactical, political, and even emotional character. The tentative and qualified nature of support for the nuclear option can be seen in what nuclear advocates are actually calling for. Few, if any, ask the ROK government actually to embark on a nuclear weapons program in the near future. The most forward-leaning of the advocates call for "consideration" of a nuclear weapons program, the acquisition of civil enrichment or reprocessing facilities as a hedging capability that would provide a future option to pursue nuclear weapons, or the return of US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. More restrained ideas include temporarily withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, declaring invalid the North-South denuclearization agreement of 1992, and warning the North Koreans that, unless they agree to abandon their nuclear program, the ROK may embark on its own or the United States may bring back its tactical nuclear weapons. In sum, extensive interviews with prominent South Koreans indicated that, despite recent public statements and polling results, genuine support for ROK acquisition of nuclear weapons remains very limited and confined to a vocal minority with little or no influence over national policy decision-making. In response to recent public comments

supportive of nuclear weapons, ROK officials as well as a broad spectrum of non-governmental South Koreans have reaffirmed their opposition to the nuclear path. When asked about the possibility of the ROK pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, a senior South Korean military official asserted: "For certain, that will not happen." The head of *JoongAng Ilbo's* editorial board, Lee Ha-kyung, maintained that a nuclear weapons program would "throw South Korea into the Stone Age" by undermining its reputation as a champion of nonproliferation, making it impossible to press for North Korean denuclearization, precipitating the departure of US forces, and damaging an economy heavily dependent on international trade. Saenuri Party Chairman Kim Moo-sung, an apparent presidential hopeful, expressed similar views to us, asserting that South Korea would be "slapped with sanctions" and its heavy reliance on nuclear power would end due to a cut-off of foreign nuclear fuel supplies. Senior officials in South Korea's civil nuclear energy establishment emphasized to us the dramatic impact on Seoul's ambitious nuclear energy plans if a decision were made to acquire nuclear weapons: Its plans to boost reliance on nuclear power to generate electricity, to become a major nuclear exporter (and complete its major reactor project in the United Arab Emirates), and to cooperate with foreign partners, including on advanced research and development, "would all go down the drain." One senior civil nuclear energy official supported South Korea's pursuit of a pyroprocessing capability, but only for strictly peaceful purposes, and said he complained when Korean politicians called for acquiring such a dual-use nuclear capability for national security reasons. (Pyroprocessing is a method for processing spent nuclear reactor fuel that South Korean scientists argue is proliferation-resistant and will help solve their looming spent fuel storage crisis. The US government sees pyroprocessing as a potential proliferation risk, but **the new US-South Korea civil nuclear cooperation agreement reached in 2015 contains pathways for Washington to grant permission for pyroprocessing, after a thorough examination of the technology.**) Although some ROK nuclear advocates have held that the United States would acquiesce in South Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons and maintain its forces on the peninsula, former Foreign Minister Song Min-soon argued that the presence of US forces in South Korea was incompatible with Seoul becoming a nuclear power. In our meeting, he noted that, in the cases of Israel and India, the United States has tolerated their nuclear programs but pointed out that the United States does not have formal alliance relations with either of those countries, binding security commitments, or a significant troop presence—all of which are critical to South Korean security but would be terminated by Seoul's acquisition of nuclear arms. While several South Koreans interviewed argued that an ROK nuclear capability was incompatible with existing US-ROK alliance arrangements, a senior government official suggested that it was also incompatible with the goal of reunifying the peninsula, saying, "If we want unification, we have to denuclearize. If we're asked if we want unification or nuclear weapons, we'd undoubtedly want unification." A small business owner and some future leaders of South Korean corporations and conglomerates ("chaebol") expressed to us that a South Korean nuclear weapons program would be very damaging politically and especially economically, maintaining that the chaebols and other large companies are against the nuclear option. They personally questioned the reliability of US security commitments, but felt South Korea had no choice except to rely on the United States for its security. The head of a large conglomerate saw the political utility of nuclear-

weapons rhetoric in persuading China to rein in the North, but was also mindful of Beijing's reaction; he noted that Korean businesspeople are concerned that one comment from China on THAAD can affect the stock market and the Korean economy. The chairman of a small/medium-sized company saw some advantages in the South's possession of nuclear weapons but believed that China and the United States "would not allow" that to happen and claimed that possessing a latent nuclear capability would be a sufficient deterrent. Several of the interviewees gave another reason for not believing Seoul would opt for nuclear weapons: The South Korean public—especially the younger generation, whose main priority is personal financial success—had grown accustomed and even inured to the North Korean threat and would not consider it necessary to counter the threat with an indigenous South Korean nuclear program, especially if it meant sacrificing their comfortable lifestyle. The key to maintaining support in South Korea for its non-nuclear status, especially in the face of an unconstrained North Korean threat, is confidence in the reliability of US security assurances. As long as ROK policymakers and public regard the US nuclear umbrella as effective and dependable, incentives will remain low for seeking an independent nuclear deterrent. Most South Koreans told the authors that they trusted the United States to stand by its commitments to ROK security, at least at the present time. They praised US support for efforts to deter and respond to further provocations from the North; welcomed strong public affirmations of US commitments by President Obama, Defense Secretary Ash Carter, and other senior US officials; acknowledged the deterrent value of recently conducted, large-scale joint military exercises; and, in a number of cases, asserted that the US-ROK alliance has never been stronger. But a significant number of interviewees indicated that they had questions and concerns about the future. Donald Trump came up in almost every conversation. His threat to withdraw US forces if South Korea did not provide adequate compensation for their presence was unnerving and reminded some of President Jimmy Carter's 1976 presidential election campaign pledge, later reversed, to withdraw US ground troops from the peninsula. Even if Trump does not become president, the unexpectedly strong support he received in the Republican primaries has reinforced worries in Seoul that the public mood in the United States is becoming more isolationist. The National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee Chairwoman Na Kyung-won (of the ruling Saenuri Party) expressed to us concern that possible future negotiations with North Korea on a peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice agreement could result in the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. Na also worried that wartime operational control of ROK forces might be transferred from the United States to South Korea without the latter having made sufficient preparations to ensure effective deterrence. She did not believe the case for ROK nuclear weapons was strong but nonetheless maintained that, given these and other uncertainties about the future strategic environment, South Korea's nuclear options should be kept open. The potential vulnerability of US territory to attack by a North Korean nuclear-armed, long-range missile was also on the minds of South Koreans. The concern expressed by some defense analysts, former military officers, and pundits: The United States might be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in response to a North Korean nuclear or massive conventional attack against the South for fear of nuclear retaliation by Pyongyang against the American homeland—in other words that, at a decisive moment, Washington would sacrifice South Korea to protect its own territory. The advent of US

vulnerability could exacerbate a concern in South Korea that the United States is reducing the role of its nuclear weapons, whereas some ROK strategists would like to see nuclear weapons play a key, if not larger, role in Korean Peninsula contingencies. One veteran journalist—*JoongAng Ilbo* editor-at-large Kim Young-hie—estimated that North Korea might be three to five years away from having the capability to strike the United States with nuclear-tipped missiles. He warned that, unless the United States and the ROK used this “grace period” to reinforce their combined deterrent capability, support for an independent ROK nuclear capability would increase. Several South Koreans interviewed did not believe North Korea’s ability to reach the United States with nuclear weapons would necessarily be a game changer. A former ROK military commander and Chairwoman Na both expressed confidence that Washington would honor its commitments despite the vulnerability of its territory. They acknowledged that, during the Cold War, America’s NATO allies found the U.S. nuclear umbrella credible even though US territory was vulnerable to nuclear attack from the Soviet Union, whose nuclear arsenal was many times more powerful than that of North Korea. Still, they believed that, to ensure the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella in the face of further advances in North Korea’s strategic capabilities, it was essential to continue working to strengthen the extended deterrent. For many South Koreans, there is no contradiction between having full confidence in US willingness to meet its alliance commitments and, at the same time, believing that the US extended deterrent could and should be strengthened. Time and again, South Koreans told the authors they did not doubt US assurances but, when pressed, expressed the view that there was room for improvement in the extended deterrent. A former senior military commander told us he was “100 percent confident” in the alliance but felt that the Korean public did not share his view and that further efforts needed to be made to reassure it. A senior government official also explained that there were suspicions and doubts in South Korea about whether the current “tools of deterrence” were sufficient, but stressed that that did not mean there were doubts about the alliance. In our interviews, ROK policy-makers and well-informed non-governmental observers, not just the general South Korean public, saw highly visible indicators of US support as critical. Sending B-52 bombers from Guam to fly over South Korea just days after Pyongyang’s January nuclear test was intended as much to show solidarity with South Koreans as to deter the North Korean regime. Similarly, a retired military commander told us that the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises in March-April 2016—the largest joint exercises since 2010, featuring more than 15,000 US personnel—were tangible demonstrations of allied commitment. And although the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system—which both countries announced in July—is controversial in South Korea, particularly in light of Chinese efforts to derail it, THAAD is also intended to reassure South Koreans of US determination to provide protection against the North. In the view of South Koreans we interviewed, such highly-publicized actions—together with strong declarations of support by the American president and US military commanders, frequent visits by senior-level US officials, and other gestures and symbols of commitment—can go a long way toward convincing America’s vital East Asian ally that it can count on the United States. A vocal minority believes that the return of US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula could be another tangible, high-profile form of reassurance. This camp maintains that the reintroduction of tactical nukes would send a powerful deterrent message to the North, demonstrate

a strong commitment to the South, and provide a bargaining chip to achieve denuclearization of the peninsula. One expert asserted that South Korean interest in redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons should be regarded as an indication that South Koreans are comfortable continuing to rely on the US nuclear umbrella and that they do not want to develop their own nuclear weapons. In addition to public demonstrations of support, the United States needs to offer reassurance at the more discreet level of interactions between the US and ROK policy-making and strategic communities. Many of those interactions now take place in the bilateral Defense Strategic Committee (DSC)—an official, expert-level consultative body that operates under the ministerial-level Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) led by South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense and the US Defense Department. South Koreans familiar with the proceedings of these bilateral exchanges told us that these detailed and highly professional interactions have come a long way in a short period of time, helping to build a better common understanding of extended-deterrence issues. South Korean experts and policymakers clearly place a high value on the opportunity to discuss sensitive security matters with their American counterparts. But several whom we interviewed did not hide their belief that, at least so far, the United States has not been forthcoming enough in sharing information about US nuclear plans or in providing the ROK a meaningful role in operationalizing the extended deterrent. One well-connected analyst, Asan Institute for Policy Studies vice president Choi Kang, claimed that the United States is often unresponsive to ROK requests for information about US deterrence planning and operations. He said the overall US approach to South Korea on such matters is, “Don’t worry, trust us, we’ll protect you.” According to him, South Koreans are concerned that a US preference in certain circumstances to respond to a North Korean nuclear attack with conventional means, like precision-guided munitions, may reflect a US reluctance to use nuclear weapons in defense of South Korea. He also held that South Korea wanted US-ROK collaboration on extended deterrence to emulate the very close cooperation assumed to take place in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, where US non-nuclear weapon state allies are involved in planning for the use of US nuclear weapons. But he stated that the United States had rejected the use of the NATO model for South Korea. The authors heard similar views at a meeting with a group of strategic analysts at a defense-oriented research institute. Their biggest complaint was that the United States did not share enough information in the Defense Strategic Committee process, including information on plans for redeploying US strategic assets to South Korea in a crisis or plans for using nuclear weapons. They also expressed an interest not just in getting briefed on US nuclear plans, but also in participating in the development of joint operational plans, which, among other things, could include ROK input into the selection of targets. The experts said the US response to South Korean requests for a greater say in US nuclear operations was that the American president has exclusive authority over the use of US nuclear weapons—they are “the president’s nuclear weapons,” they were told—and this authority could not be shared. The analysts expressed concerns about the potential future “de-coupling” of the US deterrent—the idea that, if and when US territory becomes vulnerable to North Korean nuclear attack, Washington would become reluctant to come to the defense of South Korea. Therefore, although they did not support an indigenous ROK nuclear weapons capability, they favored consideration of steps to reinforce the US extended deterrent. Those reinforcements could include

stationing US nuclear-capable aircraft in South Korea and planning to bring U.S. nuclear weapons to the peninsula in a crisis—or perhaps even stationing US nuclear weapons there permanently. It is natural that mid-level experts who specialize in deterrence issues would identify potential deficiencies in current arrangements and favor measures to shore up and enhance deterrence. But the authors found that the experts' concerns and some of their remedies were shared by senior military officers, both active duty officers and former commanders, although their reservations were often expressed in a more guarded and nuanced manner. While praising the work of the bilateral consultative process, one retired military commander told us the process had not kept pace with advances in North Korean strategic programs. A senior South Korean administration official close to these issues also said he recognized there are secrets the United States cannot disclose, but he nonetheless felt transparency could be greater, noting that Washington had yet to provide a briefing on operational plans. A retired senior military officer maintained that those who are aware of the details of the extended-deterrence dialogue feel secure, but that many South Koreans “need more proof that the US will be there for us.” Several Americans currently or formerly involved in bilateral extended-deterrence consultations confirmed that, in the Defense Strategic Committee and in semi-official discussions on the margins of DSC meetings, South Korea has persistently called for more information about US plans and a greater role in the planning process. The South Koreans, according to the Americans, have “pressed the envelope,” seeking the joint development of detailed operational plans for responding to a wide range of contingencies. An American official involved in the DSC process told us that the United States already engages in more detailed discussions with the ROK regarding the US nuclear umbrella than with any other ally. Acknowledging that the South Koreans have called for a joint planning mechanism along the lines of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, another American official said that US DSC participants have explained to their South Korean counterparts that Seoul has an inflated view of what takes place in the NATO planning body, but the Koreans seem to doubt such explanations and continue to raise the issue of a bilateral planning mechanism. Current and former US officials acknowledge that their ROK counterparts have not been fully satisfied with bilateral consultations on extended deterrence, but believe that some of their frustration is unavoidable. While South Koreans may want joint decisions on “what to strike, when to strike, and how to strike” targets in the North, the American officials point out what they have often told the Koreans—that the authority to employ “the president’s nuclear weapons” cannot be shared. And while Seoul may seek agreed contingency responses to a wide range of conceivable North Korean provocations, Washington is reluctant to limit its flexibility to tailor its responses to the particular circumstances of each case. Despite certain limitations on what can be done jointly and somewhat differing approaches toward planning, the bilateral consultative process has been fairly successful in providing South Korean policymakers and experts a greater window into the operation of the US nuclear umbrella and a greater voice in shaping the US-ROK combined deterrent. Given their dependent position and the huge stakes involved, it is inevitable and understandable that South Koreans will always push for more—more transparency, more participation in planning, more control over the factors affecting their vital security interests. But notwithstanding ROK interest, especially at the expert level, in further strengthening the components of deterrence, the prevailing view among South Koreans, at least for the time being, is



that they can continue to rely on security assurances provided by their major ally. The wide-ranging interviews we conducted tended to confirm the view that recent public expressions of support for reconsidering ROK nuclear options do not reflect a strong South Korean interest in actually pursuing nuclear weapons. Indeed, despite deep concerns triggered by North Korea's apparent determination to move forward with its nuclear and missile programs, the vast majority of South Koreans appear to remain committed to a policy of nuclear forbearance. Two interrelated factors will be the key determinants of whether South Korea will remain on its non-nuclear course. The first is North Korea. If Pyongyang's strategic programs can be reversed or significantly contained, the possibility that Seoul will opt for nuclear weapons will become even more remote. But if the North's programs continue to advance, and especially if they are accompanied by belligerent North Korean behavior, support for an independent ROK nuclear weapons capability will grow. Therefore, to reduce incentives for America's East Asian allies to pursue nuclear weapons, to diminish the likelihood that other countries will seek to follow North Korea's nuclear playbook, and to reverse the North's threat to the security of the United States and its allies, the next US administration will need to make North Korea one of its principal national security preoccupations. The second factor is confidence by South Korean policymakers and public in the reliability and effectiveness of US security assurances. Today, that confidence is relatively high, particularly among ROK elites. But many South Koreans, including those who do not now doubt US dependability, have questions about the future. They are concerned about uncertainties in the strategic landscape—whether the American public will remain fully committed to the alliance, whether possible peace negotiations with North Korea or impending changes in alliance command arrangements will weaken deterrence, and whether the possible future vulnerability of US territory to a North Korean nuclear attack will reduce American readiness to come to South Korea's defense. Given these uncertainties, even some South Koreans who currently oppose an indigenous nuclear weapons program believe it is only prudent to keep their country's future nuclear options open. If authorities in Washington and Seoul want to keep incentives and pressures for an ROK nuclear weapons capability low, they will have to give high priority to reassuring South Koreans that they can count on the US extended deterrent. That will require frequent and highly visible demonstrations of commitment, including high-level statements of support by American officials, joint exercises to show collective resolve, and tangible indications—such as B-52 and B-2 flyovers—that US strategic assets remain at the disposal of the alliance. Reassurance will also require addressing concerns raised by South Korea's strategic community about the sharing of information and the role of the ROK in extended deterrence. In the past, most South Koreans were content to leave the job of nuclear deterrence to the United States. For a growing number, especially within the strategic community, that is no longer the case. Fearful of abandonment by the major powers and chafing at continued dependence on the United States, an increasing number of South Koreans would like to see their country playing a more assertive, independent role, and this is reflected in efforts by South Korean experts and policymakers to make the ROK a more co-equal partner in deterring North Korean aggression. Especially if North Korean strategic capabilities continue to advance, South Koreans will push harder for that more prominent role. While there have been good reasons for resisting some South Korean requests for more information-sharing and

greater participation in nuclear decision-making, it will be important in the future for the United States to find ways of accommodating ROK interest in making a more substantial contribution to their combined deterrence, while at the same time preserving the US president's nuclear prerogatives and flexibility to adapt to a wide range of contingencies. The allies will need to consult closely on such critical deterrence issues as where to deploy, and how and when to re-deploy, US strategic assets, including nuclear-capable aircraft and even nuclear weapons. While ultimately such decisions will be made by the United States, it is essential that they fully take into account ROK perspectives on how best to ensure an effective deterrent. There will naturally be resistance in Washington to giving South Korea a more influential role on key deterrence questions. But if the choice is between accepting such a role and watching as South Korean support builds for an independent nuclear weapons capability, it should be clear which is the better course. As a vibrant democracy, South Korea should and inevitably will have a dynamic debate on its future nuclear options and on how those options affect its number one national security concern. There will always be proponents of acquiring nuclear weapons in South Korea. The international community should not, however, overreact to these voices. They remain a distinct minority. Decision-makers and the permanent bureaucracy, as well as most South Koreans outside government, are well aware of the adverse consequences of going nuclear. But the South Korean public could wind up strongly resenting constant warnings of such consequences from the outside, particularly if offered by American officials; such repeated warnings could be seen as attempts to exert pressure and constrain the ROK's choices. In any event, the warnings are probably unnecessary. Left to their own devices, South Koreans are unlikely to opt for nuclear weapons. But Seoul's continued nuclear abstinence cannot be taken for granted. To keep the probability of a nuclear-armed ROK low, the United States will have to make curbing North Korea's strategic programs and reassuring its ally about the reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear umbrella key components of US policy in the years ahead. (Robert Einhorn and Duyeon Kim, "Will South Korea Go Nuclear?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August 15, 2016)

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North Korea says it has resumed plutonium production from spent fuel rods and has no plans to stop nuclear tests as long as the United States still "threatens" Pyongyang, Kyodo reported August 16. The North's Atomic Energy Institute, which has jurisdiction over the country's main atomic complex Yongbyon, told Kyodo it had been producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear arms and power "as scheduled". "We have reprocessed spent nuclear fuel rods removed from a graphite-moderated reactor," the agency said in a written interview with Kyodo. The agency did not disclose how much plutonium or enriched uranium the North has produced, Kyodo said. The type of plutonium suitable for a nuclear bomb typically needs to be extracted from spent nuclear reactor fuel. In June, the UN's atomic watchdog warned that North Korea could have reactivated the Yongbyon plant for reprocessing plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, following similar warnings from a US think tank. The director of US National Intelligence, James Clapper, warned in February that the North could begin recovering plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel "within a matter of weeks to months." North Korea mothballed the Yongbyon reactor in 2007 under an aid-for-disarmament accord, but began renovating it after its third nuclear

test in 2013. It carried test out a fourth on January 6. The North's Atomic Energy Institute did not rule out the possibility of further nuclear tests, claiming it had had success in "minimizing, making lighter and diversifying" nuclear weapons, Kyodo said. "Under conditions that the United States constantly threatens us with nuclear weapons, we will not discontinue nuclear tests," the institute said, according to Kyodo. (AFP, "Kyodo: N. Korea Says It Has Resumed Plutonium Production," August 16, 2016)

8/17/16

South Korea, Japan and the United States are making good on their threat to try to further isolate North Korea from the international community as punishment for its nuclear and missile tests. The three countries singled out Singapore, Kuwait, Angola and Malta, which all have close ties to North Korea, to cooperate and impose new sanctions to undermine Pyongyang's ability to earn foreign currency, sources said. The measures are in addition to steps already taken by the U.N. Security Council, the sources said, adding that each country was approached individually at South Korea's suggestion. According to separate sources, Tokyo, Washington and Seoul also intend to lobby other countries to take a tougher stand as North Korea has ignored warnings to desist from further provocative actions. They had already decided that approaching China and Russia would not be enough. Beijing and Moscow have a number of reasons for being cautious about expanded sanctions. Although scores of countries have endorsed sanctions adopted by the Security Council, many have yet to implement them properly and this has created numerous loopholes. To date, only 42 countries have reported to the world body on the status on their sanctions, according to the South Korean government. In February, the Japanese Cabinet approved a ban on port calls by North Korean vessels as well as those that stopped in North Korea. It also banned financial transfers beyond 100,000 yen (\$1,000) except on humanitarian grounds and froze the assets of one organization and those of 10 individuals involved in the reclusive country's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. South Korea's sanctions include a freeze of assets and a ban on financial transactions for individuals and organizations assisting North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction. South Korea moved swiftly in spring to urge Uganda to stop its military cooperation with North Korea. Of the four countries, Singapore has served as the base of Pyongyang's economic activities in Southeast Asia. North Korea maintains a number of accounts in financial institutions there. South Korean government officials estimate that North Korea's foreign exchange transactions in Singapore total between \$30 million and \$40 million during peak periods. A variety of financial transactions are covered under the Security Council's sanctions against North Korea. However, deciding which deals could benefit Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs is left to each nation, raising doubts about the effectiveness of the measures. Singapore has indicated to the United Nations that it will remove North Korea from its list of nations with visa exemptions. With regard to Kuwait, Australia joined Japan, South Korea and the United States in suggesting that its foreign ministry stop issuing work visas for North Koreans in the oil-producing country, where thousands of North Koreans work. The four countries referred to the possible exploitation of North Korean workers there and suggested that many might turn to crime to survive. They also noted that employment conditions for North Korean laborers do not meet the standards set by the United Nations and the International Labor Organization. Malta is a gateway to

Europe and Africa for migrant workers, an area that is not covered by the Security Council sanctions. Angola has maintained tight military ties with North Korea since the days of the late Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea who died in 1994. Military drills in Angola are believed to be led by North Korean personnel. (Makino Yohihiro, "Japan, S. Korea, U.S. Gang up on N. Korea over Its Weapons Test," *Asahi Shimbun*, August 17, 2016)

Thae Yong Ho, minister at the North Korean Embassy in London, has arrived in South Korea with his family and is under the protection of the South Korean government, Seoul's Unification Ministry said. Ministry spokesman Jeong Joon-Hee said Thae told South Korean officials that he decided to defect because of his disgust with the government of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, his yearning for South Korean democracy and worries about the future of his children. Jeong said Thae was the second-highest official in North Korea's embassy, and is the most senior North Korean diplomat to defect to South Korea. In 1997, the North Korean ambassador to Egypt fled but resettled in the United States. (Hyung-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, "S. Korea: Senior N. Korean Diplomats Based in London Defects, Associate Press, August 17, 2016) A North Korean diplomat stationed in Britain left his post to seek asylum in another country earlier this month along with his wife and child, the latest in a series of defections by senior North Korean officials.

According to a source with in-depth knowledge of North Korea on Monday, the diplomat embarked on a defection journey "following a scrupulous plan" and was in the process of "landing in a third country as an asylum seeker." In matters of defection, "third country" signifies a country that is neither North nor South Korea. "The North Korean Embassy in Britain tried to find him, but it is said that it has failed," said the source. Earlier this year, the media reported the defections of a North Korean party official and his family from a job in Russia. According to the source, that official was escaping growing pressure to find extra sources of foreign currency to be transferred to Pyongyang. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was reportedly incensed upon being told of defections of high-class North Koreans, another source said. "Upset by such reports, Kim ordered diplomats' families return to Pyongyang (so that officials would not think of defection)," said the source. An 18-year-old math whiz sought refuge at the South Korean Consulate General in Hong Kong after participating in the 57th International Mathematical Olympiad last month. The boy, identified as Ri Jong-yol, won three silver medals at the annual math contest: at the 2014 contest in Cape Town, South Africa, at last year's in Chiang Mai, Thailand, and in Hong Kong last month. Those experiences gave him glimpses of the world outside North Korea. North Korea has been mum on Ri's defection. It is not uncommon for privileged North Koreans to seek refugee status in a third country rather than defecting to South Korea. Ko Yong-suk, the maternal aunt of Kim Jong-un, sought asylum in the U.S. and now lives there with her husband and two children. Song Hye-rang, the older sister of Song Hye-rim, former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's second wife, sought asylum in France along with his daughter and son-in-law. They are said to have settled there. "For those coming from the highest circle of power, they prefer Western countries for their rigorous protection programs, as they could be targeted by Pyongyang," said a government official. Along with the defections by high-class officials, the number of defections of average North Koreans is also on the rise after years of decline. In 2011, a

total of 2,706 North Koreans defected to the South. The number took a dive the following year to 1,502 after North Korea tightened surveillance at the border with China. Over the past four years, the yearly number of defectors hovered around the 1,500 mark as a result. In 2015, less than 1,300 North Koreans defected to the South. But as of late July, 815 North Koreans made it to South Korea in 2016, a 15.6 percentage increase compared to the same period last year. (Lee Young-jong and Kang Jin-kyu, "N. Korean Envoy in U.K. Defects with Wife," *JoongAng Ilbo*, August 17, 2016) A Britain-based senior North Korean diplomat directly flew to South Korea after expressing his wish to defect to the Seoul government, a source said August 19. Thae Yong-ho, who served as a minister at North Korea's embassy in London, and his family arrived in South Korea late last month without going through a third country, according to the source familiar with the matter. "Thae is believed to have expressed his intent to defect to South Korea" in early or mid-July, the source said. "He is known to have directly flown to Seoul from London." A diplomatic source suggested that Britain provided assistance to South Korea in bringing Thae to Seoul, saying that a host country provides assistance to the relevant country if an asylum seeker's free will is verified. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Diplomat Directly Flew into S. Korea for Defection: Source," August 19, 2016)

8/19/16

North Korea appeared to resume activities this year aimed at producing plutonium, which can be used in the core of an atomic bomb, the International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed, though it added that signs of those activities stopped last month. "From the first quarter of 2016, there were multiple indications consistent with the radiochemical laboratory's operation," IAEA chief Yukiya Amano said in a report to the agency's annual General Conference, referring to a site used to reprocess plutonium. "Such indications ceased in early July 2016," Amano said in the report posted online and dated today. Those indications included deliveries of chemical tanks and the operation of a steam plant linked to the lab, the report said. There were signs the reactor had been running in the past year, with a pause between October and December, probably to refill it with enough fuel for the next two years, according to the report dated today. Amano said in June that the agency had seen signs of reprocessing, the production of plutonium from spent reactor fuel, at Yongbyon. "There were indications consistent with the use of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility," Amano's report to the General Conference, which will be held at the end of September, said, adding that construction work had been carried out around the building that houses the facility. "There were new construction and refurbishment activities on the (Yongbyon) site, which are broadly consistent with (North Korea's) statement that all the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon have been 'rearranged, changed or readjusted'," it added. (Francois Murphy, "North Korea Appears to resume Plutonium Production, UN Says," Reuters, August 22, 2016)

IAEA: "14. The Yongbyon Site. Since the Director General's previous report, the Agency has continued to monitor, including through satellite imagery, developments at the Yongbyon site. The details of these developments are set out in paras 15-19 below. 15. Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5 MW(e)). **For most of the reporting period there were indications consistent with the reactor's operation,** including steam discharges and the outflow of cooling water. However, between mid-

October and early December 2015 there were no such indications. This period is sufficient for the reactor to have been de-fueled and subsequently re-fueled. Based on past operational cycles, a new cycle commencing in early December 2015 can be expected to last about two years. 16. Radiochemical Laboratory. From the first quarter of 2016, there were **multiple indications consistent with the Radiochemical Laboratory's operation, including deliveries of chemical tanks and the operation of the associated steam plant. Such indications ceased in early July 2016.** In previous reprocessing campaigns, the Radiochemical Laboratory's operation involved the use of the spent fuel discharged from the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5 MW(e)). 17. Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant. There were **indications consistent with the use of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility located within the plant.** Additional construction work around the building that houses this reported facility has been ongoing. 18. Light Water Reactor (LWR) under construction. The construction of what appears to be an electrical switchyard adjacent to the LWR was completed in December 2015. **The Agency has not observed indications of the delivery or introduction of major reactor components into the reactor containment building.** 19. Other locations within the site. There were new construction and refurbishment activities on the site, which are broadly consistent with the DPRK's statement that all the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon have been "rearranged, changed or readjusted." 20. The Pyongsan Mine and Concentration Plant. Since the Director General's previous report, the Agency has also continued to monitor, including through satellite imagery, developments at Pyongsan. There were **indications of ongoing mining, milling and concentration activities at locations previously declared as the Pyongsan uranium mine and the Pyongsan uranium concentration plant.**" (IAEA, Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, *Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, August 19, 2016)

ISIS: "It is significant that the IAEA writes that North Korea could have unloaded the fuel from the 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor late last year and processed it to separate plutonium in the Radiochemical Laboratory during the first half of this year. In this case, we have estimated that North Korea could have produced and separated an additional 5.5-8 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium. This amount of plutonium is enough for two to four nuclear weapons, assuming 2-4 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium per weapon, or a central estimate of 3 additional nuclear weapons based on plutonium. ...In total, including weapon-grade uranium as well, we estimate North Korea has about 13-21 nuclear weapons as of this summer. This estimate does not include the effect of additional weapon-grade uranium production during the last 18 months that could have occurred at a second enrichment plant outside Yongbyon. If this second plant was included, the upper bound of 21 would increase by a few nuclear weapons." (David Albright, "Latest IAEA Safeguards Report on North Korea," Institute for Science and International Security, August 22, 2016)

8/21/16

North Korea blasted the largest ever artillery drill conducted by South Korea's military as a grave provocation that is endangering regional peace. Uriminzokkiri, North Korea's main Internet-based media and propaganda Web site, said the exercise carried out along the demilitarized zone that separates the two countries on Thursday is an unacceptable challenge to the DPRK and showed that the war monger in Seoul will only respond to merciless force. Seoul conducted the drill involving 49 artillery

battalions and 300 guns as a show of force to mark the first anniversary of a brief artillery engagement with North Korea on Aug. 20, 2015. The exchange of fire was the result of heightened tensions sparked by the land mine attack carried out by the North that gravely injured two South Korean soldiers. Last week's exercise aimed to demonstrate Seoul's determination to firmly counter Pyongyang's military provocations. (*Korea Herald*, "North Korea Blasts Largest-Ever South Korean Artillery Drill as Provocation," August 21, 2016)

North Korean diplomats who had managed leader Kim Jong-un's secret overseas funds have escaped the country with his money, sources here said. Rumors are circulating that Thae Yong-ho, North Korea's deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom, brought \$58 million cash belonging to Kim when he recently defected to South Korea with his family members. The South Korean government denied the rumors, but some analysts here say Thae was one of the diplomats who managed Kim's secret money. The sources said many of the diplomats worked in Europe, where "a large chunk" of foreign currency has been generated for the cash-strapped Kim regime to pursue its nuclear program. In June, a senior official at Office 39, a shadow organization which directly reports to Kim concerning the use of his money, disappeared with his children after working in Europe for the past 20 years. The official, whom some South Korean media outlets identified as Kim Myong-chol, was in charge of overseeing the young despot's European slush funds. He allegedly took up to \$400 million from a hidden bank account. It remains uncertain whether he withdrew the amount in cash or transferred it to a bank account under his name. In addition, a senior official at Daesung Bank, an auspice of Office 39, fled from his office in China last year after stealing a large sum of Kim's money. In Singapore, an official responsible for handling 10 billion won of Kim's funds has been missing since 2015. In August 2014, Yoon Tae-hyung, then-chief of Daesung Bank's Russia branch, carried \$5 million with him before seeking asylum in a third country. "I'd say Kim's secret funds are worth hundreds of billions of won, and in that regards, the combined amount that the North Korean officials stole is considerable," said An Chan-il, a defector and researcher who heads the World Institute for North Korea Studies. "In particular, \$400 million taken by Kim Myong-chol is expected to deal a blow to Pyongyang because the money was believed to be from Swiss bank accounts." He speculated that North Korea used to keep the money collected from European and African countries in the accounts and transfer it back home until the Swiss government froze all North Korea-related bank accounts there in June. The measure was taken in line with the U.N. Security Council's (UNSC) harshest sanctions imposed against Pyongyang in March, aimed at cutting the flow of hard currency into North Korea. The experts said more overseas North Korean elites are likely to flee, claiming that it will become harder for them to raise the slush funds under the UNSC sanctions. "The overseas officials are afraid of being punished for failing to fulfill their jobs, and the only option they're left with to avoid punishment will be to seek asylum," said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies. Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean Studies at Dongguk University, speculated that cases of stealing money from Kim's slush funds are likely to increase in the future. "International surveillance over banking transactions with North Korea is becoming tighter, and it means Kim's 'money men' will carry his funds in cash," said Kim. "And it will be easier for them to take money when they decide to flee their

country." Yang said the Kim regime may enhance control over its officials posted abroad. "The North Korean authorities may bolster surveillance over those in Pyongyang's diplomatic missions by prohibiting them from taking their family members with them," he said. (Yi Whan-woo, "N. Korea's Secret Funds Coming to Light," *Korea Times*, August 21, 2016)

Nutrition and public health among North Koreans have improved substantially since the severe famine and economic woes of the 1990s, a new study shows. But three out of ten North Koreans were found to still suffer from malnutrition. The findings were part of "Nutrition and Health in North Korea: What's New, What's Changed and Why It Matters," a paper by Hazel Smith, a professor at the University of Central Lancashire in the United Kingdom, published by the Korea Development Institute in the August 18 edition of its KDI Review of the North Korean Economy.

In the paper, Smith notes that the North Korean food rationing system collapsed and international aid decreased in the mid-1990s, but that the public health situation has improved since then, with a lower level of nutritional disorders than in other low-income countries. Smith used data from the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and World Bank to analyze nutritional conditions among North Koreans during the '10s. According to the findings, chronic and acute malnutrition fell to less than half their '90s levels: as of 1998, 62.3% of North Koreans suffered from chronic malnutrition, while the percentage in 2012 stood at 27.9%. A large decline was also observed in acute malnutrition, from 60.6% in 1998 to 4% in 2012. "The accumulated survey findings show a profound nutritional crisis in the 1990s," Smith notes, adding, "From the late 1990s onwards, however, rates of chronic and acute malnutrition fell to the point where . . . a humanitarian food and health emergency no longer existed." Smith also reported various indicators as showing stable public health conditions, including infant and maternal mortality rates; incidence of vaccine-preventable diseases such as Japanese encephalitis, measles, and whooping cough; and death rates from malaria and tuberculosis. Life expectancy for North Koreans was calculated at 70 years in 2013 - roughly equivalent to the world average of 71 years the same year. According to Smith, nutrition and health conditions for North Koreans were not much different from those in other low-income and developing countries. Smith also noted that North Korea have achieved success in reducing vaccine preventable diseases and malaria. (Noh Hyun-woong, "Study: Since Famine of Mid-90s Public Health Much Improved in North Korea," *Hankyore*, August 21, 2016)

8/22/16

South Korea and the United States began their annual joint exercise Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG), prompting North Korea to threaten to launch a nuclear attack. The General Staff of the KPA warned that South Korea and the U.S. "should bear in mind that if they show the slightest sign of aggression on the DPRK's inviolable land, seas and air ..., it would turn the stronghold of provocation into a heap of ashes through a Korean-style preemptive nuclear strike." According to the allies' Combined Forces Command (CFC), the computer-assisted drill will run until September 2, with 75,000 troops mobilized, including 25,000 from the U.S. The United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) informed North Korea's Korean People's Army (KPA) through its Panmunjom mission of the exercise dates and the non-provocative nature of the training, the CFC noted. "UFG is designed to enhance alliance readiness, protect the region and maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula,"



the CFC said in a release. "Approximately 25,000 U.S. service members will participate in the exercise, with about 2,500 coming from outside the peninsula." For this year's exercise, nine member countries of the United Nations Command based in South Korea will join the computerized military exercise, the CFC said, noting that they are from Australia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Italy, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission observers will also participate in the drill to monitor the exercise to ensure it is in compliance with the armistice agreement between the two Koreas, the CFC said. "Training exercises like UFG are carried out in the spirit of the October 1, 1953, ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and in accordance with the armistice," the CFC said. "These exercises also highlight the longstanding military partnership, commitment and enduring friendship between the two nations, help to ensure peace and security on the peninsula, and reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the alliance." The CFC refused to disclose details about scenarios for the exercise, but observers say the drill may be aimed at striking missile and nuclear facilities in the North in response to the repressive state's continuous provocations. Seoul officials are paying keen attention to the possibility that Pyongyang would carry out military provocations during or after the exercise, which closely followed the government's confirmation of a London-based senior North Korean diplomat's defection to the South. Meanwhile, the ROK Air Force has been carrying out a war simulation exercise involving some 60 military aircraft including F-15Ks, KF-16s, FA-50 and C-130 transport planes as well as 530 troops. "The Soaring Eagle exercise was begun on Aug. 19 and will run until Aug. 26," the Air Force said in a release, today. During the drill, the Air Force is exercising to preemptively remove the North's ballistic missile threats by proactively blocking the missiles and their supply route, the Air Force said. (Jun Ji-hye, "Allies Begin Drill amid N. Korean Threats," *Korea Times*, August 22, 2016) 10/2/16

On October 27, a US military spokesperson confirmed: "Troops of South Korean Air Force's combat control team, an infiltration commando unit, and the US Air Force's 353rd Special Operations Group staged a joint exercise at Gunsan Air Base recently." "The latest Teak Knife exercise focused on infiltrating an inland area in the North to destroy key facilities." Part of the operation saw military transport aircraft practicing flying low - something that has been done since the 1990s to test infiltrating North Korea. These aircraft are apparently used to transport special forces who are on a mission to destroy Kim Jong-un's missiles and nuclear weapons. According to a South Korean news network, the 353rd Special Operations Group, which is based at the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, completes missions to send commandos into the closed country. The military spokesperson added: "The latest Teak Knife exercise focused on infiltrating an inland area in the North to destroy key facilities. "It's different from a decapitation strike operation targeting the North Korean leadership." (Rachel O'Donoghue, "Special Forces Sneak into North Korea to Destroy North Korean Missiles," [?] *Daily Star* (UK), October 30, 2016)

KPA General Staff spokesman's statement: "The U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces started the largest-ever joint military drill Ulji Freedom Guardian on August 22. The drill which will last till early in September is aimed to acquire the capability for making a surprise preemptive nuclear attack on the DPRK by "combined forces" in contingency on the Korean peninsula and carry out multi-phased scenario

for invading the DPRK. ...The saber-rattling is a clear manifestation of a vicious plot to deprive the service personnel and people of the DPRK of their cradle by force of arms and inflict a miserable fate of colonial slavery upon them. The situation on the Korean peninsula is so tense that a nuclear war may break out any moment. ...In view of the prevailing grave situation the KPA General Staff solemnly declares upon authorization the following principled stand of the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK to cope with the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces' reckless moves for a nuclear war against it that have gone beyond the danger line: **They should properly know that from this moment the first-strike combined units of the KPA keep themselves fully ready to mount a preemptive retaliatory strike at all enemy attack groups involved in Ulji Freedom Guardian.** The nuclear warmongers should bear in mind that **if they show the slightest sign of aggression on the inviolable land, seas and air where the sovereignty of the DPRK is exercised, it would turn the stronghold of provocation into a heap of ashes through Korean-style preemptive nuclear strike.** The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will hold their bayonets more tightly to annihilate the enemies in the future, too, in order to put a definite end to the nuclear war moves of the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces. It is the resolute determination and will of the Paektusan revolutionary armed forces to terminate the ever more reckless moves of the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces for a nuclear war not temporarily but indefinitely. We once again declare that the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK with remarkably increased capability for mounting a preemptive nuclear attack of Korean style are waiting for a historic chance to blow up all strongholds of aggression and war and liberate the southern half of Korea. The nuclear warmongers should not forget the iron will of the KPA even a moment." (KCNA, "Spokesman for KPA General Staff Clarifies Principled Stand on Nuclear War Drill against DPRK," August 22, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement: "The U.S. is again bringing the grave danger of a nuclear war to the Korean peninsula. On August 22 it started Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military drill targeting the DPRK with many forces deployed in south Korean, Japanese and other overseas bases, south Korean puppet forces and huge war means involved. The large-scale joint military drill for aggression being staged by the U.S. in collusion with the south Korean puppet forces despite repeated warnings of the DPRK is a grave military provocation aimed to launch a preemptive nuclear attack on the DPRK from A to Z and a challenge to regional peace and stability. The military drill is an unpardonable criminal act of pushing the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of a war as the situation there has become unprecedentedly instable due to the U.S. introduction of nuclear strategic bombers, THAAD and other strategic assets into the peninsula and its vicinity. The U.S. is creating an evil cycle of tensions while ceaselessly staging offensive joint military exercises for aggression and bolstering up armed forces. Lurking behind this is a scenario to create again the same most extreme situation as that in August last year at any cost and thus introduce more strategic assets into south Korea under this pretext, justify the formation of the U.S.-Japan-south Korea triangular military alliance and maintain military hegemony in this region. Detente, peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region would not be unthinkable unless the U.S.-south Korea joint military exercises for aggression are totally halted. We have chosen the way of building nuclear force to protect our state

and social system from the U.S. constant nuclear threat and taken hold on the strategic line for bolstering up nuclear force. It is the consistent stand of the DPRK government to fundamentally terminate the danger of a nuclear war posed by the U.S. by dint of the powerful nuclear deterrence and defend the regional and global peace. The U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK and nuclear threats including ceaseless war exercises for aggression are bound to meet the resolute and merciless counteraction by the army and people of the DPRK." (KCNA, "DPRK FM Spokesman Lashes at Ulji Freedom Guardian," August 22, 2016)

President Park Geun-hye warned of possible North Korean provocations, saying that the recent defection of North Korean elites, including a top-level diplomat, is an indication of cracks in the North's dictatorial governing structure. "As the North Korean regime has been repressing its people with its continued reign of terror while ignoring the livelihoods of its citizens, even the loyalty of North Korea's elites has begun to crumble," Park said during a National Security Council (NSC) session, which was held as the annual South Korea-U.S. military drills kicked off its two-week run. "As signs of serious cracks emerge, the likelihood of unrest in the regime is increasing," she added. Park also stressed that to prevent internal unrest and further defections by North Koreans as well as create confusion in South Korean society, the North could undertake various types of provocations or terrorist acts, including those in cyberspace. "Given that the possibility of North Korean provocations is higher than ever before, and North Korea's nuclear and missile threats are direct and real ones, our drills must be like real (battle operations)," Park said, referring to the Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise, an annual war game jointly carried out by South Korean and U.S. troops across the nation. Following the NSC meeting, Park chaired a Cabinet meeting. Calling for national unity in overcoming security challenges, the president noted that Pyongyang is moving on an "extremist path" that aims to keep South Korea on edge. "I call on Cabinet members to accurately grasp the crisis situation and sternly respond to acts that foment internal division and conflict," she said during the Cabinet meeting. Park, in addition, underscored that based on a robust defense posture, the South should make the North "clearly realize that it would self-destruct should it refuse to change tack" and move towards denuclearization. Meanwhile, experts here were divided over the question of whether the recent defection of North Korean elites indicates any weakening of the dictatorial ruler's control over the top echelons in the reclusive state. "Even though it (Thae's defection) would not portend the demise of the North Korean regime, it clearly presages a division in the regime," said Kim Yeoul-soo, an international politics professor at Sungshin Women's University. Chang Yong-seok, a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies affiliated with Seoul National University, said that the North's internal situation still makes it difficult for the elites to do anything collectively to hurt the regime, although overseas North Koreans may more easily opt to defect and seek a new life elsewhere. "We may be able to raise the possibility of cracks or divisions in the North's regime when the elites living there consider seeking asylum in foreign countries as realistic options," he said. Some observers said that Park's mention of "serious cracks" in the North Korean regime might imply her recognition of the possibility that "regime change" in Pyongyang could occur. Park's latest remarks came amid growing speculation that Seoul has virtually scrapped its peninsular trust-building process under which the

president pledged to pursue dialogue and cooperation with Pyongyang based on a robust security posture. In an unusual move in her August 15 Liberation Day address, Park urged North Korean officials and citizens to join Seoul's efforts to lay the groundwork for reunification, which she stressed would offer a "new opportunity" for them to lead a happy life without discrimination or disadvantages. In her past public speeches, Park delivered messages to the North's ruling class and rarely addressed its officials and citizens. Such a change reflects her stepped-up efforts to prepare for reunification, which could come sooner than expected amid growing expectations that Pyongyang's deepening isolation and economic hardships could trigger instability in the country and possibly the downfall of the regime. (Song Sang-ho, "Park Warns of N.K. Provocations, Unrest," *Yonhap*, August 22, 2016)

Sources say that the US government is strongly considering current US Ambassador to Malaysia Joseph Yun, a 61-year-old Korean-American, to replace Special Representative for North Korea Policy and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Sung Kim, who has been nominated to be Ambassador to the Philippines. On Aug. 20, multiple sources told the *Hankyore* that Yun is very likely to take Kim's place if the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the general session of the US Senate approve Kim's nomination as Ambassador to the Philippines next month. Born in South Korea, Yun moved to the US with his father, who was working for the World Health Organization, when Yun was in elementary school in 1963. After graduating from Cardiff University in Wales and the London School of Economics and Political Science, Yun served as a senior economist for an economic research institute called Data Resources. Yun began working as a diplomat for the US State Department in 1985. Yun was assigned to the US Embassy in Seoul on two occasions, where he served as political affairs counselor and minister, and he also built his diplomatic career in Thailand, Indonesia and Hong Kong, building a reputation as an expert on Asia. Yun was confirmed by Congress in Aug. 2013 and undertook his duties as US Ambassador to Malaysia in October of the same year. Prior to this assignment, Yun oversaw US policy in East Asia as the State Department's Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Japanese broadcaster NHK reported that "If Yun is appointed as Special Representative for North Korea Policy, he is likely to pursue countermeasures against North Korea by speeding up negotiations with related countries such as South Korea and Japan" in connection with North Korea's recent series of ballistic missile launches and its announcement that it would resume reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to produce plutonium. But since Yun's return to the State Department is contingent on the selection of the next Ambassador to Malaysia, the schedule may be delayed. (Yi Yong-in, "Current Ambassador to Malaysia Tapped as U.S. Special Rep. for North Korea Policy," *Hankyore*, August 22, 2016)

Japan intends to deploy an upgraded version of a surface-to-air missile with enhanced interception capabilities on the Nansei Islands to reinforce the air defense of remote islands, including the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture, *Yomiuri Shimbun* has learned. The ¥17.7 billion cost of introducing the missile will be included in the Defense Ministry's initial budget request for fiscal 2017. The government aims to deploy the missile around 2021. Chinese military aircraft are increasing their activity

around the Senkaku Islands. The government aims to enhance deterrence by deploying the upgraded version of the surface-to-air missile. The missile to be introduced will be an improved version of a Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air missile, which will be mounted on a vehicle. It can intercept not only fighter aircraft but also high-speed cruise missiles. It has a longer range and a better ability to cope with multiple targets than the missiles currently deployed. The government plans to make the purchase over multiple years. One missile system consisting of a launcher, radar and other equipment will be included in the initial budget request. It is harder to detect high-speed cruise missiles than fighters. The period of time between a missile's launch and when it can be intercepted is short, so the key issue is improving the capability to cope with this. In a launch test conducted in the United States, all the improved missiles hit their targets. The missile is expected to be deployed to the Ground Self-Defense Force missile unit that is planned to be stationed on Miyakojima island and Ishigakijima island in Okinawa Prefecture and Amami Oshima island in Kagoshima Prefecture. In the East China Sea, the number of scrambles by Air Self-Defense Force aircraft against Chinese military aircraft is increasing. In June, Chinese military aircraft approached ASDF aircraft around the Senkaku Islands. Initially, the Defense Ministry considered requesting two systems with the improved missile, but ultimately chose to request only one because it is continuing to introduce other expensive equipment. The ministry plans to make the deployment sequentially to the units on Okinawa Island and Kyushu in the medium term. However, construction of a widespread air defense network may be delayed. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, "New Missile Planned for Islands' Defense," August 22, 2016)

8/24/16

KCNA: "A test-fire of strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile was successfully conducted under the guidance of supreme commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK. At the observation post he was briefed on the plan for the test-fire. As soon as he issued an order to start the test-fire, the strategic submarine submerged up to a depth for firing the ballistic missile and rapidly launched the ballistic missile. **The test-fire which was conducted under a high-angle fire system in the maximum launching depth reconfirmed the stability of the underwater ballistic launching system, the starting character of the high power solid fuel engine and phased flying kinetic feature after coming up to the surface of the water. It proved that the core technical indexes of the ballistic missile including the reliability of the phased heat separation and the control and guidance system and the working accuracy of the warhead in the re-entry section perfectly met all requirements for operation.** The SLBM test-fire was successfully carried out without any adverse impact on neighboring countries. Watching the trajectory of the ballistic missile Pukguksong, he said with pleasure that it was a great manifestation and demonstration of the tremendous power and inexhaustible muscle of the DPRK and he felt enormous energy was welling out. He appreciated the test-fire as the greatest success and victory and highly praised the officials, scientists and technicians in the field of national defense science and munitions factories for having perfectly acquired the technology of SLBM in a short span of time and extended special thanks to them in the name of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the WPK and the supreme commander of the KPA. He noted with pride

that the results of the test-fire proved in actuality that the DPRK joined the front rank of the military powers fully equipped with nuclear attack capability. The U.S. vicious nuclear threat and blackmail against the DPRK only resulted in bolstering up its nuclear attack capability hour by hour and the U.S. mainland and the operational theatre in the Pacific are now within the striking range of the KPA, no matter how hard the U.S. tries to deny it, he said. Strongly warning the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet group staging the joint military exercise aiming at a preemptive nuclear strike at the DPRK with huge nuclear strategic assets involved and thereby seriously rattling its nerves, he said the Korean people would deal merciless blows at them with nuclear hammers of justice so that nails of injustice may not come out again, once an opportunity is given, now that the DPRK has in place all substantial means capable of standing up against the U.S. nuclear hegemony. He noted: "I do not guess what ridiculous remarks the U.S. and its followers will make about this test-fire, but I can say their rash acts will only precipitate their self-destruction. The best way of escaping the deadly strike of the infuriated KPA is to refrain from hurting the dignity and security of the DPRK with prudence and self-control." Warning the enemies not to underestimate the might of the DPRK, he said it would clearly show the world how it would proudly tower, after breaking the chains of sanctions, blockade and pressure of the enemies. He stressed the need for the field of national defense science to put increased spurs to mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles in order to cope with the unpredicted total war and nuclear war with the U.S. imperialists and, at the same time, focus all efforts on the development of means of their delivery. He instructed officials to take a series of all eventful actions to demonstrate the DPRK's muscle as a full-fledged military power if the enemies try to threaten its dignity and the right to existence even a bit. He warmly greeted the national defense scientists and service personnel of the navy returning to the port after the successful test-fire and warmly congratulated them. He had a photo session with them." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Guides Strategic Submarine Underwater Ballistic Missile Test-Fire," August 25, 2016)

The missile that North Korea test-fired from a submarine off its east coast today momentarily brought together three nations that have recently had reasons to squabble. At a previously scheduled meeting in Tokyo, the foreign ministers of the three nations – China, Japan and South Korea – criticized the missile test, which appeared to demonstrate a significant advance in North Korea's efforts to build a harder-to-detect means to strike American and allied forces. The missile flew 310 miles toward Japan, much farther than previous tests. Tensions between the three countries have risen in recent months: Chinese vessels have repeatedly entered disputed waters surrounding a group of Japanese-controlled islands in the East China Sea, setting off protests from Japan. Tokyo opposed a visit this month by South Korean lawmakers to islands both nations claims. And China has harshly criticized South Korea's agreement to host an American-built advanced missile defense system that the Chinese believe could be used against their missiles. But North Korea's missile launch briefly united the three other nations. "If there was a silver lining, it would be the fact that it provided the three an opportunity to have something in common, which is rare," said J. Berkshire Miller, an international affairs fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations. If the North Korean threat is to be truly defused, experts say, the three East Asian neighbors will need more common ground. "We all know that on days when North Korea doesn't test missiles, tensions may be above the surface," said Scott A. Snyder, senior fellow for

Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. "But longer term, if you're looking for conditions that would suggest real stability in the region, that is the sort of cooperation that would be needed." At a news conference in Tokyo today, Japan's foreign minister, Kishida Fumio, said North Korea's action "is simply not tolerated." His South Korean counterpart, Yun Byung-se, said the three countries "confirmed our common view that we must deter North Korea's further provocative actions." Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, said, "China opposes the development of North Korea's nuclear program, and any words or deeds that create tensions in the peninsula." He also reiterated China's opposition to American efforts to build the missile defense system in South Korea. Chinese commentators argued that the United States was partly to blame for the North's aggressive behavior. An opinion article published today by Xinhua denounced the United States and its allies for "risking turning the region into a powder keg." "Muscle-flexing leads to nowhere but a more anxious, more agitating and thus more unpredictable Pyongyang," the commentary said. Still, on social media in China, many posts placed the blame squarely on Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, describing him as an erratic and untrustworthy leader and urging the government to do more to rein him in. President Park Geun-hye of South Korea also denounced the North Korean leader in remarks during a visit to a front-line military unit today. "Given the fact that North Korea has an irrational decision-making system under a one-man dictatorship," Park said, "and that Kim Jong-un is an unpredictable character, there is a high possibility that this threat could become a reality." Today, as Abe denounced the North Korean missile launch as an "an unforgivable act of violence," his newly appointed defense minister, Inada Tomomi, said Japanese forces would begin training for overseas missions, including rescuing captured troops from peacekeeping missions. Kobayashi Setsu, a law professor emeritus at Keio University and the leader of a group that opposes the security bills passed last year, called the new training drills a "historic turning point" and a violation of the country's Constitution. "Now people outside of Japan will question if Japan can become a country that can wage war," Kobayashi said. But other analysts said that the Japanese, who mostly opposed the security laws passed after a parliamentary struggle last year, might start to accept the incremental escalation of military activity that Abe is pushing. "The more that there are dangers in the neighborhood – a rising China, a threatening North Korea – that puts wind in Abe's sails," said Jeff Kingston, the director of Asian Studies at Temple University in Tokyo. Ultimately, Abe wants to revise the pacifist clause in the Constitution. But the public – as well as members of Parliament, including some in Abe's governing coalition – would most likely oppose him. "Even with this more threatening environment, it's not going to be easy at all," Kingston said. "There is a deeply embedded attachment to the peace Constitution as part of Japanese national identity." Abe, Kingston added, "understands that he has a deep hole to climb out of to try to convince the public that that is necessary." Public reaction in Japan to the North Korean missile test was relatively subdued, although several politicians strongly protested it. Omura Hideaki, the governor of Aichi Prefecture in central Japan, which includes the city of Nagoya, said on Twitter that the missile launch was a "grave provocation." Murata Renho, a member of the upper house of Parliament and a candidate to lead the opposition Democratic Party, said she "firmly protested" North Korea's action. The significance of North Korea's missile launch may take some time to sink in, as the Japanese have become somewhat accustomed to the missile tests. "For

Japanese people, the picture of the Chinese vessels surrounding the Senkakus is more shocking," said Watanabe Tsuneo, a senior fellow at the Tokyo Foundation, a research group, referring to the Chinese incursions around the disputed islands in the East China Sea. The North Korean missile launches, Watanabe said, sometimes "look like animation." (Motoko Rich, with Makiko Inoue, Hisako Ueno, Choe Sang-Hun, and Javier Hernandez, "3 Nations Unite Against North Korean Missile Test," *New York Times*, August 25, 2016, p. A-3)

8/25/12 North Korea's military has raised its alert posture to its highest level earlier this week in response to an annual joint military drill between Seoul and Washington, a government source here said today. This year's alert level was one notch higher than that issued during last year's joint military drill, indicating that North Korea is highly sensitive to the drill. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Raises Military Alert to Highest Level amid S. Korea-U.S. Drill: Source," August 25, 2016)

8/26/16 DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement: "The news of a SLBM test-fire successfully conducted at a higher level by scientists and technicians in the field of national defense of the DPRK came to rock the world. Against this backdrop, undesirable forces are moving to create an atmosphere of putting pressure on the DPRK over the test-fire. The U.S. and some other countries following it are accusing the DPRK of its SLBM test-fire and an "urgent consultation" concerning it was held at UNSC on Thursday. The U.S. and its followers, terming the DPRK's test-fire of SLBM that fully demonstrated the nuclear attack capability of Juche Korea "violation of resolutions," brought it up to UNSC for discussion. This is just a hideous provocation reminiscent of the guilty party filing a suit first. The U.S. staged Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 joint military drills only a few months ago, openly talking about "occupying Pyongyang," after bringing hugest-ever nuclear strategic assets and troops to south Korea. It is now desperately kicking off joint military drills again to mount a preemptive nuclear attack on the DPRK despite the unanimous denunciation and opposition of all Koreans and the world public. A touch-and-go situation where a nuclear war may break out any moment is now prevailing on the Korean peninsula due to the war rehearsal. The U.S. outrageous nuclear intimidation only resulted in the steady increase of the DPRK's nuclear attack capability. The SLBM test-fire which was successfully conducted without any adverse impact on the security of neighboring countries was a vivid manifestation and a striking demonstration of the tremendous power and inexhaustible strength of Juche Korea firmly consolidated in the face of the tempest of history and all challenges by the enemy. The results of the test-fire proved in actuality that the DPRK joined the front rank of the military powers fully equipped with nuclear attack capability and the U.S. mainland and the operational theatre in the Pacific have come within the striking range of the DPRK, no matter how hard the U.S. tries to deny it. The service personnel and people of the DPRK would deal merciless blows at the U.S. with nuclear hammers of justice so that nails of injustice may not come out again, once an opportunity is given, now that the DPRK has in place all substantial means capable of standing up against the U.S. nuclear hegemony. The U.S. rash acts of taking issue with the DPRK's SLBM test-fire will only precipitate its self-destruction. The best way of escaping the deadly strike of the infuriated DPRK is to refrain from hurting its dignity and security with prudence and self-control.



**If the U.S. attempts to threaten the dignity and vital rights of the DPRK even a bit despite its solemn warning, it will continue to take one after another epochal action steps it can show as a full-fledged military power.”** (KCNA, “Spokesman for Foreign Ministry Raps Hostile Forces’ Moves to Ratchet up Pressure over Its SLBM Test-Fire,” August 26, 2016)

UNSC: “The members of the Security Council strongly condemned the launching of a submarine-launched ballistic missile by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 23 August, the ballistic missile launches conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 2 August and 18 July, and the launching of a submarine-launched ballistic missile by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 July. These launches are in grave violation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's international obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council deplore all Democratic People's Republic of Korea ballistic missile activities, including these launches, noting that such activities contribute to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension. The members of the Security Council further regretted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is diverting resources to the pursuit of ballistic missiles while Democratic People's Republic of Korea citizens have great unmet needs. The members of the Security Council expressed serious concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted these ballistic missile launches after the 15 April, 23 April, 27 April, 28 April, 31 May and 21 June launches, in flagrant disregard of the repeated statements of the Security Council. The members of the Security Council reiterated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall refrain from further actions, including nuclear tests, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and comply fully with its obligations under these resolutions. The members of the Security Council called upon all Member States to redouble their efforts to implement fully the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the Security Council, particularly the comprehensive measures contained in resolution 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council directed the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to intensify its work to strengthen enforcement of resolution 2270 (2016) and assist Member States to comply with their obligations under that resolution and other relevant resolutions. The members of the Security Council also called on Member States to report as soon as possible on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of resolution 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large, expressed their commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomed efforts by Council members, as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue. The members of the Security Council stress the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. The members of the Security Council agreed that the Security Council would continue to closely monitor the situation and take further significant measures in line with the Council's previously expressed determination.” (U.N. Spokesperson, “Security Council Press Statement on Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ballistic Missile Launches,” August 26, 2016)

A North Korean diplomat based in Russia defected last month to an unknown country, according to media reports. The diplomat worked as a trade representative for North Korea in its consular office in Vladivostok. His whereabouts and detailed route of defection have yet to be identified.

He reportedly defected with his family sometime in July, around the same time that high-profile North Korean diplomat Thae Yong-ho defected to Seoul from London. The national Intelligence Service refused to clarify if he came to South Korea or not. The diplomat is known to be a higher-level official than Kim Chol-song, the third secretary and trade representative of the North Korean mission who also defected from St. Petersburg in July. Local sources said that a joint inspection team from North Korea's security and trade departments was sent to Vladivostok following the defection. The team began a full-scale inspection of North Korea missions in Vladivostok, Russia, and China's Changchun, Shenyang and Dandong, according to the sources. Following a series of defections, Pyongyang has canceled plans to send company delegates to Yanji in China near its border for a trade fair slated to begin Sunday, they said. (Kim Hyo-jin, "N. Korean Diplomat in Russia Defects to Third Nation," *Korea Times*, August 26, 2016)

IFAS of the DPRK FoMin: "In his report to the 7th Party Congress of the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK) the Respected Comrade **Kim Jong Un**, the Chairman of the Worker's Party of Korea, said as follows: **"The United States should squarely recognize the strategic position of our Republic, now that it has joined the front rank of nuclear powers, and the trend of the times; it should scrap its anachronistic policy of hostility towards the DPRK, replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and withdraw its forces of aggression and war material from south Korea."** At present, the frenzied and large-scale nuclear war exercise aiming for the invasion of the North, led by the world No.1 nuclear power, is being conducted on the Korean peninsula, the biggest hotspot in the world under the pretext of being a "routine" one in the "defensive" nature. The Korean peninsula, where the status quo of the decades-long ceasefire has been continued, is becoming the site of the showdown for power, the tensest one around the globe. No place in the world is as much dangerous as the Korean peninsula where the great number of the vast strategic armed forces including the nuclear weapons have been intensively deployed and the joint military exercises and other warmongering military maneuvers have been conducted as frequently as the days are numbered. Even those, who are interested in the situation on the Korean peninsula to a certain degree, would not take much trouble to witness the fact that the Korean peninsula falls into the melting pot of the cycle of the aggravation of the situation in March, April and August every year. The situation on the Korean peninsula, at the very time of March, April and August every year, could be characterized by the enforcement of the large-scale US-south Korea joint military exercises and the self-defensive countermeasures of the DPRK. This paper will deal with the danger and provocative character of the joint military exercises conducted by the US in collusion with south Korea, and the influence of those war drills racket on the situation of the Korean peninsula. The US had decreased the scale of the military exercises in other parts of the world since the end of the Cold War. The US, however, constantly fanned up the war fever by conducting the joint military exercises, tantamount to those during the Cold War, every year only on the Korean peninsula. Wars can be classified into two

forms; wars of justice or wars of injustice according to their characters. Same thing could be applied to the military exercises. The military exercises can be classified by its nature; self-defensive or aggressive one. The military exercises, which the US and south Korea have been "routinely" conducting, belong to the latter one. Our Republic had never made an issue of the US military exercises, which have been conducted on the American soil or at the center of the Pacific Ocean and other places not being dangerous to it. However, the US-south Korea joint military exercises are the different matters. The unique danger which distinguishes the US-south Korea joint military exercises from the military exercises in general lies in the fact that these exercises are conducted by the US, the world No.1 nuclear power, at the doorstep of the DPRK. It is preposterous for the US to assert that these exercises are "routine" and "defensive" in nature far from the offensive one and there are no problems with them. At present, the DPRK and the US are in the state of ceasefire. This means that a life and death war would break out between the DPRK and the US at any given time. Under these circumstances, it stands to obvious reason that the DPRK could not look with folded arms on the US-south Korea joint military exercises as "routine" and "defensive" ones in nature, because the biggest nuclear weapon state and the belligerent party to the Korean War occupied the half part of its land and has been conducting these exercises at the doorstep of the DPRK by mobilizing the huge amount of its armed forces. The US is planning to hide its true identity as the "breaker" of the peace on the Korean Peninsula, and furthermore to make the DPRK "accustomed" to those exercises and being "numbed" to it in order to realize its ambition of invading the DPRK without fail. This is the main purpose which the US pursues through justifying these war games by covering them with the package of so-called "routine and defensive in nature." First of all, the war exercises being conducted by the US in collusion with south Korea are clearly provocative and aggressive in nature, **judging from the intentions, scale and other detailed specifics of these exercises.** In this June, the NATO conducted the joint military exercises codenamed "Anaconda-16" in Poland, which involved only 31,000 troops from 24 countries including 14,000 US troops. However, the US-south Korea joint military exercises codenamed "Key Resolve", "Foal Eagle 16" conducted in March and April, involved the 27,000 US troops, almost 300,000 south Korean puppet troops, "Stennis" nuclear carrier, "B-52H", "B-2A" nuclear strategic bombers and other military materials. The fact that this huge amount of the armed forces and military materials enough for conducting an all-out war had been mobilized in these exercises reveals how dangerous the US-south Korea joint military exercises are in terms of scale. Especially, the biggest danger of these exercises lies in the fact that the ultimate goal of these exercises is to stifle the DPRK by the military means, and to further "eliminate" its supreme headquarter and "occupy the capital of DPRK." In mid-December, 1953, the US National Security Council came out with the "Revamped Policy" in order to make a fresh attempt of invading the DPRK, and later made it more specific with the "Red Ford Strategy" which stipulated that the "Revamped Policy" would be realized in a blitzkrieg way by focusing on Korea and the other Asian countries before their national strength became stronger. In accordance with these war doctrines, the US turned south Korea into the base for war supplies in order to conduct the aggressive war against the North. At the same time, the US continued to modify and supplement the war schemes and conducted the war exercises as frequently as days are numbered to further aggravate the situation. The main examples of the joint military exercises are

as follows: "Focus Lens," "Focus Retina," "Freedom Bolt": All these exercises focused on the landing and airborne transporting operation for the purpose of occupying the northern part of our Republic by calling in the reinforcements from the outside of the Korean Peninsula at one time. "Team Spirit," "Ulji Focus Lens": These exercises reflected the "OPLAN 5027-98" in a detailed way, which openly brought up with the preemptive attack on the DPRK. "RSOI" ("Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration"), "Key Resolve," "Foal Eagle," "Ulji Freedom Guardian": The purpose of all these exercises are to occupy our Republic by means of the surprise landing and the other ways of dispatching the US Troops, and at the same time to eliminate the Supreme leadership and important objects including the nuclear facilities and to make a surprise on and conquer Pyongyang, its capital, by its commando units. The names of the US-south Korea joint military exercises had been changed through the decades. However, the purpose of those exercises to stifle the DPRK with the armed forces had not been changed even a little. If somebody insists that there should have been a change, then that might be the change of the character and content of the joint military exercises, because those had been changed in a more preemptive and offensive way, and in the bluntest and the most antagonistic way by even mentioning the "eliminating of DPRK Supreme leadership." The dangers become clearer when it comes to the operation plans initiated and unveiled by the US. Here are the examples. "OPLAN 5029": The core content of this Operation Plan is that the US induces the DPRK into committing to the military maneuvers by imposing a large-scale pressure on the DPRK, and engages in a military way as soon as possible when the "emergency situation" occurs in the DPRK. "OPLAN 5026": This plan is about the high-precision airstrike on the major strategic facilities of our Republic. "OPLAN 5030": It is designed to make DPRK military strength waste by imposing the low-intensity pressure against it. All these aggressive war plans against the DPRK prove that the purposes of these exercises are not defensive; they are rather to mount a preemptive attack on the DPRK and occupy it without any prior notice. Especially, prior to the "Ulji Freedom Guardian" joint military exercises of this year, the US deployed "B-52H", "B-1B", "B-2A", the 3 major nuclear strategic bombers, in the forward area on the Guam Island and made them ready for flight. Furthermore, the US is openly mentioning that they will apply the "OPLAN 5015" to the "Ulji Freedom Guardian" exercises of this year, of which the purpose is to mount a preemptive strike on the "main target" and strategic bases of our Republic. The US and south Korea conducted the exercises like the "Beheading operation," "High-precision strike," "Occupying Pyongyang" as a part of the exercises for the preemptive strike on our Republic during the "Key Resolve," "Foal Eagle 16" exercises of this March and April. Judging from this fact the "main target" much-touted by the US is none other than our Supreme leadership. Allow me to take this opportunity to make a brief reference to how absurd is the US's much-touted claim of North Korea's threats - a justification for the aforesaid joint military exercises. The US seeks to leave no stone unturned to warrant the massive joint military exercises while accusing the DPRK of its self-defensive steps for bolstering military capabilities as "provocations" and "threats." And there raises a question whether such US's argument stands authentic. It is an indelible historical fact that the US has brought in ultra-modern nuclear war hardware such as 3 major nuclear strategic assets on a continual basis and staged large-scale joint military exercises on a yearly basis on the Korean peninsula and its vicinity, thus straining the situation to the extreme well before the

DPRK acquired a nuclear deterrent force for self-defense. The reason why the disaster of a nuclear war has been curbed on the Korean peninsula over which dark clouds of a thermal war hang heavily at all times for well over 6 decades after the end of the Korean War is not because the US is peace loving nor somebody's provocations or threats have been contained due to the US-south Korea joint military exercises. There is a need to look into why the gunfire of war has not been heard thus far for the past decades and the Korean people have led a peaceful and stable life on the Korean peninsula where joint military exercises involving massive nuclear war hardware and armed forces enough to wage a round of war have folded out in a frantic manner every year. It is attributable to the fact that the DPRK has steadily increased its national defense capabilities for self-defense with the result that the US's non-stop threats of a nuclear war have been deterred. 2. The US-south Korea joint military exercises have profound implications for the situation on and around the Korean peninsula. Firstly, the US-south Korea military exercises are a precarious act of provocations which drives the situation on the Korean peninsula into an uncontrollable state and to the brink of touch-an-go war and at the same time a key factor which disrupts peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The perils of a military exercise are largely calibrated by military hardware involved, intensity and frequency. Nobody could predict when the large-scale military exercises involving ultra-modern nuclear strategic assets and huge armed forces, which are carried out under simulated conditions of a real war, would lead to an act of war against the other. It is noteworthy that the August incident of last year took place in the period of the joint military exercise codenamed "Ulji Freedom Guardian" when an unaccounted-for, inadvertent incident drove the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of touch-and-go war. Frequent gathering of clouds would inevitably bode rain. A mere look at the history of a world war tells that incessant military drills can be likened to an instrument of gauging the direction of the wind, which harbingers military actions. It is inevitable for the DPRK to take self-defensive countermeasures in response to the joint military exercises held by the US on a continual basis on the Korean peninsula. It is as clear as daylight that in the course of it, any accidental incident or conflict would easily spill over into an all-out war. Recently, it is in the mainstream of international opinion that the US's deployment of strategic assets and joint military exercises are major elements driving the situation on the Korean peninsula into an uncontrollable state. It is a foregone conclusion that the international community expresses serious concerns over the possibility of the on-going joint military exercises codenamed "Ulji Freedom Guardian" driving the situation to the brink of a war once again. Secondly, the US-south Korea joint military exercises have a hugely negative impact on ensuring peace and security in the northeast Asian region and the world at large. The Korean peninsula is shallow in terms of depth and worse still, it is a tremendously sensitive region where the interests of neighboring powers are intricately interwoven and there is no legal and institutional mechanism in place to prevent any potential military conflict. Moreover, the Korean peninsula is located at a strategically important place which borders with China and Russia regarded by the US as potential enemies. The Korean peninsula can be said to be an outpost for achieving US strategy towards Asia whereas south Korea is a military springboard where the US sets its foot on. The US's failure to lose control over south Korea implies that the former would be deprived of an outpost for fulfilling its strategy towards Korea and its assertive ambition for Asia. It is the unwavering foreign policy of

the US to accomplish its strategy of dominance over Asia with south Korea as a stronghold, and to this end, **the US seeks to tighten its military control over south Korea through deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and joint military drills.** The US is prone to make a reference to somebody's misjudgment or uncertainty. In case the US's logic is to be followed, there is no guarantee that a large-scale war would not break out on the Korean peninsula, if the United States, misjudging the strategic position of our Republic, now that it has joined the front rank of nuclear powers, persists in clinging to its anachronistic racket of military confrontation including the joint military exercises. Once an all-out war should have been broken out on the Korean peninsula where the interests of the world powers are complicatedly intertwined, because of its geopolitical value, then it will be easily followed by the world war and expanded into the unprecedented thermonuclear war. All these developments of the events would invite the terrible catastrophe to the peace and security on Korean peninsula and in the region of the northeast Asia, and further to the peace and security of the world. The US-south Korea joint military exercise is just playing the "triggering" role in aggravating the situation. It is because the scale and aggressive nature of these joint military exercises are becoming increasing and more undisguised day by day, that the Korean peninsula and the other region of northeast Asia get deeper and deeper into the crucible of the new arms race and cold war. All of these facts show that the joint military exercises being conducted by the US on the Korean peninsula should unconditionally be put to stop without fail for the guarantee of the peace and safety on the Korean peninsula and in the region of the northeast Asia and furthermore in the world. ※※※※※Over the last 60 or so years since the signing of the Armistice Agreement the US has persisted in introducing the huge number of the armed forces of invasion into south Korea and the surrounding region, and conducted the frenzied nuclear war exercises against the North year after year. And this is the primary factor which aggravates the tension on the Korean peninsula and in the region. If the US is sincerely interested in the peace and stability as they like to quote, it should scrap its anachronistic policy of hostility towards the DPRK, replace the Armistice Agreement **with a peace treaty and withdraw its forces of invasion and war material from south Korea.** If the situation of the Korean peninsula falls into the further uncontrollable state and an incident desired by nobody happens, the US, who is possessed by its anachronistic policy of hostility towards the DPRK and persists in reckless military hostile acts, will be held wholly accountable for the ensuing consequences." (Kim Kwang Hak, Researcher of the Institute for American Studies (IFAS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DPRK, "The U.S.-South Korea Joint Military Exercises and the Situation on the Korean Peninsula," August 26, 2016)

8/28/16 DRPK FoMin spokesman's statement: "The U.S. and its followers committed a serious hostile act of releasing a UN Security Council's press statement finding fault with the DPRK's measures for bolstering nuclear deterrence for self-defense such as the strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile test-fire. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK in a statement Sunday termed the UNSC's press statement a product of brigandish acts of the U.S. and other hostile forces to take issue with and deter the DPRK from exercising its legitimate right to self-defense, and categorically rejected it. The recent farce of adopting the press statement which the U.S. staged by abusing the UNSC is a wanton violation of the sovereignty and dignity of the DPRK and a reckless provocation harassing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. ...While

deliberately disregarding the written complaint filed by the DPRK against the aggressive U.S.-south Korea joint military exercises, the UNSC found fault with the DPRK's bolstering of deterrent for self-defense, being played into the hands of the U.S. This is an illegal action taken by the world body to side with the U.S. in the acute stand-off between the DPRK and the U.S. without an iota of impartiality. The U.S. and its followers are terming the DPRK's measures for self-defense a violation of "resolutions" of the UNSC and the like but even the UN Secretariat fails to give a clear answer to the question as to whether the "resolutions" are legitimate documents complying with the UN Charter. The DPRK has substantial means capable of reducing aggression troops in the U.S. mainland and the operational theatre in the Pacific to ashes in a moment once an opportunity is given to cope with the U.S. unprecedented hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK. The DPRK has already warned the U.S. that its rash act of finding fault with the SLBM test-fire would only precipitate its self-destruction and that the best way of escaping the deadly strikes to be made by the enraged people of the DPRK is to refrain from hurting its dignity and security with prudence and self-control. Now that the U.S. posed threats to the dignity and the right to existence of the DPRK defying its serious warning, it will continue to take a series of eventful action steps as a full-fledged military power. The U.S. and its vassal forces will be held wholly responsible for all the ensuing consequences." (KCNA, "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Categorically Rejects UNSC Statement," August 28, 2016)

8/29/16

Ruling party lawmakers have renewed calls to deploy nuclear-powered submarines on the battlefield, refueling debate about using the advanced weapons against North Korean ballistic missile threats. The communist state marked its first successful firing of a submarine-launched ballistic missile last week, undermining South Korea's resolve to neutralize threats via land-based missile defense systems. "The SLBM launch is a grave threat not only to South Korea, but also to the security of Northeast Asia," said Rep. Chung Jin-suk, floor leader of the ruling Saenuri Party. "(The danger from the SLBM) is even more severe than that of a land-based missile launch, because it is more difficult to detect where it has been launched from." He urged the government to positively consider having a nuclear sub in Korean waters, along with enhancing defense through strengthening the Seoul-Washington alliance, acquiring the protection of the US nuclear umbrella and installment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. (Yoon Min-sik, "Saenuri Hawks Renew Call for Nuke Submarine after N.K. SLBM Launch," *Korea Herald*, August 29, 2016)

8/30/16

The government of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is requesting another increase in spending on Japan's armed forces, with a plan to expand missile defenses that would test the nation's commitment to pacifism and escalate a regional arms race with China and North Korea. If approved, the budget proposal for 5.17 trillion yen, or \$50.2 billion, formally submitted today, would be the nation's fifth-straight annual increase in military spending. It is a 2.3 percent rise over last year. The request includes proposals to develop and potentially purchase new antiballistic missiles that can be launched from ships or land, and to upgrade and extend the range of the country's current land-based missile defense systems, a significant expansion of Japan's missile defense capabilities. The budget also details plans to buy an additional submarine and new fighter aircraft, and to put close to 1,300 soldiers from the Self-Defense Force, Japan's military, on the southern islands of Kagoshima and Okinawa. These locations are closer

to the Senkaku, the chain of islands where both China and Japan claim territorial rights. Japan's defense budget proposal includes funds to help proceed with development, in conjunction with the United States, of advanced antiballistic missiles that can be launched from ships and that have much longer ranges than previous incarnations. Experts said these missiles could be used not only to shoot down North Korean missiles, but also to deter China from invading the disputed islands. Placing more troops on the southern islands of Japan is also intended to deter China from moving closer to the Senkaku. "We're in the middle of what is commonly called the security dilemma," said Richard Samuels, a Japan specialist and the director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "When one nation does something which it believes to be defensive and in its own interests, its competitor will see it as threatening and see it as offensive, and then you get this arms race and security dilemma," he said. "That's very much in play here." Analysts said nothing in the new budget request suggested that Japan would cross the line from a primarily defensive stance to a more offensive one. "If they started to procure long-range bombers or intercontinental ballistic missiles, those would be the things where I would say, 'Now we are seeing something radically different,'" said Jeffrey Hornung, a research fellow for security and foreign policy at Sasakawa USA, a think tank in Washington. The new equipment proposals also seem carefully calibrated to address current threats. The plan to extend the range of existing PAC-3 missile defense systems from the current limit of about 19 miles, for example, would help Japan protect against North Korean missiles but avoid the appearance of instigating new confrontations, analysts said. "I think these ranges are very carefully selected," said Bonnie S. Glaser, senior Asia adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. She noted that Japan would, for instance, be aware of China's objection to any hint that Japan might get involved in disputes over Taiwan. The distances of the missiles proposed, she said, would not extend to Taiwan. Amid controversy over Japan's continued hosting of American bases and troops on the island of Okinawa, the current budget proposal also includes a request for a slight increase in spending on American operations to 178.7 billion yen. All told, the budget request remains less than 1 percent of Japan's gross domestic product, a self-imposed constraint that few Japanese administrations have breached. Some analysts noted that with China rapidly increasing its military budget, Japan's current military spending might not be sufficient. "In the long run, if the military balance in East Asia shifts in favor of China significantly, we might have to do much more than what we are doing right now," said Michishita Narushige, director of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. Miyamoto Tooru, a Communist Party member of the House of Representatives, said he did not approve of the increased expenditures at a time when the economy continues to stagnate. "I want such money to be spent on day care centers," he said. (Motoko Rich, "Japan Considers More Military Spending as Regional Arms Race Quickens," *New York Times*, August 31, 2016, p. A-4)

The North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, has executed his deputy premier for education and purged two other senior officials, sending them to re-education camps, the South Korean government said. Jeong Joon-hee, a spokesman for the South's Unification Ministry, said at a news briefing that the government had used various means to



confirm the execution of Kim Yong-jin, the deputy premier, and the purge of Kim Yong-chol, the head of the United Front Department of the ruling Workers' Party, which handles relations with, as well as spying operations against, South Korea. Choe Hui, a deputy chief of the party's Propaganda and Agitation Department, was also banished for re-education, Jeong said. Jeong provided no further details, including when the reported punishments were believed to have taken place or how South Korea had learned of them. Kim, the deputy premier, would be the highest-ranking official known to have been executed since 2013. The South Korean national news agency, Yonhap, citing an anonymous government source, reported that the deputy premier had been arrested for sitting in a "disrespectful" posture during a meeting led by Kim Jong-un. He was executed by firing squad in July, the agency said. Yonhap also reported that Kim Yong-chol, the United Front Department head, had spent a month in a re-education camp for abuse of power and that he had been released in mid-August. Since taking power in 2011, Kim Jong-un has frequently reshuffled the party and military elites as he has consolidated his authority in North Korea, which his family has ruled for seven decades. Kim has also executed dozens of top officials in what President Park Geun-hye of South Korea has called a "reign of terror," according to South Korean intelligence officials. It remains difficult to independently verify reports of executions and purges in the secretive North. North Korea rarely announces them. It was unusual for a South Korean government spokesman to make them public in an open news briefing, though intelligence officials have often briefed lawmakers in closed-door parliamentary sessions. Jeong, the government spokesman, said that he was responding to recent reports in the South Korean news media. Yesterday, *JoongAng Ilbo*, citing an anonymous source, reported that Hwang Min, a former North Korean agriculture minister, and Ri Yong-jin, a senior Education Ministry official, had been executed with anti-aircraft guns in early August. The newspaper reported that Ri had been arrested after dozing off during a meeting headed by Kim and that Hwang had proposed a policy that was deemed to represent a challenge to Kim's leadership. Jeong did not comment on the fates of those two officials in his briefing August 31. *JoongAng Ilbo* reported that the officials' reported executions might have been aimed at tightening Kim's control following a senior North Korean diplomat's recent defection to the South. South Korea announced earlier this month that Thae Yong-ho, the No. 2 in the North Korean Embassy in London, had defected to Seoul with his family. South Korean officials often cite such high-level defections, and purges like those announced today, as potential sources of instability in Kim's totalitarian regime. But some analysts dispute such conclusions. Purges and executions remain a key feature of political life in the North, said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute, a South Korean research organization. But he said that such persecutions, while barbaric, have become less frequent and "relatively restrained" under Kim Jong-un. Kim's father, Kim Jong-il, was estimated to have purged more than 2,000 officials from 1994 to 2000, he said. (Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea Aide Reportedly Killed," *New York Times*, September 1, 2016, p. A-6)

A North Korean diplomat who was reported to have defected from his post in Russia last month entered South Korea with his family and huge holdings of foreign currency, a source said. "The diplomat involved in Pyongyang's trade representatives under its consulate general in Vladivostok defected and went to South Korea via a third

country," the source said. The first secretary-level diplomat brought a "considerable" sum of foreign currency with him to the South along with his wife and children, according to the source. The foreign exchange holding was the trade representatives' foreign earnings. (Yonhap, "Russia-Based N. Korean Diplomat Defects to S. Korea with FX Holding: Source," *Korea Herald*, September 1, 2016)

9/2/16

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to accelerate efforts to resolve a thorny territorial dispute concerning islands off northern Japan. Abe and Putin met here for about three hours, including over dinner, and the focus of the discussion was the Northern Territories lying east of Hokkaido. Abe was clearly in an upbeat mood after the talks, expressing confidence that progress had been made on the isles issue, which Russia insists can only be settled with a peace treaty formally ending World War II hostilities. The Soviet Union seized the islands as the spoils of war. "The two of us were able to have a very frank discussion (on the issue of signing a peace treaty)," Abe told reporters after the talks with Putin. They and their interpreters were behind closed doors for 55 minutes as part of the lengthy meeting, during which it was decided they would meet in December in Nagato, Yamaguchi Prefecture, Abe's home prefecture. The two leaders will also meet on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum summit meeting to be held in November in Peru. According to a government source, after Abe's one-on-one discussion with Putin, the prime minister told his close associates, "We agreed that we should both make decisions from the comprehensive perspective of our own national interests." The meeting in December will be the fourth this year between the two leaders. "I want to make the meeting in Nagato one that will accelerate the process toward a peace treaty," Abe said. In their previous meeting in the Black Sea city of Sochi in May, Abe and Putin agreed to take a new approach to pushing forward with bilateral negotiations. Abe proposed eight areas of economic cooperation in the Russian Far East during that meeting and he went into further detail about what that would entail during today's talks. After the Abe-Putin meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told reporters, "We will continue to hold negotiations toward signing a peace treaty and the two leaders agreed to disclose the results of those talks during (Putin's) visit to Japan. Lavrov also said, "I felt that the Japanese side was prepared to discuss joint economic activities on the Northern Territories." Abe later addressed the Eastern Economic Forum here on Sept. 3 and proposed to Putin that annual bilateral meetings be held in Vladivostok. Putin signaled his consent, as he nodded and applauded Abe's proposal. With regard to the possible signing of a peace treaty between Japan and Russia, Abe said, "Let those of us in our generation courageously fulfill our responsibility." (Aibara Ryo and Komaki Akiyoshi, "Abe, Putin Eye Fresh Impetus on Resolving Isles and Treaty Issue," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 3, 2016) Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated September 5 that only two of the four islands in the long-standing territorial dispute with Japan are up for discussion in negotiations between the two nations, according to a report by the ITAR-Tass news agency. As a result of long and patient negotiations, the former Soviet Union and Japan signed a 1956 joint declaration stipulating that the Habomai group of islets and Shikotan would be returned to Japan after a bilateral peace treaty is concluded, ITAR-Tass quoted Putin as saying. He made the remarks in talks with reporters in Hangzhou, China, where the Group of 20 economies, including Russia, held a two-day summit through Monday,

according to the news agency. Putin thus suggested that the other two islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu, which were not referred to in the Soviet-Japan declaration, will not be subject to bilateral negotiations. On the Habomai islets and Shikotan, Putin said a major issue will be how the return of sovereignty will be handled. He has long insisted that any resolution of the territorial issue will be based on the 1956 declaration. (JIJI, Kyodo, "Putin Reiterates Only Two of Four Disputed Islands up for Negotiation with Japan," *Japan Times*, September 6, 2016)

9/3/16

DPRK FoMin spokesman's answer "as regards the reports about U.S. nuclear submarines sailing in the waters around the DPRK: It is reported that U.S. nuclear submarines have been busy conducting operations of tracking down DPRK strategic submarines in the international waters around the East Sea of Korea since last year. The reports said that the U.S. military neither admits nor denies it but **it is a stark fact that the U.S. is tracking down DPRK submarines and collecting information.** This cannot but be a dangerous act of further straining the situation on the Korean peninsula and endangering the regional peace and stability. The confrontation between strategic submarines is fraught with big danger of a nuclear war as what happened during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The U.S. introduction of nuclear submarines into the sensitive waters around the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia under the pretext of tracking down strategic submarines of someone is, in fact, targeted against China and Russia and reveals its sordid intention to hold a military upper-hand and hegemony in the region. The media, commenting on such a military move of the U.S., already warned that Northeast Asia may be thrown into the whirlwind of arms race of nuclear submarines. There is no guarantee that conflict between strategic submarines of nuclear weapons states in not vast waters of the Korean peninsula and its vicinity which are exposed to constant danger of a nuclear war due to the U.S. joint military exercises for aggression and arms buildup would not spill over into a nuclear war. The DPRK can respond to any mode of war wanted by the U.S. and the U.S. has to own full responsibilities for the ensuing consequences." (KCNA, "FM Spokesman Blasts U.S. Arms Buildup around Korean Peninsula," September 3, 2016)

9/3-4/16

As the international community was denouncing Pyongyang's provocations, Japanese diplomats [Diet members] apparently held secret talks with North Korean officials on Japanese citizens abducted by the country, an issue of great importance to Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. Several sources knowledgeable about Japan-North Korea ties said contact likely was made on Sept. 3-4 in Dalian. According to the sources, three Japanese diplomats, including a deputy director-general in the Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, entered Dalian in early September. It is unclear who on the North Korean side may have attended the talks. In May 2014, Japan and North Korea reached an agreement in Stockholm in which Pyongyang promised to resume its investigation into the Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s in exchange for Tokyo's lifting of some of its economic sanctions. It appears the Japanese diplomats wanted to confirm the validity of the Stockholm agreement and seek a sincere implementation of the provisions in that accord. According to other sources, North Korea does not appear ready to resume its investigation into the abduction issue, but it is willing to make contact with Japanese

officials. After North Korea's fifth nuclear test, Japanese officials informed their American counterparts that they were in total agreement with strengthening sanctions against Pyongyang, according to sources knowledgeable about Japan-U.S. ties. At the same time, the Japanese officials touched upon the importance of the abduction issue and informed their U.S. counterparts that contact would be made with North Korean officials if the opportunity arose. The U.S. officials did not express opposition to such contact, the sources said. (Makino Yoshihiro, "Sources: Japan, N. Korea Held Secret Talks on Abduction Issue," *Asahi Shimbun*, October 7, 2016)

9/5/16

North Korea fired off a volley of three ballistic missiles from its east coast that fell within Japan's exclusive economic zone, a move that Tokyo called a grave threat to national security amid Pyongyang's growing ability to strike the Japanese archipelago. The North launched the missiles from near Hwangju, North Hwanghae province, at around 12:13 p.m., according to the Defense Ministry. The three missiles flew about 1,000 km and fell about 200 km to 250 km west of Okushiri Island off the western coast of Hokkaido. The ministry said that the missiles were likely to have been short-range Scud missiles or Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles, which have a striking range that includes Japan, the ministry said. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide said that Tokyo had lodged a protest – using "the strongest terms" – with the North through its embassy in Beijing. "This is a threat to Japan's national security," Suga told a daily briefing. "At the same time, this is a provocation against the international community as the Group of 20 summit meeting is currently being held." Pyongyang has fired off a spate of missiles since the beginning of the year, but this is just the second time North Korean missiles have landed inside Japan's EEZ. Last month, the North test-fired what also appeared to be a Nodong missile. Defense Minister Inada Tomomi indicated that today's missiles seem to have fallen around the same area, an indication that the North is enhancing its missile capabilities and presents a grave national security threat to Japan. Pyongyang's missile barrage also came as the G-20 meeting was being held in Hangzhou, China. Although the North's intention remains unclear, a high ranking Japanese government official said that it could be trying to send message to leaders that the missiles' striking range could even hit Hangzhou. Kotani Tetsuo, a senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo, however, cautioned about this narrative. "The timing may have something to do with the G-20, but we should not read too much from it," Kotani said. "The DPRK's intention is now rather clear with the frequent missile tests: It wishes the U.S. and international community will accept it as a nuclear weapons state and go into arms control talks with the U.S. in exchange for a peace treaty." Japan might also have been an afterthought for the North in today's missile tests. Robert E. Kelly, a professor of international relations at Pusan National University in South Korea, said the tests are unlikely to have been aimed at Japan. "Rather it's the convenience of the Sea of Japan being a neighboring, large open space," Kelly noted. "That said, these missiles are certainly designed to strike Japan should Kim Jong Un choose that. I'd guess that these were probably a slap at the G-20." It could also be a response to the decision by Washington and Seoul to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in the South to counter missile and nuclear threats from North Korea. The move came just hours after the leaders of South Korea and China met on the sidelines of the G-20 summit, where Chinese President Xi Jinping told his South Korean counterpart that China opposes

the U.S. deployment of the THAAD system, the official Xinhua News Agency reported Monday. China has repeatedly expressed anger since the United States and South Korea made a final decision in July to deploy it. "Mishandling the issue is not conducive to strategic stability in the region and could intensify disputes," Xinhua quoted Xi as telling Park. Beijing worries the system's radar will be able to track its military capabilities. North Korea, which had threatened a "physical response" against the THAAD decision, has conducted a series of military technology tests this year, including a fourth nuclear test in January, in defiance of U.N. Security Council sanctions that were tightened in March. Officials in South Korea and the U.S. have tried to assuage Chinese fears, insisting that the move is designed purely to counter growing missile threats from North Korea, and not to target China. Xi said China and South Korea shared "broad common interests" and should "cherish their existing cooperative foundation and overcome difficulties and challenges", Xinhua reported. He also reaffirmed China's commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Since the decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea, China's Defense Ministry has since confirmed that it is pressing ahead with its own anti-missile system tests. But experts said today's launch could soften China's stance on THAAD. "In fact, today's tests will certainly offer more rigor to Park's argument of deploying THAAD while Xi may find it more difficult to oppose this development in light of the DRPK's missile campaign," said Sebastian Maslow, an assistant professor at the Tohoku University Graduate School of Law in Sendai. (Mie Ayako and Jesse Johnson, "North Korea Fires off Volley of Missiles near Japan amid Gathering of World Leaders in China," *Japan Times*, September 5, 2016) Japan is increasingly wary of North Korea's missile technology in the wake of the country's firing of ballistic missiles. North Korea simultaneously launched three ballistic missiles, which fell at approximately the same point within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The incident confirms that North Korea's missile capabilities and launch technologies have improved. On September 6, the government held a meeting of the National Security Council at the Prime Minister's Office in which Suga and other officials confirmed a policy of gathering and analyzing information about the missiles. It was the first time since August 3 that North Korea fired ballistic missiles into Japan's EEZ. The Rodong missile fired traveled farther than any previous missile of the type. This time, all three missiles flew about 1,000 kilometers. If fired in a different direction, missiles of this type would be capable of reaching most areas of Western Japan. The government is on high alert, not only because fishing boats and other vessels working in the EEZ were endangered, but also because of North Korea's unprecedented, provocative action of simultaneously firing three missiles that fell at approximately the same point. It is highly likely that the launches were military drills in which two or more missiles were simultaneously fired toward the same target. On August 24, North Korea fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile that flew about 500 kilometers. The launching of such missiles is difficult to detect in advance. The recent series of missile launches have effectively demonstrated North Korea's enhanced capability to launch a surprise attack. North Korea's repeated firings of missiles from mobile launch pads prompted the Defense Ministry to issue a standing order on August 8 for the Self-Defense Forces to destroy incoming missiles if necessary, enabling the SDF to intercept missiles. The SDF has dispatched one Aegis destroyer carrying Standard Missile 3 (SM3) interceptor missiles to the Sea of Japan. On the ground, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC3) surface-to-

air missile defense system units are deployed to intercept missiles in two stages. However, a military expert said, "If two or more ballistic missiles are fired simultaneously, it is more difficult for a single Aegis destroyer to cope with them." Japan owns only four Aegis-equipped destroyers carrying interceptor missiles. The destroyers are also tasked with monitoring the Chinese military in the East China Sea. More officials in the government are voicing the opinion that now is the time to seriously consider how to respond to simultaneous firings of two or more missiles. Thus the Defense Ministry aims to speed up work to modify or build Aegis-equipped destroyers. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, "Provocative Trio of N. Korean Missiles Raises Govt. Concerns," September 6, 2016) North Korea is touting technological progress in its nuclear program, saying after a nuclear test Friday that it can now produce "smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power." But it is also making strides in its missile program, analysts say – advances that could enable it to outsmart missile defense systems, which could make the missiles more attractive to potential customers. Under Kim's leadership, North Korea has also sharply accelerated the pace of missile testing, with almost two dozen launches this year alone. While many of this year's tests have not been successful and there are still many unknowns about North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, there have still been noticeable – and concerning – improvements. "It seems like North Korea is trying to qualitatively improve its missiles and develop options to evade or fool U.S. missile defenses," said Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association. "If this continues unchecked, they could develop an intercontinental ballistic missile that could pose a threat to the United States in the next decade." In its most recent salvo, North Korea launched three medium-range missiles September 5 as China, which had joined the international condemnation of last month's submarine-launched ballistic missile, was hosting the G-20 summit in Hangzhou. The rockets flew about 600 miles – putting Hangzhou within range. But they were sent in the other direction, falling inside Japan's air defense identification zone. The location is within the security belt protecting Kim and the other regime elites in the capital, said Michael Madden, editor of the North Korean Leadership Watch website. That meant the drills could be simulating the collapse of the state or the presence of hostile forces within the country, he said. But it was the modifications to the missile that surprised the rocket scientists at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif. It appears that North Korea has extended the distance a short-range Scud can fly, essentially turning it into a medium-range missile, which the North Koreans call the Rodong. That means that a longer-range missile could be wheeled out on an existing Scud transporter – obviating the need to produce new trucks. Syria is among the countries thought to have bought short-range Scuds from North Korea, in about 2000. "This is a really nice upgrade," said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program in Monterey. "Countries looking to buy North Korean missiles are probably looking at this and thinking, 'Oooh, that's nice.'" North Korea has been concentrating on developing road-mobile missiles that can be fueled in a shelter or tunnel, instead of on a traditional launch pad that can be detected by satellites – and theoretically invite a preemptive strike. Japan's self-defense forces did not detect the launch in advance, *Nikkei* reported, also saying this underscored the limits of Japan's traditional defense capability program. In the past, when activity had been seen around the launch pad, Japan's self-defense forces would roll out Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)

interceptors at the defense ministry headquarters in Tokyo. But road-mobile missiles can be readied for launch in a matter of minutes, cutting the time available to respond. Japan is "very concerned" that North Korea has launched so many different missiles in such a short period, said Atsuya Tanimoto of the Japanese Defense Ministry's intelligence analysis office. "North Korea is improving its technology," he said. North Korea also appears to be looking for other ways to avoid interception, no doubt motivated by South Korea's recent decision to host a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile unit for the U.S. military. The battery is due to be deployed to a site south of Seoul next year. But by firing the three missiles within the space of a minute, rather than over the usual course of an hour or so, North Korea appeared to be testing a way to make it more difficult to intercept incoming missiles, said Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., a military analyst affiliated with the Washington-based U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS. "This launch was probably designed to test not only operational readiness but to develop tricks to defeat antimissile defenses in Japan and South Korea," Bermudez said. "When you launch in a barrage at the same time, it complicates missile defense. So they've shown they have not just the technological capability but the operational capability for simultaneous launches." Furthermore, it appeared that the missile tested today separates after launch – making it harder for missile defense systems to intercept. "When a solid warhead remains attached to the missile, it's easier to hit because it's a bigger target," Lewis said. "If you were in Egypt, staring at Israel, you might really like a warhead like this." The progress in its medium-range missile program follows observable advances in North Korea's quest to launch missiles from sea as well as from land. North Korea was ridiculed for apparently Photo-shopping a ballistic missile launch from a submarine in May. But last month it successfully launched a missile from a submarine near its east coast port of Sinpo. It flew about 300 miles toward Japan before falling into the sea. This showed that its missile program might be progressing faster than originally expected, said John Schilling, an aerospace engineer who studies North Korea's missiles. "However, this does not mean it will be ready next week, next month, or even next year," he wrote in a commentary for the 38 North website. But North Korea's submarine-launched ballistic missiles could be operational by the second half of 2018, he wrote. Concurrent with making progress on its delivery systems, North Korea has also been refurbishing its old missile production infrastructure. Kim visited the January 18 General Machinery Plant, which makes sensitive missile components, at the end of last year and joked that it looked so good, visitors might think they were in a resort. While Bermudez warned against getting too excited about the most recent developments, saying they simply reinforce what had been seen previously, Lewis said the developments should disabuse anyone of the notion that North Korea was not serious about its missile program. "They're testing at a really fast rate because the program is real," he said. "The idea that this is a Potemkin missile program is just nonsense." (Anna Fifield, "These North Korean Missile Launches Are Adding up to Something Very Troubling," *Washington Post*, September 9, 2016) A Nodong or an extended-range Scud missile? A debate is raging over what type of ballistic missile North Korea launched on September 5. The Ministry of National Defense announced at the time that the North had launched three Nodong missiles, which had flown just over 1,000 km over the East Sea. The following morning, North Korea published an image of the launch in *Rodong Sinmun*. The conical warhead for the missile in that photograph was more reminiscent

of a Scud, differing from the “baby-bottle-neck” shape of the Nodong. The transporter erector launcher (TEL) in the photograph also appeared to be the four-wheeled vehicle reportedly used for the Scud, rather than five-wheeled kind used with previous Nodong missile launches. Contrary to the announcement by the Ministry of National Defense, experts suggested the missile launched may have been the Scud-ER, an improved version of the Scud. Scud ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea include the Scud-B, which has a range of 300 km; the Scud-C, with a range of 500 km; and the Scud-ER (extended range), with a range of 700 to 1,000 km. “The North Korean missile launched yesterday was slightly different in form from the Nodong missile launched in July,” observed University of North Korean Studies professor Kim Dong-yup. “From the size and other data, it does appear to be a Nodong missile, but the warhead is from the Scud series,” Kim continued. “It appears to be one of two things: Either the missile launched yesterday had a Nodong missile warhead that was improved and heavier, or it was a Scud-ER, which is a Scud that has been upgraded to give it longer range.” In response, the Ministry of National Defense said it had determined the missile fired on September 5 to be an “improved version of the Nodong.” “There are various types of Nodong missiles,” noted Joint Chiefs of Staff public relations office chief Col. Jeon Hakyu in a regular briefing by the Ministry of National Defense on June 6, affirming that the missile was an improved Nodong. Another military source said, “While the warhead on the missile launched by North Korea yesterday did look like [it was part of] the Scud series, South Korean and US intelligence authorities concluded from analysis of the missile’s trajectory and other factors yesterday that it was a Nodong missile and not a Scud-ER.” Regarding the four-wheeled TEL, the source said, “It looks like they’re trying to diversify their launch vehicles.” In a report on September 6, *Rodong Sinmun* said the launch exercises were “carried out to review reliability, including the flight safety and guidance accuracy of the improved ballistic rockets that have been placed in combat positions, and to judge and review the fighting capabilities of the Hwasong artillery units.” While the report did not specify whether the ballistic rocket was a Nodong or Scud, it did state that its performance had been improved. The Ministry of National Defense reportedly interpreted North Korea’s decision to change its Nodong missile warhead as possibly part of a development of different warheads toward the future goal of designing a nuclear warhead. “They may be examining what kind of warhead is appropriate for a nuclear warhead,” said one military official. Conical warheads typically descend at a faster rate than bottle-neck-shaped warheads at atmospheric reentry, due to their pointed end and streamlined angles. At the same time, the faster descent speed also means much more intense frictional heat and vibrations – which requires more advanced reentry technology. “It’s possible that improvements to North Korea’s reentry technology have made it capable of attaching a conical warhead to the Nodong missile in place of the previous baby-bottle-neck shape,” said a senior military official. The implication is that Pyongyang may be increasing the Nodong’s reentry speed to avoid interception by a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile system or Patriot missile. (Park Byong-su, “Scud or Nodong? Experts Puzzle over N. Korean Missile Launch,” *Hankyore*, September 7, 2016) In a troubling sign that Pyongyang has the capability to launch a precision attack on Japan, two of the three intermediate-range ballistic missiles it fired earlier this month had virtually identical trajectories and landing points. Sources familiar with defense matters say the North Korean missiles that landed in waters off



Hokkaido, Japan's northernmost main island, on September 5 show Pyongyang now can achieve a simultaneous and accurate launch of multiple projectiles. In addition, the missiles were most likely the Scud-ER (extended range) with a range of 1,000 kilometers, rather than the Rodong, which boasts a 1,300-km range, based on North Korea's released footage of the missiles and mobile platforms. All three missiles were fired 14 minutes past noon and flew about 1,000 km before landing in waters off Okushirito island of Hokkaido, all within Japan's exclusive economic zone. According to the sources, the second missile was fired about 30 seconds after the first one and the third was fired one second after the second projectile. The first and third missiles landed in waters about 240 km west of Okushirito island. The second missile fell within 10 km from where the other two projectiles dropped. The trajectories of the first and third were almost identical, according to the sources. The launches marked the first time that Pyongyang has succeeded in the simultaneous launching of three missiles with a range of 1,000 km. Defense analysts say an attack on a target by simultaneously firing missiles makes it harder for a missile defense system to track the projectiles and put up an effective defense. For example, an Aegis-equipped destroyer with Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force can intercept only up to two ballistic missiles at the same time in some cases, the analysts say. The North Korea's release on September 6 of a video of the missile launches showed that mobile platforms were used for firing. Japanese and South Korean officials believed that the missiles used in the test were the Scud-ER, rather than the Rodong, based on the number of wheels as well as the shape of the missile heads. The Scud-ER is slightly smaller than the Rodong. If the missiles were the Scud-ER, which have not been confirmed as being used in Pyongyang's previous tests, it means that the reclusive country has added another type of projectile that can target Japan. (Makino Yoshihiro, "Sept. 5 Launches Show North Korea's Ability to Hit Target," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 18, 2016)

KCNA: "Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA), provided field guidance to the fire drill of ballistic rockets by Hwasong artillery units of the KPA Strategic Force. **Hwasong artillery units of the KPA Strategic Force were involved in the drill. Those units are tasked to strike the bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces in the Pacific operational theatre in a contingency.** The drill was conducted to reexamine the reliability such as the flight security and guided accuracy of the improved ballistic rockets deployed for action, and to assess and inspect the capabilities of the units for action. Upon arriving at the firing site, he learned in detail about the plan for the drill and the tactical and technical specifications of the improved ballistic rockets. Then he issued an order to the commander of the Strategic Force to start the drill. The moment General Kim Rak Gyom shouted "Fire!" ballistic rockets flew into the sky in succession. The units' capability for fighting a real battle and the combat performance of the rockets were appreciated as perfect at the drill. Through the drill the Hwasong artillery units of the KPA Strategic Force demonstrated before the world their military might as a strong service capable of mounting a preemptive attack on the enemies any time and **from any place.** He expressed great satisfaction over the successful successive firing drill of ballistic rockets and congratulated the Hwasong artillery men of the KPA Strategic Force involved in the drill. **He stressed the need to continue making miraculous**

**achievements in bolstering up the nuclear force** one after another in this historic year when Juche Korea made an eye-opening curtain raiser by succeeding in the H-bomb test and set forth tasks of bringing the military deterrent on a higher stage by developing the Juche-oriented nuclear force in every way. The drill was observed by senior officials of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea including Ri Man Gon, Ri Pyong Chol and Kim Jong Sik and officials in the field of national defense science research." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Guides Fire Drill of Ballistic Rockets," September 6, 2016)

The North Korean regime of Kim Jong-un is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to develop nuclear weapons and missiles at the same time the government is begging international aid groups to provide flood relief. Jong Kwon, North Korea's counselor at the U.N. mission, sent an urgent email appeal for the aid – five days before Pyongyang set off its fifth underground nuclear test. Kwon wrote to several NGOs providing aid to North Korea on September 5, explaining that heavy rains and subsequent floods hit two provinces in the northeastern part of the country. Writing on behalf of Choe Son Hui, the new president of the Korea-America Private Exchange Society (KAPES), a Pyongyang front group that lobbies for foreign aid, Kwon stated that North Korea "would like to appeal to you all for an emergency support to the devastating flood damage area in [North Korea]," according to an email obtained by Inside the Ring. The North Korean counselor said heavy rains destroyed 17,180 houses and left 44,000 people homeless. A total of 10 people died and 15 are missing. "KAPES kindly requests you to find potentiality in your resources of supporting those people with whatever you can make," Kwon said. "It has been known that the primary necessities for them are food, shelter tent, blanket and medicine, etc." A second North Korean email told foreign groups that Pyongyang would allow monitoring of aid distribution – after the government diverted foreign aid intended for civilians to the North Korean military. North Korea "will allow monitor[ing] of the distribution of assistance," the email states. "In principle, it is necessary for all aid to go via Pyongyang," the email says, adding that "entry through the Tumen River Bridge can be allowed as an exception." "That exception can be decided once KAPES is told what, when, and how much aid is going." The emails coincided with a rare public appeal for flood relief published September 4 in KCNA. News reports from the region stated the floods are expected to cause more food shortages. Yonhap reported that North Korean food shortages will amount to some 600,000 tons less than is needed by the population. (Bill Gertz, "North Korea Seeks Aid While Building Nukes," *Washington Times*, September 14, 2016)

When South Korean President Park Geun-hye had a summit with her U.S. counterpart Barack Obama on the sideline of a G20 summit, the United States conducted a drill to launch the Minuteman III land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The launch is interpreted as a warning against the North Korean provocations and an expression of their support for the South Korea-U.S. leaders' announcement of a plan to respond to North Korean provocations with any measure. According to the U.S. Air Force on September 7, one Minuteman flew off the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California this evening. The missile flew 20 times faster than the speed of sound before plunging into the waters near the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. Air

Force said the Minuteman III missile carried a mock warhead. A U.S. Air Force official said that the launch was conducted to test the missile's accuracy and operability and confirm its effectiveness in providing nuclear deterrent for the U.S. mainland and allies. In February, the United States invited South Korean military officials to the Vandenberg Air Force Base to observe the test-launch of the Minuteman III for the first time. Then, the U.S. announced that it would defend South Korea with "all means" including the Minuteman III, which is one of the three main pillars of the U.S. nuclear umbrella together with the B-52 strategic bombers and nuclear submarines capable of sending up to three nuclear warheads to a location 13,000 kilometers away. The missile can strike the entire North Korea including Pyongyang, which is 9,360 kilometers away from the Vandenberg base. U.S. President Barack Obama, who publicly mentioned a plan to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea for the first time during a South Korea-U.S. summit, reportedly plans to withdraw his "no first use" promise. *The New York Times* cited multiple U.S. government officials as saying that Obama considered adopting the "no first use" nuclear doctrine to bolster his legacy as champion of a nuclear-free world, but is unlikely to forswear first use of nuclear weapons due to concerns among senior government officials. China and India declared such a principle in 1964 and 2003, respectively. (*Dong-A Ilbo*, "U.S. Launches ICBMs as Warning against N. Korea," September 8, 2016)

Schiller and Schmucker: "At 12:14 p.m. on September 5, 2016, North Korea launched three missiles within one minute of each other from a highway south of Pyongyang. All three launches were successful; the missiles reportedly each covered a distance of 1,000 km and landed about 240 km west of Okushirito Island, part of the Japanese prefecture of Hokkaido. The tests marked the first public demonstration of this missile, but the weapon itself is not new. Rumors surfaced more than 15 years ago that North Korea possessed this missile, and strong indications exist that it was part of a massive transfer of Soviet technology and know-how to the DPRK in the 1990s. KCNA published footage of the September 5 missile tests, showing three missiles lifting off in rapid succession from three transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) with less than a minute between the first and second launch and only a few seconds between the second and third. All three missiles were of the same type, now referred to as "Scud-ER" (for Extended Range) by some experts. The TELs that launched them are based on the Belarusian MAZ 543 chassis, which features four axles. They appear to be the kind generally used for Scud-B and Scud-C launches, with just a few minor modifications for the erector mechanism to hold the "new," longer missile. Measuring North Korean missile dimensions using the available low-quality photos and videos is always difficult, especially with regard to the length of internal propellant tanks. However, an iterative combined process of reconstruction and measurement allows for a consistent picture of the missile that is in line with the measured dimensions. The margin of error for these calculations is below 5 percent. The missile has a diameter slightly over 1 m and a total length of around 12.8 m. Its launch mass is 9.23 metric tons. Its launch acceleration of 1.4 g is low for a ballistic missile of its size, indicating the use of an existing engine not specifically designed for this rocket. Analysis shows that the low acceleration is precisely what one would expect from a missile of that size and weight equipped with a nominal S5.2/9D21 engine from the R-17/Scud-B missile. Its reported range of 1,000 km is thus only possible with a lightweight aluminum tank structure and

some modifications of the rocket's pressure system, including a torus-shaped pressure tank located at the top. The rocket provides the maximum performance that a single Scud-B engine can achieve in a missile. The guidance system is housed inside the cylindrical section below the warhead, and the whole guidance and control system matches that of the original Scud-B. The burn time is 127.8 seconds, reflecting the limits of the original control system; the original Scud-B jet vanes also can operate for more than 120 seconds. A warhead weighing approximately 500 kg would separate after engine cutoff. **The launch preparation time, however, is longer than for the Scud-B; the recently tested missile probably cannot be transported in fueled condition due to its aluminum tank structure, requiring it to be fueled just before launch.** Available footage indicates that the missile uses kerosene and another liquid propellant called inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA), the same propellants used for Scud missiles as well as the larger Nodong missile. For decades, North Korea relied on so-called Scud technology for its missiles. The Scud-B, the Scud-C, the Nodong, the elusive Scud-D, the Taepodong-1 satellite launcher and the Unha satellite launchers all used this proven Soviet technology type. It is clear by now that North Korea received massive support from Soviet/Russian entities in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Scud technology became the backbone of the North Korean rocket programs. This explains North Korea's focus on these technologies, as well as its quick row of successes over these years. **The first launch attempts for the solid-fueled KN-11 submarine-launched ballistic missile in 2015 and the liquid-fueled Musudan in 2016 seemed to represent a shift toward different technologies, away from the Scud-focused designs that appeared in the 1990s.** This is still true because the "new" Scud missile is not a new missile. Around 2000, rumors circulated that North Korea had made more missiles available for export than just the Scud-B, the Scud-C and the Nodong—the only missiles it was known to have launched, if only a few times. One of these mysterious other missiles was said to be a wrung-out Scud with a diameter of 1.025 m, a total length of more than 12 m and a launch mass of 9.3 metric tons. According to rumors, the weapon had a range of 1,000 km with a 500-kg warhead. The data indicated a very ambitious design beyond North Korea's proven capabilities, but because the missile was never seen and no indications emerged of development work, observers dismissed reports of the weapon as part of a North Korean disinformation campaign. At the same time, another Scud version that was designated the Scud-D was allegedly transferred to Syria, where one was fired in September 2000 over a distance of roughly 700 km. No photos of this missile have surfaced, but analysts generally assumed it was another conventional modification of the R-17/Scud-B family; with a diameter of 0.88 m and a length greater than 12 m. Such a weapon could carry a 500-kg warhead farther than 700 km. Considering Iraq's effort to extend the range of its Scud arsenal in the late 1980s, this modification seemed to reflect a logical design path. Yet the rumored Scud-D has remained elusive. Syria reportedly launched more of these missiles from 2005 and onward, but the details were not consistent with the Scud-D as it was depicted in literature. Only three launches of the Scud-D were ever reported from North Korea (in 2006 and 2009), but their range was little more than 400 km—far short of the Scud-D's estimated range—and no photos were ever published. It remains unknown if this Scud-D actually exists, if the "new" North Korean 1-m Scud version actually is the Scud-D that also found its way to Syria, or if a 0.88-m Scud-D was ever launched in North Korea. Clues to these

questions might be hidden in a group of mysterious drawings found by Indian port authorities on the North Korean freighter Kuwolsan harbored in Kandla in 1999. Certain details did not add up when analysts initially interpreted the drawings as diagrams of the Scud-D missile, but another look reveals striking similarities with the "new" 1-m diameter Scud. Numbers written alongside the missile sketch are a near-perfect match for the "new" missile's estimated dimensions. The diagram depicts an engine compartment that is 1,884 mm in length, with tanks that add up to 7,800 mm in length. The 2,260 mm separable warhead is shorter than that of a Scud-B, and looks a little smaller in diameter than the rest of the missile. There is a 462 mm section between the warhead and the tanks. This makes the total length 12,406 mm, somewhat short of the measured 12.8 m. However, clearly visible in photos of the "new" missile is a section between the warhead and the tank consisting of two parts, one of them cylindrical and with the smaller warhead diameter, the other conical, and both around 45 cm long. This leads to an interesting hypothesis for this missile's origins. It seems that the "new" Scud was already available around 2000, with detailed designs floating around. As for the other North Korean missiles of that era, no development program was ever observed in North Korea. According to our research, it is clear that the Scud-B and Scud-C were both transferred to North Korea from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and there are strong indications that the same had happened with the Nodong. There was also a strong connection to the Makeyev Design Bureau, with the observed designs originating from Makeyev, and with several reports stating that engineers or designers from Makeyev tried to travel (or successfully traveled, depending on the report) to North Korea around 1992. This raises the question of whether there also is a Soviet equivalent to the "new" Scud missile. And it seems that there is one, again linked to the Makeyev Design Bureau. As others have explained, Makeyev started a performance improvement program for the Scud-B in 1963, in cooperation with the Machine Plant No. 235 in Votkinsk. It seems that the Scud-C was not the only result of this cooperation. At the same time, there was a request from the Red Army for a missile capable of hurling a 500 kg warhead up to roughly 1,000 km. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty later referred to the missile that fulfilled this requirement as the OTR-22, and its Soviet system name was Temp-S, system GRAU number 9K76. A declassified DIA report from 1974 mentions Scud missile versions being developed for "ranges considerably above the ranges presently assessed," and "the longer ranges reported are inconsistent with one another." One of these advanced Scuds was the Scud-C. Another version could have been the "new" North Korean Scud, developed as a rival system for the 1,000 km requirement, combining the improved Scud-C design with the newly mastered aluminum airframe technology. Except for the fins, the "new" missile's dimensions nearly matched those of the OTR-22 (which had grid fins that were folded closely to the missile body during transport). The "new" missile would probably even fit into the oddly shaped transport container of the old Soviet Temp-S system, and the Temp-S warhead has about the same diameter as the "new" missile's body. If you look at the Scud-B, Scud-C, Scud-D and Scud-ER, the path is sensible, smart, and logical. It seems as if a single design team took a stepwise approach by increasing the basic Scud's range to 500 km, 700 km and 1,000 km, at the same time reducing the warhead weight while pursuing new design solutions only where necessary. This path resembles the development of many other Soviet rocket lines, including the R-1/R-2/R-5 line, the R-

12/R-14/R-16 line and the famous R-7/Soyuz line. This does not necessarily mean that the "new" missile is actually an old Soviet missile, but this hypothesis is consistent with every other missile activity that has been observed in North Korea in the past 30 years. Even if the Scud-ER was based on a Russian design and modified by domestic engineering, this missile is not new. As previously mentioned, the very Russian design was already present in North Korea in the 1990s, when massive technology transfers from Russia had started what is now known as the ever increasing North Korean missile threat. It seems strange that North Korea would develop just another missile with a range of around 1,000 km. The Nodong already covers this distance with a 1 t warhead, and more than that with a 500 kg warhead. There is some belief that the Scud-ER may have been a cheaper alternative to produce or perhaps a backup to the Nodong, however, every development program requires time and money, tying up precious resources and personnel for a significant amount of time. Redundant access to an already accessible strike range is a luxury that North Korea would seem not to be able to afford. Some sources indicate that this missile already was available in North Korea in the late 1990s, when the country had just received massive transfers of Soviet/Russian technology. It seems plausible that the "new" missile was part of this deal and only has been revealed now at a time when North Korea wants to show to the world that it is not a missile 'paper tiger,' but a nation that can surprise anyone anytime with its quickly evolving capabilities on the missile sector. It is unknown how many of these missiles are actually in North Korean hands, but seeing large numbers in the future would be a surprise. Because the area within range of the country's missiles has not expanded and the "new" missile requires significant time to fuel at the launch site, the North Korean missile threat remains fundamentally unchanged. It cannot be ruled out, though, that additional Soviet-era missile designs still unknown to the West could become the basis for more North Korean missiles in the near future." (Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, "Flashback to the Past: North Korea's 'New' Extended-Range Scud," *38North*, November 8, 2016)

9/6/16

The U.N. Security Council strongly condemned North Korea's latest ballistic missile launches and threatened "further significant measures" if it refuses to stop its nuclear and missile tests. The U.N.'s most powerful body agreed to the statement hours after a closed-door emergency meeting called by the United States, Japan and South Korea in response to North Korea's firing of three missiles yesterday that traveled about 1,000 km (620 miles) and landed near Japan. The council gave no indication of what "further significant measures" it might take if North Korea continues conducting tests and trying to enhance its nuclear arms capabilities. The U.S., Japan and South Korea made clear after the council meeting that they want further action, but also didn't specify what. The press statement urged all U.N. member states "to redouble their efforts" to implement sanctions against Pyongyang, including the toughest measures in two decades imposed by the council in March. Those sanctions reflected growing anger at Pyongyang's nuclear test in January and a subsequent rocket launch. The council expressed serious concern that North Korea carried out the latest launches "in flagrant disregard" of its demands. (Associated Press, ""North Korea Missile Tests Fired toward Japan Draw Strong UNSC Condemnation," *Japan Times*, September 7, 2016) UNSC Press Statement: "The members of the Security Council strongly condemned the ballistic missile launches conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on

5 September 2016. These launches are in grave violation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's international obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council deplore all Democratic People's Republic of Korea ballistic missile activities, including these launches, noting that such activities contribute to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension. The members of the Security Council further regretted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is diverting resources to the pursuit of ballistic missiles while Democratic People's Republic of Korea citizens have great unmet needs. The members of the Security Council expressed serious concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted these ballistic missile launches after the 15 April, 23 April, 27 April, 28 April, 31 May, 21 June, 9 July, 18 July, 2 August and 23 August launches, in flagrant disregard of the repeated statements of the Security Council. The members of the Security Council reiterated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall refrain from further actions, including nuclear tests, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and comply fully with its obligations under these resolutions. The members of the Security Council called upon all Member States to redouble their efforts to implement fully the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the Security Council, particularly the comprehensive measures contained in resolution 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council directed the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to intensify its work to strengthen enforcement of resolution 2270 (2016) and assist Member States to comply with their obligations under that resolution and other relevant resolutions. The members of the Security Council also called on Member States to report as soon as possible on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of resolution 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large, expressed their commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomed efforts by Council members, as well as other States, to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue. The members of the Security Council stress the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. The members of the Security Council agreed that the Security Council would continue to closely monitor the situation and take further significant measures in line with the Council's previously expressed determination." (UN Spokesman, "Security Council Press Statement on DPRK Ballistic Missile Launches," September 6, 2016)

The conflict between South Korea and China caused by President Park Geun-hye's decision to allow the deployment of a powerful U.S. antimissile system remained unresolved today as her emotional appeal to persuade Chinese President Xi Jinping faced adamant opposition. Park and Xi had a bilateral summit in the morning on the sidelines of the Group of 20 conference in Hangzhou, China. During the 46-minute meeting, the two leaders mainly discussed the escalating controversy over Seoul and Washington's decision to place the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. While Seoul and Washington repeatedly stressed that the antimissile system is to deter Pyongyang's nuclear and missile provocations, Beijing and Moscow have shown concerns that its powerful radar will be used to spy on them.

At the meeting, the first since Seoul announced the deployment plan in July, Park made extensive appeals to Xi to defend her decision. She said the South Korean people's concerns regarding the North's threats are warranted, following the North's long-range missile firing in June and submarine-launched ballistic missile firing in August. "The seriousness of the threats that we feel appear to be different from that felt by China," Park told Xi. "Because I carry the grave responsibility on my little shoulder to protect the lives of 50 million people, I was grappling day and night to find a way to protect the people from the North's nuclear and missile threats." Park told Xi, according to Kim Kyou-hyun, senior presidential secretary for foreign affairs and national security. She also assured Xi that the THAAD will only be used to counter the North. "There is no reason and no need for it to infringe upon the security of a third country," Park said. "Once the nuclear and missile issues are resolved, it will no longer be needed." Xi, however, made clear China's opposition. "Mishandling the issue is not conducive to strategic stability in the region, and could intensify conflicts," he was quoted as saying by Xinhua. (Ser Myo-ja, "Park Xi Fail to Narrow Differences over THAAD," *JoongAng Ilbo*, September 6, 2016)

Agence France-Presse (AFP) announced the opening of a new overseas bureau in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. AFP will primarily provide videos and photos to thousands of clients around the world, the news outlet said in a report dispatched from Pyongyang. AFP is the fourth foreign media company that has established a presence in the isolated country, following the US-based Associated Press, China's Xinhua News Agency and Japan's Kyodo News. "The opening of this bureau fills a gap in the AFP network of some 200 bureaus in 150 countries," the report quoted its Chairman Emmanuel Hoog as having said during the opening ceremony. During a meeting with Kim Chang-gwang, the president of the North's state-run Korean Central News agency, Hoog also said "AFP is committed to freedom of information and freedom of expression, which form part of its founding values," according to the report. The bureau is the result of the two news agencies' agreement earlier this year. AFP will hire and train local reporters to cover developments in the country and dispatch correspondents to the North on a regular basis to file reports. (Yonhap, "AFP Opens New Bureau in Pyongyang: AFP Report," September 7, 2016)

President Obama vowed to toughen international sanctions against North Korea after its government conducted a missile test launch as world leaders gathered for summits in Asia. Speaking with reporters after a meeting in Vientiane, the Laotian capital, with South Korean President Park Geun-hye, Obama said that the two agreed to work "diligently together" on the most recent United Nations sanctions against North Korea to close loopholes "and make them even more effective." "The entire international community needs to implement these sanctions fully and hold North Korea accountable," Obama said on the sidelines of a summit of Southeast Asian leaders in his last presidential trip to the continent. Park told reporters that North Korea's acts were "fundamentally threatening" and that she and Obama had agreed to "respond resolutely" to the defiance of international demands that North Korea end its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Obama believes the U.S. and South Korea have to be vigilant in sanctions enforcement, aides said. "We want to make sure we're cutting off all the lifelines that North Korea tries to grab on to," said deputy national security advisor Ben



Rhodes. Obama also said the U.S. was still open to the possibility of talks with North Korea if Pyongyang were to recognize its international obligations and work to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. "The opportunities for us to dialogue with them are there," Obama said. The U.S. has no interest in an "offensive approach" to North Korea, he said. (Christi Parsons, "Obama vows to Tighten Sanctions on North Korea after Missile Launch," *Los Angeles Times*, September 16, 2016)

9/7/16

DPRK FoMin spokesman "as regards the fact that the UN Security Council took issue with the DPRK's routine ballistic rocket launch exercise: At the UN Security Council on September 6 the U.S. and its followers cooked up a press release again in which they found fault with the DPRK's measure for bolstering up nuclear deterrence for self-defense. The DPRK categorically rejects this as an intolerable act of encroaching upon its dignity, right to existence, sovereignty and right to self-defense. The recent ballistic rocket launch exercise of the Korean People's Army was successfully conducted without giving any negative impact to the security of the countries around the DPRK and the international waters as before. The UN Security Council is not uttering a word about the brigandish act of the U.S. which is conducting nuclear war exercises for aggression after introducing huge nuclear war means including strategic assets into the Korean peninsula but is taking issue with the DPRK's legitimate measure for self-defense. This is utterly illogical. The more viciously the UN Security Council finds fault with the DPRK's legitimate measures for self-defense by siding with the U.S., arch criminal harassing peace and security on the Korean peninsula, the more glaringly it will reveal its true colors as an unfair good-for-nothing entity before the international community. The DPRK will continue to expand the signal successes of bolstering up the nuclear force in a phased way in this historic year when it started with the solemn blast of the first H-bomb test of Juche Korea." (KCNA, "DPRK FM Spokesman Rejects UNSC Press Statement," September 7, 2016)

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DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement: "Obama on his visit to Laos to take part in East Asian Summit at a recent joint press conference said the DPRK's continued ballistic rocket launches are "provocative" and that its nuclear and ballistic rocket program poses "threats" to the partners in the region and the U.S., adding that "provocation" would entail increased pressure and he would try to make sanctions against the DPRK more effective. ...Obama's reckless remarks are nothing but last-ditch efforts to dodge the criticism of the hostile policy toward the DPRK mounting inside and outside the U.S. and give a further boost to the international atmosphere of pressure on the DPRK. The only way of averting a war and defending peace in Korea, the world's biggest hotspot where constant danger of a nuclear war lingers due to the U.S. which is staging joint military exercises for a preemptive nuclear attack on the DPRK after introducing lots of strategic assets, is to increase in every way the military capabilities for self-defense with the nuclear deterrence as a pivot. ...The U.S. is talking about dialogue and negotiations while slapping unprecedentedly harsh economic sanctions against the DPRK and kicking up conspiratorial "human rights" racket in league with hostile forces. This is an intolerable mockery and insult to the DPRK. The best way for the U.S. to escape deadly blows of the DPRK is to exercise self-prudence and self-restraint, not encroaching upon the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK. The DPRK will take multi-phased eventful measures for doubling its capabilities for nuclear attack to cope with

the U.S. vicious hostile policy toward the DPRK aimed to dare threaten its sovereignty and right to existence, the statement warned." (KCNA, "DPRK FM Spokesman Slams Obama's Reckless Remarks," September 8, 2016)

9/9/16

North Korea defiantly celebrated its fifth nuclear test Friday, claiming that it can now make warheads small enough to fit onto a missile and warning its "enemies" – specifically the United States – that it has the ability to counter any attack. Although the North's proclaimed advancements could not be verified – and Pyongyang has a track record of exaggeration – the test appeared to mark another step toward North Korea's goal of putting a nuclear warhead on a weapon capable of reaching the mainland United States. Today's test – the North's second this year – underscored the ability of Kim Jong Un's regime to make progress on its nuclear and missile programs despite waves of international sanctions and isolation. "This is our response to hostile powers, including the United States. We are sending out a message that if the enemies attack us, we can counterattack," Ri Chun Hee, the veteran North Korean newsreader, said on state television. "We will continue taking measures to protect our dignity and our right to exist from the American threat." The test also appeared to be much bigger than North Korea's previous four detonations since its first in 2006. The U.S. Geological Survey detected an artificial 5.3-magnitude earthquake near North Korea's nuclear test site at 9 a.m. local time today, the 68th anniversary of the formation of the communist regime by Kim Il Sung, the current leader's grandfather, and a national holiday. "This is clearly a nuclear test," said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia nonproliferation program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif. He estimated the size at between 10 and 20 kilotons. The North's last nuclear test, carried out in January, was about six kilotons. The test happened just a few hours after President Obama's plane stopped in Japan to refuel on his way home from Laos, where he had been attending the Asean summit. The president talked to South Korea's president, Park Geun-hye, who was still in Laos, and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, said White House press secretary Josh Earnest. "The president reiterated the unbreakable U.S. commitment to the security of our allies in Asia and around the world," Earnest said. "The president indicated he would continue to consult our allies and partners in the days ahead to ensure provocative actions from North Korea are met with serious consequences." China, the closest thing North Korea has to an ally, issued a statement "resolutely" opposing the test, which took place "despite the widespread objection of the international community." "We strongly urge North Korea to keep its promise to denuclearize, to abide by relevant resolutions from the U.N. Security Council and to stop making any moves that worsen the situation," the statement from China's foreign ministry said. In its official announcement of what it said was a "nuclear warhead explosion test," North Korea claimed that it had been able to make "smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power." "This has definitely put on a higher level the [country's] technology of mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets," said the statement, carried by KCNA. This test seemed to have a dual purpose, said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. "Domestically, Kim Jong Un wants to present himself as a strong leader standing strong against the U.S." he said, suggesting this could be because Kim, at 32, is young but also perhaps because recent high-level defections have raised speculation of cracks in the regime. "Internationally, this test is designed to

show that sanctions imposed against North Korea and international pressure are not working. They're urging the world to accept its failure and revise its North Korea policy," Yang said. Today's test highlights North Korea's continued defiance, but also the ineffectiveness of even the most recent waves of tough sanctions imposed after the nuclear test in January, analysts said. "The whole expectation eight or nine months ago was that sanctions were finally going to bring North Korea to heel, but clearly that is not the case," said David Kang, a professor of international relations at the University of Southern California. "Clearly they respond to pressure with pressure of their own." Still, the international community would look for ways to inflict more pain on North Korea, which is already under sweeping sanctions. "North Korea's desperate dependence on nuclear development is testimony to Kim Jong Un's fanatical recklessness," said South Korea's President Park, who cut short her visit to Laos to return to Seoul. North Korea's provocations will do nothing but accelerate its self-destruction." In Tokyo, Prime Minister Abe also struck an angry tone. "If North Korea conducted a nuclear test, I can't absolutely tolerate it," he said. "We have to strongly protest." But Kim has not wavered, testing a range of missiles this year and apparently making some technological progress, including on a submarine-launched ballistic missile. "There's now obvious progress in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. They seem to be making precisely the technical progress that people don't want," said Euan Graham, a security expert at the Lowy Institute in Sydney who once served as a British diplomat in Pyongyang. "North Korea is obviously prepared to take the economic pain and is able to continue to materially supply the two programs." (Anna Fifield, "N. Korea Carries out Nuclear Test, Experts Say," *Washington Post*, September 9, 2016 p. A-1) South Korean President Park Geun Hye condemned the test -- calling it an action of "maniacal recklessness" -- and warned Kim Jong Un's moves would lead to North Korea's self-destruction. The blast set off an artificial earthquake around 9:30am Seoul time, with the defense ministry saying the explosion was 10 kilotons. The United States Geological Survey put the quake magnitude at 5.3. Secretary of State John Kerry, meeting in Geneva with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Friday about Syria, said he spoke with the South Korean and Japanese foreign ministers and "everybody shares concerns" about North Korea's latest action. He said he expects the U.S. to discuss this in the context of the UN. Lavrov said he expects to speak with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and that the UN Security Council resolutions "must be implemented and we will send this message very strongly." Han Yong-Sup, a professor at the Korea National Defense University and former adviser to the National Security Council standing committee and foreign ministry, said he believed North Korea had achieved miniaturization. "They are at the stage of giving final touches to make it fit onto" intercontinental or submarine launched ballistic missiles, he said. "They probably can already fit on Rodong missiles." "I personally thought it would conduct the test in December. To advance the date means it is trying to show they have everything ready before the next U.S. administration starts its term." (Seyoon Kim, Hooyeon Kim, and Shinhye Kang, "North Korea Says Tested Nuclear Bombs, Can Miniaturize Arms," *Bloomberg News*, September 9, 2016) The first sign of the North's fifth nuclear test was the detection of a tremor with a magnitude of around 5.0 by seismic research centers around the globe. A South Korean defense ministry official told reporters the military detected an artificial tremor with a magnitude of 5.0 at 9:30 a.m. at the North's Punggye-ri nuclear site in northeastern North Hamgyong Province, the site used for the

North's past four nuclear underground tests. The official said given the magnitude, the Friday blast was likely to have produced around 10 kilotons in yield. The January test created a 4.8-magnitude artificial tremor. "The magnitude of the earthquake this time was 5.04, the largest ever done by the North, including its January test with a 4.8 magnitude tremor," said Kim Nam-wook, director of the earthquake and volcano department of the Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA). "The origin of the blast was about 0.9 kilometers (0.5 miles) west of the origin of the January test and it is estimated that the blast occurred 700 meters underground." Although the weapons tested have been getting stronger, the one blasted in January was actually weaker than its predecessor. According to the KMA, the North's first nuclear test in 2006 produced a 3.9-magnitude tremor and the second test in 2009 produced a 4.5-magnitude tremor. The third test in 2013 produced a 4.9-magnitude tremor while the test in January produced a 4.8-magnitude tremor. It is estimated that the January test produced 6 kilotons of yield, which was less than the 8-kiloton yield of the third nuclear test in 2013. The North's second nuclear test in 2009 had 2-kiloton yield, and the first in 2006 yielded less than 1 kiloton in total energy. The yield of today's test could be slightly higher as estimates of the tremor's magnitude differed among earthquake observation posts overseas. Both the U.S. Geological Survey and the European Mediterranean Seismological Centre said they had detected a tremor with a magnitude of 5.3. Yim Man-sung, professor of nuclear energy environment and security at KAIST told the *JoongAng Ilbo* that the fact that the North waited only eight months for its fifth test was a telling sign that it had "secured ample nuclear materials" to be used on experiments. Yim added Pyongyang was getting to a point where it could mass-produce nuclear weapons. "The reason Seoul and Washington are putting so much pressure on the North (to give up its nuclear program) is that if left untouched, it could take a leap to make as many as 100 nuclear weapons via mass production (in the future)." (Kang Jin-kyu and Kang Chan-su, "North Korea's Fifth Nuclear Test Strongest Yet," *JoongAng Ilbo*, September 9, 2016)

DPRK Nuclear Weapons Institute statement: "Scientists and technicians of the DPRK carried out a nuclear explosion test for the judgment of the power of **a nuclear warhead newly studied** and manufactured by them at the northern nuclear test ground under the plan of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) for building strategic nuclear force. The Central Committee of the WPK sent warm congratulations to nuclear scientists and technicians of the northern nuclear test ground on the successful nuclear warhead explosion test. **The nuclear test finally examined and confirmed the structure and specific features of movement of nuclear warhead that has been standardized to be able to be mounted on strategic ballistic rockets of the Hwasong artillery units of the Strategic Force of the Korean People's Army** as well as its performance and power. It was confirmed through the results of analysis of the test that the measured values including explosion might and the nuclear material usage coefficient conformed with the calculated values and that there was no radioactive materials leakage during the test and, therefore, no adverse impact on the ecological environment of the surroundings. The standardization of the nuclear warhead will enable the DPRK to produce at will and as many as it wants a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power with a firm hold on the technology for producing and using various fissile materials. This has

definitely put on a higher level the DPRK's technology of mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets. The nuclear warhead explosion test is a demonstration of the toughest will of the WPK and the Korean people to get themselves always ready to retaliate against the enemies if they make provocation as it is part of practical countermeasures to the racket of threat and sanctions against the DPRK kicked up by the U.S.-led hostile forces who have gone desperate in their moves to find fault with the sovereign state's exercise of the right to self-defense while categorically denying the DPRK's strategic position as a full-fledged nuclear weapons state. **The DPRK will take further measures to bolster the state nuclear force in quality and quantity for safeguarding its dignity and right to existence and genuine peace from the U.S. increasing threat of a nuclear war.**" (KCNA, "DPRK Succeeds in Nuclear Warhead Test Explosion," September 9, 2016)

Immediately after the artificial quake, South Korea's military held an emergency video conference headed by JCS Chairman Lee Sun-jin and placed its military forces on full alert so Seoul could react "sternly and strongly" in case of further provocations. **"If there is any sign of the use of nuclear weapons from North Korea, we will make a preemptive strike against the North's leadership in close cooperation with the U.S.,"** Leem Ho-young, chief director of the strategic planning directorate at JCS, told reporters at a briefing. It is the first time that the Seoul government has mentioned a preemptive strike against North Korea in case of signs of a nuclear attack by its northern neighbor. (Choi Kyong-ae and Kim Soo-yeon, "N. Korea Conducts 5<sup>th</sup> Nuclear Test," Yonhap, September 9, 2016) Top nuclear envoys of South Korea and the United States agreed on the need for "swift" and "tough" measures against North Korea, promising to closely cooperate in making Pyongyang give up its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, Seoul's foreign ministry said. Kim Hong-kyun, special representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs at the foreign ministry, held talks with his U.S. counterpart Sung Kim via phone and exchanged views on necessary steps in response to the North's nuclear test earlier in the day, according to the ministry. "The two shared the view that it is necessary to take swift and strong action through the Security Council, while agreeing to closely cooperate in (seeking) stronger sanctions including additional measures at the bilateral level," the ministry said. They also agreed to have a more "in-depth" discussion on the North's latest nuclear test and its ramifications when they meet in Seoul on Tuesday next week, it added. During the meeting with the parliament's diplomacy committee, Kim also said the government cannot rule out the possibility that Pyongyang will conduct a sixth nuclear test soon. "The government acknowledges that it failed to stop the development of North Korean nukes despite making various efforts. There will be various reviews on the matter," Kim added, when suggested that Seoul should come up with a new strategy by lawmakers. "Amid the escalating gravity of the situation, we will seek to impose further pressure on North Korea and induce them to change course when the United Nations agrees to hand down more sanctions," Kim also said. (Yonhap, "Nuke Envoys of S. Korea, U.S. Underline Need for 'Tough' Action against N.K.," September 9, 2016) The South Korean military has developed a new operational concept to annihilate Pyongyang with a barrage of pre-emptive missile firings once signs of a North Korean nuclear attack are detected, defense sources said Sunday. A source said the plan, dubbed, Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), is intended to launch pre-emptive

attacks on North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as well as the regime's military leadership if signs of their impending use of nuclear weapons are detected or in the event of a war. Under the KMPR, the military would divide Pyongyang into several districts and completely destroy a certain section in which Kim and other military leadership are suspected to be hiding, before they use a nuclear weapon, the source noted. "In other words, the North's capital city will be reduced to ashes and removed from the map," the source said. The disclosure of the detailed operation came after the isolated state conducted its fifth nuclear test, Friday, claiming to have detonated a nuclear warhead successfully. In the wake of the test, observers say the North is now apparently in the final stages of making a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on a ballistic missile. The Ministry of National Defense reported details about the KMPR to the National Assembly in response to the North's latest nuclear test. The source said that the South Korean military plans to mobilize its locally developed surface-to-surface ballistic and cruise missiles, the Hyunmoo, for the operational concept. The Hyunmoo 2A and 2B ballistic missiles have ranges of 300 and 500 kilometers, respectively, while the Hyunmoo 3 cruise missile has a range of 1,000 kilometers. The military earlier said it plans to increase the number of Hyunmoo 2As, 2Bs and 3s that can simultaneously strike missile bases all across North Korea in a time of war. The source noted that the military is also planning to complete tests of its newly developed ballistic missile with a range of 800 kilometers by next year for operational deployment. "The KMPR is the ultimate operation concept the military can have in the absence of its own nuclear weapons," the source noted. Another source indicated the military has recently launched a special operational unit in charge of destroying the North Korean military leadership and launching retaliatory attacks on them. As part of allies' efforts, the United States plans to dispatch a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to South Korea next month in a show of force to deter further military provocations by the North. The USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) will sail to the West and South Seas to participate in a joint naval exercise with the South Korean military. The drill is slated for October 10 to 15, officials said, adding that the exercise will focus on training the allies' naval forces on joint precision attacks on the North's key military facilities and the regime's leadership that would be launched in the event of a war with the reclusive state. Commissioned in 2003, the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier has more than 80 combat aircraft, including the F/A-18, EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft and E-2C airborne early warning planes. It can carry about 5,000 sailors. For their part, top nuclear envoys from South Korea and China agreed to communicate and work together to halt the North's nuclear ambitions, according to the foreign ministry here, September 10. Kim Hong-kyun, Seoul's special representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs at the ministry, spoke with his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei on the phone and discussed countermeasures in response to the North's nuclear test. "Both agreed to keep open the lines of communication and cooperate with each other with regard to the North's nuclear issue, including future countermeasures," the ministry said in a press release. During the talks, Wu mentioned that China has made it clear that Beijing strongly objected to the North's nuclear test, noting that China will never recognize the North as a nuclear state, nor will it condone the country having nuclear weapons, according to the ministry. (Jun Ji-hye, "Military Ready to Destroy Pyongyang before Nuke Attack," *Korea Times*, September 11, 2016) North Korea conducted its fifth and most powerful nuclear test to date around 9:30 a.m. September 9, prompting Tokyo to

immediately file a protest amid concerns over accelerating developments in the North's nuclear and ballistic missile technologies. Tokyo lodged the protest through its embassy in Beijing, saying the test posed a "grave threat" to Japan, the region and international society, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide told a news conference. The United States and Japan are jointly urging the United Nations Security Council to convene an emergency meeting to condemn the North, Suga said. Pyongyang is known for its regular use of overblown rhetoric and few experts take any of its official statements at face value. But the country is believed to already possess dozens of intermediate ballistic missiles that can directly hit Japan, and to have already conducted five nuclear explosion tests so far. If Pyongyang succeeds in producing a nuclear warhead small enough to be mounted on those ballistic missiles, the threat to Japan, and possibly to the U.S. as well, will dramatically increase. Defense Minister Inada Tomomi did not rule out such a scenario for Tokyo. "You cannot deny North Korea might have managed to make a nuclear warhead small enough to fit a ballistic missile," Inada said. Later in the day, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo held a teleconference with U.S. President Barack Obama, who was aboard Air Force One on his way home from Laos. During the 10-minute conversation, Obama told Abe he wants to make clear to Japan that the U.S. commitment to defend Japan is "unshakable," according to a senior Japanese official who briefed reporters in Tokyo. Japan is a military ally to the U.S., which is obliged under a bilateral security treaty to defend Japan if it is attacked by a third country. Abe, meanwhile, told Obama that the nuclear test violates U.N. Security Council resolutions and is totally unacceptable to Japan. The international community should take "a resolute response" and have the North pay "a price for its provocative actions," Abe told Obama, according to the Japanese official. Obama then said he "completely agreed" with Abe, the official said. During a news conference, Suga said Japan will consider slapping new economic sanctions on Pyongyang and will urge the U.N. Security Council to adopt a new resolution to punish the North. But Masao Okonogi, professor of Korean studies at Kyushu University, is skeptical of the effectiveness of any new sanctions given all past measures have failed to stop North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs. "We are running out of measures to stop North Korea," Okonogi told *Japan Times*. "The U.N. will probably adopt a new resolution, but won't be able to take any military action. All possible economic sanction measures have been already taken." China is North Korea's main trading partner and many diplomats argue that Beijing should ratchet up pressure on Pyongyang by threatening to cut off trade, in particular oil supplies. But if China pulls the plug on oil supplies to the North, the leadership of the hermit country could "go out of control" in despair, Okonogi warned. "Economic sanctions are better than nothing, but they won't solve all the problems," Okonogi said. "It's true China thinks denuclearization (of the North) is desirable. But Beijing doesn't want the North to collapse at the same time. So you shouldn't expect too much" from any action taken by China, he said. (Yoshida Reiji and Mie Ayako, "Japan Warn of Growing North Korea Threat after Fifth Nuclear Test," *Japan Times*, September 9, 2016) North Korea's latest test of an atomic weapon leaves the United States with an uncomfortable choice: Stick with a policy of incremental sanctions that has clearly failed to stop the country's nuclear advances, or pick among alternatives that range from the highly risky to the repugnant. A hard embargo, in which Washington and its allies block all shipping into and out of North Korea and seek to paralyze its finances, risks confrontations that allies in Asia fear could quickly

escalate into war. But restarting talks on the North's terms would reward the defiance of its young leader, Kim Jong-un, with no guarantee that he will dismantle the nuclear program irrevocably. Speaking in Geneva early the morning of September 10 after announcing a deal with Russia over the Syrian conflict, Secretary of State John Kerry said the United States was willing to negotiate with North Korea, but only if it agreed that the goal of those talks was for it to give up its weapons. "We have made overture after overture to the dictator of North Korea," he said, including on normalizing the country's relationship with the West and a formal peace agreement to replace the 1953 armistice. "All Kim Jong-un needs to do is say, 'I'm prepared to talk about denuclearization,'" Kerry said. For more than seven years, President Obama has adopted a policy of gradually escalating sanctions that the White House once called "strategic patience." But the test – the North's fifth and most powerful blast yet, perhaps with nearly twice the strength of its last one – eliminates any doubt that that approach has failed and that the North has mastered the basics of detonating a nuclear weapon. "This is not a cry for negotiations," said Victor Cha, who served in the administration of President George W. Bush and now is a North Korea expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "This is very clearly a serious effort at amassing real nuclear capabilities that they can use to deter the U.S. and others." Cha said the usual response from Washington, Seoul and Tokyo – for another round of sanctions – was not likely to be any more successful at changing the North's behavior than previous rounds. That means Obama's successor will confront a nuclear and missile program far more advanced than the one Obama began grappling with in 2009. In a statement today, Obama condemned the North's test and said it "follows an unprecedented campaign of ballistic missile launches, which North Korea claims are intended to serve as delivery vehicles intended to target the United States and our allies." He said, "To be clear, the United States does not, and never will, accept North Korea as a nuclear state." Many experts who have dealt with North Korea say the United States may have no choice but to do so. "It's too late on the nuclear weapons program – that is not going to be reversed," William Perry, the defense secretary under President Bill Clinton during the 1994 nuclear crisis with North Korea, said in August at a presentation in Kent, Conn. The only choice now, he argued, is to focus on limiting the missile program. Yet the latest effort to do that, an agreement between the United States and South Korea to deploy an advanced missile defense system in the South, has inflamed China, which argues the system is also aimed at its weapons. While American officials deny that, the issue has divided Washington and Beijing so sharply that it will be even more difficult now for them to come up with a joint strategy for dealing with the North. China has been so vocal with its displeasure over the deployment of the American system that Kim may have concluded he could afford to upset Beijing by conducting today's test. Fueling that perception were reports that a North Korean envoy visited Beijing earlier this week. "North Korea almost certainly sees this as an opportunity to take steps to enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities with little risk that China will do anything in response," Evans J.R. Revere, a former State Department official and North Korea specialist, said in a speech in Seoul today. The breach between China and the United States was evident during Obama's meeting with President Xi Jinping last week. "I indicated to him that if the THAAD bothered him, particularly since it has no purpose other than defensive and does not change the strategic balance between the United States and China, that they need to work with us



more effectively to change Pyongyang's behavior," Obama said. But Obama noted that sanctions had failed at having much effect. That is largely because the Chinese have left open large loopholes that have kept the North Korean economy alive and, by some measures, enjoying more trade than at any time in years. In a recent paper, two researchers concluded that sanctions so far "have had the net effect of actually improving" North Korea's procurement capabilities for its weapons program. To evade sanctions, the North's state-run trading companies opened offices in China, hired more capable Chinese middlemen and paid higher fees to employ more sophisticated brokers, according to the scholars Jim Walsh of M.I.T. and John Park of Harvard. The sanctions, Cha noted, "are supposed to inflict enough pain so the regime comes back to the negotiation table, and that's clearly not working; or it's supposed to collapse the regime until it starves, and that's not working either." He said, "Unless China is willing to cut off everything, which they don't appear willing to do, the sanctions may be politically the right thing to do and a requisite response, but they are not the answer to the problem." That means the choices facing Obama's successor will be stark. One option is to choke off all trade, in part by telling banks that conduct transactions with North Korea that they will be shut out of dealing in dollars around the world – an effective tactic against Iran before last year's nuclear deal. But that would enrage the Chinese, and probably cut into cooperation on other issues. At the same time, an attempt to intercept all shipping could quickly escalate into a full-blown conflict, something neither Obama nor the South Koreans and Japanese have been willing to risk. On the other hand, reopening negotiations, which Donald J. Trump has indicated he is willing to consider, could mean paying North Korea again to freeze nuclear activities that the Bush administration and the Clinton administration had already rewarded it for stopping years ago. Today, the test became fodder for the American presidential campaign. Mr. Trump's campaign issued a statement that read, in part, "North Korea's fifth nuclear test, the fourth since Hillary Clinton became secretary of state, is yet one more example of Hillary Clinton's catastrophic failures as secretary of state." A statement from Mrs. Clinton said that she supported Obama's approach on sanctions, and that "this is another reminder that America must elect a president who can confront the threats we face with steadiness and strength." The explosive energy unleashed during the test today, estimated at 10 to 12 kilotons of TNT, was nearly twice that of the North's last test, conducted in January, said Yoo Yong-gyu, a senior seismologist at South Korea's National Meteorological Administration. And the fact that North Korea's fifth test came only eight months after its fourth is another indication that it is making fast progress toward fitting its ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, said Choi Kang, a senior analyst at the Asan Institute. The North had waited about three years between each of its previous tests. North Korea's advances have unnerved its neighbors in South Korea and Japan, and Trump's suggestion that the two nations should pay more for the United States to defend them has not helped. In both South Korea and Japan, a small but increasingly vocal minority has begun to advocate developing nuclear weapons to counter the North instead of relying on the United States. Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute in Seongnam, south of Seoul, argued that a South Korean nuclear program might distract the North from its efforts to build a long-range missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the mainland United States. "If South Korea arms itself with nuclear weapons, North Korea will regard the South Korean nuclear weapons, not the distant American nukes,

as the most direct threat to its security," Cheong said. (David E. Sanger, reported from Geneva, Choe Sang-hun, and Jane Perlez, "List of Options on North Korea Shrinks for U.S." *New York Times*, September 10, 2016, p. A-1) One thing that the South Korean media has used to support the talk about a preemptive strike on North Korea is a remark made by White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest on September 22. During the regular press briefing at the White House, an American reporter asked, "Does the President have any particular plans for the [sic] North Korea, such as preemptive strikes?" Earnest's initial response was, "Well, I don't have any." "Just in general -- not specifically to North Korea -- as an operational matter, we're not going to discuss any preemptive military actions in advance," Earnest went on to say. The remarks suggest that there are no plans for preemptive military action and that, even if there were, he could not tell reporters about them for security reasons. It's an extreme leap of logic to interpret this as meaning that a preemptive strike is one of several options that the US government is considering in regard to North Korea. The same implication is confirmed in Earnest's following remarks. "More generally, what President Obama has said with regard to North Korea is that the international community needs to consider what additional steps we can take to further isolate the North Koreans, particularly in the aftermath of their latest nuclear test [ . . . ] And I know that there's work that's being done at the United Nations to consider what additional steps should be taken," he said. This is a reference to the UN Security Council's discussion of new sanctions against North Korea. It's nothing new, and it's a far cry from a preemptive strike. To ease my concern, I got in touch with an expert on North Korean affairs who is familiar with deliberations taking place in the US government. When I said that I didn't think the US government would be considering a preemptive strike, the expert told me I was correct. I brought up the same issue with a diplomatic source in Washington, "You don't need to worry about it," the source told me with a smile, pointing out that Obama had even considered declaring that the US would not use nuclear weapons preemptively. With the South Korean government dropping "verbal bombs" that are not feasible and only increase public anxiety in an attempt to gloss over the failure of its North Korean policy, it's too bad that the media feels the need to blindly follow suit. (Yi Yong-in, "The Truth behind the Fuss over Preemptive Strike on North Korea," *Hankyore*, September 26, 2016)

North Korea's fifth nuclear test is, ominous not only because the country is slowly mastering atomic weaponry, but because it is making headway in developing missiles that could hurl nuclear warheads halfway around the globe, threatening Washington and New York City. "They've greatly increased the tempo of their testing -- in a way, showing off their capabilities, showing us images of ground tests they could have kept hidden," John Schilling, an aerospace engineer and expert on North Korea's missile program, said in an interview today. "This isn't something that can be ignored anymore. It's going to be a high priority for the next president." Military experts say that by 2020, Pyongyang will most likely have the skills to make a reliable intercontinental ballistic missile topped by a nuclear warhead. They also expect that by then North Korea may have accumulated enough nuclear material to build up to 100 warheads. Siegfried S. Hecker, a Stanford professor who has traveled to North Korea and who formerly directed the Los Alamos weapons lab in New Mexico, the birthplace of the atomic bomb, said North Korea's progress in missile and nuclear development

signals that it has gone from seeing unconventional weapons as bargaining chips to “deciding they need a nuclear weapons fighting force.” The Pentagon warned Congress in a report earlier this year that one of Pyongyang’s latest missiles, if perfected, “would be capable of reaching much of the continental United States.” In congressional testimony, American officials have provided more details. Intelligence analysts, they say, now judge that North Korea can miniaturize a nuclear weapon, place it atop a missile and fire it at the United States – though the odds of a successful nuclear strike are seen as low. Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, head of the Pacific Command, last year summed up the deep concern. “All the indications are that we have to be prepared to defend the homeland,” he told the Senate Armed Services Committee. Jeffrey Lewis, a North Korea specialist at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey, in California, recently noted the grim implications of a test-firing on land that featured the debut of a powerful new engine. “That means that, rather than simply hitting the West Coast, an operational North Korean ICBM could probably reach targets throughout the United States, including Washington, D.C.,” he wrote in a blog. Pyongyang obtained its first wave of Russian rocket technology in the 1980s, giving it an ability to make Scuds, short-range missiles with engines that burn kerosene and emit smoky exhaust. Soon, the collapse of the Soviet rocket industry brought North Korea a second wave of far more potent technology. In one incident in late 1992, officials at a Moscow airport blocked a group of nearly two dozen missile experts, along with their wives and children, from traveling to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. “I have always believed that our work is the most important,” Yuri Bessarabov, one of the rocket scientists, told Moscow News. “But it has turned out that we are unnecessary.” By the time President Obama took office, in January 2009, Pyongyang had deployed hundreds of short- and medium-range missiles that used motors of Russian design, and had exported hundreds of the weapons armed with conventional warheads to countries including Egypt, Iran and Syria. Typically, the countries bought Scuds. At this time, North Korea was also developing the new generation of missiles powered by a much more advanced engine. Western intelligence analysts were alarmed to discover that the new engine derived from the R-27, a compact missile made for Soviet submarines that had carried a nuclear warhead. Its creator was the Makeyev Design Bureau, an industrial complex in the Ural Mountains whose rogue experts had been detained at the Moscow airport. The engine jacked up heat, thrust and range, outpacing the Scud motor. And its propellants were more energetic than the old kerosene fuels. They were hypergolic. That meant the ingredients, when mixed, ignited spontaneously in powerful blasts. They made the smoky kerosene look archaic. The engine was being developed to power a new missile known as the Musudan, named after Pyongyang’s main launching site. The greater thrust of its single engine translated into greater range. Analysts warned that the missile’s warhead might fly for up to 2,400 miles – far enough to hit the American base at Guam but shy of the minimum intercontinental range of 3,400 miles. At a military parade in late 2010, Pyongyang unveiled its R-27 spinoff, giving substance to years of American intelligence warnings. The Musudan turned out to be 5 feet wide and 40 feet long – remarkably small compared to North Korea’s large missiles, which military analysis saw as sitting ducks. The smaller missiles displayed that day were transported on trucks and could be hauled on country roads through forested regions or kept in tunnels, making them easy to hide and, as a target, difficult

to find and destroy. Pyongyang also used the R-27 engine design as a building block to make compact missiles that could fire warheads between continents. The KN-08 missile (Korea North military type 8) was powered by two of the advanced motors. Analysts said its range was intercontinental and might send a warhead plummeting down on the West Coast. The KN-14, a longer version of the KN-08, appeared able, in theory, to send one of Pyongyang's nuclear warheads crashing down on Washington, D.C. Today, the KN-08 and the KN-14 are widely seen as the most threatening missiles in North Korea's developing arsenal, especially given the land test in April of the potent engine that apparently powers them. Still, experts note that North Korea is years away from deploying a reliable long-range missile. For instance, it has yet to master the complex technology needed to protect a nuclear warhead from the searing heat generated as it plunges from outer space to a fiery re-entry. Experts also do not see North Korea as being capable anytime soon of building a much more destructive hydrogen warhead, capable of destroying large cities. Still, military officials worry about a day of reckoning. "The intel community assesses North Korea's ability to successfully shoot an ICBM with a nuclear weapon and reach the homeland as low," William E. Gortney, commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command, told a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee in April. Eventually, he added, "we assess that this low probability will increase," and the United States will need to invest in better defenses. Making sure Pyongyang has serious doubts about whether a nuclear strike would ever succeed, Commander Gortney added, "is absolutely critical." (William J. Broad, "Experts Worry North Is Perfecting Skills That Could Extend Nuclear Reach to U.S.," *New York Times*, September 10, 2016, p. A-6)

Statement by the President on North Korea's Nuclear Test: "The United States condemns North Korea's September 9 nuclear test in the strongest possible terms as a grave threat to regional security and to international peace and stability. North Korea stands out as the only country to have tested nuclear weapons this century. Today's test, North Korea's second this year, follows an unprecedented campaign of ballistic missile launches, which North Korea claims are intended to serve as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons targeting the United States and our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan. As Commander in Chief, I have a responsibility to safeguard the American people and ensure that the United States is leading the international community in responding to this threat and North Korea's other provocations with commensurate resolve and condemnation. To be clear, the United States does not, and never will, accept North Korea as a nuclear state. Far from achieving its stated national security and economic development goals, North Korea's provocative and destabilizing actions have instead served to isolate and impoverish its people through its relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities. Today's nuclear test, a flagrant violation of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, makes clear North Korea's disregard for international norms and standards for behavior and demonstrates it has no interest in being a responsible member of the international community. Last night I returned from the G-20 and East Asia Summit meetings in Asia, where my counterparts and I were united in our call for North Korea to return to the path of denuclearization. Upon hearing the news of the test, I had the opportunity to consult separately via phone with Republic of Korea (ROK) President Park Geun-Hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. We agreed to work with the UN Security Council, our other Six-

Party partners, and the international community to vigorously implement existing measures imposed in previous resolutions, and to take additional significant steps, including new sanctions, to demonstrate to North Korea that there are consequences to its unlawful and dangerous actions. I restated to President Park and Prime Minister Abe the unshakable U.S. commitment to take necessary steps to defend our allies in the region, including through our deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to the ROK, and the commitment to provide extended deterrence, guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S. defense capabilities." (White House Office of the Spokesman, "Statement by the President on North Korea's Nuclear Test," September 9, 2016)

The Obama administration has submitted a report to U.S. lawmakers on how it plans to help North Koreans get better access to outside information. Republican Bob Corker, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the State Department submitted the report but declined to say what was in it. It is billed as a "detailed plan for making unrestricted, unmonitored and inexpensive electronic mass communications available to the people of North Korea." From 2017, the U.S. government plans to spend US\$8 million a year for the next five years to get information to North Koreans. The U.S. currently broadcasts programs to North Korea 11 hours a day via Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. The State Department seems to be looking into various plans for getting USB sticks, memory cards or small shortwave radios into North Korea. The head of one group supporting North Korean defectors who was contacted by the State Department this year said, "One USB stick costs \$15, an SD memory card costs \$35, and a tablet PC costs \$300. We told U.S. officials that they could distribute the devices by giving them to North Korean traders after loading them with South Korean TV dramas or programs shedding light on the regime's illicit activities." The devices can be programmed to show up blank on cursory inspection. One diplomatic source said, "Google is currently pursuing a project using drones to provide Internet services to countries that lack mobile infrastructure, and this could be used for North Korea as well." North Koreans apparently like to gather close to foreign embassies, where they can pick up the Wi-Fi signal. One former high-ranking official from Pyongyang said, "The most popular subject of Internet searches is news about [leader] Kim Jong-un. If people in the North find out the truth about their leader, rapid changes can take place." Tom Malinowski, the assistant U.S. secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor, said at a recent forum that in spite of continued crackdowns by North Korean authorities, use of DVDs, MP3 devices, mobile phones and tablet PCs is spreading in the North. South Korean TV dramas and foreign movies will become vehicles to shed light on the lies being told by the Kim Jong-un regime. "Over the short term, efforts by South Korea and the U.S. to boost North Korean access to outside information could be weakened by tougher crackdowns, but over the long term the effects could be explosive," said Ryu Dong-ryeol of the Seoul-based Korean Institute of Liberal Democracy. (Yoon Jung-ho and Ahn Yong-hyun, "Obama Submits Plans for Getting Info into N. Korea," *Chosun Ilbo*, September 9, 2016)

Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton suggested Friday that she would adopt a tougher stance against North Korea that could approximate the global ring of

sanctions and pressure she credits with drawing Iran to the nuclear negotiating table. "It's clear that the increasing threat posed by North Korea requires not only a rethinking of the strategy but an urgent effort to convince the neighbors, most particularly China, that this is not just a U.S. issue," Clinton said. She did not dispute that the current policy of sanctions on North Korea and pressure on its ally and protector China has failed to stop North Korean aggression, including the country's fifth nuclear test. "I think we have an opening here that we haven't had in the last several years that I intend to do everything I can to take advantage of," Clinton said of the test and the international dismay it caused. In her remarks, Hillary Clinton pledged help for U.S. allies in the region – principally Japan and South Korea – in the form of U.S. missile defense systems. "That is not something that North Korea or the Chinese or the Russians in the region are particularly pleased about, but what is the alternative?" she said. "We are not going to let anyone who is a treaty ally or partner of ours be threatened, and we are not going to let North Korea pursue a nuclear weapon with a ballistic-missile capacity to deliver it to the United States' territory. That is absolutely the bottom line." Clinton spoke after a meeting she called of former national security officials from both Democratic and Republican administrations. The main subject of the session was terrorism and the threat posed by the Islamic State, which Clinton said is not unlike the persistent threat from North Korea. More U.S. sanctions on North Korea are appropriate, but so too are negotiations toward the kind of international agreement that led to United Nations and other international sanctions and penalties on Iran over its nuclear program, Clinton said. U.S. sanctions alone did not stop Iran from moving closer to being able to field a nuclear weapon, Clinton said. "Our sanctions despite our best efforts, were not enough," Clinton said. "And although we have international sanctions against North Korea, some of which I helped to negotiate when I was there, they aren't enough, either." (Anne Gearon, "Clinton Hints at Tougher North Korea Policy," *Washington Post*, September 9, 2016)

9/10/16

As the international community looks for new ways to punish North Korea for its latest nuclear test, one area is emerging as the next front to apply pressure: North Korea's practice of sending workers overseas to earn money for the regime. The United States and South Korea had already started quietly trying to persuade host countries to stop allowing in North Korean guest workers, according to people who work in both governments. That drive is likely to accelerate now that North Korea has shown that new sanctions imposed this year have failed to dissuade it from pursuing nuclear weapons. "There's going to be a global shaming campaign," said Andrei Lankov, an expert on North Korea at Kookmin University in Seoul, citing conversations with officials. In the five years since Kim Jong Un took over, North Korea has dramatically stepped up the number of people it sends abroad to earn hard currency. At least 50,000 North Koreans—and by some estimates, double that—are working in more than two dozen foreign countries. The vast majority, about 80 percent, are in China and Russia, toiling in garment factories and on construction sites, or felling trees in Siberian forests. There have also been numerous reports of North Korean doctors working in Cambodia and Libya, sculptors building statues in Senegal and Namibia, and laborers on building sites in Mongolia and in the soccer stadiums of Qatar. The North Koreans are sent abroad usually for three years and are still tightly controlled outside the totalitarian country. At one garment factory in northern China, visited by a *Washington*

*Post* reporter last year, North Korean women lived in small dormitories inside the factory and were allowed to go out to the market only once a week and only in small groups – so they could keep an eye on one another. While they're abroad, the North Koreans are allowed to keep one-third of their earnings – or \$100 out of their monthly \$300 salary for the seamstresses in China – and the rest goes to the regime. The Seoul-based Database Center for North Korean Human Rights estimates that the Kim regime now earns \$300 million a year this way. This is a considerable amount for North Korea. Its exports to China, by far its largest trading partner, totaled \$227 million last year, according to South Korea's International Trade Association. Given that North Korea's main exports – mineral resources like coal and iron ore – were explicitly banned under U.N. sanctions imposed in March following the previous nuclear test, analysts expect Pyongyang to become increasingly reliant on labor to generate hard currency. That's where the "shaming campaign" comes in. The international community is now talking about more sanctions against North Korea. "We will be working very closely in the Security Council and beyond to come up with the strongest possible measure against North Korea's latest actions," Sung Kim, the American point man on North Korea, told reporters in Tokyo. But after years of sanctions, many analysts say there is little left to target. And it will be difficult to designate host countries directly, so American and South Korean diplomats have been using behind-the-scenes pressure. "We have raised with some governments our concerns about the use of [North Korean] workers in their countries, and consequently some governments have modified their policies," the State Department said in a report sent to Congress late last month. South Korea has been doing the same. "We've been trying to explain to these countries that this [labor export] is not good for the North Korean people and that it's aiding the North Korean regime," said Kim Dong-jo, a spokesman for President Park Geun-hye. The new campaign has already paid some dividends. Malta, the smallest country in the European Union, effectively expelled some 20 laborers who had been working on construction sites and in garment factories in July by declining to extend their work permits. Poland stopped issuing visas for North Korean workers following the nuclear test in January, the Voice of America radio station reported in June, quoting a Polish Foreign Ministry official. Poland had granted visas for 156 North Koreans in 2015, mainly to work in its shipyards. But the campaign also faces some inherent constraints. For one, China and Russia, the hosts of the vast majority of the workers, have not traditionally seemed to worry about what other countries think of them. Analysts are divided on the merits of clamping down on North Korea's labor exports. "I think that there is clearly a benefit to allowing North Koreans to experience something of the outside world," said Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul and the author of a 2014 report on North Korean labor exports. "But the downside is great." Some of the income is going toward North Korea's developments of weapons of mass destruction, Go said. "This money isn't just being spent on toys for Kim Jong Un." Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, said the benefit of exposing North Koreans to the outside world, even if only a sliver, was worth the cost of potentially funding the nuclear and missile programs. "I believe that the more that North Koreans experience working overseas, the higher the chance of North Korea changing," Yang said, noting that the workers might learn how rich South Korea is and how advanced South Korean products are. "There could easily be 200,000 North Koreans who now have a different,

positive view of South Korea." Lankov said that overseas labor was far more lucrative than work at home, where the average salary for a government official is less than \$10 a month. Returning to North Korea with even \$1,000 or \$2,000 could be transformational in a country tentatively moving toward marketization. "These workers return with a few thousand dollars, an amount of money that is sufficient to start a small business in North Korea," Lankov said. This trend has created a little bit of freedom in North Korea, with the reliance on markets to provide what the state no longer can slightly weakening the regime's control over the North Korean populace. But Choi Yoon-cheol, secretary general of the North Korea Strategy Center, a defector-led advocacy group based in Seoul, thinks the costs are too great. "Yes, there's a positive side to this," he said. "But the money can also be a source for developing the missile and nuclear programs. We should make stopping this our priority." China – the most important country in this situation – has voiced clear anger over the recent nuclear and missile tests, but its priority remains ensuring stability on its borders. "China has their own reasons why they don't want this," said Kim Byung-Yeon, a professor at Seoul National University who focuses on the North Korean economy. "If China agrees to reduce the number of workers, they'd just have to give North Korea more aid." (Anna Fifield "New Tactic against N. Korea: Send Its Workers Home, *Washington Post*, September 11, 2016, p. A-1)

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DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement: "Scientists and technicians of the Nuclear Weapons Institute of the DPRK successfully conducted a nuclear explosive test for judging the power of nuclear warheads. Much upset by this, the Obama group has gone foolish in its moves to incite an atmosphere of putting pressure and stifling the DPRK and to cover up its failed DPRK policy by branding the DPRK as the "harasser of peace." On Friday [September 9] Obama personally made public a "statement" in which he branded the DPRK's nuclear warheads explosive test as a "threat" and "provocation" to peace and security and "ignorance" of the international norms of practices, adding that he will never acknowledge the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state but will cooperate with the international community to take additional crucial measures. The nuclear warheads explosive test was a demonstration of the toughest will of the DPRK that showed it is ready to counterattack the enemies if they make a provocation as it was part of the substantial countermeasures to the threat of a nuclear war and sanctions racket kicked up by the hostile forces including the U.S. **We are holding fast to the line of simultaneously developing the two fronts** to safeguard the sovereignty, right to existence and peace from the ever-increasing nuclear threat and blackmail of the U.S., and the recent test was just part of the whole course of implementing the line. With the end of its tenure nearing the Obama group has faced a flurry of censures from the public at home and abroad for its totally bankrupt DPRK policy which only resulted in compelling the DPRK to increase its nuclear attack capabilities moment by moment. Obama's recent publication of the "statement" is aimed to shift the blame for pushing the DPRK to have access to nukes and save even a bit his face that was completely lost before the world. The U.S. is the very one which compelled the DPRK to develop nuclear warheads, and its nuclear threat and blackmail that have constantly been posed to the DPRK almost every day for the past decades have been an engine which pushed the DPRK to reach this point. Obama is trying hard to deny the DPRK's strategic position as a legitimate nuclear weapons state



but it is as foolish an act as trying to eclipse the sun with a palm. It is foolhardy for the Obama group to get itself busy while crying out for the senseless sanctions ballad even today when its "strategic patience" policy became totally bankrupt and it is nearing the end of its tenure. As was already clarified, we will continue to take measures for increasing the nuclear force of the country in quality and in quantity to safeguard the dignity and the right to existence of the DPRK and ensure genuine peace from the U.S. increasing threat of a nuclear war." (KCNA, "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Refutes Obama's 'Statement' against Nuclear Warheads Explosive Test," September 11, 2016)

U.N.: "Flooding, triggered by heavy rains as a result of Typhoon Lionrock, in north-eastern DPRK has displaced tens of thousands of people and destroyed homes, buildings and other critical infrastructure. Areas along the flooded Tumen River are acutely impacted with Musan and Yonsa counties and Hoeryong City in North Hamgyong Province particularly severely affected. Counties in Ryanggang Province that border Yonsa County may also be affected but currently there is limited information available from these areas. The Government has confirmed that 133 people have been killed and another 395 people remain missing as a result of the floods. More than 35,500 houses have been damaged, 69 per cent of which have been completely destroyed, and a further 8,700 buildings, including schools and public buildings, have been damaged. Around 16,000 hectares of arable land has been inundated. Based on official figures and assessment findings, at least 140,000 people are in urgent need of assistance. Of those, over 100,000 people are estimated to have been displaced. An estimated 600,000 people in more than six counties have also been affected by the interruption of water supply systems. The most affected areas in Musan and Yonsa counties remain inaccessible. From 6-9 September a Government-led joint needs assessment was conducted, which included UN agencies, DPRK Red Cross, IFRC and international NGOs. The assessment team visited several of the most affected areas, including Hoeryong City and surrounding villages, but were unable to access Musan and Yonsa. Based on the assessment and as a result of discussions with the Government, shelter, food, health, and water and sanitation have been identified as immediate needs. Humanitarian agencies have released relief materials from in-country stockpiles including food, nutritional supplements, shelter and kitchen kits, water purification and sanitation supplies, emergency health supplies and education supplies." (U.N. Spokesman's Office, September 11, 2016)

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North Korea is ready to conduct an additional nuclear test at any time, South Korea's Defense Ministry said, three days after the reclusive North's fifth test drew widespread condemnation. "Assessment by South Korean and U.S. intelligence is that the North is always ready for an additional nuclear test in the Punggye-ri area," the site of the North's five nuclear explosions, Defense Ministry spokesman Moon Sang-gyun told a news briefing. "North Korea has a tunnel where it can conduct an additional nuclear test," Moon said. (Ju-Min PAark and Jack Kim, "North Korea Ready for Another Nuclear Test at Any Time: South Korea," Reuters, September 12, 2016)

The United States has postponed its planned flight of a supersonic bomber to South Korea aimed at showing its defense commitment to its key ally due to unfavorable weather conditions, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) said. Two B-1B Lancers were

scheduled to fly over the skies of South Korea at around 10:00 a.m. today, flanked by an entourage of one South Korean F-15K and one U.S. F-16 fighter jets, according to the USFK. "Due to inclement weather conditions, the engagement at Osan Air Base scheduled for today has been postponed. More information on flight will be available soon," USFK spokesman Christopher Bush said in a statement at an air base in Pyeongtaek, 70 kilometers south of Seoul. (Yonhap, "U.S. Delays Flight of B-1B Bomber to S. Korea due to Winds," *Korea Times*, September 12, 2016)

Defense Secretary Ash Carter said China had an "important responsibility" in North Korea. But Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told reporters today that Carter was "being too modest." She cited a Chinese saying – "Whoever started the trouble should end it" – in calling on the U.S. to "take on its due responsibility." Hua said, "I think the U.S. should go over the process of the development of the nuclear issue and earnestly work on a tangible and effective resolution." (Associated Press, "China Says It Can't End North Korea Nuclear Program on Its Own," *Japan Times*, September 12, 2016)

Hecker: "**How many nuclear warheads can the DPRK produce?** North Korea's capacity to produce plutonium remains limited to 6 kilograms, or approximately one bomb's worth, per year. We estimate that it may have a stockpile of 32 to 54 kilograms (roughly 6 to 8 bombs' worth) of plutonium now. Whereas plutonium production can be estimated reasonably accurately because of telltale signals resulting from reactor operation, production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) remains highly uncertain. However, based on what I saw at the Yongbyon centrifuge facility during my last visit in November 2010, the expanded footprint of the facility since, and our probabilistic estimates of how much it could make in covert facilities, it is possible that the DPRK could add 150 kg of HEU (roughly 6 bombs' worth) to a current stockpile of perhaps 300 to 400 kg. In other words, a stockpile of sufficient fissile material for approximately 20 bombs by the end of this year and a capacity of adding approximately 7 per year makes the DPRK claim sound plausible. **Can the DPRK produce lighter, smaller warheads and as claimed by the DPRK Nuclear Weapons Institute, ones that have been "standardized to be able to be mounted on its ballistic missiles?"** With the two successful nuclear tests this year, we must assume that the DPRK has designed and demonstrated nuclear warheads that can be mounted on some of its short-range and perhaps medium-range missiles. Its ability to field an ICBM fitted with a nuclear warhead capable of reaching the United States is still a long way off—perhaps 5 to 10 years, but likely doable if the program is unconstrained. As much as a doomsday nuclear shot at the United States worries Americans, it is not what I consider to be the primary threat from Pyongyang's unrelenting drive to more bombs and better bombs. ...By the time our Stanford team visited Pyongyang in February 2009, we were told that times had changed—the North was going to launch a long-range rocket and that matters would get much worse. And, so they did. The launch was followed by UN condemnation and Pyongyang's expulsion of the international inspectors and American team. Then in May, the North conducted its second nuclear test, which, unlike the first, appeared successful. Seoul and Washington apparently rebuffed Pyongyang's overtures in the summer of 2009 to get back on a diplomatic track and the DPRK was off and running on a determined path for more and better bombs,

combined with greatly increasing its missile threat. The death of diplomacy, namely the Obama administration's retreat to "strategic patience" and the demise of the Six Party Talks, opened the door to an unrelenting expansion of the North's nuclear weapons program, as best as one can tell, unconstrained by international opprobrium and escalating sanctions. Construction activities at Yongbyon picked up steadily in the latter half of 2009. Pyongyang made numerous claims of nuclear progress—declaring it had achieved nuclear fusion and that it was successful in enriching uranium, which it stated was now required to fuel the new indigenous light water reactor it was going to build. Most of these pronouncements were dismissed outside the DPRK, but then came its remarkable revelation of a modern, industrial-size uranium centrifuge facility during our Stanford delegation's last visit in November 2010. Then, the curtain descended on foreign visitors to Yongbyon, while construction and testing picked up and has continued to the present. Based on commercial satellite imagery, the 5 MWe Reactor in Yongbyon has operated off and on since August 2013. It is capable of producing up to 6 kg plutonium annually, but also is capable of producing tritium for fusion bombs if Lithium-6 targets are irradiated in the reactor. The Radiochemical Laboratory is operational again allowing plutonium to be separated from the spent reactor fuel. The North also has hot cell facilities near its IRT-2000 Reactor to recover tritium that may be produced in either reactor. It has rebuilt the fuel fabrication facilities to allow more metallic 5 MWe Reactor fuel to be fabricated. It has completed the external construction of the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR), including having developed fuel fabrication facilities for its ceramic fuel. It has doubled the size of the Yongbyon centrifuge hall, enabling it to enrich uranium for ELWR fuel and produce the feed material that is likely taken to a covert facility to be enriched to weapons-grade HEU. The expansion of Yongbyon facilities, all visible from above, has been nothing short of breathtaking. I was puzzled for many years by the slow pace of North Korea's medium-to-long-range missile testing program. However, at about the same time as the Yongbyon expansion began, Pyongyang also mounted a major construction effort on a new launch facility on its west coast, from which it has launched three long-range rockets since 2012. Much of the world laughed as the North paraded what looked like dummy missiles through the streets of Pyongyang during military parades, but they are not laughing any more, as the pace of missile tests during the past year has been just as intense as its nuclear buildup. Beyond the satellite launches, the North has now demonstrated its capability to fire a submarine-launched ballistic missile and a solid-fuel, two-stage medium range missile. This brings us full circle to the fifth nuclear test. This test must be viewed with great concern, not for any specific capabilities it may have demonstrated, but as part of this enormous buildup of North Korea's nuclear arsenal. Five tests conducted over a ten-year period, sufficiently spaced that the test results can inform the next test, are deeply alarming. What are the greatest threats from the rapidly expanding North Korean nuclear program? Left unchecked, Pyongyang will likely develop the capability to reach the continental United States with a nuclear tipped missile in a decade or so. Much more troubling for now is that its recent nuclear and missile successes may give Pyongyang a false sense of confidence and dramatically change regional security dynamics. The likely ability of the DPRK to put nuclear weapons on target anywhere in South Korea and Japan and even on some US assets in the Pacific greatly complicates the regional military picture. That situation would be exacerbated if Pyongyang decides to field tactical nuclear

weapons as its arsenal expands and its confidence in its nuclear arsenal grows. More bombs and better bombs also increase the potential of accidents and miscalculations with greater consequences as the number and sophistication of bombs increase. Rendering the nuclear enterprise safe and secure in case of internal turmoil or a chaotic transition in the North becomes more difficult. We also cannot rule out that a financially desperate leadership may risk the sale of fissile materials or other nuclear assets, perhaps to non-state actors. So, what to do? The latest nuclear test demonstrates conclusively that attempting to sanction the DPRK into submission and waiting for China to exert leverage over Pyongyang's nuclear program do not work. Increasing sanctions and adding missile defenses in South Korea to that mix will also not suffice and make China even less likely to cooperate. What's missing is diplomacy as much as Washington may find it repugnant to deal with the Kim regime." (Siegfried Hecker, "What to Make of North Korea's Latest Test?" *38North*, September 12, 2016)

9/13/16

Two B-1B nuclear-capable strategic bombers of the U.S. Air Force flew over South Korea in a show of force against North Korea that conducted its fifth nuclear test last week in defiance of global warnings. The B-1B Lancers conducted a low-altitude flight over Osan Air Base, south of Seoul, around 10:00 a.m. after having flown from the Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. The aircraft is capable of carrying the largest payload of both guided and unguided weapons of any current American bombers. One B-1B was escorted by four F-15Ks from South Korean Air Force, while the other was escorted by four F-16s from the U.S. Air Force during the flight. "North Korea's nuclear test is a dangerous escalation and poses an unacceptable threat," Gen. Vincent Brooks, the commander of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the United States Forces Korea (USFK), said at a news conference held after the flyover. "The United States has an unshakable commitment to defend allies in the region and will take the necessary steps to do so, including operations like this one today, and the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) battery on the Korean Peninsula." South Korea and Washington announced a decision in July to deploy a THAAD battery here by the end of next year to better deter evolving threats from the North's nuclear and missile programs. Gen. Lee Sun-jin, chairman of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, also said if North Korea continues to develop its nuclear weapons, it will meet retaliatory actions that will "shake the very founding of its regime." (Jun Ji-hye, "U.S. Supersonic Bombers Fly over S. Korea," *Korea Times*, September 13, 2016)

Sung Kim: **Q:** Following the fourth nuclear test earlier this year, the UN Security Council adopted the toughest set of sanctions ever. It produced some results. There was pressure and sanctions imposed against Pyongyang, but Pyongyang pressed ahead with the fifth nuclear test anyway. In the United States and Korea as well there are some views, especially questions on the effectiveness of sanctions and pressure against Pyongyang because that did not stop the North from conducting another nuclear test and there are people who raise the need for dialogue, maybe six-party talks, two plus two, or North Korea-U.S. dialogue as it goes forward. What is your view of this? I do understand the official position of the U.S. government. Is it still that the denuclearization of North Korea should come first before any dialogue or is it time for you or for the U.S. government to think about new ideas or creative solutions to resolve and address the current issues? **KIM:** Thank you very much. I know there's a lot of

frustration and concern that sanctions and pressure have not resulted in immediate or instant success, but I think it's important to remember that pressure and sanctions need time. It requires sustained and concerted effort, systematic effort, to really have the kind of effect that we desire. And let's not forget that Security Council Resolution 2270 was passed only about six months ago in March, so I really do think that we need to give it more time to have the kind of effect that all of us are looking for. I think it is also important to recognize that while Security Council Resolution 2270 and other sanctions have not been successful in deterring North Korean provocation I think the sanctions have had some effect in making it hard for North Korea to earn foreign currencies to support illicit activities. That's a very important goal. With regards to possible resumption of dialogue, as you know, President Obama and other senior officials of the U.S. government have made very clear that **we remain open to credible, meaningful, authentic dialogue on denuclearization.** And you mention many formats that may be considered. Frankly, I don't think it is a question of different formats, I think it is a question of North Korean intentions and commitment. If the North Koreans are ready to talk to us sincerely about denuclearization, I think we can work with them in the six-party process. I do believe that the six-party process remains a viable forum for addressing North Korea's nuclear issue. As we said just last week, I think President Obama made clear again our willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue, but unfortunately what we are seeing from North Korea is not a sincere interest in dialogue, but a series of unprecedented level of provocation. **Q:** This is the end of the Obama administration term and the presidential race is currently on in the United States, so because of what's going on in terms of the domestic politics and people point out that the U.S. policy and pressure and sanctions against Pyongyang are losing momentum, is not really gaining momentum. So I was wondering if you could tell us a little bit about how much of a priority it is for the administration to address the denuclearization of North Korea and also, as you mentioned in your opening, there is a growing argument in Korea that Korea itself should acquire nuclear weapons and this argument is gaining ground, but in your opening you just mentioned that the U.S. is ready to provide all the available defensive capabilities including extended deterrence so what is the U.S. government's position on some of the arguments that the tactical U.S. nuclear weapons should be redeployed to the Peninsula or that Korea should acquire its own nuclear weapons? **KIM:** Thank you very much. Without commenting on politics, I can assure you that North Korea and the challenge provided by North Korea occupies a very high priority spot in the U.S. government. Starting with President Obama, the senior leadership in the U.S. government is very much focused on how we can work with the Republic of Korea and our other partners to try to address this issue in an effective manner. And I fully expect that through the political transition in Washington that focus, the emphasis, and that priority will remain in place. On the question of reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, the U.S.-ROK alliance is truly one of the strongest alliances we have anywhere. **We have confidence that we have the capabilities to defend against the threat posed by North Korea. Of course, that includes our extended deterrence commitment to the Republic of Korea. Our leaders and, more importantly, our military leaders have determined that there is no need to reintroduce nuclear weapons on the Peninsula and that what we have now in the strong foundation of our alliance, and all of the efforts that we are continuing to**

**make to strengthen that alliance, including of course our decision to deploy the THAAD Missile Defense System on the Peninsula and our unshakable commitment regarding extended deterrence, is more than sufficient to deal with the threat posed by North Korea.”** (Special Representative for North Korea Policy Sung Kim, Joint Press Availability with Ambassador Kim Hong-kyun, Special representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seoul, September 13, 2016)

North Korea’s nuclear program is directed at the United States, a close adviser to Kim Jong Un said after last week’s atomic test, according to a Japanese lawmaker who just returned from Pyongyang. The warning came as two U.S. military B-1 bombers flew over the southern half of the peninsula in a show of force against North Korea, and top military brass and diplomats alike warned Pyongyang the United States was prepared to take all steps to contain and punish the regime. **Antonio Inoki**, a former professional wrestler who now serves in Japan’s parliament, returned today from a five-day visit to Pyongyang saying that Japan need not worry about the North’s nuclear program. “This is not directed at Japan. The nuclear development is toward the United States,” Inoki quoted Ri Su Yong, an elder statesman of North Korean foreign affairs who is particularly close to Kim, as saying. Ri was Pyongyang’s ambassador to Switzerland while Kim, now the 32-year-old North Korean leader, attended school there. He served as foreign minister in Kim’s regime until May, when he was promoted to a full member of the politburo and director of the party’s international relations department. Inoki, who has tried to be a bridge between Japan and North Korea, told Japanese reporters who were waiting for him at the Beijing airport that he spent 90 minutes with Ri on September 10, the day after the nuclear test. His trip coincided with the nuclear test and followed provocative missile launches, several of which have landed within Japan’s air defense identification zone, earning harsh condemnation from Japan. Pyongyang put out another dismissive statement today about the reaction to its nuclear test. “The U.S. and its followers are making much fuss, creating impression that a nuclear bomb was dropped in downtown Washington or Seoul,” KCNA reported. “Neither sanctions nor provocation nor pressure can ever bring down the position of the DPRK as a full-fledged nuclear weapons state, and highhanded political and military provocations of the enemies will only invite a merciless nuclear strike which will lead them to a final ruin,” the report said. In Seoul, American and South Korean officials stepped up their warnings to the Kim regime. “North Korea’s nuclear test is a dangerous escalation and poses an unacceptable threat,” said **General Vincent K. Brooks**, commander of U.S. Forces Korea as two **B-1B Lancers**, which carry the largest payload of any American bomber, flew over South Korea together with American F-16s and South Korean F-15Ks. The bombers were moved to an American air base in Guam in August as part of a buildup against North Korea, and conducted a training exercise with Japanese fighter jets over the southern island of Kyushu while they were en route to the Korean Peninsula. “Today’s demonstration provides just one example of the full range of military capabilities in the deep resources of this strong alliance to provide and strengthen extended deterrence,” Brooks said. Separately, Sung Kim, Washington’s point man on North Korea, said after meeting his South Korean counterpart that the latest nuclear test has bolstered international resolve to hold North Korea accountable. “We are, of course, working . . . to take additional significant steps including new

sanctions to demonstrate to North Korea that there indeed are serious consequences for its unlawful and dangerous actions," he said. Inoki entered politics by creating his own "Sports and Peace Party" and has organized **two wrestling tournaments** in Pyongyang, the most recent of which featured three Americans as well as Japanese wrestlers. Inoki hoped that the event would kick-start Japanese government efforts to find out what happened to 12 Japanese citizens who were abducted during the 1970s and 1980s to train North Korean spies in the Japanese language and ways. Inoki's continuing ties with North Korea have been controversial in Japan. Suga Yoshihide, a top aide to the Japanese prime minister, was critical of the visit. "We ask all Japanese people to refrain from traveling to North Korea as an anti-North Korean measure, and we had notified this lawmaker Inoki of this before his visit," Suga said today. "With that in mind, I have to say it was extremely inappropriate that he had gone." (Anna Fifield, "North Korea's Nuclear Program Is Targeting U.S., Japanese Lawmaker Says," *Washington Post*, September 13, 2016)

Wit: "The next administration must recognize that the United States, not China, is the indispensable nation when it comes to dealing with North Korea. Our allies, who look to us to provide leadership, already know this. So do the Chinese, who insist that only Washington can persuade the North Koreans to stop their bad behavior. North Korean officials have even told me in private that it is true for them, too. If a new administration understands that the United States must take the lead, it can use the substantial diplomatic, military and economic power at its disposal to manage and potentially resolve this challenge. At the core will be a willingness to take all necessary steps to protect our allies, even measures that can anger China, like the recent decision to deploy advanced missile defenses in South Korea. A new administration should also seek to tighten sanctions, just as the Obama administration is doing, recognizing that, because of China's enduring support for the government in Pyongyang, sanctions will always fall far short of pressuring North Korea the same way they did Iran. A successful strategy will have to include a new diplomatic initiative aimed at persuading the North to first stop expanding its arsenal and then to eventually reduce and dismantle its weapons. To persuade the North Koreans to do this, Washington will have to address their security concerns. In the short term, that may mean temporarily suspending or modifying some American-South Korean military exercises. In the longer term, it may mean replacing the armistice in place since the end of the Korean War with a permanent peace agreement. These initiatives will be met with skepticism not only in the United States – where many people believe that negotiating with North Korea is a waste of time – but also in Pyongyang. As a North Korean official, who believes a new administration will just tear up previous agreements, said to me earlier this year, "It's easier for us to build nuclear weapons than to be involved with you for decades only to have agreements turn into useless scraps of paper." Nevertheless, there are signs that North Korea is interested in dialogue. On July 6, the government issued a pronouncement ostensibly seeking denuclearization talks with the United States, specifically mentioning Kim Jong-un's name in support of this initiative. One reason North Korea may be motivated to consider denuclearization is economic. Since taking office in 2011, Kim has been committed to improving his country's economy. He seems to believe that nuclear weapons would allow even more focus on that objective. Nevertheless, he has deliberately left room to ease off the nuclear track and explore a

dialogue, perhaps reflecting an understanding that there are limits to what his country's economy can achieve while it is isolated from the international community. Of course, no one is naïve enough to take these statements at face value. Talks between governments are the only way to know for sure. As the Obama administration winds down, little can be done to change policy at this point. Moreover, the North Koreans are unlikely to be responsive to new initiatives since they know that the next American administration will have its own approach. The first hundred days in office will be critical for the next American president. If a window is open to curb North Korea's nuclear ambitions, it may not stay open for long." (Joel Wit, "How to Stop North Korea," *New York Times*, September 13, 2016, p. A-27)

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KCNA: "The U.S. imperialists are going reckless, taken aback by the DPRK's successful nuclear test. After declaring their plan to massively introduce nuclear strategic assets including nuclear carriers and nuclear strategic bombers into the Korean peninsula, they perpetrated such military provocation as letting ill-famed two nuclear strategic bombers B-1Bs which had already been forward-deployed in Anderson Air Force Base on Guam fly over south Korea on Tuesday as the first phase. They are blustering this is a "demonstration of fulfillment of their strong commitment to protecting" south Korea and "strong warning" to the DPRK, in particular. B-1B is the ill-famed nuclear war means of the U.S. imperialists for mounting a preemptive nuclear attack during their wars of overseas aggression. They are bluffing that B-1Bs are enough for fighting an all-out nuclear war. ..." (KCNA, "U.S. B-1B Nuclear Strategic Bombers Fly over S. Korea," September 14, 2016)

A total of 138 people have been confirmed killed and 400 people remain missing after remnants of Typhoon Lionrock caused heavy rains and flooding in the northeast of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) two weeks ago. The full extent of the damage is still being determined as some areas impacted by the floods remain inaccessible. The heavy rains also caused the Tumen River to overflow, leading to severe floods and landslides, particularly in North Hamgyong Province. Almost 20,000 houses have been destroyed, in addition to schools, health clinics and other critical infrastructure. Floodwaters have destroyed agricultural land with standing crops nearing harvest largely unsalvageable, livestock lost and kitchen gardens destroyed. An estimated 140,000 people require assistance, especially vulnerable groups such as pregnant women, people with disabilities, the elderly and children. Following the disaster the Government of DPRK responded by mobilizing civilian volunteers and redirecting construction support to the impacted areas. UN agencies and international NGOs in DPRK are responding to the urgent needs and are providing immediate shelter relief, food, non-food items such as kitchen sets and nutritional assistance, as well as water purification and health care supplies. The Government has committed to providing full access for monitoring and follow up on distribution of relief items to the affected areas. "The situation will become aggravated as winter is approaching and temperatures will rapidly plunge below zero degrees," said UN Resident Coordinator Tapan Mishra. "The Government is doing its utmost to make sure that the situation stabilizes before the onset of winter and humanitarian organizations working in DPRK stand ready to support in any way possible."

"DPRK has suffered from flooding in the past, but this is the largest disaster in recent



memory and the impact is devastating," said Mishra. "We must do everything we can to bring humanitarian and recovery relief to those affected." (U.N. Spokesman, "Torrential Rains and Flooding Bring Devastation to DPRK," September 14, 2016)

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North Korea is ready to launch new attacks, the country's foreign minister has said, suggesting the communist regime may take further provocative action following North Korea's recent nuclear test. "North Korea is ready to launch another attack in defiance of the provocations by the United States," North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho said. He made the remarks during a summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Venezuela. North Korea is seeking to expand diplomatic fronts with nonaligned countries in a bid to break away from international isolation as it is under heavy U.N. sanctions for its nuclear and missile tests. Meanwhile, North Korea's latest ballistic missiles launched earlier this month have improved their precision, South Korean government sources said September 16. "All three Rodong missiles fired by North Korean on Sept. 5 landed within 1,000 kilometers of their targets," a source said. (Yonhap, "N.K. Warns of Additional Provocation," Korea Herald, September 16, 2016)

CFR Task Force: "Executive Summary: Since 1953, when an armistice put an end to the major military operations of the Korean War, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States Forces Korea have been trapped in an increasingly dangerous cycle in which North Korea provokes a militarized crisis until minor concessions settle the situation at a new normal. The U.S.-ROK alliance has succeeded in preventing these recurrent crises from igniting a war, but this cycle of provocation hides perilous long-term trends. North Korea's accelerating nuclear and missile programs pose a grave and expanding threat to the territory of U.S. allies, to U.S. personnel stationed in the region, and to the continental United States. More generally, North Korea's behavior has endangered the emergence of a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia. The United States and its allies have failed to meet their critical objectives: to roll back North Korea's expanding nuclear and ballistic missile programs and prevent it from spreading nuclear and missile technology to dangerous actors around the world. China's reluctance to pressure the DPRK has allowed the regime to further destabilize a region critical to U.S. national interests, to systematically perpetrate crimes against humanity, and to threaten the safety of U.S. allies. The countervailing diplomatic, economic, and military steps required to deter and contain the North Korean regime threaten to aggravate U.S. tensions with China just as the United States and its regional partners are attempting to encourage China's rise to remain consistent with a peaceful, prosperous, and just regional order. Yet developments in the past year have altered the North Korea problem in important ways. In March 2016, the United Nations (UN) Security Council—with China's consent—unanimously passed Resolution 2270 to significantly strengthen the sanctions regime that restricts arms transfers and limits trade with North Korea. Pyongyang's actions and Beijing's reticence have also provided incentive for closer military cooperation between the United States and its allies, including on missile defense. Additionally, South Korean President Park Geun-hye has made concerted efforts to improve the ROK's bilateral relations with both China and Japan, and a new round of regional diplomacy has improved coordination over the North Korean nuclear problem. Yet North Korea is also accelerating the development of a capability

to strike the continental United States, as well as U.S. allies, with a nuclear warhead delivered by an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). These developments present the U.S. president with an exigent threat of a North Korea that can strike at the United States—but also with new opportunities to halt the cycle of provocation and prevent North Korea from achieving this capability. China’s policy toward the DPRK will critically affect the fate of the region. If China, the United States, and U.S. allies can work together to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and mitigate its threatening military posture, a stable, prosperous Northeast Asia led by China and U.S. allies can emerge; if they cannot, the DPRK’s recklessness will further strain the U.S.-China relationship and destabilize a region vital to both countries’ interests. For this reason, encouraging a transformation of China’s policy toward North Korea should be the next administration’s top priority in its relations with China. This transformation should be accomplished through a sequence of steps to gradually increase the pressure on China to support a cooperative approach, which could result in the peaceful resolution of the armistice, the elimination of nuclear capability, and the eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula. In this context, the Council on Foreign Relations convened an Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea to assess the efficacy of existing policy and offer recommendations to U.S. policymakers on reducing the threat from North Korea for the remainder of President Barack Obama’s presidency, as well as for the next administration. The Task Force assesses that the current policy of strategic patience will not halt the recurrent and dangerous cycle of provocation or ensure a stable regional security order into the future. If allowed to continue, current trends will predictably, progressively, and gravely threaten U.S. national security interests and those of its allies. Halting these alarming and negative trends requires a new strategy toward North Korea and the region, one guided by a broader organizing principle: to bring about a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia that U.S. allies have a hand in leading. In the long run, achieving this vision requires that the Korean Peninsula be free of nuclear weapons and respectful of human rights, whether by genuine transformation of the North Korean regime or by unification. U.S. policy toward North Korea will have to be integrated with broader U.S. strategy for maritime Asia, or both are likely to fail. The United States should present North Korea with a sharper choice: seek a negotiated settlement to return to compliance with UN resolutions on nuclear weapons or face severe and escalating costs. These steps should be carefully and deliberately sequenced to calibrate pressure on North Korea—to credibly signal to Pyongyang that the United States and its allies will continually increase pressure until serious talks resume, to ensure that the regime has an opportunity to respond to specific pressure tactics at designated junctures, and to maximize opportunities to work with China. **The United States should act immediately to secure its interests and those of its allies against the grave and growing North Korean nuclear and missile threats by expanding U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation to actively and strictly enforce sanctions on North Korea and by strengthening its joint deterrence profile. On a parallel course, the United States and its allies should offer restructured negotiations that provide genuine incentives for North Korea to participate in substantive talks while increasing pressure by strictly enforcing the new sanctions in UN Security Council Resolution 2270, targeting North Korean illicit activity, and encouraging other nations in the region—including China—to join this effort.** If Pyongyang refuses this proposal, the

United States should seek new multilateral sanctions to restrict the regime's funding sources and enact additional military measures to strengthen allied deterrence of military attacks. New nuclear tests or military attacks by North Korea should accelerate this timetable. North Korea should not be allowed to use talks as a way of detracting attention from bad behavior, as has been the case in the past. Abrogation of the testing ban, new attacks, or stalled talks should result in their termination. The United States should also make a new approach to China. To enlist China in the effort to bring about a stable and nonnuclear Korean Peninsula, U.S. officials should propose a dialogue on the future of the Korean Peninsula to demonstrate that it is in both countries' security interests to find a comprehensive resolution to the problem. A unified response to North Korea stands the greatest chance of finding a lasting solution on the peninsula and of forging a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia, and is by far the preferable course of action. As long as North Korea retains a nuclear capability, the U.S.-China relationship will be strained. To the extent that Beijing declines to cooperate or this effort does not show results, the United States and its allies will have no choice but to greatly accelerate efforts with Japan and South Korea to bring about a Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons.

*Findings and Recommendations* The Task Force reached ten findings and six recommendations. These support five broad principles for U.S. policy: promote a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia, restructure negotiations, protect human rights, enforce sanctions and escalate financial pressure, and strengthen deterrence and defense.

*Finding 1.* In its assessment of the status of the North Korean regime, the Task Force finds that North Korean leader **Kim Jong-un has ruthlessly consolidated power and there is low probability of regime collapse in the near future. Over time, however, North Korean citizens' increasing access to information from the outside world, as well as growing internal markets, could form the basis for a gradual transformation of the totalitarian system.**

*PROMOTE A STABLE AND PROSPEROUS NORTHEAST ASIA*

*Findings 2.* The Task Force finds that although China remains North Korea's primary patron, it is increasingly willing to exert pressure to curb the regime's erratic behavior.

3. The Task Force finds that South Korea's improving relations with Japan and China present new opportunities for cooperation on North Korea policy.

4. The Task Force finds that South Korea can be an effective representative of shared U.S.-ROK interests, including deterrence signaling to North Korea, coordination with China, and regional diplomacy to promote sanctions enforcement.

*Recommendations* I. To ensure that U.S. policy remains consistent with the long-term objective of a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia, the Task Force recommends that the United States and its allies engage China as soon as possible to plan for the future of the Korean Peninsula. These talks, both trilateral and in a five-party format, should plan for militarized crises, collapse scenarios, and the role of a unified Korea in Northeast Asian security. ■ Five-party talks consisting of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States should begin as soon as possible to prepare a common proposal for the next round of multilateral negotiations and also to discuss other areas of regional concern. In this way, the parties can accomplish the intended regional stability functions of the Six Party Talks and help promote their resumption. ■ To convince China to participate, Washington and Seoul should jointly reassure Beijing that Korean unification will not damage its interests. These steps can include guarantees that Chinese investments on the peninsula will remain intact or be compensated, as well as a dialogue to de-conflict

plans for border control, refugees, port access, and military operations during collapse scenarios. The United States and South Korea can also jointly present conditions under which the alliance would consider revising the number and disposition of U.S. forces on the peninsula. Although the alliance should continue in any event, attenuation of the threat may allow for a commensurate reduction of U.S. force posture on the peninsula. *RESTRUCTURE NEGOTIATIONS Finding 5*. Although a negotiated agreement on complete and verifiable denuclearization remains a preferable mechanism for resolving the nuclear issue, the Task Force finds that **negotiations are unlikely to eliminate North Korea's nuclear or missile capabilities in the near future. Nonetheless, a new diplomatic approach could potentially freeze North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, establish conditions for increasing pressure if North Korea rejects the proposal, and lay the groundwork for eventual rollback of the regime's nuclear capabilities.** *Recommendations II*. The Task Force recommends that **the United States move quickly to propose restructured negotiations to limit North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and work toward denuclearization and a comprehensive peace agreement.** ■ Under this model, the United States should undertake talks subject to the following conditions: first, **reaffirmation of the principles of the 2005 Joint Statement**, including a nonnuclear peninsula, by all parties; second, progressive steps on the nuclear issue at each stage in the negotiations; third, a moratorium on tests of nuclear weapons and missiles with a range-payload capability greater than existing Scud missiles. The United States and the other members of the talks should avow that they will never accept the DPRK as a nuclear state. ■ Early stages of the negotiations should **focus on attaining a verified freeze** on the DPRK's nuclear capabilities. Additionally, the parties **may explore steps on conventional arms control (including limits to the deployment of and exercises with conventional forces), limitations on missile development, nonproliferation of nuclear material or technology, or site-specific inspection** of North Korean nuclear facilities. ■ The eventual outcome of the talks is a comprehensive deal in which North Korea, South Korea, and the United States, supported by China, sign a peace agreement that will finally end the Korean War and gradually normalize relations in exchange for complete nuclear disarmament and progress on human rights. *PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS Finding 6*. The Task Force finds that the North Korean state continues to commit grave crimes against humanity, but may be sensitive to international pressure to live up to UN standards on human rights. *Recommendations III*. The Task Force recommends that the United States work with allies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the United Nations system **to escalate pressure on North Korea to respect the human rights of its citizens.** ■ As a first step, U.S. diplomats should work with global partners to **signal that they will move to suspend North Korea's credentials at the United Nations if it does not demonstrate real progress on human rights.** To avert this action, North Korea would have to accept visits from UN human rights officials to demonstrate progress. When it meets at the start of each General Assembly session, the UN Credentials Committee can assess whether North Korea has met the requirements. ■ U.S. policymakers should facilitate governmental and nongovernmental efforts to allow information about the outside world to reach the North Korean people. ■ The United States should support international efforts to seek accountability for North Korean individuals and entities responsible for crimes against humanity while expanding U.S. sanctions against them.

*ENFORCE SANCTIONS AND ESCALATE FINANCIAL PRESSURE Finding 7.* The Task Force finds that the recent expansion of the sanctions regime is a necessary step in exerting pressure on North Korea. However, expanded and sustained efforts are required to ensure that they are rigorously implemented and have the desired effects, including measures to provide amenable states with material assistance and to pressure those that illegally trade with or finance North Korea. *Recommendations IV.* The Task Force recommends that the United States invest in rigorous enforcement of the sanctions regime and apply escalating pressure on North Korea's illicit activities. ■ The United States should act quickly to support East and Southeast Asian states in creating a standing multilateral mechanism to coordinate implementation of Resolution 2270. This group should facilitate the sharing of intelligence, coordinate enforcement operations, and distribute resources donated by partners from outside the region, including the United States. Given its sophistication in circumventing previous sanctions, regional states should prioritize interdiction and inspection of North Korean shipping. ■ Should North Korea fail to reenter negotiations, the United States should work with its allies to prepare future financial sanctions and other measures that target the full range of the regime's illicit activity, including steps to punish corruption, exporters of slave labor, as well as foreign firms and banks that support these activities, wherever they reside. The United States should allow U.S. companies to bring legal action against sanctions violators and facilitators.

*STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE Findings 8.* The Task Force finds that North Korea's development of the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead on a long-range ballistic missile would dramatically increase its ability to threaten the United States and its allies. 9. The Task Force finds that although U.S.-ROK deterrence policy may have succeeded in preventing major military attacks since 2010, the frequency and severity of North Korea's aggressive behavior will likely increase as its nuclear and sub-conventional capabilities continue to develop. *Recommendations V.* The Task Force recommends that the United States, South Korea, and Japan move expeditiously to tighten collaboration and strengthen their deterrence and defense posture. ■ To reduce North Korea's incentives to divide the three partners with selective military strikes, **they should issue a collective security commitment declaring that an attack by North Korea against any one of them is an attack against all.** ■ The United States, South Korea, and Japan should, through joint exercises and coordinated deployment, expand allied capacity in defensive and offensive cyber operations, antisubmarine capabilities, missile defense, special forces, and air and naval forces to enforce new UN sanctions. VI. The Task Force recommends that the United States, South Korea, and Japan **build capacity to intercept all missile launches with a range-payload capability greater than existing Scud missiles** originating from North Korea, **whether they are declared to be ballistic missile tests or civil space launch vehicles.** In the event that Pyongyang fails to reenter negotiations, or the negotiations fail, the three partners should be prepared to declare and then implement this policy. *Finding 10.* The Task Force finds that current trends, if allowed to continue, will predictably, progressively, and gravely threaten U.S. national interests and those of its allies. This overall strategy seeks to prevent North Korea from attaining the capability to carry out a nuclear strike on the continental United States, but also hedges against the possibility that it does cross this threshold. The proposed enhancements of allied deterrence and defense posture will help ensure that the

United States and its allies can meet their national security needs in the years immediately following a successful North Korean test of an ICBM capability. Although it does propose increasing pressure on North Korea to return to the negotiating table, this strategy does not seek to cause the North Korean regime to collapse, an event that is most likely to occur as a result of the regime's continued gross economic mismanagement and cruel and inhumane treatment of its citizens. However, if North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and long-range missile capabilities and achieves the capability to strike the United States, Washington will have to work with allies to reassess overall strategy toward the regime. That policy review would consider more assertive diplomatic and military steps, including some that directly threaten the regime's nuclear and missile programs and, therefore, the regime itself. At that juncture, these measures may be necessary to protect the United States and its allies and to meet their immutable objective of a stable, free, and nonnuclear Korean Peninsula." Excerpt of report: ... "Although a negotiated agreement to free the peninsula of nuclear weapons will remain the primary objective of U.S. policy, the Task Force finds that this goal has become improbable in the near future. Both to pursue this goal and to promote national security interests, the Task Force recommends that the United States propose restructuring negotiations with North Korea on the expectation **that intermediate agreements on other issues can demonstrate the benefits of cooperation and establish an incentive to achieve a wider agreement further down the line.** The first step in this model will be to find agreement on the enabling conditions for talks. The next administration should review U.S. policy on negotiations and **communicate clear preconditions for the resumption of formal multilateral negotiations.** It should formally **dispel the mistaken perception that it places preconditions on informal talks** with North Korea **and that it demands unilateral steps** prior to the start of formal negotiations. Instead, the United States should **insist on three conditions for resumption of talks. First, all parties should agree to reaffirm the principles of the Joint Statement of 2005, including its commitment to a nonnuclear peninsula and a stable and lawful regional order.** Second, **negotiations need to make consistent progress on the nuclear issue at each stage** in the negotiations to ensure that North Korea cannot benefit by stalling on denuclearization. Third, because it will be impossible to negotiate while the DPRK carries out nuclear and long-range missile tests, the United States should **insist on a moratorium on all tests of nuclear explosives and missiles with a range-payload capability greater than existing Scud missiles, whether declared to be ballistic missiles or civil space launch vehicles.** Because **North Korea still has not tested a long-range ballistic missile with a reentry vehicle, a test moratorium will constitute a meaningful restraint on the program** while negotiators seek a verified freeze on its other aspects. In exchange and if requested by Pyongyang, the U.S. and South Korean governments may, for as long as negotiations are progressing, **consent to supply nutritional assistance to the North Korean civilian population, provided that NGOs can certify that these supplies are not being diverted to the military;** U.S. and South Korean officials may also **consider modifications to the scale and content of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises.** Initial negotiations should focus on attaining a verified freeze in North Korea's nuclear capabilities. A complete verified freeze of the nuclear program would require six restrictions: no nuclear tests; no missile launches, whether declared to be ballistic missiles or civil space launch vehicles

with a range-payload capability greater than the DPRK's existing Scud missiles; no plutonium reprocessing; no uranium enrichment; suspension of reactor operations at Yongbyon; and readmission of the IAEA to North Korea to monitor the nuclear elements of the freeze, both at declared facilities and with the approval of the five parties (China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, United States). Additionally, **the parties can explore conventional arms control measures; limitations on missile development; steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, and materials beyond North Korea's borders; early access for IAEA inspectors to specific North Korean nuclear facilities that Pyongyang has declared to be for civilian purposes; and measures to promote the welfare of North Korea's citizens, starting with allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross to access political prison camps.** In the initial phase, U.S., South Korean, and North Korean negotiators can also begin to discuss the terms of a peace treaty that will end the Korean War. The eventual objective of these staged negotiations is to achieve North Korea's complete denuclearization and reentry into the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In exchange, the regional powers would commit to sign a comprehensive peace treaty, normalize relations, lift the appropriate sanctions, and allow North Korea's integration into the global financial system. Full normalization of relations and sanctions relief will require major progress on North Korea's human rights position, including the release of all political prisoners and their families, a full accounting and voluntary repatriation of all persons abducted from foreign countries, nondiscriminatory food aid distribution monitored by aid workers who are guaranteed full nationwide access, freedom to leave the country and return without punishment, and ending the information blockade imposed on North Korea's citizens by the government. The main negotiations can take place under the Six Party Talks format, but certain issues can be resolved in smaller talks among North and South Korea, the United States, and China. This format, in which Korean representatives could be the primary negotiators, can be used to negotiate preconditions prior to the start of talks as well as the terms of an armistice that will be signed at the end of the process. Limiting the membership of the negotiations on difficult issues may encourage China to apply pressure on North Korea. The Task Force recommends that U.S. negotiators remain open to other formats for talks that could potentially be productive." (Council on Foreign Relations, *A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia*, Independent Task Force Report 74, September 2016)

The number of people in favor of reunification has dropped significantly apparently due to a series of recent provocations by the communist North. In a survey conducted by the National Unification Advisory Council, 74.4 percent of respondents said they saw a need for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. The ratio marked a 7.7 percentage point drop from 82.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2015, and the lowest level since the presidential council began conducting the quarterly survey at the start of last year, it said. "The recent deterioration in South-North relations caused by North Korea's nuclear tests and missile launches, followed by the shutdown of the countries' joint industrial park in Kaesong appear to have adversely affected people's sentiment toward North Korea and reunification," the council said. The worsening of sentiment toward the communist North was clearly more apparent among the younger generations as only 20.1 percent of respondents in their 20s said the divided Koreas

"must" reunify, while more than half of those in their 50s and 60s said reunification was a must. The latest survey was conducted on 1,000 people throughout the country, and has a sampling error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points. (Yonhap, "Fewer S. Korean See Need for Unification with N. Korea: Survey," *Korea Herald*, September 15, 2016)

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If North Korea's fifth nuclear test rattled outside policy makers by demonstrating technological advances in the country's weapons program, it also reminded them of how difficult it remains to parse the country, one of the world's most isolated and secretive. Not even those of us in South Korea saw what was coming on Friday morning until European monitors of seismological signals reported a tremor emanating from the Punggye-ri test site. South Korea's president, Park Geun-hye, had to cut short her state visit to Laos. The prime minister and the unification minister had to rush back to Seoul from trips to provincial cities. For months, the Defense Ministry here has given the standard – and the safest – answer when asked about the likelihood of another nuclear test by the North: The country was ready to conduct one at any time, whenever its leader, Kim Jong-un, gives the go-ahead. That answer, though, is hardly satisfying for those of us who cover the region – and who live within striking range of North Korean missiles, which Kim seeks to mount with nuclear warheads. Still, it is often a fruitless exercise to try to predict North Korean developments. Being on constant alert, always ready for surprise, is the safest course. I remember how startled I was when North Korea announced the death of Kim's father and predecessor, Kim Jong-il, in 2011. And *The Times* was not the only organization caught off guard: Outside intelligence agencies did not know about the leader's death until the North announced it two days after the fact. Many journalists and senior government officials, including presidential aides, were out for lunch when an announcer appeared on North Korean television and read the news in a weepy voice. For decades, American spy satellites have been scouring key North Korean military sites, including the hilly Punggye-ri site where the North has conducted all its previous underground nuclear tests. In recent years, private think tanks have also scrutinized the site, relying on commercial satellite imagery. The results, however, are often inconclusive. Some outside news outlets, such as the Associated Press and the Japanese news agency Kyodo, operate bureaus in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. But their reporters are not allowed to meet people or to travel freely. Those trying to report on North Korea from the outside sometimes talk to sources – often *paid* sources – inside the North, but the accounts from such sources usually cannot be verified. Outside reporters also often rely on defectors from the country, but few defectors arrive with access to valuable intelligence on its nuclear programs or top leaders. And, of course, all of North Korea's news media is state-controlled, which makes it difficult to separate fact from propaganda. South Korea's National Intelligence Service, or N.I.S., is a frequent source of North Korean news in the South Korean media – which, in turn, is often eagerly picked up and repackaged throughout the international news media, feeding a high demand for updates. (N.I.S. often leaks information to several representatives of the local media, insisting that it be attributed to an anonymous source. The next day, the local media outlets offer identical reports – and the N.I.S. spokesman's office refuses to confirm the information when reporters from foreign news organization call in.) But analysts warn that the agency's lack of political neutrality



often taints its information. The government of South Korea, especially N.I.S., has been accused of leaking selected information – or even incomplete and unverified intelligence – about the North to help influence domestic opinion and push its policies. In recent months, it took the unusual steps of publicly announcing high-profile defections from the North and the executions of top officials there, invariably citing them to portray North Korea as unstable and desperate under Kim. Andray Abrahamian, a North Korea expert who works for the Choson Exchange, recently warned of unverified rumors about North Korea finding audiences via the foreign news media. “North Korea’s opacity makes it seemingly easy to start rumors about what may be taking place there, as corroboration often seems too difficult to pursue,” Abrahamian wrote. “Reader interest in North Korea – and especially in salacious news – is high, making it very hard for journalists and editors to resist repeating a rumor when they are far from the story and thus less accountable for it.” What does all this mean for a *Times* bureau chief stationed in Seoul? How does it affect my reporting? One of the first things I do when I see a dramatic piece of news spreading through the media is to trace it to its origin. Very often, it starts with a report in the South Korean news media based on a single anonymous source, and I try to gauge the news outlet’s track record and potential ideological bias. It remains shocking how one such report or rumor can mutate, distorted and amplified, as it is repackaged by other news outlets abroad. (One recent example is the infamous “Kim Jong-un fed his uncle to dogs” story.) Given the uncertainty and sensitivity surrounding North Korea, officials here habitually fall back on anonymity when talking to reporters. This, in turn, means that anonymously sourced stories abound in South Korean news media, especially when the report concerns North Korea. Living up to The Times’s strict guidelines on using anonymous sources means extra efforts to reach out to and crosscheck sources, always trying to find ones willing to go on the record – and, very often, letting stories go unpublished. (It often takes weeks and even months before such a story is, if ever, independently confirmed or disputed. By then, it has been long forgotten.) The truth is that there is no foolproof way to report on North Korea. But it helps to remember that the two governments on the Korean Peninsula have been locked in a military standoff for decades, and that the North is ruled by a young, ambitious, cult-like leader obsessed with securing his – and his regime’s – survival by building a nuclear arsenal. That helps explain what I consider a remarkable consistency in the North’s behavior and pronouncements when considered in the long term. But it doesn’t help me, or anyone else, predict tomorrow’s North Korean news. (Choe Ang-hun, “Rumors, Misinformation and Anonymity: The Challenges of Reporting on North Korea,” *Times Insider*, September 16, 2016, p. A-4)

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Kerry: “We have said many times that we are prepared to sit down with the DPRK to deal with the issues of nonaggression, of peace on the Korean Peninsula, of joining the international community, of attracting assistance and economic development, **providing North Korea is prepared to talk with the rest of the world about responsible approaches to the question of nuclear weaponry and a nuclear program. So they must engage in a discussion about denuclearization. And the immediate need is for them to freeze where they are - to agree to freeze and not engage in any more provocative actions, not engage in more testing particularly, in order to** bring countries together and to **begin a serious negotiation about the**

**future.**" (Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks with ROK Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se and Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio, September 18, 2016)

They were beaten and forced to make false confessions. Many spent years in prison. Some were executed. Most were forgotten for decades. Over six decades, scores of people were arrested by the South Korean authorities and accused of spying for North Korea, only to be exonerated, sometimes decades later, long after many of them had served lengthy prison sentences. There has never been an official tally of the exact number of people affected, but a new film has documented almost 100 cases, some of which involved alleged spy rings with multiple people. The cases have mainly disappeared from public memory, but the new documentary, by the investigative journalist Choi Seung-ho, is lifting a veil on what he sees as one of the most shameful legacies of South Korea's counterintelligence authorities. Just before the closing credits of the film, "Spy Nation," a list of the names of the falsely accused scrolls down the screen. It is an eloquent indictment of the abuse of power engaged in by South Korea's counterespionage agencies, especially the National Intelligence Service, in the name of fighting the Communist threat from North Korea. Choi, a former TV producer now affiliated with the independent investigative news website Newstapa, accosted or ambushed interrogators and former top officials from the N.I.S., as well as state prosecutors who worked with them in espionage cases. He challenged them with questions in front of courthouses, at elevators and in airport lounges. All refused to answer, some running away. South Korea created the N.I.S., initially known as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, in the 1960s to catch spies from North Korea, with which it remains technically at war. But under successive military dictators, including Park Chung-hee, the father of the current president, Park Geun-hye, the intelligence service and other state agencies were also accused of concocting fake spy cases to arrest and discredit dissidents and divert attention from domestic crises. Over the past decade, many of the cases were retried after the government's Truth and Reconciliation Commission found them to be built on fabricated evidence and confessions extracted through torture. But even as many of the victims were cleared of spying charges, some posthumously, the intelligence service was accused of fabricating new cases. "Spy Nation" chronicles one such case, the story of Yu Woo-sung, an ethnic Chinese from North Korea who defected to the South in 2004. Yu, 35, was considered a rare success story among defectors from the North, who often have trouble adapting to life in the South. He was working as a welfare official at Seoul's City Hall in 2013 when the N.I.S. arrested him on charges of spying for North Korea. The agency based its accusation largely on confessions it said Yu's sister, Ga-ryeo, had made after entering South Korea from the North in 2012. At the time, the agency was being plunged into a major scandal. A team of secret agents was accused of running an online smear campaign against Ms. Park's rivals before her election in December 2012. The agency's former director, Won Sei-hoon, was later convicted on charges of meddling in domestic politics. Yu's arrest made headlines, a coup for the intelligence service, which was desperate to salvage its image. "One day I was a model defector, and the next they made me an evil spy," Yu said in an interview in 2014. But Yu's sister later testified in court that officials had beaten and coerced her into making false confessions against her brother while they held her without legal representation in solitary confinement at the agency's interrogation center for 179 days. The agency

denied using coercion at the center, south of Seoul, where it screens fresh arrivals from the North for up to six months to ferret out spies. Photos that the agency presented as evidence in court, saying they had been taken while Yu was secretly visiting North Korea in 2012, turned out to have been taken in China. The Chinese immigration documents that the agency said had recorded Yu's border crossings into North Korea were found to have been faked. A Korean-Chinese man stabbed himself in a Seoul hotel room after leaving a suicide note saying the agency had promised to pay him to fabricate the documents. The officer who hired him also tried to kill himself by inhaling carbon monoxide in his car. (Neither man died.) The court threw out the espionage charge against Yu. While all this was unfolding in 2014, the agency announced the arrest of another suspected spy, also a defector from the North. But the man, Hong Kang-cheol, walked free after a court declared his confessions invalid because he had not been informed of his right to remain silent and consult a lawyer. Hong said he had been held in solitary confinement for 84 days and forced to write draft after draft of a confession until a fictional version emerged that satisfied his interrogators. "I had no freedom to meet visitors, no freedom to move, completely isolated from the outside," Hong said after an appeals court upheld his acquittal in February. Over the years, the intelligence agency has repeatedly pledged not to abuse its power or act as a political tool of presidents. But scandals at the secretive agency have frequently rocked the country, with several of its directors ending up in jail. The agency declined to comment on "Spy Nation," which won the top documentary award at the Jeonju International Film Festival in South Korea in May. Park apologized for the agency's fabrication of evidence against Yu and replaced the N.I.S. chief in 2014. The agency has also promised to make its operations at the interrogation center more transparent. But scrutinizing the N.I.S. remains highly delicate in South Korea, where right-wing activists consider any criticism of the agency a "pro-North Korean" attempt to undermine national security. No multiplex chain has come forward to screen the film. Choi was able to schedule its theatrical release for October only after 35,000 people paid for tickets in advance through an online campaign. He also plans to take his film to Japan and to the Sundance Film Festival. Lee Cheol, 68, one of the former political prisoners interviewed in "Spy Nation," was sentenced to death in 1977 on spying charges. He was freed after 13 years, but was exonerated only last year in a retrial. His memory of torture remains raw. "They made me naked and beat me randomly, threatening to burn my genitals with cigarettes," Lee said. "They threatened to rape my fiancée and even her mother. In the end, I told them I would confess to whatever they wanted me to." (Choe Sang-hun, "Film Shines Light on South Korea Spy Agency's Fabrication of Enemies," *New York Times*, September 18, 2016, p. A-9)

9/19/16

South Korea's military appointed senior commanders to two key posts as part of an ongoing effort to better counter rising threats from North Korea, the defense ministry said. Um Hyun-seong, 58, vice chairman of Seoul's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), will take over from the current Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jung Ho-sup. Leem Ho-young, 57, chief director of JCS's Strategic Planning Directorate, will replace Gen. Kim Hyun-jip as deputy commander of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), the Ministry of National Defense (MND) said in a statement. (Yonhap, "S. Korea Appoints New Military Leaders amid Rising Threats from N. Korea," September 19, 2016)

South Korea said that it was unlikely to provide humanitarian aid to tens of thousands of flood survivors in North Korea even if the country asked for help, reaffirming its hardline stance after the North's fifth nuclear test. North Korea has mobilized soldiers and workers in internal relief efforts for an estimated 140,000 victims in its northern provinces after torrential rains last month caused what it has described as some of the worst flooding in its history. International relief agencies like the United Nations World Food Program have also sent food and other assistance and have appealed international donations. "North Korea has not asked for help, and we don't expect it to," Jeong Joon-hee, a spokesman for the South's Unification Ministry, said at a news briefing. "Even if it does, I think, given the present situation, that the possibility of providing aid is low." News of flooding and extensive damage in the impoverished North has prompted many in the South to call for sending humanitarian aid. Despite North Korea's frequent provocations and its pursuit of nuclear weapons, the suffering of ordinary citizens elicits sympathy in the South. The South's Constitution includes North Korea in its territory and calls for "national unity" through "humanitarianism and brotherly love." The flooding hit near North Korea's border with China, the poorest region in the country. Jeong said that North Korea was not helping itself by conducting a costly nuclear test this month as its people were suffering from the floods. (Choe Sang-hun, "South Korea: No Aid to North for Flood Woes," *New York Times*, September 20, 2016, p A-10)

9/20/16

KCNA: "Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, visited the Sohae Space Center to guide the ground jet test of **a new type high-power engine of a carrier rocket for the geo-stationary satellite**. The newly developed high-power engine is a single engine whose thrust is 80 tf. The test was aimed to make a final confirmation of the feature of combustion chamber, operation accuracy of valves and control systems and structural reliability of the engine during 200 seconds-long working time. Kim Jong Un issued an order to conduct the test. The moment the engine spewed out huge flames with deafening sound. The test showed that thrust and other technological indexes of the engine accurately reached the estimated values and the feature values of all systems of the engine remained stable throughout the working time. The successful manufacture of the engine provided a firm scientific and technological guarantee for developing and completing the carrier rocket for geo-stationary satellite during the 5-year program for national aerospace development and made it possible to acquire sufficient carrier capability for launching various kinds of satellites including earth observation satellite at a world level. He expressed great satisfaction over the results of the test and highly praised the officials and scientists and technicians of the National Aerospace Development Administration for having successfully and devotedly carried out the task given by the Party in a short span of time. The space science and technology and the space industry are an important barometer for estimating the national power, he said, calling for more dynamically paving the avenue to space conquest by conducting in real earnest the work for developing the space in order to fulfill the 5-year program for national aerospace development. The development and use of space are an important policy of our Party and an important work for which the state should make sustained efforts, he said, adding that the National Aerospace Development Administration should carry

out the space development with a main emphasis on the satellite development and manufacture and launch more satellites for different uses by indigenous efforts and technology and thus turn our country into a possessor of geostationary satellites in a couple of years to come. Noting that thanks to the implementation of the Party's line of prioritizing science and technology world-startling unprecedented miraculous successes have been made in the field of cutting-edge science and technology including space technology despite the difficult economic conditions of the country, he requested the officials, scientists and technicians to round off the preparations for launching the satellite as soon as possible on the basis of the successful test and thus bring the news of greater victory to the people who have steadfastly lived and struggled under the leadership of the Party, unwaveringly trusting it, though they have fastened their belts owing to the enemies' harsh sanctions and moves to stifle the DPRK." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Guides Ground Jet Test of New-type High-Power Engine of Carrier Rocket for Geo-stationary Satellite," September 20, 2016)

Schilling: "KCNA reported that Kim Jong Un had overseen the testing of a large new rocket engine at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. They claimed this new engine had a thrust of 80 tons and would be use for a new space launch vehicle. Rocket engine thrust isn't normally measured in "tons," and there is some ambiguity in how to interpret that figure. It is also possible that the North Koreans are exaggerating; we can't directly verify thrust from the images they released. Regardless, we can tell that the engine is substantially larger and more powerful than anything North Korea has tested before, even than the new ICBM engine tested in April, and the thrust may well be in the range of 160,000 pounds or 80,000 kilograms force. And, **while this particular engine may not be slated for an ICBM, we have now seen that North Korea can build large rockets using both solid and high-energy liquid propellants, to their own requirements.** Whatever missiles North Korea may roll out in coming years, we can no longer expect to be limited to what can be cobbled together from old Russian cold-war leftovers. The plume coloration indicates that this engine **probably uses the high-energy UDMH (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine) and NTO (nitrogen tetroxide) propellants used by the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile and the April 9 engine test**—both derived from the old Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile whose technology North Korea illicitly acquired in the 1990s. However, a side view clearly shows the exhaust of a gas generator turbo-pump, rather than the more advanced staged-combustion cycle of the R-27. North Korea has previously used the gas-generator design on its (mostly) home-grown Nodong engine. The new engine does not have either vernier nozzles or jet vanes, suggesting the entire engine may be gimballed for steering purposes. This does not appear to be a copy of any Russian engine, but represents a mix of technologies well suited to a North Korean large engine development program. It is reasonable to wonder whether North Korea might have had help in taking this unprecedented step, and two potential collaborators come to mind. China's space launch vehicles, and some of their older ICBMs, use an engine called the YF-20 that is of the same size, performance and general technology as the new North Korean engine. However, there are visible differences between the new engine and the YF-20. We shouldn't assume that China is helping Pyongyang. However, as we know, North Korea can sometimes connive with Chinese merchants to buy goods that are pretty

obviously on the military side of the dual-use spectrum. For instance, while they probably couldn't procure complete rocket engines, they could maybe get blueprints or critical components like turbo-pumps. Iran is another potential collaborator. There have long been ambiguous and difficult to pin down reports that Iranian engineers have been working with their North Korean counterparts on an "80-ton rocket booster." The two nations have long collaborated in rocketry, with similar goals and technologies, and while their missile programs have diverged in recent years, their space programs are still in some respects a joint effort. Still besides the similarity in size, there is no additional evidence to prove this assertion. The bottom line is that the North Koreans have the engine, it seems to work, and they can probably build more of them for whatever purpose they see fit. The question is, what are they going to do with it? Given the size of the engine, they probably aren't going to build an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with it. The engine is too big and powerful for the KN-08 and KN-14 road-mobile ICBMs under development in North Korea. Space launch vehicles are another matter. North Korea has upgraded its Sohae launch site over the past few years to accommodate new, larger space launch vehicles that we have not yet seen. We may have just seen its engine. Or, more likely, one of its engines—liquid-fuel space launch vehicles typically use more than one engine on the first stage, and North Korean practice so far has been to use four engines. Iran, too, seems to favor a four-engine design. And a launch vehicle using four of these new engines would be about the right size for the upgraded launch pad and gantry tower at Sohae. North Korea recently announced it plans to launch rockets to the Moon within the next ten years, along with launching increasingly capable satellites into Earth orbit. This engine would be suitable for launching modest unmanned lunar probes, along with geostationary communications satellites and various sorts of reconnaissance satellites in lower orbits. They still have a way to go on the necessary satellite technology, of course, but they are now one step closer to demonstrating a basic operational capability in outer space. We should start thinking about how we might live with a North Korea that has such a capability. And, while this particular engine may not be slated for an ICBM, we have now seen that North Korea can build large rockets using both solid and high-energy liquid propellants, to their own requirements. Whatever missiles North Korea may roll out in coming years, we can no longer expect to be limited to what can be cobbled together from old Russian cold-war leftovers." (John Schilling, "North Korea's Largest Engine Test Yet," *38North*, September 21, 2016)

A new rocket engine that North Korea claims to have successfully tested this week would be powerful enough to range the continental United States if it has the capability to put a satellite into orbit as claimed by Pyongyang, a top US commander said. The North claimed earlier Tuesday that it successfully conducted a "ground jet test of a new type high-power engine of a carrier rocket for the geo-stationary satellite." It said the "single engine" has a thrust of 80 tons, which is three times the power of the engine used in the North's previous long-range rocket launches. The claim, if confirmed, would represent big progress in the North's efforts to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the US. The announcement also raises concern Pyongyang is preparing for yet another long-range rocket launch after a successful launch in February. "There was news of a test of a new, very large rocket

engine, a rocket engine that he (the North) said would be capable of going to the geosynchronous orbit in space. If it has that capability, it has the capability to reach the United States. So I'm very concerned about that," Air Force Gen. John E. Hyten said during a Senate hearing to confirm his nomination as commander of the US Strategic Command. (Yonhap, "Incoming U.S. Strategic Commander: New N. Korean Rocket Engine May Range U.S.," *Korea Herald*, September 21, 2106)

DPRK FoMin spokesman reply to "answer to the question raised by KCNA slamming slamming the U.S. and its followers' accusations against the DPRK over its measures for bolstering up nuclear deterrent for self-defense: U.S. Secretary of State Kerry held tripartite talks with the foreign ministers of Japan and south Korea in New York on Sept. 18. There, Kerry again talked about the tattered "dialogue for denuclearization", terming the DPRK's measures for bolstering up its nuclear force "provocation and ill-advised action" and the like. These are nothing but gangster-like remarks making profound confusing of right and wrong. The DPRK's nuclear force serves as a treasured sword of justice for putting a definite end to the U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail that have lasted for more than half a century and protecting not only the sovereignty and vital rights of the country but also peace and security in Northeast Asia and the rest of the world. The U.S. persistent labeling of the DPRK's measures for bolstering up the capability for self-defense as "threat" is nothing but a pretext for justifying its aggressive hostile policy towards the DPRK and strategy for dominating Asia. The U.S. is ridiculously trumpeting that the DPRK will "get great reward" in return for dismantling its nukes but it is a cynical ploy to disarm the DPRK and occupy the whole of the Korean peninsula and, furthermore, realize its wild dream for world domination. The U.S. undisguised hostile military actions and nuclear blackmail against the DPRK scrapped the keynote of the September 19 joint statement and deprived it of both legal ground and moral justification to talk about "fulfillment of its commitments." Well aware that it is impossible to bring the DPRK to its knees through economic pressure and military threats, the U.S. is scheming to "topple its social system," pulling up it over its "human rights issue", but it is a daydream. The U.S. and its vassal forces' desperate rackets to tighten sanctions against the DPRK and ratchet up the pressure upon it would only harden the will of its service persons and civilians to take revenge upon them. The DPRK will take powerful counteractions of its own style one after another and make the U.S. regret its reckless actions taken with its wrong judgment." (KCNA, "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Slams U.S. Accusations over Its Measures for Bolstering up Nuclear Deterrent for Self-Defense," September 20, 2016)

North Korea's repeated flouting of U.N. Security Council resolutions by conducting nuclear and missile tests calls into question its suitability for membership of the world body, South Korea's top diplomat has told the Associated Press. Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se stopped short of calling for Pyongyang's expulsion from the U.N. but said its authoritarian government was violating the terms under which both the Koreas had been admitted 25 years ago. He said the North had "broken records" in its violation of global norms: It is the only nation to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century and is already subject to five Security Council resolutions over its weapons testing. "I think all members of the U.N. have to ask themselves whether North Korea is really qualified as a member of the U.N.," Yun said in an interview said on the sidelines of the

annual gathering of world leaders at its headquarters in New York. Calling North Korea a "serial offender," he said the Security Council, the U.N.'s top decision-making body, needs to close loopholes in existing sanctions and impose tough new measures in response to the North's fifth and most recent atomic test. He said that the "Hiroshima-sized explosion" made clear that Pyongyang poses an "existential threat" to its U.S.-allied southern neighbor and a growing menace to the world. "This latest test is a very sobering reminder (that) the danger and the threat from North Korea is now reaching a very, very dangerous stage. For many years we have been talking about the development of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles, and now we may be reaching a stage where we have to worry about the deployment of nuclear-tipped missiles," Yun said. "If that day comes, that's not just a threat to South Koreans or to Japanese, it's a threat to the United States and almost all members of the international community," Yun said. He described the ongoing negotiations over a new Security Council resolution as a "last chance ... to check this fanatic behavior" of young leader Kim Jong Un. (Matthew Pennington, "S. Korea Questions 'Serial Offender' N. Korea's U.N. Membership," Associated Press, September 20, 2016)

ISIS: "Commercial satellite imagery from July and August 2016 shows continued activity at the Yongbyon nuclear site, a major site for plutonium and weapon-grade uranium production for nuclear weapons. A recurring mystery is the operational status of the 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor and the amount of plutonium produced there. Recent imagery suggests that its operation remains limited. In addition, a question is when the experimental light water reactor (LWR) will start. This new reactor could make considerably more weapon-grade plutonium than the 5 MWe reactor. Given the importance of plutonium to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, another question remains whether North Korea will seek to boost plutonium production at these two reactors by getting the smaller one to work better and starting the larger one. The recent campaign to separate plutonium at the Radiochemical Plant may be finished. Recent imagery shows little activity there. An earlier Institute report estimated that North Korea could have separated about 5.5 to 8 kilograms of plutonium during this campaign, which is roughly enough for 1 to 4 nuclear weapons. This level of plutonium production is less than nominal and implies the reactor is not working as well as possible. The outward construction of the possible tritium separation facility appears to be largely complete. This facility could increase North Korea's separation of tritium. Tritium is critical to the development and deployment of more powerful thermonuclear weapons, particularly designs aimed at significantly increasing the explosive yield of an atomic explosion. The 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor is the site where North Korea produces plutonium in natural uranium fuel. DigitalGlobe commercial satellite imagery dated August 26, 2016 showed no outward signs of full power, such as extensive water discharge into the nearby river or steam venting from the reactor's turbine structure. An Airbus commercial image dated July 14, 2016 also shows no water or steam discharge. The August 28 image depicts vehicles, including what appears to be a flatbed truck, at the building's entrance as well as additional, unidentifiable new objects. Although this implies activity at the reactor site, the nature of the activity is unknown. The flatbed truck that is present at the building's entrance appears to be the same truck previously identified in a May 22, 2016 image and possibly the July 14, 2016 image. This suggests this vehicle is



regularly used or scheduled for use; however, its purpose is unknown. Our assessment is that the reactor has operated intermittently or at low power since mid-2014. Based on the recent imagery, we do not detect evidence of consistent operation at full reactor power in July and August 2016. Although North Korea has conducted extensive renovations of the reactor during the last several years, including importing equipment and materials from abroad, the reactor's operation may remain sporadic. Based on information of a knowledgeable government expert, the nominal thermal power of the reactor is likely only in the range of 15-20 megawatts-thermal. Originally, the reactor's nominal power was in the range of 20-25 megawatts-thermal. However, it is unclear if the reactor is reaching even these reduced power levels on a consistent basis. On August 19, 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released an annual report, *Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, discussing activities at the Yongbyon site. According to the report, "For most of the reporting period [the last year] there were indications consistent with the reactor's operation, including steam discharges and the outflow of cooling water. However, between mid-October and early December 2015 there were no such indications. This period is sufficient for the reactor to have been de-fueled and subsequently re-fueled. Based on past operational cycles, a new cycle commencing in early December 2015 can be expected to last about two years." The IAEA has apparently concluded that the fuel in the core of the reactor was removed and new fuel inserted by the end of 2016. However, the report does not provide any information about the level of reactor operation. The Radiochemical Laboratory is where North Korea chemically processes discharged irradiated fuel from the 5 MWe reactor and separates plutonium for nuclear weapons. A government source confirmed in June 2016 that activities inside the main building of the Radiochemical Laboratory had recently taken place that implied the separation of plutonium. Based on commercial satellite imagery during the spring, the Institute could see activity was occurring that indirectly indicated that the spent fuel discharged from the 5 MWe reactor was being processed to extract plutonium. This activity included the presence of more vehicles than usual, modifications to waste sites at the complex, and the emission of smoke in the main stack at the coal fired steam generation plant, which is typically operated to produce steam used in waste processing activities following the separation of plutonium from irradiated fuel. In a previous study, the Institute estimated that the separation campaign involved the processing of a full core of irradiated fuel from the 5 MWe reactor. The processing of a full core is estimated to have resulted in a total of 5.5-8 kilograms of separated weapon-grade plutonium, or enough for one to four nuclear weapons, assuming 2-4 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium per weapon, or a central estimate of 2.5 nuclear weapons equivalent. This amount of plutonium is less than nominal. Accepting the IAEA's finding that the reactor fuel was discharged in late 2016, the fuel was in the reactor for somewhat more than two years. As a result, the average annual production of plutonium was about 2.5 to 4 kilograms. The IAEA has concluded that North Korea has likely reprocessed fuel from the 5 MWe reactor in a campaign that likely ended by this summer. According to the IAEA's August 2016 report, "From the first quarter of 2016, there were multiple indications consistent with the Radiochemical Laboratory's operation, including deliveries of chemical tanks and the operation of the associated steam plant. Such indications ceased in early July 2016. In previous reprocessing campaigns, the Radiochemical Laboratory's operation

involved the use of the spent fuel discharged" from the 5 MWe reactor. The July 14 and August 28, 2016 imagery shows little activity at the Radiochemical Laboratory, including no smoke being emitted at the coal fired steam plant. As of August 28, there are only a few new objects, most likely vehicles and possibly sheds, in proximity to the spent fuel reception building. In addition, there is no obvious work around the nuclear-waste-related building 500, where earlier, trench work was being done next to the building. The Experimental Light Water Reactor (LWR) is still under construction, although North Korea announced that the reactor would be finished several years ago. In the recent July and August imagery, there does not appear to be any external activity taking place. The lack of any activity is consistent with the August report of the IAEA. According to the IAEA report: "The construction of what appears to be an electrical switchyard adjacent to the LWR was completed in December 2015. The Agency has not observed indications of the delivery or introduction of major reactor components into the reactor containment building." When this reactor may start remains a mystery. In addition, although North Korea has stated that the reactor would concentrate of producing electricity, another question is whether it will also make plutonium for nuclear weapons. Given the age and size of the 5 MWe reactor and the importance of plutonium for making nuclear weapons, North Korea would have a strong incentive to finish the reactor and produce weapon-grade plutonium in it. The possible isotope separation plant appears outwardly to be nearing completion. This facility is located east of the fuel fabrication complex and possibly slated at least in part to separate tritium and other isotopes for nuclear weapons purposes. This facility could increase North Korea's separation of tritium, which could benefit a program to make different types of thermonuclear nuclear weapons, particularly boosted designs. External construction may be finishing at the site. June 2016 satellite imagery showed trucks and construction material, but the July 14 imagery shows the site to be relatively clean of construction material. Changes visible in the August 28 imagery include the covering of a seemingly empty water tank and the presence in close proximity of an object which could possibly be a gas tank. Questions have arisen over whether this plant may be intended to separate plutonium from irradiated fuel. The Institute analysis relied partially on an assessment that the concrete walls of the hot cells appear too thin to provide adequate shielding for separating plutonium from irradiated fuel. However, we received a question as to whether North Korea could use advanced concrete that would allow thinner walls while providing the same radiation shielding as much thicker, regular concrete walls. We queried two experts who responded that North Korea is not prone to using advanced concrete and it usually uses simpler technology. Moreover, the experts pointed out that the internal structure of this building is composed of hot cells with what looks like laboratory space behind the cells. To them, artificial isotope separation makes more sense than plutonium separation. The July and August 2016 images do not show significant external activity at the centrifuge plant, which is located in the fuel production complex and believed to be operational. In the August image, there appear to be vehicles located west of the main centrifuge building and new objects to the east of it, leading to the conclusion that construction may be happening nearby. (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach, and Samta Savla, September 2016: Monitoring Activities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Site, Institute for Science and International Security, September 20, 2016)

The police in northeastern China have announced a criminal investigation into a Chinese conglomerate that does extensive trade with North Korea, which researchers in South Korea and the United States say included materials that can be used in the production of nuclear weapons. The Public Security Department of Liaoning Province said on a government website last week that the Hongxiang conglomerate, based in Dandong, a major trading center with North Korea, was suspected of "serious economic crimes." "During their work, the Liaoning public security authorities discovered that for a long time the Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Company Ltd. and a relevant responsible individual engaged in suspected grave economic crimes during trading activities," the department said. The police did not specify whether the company's prominent chairwoman, Ma Xiaohong, was under investigation, nor did it say whether the company was the object of scrutiny for its North Korean business, which makes up the bulk of its trade. The action was compelled by two recent visits to Beijing by officials from the Justice Department to warn the Chinese of the illegal activities of the Dandong company, according to an American law enforcement official who asked not to be identified before a pending announcement of charges against the company by the United States. The information provided to the Chinese included allegations that the company was helping North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the official said. The statement by Liaoning Province came just days before a report issued today by a South Korean think tank and a Washington research group that singled out the Hongxiang group for dealing in products that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Ma has avidly supported stronger economic ties with North Korea and has called the Hongxiang group a "golden bridge" between China and the North. One of the targets of the Chinese investigations appears to be aluminum products that Hongxiang is said to have sold to North Korea. A division of the Hongxiang conglomerate dispatched two shipments of aluminum oxide worth \$253,219 to North Korea in September 2015, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in South Korea and the C4ADS research group in Washington said in their report. According to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, aluminum oxide is used to avert corrosion in gas centrifuges during uranium enrichment. The report listed three other products – aluminum ingots, ammonium paratungstate and tungsten trioxide – that Hongxiang sold to North Korea and that the United States Commerce Department considers to have possible civilian and nuclear uses. Aluminum oxide is among a long list of items issued in 2013 by China's Ministry of Commerce that are banned for sale to North Korea. The unusual action by China follows congressional legislation passed this year aimed at forcing Beijing to penalize its companies that do business with North Korea. And Ma's Hongxiang group has been an especially energetic player in such business. "Be thankful that we were born in this great era and were born in Dandong, this beautiful city on the frontier of China and North Korea," Ma, 44, wrote in an introduction to herself on the Hongxiang conglomerate's website. "Be even more thankful that we have chosen this business of doing trade and serving as a shipping agent with North Korea. North Korea's resumed resurgence and unlimited needs can make all our dreams become possible." According to the Hongxiang website, where Ma appears in photographs as a philanthropist with boundless enthusiasm for trade between China and North Korea, the conglomerate's business interests include chemicals, minerals, metals and coal, the latter one of North Korea's most valuable exports. After North Korea held its first

nuclear test in 2006, Ma told a Chinese newspaper that she was “not too surprised.” She said, “I think the groundwork has been prepared for a long time.” The company also owns hotels, travel agencies and a shipping fleet of 10 vessels that link Chinese and North Korean ports and apparently carry coal out of the North, the report said. Washington and Beijing have had mounting difficulty in agreeing how to deal with North Korea’s expanding nuclear weapons program. The North conducted its fifth underground nuclear test less than two weeks ago, its most powerful so far. The Chinese government criticized the test but has strongly protested the decision by the Obama administration this summer to deploy an advanced missile defense system in South Korea intended to give the country protection against the North’s weapons. During a meeting in Hangzhou, China, this month, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, raised the issue of the missile system with President Obama. The two sides failed to resolve the issue, Obama said later. The investigation by the Chinese authorities was not surprising, said an expert on North Korea, Cheng Xiaohe, an assistant professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing. The action did not suggest a sweeping inquiry into Chinese trade with North Korea, he said. “If the United States makes concrete allegations, China has to oblige,” he said. The Chinese government may use the inquiry to concentrate on one relatively small company while warning bigger entities like banks of the consequences of continuing to do business with the North, he said. After protracted negotiations with the United States, China agreed this year to tougher United Nations sanctions on the North. But enforcement by the Chinese has been lax, analysts say. Coal is North Korea’s major export and foreign currency earner, and most of North Korea’s coal is shipped through China. Recent figures showed that coal sales were down 12 percent since the sanctions were put into effect, a marginal amount, said Stephan Haggard, a Korea specialist at the University of California, San Diego. Until now, Ma has enjoyed support from the Chinese authorities, especially the Dandong government. As recently as June, the Ministry of Commerce gave Hongxiang a license to import oil products, something private Chinese businesses can do only with special permission. But a spreading political scandal also implicated Ma and may have been another sign that she has lost her political protection. Ma was among 452 delegates of the Liaoning Province People’s Congress who were stripped of their membership this month after investigators found that they had bribed their way onto the legislature. Membership brings little power but creates opportunities to mingle, and make deals with, powerful officials and entrepreneurs. People who answered telephone calls to Ma’s offices said they could not speak to journalists or did not know where she was. The Liaoning police also declined to comment. In 2006, Ma told the newspaper *Southern Weekly* that doing business with North Korea could be perilous. “If the political winds really change, our business will be smashed to smithereens,” she said. (Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, “Chinese Firm Suspected of Aiding North Korea,” *New York Times*, September 21, 2106, p. A-3)

Ruediger Frank: “The US Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) issued a call worth an estimated 1.6 million USD for projects to “foster the free flow of information into, out of, and within the DPRK.” In particular, applicants are encouraged to submit proposals for producing and transmitting radio broadcasts into North Korea; producing content and/or acquiring existing content of interest to North Korean audiences; exploring new mechanisms or expanding existing

mechanisms for sharing or consuming information and content; raising awareness of legal rights under existing DPRK domestic laws and its international human rights obligations; raising awareness of international best-practices and norms; promoting fundamental freedoms, including expression, movement, association, and peaceful assembly. In other words, the US government has decided to instigate a "Pyongyang Spring" through a targeted and concerted media and information campaign—and we are not talking about those ridiculous loudspeakers at the DMZ....Will this kind of strategy work in the case of North Korea? If so, will it work the way the US government hopes? I am skeptical, for a number of reasons, including the nature of North Korean ideology, existing access to information in North Korea, the actual effect of the media campaign, and the potential reaction of the Pyongyang government. ... North Korea's ideology is not like the Marxism-Leninism that ruled the former Eastern bloc before 1990, which was more or less of a technical nature and externally imposed. Rather, it is much closer to the religious fundamentalism that made the Arab Spring such a big disappointment for those who had hoped for a quick and easy solution. Instead, the emerging power vacuum after the demise of the old regime was filled by forces that could hardly be described as a Western democratic type. North Korea's ideology is defensive ultra-nationalistic and is reinforced by the historical experiences of the Japanese occupation and American carpet-bombing. North Koreans believe that they have nothing good to expect from foreigners, in particular if their forces are stationed along their borders, and that only military strength can protect them. I am not saying that this makes the ideology and its link to the regime unbreakable, but it does make the task much more challenging than some in Washington seem or want to believe. Moreover, North Korea's ideology is remarkably flexible. ... A good dose of skepticism is in place regarding the idea that North Koreans know close to nothing about the outside world or their own reality, and that if only their eyes were opened, they would brush the Kim family aside and happily join South Korea, cap in hand. My own interaction with North Koreans during the last 25 years tells me that even without the internet and Fox News, these people are remarkably well informed. Transmitted by word of mouth, the main source of that information is China. ...All that knowledge has been around for years, but the system still seems to be stable and resilient. Those who hope that a simple media campaign will provide a quick fix to the North Korean nuclear program need to consider this. Taking comfort in the fact that the ridiculously small number of North Koreans, less than 30,000 since 1953, who made it to South Korea or the United States were able to break free from the spell of *jucheism* would be self-deception. Defectors are a self-selective group: they leave precisely because they do not like the system. Human rights organizations report about discontent within the country, thus creating the impression of an imminent uprising that only needs a little push from the outside to happen. But how representative are such events? Making the idea that North Korean society is at a tipping point a working hypothesis could be dangerously misleading. An often-ignored risk lies in the chance that a clumsily designed campaign might backfire and achieve the opposite of the desired effects. North Koreans are not dumb. They know what propaganda is. If they realize that the other side is trying to manipulate them, they will turn their back on it in disgust. We know that some North Koreans secretly watch movies and TV series for entertainment. This is their "content of interest." I can see how subversive messages of the type "life is great on our side" can be smuggled in; I am less optimistic on "raising awareness of

legal rights under existing DPRK domestic laws and its international human rights obligations” or “raising awareness of international best-practices and norms.” In hindsight, I believe the most effective tool of West German propaganda in East Germany was normality. Being able to watch regular TV and to listen to regular radio broadcasts created the impression of being a witness, not a target. Content that is specifically designed for North Koreans will enrich those who produce it but otherwise will achieve little. However, given the proven inclination of the South Korean government towards micro management, I am quite skeptical whether it will be tried to make regular South Korean media content accessible to North Koreans at all. Rather, some bureaucrats in Seoul will edit out everything that they consider inappropriate—like fist-fights in the National Assembly, documentaries about the homeless, etc.—to create a South Korean version of “only beautiful, please.” Even if we assume that such a media campaign would be successful, there is no reason to believe that those in power in North Korea will sit idle. Counter-measures will be of a technical and political nature. The recent introduction of internet-protocol television (IPTV or streaming TV) can mean many things, including a much better way to prevent the consumption of non-authorized broadcasts. Once no antennas are needed to receive North Korean TV, those who nevertheless keep them installed will invite the suspicion of authorities. Radio frequencies can be blocked by a strong carrier signal, which the North Koreans have been doing for decades. In any case, watching Western media, be it over TV or on DVDs and USB sticks, is still illegal and a punishable offense. North Koreans violate this rule only selectively and carefully; too much is at stake for them. The state has many ways to even increase the cost of noncompliance. One reason why Western propaganda was so successful in Eastern Europe was a remarkable negligence by the governments there. For instance, how many Hungarians were publicly executed in the 1980s for watching Hollywood movies? When I grew up in East Germany, West German TV was frowned upon by the state but otherwise perfectly legal. Do not expect the same lenience from the North Korean state. As is the case for most large bureaucracies, North Korea’s system of surveillance is less perfect than we tend to believe—and a remarkable amount of activity is taking place below the radar. A media campaign of the type cited above could raise the related awareness of the North Korean authorities and compel them to invest more resources into counter-measures. In the end, it could turn out that fewer people, not more, will have regular access to alternative sources of information. ...Expectations of what can be accomplished through external pressures need to be grounded in a better understanding of conditions on the ground in the North, not just defector testimony, lest we waste taxpayers’ money or drift right into some other chaotic situation. In particular, explicit or implicit analogies with Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union must be scrutinized to better understand the potential and limitations of what can be done. As I and many others have argued repeatedly, a much more effective and sustainable strategy to change North Korea would be to fund business relations and market activities—drivers of real social and values changes over the past decades. So far, the US is leaving this—and the information and soft power that comes with it—to the Chinese, who happen to also be its biggest strategic rival on the peninsula and in the region.” (Ruediger Frank, “Between Wishful Thinking and Realism: A Prague Spring, Pyongyang Style,” *38North*, September 29, 2016)

9/21/16

The United States sent two armed strategic bombers to South Korea, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) said, in the latest move to demonstrate Washington's security commitment to its Asian ally and warn against additional North Korean provocations. One of the two B-1B Lancer bombers landed at Osan Air Base. The other flew over the base in Pyeongtaek, 70 kilometers south of Seoul, and returned to U.S. Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, the USFK said. The flyby comes only a week after a pair of B-1B Lancers flew over South Korea. (Yonhap, "U.S. Sends 2 B-1B Bombers over S. Korea in Show of Force against N. Korean Provocations," September 21, 2016)

South Korea's military has a plan to assemble a special force that could remove North Korean leader Kim Jong Un from power in case of a nuclear threat, a top defense official says. South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo confirmed reports that a special force could target North Korean leadership in the event of an emergency. The military is also preparing what it calls a massive punishment and retaliation project to target and destroy key sites in the North, Han said. "If it becomes clear the enemy is going to use nuclear missiles, in order to suppress that aim, the idea is to retaliate against the enemy's key areas, including its leadership," he told lawmakers at the National Assembly. (Kim Gamel and Yoo Kyong Chang, "South Korea Hatches Plan to Remove Kim from Power in Case of Nuke Threat," Stars and Stripes, September 22, 2016)

At 6 am on August 18, Yonhap, South Korea's main news agency released an "exclusive" article that stated, "A source familiar with the North Korean situation said the father of Thae Yong-ho, a minister-level diplomat at the North Korean embassy in London, appears to have been first-generation anti-Japanese partisan Thae Byong-ryol, who served as a dispatch rider to Kim Il-sung." The article's content was reported in turn by several other news outlets. At 7 pm the previous day, South Korean Ministry of Unification spokesperson Jeong Joon-hee announced at an emergency press conference that Thae - whom he called the "highest-ranking North Korean diplomat who has defected to date" - had arrived in South Korea with his family. All eyes were on the Yonhap News report. An anti-Japanese partisan bloodline was seen as the highest possible in North Korea apart from the so-called "Baekdu bloodline" connecting Kim Il-sung to son Kim Jong-il and grandson and current leader Kim Jong-un. Thae Byong-ryol was also a key presence in the North Korean elite who served as a general in the People's Army before his death in 1997. One problem: the report wasn't true. On August 23, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported to the National Assembly Intelligence Committee that Thae Yong-ho was not the son of Thae Byong-ryol. So who was this "source familiar with the North Korean situation"? Who convinced an experienced reporter with a prominent news agency that they had an "exclusive" story to report - even though it wasn't true? Was it an NIS agent or high-ranking figure with a foreign affairs and national security agency? A North Korean defector claiming ties with North Korean authorities? A businessperson trading with North Korea in its Chinese border region? Someone with years of experience in humanitarian aid or exchange and cooperation with North Korea? A scholar specializing in North Korean issues? The questions only multiply - yet there are no clues toward identifying the source. A "North Korea source" has no identity. He or she is a phantom. The rule in journalism is to identify sources by name. There are exceptions, though. First among them are

instances where anonymous reporting is unavoidable as a way of protecting privacy or other human rights. An example would be keeping the name of the victim secret when reporting on a sexual assault. Second would be a case where opinions are needed to guarantee the public's right to know, and the subject is a high-ranking source who would never agree to reveal their name. For news outlets in the US and other Western countries, anonymous reporting is granted as an exception when the subjects are high-ranking officials in foreign policy areas. South Korean news outlets tend not to limit their anonymous quoting of high-ranking government officials to the areas of foreign policy and national security. Instead, they are used more broadly. As a reporting practice, it leaves much to be desired. But even in this case, various methods are used to provide a clue toward the anonymous source's identity - distinguishing them from the kinds of sources whose identity cannot be guessed. When anonymous quotes are used unavoidably for reporting convenience rather than human rights productions, the guideline is that enough devices should be used that readers or listeners might be able to infer who the source is. A sort of shorthand is used whenever government officials are used as sources. They are identified as "high-ranking official," "(high) senior official," "senior official," and "official," in descending order of prestige. "High-ranking officials" are typically in political service, namely a minister or vice minister. While "high-ranking government official" could refer to any one of dozens of people, a "senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official" could only be one of three people: Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung-se, First Vice Minister Lim Sung-nam, or Second Vice Minister Cho Tae-yul. A "senior Ministry of Unification source" would be either Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo or Vice Unification Minister Kim Hyung-suk. "(High) senior official" often refers to an assistant vice minister or a senior professional public servant at the office director level, as opposed to a minister or vice minister. If Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Kim Hong-kyun, South Korea's senior representative at the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue, were to speak to the press on condition of anonymity, he would typically be listed as a "(high) senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official." A kinder reporter might name him as a "senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs authority in charge of matters related to the Six-Party Talks and North Korea's nuclear program." "Senior official" refers to someone at the director general level in a central government agency. A reference to a "Ministry of Foreign Affairs authority involved in discussions and implementation of the South Korean and Japanese government's Dec. 28 agreement on the comfort women issue" would essentially mean the director of the ministry's Northeast Asia bureau. "Official" refers to someone at the section director level in a central government agency. Apart from highly exceptional circumstances, government officials below the section director level are not used as sources for articles. Even at the working level, no one has authority to decide policy. By following this hierarchy, reports offer a hint for readers with enough background knowledge of the article's context to gather who the source might be. In contrast, the word "source" is generally used when the person being quoted anonymously is not a public official. But since there aren't any fixed rules about this, it can be difficult to determine the source's identity. Because of these considerations, there's a huge difference in credibility between stories that quote "officials" and those that quote "sources," even though they are all technically anonymous reports. In theory, responsible media outlets and journalists who are scrupulous about their reporting ethics make an effort not to write or publish articles



that rely upon "sources." It is acceptable to leave a "source" anonymous when it is necessary to conceal their identity because of the sensitive nature of the story. But at such times, the unwritten rule that reporters should double check their sources must be applied with exceptional strictness. Otherwise, reporters are liable to print false reports or to be manipulated into become unwitting publicists for their source. Here's one example. On the afternoon of Feb. 10, the Unification Ministry beat reporters with a document titled, "North Korea's abruptly purged Ri Yong-gil, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, in early February." The document said that Lee, a 61-year-old general, had been executed in early February on charges of factionalism, corruption and abuse of power. The Ministry required reporters to cite a "source related to North Korea" in their articles. February 10 was the day that the administration of President Park Geun-hye responded to North Korea's rocket launch on February 7 by announcing the complete shutdown of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. When the Unification Ministry provided the press with the document about the execution of Ri Yong-gil, it was presumably part of a propaganda campaign aimed at diverting public attention from the shutdown of the Kaesong Complex (which had been described as the last safety valve for inter-Korean relations) and at fomenting public anger at the "reckless and despicable" Kim Jong-un regime with its "regular nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches." According to the government's organizational scheme, the Unification Ministry is the agency that handles North Korea policy. Collecting intelligence about North Korea is the work of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). It was irresponsible and politically calculated for the government to leak sensitive information about North Korea to the press under the mask of a "source connected with North Korea." That is especially the case since the information in question was not even true. The Park administration had claimed that Ri Yong-gil had been executed in early February, but a report in the May 10 edition of the Rodong Sinmun newspaper confirmed that Ri had been selected as a candidate member of the Central Military Commission and the Politburo during the first plenary session of the 7th Congress of the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee on May 9. This marked the return of a man who had supposedly been killed. This topic was addressed in a column titled "Rumors, Misinformation and Anonymity: The Challenges of Reporting on North Korea" that ran in the *New York Times* on September 16. "South Korea's National Intelligence Service, or N.I.S., is a frequent source of North Korean news in the South Korean media [. . .] insisting that it be attributed to an anonymous source. [. . .] The government of South Korea, especially N.I.S., has been accused of leaking selected information - or even incomplete and unverified intelligence - about the North to help influence domestic opinion and push its policies," the column said. Reports originating from "sources" do not always prove incorrect. Take this one for example: "On [Jan.] 15, a source in intelligence said that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had instructed the KWP Organization and Guidance Department on Jan. 8 that he had chosen Jong-un, his son by his third wife, Ko Yong-hui, as his heir." This was the key information in an article on Jan. 15, 2009, by Choi Seon-yeong and Jang Yong-hun, reporters for Yonhap News, which broke the news that North Korea had decided to transfer power to a member of the third generation of the Kim dynasty. At the time of publication, this article did not create much of a stir. There was hardly anyone at the time who expected that Kim Jong-un would become North Korea's third leader, considering that Kim had never shown his face at a single public event and that even

his name was being misspelled in the Korean press. But then a picture of Kim Jong-un standing next to Kim Jong-il at the 3rd Conference of the Korean Workers' Party (which was held after a hiatus of 44 years) in Sep. 2010 ran on page one of the September 29 edition of the *Rodong Sinmun*, and Kim Yong-nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, said during an interview with Associated Press Television News that "We now have the honor of serving Comrade Kim Jong-un, the young general." It was only then that the Yonhap story was belatedly confirmed to have been a major scoop. Even after receiving the Korea Journalist Award in 2011, the two reporters did not reveal who the "source in intelligence" had been. At the same time, they did discuss how they had gone about verifying the credibility of their source and about how it had been necessary to preserve the source's anonymity in their acceptance speech for the 42nd Korean Journalist Award. "We were able to produce exclusive articles about North Korea from the same sources, including a story about Jang Song-thaek being under house arrest in 2003 and about Kim Ok, fourth wife of Kim Jong-il. [ . . . ] Because of questions about the credibility of tips or intelligence about the North Korean establishment and because of the surprising selection of Jong-un, the third son who was only in his mid-twenties, we decided against immediately writing an article and mobilized all our trustworthy sources not only in South Korea but also in the US, Japan and China to track changes in North Korea's internal power structure. We were acting on our belief that we could not write a report without multiple confirmations of the fact, given the closed nature of North Korean society. [ . . . ] While it is standard practice to reveal the identity of sources, we had no choice but to leave this source anonymous since there is a greater need to protect the identity of sources related to North Korea than in other areas because of concerns for their physical safety." It's not easy to report on North Korea. Not only is it nearly impossible to do direct reporting inside North Korea, but there are few ways to confirm the veracity of the information being reported. Aside from rare exceptions, the North Korean government does not provide information to reporters from media organizations that are outside the North. When there is something that it wants to say, the North Korean government makes use of the *Rodong Sinmun* or the Korea Central News Agency, but it is not easy to distinguish between fact and propaganda. Even when South Korean and foreign media print major errors, the North Korean government does not request corrections or take legal action. Under such circumstances, it is not easy to separate the wheat from the chaff. Reporting about North Korea has not always depended upon anonymous sources as in recent years. When inter-Korean relations are good, there is less use of anonymous sources. When North and South Korea are on better terms, with officials from the two sides meeting frequently, and when there is regular exchange and cooperation in the private sector, more South Koreans have a chance to interact directly with North Koreans. Reporters also have more opportunities to visit the North and do reporting on the ground. That means that more sources are available for stories about North Korea and that those stories can be built on a stronger foundation. During the presidencies of Kim Dae-jung (1993-1998) and Roh Moo-hyun (1998-2003) - when there were two inter-Korean summits, when dozens of government meetings were held each year, and when there were a multitude of cooperation and exchange programs, including the Kaesong Complex and tours to Mount Keumkang - there was not the flood of articles depending on unidentifiable sources as there is today. When senior government

officials are openly discussing the results of meetings and when numerous participants in cooperation and exchange projects are willing to go on the record and share news from North Korea, the media does not need to rely on anonymous sources. But during since Lee Myung-bak became president in 2008, not a single South Korean reporter has openly visited Pyongyang for the purpose of reporting. Since Park became president, the government has ended its long-standing practice of allowing reporter pools to do on-site reporting at the inter-Korean government meetings that occur once in a blue moon. (Lee Je-hun, "Who Really Are the Anonymous Sources Connected to North Korea?" *Hankyore*, September 21, 2106)

The number of open-air markets in North Korea has doubled since 2010, a pundit said Tuesday. Their number increased from about 200 in 2010, when former leader Kim Jong-il was still alive, to some 400 during the reign of his son Kim Jong-un, according to analysis of satellite images by Curtis Melvin at Johns Hopkins University. "About 1.8 million North Koreans go shopping in these markets every day," an intelligence officer here said. "Most ordinary people except the elite in Pyongyang and soldiers depend on them." The development seems to have helped buffer people from the shock of international sanctions. "No matter how tightly the UN Security Council knits the sanctions network, it's still hard to prevent ordinary peddlers from crossing between the North and China," a source said. "Ordinary North Koreans don't suffer too much of a blow in their day-to-day lives because of the constant influx of Chinese-made daily necessities and food into the markets." Six months since the UNSC tightened sanctions in March rice prices are stable at 5,000 won per kg throughout North Korean markets. "Thanks to booming markets, once-poor villages near the border are now better off than inland villages," another source said. (Kim Myong-song, "Markets Proliferate under Kim Jong Un," *Chosun Ilbo*, September 21, 2016)

North Korea's exports of mineral resources like anthracite coal and iron ore have lent big support to the country's economy in the past 18 years, with most shipped to China, a report said Wednesday. Outbound shipments of North Korean minerals totaled \$1.35 billion last year, shooting up more than thirtyfold from \$430 million in 1998, according to the report released by the state-run Korea Development Institute (KDI) think tank. Its total exports tripled to \$2.93 billion from \$979 million over the same 1998-2015 period. Moreover, mineral exports accounted for 46.1 percent of the country's total exports in 2015, sharply up from 4.4 percent in 1998. Some \$1.3 billion worth of North Korea's mineral resources were sold in China, the country's strongest ally, last year, taking up 52.4 percent of North Korea-China exports of \$2.48 billion. "North Korea's mineral exports have risen sharply over the past 18 years and become one of the most important sources of hard currency," the KDI report said. "A steep rise in exports of mineral resources has contributed to steady growth of the country's exports amid a series of international sanctions." (Yonhap, "Exports of Mineral Resources Back N. Korea's Economy," *Chosun Ilbo*, September 21, 2016)

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KPA General Staff statement: "The U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet warmongers' anti-DPRK military provocations have pushed the situation on the Korean peninsula to the uncontrollable and irreversible phase of the outbreak of a nuclear war. The final target of the racket for military pressure on the DPRK being kicked up by the

U.S. and the puppet group of traitors is the "regime change in the north" through the "removal" of the supreme leadership of the DPRK. Upon authorization, the General Staff of the KPA clarified the principled stand to take a military counteraction of the Korean revolutionary armed forces: Robber-like U.S. imperialists and the Park Geun Hye group of traitors should not forget even a moment that our revolutionary armed forces are ready to fight a decisive battle to thoroughly foil the reckless military moves for carrying out their "scenario for making a preemptive strike at the north." The time will prove what disastrous consequences will be entailed by the reckless remarks made by such half wits as Park Geun Hye and Han Min Gu. The DPRK's access to the treasured nuclear sword is aimed to foil the adventurous nuclear war racket of the U.S. imperialists who have ceaselessly resorted to nuclear threat and blackmail against the DPRK for the last several decades. The nuclear warheads fired by the KPA as punishment will completely reduce to ashes Seoul, the center of confrontation with compatriots where Chongwadae is located and reactionary ruling machines are concentrated. The U.S. imperialist aggressor forces should face up to the reality on this land. Should they escalate the danger of military provocations by letting B-1Bs fly over the air of Korea, the KPA will sweep Guam, the base of provocations, from the surface of the earth. The "operation for eliminating the leadership of the north" much touted by the Park Geun Hye group would only result in bringing the complete collapse of Chongwadae and reducing Seoul to debris and the U.S. introduction of nuclear war means would put its aggressor forces' bases in the theatres of Pacific operations into a nuclear nightmare. The U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces should seriously heed to the DPRK's warning that the only way for them to escape the infuriated KPA's crushing strikes is to exercise prudence and self-restraint, refraining from infringing upon the latter's dignity and security. Our revolutionary armed forces never make an empty talk." (KCNA, "KPA General Staff Clarifies Its Stand to Retaliate against U.S. and S. Korean Puppet Warmongers' Provocation," September 22, 2016)

North Korea has covered the entrances to two tunnels at its remote nuclear test site, fanning speculation that it may be about to detonate another nuclear bomb. Camouflaged covers over tunnels at nuclear test sites are considered clear signs of an impending test. The South Korean military believes the North could conduct another nuclear test around October 10, the founding day of the North Korean Workers Party. (Lee Yong-soo, "N. Korea Ready Site for More Nuclear Tests," *Chosun Ilbo*, September 22, 2016)

Michael Elleeman: "North Korea's ground test of a powerful, liquid-fueled engine on September 20, and the launch of three modified-Scud missiles earlier this month renewed allegations that Pyongyang and Tehran are collaborating on ballistic-missile development. The accusations are mostly speculative, based largely on the apparent similarities of ballistic missiles and satellite launchers appearing in both Iran and North Korea. A detailed examination of the designs employed by the two countries casts doubt on claims that the two countries are co-developing missiles and satellite launchers, exchanging detailed design data, and testing prototypes for each other. Pyongyang and Tehran may share test data on a limited basis, and perhaps trade conceptual ideas. But there is little evidence to indicate the two regimes are engaged in deep missile-related collaboration, or pursuing joint-development programs.

...During its war with Iraq in the 1980s, ...Iran turned to North Korea for its longer-term requirements. Pyongyang shipped between 200 and 300 Soviet-built Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran during the latter years of the war and into the early 1990s. Iran renamed the missiles Shahab-1 and -2, respectively. The transactional relationship between Iran and North Korea continued throughout the 1990s, with Pyongyang providing missile-maintenance infrastructure and training, as well as medium-range Nodong missiles, which Iran dubbed Shahab-3. When Tehran test fired its Shahab-3 in July 1998, it was only the second known launch of the Nodong, with North Korea having successfully flown the missile just once, in 1993. Iran continued to flight test the Shahab-3, as did Pakistan, another recipient of the Nodong, which it calls Ghauri. The preliminary flight trials conducted by Iran and Pakistan showed promise, though Iran was concerned that the Shahab-3's maximum range was less than 1,000 km. Consequently, Tehran's engineers and missile specialists modified the Shahab-3 to create the 1,600-km range Ghadr missile, which was initially test flown in 2004. It is unclear how deeply involved North Korea was in Iran's program to modify the Shahab-3, and create the Ghadr missile. While it is reasonable to assume that some flight-test data were shared, interviews with Russian and Ukrainian specialists aiding the Iranian missile program during the late-1990s suggest that cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran was isolated and not comprehensive. Iran's compartmentalisation of the missile programs would have impeded deep technical collaboration with North Korea, if not preventing it altogether. Moreover, if the security procedures in Iran continue today, it is unlikely Pyongyang and Tehran are actively cooperating on missile and satellite-launcher development, though critical materials and components may continue to flow from one country to the other. Those arguing that Iran and North Korea are cooperating on missile development cite four observations. Two of them center on the similarities in the evolutionary versions of Pyongyang's Nodong missiles and Tehran's Shahab-3 and Ghadr systems. The third observation focuses on the solid-propellant technology recently used by North Korea to propel its submarine-launched ballistic missile, the KN-11, which some argue is identical to that employed by Iran's two-stage, medium-range Sajjil missile. The fourth, and most often cited observation, and the one said to be corroborated by official US government sanctions, claims that Tehran and Pyongyang are cooperating on the development of large rockets used to loft satellites into orbit. As discussed above, to overcome shortfalls in the reliability and reach of the Nodong missiles imported from North Korea, Iran modified the Nodong/Shahab-3 to create the Ghadr missile. The evolution in design was incremental, with several versions of the improved Shahab-3 tested in Iran. North Korea, which launched only one Nodong prior to 2006, presumably retained the original design. There are no publicly available photographs of the Nodongs tested in 2006, so it is impossible to know if any modifications were introduced by North Korea. The first public appearance of the missile occurred in 2010, when the Nodong was seen during a military parade in Pyongyang. The Nodong that appeared in the parade was a mock-up, though, at first glance, it looked similar to the Ghadr, including the complex shape of the nosecone. This led some to conclude that North Korea and Iran collaborated on its design, and by extrapolation, possibly the flight-trials conducted in Iran during the 2000s. In August 2016, North Korea's KCTV aired video of Nodong missiles being fired from their respective mobile launchers near Hwangju and roughly 40-km south of Pyongyang. The missiles resembled those seen in the 2010

parade, with the Ghadr-like nosecone design. It is reasonable to conclude from these occasions that engineers from the two countries shared at least some nosecone-design information. However, a closer examination of 2016 launches reveals definitively that the similarities between the North Korea's new Nodong missile and Iran's Ghadr do not extend beyond the shape of their nosecones. Indeed, the external dimensions and features, other than the similar nosecones, are quite different. Figure 1 illustrates two prominent differences. The Ghadr's rear fins are much smaller than those found on either version of the Nodong, and the Ghadr's airframe and propellant tanks have been lengthened to carry more fuel. The original and new Nodong airframes appear to be the same, only the nosecone has been altered. It is interesting to note that the minimum distance between North Korean territory and Tokyo is just over 1,000 km. If the new Nodong is a clone of the original version, but with a new nosecone and smaller warhead, it has a maximum range of about 1,000 km, when launched with a 700 kg payload. To ensure pre-launch survival, Pyongyang would presumably want to deploy and fire the missile from deep within its territory, which requires a reach of 1,200 km or greater. In other words, North Korea has great incentive to extend the Nodong's range, yet it does not appear to have adopted the Ghadr's design. In September 2016, North Korea fired three missiles, again from mobile launchers situated on a highway near Hwangju. The missiles travelled about 1,000 km before crashing into the East Sea, though within Japan's air defense identification zone. Most observers initially suspected that the missiles launched were Nodongs because the longest-range alternative is the Scud-D, which has a range limit of just over 700 km. Pyongyang reportedly developed a Scud-D missile with a range of just over 700 km. Video of the launch appear to show a Scud-B warhead placed on a Nodong airframe, with a short flange connecting the two. An Iranian missile with a similar nosecone and airframe configuration was seen in Tehran a dozen years ago, leading one analyst to conclude that North Korea and Iran collaborated on the design. But again, closer scrutiny of the missiles and an analysis of the trajectories expose a different story (see Figure 2). The missiles were extended range Scud missiles, or Scud-ER, having a diameter of 1.0 m, and an overall length of about 12.6 m. The diameter and length of the Scud-B and -C are 0.88m and 10.944 m, respectively. The Scud-D has the same diameter as the -B and -C versions, though its length is 12.4 m. The Scud-ER is very different than the Shahab-3—with the so-called NRV nosecone—seen in Iran in 2004. Iran, unlike North Korea, has pursued both liquid- and solid-fueled missiles since its dual-track approach to missile acquisition started in the early 1980s. Iran now possesses a family of short-range missiles, including the Fateh-110 and Fateh-313, which were developed over a period of at least two dozen years. Tehran is also developing a two-stage, medium-range missile, the Sajjil. The Sajjil program likely began in or about the year 2000. The first ground tests of the 13.5-metric ton, stage-one motor reportedly occurred in 2005. The Sajjil, though dubbed Ashoura at the time, underwent its initial flight test, which failed, in 2007; a successful test occurred in 2008, though only the first stage was active. Flight-testing continued until 2011, when launches abruptly stopped before the missile was fully developed. The reasons behind the halt in testing remain unclear. North Korea, on the other hand, has limited experience developing and producing solid-fueled missiles. The largest solid-rocket motor manufactured by Pyongyang before 2016 weighs only one-metric ton and propels the KN-02 missile, a copy of the Soviet Tochka. The KN-02 has a maximum

range of about 100 km, though versions of the original Tochka can reach beyond 120 km. In April 2016, North Korea conducted a ground test of a large solid-fueled motor and test launched at least two solid-propellant missiles from an underwater platform, likely its GORAE-class submarine. The KN-11, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is a two-stage system. Each stage consists of a solid-propellant rocket motor substantially larger than any tested by the North before, excepting the April ground test. Learning to manufacture large-diameter, solid-fueled rocket motors typically requires decades of effort, as illustrated by the history of Iran's program, as well as others. Yet, with no public reporting of large solid-motor development in North Korea prior to 2016, the KN-11 emerged suddenly and flies successfully to a distance of 500-600 km. The sudden, unexpected appearance of the solid-fueled KN-11 led to speculation that Iran may have aided Pyongyang's efforts to design, develop and manufacture large-rocket motors, or perhaps supplied the motors to North Korea outright. Tal Inbar, an Israeli analyst who closely follows the missile and space programs of Iran and North Korea, asserts that the KN-11's 1.25 m diameter motors are the same as those found on Iran's Sajjil missile. He further states that the KN-11 is built using a propellant that is "identical to the technology developed in Iran." The exact dimensions of the KN-11 are difficult to extract from the photos and videos released by Pyongyang. However, the relative dimensions are readily derived from the photos. Based on the performance of the KN-11, the missile's diameter is likely between 1.2 and 1.5 m. The length of the KN-11's first stage is then between 3.5 and 4.4 m; the second stage is between 1.5 and 1.9 m long. The Sajjil has a diameter of 1.25 m, with first- and second-stage lengths of 9 m and 5.6 m, respectively. The relative dimensions—the ratio of the length to the diameter—of the KN-11 stages are clearly different from those of Iran's Sajjil. Further, the external features of the Sajjil reveal stage separation apparatus that are not visible on the KN-11, indicating differing design philosophies. Both missiles do use jet vanes for steering during the boost phase of flight, though the vanes themselves are slightly different. Finally, it is possible that the propellant formulation used by the KN-11 and Sajjil are very similar, though this should be expected. Most solid-fueled rockets use a variation of what is called a composite propellant formulation, so it would be surprising if the KN-11 and Sajjil differed significantly. Lastly, many observers note the similarity between the satellite-launch vehicles, or SLVs, used by Iran and North Korea, and speculate that the two countries are collaborating on large rocket development. It is true that the Taepodong-1 SLV launched by Pyongyang in 1998, and Iran's Safir SLV have first stages powered by the Nodong engine. It is also true that the first stage of the North Korea's Unha SLV and Iran's Simorgh SLV use a cluster of four-Nodong engines, and the upper-most stages of both SLVs are propelled by the steering engines originally employed by the now-retired Soviet R-27 SLBM. But a closer look at the SLVs reveals differences inconsistent with close cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran. The most obvious difference is that the two North Korean SLVs operate using three stages, whereas Iran's two SLVs are two-stage systems. This likely reflects the more conservative design approach taken by North Korea, where until late-2015, engineers had limited experience developing new missiles and launchers. The paucity of missile-development testing, and learned knowledge accrued from testing activities, likely led North Korean specialists to over design the Taepodong-1 and Unha launchers to ensure each succeeded in lofting a specified payload to a certain orbit. There may,

however, be other reasons behind the decision to employ three rather than two stages. Regardless, the divergent design philosophies argue against deep cooperation. The decision to power the first stage of the Taepodong-1 and Safir with a Nodong engine was very likely driven by that lack of viable alternatives. Neither North Korea nor Iran have the experience and wherewithal to design and develop a powerful liquid-propellant engine indigenously, so therefore each had to rely on the engines available for use. The roughly 27-ton thrust Nodong engine was a logical engineering choice for small SLVs. The alternative would have been to cluster two or four Scud engines together to form the power unit for a first stage, though such configurations would have required a new and larger diameter airframe. When North Korea, and later Iran, began the design of the Unha and Simorgh SLVs, respectively, the most powerful engine available was still that associated with the Nodong missile. Again, the lack of viable alternatives drove both countries to design a first stage powered by a cluster of four Nodong engines, with each engine relying on its own turbo-pump assembly to deliver propellant to the combustion chamber. It was, and remains today, beyond the technical capacity of either country to design, develop and build a larger pump capable of simultaneously feeding all four engines. The Unha and Simorgh both employ four small engines to steer the first stage. Arguably, this feature suggests some level of design cooperation. However, beyond the use of four small engines, the two designs diverge. Each steering engine of the Unha receives its propellant from the turbo-pump of an adjacent Nodong engine by tapping into the fuel and oxidizer lines of the nearby engine and diverting a small portion of the flow. In other words, each Nodong turbo-pump feeds a Nodong engine and a steering engine. Iranian engineers, on the other hand, adopted a different design for the Simorgh. All four steering engines of the Simorgh are supplied propellant by a single Scud-engine turbo-pump assembly placed at the center of the Nodong engine cluster. The Iranian design delivers up to 13 tons of additional thrust compared to the Unha. In November 2013, Bill Gertz reported that Iranian missile technicians had visited North Korea in secret to jointly develop a new "80-ton rocket booster" for long-range missiles or SLVs. Two months later the US Treasury Department issued sanctions against several persons and entities, including the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, or SHIG, the firm responsible for development of Iran's liquid-fueled missiles, and two individuals, Seyed Mirahmad Nooshin and Sayyed Medhi Farahi. The Treasury Department notice specifically mentions that Nooshin and Farahi had travelled to North Korea, and that the two "have been critical to the development of the 80-ton rocket booster." It is unclear if the 80-ton rocket booster specified in the media and Treasury Department reports describes the overall size of multi-stage booster rocket, or just that of the single stage of a larger SLV. In either case, the description might apply to the Unha or Simorgh SLV. The overall mass of the Unha SLV is about 87 metric tons, and the Simorgh SLV is roughly 85 metric tons. The first-stage masses of the Unha and Simorgh are approximately 70 and 76 metric tons, respectively. It is within reason to conclude that the reports apply to either the first stages of the two SLVs, or the multi-stage configuration of the Unha or Simorgh. It would not be surprising if Iran and North Korea held discussions about their respective space programs, and the general technical details of their SLVs. Iran has, in the past, presented technical papers about its space program and SLVs at international meetings, so sharing general design and performance information is not unprecedented. However, as discussed above, the



significant design differences of the Unha and Simorgh first stages indicate that the two countries are not co-developing rockets and that there may be limits to just how much technical information Tehran and Pyongyang share, or employ. The recent ground test of an 80-ton thrust engine by North Korea raises additional questions, and might be the focus of the Gertz article and the Treasury Department notice. The engine tested is likely a version of China's YF-20 design, of which there are several varieties. The YF-20 engine uses high-energy propellants, similar to the combination employed by North Korea's Musudan, or KN-10, intermediate-range ballistic missile, and generates roughly 80 tons of thrust. North Korea announced that the engine tested produces 80 tons of thrust, and was for lifting satellites into geosynchronous orbit. The Treasury notice specifically mentioned an 80-ton booster; it did not refer to an engine. Nonetheless, perhaps the intelligence reporting that informed the sanctions lacked the necessary detail to distinguish between a rocket and engine, or the authors of the notice did not appreciate the differences. If the report was referring to the amount of thrust produced by the booster's engine, then it is possible that Iran and North Korea are working together on a new rocket. If so, the booster rocket itself would necessarily weigh fewer than about 65 metric tons, and even less if it is the first stage of a larger system. Evidence available in the public domain indicates that North Korea has, for several decades, supplied Iran with complete missiles and critical components for larger missiles and SLVs. The transactional relationship very likely results in information exchanges, including the sharing of flight-test data, possibly more. But, the evidence to date is inconsistent with design collaboration or joint-development efforts between the two countries. This could change, especially as North Korea presents new capabilities. Given Pyongyang's history of shipping missile components to Iran and others, and its willingness to support the secret construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria, it is possible, if not likely, that North Korea would ship advanced engines to Tehran, including the engine most recently tested. Therefore, the international community must remain vigilant and closely monitor the missile and SLV activities in both countries. Signs of deeper collaboration between Iran and North Korea must also be closely monitored, since deeper cooperation has the potential to accelerate the development efforts on both parties." (Michael Elleman, "North Korea-Iran Missile Cooperation," *38North*, September 22, 2016)

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The option to impose a secondary boycott, which penalizes foreign companies trading with a target country, will be a very effective tool if it is imposed on North Korea for its latest nuclear test, a senior foreign ministry official said. "There's a so-called secondary boycott which has not been mobilized yet," Vice Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul said during his televised interview with Yonhap News TV. The secondary boycott, if adopted, would target any foreign companies that transact with North Korea, pushing the communist country further into isolation from the international economy. If used, the approach would have the biggest influence on companies in China, by far Pyongyang's No. 1 trading partner. "If this is applied, it would have very significant impact ... the U.S. may consider applying a secondary boycott if they judge North Korea's nuclear program cannot be stopped without using it," Cho noted. (Yonhap, "Secondary Boycott Powerful Tool to Sanction N. Korea: Official," September 23, 2016)

The government has firmed up a plan to make the return of two of the four northern territories the minimum requirement for finding a resolution to the long-standing issue with Russia. This approach would represent a departure from the government's previous precondition to resolve the issue of sovereignty with regard to all four islands when Tokyo and Russia conclude a bilateral peace treaty to formally end their World War II hostilities. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold talks in Peru in November, and on Abe's home political turf in Yamaguchi Prefecture in December. The government hopes having both leaders hold discussions in line with this plan will pave the way to signing a peace treaty and resolving the territorial issue. According to several government sources, the government plans to make the return of Shikotan Island and the Habomai group of islets the minimum requirement for finding a resolution to the issue. The government's position that sovereignty over Etorofu and Kunashiri belongs to Japan will remain unchanged. However, one proposal being floated would see discussions continue after a peace treaty is signed, with free access to the territories and joint economic activities conducted there before the latter two islands are ultimately returned to Japan. The Japanese government has hitherto engaged in negotiations under the basic plan that a peace treaty will be signed after the sovereignty issue of all four islands has been resolved. In 1993, the leaders of Japan and Russia signed the Tokyo Declaration, which spelled out these steps. The government has indicated a plan in which once it had acknowledged that sovereignty over all four islands belonged to Japan, it would respond flexibly regarding their return date and other conditions. However, while Japan has insisted the four islands are inherently Japanese territory, Russia has claimed they became part of its territory as a result of World War II. Because Russia demanded a final resolution based on the 1956 joint declaration between Japan and the Soviet Union that stated Shikotan and Habomai will be returned to Japan after a peace treaty is signed, there was no progress in treaty negotiations that included discussions on territorial issues such as those pertaining to sovereignty. In a bid to break the deadlock, the government appears to have shifted from insisting on holding negotiations on the precondition that the sovereignty issue with regard to all four islands must be solved. Instead, it plans to seek the return of Habomai and Shikotan, as it is highly possible Russia would agree to this. During their summit meeting in the southern Russian city of Sochi in May, Abe and Putin agreed to apply a "new approach" to negotiations on the territorial issue without being constrained by conventional ways of thinking. "We want to reach an agreement by not getting too hung up on how previous negotiations have progressed," a senior Japanese government official said. It is possible talks hewing to this line also were held during a meeting between Abe and Putin in the Russian far eastern city of Vladivostok in September. However, there is likely to be domestic opposition to the conclusion of a peace treaty without any clear-cut explanation on sovereignty over all four islands. It is possible Russia might not respond to negotiations regarding Kunashiri and Etorofu once a peace deal has been inked, so the Japanese government plans to carefully watch how Moscow approaches the issue, the sources said. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, "2 Islands' Return from Russia Key to Treaty," September 23, 2016)

Officially, the United States and North Korea barely speak to each other, their communications often limited to public exchanges of insults. The U.S. ambassador in

Seoul is “a villain, a crazy person,” a North Korean diplomat says. North Korea is a “wasteland” compared to South Korea, President Obama tells the United Nations. But out of the limelight, and sometimes in secret, a small corps of former U.S. diplomats and intelligence officials, often working with academic specialists, meet regularly with high-ranking North Koreans. They have sat down in Singapore, Berlin, Beijing and elsewhere to discuss everything from the details of North Korea’s nuclear program to concerns about the effects of international trade sanctions on Pyongyang. They have talked about the growing security fears in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo, and about the timing of North Korean missile tests. If it’s not quite diplomacy, it sometimes gets pretty close. “The North Koreans understand that we’re in no way representing the United States government. So sometimes, we can raise things that the U.S. government isn’t able to,” said Leon V. Sigal, a former State Department policy official and long a key player in what are commonly called Track 2 talks. “I can say to them, ‘Hey, this is why the U.S. government is doing this.’ And then probe and say to them: ‘Look, what you’re doing is not going to work. How about this?’” The two countries did quietly hold a series of discussions, apparently late last year, but those came to nothing. Since then, North Korea has staged two nuclear tests and a flurry of missile tests, building an increasingly sophisticated arsenal, but there have been no known direct communications between Washington and Pyongyang. While Track 2 talks are common between rival countries – Indian academics, for instance, regularly meet with their Pakistani counterparts – the North Korean discussions are often seen as a key part of Washington-Pyongyang relations. To critics, the Track 2 North Korea meetings are a waste of time. Or worse, they allow Pyongyang to claim the high road – insisting it’s seeking an avenue to peace – despite its years of cheating on past deals. But John Delury, a professor at Yonsei University in Seoul, said that with communication between North Korea and the U.S. almost non-existent, Track 2 talks have become a placeholder for government-to-government discussions. Informal talks are “a way for the North Koreans to send indirect messages,” he said, and try out ideas they may be hesitant to suggest in official channels. While Track 2 participants are rarely formally debriefed by U.S. officials, the substance of their talks is often widely shared among the small pool of experts – in government, academia and think tanks – who focus on North Korea. That information can then be used once official talks restart. “There’s a lot that you pick up just by sitting in the same room,” ranging from what issues are open to discussion to group dynamics, Delury said. But what has emerged recently from Track 2 discussions? That depends on who you ask. To Sigal, the talks have revealed a North Korea willing to discuss limitations on its nuclear weapons program, despite Pyongyang’s public insistence that it is now a nuclear power. “Even now, as bad as things are, it’s clear” that North Korea is ready to talk, he said. He declined to spell out the details of his discussions, but said that a series of slow, reciprocal steps by both sides – “they would suspend certain activities, the U.S. would take certain steps” – could lead back to official negotiations. In the end, he said, those negotiations may not be successful, but: “You don’t know until the U.S. and the North Koreans sit down and try to work things out.” Some other Track 2 participants, though, say they’ve seen no sign of North Korean willingness to discuss denuclearization. “During several meetings in recent months, I’ve raised the idea of a denuclearization dialogue with the North Koreans,” Evans Revere, a former Asia specialist at the State Department, said in an email. “The response from them has been quite definitive . There will be no

denuclearization; we are now a nuclear-weapons state; the time for denuclearization dialogue is over; you must learn to live with and accept this new reality." Who is right? It's hard to know. North Korea's policy statements are rarely easy to interpret, with serious proposals sometimes buried inside bombastic propaganda, and experts regularly disagreeing about what message is intended. Some North Korea watchers, for example, believe that Pyongyang held out an olive branch in July, when a story from the state news agency said the North wanted "the denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula." While the statement also included a long list of North Korean demands that would seemingly make any agreement impossible, some saw it as a first offer, and a sign that Pyongyang was willing to start negotiating. The U.S. government, though, has seen little that looks like an olive branch. Anna Richey-Allen, the spokesperson for the State Department's East Asia and Pacific Bureau, said Washington is open to talking to Pyongyang. "But the onus is on North Korea to take meaningful actions toward denuclearization and refrain from provocations," she said in an emailed statement. Years of broken agreements have left much of the world – and much of the U.S. government – unwilling to trust North Korea in negotiations. American officials are deeply hesitant about agreeing to direct talks with Pyongyang, fearing the political fallout if the North again reneges on a deal. But as Pyongyang's arsenal continues to grow, with experts warning it could have nuclear missiles capable of hitting the United States within a few years, Sigal says the U.S. must focus on those years when North Korea did stand by at least some of its agreements. "Most people in Washington have an assumption that the North Koreans are bad guys – which is true enough – but also that you can't deal with them. I say that assumption is fundamentally wrong," Sigal said. "I think you have to be talking to them. And that's the purpose of Track 2." (Tim Sullivan, "Almost Diplomacy: U.S. Ex-Officials, N.Koreans Quietly Meet," Associated Press, September 23, 2016)

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North Korea's top diplomat vowed to bolster the country's "national nuclear armed forces" to cope with what he calls "increased war threats from the United States," claiming the country's fifth nuclear test was part of such efforts. Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho made the pledge during an address before the U.N. General Assembly, claiming that the Korean Peninsula has now been turned into "the world's most dangerous hotspot which can even ignite the outbreak of a nuclear war." "The successful nuclear warhead explosion test that we have conducted recently is part of practical countermeasures to the rackets of threats and sanctions of the hostile forces, including the United States," Ri said. "The DPRK will continue to take measures to strengthen its national nuclear armed forces in both quantity and quality in order to defend the dignity and the right to existence and safeguard the genuine peace vis-a-vis increased war threats of the U.S.," he said. Ri said U.S. "hostile policy" motivated the North to develop nuclear bombs. "The DPRK had no other choice but to go nuclear inevitably after it has done everything possible to defend the national security from the constant nuclear threats from the U.S.," he said. "Our decision to strengthen (our) nuclear armament is a righteous self-defensive measure to protect ourselves from constant nuclear threats of the United States." Ri also said that nuclear armament is now the "policy of our state." **"As long as there exists a nuclear weapons state in hostile relations with the DPRK, our national security and the peace on the Korean Peninsula can be defended only with reliable nuclear deterrence,"** he said, referring to

the U.S. "Only a couple of days ago, the United States again threatened the DPRK by flying the B-1B strategic bomber over the military demarcation line on the Korean Peninsula and landing in South Korea," he said. "The United States will have to face tremendous consequences beyond imagination." Ri reiterated the North's long-running claims that U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises are evidence of U.S. hostile policy. Pyongyang brands the annual exercises as a rehearsal for invasion despite repeated assurances from Washington and Seoul that they are purely defensive. Ri said such drills are "extremely provocative," "thoroughly offensive," and "aggressive nuclear war exercises."

He also accused the U.N. Security Council of double-standards, saying the global security body takes issue only with the North's nuclear and missile tests while remaining silent about such weapons tests by other nations. "The U.N. Security Council is a place where guilt is decided not on the basis of justice, but by the criterion whether one has veto power or not," he said. "The United States has no more qualification to force U.N. members to implement this kind of undeserved resolution while the member states have no more obligation to implement this unfair and unjust resolution." (Yonhap, "N. Korean FM Shrugs off UN Condemnation, Vowing to Bolster Nuclear armed Forces," *Korea Times*, September 24, 2016)

After North Korea conducted its fifth and most powerful nuclear test this month, South Korea's president, Park Geun-hye, met with her country's opposition leaders to discuss how to react. The outcome was not surprising. Her liberal political opponents urged her to talk to the government in Pyongyang. Park, a conservative, said that would be a waste of time. Rather, she said, South Korea and its allies must focus on tightening sanctions, pressing the North to give up its nuclear program or face collapse. "This is a battle of wills that we must win," Park told the opposition leaders, asking them to support her position. They refused. One of them said later that talking to the president was "like talking to a wall." Pyongyang's September 9 nuclear test, its second this year, has sharpened South Korea's decades-old divide over how to deal with its belligerent neighbor, as the North makes what experts consider significant strides in its nuclear arms and missile development. And it has left Park more embattled than ever as she approaches her last year in office. While pushing for yet more sanctions, Park has doubled down on confrontational speech toward both Pyongyang and her domestic critics. Analysts say Park, who is barred under South Korea's Constitution from seeking re-election next year, has two equally unpalatable options. She can stay on her current course, facing more provocations from Pyongyang and the likelihood of going down in history as the president during whose term the North completed nuclear weaponization. Or she can try to engage an erratic government that has gone so far as to call her a prostitute, and that has not agreed to discuss the possibility of nuclear disarmament in any future talks. "Negotiations may still be possible, but the price to pay to North Korea has become much higher," said Cho Han-bum, an analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a government research organization in Seoul. Doubts about Park's North Korea policy have spread even within her own conservative party. While most of its leading contenders to succeed her support sanctions against the North, they have gone further, saying that Seoul should consider asking the United States to bring back tactical nuclear weapons, which it withdrew from the South in the early 1990s. Some party heavyweights have even said the South should build its own

nuclear bombs. Park's government has disavowed both options. Park's difficulties have much to do with South Korea's fractured domestic politics, in which liberal and conservative parties have often seized on North Korea as a way to discredit one another. Three of the North's five nuclear tests have taken place under Kim, during whose rule the North has tested 31 ballistic missiles, twice as many as it did during the 17 years that his father, Kim Jong-il, was in power. This year alone, the North test-launched 24 ballistic missiles. On September 18, Yun Byung-se, South Korea's foreign minister, acknowledged that North Korea was "at the final stage of nuclear weaponization." The North's missile threat was Park's justification for accepting the deployment of an American missile-interceptor battery, known as THAAD (for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), on South Korean soil, a proposal that had been discussed with Washington for years. But that decision angered China – North Korea's sole major ally, whose cooperation is crucial for enforcing sanctions – which sees THAAD as part of an American effort to encircle it. Park's choice of Washington over Beijing in the dispute has been seen here as a momentous decision and a central part of her legacy. "When President Park calls THAAD inevitable, she sends a message that when relations between the United States and China turn bad and South Korea has to choose, it will be the United States," said Lee Jung-chul, a political scientist at Soongsil University in Seoul. The THAAD deployment has been highly contentious here, with many South Koreans seeing their country as a pawn in a contest for supremacy between the two powers. And it has added fuel to the criticism of Park. Choo Mi-ae, the leader of the main opposition party, has called the system "militarily useless" and a "diplomatic checkmate" that pushed China closer to Pyongyang. In a commentary published by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, former Foreign Minister Song Min-soon said the issue had become a "shibboleth" by which South Koreans distinguished political friend from foe. Critics have also accused Park of stoking fear about North Korea to bolster her domestic leadership, a tactic they say recalls the days of her father, the military dictator Park Chung-hee. Last week, warning of a "danger of war" and a "national emergency," Park called for "a thorough surveillance of impure domestic forces and those who cause social instability." That has reinforced a hard-line image that Park has had since taking office. During her tenure, it has become fashionable among conservatives to label all anti-government dissidents as "jongbuk," or followers of North Korea. Her government shut down a small left-wing opposition party on charges of subscribing to North Korea's communist ideology. Park's language about the North has also become more uncompromising – in recent weeks she has called Kim "out of control" and "maniacally obsessive." A poll conducted this week by Gallup Korea found that Park's approval rating had slipped to 31 percent, essentially unchanged from two weeks earlier, before the North's latest nuclear test. Still, her governing Saenuri party is more popular than the opposition and remains loyal to the president in Parliament. In recent years, the South Korean military has drawn up plans to launch a pre-emptive strike against the North's leadership at the first indication that it is preparing a nuclear missile attack. Such policies have helped to keep Park popular among older, more conservative South Koreans, who have vivid memories of the Cold War and revere the anti-Communist stance of her father. But not everyone is assured. "In adopting a more aggressive posture and acquiring the weapons to match it, South Korea risks raising the chances of conflict on the Korean Peninsula and fostering regional instability in the meantime," the global intelligence company Stratfor said in a

recent analysis. (Choe Sang-hun, "South Korean Leader Faces Few Options on North," *New York Times*, September 24, 2016, p. A-6)

The increasing threat from North Korea means that decisions about moving U.S. forces away from the front lines, and transferring operational control to the South, must be driven by conditions -- not timelines -- the U.S. Eighth Army commander said. Lt. Gen. Thomas Vandal said the much-delayed relocation of the bulk of U.S. forces in Korea to regional hubs south of Seoul is finally on track, with most major units expected to be in place by early 2018. But the 210th Field Artillery Brigade will remain near the heavily militarized border with North Korea for the foreseeable future. The Combined Forces Command and USFK headquarters also will maintain a residual force at the Yongsan U.S. Army Garrison in Seoul. "Right now, it's conditions-based moves," Vandal said in an interview Thursday with Stars and Stripes at his office at the military's headquarters in Yongsan. "That is because of the criticality of having the counter-fire capabilities to the north." Vandal, who is also the chief of staff for USFK and the Combined Forces Command, said the artillery brigade and supporting forces will remain at Camp Casey at least until 2020, according to an agreement with the South Korean government. But the trigger for the move will rely on the ability of the South Korean military to fully take over the positions. That would include having and being able to operate a comparable multiple-launch rocket system capable of defending against the North's massive arsenal. Under the current arrangement, the South is in charge of its own troops during peacetime, but U.S. commanders would take charge of all combined forces if war breaks out with North Korea. Vandal said USFK has been working with South Korea's military to develop its core capabilities so it could be fully responsible for its own security. "I would anticipate sometime in 2025 time frame, but again we're not tied to a specific time; we're tied to the conditions," he said. He said the \$10.7 billion program to expand Camp Humphreys to accommodate an eventual population of 42,000 is finally shifting from the construction phase to the move phase, pointing out that the Republic of Korea is covering 92 percent of the cost. He said the Eighth Army headquarters will be in place by next July and the 2nd Infantry Division by January 2018. The 6th Medical Brigade also will move next summer, he said. "There will still be the capability here on the peninsula, but not specifically for the initial portion of the long-range artillery attack that could occur," he said. Vandal also said the introduction of rotational forces has improved readiness and cohesion by reducing the turbulence from constant turnover of personnel. U.S. soldiers usually serve one- to two-year tours in South Korea. Under the rotational plan, units train and deploy together for nine-month stints. The Army deactivated the 1st "Iron" Brigade Combat Team last year, which had been in South Korea since 1965, and replaced it with rotations from the Fort Hood, Texas-based 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. "We've increased the number of rotational forces fairly significantly," Vandal said. Other rotational units include a multiple-launch rocket system battalion, an engineering battalion and an aerial squadron that will replace its outgoing fleet of OH-58 Kiowa Warriors with Apache attack helicopters next year. The 2nd Infantry Division was also transformed into a combined U.S.-South Korean division. Vandal acknowledged rotations take a toll on the troops because they aren't able to bring their families with them, but he said the urgency of the mission keeps them focused. "At the end of the day, they want to deploy. They want to go overseas, they want to train, they want to

have a sense of purpose and that's what they have in Korea," he said. "They understand that, at any minute, we could be called to go to war." (Kim Gamel, "North Korean Threat Changes Timelines for U.S. Moves," *Stars and Stripes*, September 24, 2016)

9/25/16

More than half of South Koreans support nuclear armament in defense against North Korea, a straw poll by Media Research suggests. Overall support among some 1,000 respondents was at 51.1 percent. It was especially strong among elderly respondents at 73.1 percent, gradually dwindling the younger respondents became, with a majority of under-40s against. Among the supporters, 56.1 percent called for South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons, while 40.8 percent wanted only the U.S. to deploy tactical nuclear weapons here. A majority of 58.8 percent also supported the planned deployment of a U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense battery here, with 33.4 percent against. Meanwhile, a separate straw poll by Gallup Korea of 1,010 adults nationwide last week also showed solid support for nuclear armament. Some 58 percent said Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons with 34 percent against. The figure is slightly up from the 54 percent who were in favor right after North Korea's fourth nuclear test in January. By age group, 20-somethings were more against with 55 percent while 39 percent were in favor, but among those in their 40s, 50s, and 60s it was the other way around. Among supporters of the ruling Saenuri Party, 75 percent were in favor, but even among supporters of the opposition parties, support was at over 50 percent. Asked whether the government has to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea after recent flood damage, 55 percent of respondents said no. (Cho Yi-jun, "Most S. Korean Support Nuclear Armament," *Chosun Ilbo*, September 26, 2016)

9/26/16

Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump showed their opposing positions on Korean Peninsula issues in their first televised debate as the US Democratic and Republican Party presidential candidates. While discussing the military Commander-in-Chief's authority to decide on the use of nuclear weapons, Clinton said Trump had "repeatedly said that he didn't care if other nations got nuclear weapons - Japan, South Korea, even Saudi Arabia." She added, "It has been the policy of the United States, Democrats and Republicans, to do everything we could to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons." In response, Trump said, "We defend Japan, we defend Germany, we defend South Korea, we defend Saudi Arabia, we defend countries. They do not pay us." "If they don't pay a fair share . . . we can't defend Japan [or other allies]," he added, suggesting that US troops could be pulled if allies don't pay more to station them - and that he doesn't care if they arm themselves with their own nuclear weapons. It was a repeat of his previous claim that South Korea and other allies are "free riders." It's a position that has resonated considerably with low-income white voters. Along the same lines, Trump also reiterated his isolationist foreign policy position. "I want to help all of our allies, but we . . . cannot be the policemen of the world," he said. "We cannot protect countries all over the world." In contrast, Clinton countered Trump's isolationist calls for recalibrating the US's alliances by saying she "want[s] to reassure our allies in Japan and South Korea and elsewhere that we have mutual defense treaties and we will honor them." But although she did not mention it in the debate, she agrees in principle with demanding a large share of US troop stationing costs from allies. Trump also made reference to North Korea issues. "[If] you look at North Korea, we're doing



nothing there," he said. "China should solve that problem for us." In this, he differed little from the argument for a greater role from Beijing that has become the mainstream view in Washington - including from Clinton. Trump trotted out his trademark protectionism as well. "We have to stop our jobs from being stolen from us," he said, adding that the US "ha[s] to negotiate trade deals." If Trump is elected, trade frictions with the US may be expected to intensify considerably. Clinton, who has voiced support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and free trade, backed off on the issue in the debate, saying she "hoped it would be a good deal, but when it was negotiated, which I was not responsible for, I concluded it wasn't." Her response may be taken as evidence of considerable hostility toward free trade among the US public. (Yi Yong-in, "In Debate, Clinton and Trump Show Different Colors on Korean Peninsula Issues," *Hankyore*, September 28, 2016)

Debate excerpts: "CLINTON: He has said repeatedly that he didn't care if other nations got nuclear weapons, Japan, South Korea, even Saudi Arabia. It has been the policy of the United States, Democrats and Republicans, to do everything we could to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He even said, well, you know, if there were nuclear war in East Asia, well, you know, that's fine... TRUMP: Wrong. CLINTON: ... have a good time, folks. ...TRUMP: China should solve that problem for us. China should go into North Korea. China is totally powerful as it relates to North Korea....TRUMP: Iran is one of their biggest trading partners. Iran has power over North Korea. And when they made that horrible deal with Iran, they should have included the fact that they do something with respect to North Korea. ...CLINTON: Well, let me—let me start by saying, words matter. Words matter when you run for president. And they really matter when you are president. And I want to reassure our allies in Japan and South Korea and elsewhere that we have mutual defense treaties and we will honor them. It is essential that America's word be good. And so I know that this campaign has caused some questioning and worries on the part of many leaders across the globe. I've talked with a number of them. But I want to—on behalf of myself, and I think on behalf of a majority of the American people, say that, you know, our word is good. ...TRUMP. ...And now you want to approve TransPacific Partnership. You were totally in favor of it. Then you heard what I was saying, how bad it is, and you said, I can't win that debate. But you know that if you did win, you would approve that, and that will be almost as bad as NAFTA. Nothing will ever top NAFTA. CLINTON: Well, that is just not accurate. I was against it once it was finally negotiated and the terms were laid out. I wrote about that in... TRUMP: You called it the gold standard. You called it the gold standard of trade deals. You said it's the finest deal you've ever seen. CLINTON: No. TRUMP: And then you heard what I said about it, and all of a sudden you were against it. CLINTON: Well, Donald, I know you live in your own reality, but that is not the facts. The facts are—I did say I hoped it would be a good deal, but when it was negotiated... TRUMP: Not. CLINTON: ... which I was not responsible for, I concluded it wasn't. I wrote about that in my book..."

Kim Jong-un is headed to the moon. That, at least, is one of the official North Korean explanations for the testing last week of a rocket engine that, if as powerful as the North claims, would rival the commercial rockets that Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk, of Amazon and Tesla, now use in their aerospace companies to fire payloads into space.

Inside the United States' intelligence agencies, though, there is considerable skepticism that North Korea is truly eager to plant a flag on the lunar landscape. The agencies are exploring another explanation: that Kim, the North Korean leader, is racing ahead, as the United States is distracted by a bruising presidential election, to develop a way for his growing arsenal of nuclear weapons to reach New York and Washington. The North may not be working alone. An intelligence finding that the United States quietly made public in January suggests that the development of the North's big engine, which it claims produces 80 tons of thrust, may be part of a joint partnership with Iran. A Treasury Department announcement of sanctions against Iranian officials and engineers named two who had "traveled to North Korea to work on an 80-ton rocket booster being developed by the North Korean government." Today, the Obama administration announced criminal charges and Treasury Department sanctions against four Chinese individuals and a company that it said engaged in money laundering to help the North's programs for weapons of mass destruction. The sanctions were against the Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Company and its primary owner, Ma Xiaohong, who lives near the North Korean border. An engine that delivers 80 tons of thrust would have about three times the power of an advanced North Korean rocket shown in a ground test in April, though it is not possible to verify the North's claims. By most unclassified estimates, it will take North Korea perhaps five years to marry its missile advances with a weapon small enough and strong enough to survive the stresses of re-entering the atmosphere atop an intercontinental ballistic missile. So far, Kim's engineers have never executed a military test flight that could reach beyond the middle of the Pacific. The potential links to Iran complicate the issue. Iran has ignored a United Nations Security Council resolution, passed in conjunction with last year's agreement freezing its nuclear program, to refrain from tests of nuclear-capable missiles for eight years. The Obama administration has not sought sanctions, knowing they would be vetoed by Russia and China, nor has it said much in public about the details of the cooperation on the new rocket engine. There is a long history of sharing missile technology, but no persuasive evidence exists that the Iranians have been involved in the North's nuclear weapons tests. The moonshot talk may be aspirational, but it is not lunacy. Rocket experts say four of the new North Korean engines, clustered at the base of a space vehicle, would be powerful enough to hurl a no-frills payload to the moon. But the North would have to master many other technologies before even an unmanned vehicle could be landed there. In an interview last month with The Associated Press, the director of the scientific research department of North Korea's National Aerospace Development Administration, Hyon Kwang Il, said a moonshot was the nation's goal. "Even though the U.S. and its allies try to block our space development, our aerospace scientists will conquer space and definitely plant the flag of the D.P.R.K. on the moon," he said, using the abbreviation for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Whatever the goal, the most important aspect of the new North Korean engine is that its design appears to be indigenous, rather than a knockoff of decades-old Soviet missiles. That suggests a growing domestic ability, which may explain the appeal to Iran, which intelligence officials speculate may be helping to fund the effort. "It's like nothing we've seen before," John Schilling, an expert on North Korea's missile program at 38 North, a blog and think tank of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, said of the powerful new engine. "It's somewhat frightening that they have this

capability, but somewhat encouraging that they want to use it for space launching." History shows that any strides in rocketry, no matter what the claimed purpose, can aid both civil and military programs. "That's what the United States did," said David Rothkopf, who has written two histories of the National Security Council. "It's what the Russians did. It's what the Chinese did. Why not the North Koreans?" American officials would not publicly say that the program referred to in the Treasury sanctions was the same one that resulted in last week's test. But there was no other logical conclusion. The announcement identified "Iranian missile technicians" from companies working for Iran's Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics. It said that two of them, Seyed Mirahmad Nooshin and Sayyed Medhi Farahi, "have been critical to the development of the 80-ton rocket booster, and both traveled to Pyongyang during contract negotiations." Dr. Schilling said the big new engine seemed more suited to launching satellites and space probes than warheads. The North Korean military is known to prefer missiles small enough to transport on trucks, haul on back roads and hide in tunnels. It seems to be looking for something that would create at least the impression that it will not take long for it to fly to the moon or strike any part of the United States. "You cluster four of them together, and that's a very healthy ICBM," Jeffrey Lewis, a North Korea specialist at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, Calif., said of the new engine. Of course, moving from a static engine test to a cross-Pacific flight test would take considerable time, and the rocket would be a giant sitting duck for American targeting on the launch pad. One possibility is that the North is trying to replicate elements of the American "triad" – the creation of a nuclear arsenal that can be delivered by aircraft, from ground-based silos and from submarines. The North Koreans may be thinking, "Why not have everything?" Dr. Lewis said. David C. Wright, a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a Cambridge, Mass., group that monitors proliferation, also argued that North Korea's advance could well end up powering ICBMs from deep silos. He noted that the high power of the new North Korean engine was similar to one that Chinese scientists developed to power that nation's first long-range missile. Dr. Wright, in a blog post on the North Korean advance, noted that the Chinese rocket, known as the DF-5 (for Dong Feng, or East Wind), "could carry a nuclear warhead to anywhere in the United States." "Who knows what North Korea might want to do?" Wright said. "At this point, I don't think we can take an ICBM off the table." (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "North Korea Says Rocket Is for a Moonshot, But Experts See Military Agenda," *New York Times*, September 27, 2016, p. A-7)

From kicking out North Korean workers and ending visa-free travel for its citizens, to stripping flags of convenience from its ships, Cold War-era allies from Poland to Mongolia are taking measures to squeeze the isolated country. More such moves, with prodding from South Korea and the United States, are expected after North Korea recently defied U.N. resolutions to conduct its fifth nuclear test. North Korea's limited global links leave most countries with few targets for penalizing the regime on their own. Mounting sanctions over the years have made Pyongyang more adept at evasion and finding alternative sources for procurement, a recent paper by experts at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found. Nonetheless, South Korea has been especially active in pushing the North's allies for unilateral action in hopes of reining in Pyongyang's arms program. "If long-standing

friends of North Korea continue to publicly curb their ties with the country, Pyongyang will have fewer places overseas where its illicit networks can operate unhindered or with political cover from the host capital," said Andrea Berger, deputy director of the proliferation and nuclear policy program at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). South Korean officials have declined to say whether they have made inducements to countries to punish North Korea. "Presumably in the course of that diplomatic interaction it is also being made clear to Pyongyang's partners that deeper trade ties with economies like South Korea will not be fully realizable" without taking steps against North Korea, Berger said. Angola, for one, has suspended all commercial trade with Pyongyang, banning North Korean companies from operating there since the U.N. toughened sanctions in March, a South Korean foreign ministry official told Reuters recently. Angola was suspected of buying military equipment in 2011 from North Korea's Green Pine Associated Corp, which is under U.N. sanction, according to a 2016 U.N. report. North Korea had also cooperated with Angola in health care, IT and construction, South Korea's embassy there said in December. Angolan officials did not respond to requests for comment, but the country told the U.N. in July it had not imported any light weapons from North Korea in recent years. North Korea's export of cheap labor has also been targeted. Earlier this year, Washington urged countries to curb the use of North Korean workers, who number roughly 50,000 and generate between \$1.2 billion and \$2.3 billion annually for Pyongyang, according to a 2015 U.N. report. Poland, which hosted as many as 800 North Korean workers, according to some estimates, this year stopped renewing visas, as did Malta. Travel restrictions have also increased, with Ukraine recently revoking a Soviet-era deal that allowed visa-free visits for North Koreans. Singapore, which has been a hub for North Korea-linked trade, will require visitors from the country to apply for visas starting next month, its immigration authority said in July. The vast majority of North Korea's trade is with China, and experts warn sanctions will have limited impact without Beijing's backing. China condemns Pyongyang's nuclear program but is also its chief ally and is unwilling to pressure leader Kim Jong Un's regime too far, fearing a collapse that would destabilize the entire region. That means agreeing significantly tightened U.N. sanctions could be difficult. Some of the most tangible results of recent efforts to isolate North Korea have seen countries ban its ships from their registries. North Korean-owned vessels are suspected of using other flags to camouflage the movement of illicit cargo. Landlocked Mongolia, which is among Pyongyang's steadiest allies but also has close ties with Seoul, cancelled the registrations of all 14 North Korean vessels flying its flag, according to a report it submitted to the U.N. in July, even though sanctions compelled it to act on just one of them. Cambodia, once the most popular flag of convenience for North Korea, ended its registry scheme for all foreign ships in August, although it did not single out North Korea. The flags of 69 North Korean ships, none of them on a U.N. blacklist, have been de-registered since the U.N. tightened sanctions in March, South Korea's foreign minister said last month. The North's merchant fleet is estimated by the U.N. at roughly 240 vessels. (Ju-min Park and Tony Munroe, "Squeezing North Korea: Old Friends Take Steps to Isolate Regime," Reuters, September 26, 2016)

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The Department of State pledged to block North Korea's access to banking infrastructure at the international level. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel said the U.S. government would shut down any banking activities linked to North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs, at a hearing of Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Russel said he agreed with Subcommittee Chairman Matt Salmon that the U.S. should impose financial sanctions on the North by cutting off specialized financial messaging services provided by the Belgium-based SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) system. SWIFT - used by more than 11,000 financial institutions in more than 200 countries - abided by the EU Regulation 267/2012 which prohibits providing financial services to EU-sanctioned Iranian banks until sanctions against the country were lifted early this year. "The SWIFT system which is what I think you are referring to is not a U.S. system, and therefore not under our direct control. I believe it's an EU system up housed in Brussels," Daniel Russel, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S Department of State said, when asked by how the U.S. administration planned to further penalize North Korea. The necessity of far-reaching financial sanctions rose to the surface after the North was suspected to be connected to Bangladesh Bank heist back in May. "We are in discussions with our partners, including the EU, about tightening the application of sanctions and pressure, including and particularly to deny North Korea access to the international banking infrastructure that it has abused and manipulated in furtherance of its illicit programs," Russel said. "I think that our hope is that we will in fact ultimately be able to reach an agreement that would further restrict North Korea's access." Russel underscored that the U.S. would step up its surveillance to close loopholes with South Korean and Japanese counterparts, with a key focus on cutting off sources of bulk cash generated through the coal trade and overseas by North Korean workers. U.S. Republican Representative Sean Duffy's amendment (H.Amdt.1432), which included the DRPK in the Prohibiting Future Ransom Payments to Iran Act (H.R.5931), was passed in the House of Representatives on September 22. As of September 28, the bill is yet to pass the Senate. "An amendment numbered 4 printed in House Report 114-781 to prohibit cash and precious metal payments [such as gold] to designated state sponsors of terrorism and North Korea in addition to Iran," the official website of the U.S. Congress states. Salmon also attacked China, blaming the country's lack of resolve to implement sanctions and arguing that the U.S. should figure out newer and more improved ways to limit the China's abilities and reinforce pressure on the DPRK. "Most people realize that China poses a lot more leverage over North Korea than anybody else combined," Salmon said during the hearing. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs today voiced opposition to U.S. unilateral measures issuing charges against China's Dandong HongXiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd. (DHID) and four senior managers. The targets were alleged to involve in the development of centrifuges for uranium enrichment by supplying Pyongyang with aluminum ingots, ammonium paratungstate, aluminum oxide and tungsten trioxide. "If any country tries to exercise 'long-arm jurisdiction' by enforcing its domestic laws over China's enterprises and individuals, we are firmly opposed to that," Geng Shuang, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson told reporters during a regular briefing. (Dagyum Ji, "U.S. Crackdown on N. Korea Access to International Banking," *NKNews*, September 27, 2016)

A majority of professional military officers staunchly think of North Korea as the enemy, but among their conscripted men the proportion is less than half. According to figures from the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses published by Saenuri lawmaker Kim Hack-yong, 64.6 percent of officers regard North Korea as the enemy but only 47.4 percent of enlisted servicemen. Hankook Research polled 1,620 officers and 1,928 enlisted servicemen for the institute last year. In a similar survey in 2014, the numbers were closer with 56 percent of officers and 52.5 percent of conscripts thinking of the North as the enemy. The gap between the two groups also shows in their assessment of the security situation, where 50.7 percent of officers but only 36.9 percent of conscripts said the situation is precarious. And 60.1 percent of officers but just 36.5 percent of enlisted men believe the security threat will grow. Some 86.8 percent of officers believe there is a chance of skirmishes between the two Koreas, compared to 68.5 percent of conscripts. Forty-three percent of officers and 29.8 percent of enlisted men thought there is a possibility of full-scale war. Meanwhile, enlisted men also took a dim view of compulsory military service, with 33.6 percent saying they wanted to avoid it if possible and 11.5 percent saying conscription is wrong. Some 49.8 percent said serving in the military is their duty. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "Less Than Half of Enlisted Soldiers Consider N. Korea the Enemy," September 28, 2016)

9/24-27/16

A private American delegation visited North Korea September 24-27 – two weeks after the country's most recent nuclear bomb test – in a low-key humanitarian mission carried out with the Obama administration's support, the organizer and the White House said October 7. The visit appeared to be the first face-to-face contact in North Korea between such an American delegation and North Korean officials in nearly two years. Although the visitors were not acting in any American governmental capacity, North Korea's agreement to receive them suggested that both sides might be seeking an opening, however small, for more engagement – despite tensions over North Korea's nuclear weapon and missile development that have left the country severely isolated. The visit was organized by the Richardson Center for Global Engagement, a nonprofit group led by Bill Richardson, a former New Mexico governor and United Nations ambassador, who has served as an intermediary between North Korea and the United States for many years. In a statement, the group said its delegation had discussed resuming work on recovering the remains of American soldiers from the Korean War; possible help for victims of North Korea's disastrous floods; and an American request that the North release Otto F. Warmbier, a University of Virginia student imprisoned since January. Warmbier, who had been on an organized tour of North Korea, was sentenced to 15 years of hard labor on charges that he had tried to steal a political poster from his hotel. "The Richardson Center delegation was treated well and with respect," the group's statement said. During its meetings, the statement said, "frank and good discussions were held on these issues and very modest progress was made." Richardson's top aide, Mickey Bergman, led the delegation, which also included Rick Downes, the president of the Coalition of Families of Korean & Cold War POW/MIAs, and P. Willey a professor and forensic anthropologist at California State University, Chico. The visitors met with the vice minister of foreign affairs, Han Song-ryol, and other North Korean officials, as well as Sweden's ambassador, Torkel Stiernlof, who looks after American interests in North Korea because the United States and the North have no diplomatic relations. In a telephone interview, Bergman said he

could not elaborate on what was discussed concerning Warmbier, who has not received any consular visits since March. Bergman said the North Koreans were especially interested in help for areas affected by flooding, which severely ravaged northeastern parts of the country in August and left at least 70,000 people homeless. "But we have to be able to have the humanitarian interests from our side, such as the return of Otto Warmbier and the recovery of remains of American servicemen, met as well," Bergman said. Asked to comment on the trip, Ned Price, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said in an emailed statement, "The White House was consulted and is supportive of this humanitarian effort by Governor Richardson's Center." (Rick Gladstone, "In Rare Encounter, a Private U.S. Delegation Visits North Korea," *New York Times*, October 8, 2016, p. A-5)

9/29/16

North Korea's gross domestic product per capita surpassed \$1,000 for the first time last year despite heavy sanctions imposed following a series of nuclear and missile tests. Hyundai Research Institute estimated North Korea's nominal GDP per capita at \$1,013 in 2015, up from \$930 from the previous year, based on its own income analysis model. The reclusive state's nominal GDP reached \$986 in 1987, but has since declined to around \$650 in the early 2000s. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the North produced 4.78 million tons of crops in 2015, a 10.7-percent fall from a year earlier, due to severe drought. The price of rice per 1 kilogram surged 5.6 percent on-year to 5,200 won (\$4.73). Trade with China was valued at \$5.71 billion won last year, down 16.8 percent from 2014, mainly due to a drop in the North's exports of natural resources to its largest trading partner. In contrast, inter-Korean trade rose 15.6 percent on-year to \$2.71 billion in 2015, the institute said. The international community's aid to Pyongyang was tallied at \$31.87 million last year, up 12.4 percent from a year ago, but less than 2011's \$97.11 million, it noted. (Yonhap, "N.K.'s Per Capita GNP Tops \$1000: Report," *Korea Herald*, September 29, 2016)

Perceptions of North Korea as a "cooperation partner" are up from last year among South Koreans despite Pyongyang's recent nuclear test and ballistic missile launches, a survey shows. The results also showed less perception of North Korean nuclear weapons and possible armed provocations as a threat. The trend in changing perceptions is noteworthy for pointing in the exact opposite direction from the Park Geun-hye administration's current North Korea policy. The Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies released findings from a 2016 survey on unification perceptions. Perceptions of North Korea as a "cooperation partner" stood at 43.7% this year, up 8.5 percentage points from 35.2% in 2015. Perceptions of it as an "enemy" were down 2.2 percentage points from 16.5% to 14.3%. While the number of participants regarding the North Korean nuclear program as a threat remained overwhelming high, it was also down 4.5 percentage points from 84% last year to 79.5% in 2016. The number perceiving the possibility of armed provocations by the North as a threat also fell from 70.5% to 66.1%. Perceptions of the North Korean regime as being "amenable to dialogue and compromise" were low, but rose slightly from 28.7% to 30.5%. SNU professor Kim Byung-ro, who handled the analysis, attributed the findings to the effects of an agreement on Aug. 25, 2015, to holding intergovernmental talks and civilian exchange between South and North, as well as

"fatigue from the 'pressuring Pyongyang' policies after every crisis emerging from North Korea." Inter-Korean relations were cited by 34.9% of respondents as the relationship "most requiring cooperation towards reunification," ahead of cooperation between South Korea and the US (26.1%) and South Korea and China (7.0%). 32% of respondents said all three forms of cooperation were needed. Inter-Korean relations ranked first across the board, regardless of respondents' political party affiliation or progressive or conservative political leanings. In a possible reflection of these changing perceptions, the satisfaction rating for the Park administration's North Korea policy stood at 45.1% this year. The level has fallen each year since coming in at 57.6% in the administration's first year in 2013, but this marks the first time it has dropped below 50%. "Compared to last year, satisfaction ratings plummeted among people in their thirties (47.2 to 36.4) and sixty and over (59.4 to 49.5) in terms of age, and among conservatives (58.2 to 47.2) in terms of political views," said supervising researcher Chang Yong-seok, who was in charge of the analysis. Positions both supporting and opposing South Korea's nuclear armament, as proposed by some Saenuri Party lawmakers, were both down from 55.8 to 52.8 and from 17.5 to 15.2, respectively, while the percentage "withholding judgment" rose from 26.8 to 31.9. The findings were interpreted as reflecting an increased sense of alarm, with many viewing active situational management and independent problem-solving efforts through inter-Korean cooperation as necessary amid the recent decline and turbulence in the Northeast Asian political situation, including North Korea's nuclear test and frictions between Washington and Beijing. (Lee Je-hun, "Survey: Increase in Percentage of S. Koreans Who See N. Korea as 'Cooperation Partner,'" *Hankyore*, September 30, 2016)

9/30/16

President Park Geun-hye issued a blunt message to urge North Korean soldiers and citizens to defect to the South, inviting criticisms from liberal politicians over her provocativeness while fueling speculations about conditions in the reclusive communist regime. Park made the comment in a speech at a ceremony to mark Armed Forces Day. Park made perhaps the most provocative proposal by far to North Koreans. "Today, I want to clearly tell the reality that the North Korean regime is facing to the North Korean authorities, military and people," she said, stressing that it is a misunderstanding and miscalculation of the young North Korean ruler to expect to achieve security and internal unity by demonstrating its nuclear and missile capabilities and escalating military tensions. She, then, directly addressed the North Korean people. "We know the brutal reality that you are facing now. The international community is also seriously concerned about the North Korean regime's human rights abuses." Promising that the South will do its best to end the North's provocations and inhumane rule, Park said, "We will leave the path open for the North Korean people to find hope and life. Come to the free land of the Republic of Korea at any time." In the talk, Park also urged the South Korean military to be ready for contingency in the North. She said the number of North Korean residents escaping due to famine and oppression is increasing and even the elites and soldiers, who supported the regime, are defecting. She warned that Pyongyang may commit terrorist activities and provocations to stop the internal chaos and stir confusion in the South. Park's message was by far the most outspoken and straightforward invitation to the North Korean people to abandon their communist homeland. She also addressed the soldiers of the North, an unprecedented provocation to the country whose regime security is based



on its military capabilities. The liberal opposition parties were critical of Park. "She appeared to be very angry, but that doesn't solve the contradiction on the Korean peninsula," Rep. Ki Dong-min, spokesman of the Minjoo Party of Korea, said, urging her to accept the opposition parties' demands to talk to the North. Rep. Park Jie-won, acting head of the People's Party, said Park's message was too direct and aggressive. "If you directly talk about the collapse of the North and defections of its people, it is a de facto declaration of a war, no longer just a pressing message to the North Korean leader," he said in a Facebook post. "The North is an enemy in a war, but it is also a partner in a dialogue and peace. It would have touched the North and the world better if she proposed to send rice to the flood-stricken North, rather than issuing a stern message." (Ser Myo-ja, "Park Encourages North's Soldiers, Citizens to Defect," *JoongAng Ilbo*, October 3, 2016, p. 1)

Bermudez: "Commercial satellite imagery strongly suggests that a naval construction program is underway at North Korea's Sinpo South Shipyard, possibly to build a new submarine. While there is no direct evidence that the program is for a boat to carry the ballistic missile currently under development, the presence of an approximately 10-meter-in-diameter circular component outside the facility's recently renovated fabrication hall may be intended as a construction-jig or as a component for the pressure hull of a new submarine. However, it is also possible the ring may be related to another construction project. If this activity is indeed to build a new submarine, it would appear to be larger than North Korea's GORAE-class experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA), which has a beam of approximately 7 meters." (Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Is North Korea Building a New Submarine?" *38North*, September 30, 2016)

South Korean Coast Guard officials said that they were investigating the deaths of three Chinese fishermen whose boat caught fire during a crackdown on illegal fishing. The unlicensed fishing boat with 17 crew members on board was stopped on suspicion of poaching in waters off South Korea's southwestern coast on Thursday, a statement from the coast guard said. When the crew members locked themselves in a steering cabin to resist an attempt to search the vessel and question them, coast guard officers threw flashbang grenades into the cabin, the statement said. The grenades are nonlethal but produce a blinding flash of light and loud sound. The boat soon caught fire. Although the officers rescued 14 fishermen, they later found the other three dead, apparently from inhaling toxic fumes from the fire. The coast guard said autopsies were planned to determine the causes of their deaths. It was also investigating what had caused the fire. Officials in South Korea have long complained about the growing numbers of Chinese boats that they say are venturing farther from their increasingly barren home waters to poach near South Korea. The Chinese government's reaction to the deaths of the fishermen suggests that it may not want the episode to worsen ties already strained by the planned deployment of an advanced American missile defense system in South Korea. When asked about the matter on Friday in Beijing, Geng Shuang, a spokesman for China's Foreign Ministry, said Chinese diplomats were working with South Korean officials to resolve the status of the surviving crew members and preserve the remains of those killed. Geng said China had asked South Korea to "carry out comprehensive, objective and unbiased investigations in collaboration with

China." (Choe Sang-hun, "3 Chinese Die in Crackdown by Koreans on Poaching," *New York Times*, October 1, 2016, p. A-3)

South Korea selected a golf course in the southeastern part of the nation as the "final" site for an advanced U.S. missile defense system to better counter North Korea's evolving missile and nuclear threat, the defense ministry said Friday. The decision comes nearly three months after Seoul and Washington originally chose the Seongsan anti-aircraft missile base in Seongju, 296 kilometers southeast of Seoul, to host the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system by 2017. "We have conducted a simulation-based evaluation on three alternative sites in Seongju. The test results showed the Lotte Skyhill Country Club is the most optimal site for THAAD in terms of six principles," Moon Sang-gyun, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, told Yonhap News Agency. The six principles are operational effectiveness, remoteness to ease health concerns, infrastructure, overall safety considerations, construction time and cost, and the required preparation time for installation. Three candidate sites in three different townships were Mt. Yeomsok in Geumsoo, Mt. Kkachi in Sooryoon and the golf course operated by Lotte Group in Mt. Dalma, Chojeon. (Choi Kyong-ae, "S. Korea Picks 'Final' Site for THAAD," Yonhap, September 30, 2016)

10/3/12

Moscow may have allowed several North Korean nuclear researchers to work at Russian nuclear sites, including a scientist who is under United Nations Security Council sanctions. The North Korean nuclear scientists were allowed to engage in their research in Russia until early 2015 when Pyongyang stopped paying an annual membership fee to the Russian government, Japanese news agency Jiji Press reported. Furukawa Katsuhisa, who served on the U.N. Security Council's North Korea sanctions committee, said the group has evidence the North Koreans were allowed to conduct studies at Russian nuclear facilities in violation of international sanctions. Russian authorities had said the North Korean scientists' work was "not related to nuclear weapons research," but Furukawa said the researchers were working at a major nuclear research institute where North Korea was one of 18 countries in representation. The Japanese official said the Russian policy is a violation of international sanctions, adding the research center may have also hosted Ri Chae Son, a North Korean nuclear scientist under U.N. sanctions since 2009. Russian authorities had said Ri was banned from the country after he was placed under sanctions, but Furukawa said Russian officials did not give the U.N. committee access to immigration records, which casts doubt on the authenticity of the claims. Furukawa served on the committee from October 2011 to April 2016, and was in charge of investigating North Korea sanctions violations. (Elizabeth Shim, "Report: Russia Allowed North Korea Nuclear Scientists to Conduct Research," UPI, October 3, 2016)

10/4/16

Two high-ranking officials from the North Korean embassy in Beijing - including a man who had overseen leader Kim Jong-un's health care - defected with their families last month, a source well-informed on North Korea revealed. "On September 28, a heavyweight representative in North Korea's mission in Beijing - who came from the Health Ministry - escaped with his wife and daughter," the source exclusively told *JoongAng Ilbo*. "This family made contact with the Japanese Embassy in China to begin the procedure to head to Japan." The official has relatives in Japan, which was

why he chose to defect to Tokyo rather than Seoul. As a high-ranking Health Ministry official, he would have overseen the Bonghwa Medical Center, which treats North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his family, as well as the Namsan Hospital and the Red Cross Hospital. He was in charge of procurement and acquisition of drugs and medical equipment for Kim's health, according to the source. "Around the same time, another senior official at the Beijing mission also defected with his family," he added. "This official also hoped to head to Japan, and Chinese and Japanese authorities negotiated this." South Korean authorities are aware of the defections and are working on bringing the defectors to Seoul, the source said. Such officials are not diplomats with the North Korean Embassy in China. They handle trade, economic cooperation and other exchanges in the country they reside in. The two defectors and their families resided in the North Korean Embassy housing. "Two high-ranking officials of a North Korean mission defecting almost simultaneously is an unheard of event," the North Korea source added.

South Korea's Ministry of Unification was not able to confirm the defections on October 5. "There is nothing that we can confirm," Jeong Joon-hee, spokesman of the Unification Ministry, told reporters. A Blue House official said on the defection report, "If the content of the report is true, this would mean a close aide in the North Korean government has defected, so we are paying close attention." (Lee Young-jong and Sarah Kim, "Two Top Officials Flee Pyonyng's Beijing Embassy," *JoongAng Ilbo*, October 6, 2016)

Calls are growing louder in the US for Washington abandon its focus on sanctions in North Korea policy and negotiate with Pyongyang. Speaking at a discussion on Northeast Asia issues organized jointly in Washington by the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and South Korea's Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation (PCUP), Robert Gallucci, a former US State Department special envoy on the North Korean nuclear issue, stressed the importance of negotiations as the first means of resolving the currently deadlock in North Korea issues. "If they work properly, negotiations are better than war," Gallucci said. "We could continue just as we are now. We could continue with what might be called some version of containment, where we have a sanctions regime," Gallucci continued. "But . . . as we do contain the North, we also watch the situation get worse," he warned. "The North Korean case is not like fine wine. It doesn't get better with age. With each passing month and year, we look a nuclear weapons capability that grows qualitatively and quantitatively," he added. Gallucci went on to say the leaders in Pyongyang "think nuclear weapons will give them as deterrent to US efforts at regime change." He also suggested they may be willing to negotiate abandoning their nuclear ambitions if there is a definite guarantee on the regime's survival. "While it may be difficult to negotiate with North Korea, there is no better option," he added, arguing that a preemptive strike or other measures would only make the situation worse. In terms of the "carrots" that could be offered to Pyongyang in the negotiation process, Gallucci said Washington would have to have discussions with Seoul on key elements in the South Korea-US alliance such as joint military exercises. Sogang University Graduate School of International Studies professor Kim Jae-chun, who is visiting the US along with PCUP civilian vice chairperson Chung Jong-wook, also described a "different" mood in the US during a meeting the same day with foreign correspondents

in Washington. "In meeting with US experts, I've gotten the sense there are more people there than in South Korea who think we should have dialogue with North Korea if certain conditions are met," Kim said. "Some experts have said we should pursue dialogue if North Korea declares a moratorium [on nuclear testing and missile launches]," he added. "I had the feeling South Korea could end up like the proverbial dog left staring at the roof where it chased the chicken [if the differences continue]," Kim said. "I think to myself, how about at least discussing different scenarios internally?" A number of other US figures have previously called for negotiations with Pyongyang in interviews or opinion pieces, including former Secretary of Defense William Perry, Woodrow Wilson Center president Jane Harman and coordinator James Person, US nuclear expert Siegfried Hecker, and Arms Control Association executive director Daryl Kimball. (Yi Yong-in, "Robert Gallucci Says 'the North Korea Case Is Not Like Fine Wine,'" *Hankyore*, October 6, 2016)

If history is any guide, provocative actions from North Korea can be expected around the time of US elections, a new study says. Over the past 60 years, North Korea's leaders have attempted to incite tensions around the time of American elections -- especially in recent years, the study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies says. For example, North Korea conducted a missile test and then a nuclear test shortly after President Barack Obama was elected. "Doing a major test would be a way of trying to intimidate the incoming president," said Victor Cha, one of the study's authors. "North Korea chooses particular windows that they know will gain maximum attention from the world, and the US in particular." "It could be a sixth nuclear test, it could be launching of their rocket which put a satellite in orbit," Cha added. The study is scheduled to be published this week on the CSIS website *Beyond Parallel*. But some analysts see a shift in North Korea's provocations, from symbolic actions to concrete military tests, since Kim Jong Un took power after his father's death in 2011. These analysts see a decrease in deadly provocations that are primarily symbolic, such as the 2010 shelling of the disputed South Korean island Yeonpyeong, or the 2010 sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan with a torpedo. Only one has occurred recently -- the placing of land mines in the demilitarized zone, which injured two South Korean soldiers last year. "Nothing as aggressive as we saw under his father," said Ken Gause, who analyzes North Korea's leaders for CNA Corp. "Kim Jong Un, with the exception of the August crisis of last year, he has pretty much restricted his provocations to missile tests, nuclear tests, and cyber attacks." The past few years have seen an exponential jump in the number of North Korean weapons development tests, according to statistics from 38North, including 15 missile tests in 2016 alone. Any provocations carry an increased risk of escalation these days, analysts say, for two reasons. First, the South Korean government after 2010 made it easier for military commanders to respond to a provocation without waiting for politicians to consider a response. "They are more likely to retaliate earlier than in the past; they are also more likely to respond exponentially," said former CIA analyst Bruce Klingner, now with The Heritage Foundation. And second, Klingner said, the North's growing nuclear capability could give North Korean leaders a sense of impunity. "They may feel more emboldened conducting not only provocations, but actual attacks," he said, "feeling that they have immunity from any kind of US response, because North Korea has a nuclear deterrent to the US nuclear umbrella." North Korea is one of the most difficult national security

challenges the next president will face, according to CIA director John Brennan. Asked to identify America's biggest risk across the globe, he told CNN's Erin Burnett last week: "Kim Jong Un's nuclear arsenal missile capability. Not just to threaten his neighbors, but also to have intercontinental capability. That's something that the new team and the current team is looking at very, very closely and will need to be able to address." But, national security analysts say, the US appears to have little leverage to stop the country's nuclear program from racing ahead. "I don't think we can solve it diplomatically, that much is clear. Every administration in the last 20 years has tried a diplomatic approach, and the North Koreans have blown through every one," said CSIS's Michael Green, who himself handled such efforts when he was director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council. "What the US can do, with allies and partners -- and hopefully China -- is constrict North Korea's access to technology, to money, slow down their nuclear program, and start setting the stage for negotiations," he said. (Dugald McConnell and Brian Todd, "North Korea May Be Planning October Surprise, Study Says," CNN, October 4, 2016)

10/5/16

KCNA Commentary: "The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces' scenario for "a preemptive attack" on the DPRK is being put into practice. Shortly ago, the U.S. staged a drill under the simulated conditions of making "precision strikes" at the building of the supreme headquarters of the DPRK, Yongbyon nuclear facilities and its major strategic rocket bases by introducing guided-missile destroyer and a sea patrol plane of the U.S. navy into the East Sea of Korea and mobilizing guided-missile destroyers of the south Korean puppet navy. It is mulling escalating military actions under the simulated conditions of "preemptive strike" at the DPRK in the sky, land and sea with huge armed forces including the nuclear carrier task group and NATO forces involved. The Park Geun Hye group went busy inspecting frontline units of the puppet army, crying out for "turning the north into a huge cemetery at single strike." They are staging a rehearsal for conducting "a beheading operation" after establishing "triad strike system" for carrying out "a large-scale retaliatory operation plan." As the international community unanimously terms the U.S. and south Korean warmongers' saber-rattling "a drill for making precision strike, a rehearsal at the level of actual operation," the enemies' scenario for mounting a "preemptive attack" on the DPRK is being openly carried out at the stage of the operation for regime change after going beyond the boundary of military drill. Herein lies its adventurous nature. By daring regard the supreme headquarters which represents the destiny of all Koreans as the "target of preemptive attack," the warmongers have gone beyond the danger line in their military hysteria and this makes the DPRK's army hard to repress its towering resentment. The prevailing situation once again brought to light the U.S. and its stooges' true colors as a wrecker and disturber of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK's revolutionary armed forces had already clarified their stand how to deal with those who hurt the supreme dignity of the DPRK and aggressors and warmongers who seek to invade the inviolable territory of the DPRK. The DPRK has made a switchover in its mode of counteraction to cope with the enemies' military hysteria to that of preemptive attack and its striking groups are fully ready to go into an action to mount a preemptive attack on them. It is quite easy for the Korean People's Army to put the military actions in south Korea and its vicinity under control as the former has all aggressive bases in the U.S. mainland and Pacific operation bases within

the range of its strikes. The closer they come in attack, the clearer the target will become and the more readily the DPRK's countermeasure will be taken. The warmongers would be well advised to think twice over the warning of the DPRK's revolutionary armed forces." (KCNA, "U.S. and S. Korean Warmongers Had Better Heed DPRK's Warning: KCNA Commentary," October 5, 2016)

10/6/16

Ambassador Ri Tong Il: "Going nuclear is the policy line of our state. **As long as the imperialists continue their nuclear blackmail and arbitrary actions**, the DPRK will hold steadfast to the strategic line of simultaneously promoting economic construction and the building up of the nuclear forces, and will continue to further bolster its self-defensive nuclear forces in quality and quantity. The successful nuclear warhead test which was conducted recently was a demonstration of the ever strongest will of the DPRK showing it is ready to counterattack the adversary if they make a provocation as it was part of the substantial countermeasures to the threat of nuclear war and sanctions racket of the hostile forces including the US who are viciously taking issue with our nation's legitimate exercise of right to self-defense. As the DPRK has publicly stated earlier, the standardization of the nuclear warhead will enable the DPRK to produce as many as it requires a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads with higher strike power. As it has already declared itself as a responsible nuclear weapon state, **the DPRK will not use nuclear weapons first, unless the forces of aggression hostile to the country violate its sovereignty with nuclear weapons** and the DPRK will faithfully observe its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation as it has made before the international community, and strive for global denuclearization." (DPRK Text of Ambassador Ri Tong Il's Statement at the First Committee, October 6, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement "in connection with the fact that the Obama group's racket for sanctions and pressure on the DPRK has reached an extreme phase: Far from drawing a lesson from its failed DPRK policy, the Obama group is threatening and blackmailing the DPRK by force of arms and is not hiding even the fact that it is seeking "a regime change" in the DPRK while daring hurt the dignity of its supreme leadership. ...It is also making desperate efforts to isolate and stifle the DPRK by pressurizing other sovereign countries to sever relations with the DPRK or downgrade the level of ties with it. This is nothing but the last-ditch efforts of those who are on a losing streak in the political and military stand-off with the DPRK. Defying universally accepted principle of international law that sovereign states can never be subject to jurisdiction of other countries under any circumstances, the Obama group is brandishing the sanctions stick against those countries disobedient to it. It is, indeed, a group of rogues. In order to defend itself from the group of gangsters keen on inflicting even nuclear holocaust at the end of putting unprecedented political and economic pressure and military threats, the DPRK has bolstered the nuclear force both in quality and quantity after setting it as a national line to go nuclear and has now soared as a nuclear power possessed of powerful nuclear attack capabilities. A stick has to be used against the horde of wolves like the U.S. which comes in fierce attack to eliminate the DPRK while categorically denying the sovereignty of the DPRK and its right to existence. Only then the U.S. will come to its senses. The U.S. will sooner or later face a shuddering reality in which their bayonet that targeted the life of the

people of the DPRK will boomerang on it." (KCNA, "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts Obama Group's Racket for Sanctions and Pressure upon DPRK," October 6, 2016)

To stop Pyongyang's march to a nuclear arsenal, the White House is looking to target Chinese companies that bankroll Kim Jong Un's banned weapons. The Obama administration is heatedly debating whether to trigger harsh sanctions against North Korea that would target Chinese companies doing business with the hermit regime, in a crackdown like the one that crippled Iran's economy, Foreign Policy has learned. But some White House officials worry that the tough economic penalties, which have already been approved though not deployed, would cause a serious rift with Beijing. Officials told FP that the approach would be similar to the sweeping secondary sanctions that were slapped on global banks handling transactions with Iran. But a decision to go after Chinese banks and trading companies that deal with Pyongyang could rupture Washington's relations with Beijing, which bristles at any unilateral sanctions imposed on its companies or drastic action that could cause instability in neighboring North Korea. "In the past two or so years, there's a general appreciation that the situation has become worse and that we, the United States and the responsible nations of the world, need to up our game," said a senior government official. As a result, the administration is "looking at a more active and more aggressive use of the authorities" for sanctions. The political calendar in the United States also is shaping the internal discussions, with some officials arguing that President Barack Obama would be better placed to order the move in his final months in office, rather than leaving it to a new administration to enter into a heated dispute with China. "Looking at the calendar, all the players on North Korean policy are acutely aware that there is a need, and we have a chance to solidify this robust policy so that the next administration is working on a higher platform," the senior official said. China has repeatedly voiced support for U.N. Security Council resolutions barring any commercial backing or supplies for North Korea's nuclear weapons or missile projects. But Beijing also has made clear that it opposes unilateral sanctions by other governments, and Chinese officials are wary of any penalties that would create a food shortage or energy crisis that triggers upheaval in its impoverished neighbor. "We're willing to cooperate with relevant countries under the condition of mutual respect and on equal footing, but at the same time oppose any country's so-called long-arm management of Chinese entities or individuals according to its internal laws," the foreign ministry said in a statement to *Bloomberg News* this week. (Dan De Luce, "U.S. Weighs Iran-Style Sanctions on N. Korea, Risking a Rift with China," *Foreign Policy*, October 6, 2016)

Jack Liu: "Recent commercial satellite imagery of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site from October 1 indicates continuing activity at all three tunnel complexes that could be used to conduct a nuclear test. Activity at the North Portal where the September 9 test occurred, may be for a number of purposes including collecting post-test data, sealing the portal or preparing for another test. There is also increased activity near one of the two entrances at the South Portal where excavation stopped in 2012. The purpose of this activity is also unclear although the portal is assumed to be capable of supporting a nuclear test once a decision is made to move forward." (Jack Liu, "North Korean Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Activity at All Three Portals," *38North*, October 6, 2016)

10/7/16

South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies have detected increased signs at the Tongchang-ri missile test site on North Korea's west coast, prompting speculation that the reclusive state may be preparing to launch a long-range missile, Yonhap reported, citing an unnamed South Korean government official. "Activities at the Tongchang-ri missile base have been visibly increased recently," the official was quoted as saying. "It appears (North Korea) is preparing to make strategic provocations, like launching a long-range missile." (Kyodo, "Increased Activity at North Korean Missile Site: Report," October 7, 2016)

An October 7 incident in which a Chinese fishing boat deliberately rammed and sank a South Korean Coast Guard high-speed vessel is showing signs of escalating into a head-on collision between the two governments. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang harshly protested the South Korean government's response measures at a regular domestic and foreign press briefing on the afternoon of October 12. "There is no legal basis for the administrative activities the South Korean Coast Guard is carrying out in those waters," Geng said. His remarks strongly suggest a diplomatic riposte to Seoul's actions on October 11, when it summoned Chinese ambassador Qiu Guohong to protest the sinking and announced after a countermeasures meetings by related government agencies that it would proceed with firing on Chinese boats if necessary. Geng also resorted to undiplomatic language to denounce South Korea for "blindly raising the level of its punishments." Citing "geographic coordinates provided by South Korea" and a bilateral fishing agreement, Geng asserted that there was "no legal basis for the administrative activities the South Korean Coast Guard is carrying out in those waters." His remarks suggested the area in which the collision and sinking took place corresponds to "provisional measure waters" as per Article 7 of the fishing agreement. The agreement states that "fishing by boats from both countries is permitted" in provisional measure waters, and that "South Korean boats should be controlled by South Korea and Chinese boats by China, with neither side enforcing the law against the other side's boats." Geng remained conspicuously silent on the location and legal nature of the waters where the Chinese boat was initially discovered fishing illegally by the South Korean Coast Guard. While China cited the fisheries agreement as the basis for its argument, Seoul cited domestic law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to dispute it. "The incident was one in which the South Korean Coast Guard spotted and tracked a Chinese boat illegally fishing in South Korean waters, at a position of 37°28'33"N and 124°2'3"E, and the South Korean Coast Guard high-speed vessel sank as a result of a collection with the Chinese boat outside South Korean waters (37°23'6"N, 123°58'56"E)," explained a South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. "The authority invoked by the South Korean Coast Guard to pursue it was a right granted by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which both South Korea and the US have joined," the official added. The convention does acknowledge the right of a country to pursue and exercise administrative power over foreign vessels that have fled into international waters from that country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). "The Chinese fishing boat in question was caught in a Coast Guard crackdown while illegally fishing in 'designated waters' where it is required to respect South Korean law, and it fled outside those designated waters, where it rammed and sank the high-speed vessel," said a South Korean government official. "Even outside of the designated waters, the South Korean Coast



Guard is entitled to exercise pursuit authority in waters outside of China's territorial waters," the official said. The differing standards offered by the South Korean and Chinese governments as a legal basis governing the incident are noteworthy because of the likelihood of them becoming a serious topic of debate as the two sides look for a solution. The situation is also tied to their negotiations since last year to define maritime boundaries, which are not clearly set in the bilateral fishing agreement. The two sides also differ sharply in what they are demanding from the other. "We must not use excessive means that could harm the safety of Chinese crewmembers, and we must guarantee the safety and legal rights of those Chinese members," Geng said. In response, a South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs official called Seoul's measures "a justifiable action based on established international law and South Korean domestic law" - showing the absence of any common ground. An expert in maritime law suggested the two sides would "ultimately have to find a solution through a joint investigation." "Joint committees as per the South Korea-China fishing agreement have previously been established to decide on catch quotas and numbers of fishing boats, but one could be formed this time for a joint investigation," the expert said. (Lee Jehun, Kim Ji-eun, and Kim Oi-hyun, "Illegal Fishing Leading to Head-on Clash between South Korea and China," *Hankyore*, October 13, 2016)

Shultz-Perry report: "The Hoover Institution and the US-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) held a two-day conference at Stanford University in mid-June on "Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Way Ahead." The conference was chaired by former Secretary of State George Shultz and former Secretary of Defense William Perry and included a diverse group of 40 area and functional experts, academic specialists, and retired diplomats and military officers from the United States and several other countries. Participants agreed that the North Korean nuclear issue has dramatically worsened since the end of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 2006 and the collapse of the Six Party Talks the following year. Apart from largely symbolic actions such as condemnatory UN resolutions and new sanctions, little has been done to address the problem. Meanwhile, Pyongyang has made significant progress on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, further weakening crisis stability on the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific. As Kim Jong Un continues to consolidate his leadership and stabilize the economy, **a North Korea collapse scenario is looking unlikely anytime soon.** The US must take a more active role in trying to find a solution. Though no one regarded it as a panacea, **the consensus of participants was that engaging North Korea has been historically far more effective than isolating it.** Engagement could be **conducted in phases, moving from Track II dialogues to working level talks and eventually to more formal negotiations.** As this process unfolds, coordination with South Korea and other countries in the region is crucial. Many participants suggested expanding the negotiation space to include broader regional issues as a way to build trust and momentum for talks. Participants also agreed that the next administration should **conduct a "Perry Process" II** to search for new ideas and build a bipartisan policy consensus. **Participants generally agreed that "strategic patience" had failed—it seems to have been more an exercise in managing US domestic public opinion than an effective policy response.** In retrospect, **shunning North Korea only gave it breathing space to stabilize its domestic situation and push forward its strategic programs.** While hope springs

eternal, **sanctions do not seem to be slowing the pace of Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs.** At this point, **they serve primarily to give the appearance of action.** This is also true on the South Korean side. The closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex did little to curb North Korea's weapons programs, but instead severed the last channel of inter-Korean contact and cooperation. Despite predictions of the impending regime collapse, Kim Jong Un has shown considerable resilience, remaining in power on his own for five years. Many participants suggested that **he has now consolidated his position. He has gradually shifted away from his father's "military first" legacy by increasing the role of the party and cabinet. Kim seems determined to rebuild the economy and achieve actual results.** Most experts acknowledge that **the economy has begun to grow again, albeit at a slow rate.** Based on these developments and the fact that North Korea now has a fledgling nuclear weapons capability, it is clear that **waiting for regime collapse is not a viable policy.** There was consensus that the next administration needs to better understand North Korea's motivations if it is to have any chance of influencing its behavior. Participants agreed with Secretary Perry's formulation that the regime has four goals: 1) maintaining the Kim regime—the primary objective; 2) attaining international recognition, respect, and dignity; 3) developing the economy; and 4) achieving unification under its own terms. However, several participants observed that even Pyongyang seems aware that unification on its terms is highly unlikely given its current strapped circumstances. In contrast, US goals are less clear. There was consensus among participants that the US has been overly ambitious and unrealistic in its approach to the problem. Denuclearization, alliance management, non-proliferation, and human rights remain major priorities. However, these objectives can sometimes be at odds with one another. For example, **harsher sanctions and stronger international condemnation of North Korea over human rights abuses have only heightened the Kim regime's sense of insecurity, making prospects for denuclearization less likely.** Further exacerbating this lack of a coherent set of ranked priorities is the fact that high-level US policy attention to the issue has been intermittent. As pressure on North Korea mounts, the danger of conflict by accident or miscalculation rises. As one participant put it, sanctions could backfire and push North Korea into a corner, creating a "fight-flight" situation. Participants agreed that China's cooperation was essential but with increasing tensions in the South China Sea, the US rebalance to Asia, and South Korea's decision to deploy THAAD, this can no longer be taken for granted. Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs continue to make progress despite US and international sanctions. **Siegfried Hecker estimated that with the 5MW (electric) gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon once again in operation, Pyongyang can produce an estimated maximum of 6 kg of plutonium per year—the equivalent of one bomb annually. By the end of this year, it is estimated to have between 34-52 kg of plutonium.** Estimates of its HEU production are less certain, as enrichment facilities are more difficult to locate and observe. **Hecker estimated Pyongyang's production capacity at 150 kg per year, the equivalent of 6 bombs annually. Altogether, he believed Pyongyang may have enough material for approximately 25 bombs by the end of 2016. He also noted that North Korea has the technical ability to produce deuterium and tritium— isotopes of hydrogen required to create fusion (thermonuclear) weapon—at an unknown capacity.** While many experts doubt Pyongyang's claims that it tested a

fusion bomb during its January 2016 test, Hecker stated that a boosted fission bomb could not be ruled out. (Subsequent to the conference, North Korea conducted a fifth nuclear test—its second test of 2016 and its largest yet, in terms of explosive yield). North Korea is also making steady progress on its missile program. The pace of testing has markedly increased, with every failure providing new information to improve its missiles and increase their reliability. With its existing stockpile of short- and medium-range missiles, Pyongyang is capable of striking targets throughout South Korea, Japan, and elsewhere in the region. It is also committed to developing a long-range missile capable of posing a direct threat to the US—Pyongyang has on multiple occasions paraded apparent mock-ups of a road-mobile ICBM under development, the KN-08, that could eventually reach the US mainland. It is also forging ahead with its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program, as evidenced by its past testing. (Subsequent to the conference, it successfully launched an SLBM that reached 500 km before falling within Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone). This latent capability carries serious implications for regional stability, deterrence, and non-proliferation. Ted Postol, a professor of science, technology, and national security policy at MIT, also noted that North Korea had already demonstrated the ability to potentially counter the THAAD system being deployed in South Korea. By cutting the upper stage of its missiles into smaller sections that will fragment upon reentry, it may be able to exploit the physical limitations of the system's infrared homing systems. Attracting less attention but probably of more immediate significance, North Korea has tested and is about to deploy a new 300 mm multiple rocket launcher with highly accurate terminal guidance and a much longer range. This new system is a major upgrade to existing forward-deployed artillery already capable of destroying Seoul. It gives Pyongyang the capability to take out high-value military and leadership targets deep in the South with great precision and with little advance preparation. Besides their obvious tactical and strategic worth, North Korea's conventional artillery, rocket artillery, and missile systems are useful as tools of political intimidation. There was wide consensus among participants that the new US administration should undertake a comprehensive review of North Korea policy along the lines of the "Perry Process." The focus should not be on second-guessing officials, but rather taking on a fresh look at the problem. **There was agreement that while deterrence is still necessary, it is no longer enough.** Several participants noted that **periods of engagement with North Korea were associated with a reduction in tensions. More focus is required on ways to stabilize the peninsula, reduce tensions, and peacefully engage North Korea.** Participants also observed that Seoul's current hardline stance should not be regarded as a given. A renewed attempt to reach out to Pyongyang is possible before the South Korean presidential election at the end of next year, and Seoul's policy could soften dramatically with a different administration. On the other hand, there was a chance that the public attitude towards the North could harden significantly if there were an incident involving loss of life. Several participants stressed the need for closer US-ROK political and military coordination. There is growing anxiety in Seoul over the progress of Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs and how to counter it. Participants also expressed concern about what the change of administration in Washington next year would mean as well as how it will be perceived in Seoul. In a session devoted to a discussion of mechanisms for engaging North Korea in efforts to create a stable structure of peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia, the following principles were

advanced: **Most participants agreed that it is unlikely that North Korea would agree to relinquish its nuclear weapons**—while this might have been possible when its program was still at an early stage, the opportunity has long since passed. Its nuclear program has now solidly developed into an actual capability that is highly advertised. **The most that could be hoped for is probably a freeze on further nuclear and missile testing and development.** One participant noted that such a freeze—with the possible exception of space launches—would be a significant achievement in itself. However, obtaining agreement to a freeze at this point would likely require substantially more concessions than previous US administrations have been willing to provide. **A package that North Korea might accept would probably have to include an end to large-scale military exercises, significant sanctions relief, and a range of confidence-building measures. As part of such a deal, one participant suggested that it might even be necessary to consider arranging for North Korea to acquire more advanced conventional defensive weapons.** Several different geometries were discussed for resuming formal talks. Engagement could be conducted in phases, starting with an increase in Track II dialogues before establishing working level talks that could eventually lead to more formal multilateral negotiations. Many Instead of pursuing a grand bargain, it may be more effective to break the problem into smaller pieces and embrace a broad set of issues. There was wide consensus among participants that the new US administration should undertake a comprehensive review of North Korea policy along the lines of the “Perry Process.” While the Six Party model is a practical way of initiating a dialogue, several variations can also be considered, such as a Track 1.5 study of security issues in Northeast Asia; a Northeast Asia nuclear-free zone, or a conference on security and cooperation in Northeast Asia modeled loosely on the methods used to establish the post-Cold War order in the Euroatlantic region. The United States will have a decisive voice in any negotiations of this type and a renewed and sustained commitment of time by the next President will be essential to the success of this enterprise. Regardless of the approach, the first step must be to reinstate contact with North Korea. **CONCLUSION** Decades of US and international efforts have failed to halt the development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Instead, Pyongyang may now have enough fissile materials to produce at least 25 nuclear weapons by the end of 2016. At the same time, it has increased the tempo of its nuclear and missile tests and may be able to deploy a submarine-launched ballistic missile within the decade. Meanwhile, the North Korean government seems increasingly unlikely to collapse, with Kim Jong Un continuing to consolidate power and focus on economic growth. **The US must take a lead with its allies and regional partners in addressing the issue by restarting engagement with North Korea.** Such a process may be conducted in stages, beginning with Track II discussions that can eventually lead to formal negotiations. While denuclearization must officially remain on the table, a halt on development or testing would be a significant step in the right direction. It is also important to consider expanding the scope of talks to include broader regional issues that can be used to build confidence and momentum. While restarting talks is a longer-term goal, in the near-term, the next administration should strongly consider conducting another internal policy review similar to the Perry Process in order to form a coherent set of policy priorities and actions.” (The Hoover Institution and the US-Korea Institute at the

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, *Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Way Ahead*, (October 2016)

10/10/16

South Korea and the US kicked off a large-scale joint naval drill involving a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Ronald Reagan, in a fresh display of force to deter North Korean provocations.

The Invincible Spirit program, scheduled to run through October 15 in the waters surrounding the peninsula, came amid soaring speculation that the communist state may stage another long-range missile or nuclear test in celebration of the Oct. 10 anniversary of the founding of its ruling Workers' Party. "This drill is designed to show the alliance's robust resolve for retaliation against a series of North Korean provocations, and improve the two nations' joint combat capabilities," Seoul's Defense Ministry spokesperson Moon Sang-gyun said at a news briefing. On the prospects for Pyongyang's provocation, Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesman Col. Jeon Ha-kyu said the regime is seen "ready for a nuclear test at any time and it is a matter of decision" by the leadership. "With the possibilities of North Korea's strategic and tactical provocations in mind, we're closely tracking and monitoring related movements. We are also maintaining a corresponding readiness posture," Jeon added. Put in service in 2003, the 97,000-ton Nimitz-class carrier is capable of carrying about 90 jets including F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters, EA-18G Growler electric warfare planes and E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft. The exercise is expected to mobilize other major assets of the two countries' Navies, Air Forces and Armies. Among them are some 40 South Korean warships led by the Aegis-equipped destroyer King Sejong the Great, seven US vessels including Ticonderoga-class Aegis missile cruisers, P-3 and P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and Apache helicopters, the Navy here said in a statement. In the East and West Seas, the allies are slated to carry out the maritime counter special operations force, a program intended to defeat North Korean special agents seeking to penetrate from the rear. The aircraft carrier strike group, meanwhile, will stage anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, precision-guided striking and carrier escort trainings off the southwestern shores of the peninsula, among other areas. (Shin Hyon-hee, "Allies Stage Military Drills with Nuke-Powered Carrier," *Korea Herald*, October 10, 2016) US military forces have reportedly taken part in a series of drills to practice taking out North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un in the event of an attack on the South by Pyongyang. A defense ministry official confirmed one section of the drills - named 'Invincible Spirit' - involved plans to remove the North Korean leadership in case aggression between the two countries escalates, according to Yonhap. (Gabriel Samuels, "U.S. and South Korea 'Join Forces for Drills' Aimed at Taking out North Korea's Kim Jong-un," *The Independent*, October 12, 2016)

10/11/16

China appears to have pushed back on a U.S. bid to close a U.N. loophole that allows North Korea to export coal for "livelihood purposes," saying the well-being of North Koreans is a priority in negotiations on possible new U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang. Since North Korea's fifth and largest nuclear test four weeks ago, the United States and China, a close ally of North Korea, have been negotiating a new draft Security Council resolution to punish Pyongyang. "We cannot really affect the well-being and the humanitarian needs of the people and also we need to urge various parties to reduce tensions," Chinese U.N. Ambassador Liu Jieyi told Reuters on October 7 of discussions

with the United States on "a draft resolution with a wider scope of measures." In March, the 15-member Security Council imposed tough new sanctions on North Korea following its fourth nuclear test in January. That resolution bans the 193 U.N. member states from importing North Korean coal, iron and iron ore unless such transactions are for "livelihood purposes" and would not be generating revenue for Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs. Coal is particularly important to the economic health of North Korea because it is one of its only sources of hard currency and its largest single export item. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, said on October 8 that some of the exemptions included in the March resolution - out of concern for the welfare of North Koreans - appeared to have been exploited. "In the negotiation that we are currently in the midst of in the new resolution, we are hoping to address some of the shortcomings that we have seen," Power told reporters during a visit to Seoul. China's imports of coal from neighboring North Korea reached 1.53 million tonnes in April, down 35 percent on the previous month when the latest U.N. sanctions were adopted, but by August imports from North Korea had risen to 2.47 million tonnes. "Fundamentally, no matter (what) any resolution says, it is going to be up to the Member States of the United Nations, and particularly those Member States that have dealings with the DPRK (North Korea), to fully enforce the resolution," she said. China imported \$1 billion worth of North Korean coal in 2015 and \$73 million of iron ore, according to Chinese customs data. "We are still looking at the specific things in the draft. It's still in the process of being discussed," Liu said. "We certainly hope that we will achieve a result soon, but it depends on how we work together ... towards a common position." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a regular press briefing on Tuesday that China supported a further response by the Security Council but that it should focus directly on North Korea's nuclear program. "We believe that the relevant Security Council response should clearly target North Korea's nuclear activities and be helpful in realizing goals of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, and in maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula," Geng said. Power told reporters in Seoul on Monday that the United States wanted a U.N. resolution "that makes a substantive difference and changes the calculus over time of the North Korean leadership." (Michelle Nichols, "China Appears to Push back on U.S. Bid to Choke North Korea Coal Exports," Reuters, October 11, 2016)

10/12/16

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Daniel Russel told reporters in Washington that Kim Jong Un will "immediately die" if he decides to equip his country with weapons advanced enough to launch a nuclear strike. "Perhaps he's got an enhanced capacity to conduct a nuclear attack and then immediately die. But that can't be plan A," Russel said. The warning comes amid calls from several senior U.S. figures for a preemptive strike on North Korea's nuclear and missile facilities. Russel said North Korea's argument that it needs nuclear weapons to deter a U.S. invasion is "absurd." Instead, developing nuclear weapons only reduces the safety sought by the North Korean leader while isolating his country even further within the international community. (Lee Kil-seong, "U.S. Diplomat Warns N. Korea of Tougher Consequences," *Chosun Ilbo*, October 14, 2016) "To the extent that the Chinese authorities themselves take action against North Korea malefactors or Chinese companies that are collaborating with North Korea, then there's no cause for action by the United States or others," Russel said, according to AP. "Where they don't take

action, the United States reserves the right under UN Security Council resolution 2270 or under our own national authorities to take action," he said, referring to the latest package of sanctions adopted after the North's January nuclear test. (Yonhap, "U.S. Official Warns N. Korean Leader of Death If He Attempts Nuclear Attack," *Korea Herald*, October 14, 2016)

A high-level North Korean official in charge of state surveillance defected to the South in 2015, a government source said. The South Korean source said the official was a director-level member of Pyongyang's state security department, Yonhap reported. The high-ranking defector was in charge of identifying trends in public sentiment among the residents of Pyongyang, the capital where the country's elite reside. "It is believed in interviews with [South Korean] authorities the official said public sentiment [about the North Korean leadership] in Pyongyang is 'heated,'" the source stated. The term "heated" is used to convey negativity about the Kim Jong Un regime, the source explained. It is highly unusual for North Korean state security department personnel to flee the country, and the defector, identified as "A" in the Yonhap report, is believed to have left with confidential information on the Kim regime, and the leadership's surveillance methods critical to maintaining control of the population. The defector reportedly told South Korean government interviewers members of his bureau were uncomfortable with Kim's rule, and after watching "others bounce," state agents are "bouncing," or exiting the regime. (Elizabeth Shim, "Report: North Korea State Security Official Defected with Important Information," UPI, October 11, 2016)

South Korea's military said it will greatly expand the capabilities of its special forces to strike key North Korean command facilities and its leadership in the event of a crisis. In a parliamentary audit, the Army said it is striving to be ready to carry out independent special operations against the North's provocations, with a plan to secure hardware, such as the latest MH-47 series choppers, compact satellite links and advanced small arms. "The Army is seeking to have a special operations unit capable of infiltrating (enemy territory), completing its given mission and coming back in one piece," Army Chief of Staff Jang Jun-kyu said during the audit held in the Army's Kyeryongdae military headquarters near Daejeon, 164 kilometers south of Seoul. The MH-47 series helicopter under consideration for deployment in the Army are variants of the battle-tested Chinook choppers operated by the South Korean and U.S. military that are designed for special operations. The helicopters equipped with airborne refueling equipment and a radar system that can detect topography, can carry 40 special forces troops and fly some 600 km into enemy territory, according to the Army. As for the time frame for deployment, Rep. Baek Seung-joo from the ruling Saenuri Party said such equipment should be deployed "as quickly as possible" amid growing nuclear and missile threats from the North. "We are stepping up our efforts to upgrade the capabilities of the C-130 cargo plane and other transport aircraft," Jang said. Currently, the Army plans to secure the capability to carry out special missions by 2018. (Yonhap, "Military Expanding Special Forces Capability to Strike Key N.K. Facilities, Leadership," October 12, 2016)

The former commanders of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) have expressed their support for possible pre-emptive strikes against North Korea if a nuclear attack is

deemed imminent.

Burwell Bell, who commanded U.S. armed forces stationed in South Korea from 2006 to 2008, said that pre-emptive strikes are necessary if information that the North is making the final touches on a nuclear attack is detected, according to Voice of America (VOA). "Their sovereign right to defend themselves against a catastrophic surprise attack demands that they reserve the right and have the capability (of pre-emptive strikes)," Bell told the VOA. The former commander noted that it is improper to wait until an actual attack takes place even if an imminent attack has been detected. "This is not just about an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and nuclear weapons. This is about any kind of weapon capable of mass destruction that can be delivered by surprise if that has a high probability of success," he said. Walter Sharp, who was USFK commander from 2008 to 2011, has made a comment similar to that of Bell, the VOA added. He said that pre-emptive strikes should be guaranteed if there is clear evidence that the United States and its allies have become targets of attack by an enemy including North Korea. Comments from former USFK commanders are in line with previous remarks from Mike Mullen, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mullen said during a forum hosted by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, September 16, that it is important to develop "the capability to defend ourselves," noting that a preemptive strike is just one out of many potential options, and this depends on the actions of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. He said allies could theoretically take out launch capabilities on the launch pads of the North or take them out once they are launched. James Thurman, who served as USFK commander from 2011 to 2013, said he supported Mullen's argument, adding that all possible options should be considered, according to VOA. (Jun Ji-hye, "Ex-USFK Commanders Support Pre-Emptive Strikes against N. Korea," *Korea Times*, October 12, 2016)

10/15/16

The U.S. military detected a failed North Korean test launch of an intermediate ballistic missile, the Pentagon said. The U.S. Strategic Command's systems detected that the Musudan missile failed in a launch conducted near North Korea's northwestern city of Kusong, the Pentagon said in a statement. It provided no details on what went wrong but said the launch never posed a threat to North America. "We strongly condemn this and North Korea's other recent missile tests," said U.S. Navy Commander Gary Ross, a Pentagon spokesman. "Our commitment to the defense of our allies, including the Republic of Korea and Japan, in the face of these threats, is ironclad. We remain prepared to defend ourselves and our allies from any attack or provocation." South Korea's military said early today that North Korea fired what it believed was a Musudan missile at 0333 GMT (11:33 p.m. EDT on Friday) but it failed immediately after launch. It did not elaborate on the reason for the failure. (Mark Spetalnick, "U.S. Detects Failed North Korean Missile Test: Pentagon," Reuters, October 16, 2016) It was launched from the city of Kusong, near the Chinese border, which is a different site than had been used in past missile tests. "There is a high possibility that North Korea chose a third place other than previous missile launch sites because it needed to show that it can strike its target at anytime and anywhere it wants, even if (its enemy) deploys THAAD and utilize fighter bombers and carriers," said Chung Sung-yoon, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification. Michele Flournoy, who some media outlets have reported as being considered for U.S. defense secretary in Hillary Clinton's administration if she wins the November presidential



election, has also taken a hard line against North Korea. In a recent interview with Yonhap, she said, without a commitment from North Korea to work toward denuclearization, negotiations would be "a waste of time." A group of former U.S. officials and regional analysts recently recommended that Washington offer Pyongyang incentives like immediate food aid and a possible reduction in U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises in return for a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests. Their recommendations are conditioned on North Korea demonstrating a commitment to address the denuclearization issue, and offer the possibility of further concessions in the future, including a formal peace treaty and the normalization of relations, if real progress is achieved. Flournoy, however, emphasized during her interview support for increased military deterrence like the deployment of the U.S. THAAD anti-missile shield in South Korea, and said that "the focus of our policy should be to try to put through sanctions and other pressure, get the leadership to come back to the negotiating table and make good on their earlier promises of denuclearization." Her views could indicate that under Clinton the U.S. would continue to support strong sanctions and deterrence against North Korea and maintain a close American military alliance with South Korea. (Brian Padden, "North Korean Missile Tests Reduce Prospects for Compromise," VOA, October 17, 2016) North Korea has made no secret of its goal to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the United States mainland, giving it the means to send a nuclear warhead to its archenemy. Kim Jong Un's rocket scientists are thought to be several years from being able to do this, instead concentrating on intermediate-range missiles that can reach only as far as Guam. But now some analysts are asking: Did North Korea just try to launch two long-range missiles? "We think it is important that people consider the possibility that this was a KN-08 test," said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia nonproliferation program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey in California, referring to the intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, by its technical name. North Korea conducted two missile tests earlier this month. Both took place at an air base in Kusong on North Korea's west coast, on the other side of the country from the usual Musudan test site near Wonsan, on the east coast. The United States Strategic Command said October 26 that both tests are "presumed" to be of Musudan missiles, and South Korean military officials have said the same. The Musudan is technically capable of flying as far as 2,400 miles, putting Guam within range and almost reaching Alaska. These would mark the seventh and eighth Musudan tests this year. Only one, in June, was a success, flying about 250 miles and reaching a surprisingly high altitude. But after poring over satellite photos enhanced with a near infrared band of light, Lewis and his fellow experts at MIIS think there's an even chance that the launches were of ICBMs. "We're not fully persuaded that it was a Musudan," Lewis said, noting that Strategic Command, known as StratCom, twice misidentified three missiles that North Korea launched in September. "We still think people are being too quick to jump to the conclusion that this was a Musudan. Even if it's only 50/50, being shocked half of the time is still bad," he said. Looking at before-and-after satellite imagery from Planet Labs, a San Francisco-based imaging company, Lewis and his colleagues found burn scars after each missile firing, showing where the hot exhaust scorched the pavement and grass. Near infrared light can discriminate between burned and untouched parts of vegetation. "The first scar is really big. That is consistent with a catastrophic failure," he said, noting that it was possible that the explosion damaged

the launch vehicle on which it was mounted. "The second burn scar is small, like the missile flew some distance before whatever went wrong." These big burn scars are much bigger than what had been seen after Musudan tests, and the fact that they happened on the other side of the country added to suspicions about the kind of missile being tested. Other analysts said it is possible, if not probable, that the tests were of ICBMs. "While this was most likely a Musudan test, the possibility of a KN-08 cannot be ruled out," said John Schilling, an aerospace engineer who frequently writes about the North's missiles. Schilling expects North Korea's road-mobile ICBMs to reach operational status early in the next decade – perhaps within five years. "It seems most likely that the latest test was an attempt to test the Musudan from an operational launch facility rather than a test facility," he said, explaining the difference in test location. Although noting that StratCom should be able to distinguish between a Musudan and a much larger ICBM, he also pointed out that the U.S. agency had misidentified the three missiles launched last month. StratCom first called them short-range Rodongs, then medium-range Musudans. They turned out to be extended-range Scud missiles. "I do not place high confidence in their ability to distinguish a KN-08 from a Musudan," Schilling said. "And I do not think anyone should have high confidence in their ability to predict North Korean behavior regarding missile testing." Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., chief analytics officer at AllSource Analysis, a Denver-based consultancy, also said the likelihood was that the missiles were medium-range Musudans. "Given their concentration on perfecting the Musudan, I would think they were testing a Musudan," he said, saying that the test site could have been moved simply to make it harder for intelligence agencies to monitor the activity. Although all but one Musudan test has failed, North Korea has shown rapid advances with its missile program this year. It successfully launched a ballistic missile from a submarine in August and launched what it said was a satellite in February. That launch was widely considered a cover for an ICBM test. (Anna Fifield, "Did North Korea Just Test Missiles Capable of Hitting the U.S.? Maybe," *Washington Post*, October 26, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement: "The U.S. hostile acts of hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK have now reached the point of self-contradiction, going far beyond the tolerance limit. Rassel, U.S. assistant secretary of State for East Asia-Pacific Affairs, on October 12 had the temerity of hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK and blustering that the DPRK would come to its end the moment it acquires the capability to mount a nuclear attack. This is the most blatant challenge to the DPRK and a hostile act of putting into practice a declaration of war against the DPRK. The extreme vituperation let out by him is a paradox making profound confusion of the right and wrong. The reality is quite contrary to what he uttered. The moment the U.S. comes in attack on the DPRK, the White House will come to an end before anything else. The anti-DPRK invectives reeled off by this guy is the last-ditch efforts aimed to evade the responsibility for endangering the security of the U.S. mainland as a whole by pushing the DPRK to become the most powerful nuclear weapons state now that the Obama group's DPRK policy proved to be totally bankrupt before its ouster. He, who had been reportedly in charge of the DPRK policy for the past two decades, is so ignorant of the DPRK. So pitiful is the fate of the American people who depend on such minions for the security of the country. Being seized by megalomania that it can do whatever it wants, the U.S. has become blind in facing up

to the world. It is, therefore, unable to judge that the DPRK is not such a country which it can make obedient to Washington. What Rassel uttered is just a squeak of a rat but behind him there is shrill cry of Obama. The DPRK will remain unperturbed by the useless wriggling of Obama, but the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK including the highly developed nuclear force will never miss the target as they regard it as their primary mission to safeguard the supreme leadership. The U.S. will have to pay a high price for malignantly hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK, and Obama will come to understand the meaning of the price before he leaves the White House." (KCNA, "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts U.S. Official's Remarks Hurting Dignity of Supreme Command of DPRK," October 15, 2016)

10/16/17 President Park Geun-hye vowed that South Korea will not seek compromise with North Korea over issues of missile threats, adding that recent defections of North Koreans, including high-ranking officials, have also exposed the Kim Jong-un regime's tyranny. "Although its people are suffering from a flood and economic trouble, North Korea is threatening the peace and future of Koreans by concentrating on nuclear weapons and missiles," Park said in a video message at a sports event for those who fled from five North Korean provinces to the South. "We will not surrender to or compromise with them." Park also asked support from South Koreans to boost the government's effort to drive North Korea's change. "South Korea will make all-out efforts to end North Korea's provocations by cooperating closely with the international community and to achieve denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, as well as peaceful unification," she said. (Yonhap, "Park Says S. Korea Will Not Seek Compromise with N. Korea's Tyranny," *Korea Times*, October 16, 2016)

10/17/16 Security Council Statement: "The members of the Security Council strongly condemned the most recent failed ballistic missile launch conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 14 October 2016. This attempted launch is in grave violation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's international obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council deplore all Democratic People's Republic of Korea ballistic missile activities, including this failed launch, noting that such activities contribute to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension. The members of the Security Council further regretted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is diverting resources to the pursuit of ballistic missiles while Democratic People's Republic of Korea citizens have great unmet needs. The members of the Security Council expressed serious concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted this ballistic missile launch after the 15 April, 23 April, 27 April, 28 April, 31 May, 21 June, 9 July, 18 July, 2 August, 23 August, and 5 September launches, as well as the nuclear test of 9 September, in flagrant disregard of the repeated statements of the Security Council. The members of the Security Council reiterated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall refrain from further actions, including nuclear tests, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and comply fully with its obligations under these resolutions. The members of the Security Council called upon all Member States to redouble their efforts to implement fully the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

by the Security Council, particularly the comprehensive measures contained in resolution 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council directed the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to intensify its work to strengthen enforcement of resolution 2270 (2016) and assist Member States to comply with their obligations under that resolution and other relevant resolutions. The members of the Security Council also called on Member States to report as soon as possible on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of resolution 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large, expressed their commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomed efforts by Council members, as well as other States, to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue. The members of the Security Council stress the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. The members of the Security Council agreed that the Security Council would continue to closely monitor the situation and take further significant measures in line with the Council's previously expressed determination." (UN Spokesman, Security Council Press Statement on DPRK Failed Ballistic Missile Launch," October 17, 2016)

North Korea, angered by what it says are increasingly "aggressive" exercises in the South in conjunction with U.S. forces, said it will strike first with nuclear weapons if it feels threatened. North Korea also stated it will continue nuclear tests after its recent, 5th nuclear event and will continue ballistic missile testing. The North has launched over 20 ballistic missile shots in recent months as it strives to increase its ability to deliver payload on target. "The US has nuclear weapons off our coast, targeting our country, our capital and our dear leader, Kim Jong Un. We will not step back as long as there's a nuclear threat to us from the United States," said Lee Yong Pil, director of the Foreign Ministry's Institute for American Studies, reports NBC News. "If we see that the US would do it to us, we would do it first," Lee said. "We have the technology. We have to have nuclear weapons to protect our country, and it's our policy to go nuclear." Lee also stated North Korea has the ability to launch a missile that could hit the west coast of the United States. American intelligence doesn't believe this claim as of yet. Pyongyang also discussed sending satellites into orbit with its new missile launch capability, an ability the West does not believe it has. The regime also discussed space travel. "In the future, our goal is not just going to the moon, but to other planets," Ri Won Hyok, a senior official for North Korea's space program, told NBC News. (L. Todd Wood, "N. Korea Warns Use of Nukes on First Strike," *Washington Times*, October 17, 2016)

10/18/16

Can South Korea develop a nuclear-powered attack submarine to deter threats from North Korea's submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)? The government and the ruling Saenuri Party said that they have agreed to consider developing such a vessel during a meeting at the National Assembly. Rep. Kim Gwang-lim, chief policymaker of the ruling party, told reporters after the meeting that he strongly requested the government to build a nuclear-powered attack submarine as early as possible to counter the North's SLBM threat. "The party stressed that securing a nuclear sub is an urgent task to overcome the North's asymmetric capabilities and strengthen self-

defense," he said. "The government vowed to seriously consider the suggestion." However, critics have questioned the feasibility of the development, saying that the nation would face major hurdles, including disapproval from the United States, which virtually controls the uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing of South Korea. Calls for developing a nuclear attack sub surfaced after the North successfully launched an SLBM, August 24, which flew about 500 kilometers and landed within Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone in the East Sea. If an SLBM flies at least 300 kilometers during its test, the launch is considered successful, according to experts. Days after the launch, Rep. Chung Jin-suk, floor leader of the ruling party, publicly urged the military to consider getting nuclear attack submarines that can deal with the North's SLBMs, which he said are a more serious threat than land-based missiles, as their launch point is difficult to detect. A nuclear submarine can stay submerged and hidden under water for as long as it has supplies for its crew, making it harder to track than conventional diesel-electric ones that have to surface frequently and operate a diesel engine to recharge their batteries. Supporters of having nuclear attack subs say such vessels can be assigned to patrol around North Korean submarine bases without being detected and trail SLBM-armed subs heading out to sea. Moon Keun-sik, a submarine expert at the Korea Defense Security Forum, said, "If the technological aspect is considered only, the military would be able to develop and build a nuclear sub within two to three years." Another question is whether the United States would approve of Seoul's uranium enrichment in order to operate such a submarine. Some say that a revision of the Seoul-Washington nuclear cooperation deal signed last year would allow Seoul to enrich its uranium to a level of 20 percent when using U.S. ingredients, but critics point out that the agreement disallows uranium enrichment for military purposes. "The two countries have yet to review whether or not the revision would allow South Korea to secure uranium necessary for a nuclear submarine," a ministry official said. Critics added that Seoul's development of a nuclear attack sub could also prompt Japan to develop its own and pursue nuclear armament, and consequently, cause an arms race in Northeast Asia. "We should consider the balance of military might in the Northeast Asian region," the official said. (Jun Ji-hye, "Can S. Korea Get U.S. Approval for Nuclear Sub?" *Korea Times*, October 18, 2016)

The South Korean government and the ruling Saenuri Party agreed to move forward the implementation of three programs aimed at countering North Korea's nuclear threat. The three programs - the kill chain, the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and the Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) - were initially scheduled to be ready by the mid-2020s, but that has been pushed forward to the early 2020s. This plan was announced by Kim Gwang-lim, chair of the Saenuri Party's policy committee, during a discussion about strengthening defensive countermeasures for North Korea's nuclear program that took place in the National Assembly on Oct. 18 and was attended by Saenuri Party floor leader Chung Jin-suk and Defense Minister Han Min-koo, among others. The government and the Saenuri Party are planning to accelerate programs that have already been confirmed but which have been delayed because of budget shortfalls. Consequently, the government is planning to include the acquisition of two more early warning radars for ballistic missiles in next year's budget. It will also consider renting foreign satellites until a spy satellite can be deployed in 2021 or 2022. The South Korean government is also planning to purchase additional

Taurus long-range air-to-surface missiles and helicopters for maritime applications earlier than scheduled. "It will cost an additional 200 or 300 billion won [US\$178-267 billion] to move our defense upgrades forward by about one year," Kim Gwang-lim said. (Park Byong-su and Kim Jin-cheol, "South Korea Moves up Schedule for Three Programs to Counter N. Korean Nukes," *Hankyore*, October 19, 2016)

10/19/16

South Korea and the United States agreed to launch a high-level dialogue to discuss how to carry out the U.S. "extended deterrence" protection of the Asian ally from nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. The agreement to establish the "Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group" was reached in "two plus two" alliance talks that brought together South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se and Defense Minister Han Min-koo, and their U.S. counterparts, Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Ash Carter. It represented a firmer commitment from Washington to use nuclear weapons and all other military capabilities to defend the ally amid heightened security concerns in South Korea in the wake of the North's fifth nuclear test last month and a series ballistic missile launches. "I assured the minister of our commitment, the United States' commitment, to defend South Korea through a robust combined defense posture and through extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike and missile defense capabilities," Kerry said during a joint news conference with Yun after the talks. "Let me be clear. Any attack on the United States or its allies will be defeated and any use of nuclear weapons will be met with an effective and overwhelming response. To that end, I'm pleased that we agreed to establish a dialogue on extended deterrence," he said. Kerry said the vice-minister-level dialogue will comprise foreign and defense ministries of the two countries. "This step that we're taking on the extended deterrence is further evidence of our readiness, our resolve and our determination across governments to protect ourselves from threats from North Korea," he said. Kerry also said the U.S. will deploy the THAAD missile defense system to the South as early as possible. Yun said that the two countries will discuss details of extended deterrence when their defense ministers hold annual talks on Thursday. The meeting could include discussions on bringing in U.S. strategic assets to South Korea, such as nuclear-capable B-52 and B-1B bombers, F-22 stealth fighter jets and nuclear-powered, cruise-missile submarines. Kerry also held out the prospect of benefits North Korea can get from denuclearization, such as "sanctions relief, economic cooperation, energy and food aid, new peace arrangements, diplomatic normalization, actually nonaggression understanding." "Now, North Korea has it within its power to achieve the security, the development and the respect that its leader has claimed to want. But those can only be achieved through a discussion of denuclearization with respect to weapons," he said. Kerry said the U.S. is working to come up with additional U.N. sanctions on the North with a focus on closing the "livelihood loophole" in the last U.N. Security Council resolution, referring to the exception that allows Pyongyang to export coal for livelihood purposes. The U.S. will continue to pursue such pressure measures as they are "entirely preferable obviously to the military choice which we have again and again said is a last resort only as a matter of defensive measure to protect our nations," Kerry said. North Korea should also be a key focus of the next administration, he said. "I'm absolutely confident without any question whatsoever that whoever is president of the United States, they're going to have to be and will be very, very focused on this particular challenge, which is

one of the most serious that we face globally," he said. At the start of the talks, Carter also made strong remarks reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the South. "The U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea is unwavering. This includes our commitment to provide extended deterrence, guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S. defense capabilities. This include our commitment to provide extended deterrence guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S. defense capabilities," he said. "Make no mistake. Any attack on America or our allies will not only be defeated, but also any use of nuclear weapons will be met with an overwhelming and effective response," Carter said. A key focus of Thursday's defense ministers' talks, known as Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) will be whether the U.S. will agree to permanently deploy strategic assets in the South.(Chang Jae-soon, "S. Korea, U.S. Agree to Launch High-Level 'Extended Deterrence' Dialogue," Yonhap, October 20, 2016)

Kerry: "I assured the minister of our commitment, the United States' commitment, to defend South Korea through a robust combined defense posture and through extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike and missile defense capabilities. Let me be clear: Any attack on the United States or its allies will be defeated, and any use of nuclear weapons will be met with an effective and overwhelming response. To that end, I am pleased that we agreed to establish a dialogue on extended deterrence. That dialogue will be co-chaired by representatives from the four ministries that participated in today's 2+2 dialogue. And the dialogue that we began today on the defense side will continue this evening and tomorrow with our Defense Secretary and their defense minister. Now, this step that we are taking on the extended deterrence is further evidence of our readiness, our resolve, and our determination across governments to protect ourselves from threats from North Korea. If the North continues to violate international law by pursuing its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program, it will come under even stiffer sanctions, greater pressure, and be left further and further behind while the rest of the regions prospers. Now, it doesn't have to be that way. I want to emphasize that. That is not the sought-after policy of the United States or of the Republic of Korea. It's not our choice. Pyongyang can open the door to a range of possibilities: sanctions relief, economic cooperation, energy and food aid, new peace arrangements, a diplomatic normalization, actually a non-aggression understanding with respect to the peninsula, as well as peace on the peninsula itself. Now, North Korea has it within its power to achieve the security, the development, and the respect that its leaders claim to want, but those can only be achieved through a discussion of denuclearization with respect to weapons. A 5,000-year-old civilization country, a long history, Iran, decided to do exactly that, to move into a discussion after 30-plus years of not even talking with the United States of America. And yet, it was possible to create a compliance with the nonproliferation treaty, a compliance with the IAEA requirements, and to move away from the potential of nuclear weapons. There's obviously a distinction between a country that didn't have them and was moving towards it and a country that has already exploded nuclear devices, but the principle is the same. The concept of peaceful choices and of compliance with global norms and standards is the same. Almost every single country in the world, with the exception of North Korea, is moving to either remain a non-nuclear country, a peaceful country, or if they have weapons, to begin to reduce the number of weapons, which is exactly what Russia and the United States did in the

START Treaty and what we are prepared to do even further now. So we're moving in the opposite direction from North Korea, and our hope is that North Korea will make the choice that it has within its power to move in a different direction. ...And I just say to everybody, when any person of common sense makes a simple judgment about the comments of North Korea, the leader Kim Jong-un when he says, "Well, I have to do this to defend against the United States," no. Everybody knows that. The United States has had the power to wipe out North Korea for years - for years. And if indeed that was our goal, we wouldn't be sitting around waiting while they're getting additional nuclear weapons. Everything that we have done over the years speaks counter to that theory.

...Q. Yes, my name is Kim Jun-ge from JKVC. My question goes to Minister Yun first. When I read the joint statement today as was mentioned by you, you agreed to establish a high-level discussion group on extended deterrence. And this is my question: How is it different from another high-level consultation group that you already had in place and how frequently do you believe that this meeting will take place? Do you have a specific blueprint? And of course I know that it is meaningful to agree to establish this kind of mechanisms; however, regarding the threat of North Korea, if you look at the strategic assets of the U.S., I believe that some people are raising the need to deploy such a strategic assets closer to the Korean peninsula, and I believe that this could be discussed during the SCM meeting tomorrow. I wonder whether you have discussed this same issue during your 2+2 meeting today. And my next question goes to Secretary Kerry. Recently, the U.S. Government announced sanctions against Hongxiang Group of China because it had dealings with North Korea. I believe that a lot of people are raising the need for the so-called secondary boycott and I wonder what the U.S. Government position is on this matter. Are you willing to (inaudible) and introduce the secondary boycott immediately or are you willing to wait and see how the things go in the UN Security Council? Or do you believe that this secondary boycott is a matter that you need to address in a - in a longer-term perspective - from a longer-term perspective? **YUN:** (Via interpreter) Let me address the first question first. We agreed to establish a new 2+2 high-level group, and this new group is different from the three existing mechanism on the economy and North Korea and so forth. Between existing - between our two nations there was a vice-minister-level consultative body and there was another strategic committee, but the one that we are agreeing to establish is at a higher level. And so far, we have focused our consultations on diplomatic - on military matters, excuse me. But as we move forward with this new body, we are going to address more wider array of measures, including diplomatic measures and extended deterrence. And regarding the agenda of this new meeting, we will have to see how things go as our working-level staffs thrashes out the terms of reference. I believe that this will be a new strategic mechanism for both of our nations. And regarding the permanent deployment of the U.S. strategic assets close to the Korean peninsula, I understand that there will - matter will be taken up by the SCM participants tomorrow, so I will not touch upon that issue myself today. Thank you. **KERRY:** So you asked whether or not a secondary boycott would be a longer-term or something that we would do at this particular moment. Let me frame it a little differently. I would say it is not longer-term, but it is also not at this current moment what we are seeking. But it is not off the table as an option for the United States and our allies. We have indeed sanctioned a couple of individual entities that were very specifically engaged in the transfer of proliferation items or facilitating



proliferation itself by virtue of the role that they played in the finance regarding North Korea's program. And we will continue to look very, very carefully at who is doing what and to hold people accountable. But at this point, I would not call it a secondary boycott. I would call it a selective approach while we hope that people will make wiser choices and there will be a greater level of enforcement. But we're serious about this, and we need everybody to be serious about this. And we need to recognize that thus far, the level of pressure has not been sufficient to change the calculation, and therefore we have to increase it. Remember that even with Iran it took a period of time to build the capacities, and it may be that we have to undertake the same kind of effort here, which would become much broader. And we'll see where we go over the course - our first choice is to have a full measure of cooperation. And frankly, our first choice would be also to have a serious conversation at a negotiating table that makes the region safer and actually allows for North Korea to meet the needs of its people, which is not happening today." (DoS, Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks with ROK Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se at Press Availability, Treaty Room, Washington, October 19, 2016)

FM Yun: "JCS Commander General Dunford recently assessed that North Korea is becoming a direct threat to the mainland U.S. My president also likened the threat to a dagger at our throat. These assessments demonstrate that Korea and the U.S. are seeing eye to eye when it comes to the threat posed by the North. ...The Park Geun-Hye and Obama administrations are taking concrete and effective measures based on their defense commitments, which are more robust than ever. Allow me to stress the following four points in this regard. First, we must update our comprehensive response strategy to deter the threat of North Korea. Like the two blades of scissors, diplomatic pressure and military deterrence must be in full sync. All tools in our toolkit, including the ones from the so-called DIME - that is diplomatic pressures, information, military measures, and economic sanctions - must be fully mobilized to this end. Second, we must **concretize and institutionalize extended deterrence** so as to effectively forestall the threats that are now becoming a fact of life, and heighten the public's sense of security. The ROK-U.S. alliance's deterrence strategy has evolved from the nuclear umbrella doctrine in 1978 to extended deterrence of today. I hope that we will focus on fleshing out extended deterrence and devising relevant institutional support during this meeting, as is discussed by our leaders in early September. What's most important, continuously - **what is most important is to continuously demonstrate our capabilities and means for invaluable deterrence with our commitments and actions so that Pyongyang can feel the panic under their skins.** Third, **we must take a holistic approach that goes beyond deterrence in order to induce a genuine change in North Korea.** As North Korea's nuclear issue is part of a larger North Korean problem, we need to apply pressure most intensively in areas of direct impact, such as by addressing its human rights abuses, including (inaudible) slave labor, as well as sending information into the North. I look forward to concrete discussions on this front. Finally, I would like to address our alliance and this 2+2 meeting in terms of the roles and spectrum of cooperation. While faithfully carrying out our pressing tasks, such as countering North Korea's nuclear threats and defending the peninsula, our two countries must continue to expand and deepen their cooperation to live up to the name of our mutually beneficial comprehensive strategic alliance. To

this end, we need to continue to develop the 2+2 meeting as a platform for our cooperation and deliberation that are gaining greater significance. I hope that the achievements of the alliance we have obtained together during the past two - past three and a half years will be continuously brought to new heights under your new administration. Without a doubt, we will serve as a vital stepping stone towards this end - this meeting is. (DoS, ROK Foreign Minister Yun, Remarks at the U.S.-ROK 2+2 Ministerial Meeting, Washington, October 19, 2016)

South Korea and the United States agreed to make joint efforts to hold North Korean leader Kim Jong-un accountable for human rights abuses. The agreement was reached during high-level talks in Washington, D.C. among Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se and Defense Minister Han Min-koo and their U.S. counterparts John Kerry and Ash Carter. "The secretaries and the ministers noted the diversion of North Korea's resources to nuclear and missile development was further aggravating the hardship of the people suffering under Kim Jong-un and his regime," a joint statement, released after the meeting said. "They decided to work further on issues such as holding the leadership in North Korea accountable." According to the statement, such efforts include the promotion of international discussions on the issue; ensuring accountability, including against the highest leadership in Pyongyang; and increasing information access for the North Korean people. (Kang Seung-woo, "Allies to Push for Human Rights Trial for N. Korean Leader," *Korea Times*, October 20, 2016)

The United States, Japan and South Korea will practice detecting and stopping ships carrying weapons of mass destruction during a sea exercise this weekend. The trilateral exercise comes in light of North Korea's continued work on its nuclear weapons and missile program, South Korean defense officials told reporters in Seoul on Thursday. The maritime interdiction operation will be held Saturday and Sunday in international waters south of South Korea's Jeju Island, Yonhap News reported. The sea services also will conduct search and rescue exercises aimed at rescuing personnel on disabled ships, the report said. The Navy is sending the Yokosuka-based destroyer USS McCampbell, the replenishment oiler USNS Tippecanoe, a patrol aircraft and a helicopter, according to Yonhap. Japan is sending the destroyer Ariake and multiple helicopters, while the destroyer Yulgok YiYi will represent South Korea, according to the report. (Erik Slavin, "Navy to Join Japan, S. Korea in Drill Aimed at N. Korea Weapons Shipping," *Stars and Stripes*, October 20, 2016)

10/20/16

North Korea test-fired a missile that failed immediately after launch early on Thursday, the U.S. and South Korean militaries said, hours after the two countries agreed to step up efforts to counter the North's nuclear and missile threats. The missile was believed to be an intermediate-range Musudan and was launched from the western city of Kusong, where the isolated state attempted but failed to launch the same type of missile on October 15, the U.S. Strategic Command and South Korea's Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. The launch came shortly after the United States and South Korea agreed in Washington to bolster military and diplomatic efforts to counter the North's nuclear and missile programs, which it is pursuing in defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions. "We strongly condemn the North's continued illegal acts of provocation," the South's Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement. Japan condemned

the launch and said it would make a formal protest to the North through its embassy in Beijing. The failed missile launch was the eighth attempt in seven months by the North to launch a weapon with a design range of 3,000 km (1,800 miles) that can be fired from road mobile launchers, the two militaries said. North Korea has been pursuing its nuclear and missile programs at an unprecedented pace this year. In June, North Korea launched a Musudan missile that flew about 400 km (250 miles), more than half the distance to Japan, a flight that was considered a success by officials and experts in South Korea and the United States. North Korea said on Thursday that it would continue to launch satellites despite its rival South's objections, in a statement by its space agency carried by official media. News of the North's latest ballistic missile launch broke during the third and last U.S. presidential debate in which Republican candidate Donald Trump and his Democratic rival, Hillary Clinton, exchanged sharply contrasting views on U.S. alliances. Trump said U.S. defense treaties around the world, including with South Korea, had to be renegotiated because "we're being ripped off by everybody in the world". Clinton said Trump wanted to tear up alliances that keep nuclear proliferation in check while she believed alliances make the world and the United States safer. "I will work with our allies in Asia, in Europe, in the Middle East and elsewhere," Clinton said. (Ju-Min Park and Eric Walsh, "Another North Korea Missile Fails after Launch: U.S., S. Korea," Reuters, October 20, 2016)

DPRK National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) spokesman's statement "in connection with the fact that the Park Geun Hye group of traitors are viciously pulling up the DPRK over its satellite launch and its right to use space for peaceful purposes even in the international arena. At the recent meeting of the 4th Committee of the 71st UN General Assembly the DPRK delegate clarified the consistent principle and stand of the DPRK on the legitimate satellite launch and the right to use space for peaceful purposes, commanding strong sympathy and support of the attendants. The south Korean puppet delegate who was watching for an opportunity to find fault with the DPRK doggedly earned the right to speak as soon as the DPRK delegate's speech was over and uttered that "the international community is striving for the use of space for peaceful purposes but the north is an exception" and "the north is continuously violating the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council." He went the lengths of asserting that "any attempt of the north to justify banned activities by citing the right to use space for peaceful purposes is illegal." As the DPRK delegate refuted his remarks with reasonable logic and by citing relevant law, he said that "it is clear that the true aim sought by the north in launching satellite is not for peaceful purposes" and that "it is necessary to seriously examine the issue of the north's qualifications as a member nation of the UN." The spokesman ridiculed the recent act of the south Korean puppet group as a hysteric fit of those taken aback by the invincible spirit and might of the DPRK making a long drive undeterred by all sorts of challenges and obstructions of the hostile forces. The recent strange attitude of the puppet delegate at the UN General Assembly was pursuant to the Park Geun Hye group's sinister intention to brand the DPRK's exercise of its independent right as "provocation" and incite an international atmosphere for putting sanctions and pressure on it. Traitor Park who even let her stooges kick up a gangster-like confrontation racket in the international arena, is a shame on the nation. ...The groundless outpourings let out by the puppet group about the DPRK's satellite launch

only clearly disclose the despicable true nature of itself as a group of idiots unable to distinguish satellite from long-range ballistic missiles, ignorant imbecile devoid of elementary discerning ability and a group of traitors keen on the confrontation with the fellow countrymen in the north. Dogs bark but caravan moves on. No matter how desperately the puppet group may work to prolong their remaining days while clinging to the coattail of their American master, **the DPRK will launch more Juche satellites and step up the dynamic advance for conquering vast space under the five-year plan for the state space development.** The Park group should clearly know that the more desperately they may try to block the DPRK's peaceful space development, the bitterer international shame they will only face and the further they will precipitate their miserable end." (KCNA, "DPRK's Juche Satellites Will Continue to Soar Despite Park Guen Hye Group's Obstructions: NADA Spokesman," October 20, 2016)

Toloraya: "Kim Jong Un has outmaneuvered the international sanctions regime with his "*byungjin*" policy of simultaneous nuclear and economic development, and the world must now find a strategy to curtail the country's nuclear program. The North Korean nuclear dilemma has evolved far beyond the issue that sanctions originally sought to counter. While Pyongyang has achieved unprecedented nuclear and missile advances during US President Barack Obama's administration, the basis for that leap forward was established during Kim Jong Il's rule. The former leader was far more moderate and inclined toward compromise than his son; he preferred not to provoke his opponents with excessive nuclear and missile demonstrations and only presided over two nuclear tests and a handful of missile tests—quantities inadequate for the deployment of operational weapons. Kim Jong Il appeared to restrain the North's nuclear development in hopes that diplomacy would finally work, and reasonable members of the US establishment would overrule US and South Korean conservatives with a strategic decision to recognize and coexist with North Korea. That decision never came during Kim Jong Il's lifetime, and the less patient Kim Jong Un seems to have adopted none of his father's limits on pressuring the United States and South Korea. Still, the Obama administration did not initially anticipate the level of progress Pyongyang has achieved under its guiding principle of "strategic patience," which relies on the false assumption that the regime is nearing collapse. In line with this thinking, Washington has answered North Korea's nuclear and missile tests by trying to increase the North's economic and political isolation. But despite a decade of sanctions and related international steps, North Korea has succeeded in acquiring a significant new nuclear potential while still achieving modest economic growth. Rather than prompting calls for a new method to deal with the North's nuclear program, experts are now rationalizing that the restrictions were never tough enough. In the absence of alternate approaches, the failure of sanctions to stop North Korea's nuclear and missile development has dire implications. The prospect of US territory becoming vulnerable to North Korean attack is uncomfortable for Washington, and in the wake of the North's fifth nuclear test, US policymakers see an urgent need to act. Meanwhile, other countries fear that a continued unchecked increase in Pyongyang's nuclear and missile capabilities will trigger countermeasures, such as the recently announced plan to deploy the US-built Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. Such developments—particularly those that increase US military capabilities in

the region—will prompt military reactions by China and Russia, initiating a spiraling arms race in Northeast Asia that could spread globally. After this year's flurry of nuclear and missile tests, the United States continues to apply the old logic of sanctions to a new, totally different situation. What Washington and Seoul want to see from the international community are stronger and more far-reaching sanctions, including a ban on Air Koryo flights, a measure to bar ships that have visited North Korean ports from docking in other countries, the closure of loopholes on mineral shipments across DPRK borders, a ban on textile and sea products exports, a crackdown on cash flows (including those for the North's international workforce) and denial of access to the international banking infrastructure. Could more severe sanctions change the situation qualitatively? It would be naïve at best to believe that simply "punishing" the leadership in Pyongyang further will prompt Kim Jong Un to denounce nuclear weapons. Similarly, it would be ridiculous to expect that some new daily inconveniences could push the elite to give up a nuclear deterrent they now see as their only guarantor of security, as well as their nation's major source of pride and basis of power. If sanctions cannot persuade the regime to change its behavior, can they limit North Korea's access to crucial technologies, materials and sources of income? While life for North Korean traders is now harder as a result of sanctions, the actual effect of the measures is limited: numerous loopholes cannot be closed, and the nature of global business means that new ones appear constantly. This situation cannot be remedied, except perhaps by surrounding North Korea with an iron wall and suspending all cross-border traffic. Even then, this would not eliminate the nuclear and missile capabilities North Korea has already developed. Alternately, could the sanctions aim to make life for North Koreans so hard that they are spurred to rebel against their leaders and overthrow the regime? Cynical as it is, such an effort would have a slim chance of succeeding in a different country—but not in North Korea. Believing this could work disregards the dynamics and laws of totalitarian societies, much less the extreme case of the North. With such a highly stratified social structure, the upper classes would rather let a large part of the population perish (as what happened in the 1990s) than permit actions that could foment an uprising. The policy of strategic patience is thus a dangerous delusion. It gives the semblance of action, while North Korea continues to grow its nuclear and missile programs. Despite all the mockery, North Korea's *byungjin* policy seems to have proven more effective than foreign critics expected. This is evidenced by empirical data I have collected during recent visits to North Korea. Estimates put North Korea's per capita GNP over \$1,000 for the first time since the 1980s. Likewise, the average middle-class standard of living, at least in Pyongyang, is incomparably higher than in the 1980s, and rural areas are also faring better as well. The energy supply is comparatively normal (even in the countryside, where new technologies like solar cells have been widely adopted). Food, at least in Pyongyang, is plentiful and diverse, and a growing part of it is produced within the country. Business is brisk (both in the markets and throughout the economy in general), the national currency is stable and construction is booming. Social and territorial differentiation has become much more pronounced, but this is a usual price of development. **What are the sources of this growth? One explanation might be that less is now spent on the conventional military sector, while nuclear development at this stage is cheaper—it may only cost 2 to 3 percent of GNP,** according to some estimates. Theoretically, *byungjin* is more "economy friendly" than

the previous “*songun*” or military-first policy which supposedly concentrated resources on the military. At the same time, Kim Jong Un appears to tolerate an amount of private entrepreneurship, an approach his father would have frowned upon and his grandfather would have opposed even more. Internal reasons for the North’s economic growth include an increase in agricultural production and in general business activity, developments resulting from a more lenient market-oriented economic policy and government investment in the demand-oriented industrial production sector. Some facilities use investment from abroad—mostly China. These activities reflect a change in both the structure of the economy—which is becoming more market-oriented—and in its technological level, further boosting economic growth. External sources of income have also not suffered much. In fact, exports are actually growing, largely thanks to China. After temporarily abiding by recently-imposed UN sanctions, China appears to have returned to “business as usual” by exploiting the UN resolution’s “humanitarian clause,” resulting in benefits to North Korean manufacturing. North Korea and China have developed a mutually beneficial arrangement, with North Korea serving as both a supplier of raw materials and a market for Chinese goods. Given China’s concern over the deployment of THAAD, Beijing is unlikely to push forward on sanctions implementation that would undermine such a division of labor. North Korea also seems to have created new business channels, maybe through offshore firms and other business techniques that enable it to procure products from Japan and elsewhere. Through my conversations in Pyongyang, I got the impression that the economic planners are seeking a new paradigm of development. This approach does not appear to be based on restoring its outdated heavy industrial potential, but rather on “jumping over” the re-industrialization phase to a more knowledge-based economy. This concept demands educational capabilities that North Korean engineers have already demonstrated with the country’s indigenous nuclear and missile achievements. “Construction of a powerful civilized state” with an emphasis on science and technology now seems to be the focus of all government policies. In light of *byungjin*’s success, international policymakers would be unwise to base plans on presumptions of the North Korean regime’s imminent collapse. Sanctions and isolation alone won’t be enough to solve the North Korean nuclear problem. My high-level counterparts in Pyongyang openly told me that they are not particularly interested in taking a first step, and that US will have to do it. In other words, the North Koreans are exercising a “strategic patience” of their own. What does this mean for a new US administration? Washington is free to recognize the failure of former policies, but it cannot look to war as a viable alternative. It must instead devise a strategy aimed at finding a new balance of interests and reconciling desirable outcomes with what is possible. A restart of the diplomatic process—ideally in a multilateral format that would enable all interested actors to benefit—could at least bring about a freeze on further North Korean nuclear and missile development. Little hope is left for North Korean capitulation, and a new search for compromise should start—the sooner, the better.” ((Georgy Toloraya, “Byunjin vs. the Sanctions Regime: Which Works Better?” *38North*, October 20, 2016)

10/21/16

Seoul and Washington failed to reach a consensus over the permanent stationing of US strategic assets on the peninsula, amid skepticism due to US financial and operational constraints, saying further discussions are needed. But after the annual

Security Consultative Meeting with US Defense Secretary Ash Carter in Washington, South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo indicated the allies may take additional military steps other than the dispatch of a nuclear bomber and advanced warship here to better counter North Korea's growing threats. "We will look into such measures going forward including the standing deployment of US strategic assets ... to improve the implementation of the US' extended deterrence," Han said at a joint news conference.

The idea of a lasting stay of US strategic assets was floated in the wake of North Korea's fourth and fifth atomic experiments this year as many lawmakers and experts here call for measures beyond a one-off dispatch of warplanes and other weapons upon major provocations from across the border. Ahead of the SCM, the two countries' defense agencies had reportedly been looking into whether the B-1B nuclear bomber and Aegis-equipped destroyer could be sent. But skepticism persists given the potential impact on their operational plans and the costly maintenance prices at a time when the US grapples with budget constraints. The issue will continue to be dealt with through the newly created body and other channels, Yun said. "There will be discussions over how to operate the group in detail, which I think would accelerate given the grave situation on the peninsula," the minister told reporters upon his return from Washington. "We will explore various measures to advance the enforcement of the extended deterrence including the constant circulative stationing of US strategic assets." (Shin Hyon-hee, "Allies Fail to Reach Agreement over U.S. Strategic Assets' Deployment," *Korea Herald*, October 21, 2016)

Secretary of State John Kerry has described North Korea as an "illegal and illegitimate regime" in a possible indication that the U.S. government is taking a harder line on the communist nation. He made the remark at the start of talks with Kuwait's Foreign Minister Sabah Al-Khalid Al-Sabah, praising the Middle Eastern nation for its efforts to help curb North Korea's weapons proliferation. "I want to thank the Amir and his government for their efforts to help counter the proliferation of the DPRK, of North Korea. They have recently taken steps to curb flights and to make sure that revenues from workers are not sustaining an illegal and illegitimate regime in North Korea," he said, according to a State Department transcript. Kerry appears to be referring to Kuwait's reported suspension earlier this year of the North's Air Koryo flights, as well as measures to ensure that wages of North Korean workers are not diverted to the country's nuclear and missile programs. "We have also been very, very open about the fact that North Korea's export of labor generates significant revenue for the government and it enables, in fact, the development of those very programs," State Department spokesman John Kirby said at a regular briefing later in the day. "We have raised our concerns, and we'll continue to do so with governments about the use of laborers -- workers from North Korea in their countries. And that's what he's referring to." (Yonhap, "Kerry Calls N. Korea 'Illegal and Illegitimate Regime,'" October 23, 2016)

10/21-22/16 North Korean top-ranking officials held two-day unofficial talks with former U.S. officials in Malaysia, raising questions over the nature of the meeting and possibility of further dialogue between the two countries. North Korean foreign vice minister, Han Song-ryol, who previously served as deputy ambassador to the United Nations, was among the five North Korean officials involved in the meeting with four U.S. former officials.

Jang Il-hun, Pyongyang's current deputy ambassador to the United Nations, also took part. Among the participants, who gathered at a hotel in Kuala Lumpur, was Robert Gallucci, who was part of a U.S. negotiation team in 1994 that reached a landmark deal with Pyongyang on freezing its nuclear weapons program in return for economic incentives. Joseph DeTrani, a former U.S. deputy envoy for the long-stalled six party talks aimed at dissuading the North from its nuclear weapons program, and Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council, were also there. While details of the two-day meeting remain unknown, Sigal told reporters there that the North Korean team demanded the two sides begin talks for a "peace treaty" that would establish diplomatic relations between the two. Sigal told reporters that the talks "gives us a chance to explore things that you know go beyond what the government is saying right now to see if we can find a way back to negotiations." (Kang Jin-kyu, "North Korea and U.S. Officials Hold Two-Day Meeting," *JoongAng Ilbo*, October 24, 2016) The United States on October 23 dismissed recent talks between North Korean diplomats and former U.S. government officials as a private "Track 2" meeting taking place without the involvement of the U.S. government. The rare meetings drew intense media attention as they could signal Pyongyang's willingness to reopen negotiations with the United States amid heightened tensions in the wake of its fifth nuclear test and a series of missile launches. But the U.S. government dismissed the talks as an unofficial "Track 2" contact. "We have seen the reporting on Track 2 meetings. Track 2 meetings are routinely held on a variety of topics around the world and occur independent of U.S. government involvement," State Department spokeswoman Anna Richey-Allen said. (Yonhap, "U.S. Gov't Dismisses Rare Talks with N. Koreans as 'Track 2' Meeting," *Korea Times*, October 23, 2016) A South Korean official who spoke to Seoul Daily said the United States is taking a cautious approach, because "hasty dialogue only legitimizes North Korea's bad behavior," but Nam Sung-wook, a professor of North Korean studies at Korea University, said Seoul probably does not want to officially acknowledge the significance of the talks with North Korea because of its "alignment to sanctions policy." For North Korea, the informal talks are a way to feel out the next U.S. administration's policies, and to raise the stakes on a less flexible U.S.-South Korea position on Pyongyang's nuclear deterrent, Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* reported. Sigal said there was some progress during the dialogue and added it is unlikely anything will happen until the end of President Barack Obama's term in office, *Dong-A Ilbo* reported. Sigal also said the new administration should look into revising current North Korea policy in January. Han said he stated North Korea's position: the restart of a peace process, culminating in a peace treaty, before any discussion of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons or missile programs, according to *Donga Ilbo*. (Elizabeth Shim, "U.S., North Korea Diplomats Meet in Malaysia for Informal Talks," UPI, October 24, 2016) "The U.S. says that the latest consultation is a 'track 2' meeting that doesn't have anything to do with its government," a ministry official said, adding that the U.S. attendees who used to be involved in Washington's North Korea affairs decades ago have no bearing on its current policy. "With the principle that the North's denuclearization is the top priority, the U.S. government remains firm on its position that mentioning dialogue in a hasty manner without signs of the North's willingness to give up its nuclear weapons could only end up justifying its wrong behavior," he added. The official said it is unusual by international standards that the North sent its



government officials to such informal consultations, which he believes demonstrates how desperate it has become to come out of its diplomatic isolation. He noted that South Korea and the U.S. will make Pyongyang feel the pinch from the isolation from the world. "South Korea and the U.S. will keep working closely with the international community to apply strong sanctions and pressure on the North," he said. (Yonhap, "U.S. Remains Firm on N.K. Nukes, Dismisses Speculation on Talks with Pyongyang: Official," October 23, 2016)

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There is also no precedent for a South Korean president simultaneously mentioning "rapid change" in North Korea and urging North Koreans to "come to the South." Park's recent comments appear to reflect a disturbing combination of the ideas that the North Korean regime will collapse and that unification will occur through the sudden absorption of the North into South Korea. This is a violation of Article 66, Paragraph 3, of the South Korean Constitution, which obligates the president "to pursue sincerely the peaceful unification of the homeland." Most importantly, Park's assessment that defections have rapidly increased is not factual. According to the latest statistics from the Unification Ministry, 894 North Koreans have entered the South between January and August of this year. This is certainly not comparable to 2009, when the number of defectors peaked at 2,914, and it is even less than 2013, the first year of Park's presidency, when there were 1,514 defectors. This is evidence that Park's attitude toward North Korea is based not on the facts but rather derives from her attachment to the idea of regime collapse. There is nothing new in that. Park frequently revealed this attitude even before North Korea's fourth nuclear test on January 6. She compared unification to a "jackpot" during her New Year's press conference on January 6, 2014, and she instructed the government to "be fully prepared" since "unification might happen even in the next year" during a meeting of the Unification Preparatory Committee on July 10, 2015. After the North's fourth nuclear test, Park shifted her focus from vague expectations to aggressive action. One characteristic remark was when she said "the government and I will certainly change the North Korean regime" during an address to the National Assembly on February 16. Park has also shown that she regards dialogue and negotiations as improper. She said that "engaging in dialogue right now only buys time for North Korea" during a meeting between representatives from the ruling and opposition parties at the Blue House on Sep. 12 and that "clinging to dialogue endangers the public" during a cabinet meeting on Oct. 11. This too is a violation of Park's constitutional obligation to "pursue sincerely the peaceful unification of the homeland." The idea of a North Korean regime collapse had been broached in some segments of South Korean society even prior to this while regimes in the socialist world were toppled one after the other during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, but the idea did not gain widespread credence. This was because the administration of former president Roh Tae-woo adopted the basic inter-Korean agreement after a long period of negotiations with North Korea. According to this agreement, Seoul and Pyongyang promised to recognize and respect each other's governments (Article 1), not to meddle in each other's internal affairs (Article 2), not to criticize or slander each other (Article 3) and not to attempt to bring down or overthrow each other's regimes (Article 4). This was the path not to regime collapse but to coexistence. During the five years of the Roh Tae-woo administration, there were 164 meetings between officials from North and South Korea, which was more

than any other regime save the Roh Moo-hyun administration (which had 169 meetings). In other words, not all conservative administrations in South Korea have been obsessed with the idea of regime collapse. The second collapse argument also emerged on the occasion of a death - just after the passing of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011. Numerous predictions raged at the time. The Lee Myung-bak administration had already been fanning collapse predictions since before Kim's death. At a talk with local Koreans in Malaysia in December 2010, Lee pronounced that "unification is drawing nigh." It was a year when inter-Korean relations had been driven to the edge with the ROKS Cheonan sinking on March 26, the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, and the Lee administration's May 24 Measures, sanctions cut off most forms of inter-Korean exchange. Yet North Korea didn't drop off the map. According to the Bank of Korea, its economy has not experienced negative growth even once since 2011. The Chinese customs service noted that trade between North Korea and China rose 162% in 2011 from the year before, when the May 24 measures were imposed. It was a so-called "balloon effect." Yet Lee continued to hold on to his illusions about Pyongyang's imminent collapse, declaring at an invitational reception for National Unification Advisory Council overseas advisory committee members on September 25, 2012, that unification would "come like a thief in the night." It was in the fall of 2013, the first year of Park's presidency, that the third collapse scenario struck South Korea. The fuel for it was the execution of second-in-command Jang Song-thaek - Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law and Kim Jong-un's uncle - on December 12 of that year. At a year-end National Intelligence Service event on December 21, then-director Nam Jae-joon predicted that "the homeland will be unified under a liberal Republic of Korea regime by 2015." In her New Year's press conference the following January 6, Park trotted out her "unification as jackpot" scenario. It is worth noting how aggressive Park's collapse predictions have become over the course of the North's fourth and fifth nuclear tests, the latest on September 9. They could be the result of both frustration with the lack of viable policy means of controlling and stabilizing the situation and a strategic determination to distract the public's attention from the administration's policy failures. (Lee Je-hun, "Come to the Friendly South? Pres. Park's Fixation on North Korean Collapse," *Hankyore*, October 23, 2016)

10/25/16

The U.S. policy of trying to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons "is probably a lost cause" and the best that could be hoped for is a cap on the country's nuclear capability, the Director of U.S. National Intelligence James Clapper said. However, underscoring conflicting views in the Obama administration, the State Department said U.S. policy was unchanged and continued to be to seek the "verifiable denuclearization" of the Korean peninsula. Clapper made clear at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations think tank in New York he did not think that the policy the administration has stuck to, in spite of repeated North Korean nuclear tests, was realistic. "I think the notion of getting the North Koreans to denuclearize is probably a lost cause," Clapper said at the Council on Foreign Relations think tank in New York. "They are not going to do that - that is their ticket to survival." Clapper was asked if he thought North Korea could mount a nuclear warhead on a missile that could reach the West Coast of the United States and reiterated the intelligence assessment that this had to be a "worst-case assumption." He said North Korea had yet

to test its KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile, so neither North Korea nor the United States knew whether it worked. "Nevertheless, we ascribe to them the capability to launch a missile that would have a weapon on it to reach parts of the United States, certainly including Alaska and Hawaii," he said. "They could do it. We have to make the worst-case assumption here." Clapper said he got a good taste of how the world looks from North Korea's viewpoint when he went to Pyongyang on a mission in 2014 to secure the release of two Americans. "They are under siege and they are very paranoid, so the notion of giving up their nuclear capability, whatever it is, is a non-starter with them," he said. "The best we could probably hope for is some sort of a cap, but they are not going to do that just because we ask them. There's going to have to be some significant inducements." State Department spokesman John Kirby said he had not seen Clapper's remarks but told a regular news briefing in Washington that the administration did not believe denuclearization was a lost cause. "No, nothing's changed ... that's not our position. Our policy objective is to seek to obtain a verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. That is the policy; that is both the goal and what we want to see and there is a way to do that." Clapper also said it bothered him that the United States was not capitalizing on using information as a weapon against North Korea. "That's something they worry about a lot ... That is a great vulnerability I don't think we have exploited. Right now, we are kind of stuck on our narrative and they are kind of stuck on theirs." (David Brunnstrom, "Getting North Korea to Give up Nuclear Bomb Probably 'Lost Cause': U.S. Spy Chief," Reuters, October 26, 2016) If North Korea has been a foreign policy headache for Barack Obama's presidency, it threatens to be a migraine for his successor. The next president will likely contend with an adversary able to strike the continental U.S. with a nuclear weapon. Whoever wins the White House is expected to conduct a review of North Korea policy. It's too early to predict what that portends, but the North will grab more attention of the next president than it did for Obama, who adopted strategic patience: ramping up sanctions in a so-far fruitless effort to force the North to negotiate on denuclearization. With surprising candor this week, National Intelligence director James Clapper said that persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons is probably a "lost cause." That appeared to challenge to a key tenet of U.S. policy shared by U.S. allies and adversaries alike that agree on the goal of the denuclearization of the divided Korean Peninsula, however distant it may be. But Clapper was also channeling what many experts are thinking. Leader Kim Jong Un appears to see nuclear weapons as a guarantee of his own survival. Six-nation aid-for-disarmament talks have not convened since Obama took office in 2009, during which time the North's capabilities have leapt ahead. "Without a shift in U.S. strategy toward North Korea, the next U.S. president will likely be sitting in the Oval Office when the regime finally acquires the ability to strike the continental United States with a nuclear weapon," said a recent Council on Foreign Relations report. Clapper said the best hope for the U.S. is probably to negotiate a cap on the North's nuclear capabilities. But that implies recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, which the U.S. has said it will not do. "The dilemma for policymakers in dealing with North Korea is that if one accepts that the door to negotiation of denuclearization with North Korea is closed, the alternative set of options involves either acquiescence to a nuclear North Korea on the one hand or pressure leading to regime change on the other," said Scott Snyder, senior fellow for Korea studies at the council. U.S. experts who held unofficial talks with North Korean

officials in Malaysia last week maintain that negotiations on denuclearization are still possible. "I think the best course would be to test the proposition by some serious engagement in which we see whether their (North Korea's) legitimate security concerns can be met," said Robert Gallucci, who negotiated a 1994 disarmament agreement that curbed North Korea's nuclear program for nearly 10 years. He added that the concerns of neighboring South Korea and Japan - they face the most immediate threat from Pyongyang - would also have to be met. "We don't know for sure that negotiations will work, but what I can say with some confidence is that pressure without negotiations won't work, which is the track we are on right now," said another participant, Leon Sigal from the New York-based Social Science Research Council. But there is a deep, bipartisan skepticism in Washington about talks with Pyongyang, which has recanted on past accords and says it will never give up its nuclear weapons. Still, North Korea has not entirely closed the door to talks. A July government statement suggested it remained open to discussions on denuclearization of the peninsula. The U.S., however, slapped sanctions on Kim the same day for human rights abuses. The North said that was tantamount to declaring war. (Matthew Pennington, "Lost Cause? North Korea Nuke Threat Awaits Next President," Associated Press, October 28, 2016)

Clapper: "ROSE: Let me turn to North Korea. Can you tell us how—what's the status of their ability to put a nuclear warhead on a missile that can reach the West Coast of the United States? CLAPPER: Well, we've actually assessed that capability. We, in a situation like that, always have to worst-case. But, frankly, in a case of their intercontinental ballistic missile, the KN-08 specifically, neither they nor we know whether that missile will actually worked—works since it's never been tested. But nevertheless, we ascribe them—to them the capability to launch a missile that would have a weapon on it that potentially could reach parts of the United States, certainly including Alaska and Hawaii.... I will say again: Neither they nor we know whether these—their missile systems will work, but we have to make the worst-case assumption here. ROSE: OK. What if it worked? What are our options? Sanctions? Sabotage? Or just trust them? CLAPPER: Well, if they actually launched the missile? ROSE: No, we know they have that capability. We're assured. So it's not just a worst-case scenario, but it's a scenario that's possible and likely. What are our options? What's our strategy? CLAPPER: Well, I—that's a policy question. ROSE: I know. CLAPPER: I don't do policy. (Laughter.) ROSE: Yeah, I know. But you have opinions. CLAPPER: I'm just down in the engine room shoveling coal, and the people on the bridge— ROSE: So when the president says what do you think we should do, what's your strategy, you say that's opinions, I don't have opinions. CLAPPER: Well, I mean, I think there are a number of options. Obviously, military is one of them. Sanctions—although we're kind of running out of gas on sanctions since we've imposed most of them that we can. A key player with respect to sanctions is of course China. And so if a military option were to be exercised, then obviously we would play very heavily in that process. But that's not a decision, fortunately, that the intelligence community makes. .... Q: I'm Lee Sigal. I do work on North Korea. You talked about the assessment of threat in North Korea. I'm curious if the community has ever been asked to assess what negotiations can do to suspend North Korean nuclear programs. If not, why not? And if so, if you could share with us any of that assessment. CLAPPER: Well, I had my own brief foray into diplomacy

with the North Koreans in November 2014, and it just proved to me I made the right decision not to try to be a diplomat. (Laughter.) ...I would say, in answer to your question, I think the notion of getting the North Koreans to denuclearize is probably a lost cause. They are not going to do that. That is their ticket to survival. And I got a good taste of that when I was there about how the world looks from their vantage. And they are under siege and they are very paranoid. So the notion of giving up their nuclear capability, whatever it is, is a nonstarter with them. I do think— Q: Suspending the program. ...CLAPPER: Well, the best we could probably hope for is some sort of a cap. But they're not going to do that just because we ask them. (Laughter.) There's going to have to be some significant inducements. What does bother me a bit is that we don't capitalize on our great weapon, which is information. And that's something they worry about a lot. And their reaction to the loudspeakers being activated along the DMZ or the dropping of leaflets by NGOs over North Korea, and they go nuts when that happens. And so that is a great vulnerability that I don't think we have exploited. But right now we're kind of stuck on our narrative, and they're kind of stuck on theirs. ROSE: So an Iranian kind of negotiation that would put a cap or suspend is not—your experience in diplomacy is that it's not likely to happen. CLAPPER: I don't think so. ROSE: And what about a kind of Stuxnet sabotage? Kind of sabotage of their facilities? CLAPPER: Well, I'm not going to go into that. (Laughter.) (Council on Foreign Relations, Conversation with James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Presider: Charlie Rose, October 25, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's answer to a question raised by KCNA Tuesday "in connection with the fact that the U.S. State secretary let out provocative remarks slandering the dignified government of the DPRK. U.S. State Secretary Kerry called the DPRK "illegal and illegitimate regime" on October 21. He has malignantly slandered the DPRK as "a rogue state" and "den of evils" since the first day of his office. Now with the tenure of his office almost running out he is still spewing out invective against the DPRK, not discarding his bad habit. This is nothing but a rubbish of the guy who has become helpless in the face of the total bankruptcy of the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK. The Obama group including Kerry is a herd of illegal gangsters as they overthrew by force the legitimate governments of sovereign states and killed tens of thousands of innocent people in different parts of the world for the mere reason that they courted displeasure. But for the U.S. ruled by such ignorant political hooligans as Kerry, the world would have become a pacific place better to live. This is the unanimous comment of the overwhelming majority of the world people. No matter how desperately the Obama group may work to brand the DPRK as illegal, it will not undermine the strategic position of the DPRK which is demonstrating its dignity and might all over the world with the might of the single-minded unity and tremendous national power. The DPRK will dynamically advance along the road already chosen by itself no matter what Kerry may say." (KCNA, "FM Spokesman Slams U.S. State Secretary's Provocative Remarks against DPRK," October 26, 2016)

10/27/16

South Korea said that it would restart talks with Japan about a military intelligence-sharing pact, four years after a similar agreement was canceled in the face of a domestic furor. Officials at the Defense Ministry said in a news briefing on Thursday that such an agreement would allow South Korea to better address the growing

nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. The South hopes to sign a deal by the end of the year, the officials said. The United States has also pressed Japan and South Korea, its allies, to increase military cooperation so that the three countries could more effectively work together to monitor and confront the military threats from the North. Senior officials from all three countries met in Tokyo today to discuss ways of increasing pressure on North Korea. But South Koreans remain wary of cooperating too closely with Japan, especially given its relatively nationalist administration under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which some say has tried to glorify Japan's brutal colonial rule of Korea in the early 20th century. In 2012, a deal was postponed at the last minute after criticism that the government had not allowed enough public debate. Two years later, the United States persuaded South Korea and Japan to sign a trilateral pact on sharing intelligence on North Korea's nuclear and missile activities. Even then, Japan and South Korea did not agree to share data directly; under the agreement, the United States acted as an intermediary. (Choe Sang-hun, "South Korea Plans to Revive Talks with Japan on Sharing Intelligence," *New York Times*, October 27, 2016)

10/28/16

Park Geun-hye, South Korea's first female president and daughter of the military dictator who turned the country into an industrial powerhouse, is facing the biggest challenge of her turbulent tenure. Park, notoriously aloof even to her top aides, has been taking private counsel from Choi Soon-sil, a woman she's known for four decades. Despite having no official position and no security clearance, Choi seems to have advised Park on everything from her wardrobe to speeches about the dream of reunification with North Korea. Calls for her resignation – and even impeachment – are resonating from across the political spectrum, and her approval ratings have dropped to a record low of 17 percent, according to two polls released today. Today, Park directed all of her top advisers to resign en masse, with her spokesman saying a reshuffle would take place, Yonhap reported. Kim Jae-won, senior presidential secretary for political affairs, told a parliamentary session that Park's chief of staff had already stepped down. It's not clear, however, whether it will be enough. "Park Geun-hye's leadership is on the brink of collapse," said Yoo Chang-sun, a left-leaning political analyst. Shin Yool, a right-leaning professor at Myongji University, called it the "biggest crisis" since South Korea was founded 70 years ago. "The president has lost her ability to function as leader." Choi is the daughter of the late Choi Tae-min, who was a kind of shaman-fortune teller described in a [2007 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul](#) as "a charismatic pastor." Locally, he's seen as a "Korean Rasputin" who once held sway over Park after her mother was assassinated in 1974. "Rumors are rife that the late pastor had complete control over Park's body and soul during her formative years and that his children accumulated enormous wealth as a result," read the cable, released by WikiLeaks. South Korean media have uncovered evidence that, they claim, shows that Choi Soon-sil wielded undue influence over the president. JTBC, a television network, said it had found a tablet computer that contained files of speeches the president had yet to give, among other documents. The younger Choi is said to have edited the landmark speech that Park gave in Germany in 2014, laying out her vision for unification with the North. *Hankyoreh* wrote that actual presidential aides "were just mice to Choi's cat." She is also rumored to have created a secret group called "the eight fairies" to advise the president behind the scenes. TV Chosun, the channel belonging to *Chosun Ilbo*, aired a clip showing Choi overseeing the making of

an outfit for Park, "raising doubt whether Park made any decision at all without Choi," the paper said. Meanwhile, investigators are looking into allegations that Choi siphoned off money from two recently established foundations that collected about \$70 million from the Federation of Korean Industries, the big business lobby with members including Samsung and Hyundai. Prosecutors raided Choi's home in Seoul this week looking for evidence. At the same time, there are allegations that the daughter of Choi Soon-sil was given special treatment when she applied for Ewha Womans University, one of South Korea's top colleges. Local media have reported that her daughter's grades were not good enough, so the rules were changed to give credit to applicants who had won equestrian awards, as she had. The already-embattled president of Ewha resigned this week. Choi is in Germany with her daughter and is refusing to return to South Korea to answer questions, saying she is having heart problems and cannot fly. But in an interview with *Segye Ilbo*, she denied creating the Eight Fairies group, owning the tablet or knowingly receiving classified information. "Because I was not a government official, I had no idea that this was confidential," she told the paper. Park apologized October 25 for the scandal, saying she had always acted "with a pure heart." Then she canceled a planned meeting related to North Korea today so she could consider ways to "resolve the nation's anxiety and stably run the government," according to a spokesman. She did, however, attend a ceremony in the southern city of Busan, where university students shouted "Park Geun-hye should step down!" and "Choi Soon-sil must be arrested!" South Korea is no stranger to political corruption scandals – almost every president has been tainted by one – but this time feels different to some analysts. "There's been corruption around the center of power throughout South Korean political history, but they have involved family members or people close to the president, but not the actual president," said Shin of Myongji University. "I can only think of two ways for Park Geun-hye to get out of this situation: She can propose a grand-coalition government or promise to step down after a constitutional amendment [allowing her to cede power] is passed," he said. *Chosun Ilbo*, South Korea's largest newspaper and an influential conservative voice, was similarly damning. "This is no ordinary lame-duck phenomenon. This is a complete collapse of a president's ability to run a government," it said in an editorial this week, calling on her to dissolve her government secretariat and appoint a caretaker prime minister. "The only way open to her is to pull out of government and put the public good first," it wrote. "Many people are ashamed for her. It is time she was, too." (Anna Fifield and Yoonjung Seo, "South Korea's Presidency 'on the Brink of Collapse' as Scandal Grows," *Washington Post*, October 29, 2016) One 8-page file, titled "Blue House meeting," was saved ten hours before the then president-elect Park met her predecessor Lee Myung-bak on December 28, 2012. That document appears to have been Park's script for this crucial meeting. It includes this question: "What contacts have made between the two Koreas?" And this answer: "The military had three secret contacts with the North's National Defense Commission recently." Officials involved have now confirmed these contacts. But no one knew at the time, or was supposed to. This was a national security secret which Choi had no right to be privy to. A second case is Park's vaunted Dresden Initiative. As *NK News* has already reported in detail, the computer files indicate that chunks of this major speech were drafted by Choi. These include the bright idea of Dresden as a model for Korea – even though the German process of unification by absorption was hardly likely to go down well in

Pyongyang. Privy to secrets, drafting speeches: those are facts. There's lots more dynamite in the files, but here we will focus on the DPRK angle. The *Hankyoreh*, Seoul's main left-leaning daily, has posed two further questions, bearing on key decisions and the overall thrust of Park's Nordpolitik. Item: Was Choi Sun-sil behind the closing of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in February? A *Hankyoreh* headline on October 27 posed that question. The Unification Ministry has denied any such influence. The paper's evidence is circumstantial, yet plausible in explaining this unexpected U-turn from Park's previous efforts to save the Kaesong zone. The same article says Choi believed Korean unification was imminent: "within the next two years." This could explain why in 2014 Park suddenly came up with the odd and counter-intuitive idea of unification as a bonanza or jackpot. According to the *Hankyoreh* no ministry had proposed this. Reframing unification as a happy contingency for the ROK left no space for the outreach to the DPRK offered in Dresden and Park's earlier slogan of 'Trustpolitik.' (Aiden Foster-Carter, "Did Kim Guen Hye's Rasputin Run Her North Korea Policy?" *NKNews*, October 28, 2016)

A new sanctions package against North Korea that more effectively blocks the regime's overseas funding sources is taking shape at the United Nations, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said. In ongoing talks, Beijing has been willing to discuss with Washington a loophole in a previous sanctions resolution that allows Pyongyang to earn annual revenue of \$1 billion from coal exports to China, Blinken told *The Wall Street Journal*. While China may incur economic costs from closing that loophole, Blinken said he was hopeful Beijing would work with the U.S. and other nations to further pressure Kim Jong Un regime's finances and force it into denuclearization talks. "China has to decide what its larger interest is. It's clearly in preserving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula," he said. Blinken was speaking in Seoul before traveling to Beijing today to discuss North Korea and other issues with Chinese officials. (Alastair Gale, "U.S. Says Deal to Deepen North Korea Penalties Is Advancing," *Wall Street Journal*, October 28, 2016)

If North Korea has been a foreign policy headache for Barack Obama's presidency, it threatens to be a migraine for his successor. The next president will likely contend with an adversary able to strike the continental United States with a nuclear weapon. Whoever wins the White House in the November 8 election is expected to conduct a review of North Korea policy. It's too early to predict what that portends, but the North will grab more attention of the next president than it did for Obama, who adopted strategic patience: ramping up sanctions in a so-far fruitless effort to force the North to negotiate on denuclearization. With surprising candor this week, National Intelligence director James Clapper said that persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons is probably a "lost cause." That appeared to challenge to a key tenet of U.S. policy shared by U.S. allies and adversaries alike that agree on the goal of the denuclearization of the divided Korean Peninsula, however distant it may be. But Clapper was also channeling what many experts are thinking. Leader Kim Jong Un appears to see nuclear weapons as a guarantee of his own survival. Six-nation aid-for-disarmament talks have not convened since Obama took office in 2009, during which time the North's capabilities have leapt ahead. "Without a shift in U.S. strategy toward North Korea, the next U.S. president will likely be sitting in the Oval Office when the



regime finally acquires the ability to strike the continental United States with a nuclear weapon," said a recent Council on Foreign Relations report. Speaking at the council in New York on October 25, Clapper said that North Korea has yet to test its KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile, so it is unclear if it works, but the United States operates on the "worst-case" assumption that Pyongyang is potentially capable of launching a missile with a weapon on it that could reach Alaska and Hawaii. Experts have estimated the missile, which can be moved by road, making it harder to target in a pre-emptive strike, could be operational by around 2020. With five nuclear tests now under its belt, the North may already be able to miniaturize a warhead for use on a short-range missile, if not on an intercontinental missile. It has also launched two rockets into space, and has begun testing submarine-launched missiles. U.S. experts estimate that it now has 13 to 21 nuclear weapons, and could have as many as 100 by 2020--approaching what India likely has today. Clapper said the best hope for the United States is probably to negotiate a cap on the North's nuclear capabilities. But that implies recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, which the United States has said it will not do. "The dilemma for policymakers in dealing with North Korea is that if one accepts that the door to negotiation of denuclearization with North Korea is closed, the alternative set of options involves either acquiescence to a nuclear North Korea on the one hand or pressure leading to regime change on the other," said Scott Snyder, senior fellow for Korea studies at the council. Of the U.S. presidential candidates, Democrat Hillary Clinton wants the international community to intensify sanctions as the Obama administration did with Iran, which eventually opened the way for a deal to contain its nuclear program. Divining what Republican Donald Trump might do is tricky. He wants the United States to leverage its trade ties to get China to rein in its unpredictable ally. But he's also said he'd be ready to meet Kim, and suggested detaching the United States from the problem by allowing its allies Japan and South Korea to get nuclear weapons. U.S. experts who held unofficial talks with North Korean officials in Malaysia last week maintain that negotiations on denuclearization are still possible. "I think the best course would be to test the proposition by some serious engagement in which we see whether their (North Korea's) legitimate security concerns can be met," said Robert Gallucci, who negotiated a 1994 disarmament agreement that curbed North Korea's nuclear program for nearly 10 years. He added that the concerns of neighboring South Korea and Japan--they face the most immediate threat from Pyongyang--would also have to be met. "We don't know for sure that negotiations will work, but what I can say with some confidence is that pressure without negotiations won't work, which is the track we are on right now," said another participant, Leon Sigal from the New York-based Social Science Research Council. But there is a deep, bipartisan skepticism in Washington about talks with Pyongyang, which has recanted on past accords and says it will never give up its nuclear weapons. It claims it needs nukes to deter an invasion by the United States, which has 28,500 troops in South Korea. Still, North Korea has not entirely closed the door to talks. A July government statement suggested it remained open to discussions on denuclearization of the peninsula. The United States, however, slapped sanctions on Kim the same day for human rights abuses. The North said that was tantamount to declaring war. (Matthew Pennington, "Lost Cause? North Korea Nuke Threat Awaits Next President," Associated Press, October 28, 2016)

10/29/16

The Red Cross is struggling to raise needed funds to aid flood-affected regions of North Korea after a disappointing response from the international community to its emergency appeal, a spokesman said. At least 133 people have died in North Korea and some 600,000 people have been affected by flooding caused by heavy rain in late August and early September. Concerns are growing about the health and welfare of those affected as winter sets in. Red Cross has only raised 25 percent of the 15.2 million Swiss francs (\$15.38 million) it sought in an emergency appeal aimed at helping more than 330,000 people needing humanitarian assistance over the next 12 months. International donors need to "put politics aside and recognize this is a humanitarian tragedy for thousands of people," Patrick Fuller, communications manager for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), told reporters in Beijing after returning from North Korea. (Reuters, "Red Cross Struggles to Raise Funds for North Korean Flood Relief," October 29, 2016)

Blinken: "Q: On North Korea, you're focused very much on coal exports to China, and trying to close that kind of loophole. You mentioned earlier you weren't trying to bring Kim Jong-un to his knees but to his senses. Obviously from that point of view and perhaps from the Chinese point of view, closing that loophole would be crippling to the North Korean economy. I was wondering, how do you sort of see, how do you square the circle? And secondly, how has the Chinese response to deployment of the THAAD missile defense hindered the prospects for a breakthrough on this point?"

BLINKEN: With regard to the first part of the question, we've seen through experience that if you approach sanctions, pressure, isolation in a sustained and comprehensive way, you can have a real effect in changing conduct. And there's no better example recently of course than Iran, which made the fundamentally important decision after years of mounting pressure to freeze its program, allow in inspectors, start to roll the program back in some respects. And that created time and space in which we were able to negotiate a comprehensive agreement. Similarly with North Korea. We believe that if we can apply, build and apply this kind of pressure in a sustained and comprehensive way, then as the leadership looks at its interests it may come to the conclusion that its interests lie in moving back toward denuclearization, not persisting in trying to advance its weapons programs and forsaking the interests of its people, and guaranteeing its isolation and further weakening. Now, our purpose is not to crater the Northern Korean economy. It's to exert enough sustained pressure that it has an effect on Kim Jong-un's calculus. That will take time. But most importantly, it will take China because of the relationship. Coal is critical because last year, by our assessment, North Korea got about a little over a billion dollars in revenue from selling coal. Unfortunately, in a number of months over the summer, China's coal imports from North Korea were up over the same month the previous year. Despite 2270. And there is a difference between us, there has been a difference between us on 2270. The plain language of 2270 makes it very clear that the export of coal or the importation of coal to China is prohibited unless you can demonstrate that the transaction in question goes to the livelihood of the North Korean people. The Chinese have reversed the presumption and their approach has been that the trade in coal is allowed unless you can demonstrate that it's going to the weapons program. But that's not what 2270 says. So we're trying in New York now as well as here to focus on what was the very clear premise of 2270, and we're convinced that can have a significant impact on North

Korea's thinking. The interesting thing about sanctions is that when you look at the sweep of these things throughout history, they're a failure until they succeed. But you have to do it in a comprehensive and sustained way. With regard to THAAD, one of the things that I mentioned earlier that, at least from my perspective, the relationship has never been more clear, more open, more direct, and we're not in the business of trying to surprise each other. We try to put our cards on the table and just be very clear about our interests, just as China is. And the steps that we plan to take. So we said for many, many, many months before the decision was made to deploy THAAD to South Korea that this is something we're going to have to strongly consider and ultimately do if there is not a clear change in the trajectory in North Korea. And we, this is not directed at China. It's a purely defensive system. It won't affect China's strategic deterrent. But we understand you don't like it. And of course if there were no threat from North Korea we wouldn't need to do it. But unfortunately, not only is there a threat, but it is getting more and more acute. So we've also been clear that the decision to deploy THAAD was the latest but not the last defensive step that we would have to take in the event the threat persists. My own sense is that has not affected the discussions or negotiations in New York. To the contrary, I think showing that we are dead serious about defending our security and that of our allies and partners and will take any step necessary to do that hopefully will motivate China to work with us to change the conduct of the North Korean regime. That's ultimately the best way for us not to have to take steps going forward that add to our defenses. Again, none of which are directed at China, but which we acknowledge China is not usually enthusiastic about.

Q: As a quick follow up, has China directly linked the two issues in your discussions on the new sanctions? BLINKEN: Not to my knowledge. Q: It sounds like maybe from your side you have, in the sense that there's sort of an implicit threat that if --BLINKEN: It's -- Q: -- if new measures can't be found to restrain North Korea then there could be further steps to -- BLINKEN: Yeah. There's no threat. It's just a statement of fact. And we've been very clear and direct in explaining that from our perspective the threat posed by North Korea's missile and nuclear programs has, is moving to a qualitatively different place. And that threat and its continuation is not acceptable from the perspective of U.S. national interests. And our strong, strong desire is to work cooperatively with China. Now China has the same broad interest and the same objective that we do which is denuclearization. We're on the same page. But it's also fair to say, as everyone knows, that China puts a premium on stability. And that's totally understandable. **But the problem is, the greatest source of instability is the North Korean regime and its actions.** And the best way actually to uphold China's interest in preserving stability is to deal with this problem. And we can't deal with the problem effectively without China playing a leading role. So that's the nature of the conversation. But it's not about threats. It's really just about facts and a clear assessment of our interests and the steps that we have to take to protect our interests. (Deputy Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, "Media Roundtable in Beijing, October 29, 2016)

11/1/16

U.S. officials say North Korea preparing missile launch: report North Korea is preparing to launch an intermediate-range ballistic missile in the next three days, Fox Business Network reported on Tuesday, citing two unidentified U.S. officials. The communist nation planned the launch for between 24 and 72 hours, the cable network reported.

Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies said the trend also suggested the possibility of an act during the December transition period for the next U.S. administration. (Doina Chiacu, "U.S. Officials Say North Korea Preparing Missile Launch: Report," Reuters, November 2, 2016)

11/2/16

President Park Geun-hye of South Korea replaced the country's prime minister as she struggled to regain some of the authority lost to a growing political scandal. Park's new appointee, Kim Byong-joon, was once a chief policy coordinator for President Roh Moo-hyun. Roh, in office from 2003 to 2008, was a progressive leader often hated by Park's conservative followers. Kim's appointment as Park's deputy is seen as an overture to the progressive opposition parties as the president nears her last year in office. Park's advisers in and outside her governing party have asked her to reform her cabinet to signal a new beginning for her embattled government. Kim's appointment required parliamentary approval. He replaces Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn. Hwang has not been accused of any wrongdoing, but Park replaced him to project the image of a fresh start, analysts said. On October 30, Park fired eight presidential aides, including her chief of staff, in an effort to regain public trust. That was a day after thousands of South Koreans took to the streets to call for her removal from office. Today, she also replaced her chief economic minister and domestic safety minister. Yim Jong-yong, the minister for the Financial Services Commission, became minister of strategy and finance, the top economic policy maker. But the reshuffling did not affect the national security and foreign affairs posts in the cabinet. As the leadership changes unfolded, prosecutors summoned former presidential aides accused of helping Choi Soon-sil, the woman at the center of Park's leadership crisis, manipulate important government affairs from the shadows. Choi, 60, a friend of Park's for 40 years, is widely seen here as the president's secret adviser, though she has no official government title. She was also accused of using her influence to extort \$69 million from big businesses in the form of donations to two foundations she controlled. Yesterday, after weeks of avoiding the news media and public scrutiny, Choi presented herself to prosecutors. She tearfully apologized before a phalanx of television cameras, while angry citizens demanded her arrest. One person was detained while trying to hurl a tub of excrement at her and the prosecutors' office, claiming that the investigation was rigged to protect Park. Prosecutors are seeking an arrest warrant for Choi. The scandal has been particularly upsetting to South Koreans because of Choi's background. Her father, a religious leader named Choi Tae-min, is said to have befriended Park in the mid-1970s by claiming that he could help her contact her dead mother, who was assassinated in 1974. Park's father, Park Chung-hee, led a military dictatorship in South Korea from 1961 until 1979, when he, too, was assassinated. Many South Koreans believed that Mr. Choi, who died in 1994, exercised a Rasputin-like power over Park and used it to collect bribes. After Park became president in early 2013, rumors persisted that Choi was meddling in government affairs, installing her associates in political posts and helping them win large government contracts. Park acknowledged last week that she had let Choi edit some of her most important speeches, seeming to vindicate those suspicions. Her approval ratings have plummeted to record lows in the past couple of weeks. (Choe Sang-hun, "Hoping to Defuse Scandal, South Korea's President Picks New Premier," *New York Times*, November 2, 2016, p. A-8) Prime Minister-designate Kim Byong-joon, if approved by

parliament, will take control of domestic affairs, presidential aides said, indicating President Park Geun-hye will take a back seat in running the country. Their remarks presaged the introduction of a power-sharing governance structure in which the president takes charge of external affairs such as defense and foreign policy, with the premier calling all the shots on internal matters. In a move to assuage public outrage over an influence-peddling scandal involving her close confidante, Park nominated Kim, policy advisor to late liberal President Roh Moo-hyun, and two Cabinet ministers. But opposition parties immediately called on her to cancel what they called "unilateral" nominations. "(The designation of Kim) means that (Park) will virtually take a back seat (in running the country)," a source told Yonhap, declining to be named. "Nominee Kim will be the chief executive in charge of managing internal affairs." After completing a personnel overhaul of her secretariat, Park is expected to publicly explain her decision to delegate part of her executive power to the new prime minister, a source said. "As soon as President Park openly confirms the authority of Prime Minister-designate Kim, it is fair to say we will have two presidents," the official said over the phone. "Then, Kim will be a president for internal affairs, while Park will retreat from her authority (to handle domestic matters)." (Song Sang-ho and Kang Yoon-seung, "New PM to Take Care of Domestic Affairs: Presidential Aides," Yonhap, November 2, 2106)

North Korea has been preparing to launch another mid-range ballistic missile "in the next 24 to 72 hours," U.S. officials told Fox News. A government source here appeared to confirm the assessment. "We've spotted movement of a transporter erector launcher carrying a Musudan missile," the source said. "We can't disclose where they're preparing to launch it from but presume that it's ready for liftoff." "Musudan" is the label boffins have been using for a Hwasong-10 missile believed to have a range of 3,500 km, which would be capable of striking the U.S. military base on Guam in the western Pacific. "It's possible that the North will launch a provocation ahead of the U.S. presidential election on November 8, to attract attention," a diplomatic source speculated. (Kim Deok-han, Lee Yong-soo, "N. Korea 'Poised to Launch Another Mid-Range Missile,'" *Chosun Ilbo*, November 03, 2016)

North Korea imported record amounts of rice from China in September, apparently to stabilize prices amid rapid hikes, Voice of America reported. The North imported 16,000 tons of rice worth US\$9.9 million, from China in September, VOA reported quoting analysis of customs data by Kwon Tae-jin of the GS&J Institute in Seoul. Over the whole first eight months the North imported only 14,000 tons of rice. The North's imports of wheat flour increased 15 times and its imports of starch more than doubled on-month in September. Meanwhile, the North also imported 772 tons of fertilizer from China in September, up 73 percent on-year. (Cho Yi-jun, "N. Korea Buys Record Amounts of Rice from China," *Chosun Ilbo*, November 04, 2016)

11/4/16

The United States formally prohibited U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining accounts created on behalf of North Korean banks, extending sanctions imposed on the isolated Asian country over its nuclear and missile programs. The U.S. Treasury Department said North Korea was using front companies and agents to conduct illicit financial transactions to support the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to evade international sanctions. "Such funds have no place in any

reputable financial system," Adam Szubin, the department's acting under secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence said in a statement. A Treasury Department order requires U.S. financial institutions "to apply additional due diligence measures to prevent North Korean financial institutions from gaining improper indirect access to U.S. correspondent accounts." The move comes after the Treasury in June declared North Korea a "primary money laundering concern" and proposed the steps to further block its ability to use the U.S. and world financial systems to fund its weapons programs. Today's announcement comes as the United States is pushing for tougher United Nations sanctions against North Korea after its latest nuclear test on September 9. China's support is crucial for the sanctions to be effective but Beijing has appeared to push back on U.S. efforts to tighten restrictions on North Korean exports. Beijing expressed concern when the U.S. Treasury plans were announced in June, saying it opposed any country using its domestic laws to impose unilateral sanctions on another country. (David Brunnstrom, "U.S. Acts to Block North Korea Access to Financial System," Reuters, November 4, 2016)

An advanced U.S. missile defense system will be deployed to South Korea in the next eight to 10 months to better counter growing threats from North Korea, USFK Commander Gen. Vincent K. Brooks said in a seminar hosted by the Association of the Republic of Korea Army in Seoul. "You're gonna see the deployment of a THAAD battery. This is an alliance decision. It will come in the next eight to 10 months. That is an Army unit and ... a larger configuration than the one in Guam." The base in Guam is known to operate just two Army missile launcher pads with one more in reserve. The number is comparatively small, considering that a standard-sized THAAD unit has six launchers. The general's comments translated into South Korea getting between four to nine launchers. In July, South Korea and the U.S. announced a decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea to better defend against the North's evolving nuclear and missile threats. As for the issue of the rotational deployment of strategic assets such as nuclear-capable B-52 bombers, F-22 stealth fighter jets and nuclear-powered submarines to the Korean Peninsula, Brooks said "that is under review," and it is a decision to be made by high-ranking policymakers. Asked if the U.S. could consider bringing tactical nuclear weapons back to the peninsula, he balked at the idea, saying the presence of strategic assets here will "complicate the situation and is not militarily necessary" because the strategic assets will be immediately sent to the peninsula to counter North Korean provocations. (Choi Kyong-ae, "USFK Chief Says THAAD to Be Deployed in Next 8-10 Months," Yonhap, November 4, 2016)

President Park Geun-hye said that she was willing to submit to questioning by prosecutors investigating a scandal that has engulfed her administration, saying she would sever ties with an old friend accused of using their relationship to extort money from businesses. Park's nationally televised speech came as a poll by Gallup Korea indicated that she has become South Korea's least popular president since the country moved to democracy in the 1980s. Park, who at times seemed to be nearly overcome by emotion, said she had been unable to sleep because of the humiliation and despair she had experienced since the scandal involving her friend Choi Soon-sil erupted, and that at times she regretted having become president. She said she had told her staff to

cooperate fully with prosecutors investigating Choi and her connections to the administration. "I again deeply apologize for causing an immeasurable disappointment and worry," Park said. "All this is my fault, caused by my negligence." "If necessary, I am ready to subject myself faithfully to the prosecutors' investigation," she said. "Anyone whose wrongdoing will be revealed in the investigation should be held responsible. I myself should be no exception." Park did not elaborate on that statement. But under South Korea's Constitution, the president is protected from indictment even if she is accused of a crime. No sitting president has ever been questioned by criminal investigators, and prosecutors have yet to say whether they want to question Park. But they have come under mounting pressure to do so from opposition politicians and a public outraged by the recent developments in the case. (Choe Sang-hun, "South Korean Leader Will Accept Inquiry," *New York Times*, November 4, 2016, p. A-6)

KCNA: "Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA), inspected a special operation battalion under KPA Unit 525. He personally organized the battalion and made sure that its barracks were successfully built. ...The combatants of the battalion having their basic mission to wipe out the human scum who have committed thrice-cursed high treasons, holding important posts at Chongwadae, the puppet government and the military, have fully displayed their capability to fulfill their duties independently and effectively. He highly praised them for their successes in the drills, saying that all of them are one-match-for-a-hundred fighters with iron fists and they are crack shots as they hit all targets with pistols and automatic rifles. Noting that the battalion is a combat unit to which the supreme commander attaches special importance and in which he reposes the deepest trust, he set forth the tasks facing the battalion. Expressing expectation and conviction that the combatants of the battalion having an important mission to stab the enemy hearts with sharp daggers and break their backs would successfully carry out their honorable combat duty, he gave them a pair of binoculars and automatic rifle as gifts before having a photo session with them. He was accompanied by KPA Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong So, director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA, KPA Vice Marshal Ri Myong Su, chief of the General Staff of the KPA, and Army Col. General Ri Yong Gil, first vice-chief of the General Staff and director of the General Operation Bureau of the KPA." (KCNA, "Kim Jong Un Inspects KPA Special Operations Battalion," November 4, 2016)

11/6/16

If Hillary Clinton is elected, her national security team plans to urgently address the growing North Korean nuclear and missile threat. That would surely raise tensions on the Korean peninsula – and it could also lead to an early and acrimonious confrontation between a Clinton administration and the Chinese government of Xi Jinping. Xi is staunchly opposed to Clinton's plan to drastically increase sanctions on the regime of Kim Jong Un. At the Munich Security Conference Core Group meeting here last week, Chinese officials and experts delivered a clear and unequivocal message to the visiting Westerners: China will not take any steps against Pyongyang that might increase the chance of a confrontation with the North Korean regime or encourage regime change on China's border. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui said that although China might endorse a limited U.N. Security Council

resolution in response to North Korea's recent provocations, there's no Chinese appetite for further pressure. The Chinese rationale is simple: Beijing values stability on the Korean peninsula more than it fears the growing prospect that North Korea will succeed in its goal of becoming a full-fledged nuclear power capable of striking the West. "China will never allow war or chaos on the peninsula, and if that occurs that will help no one," Zhang said. "We need to bring the issue back to the track of dialogue and consultation." In Washington, there's bipartisan consensus that returning to the negotiating table without significantly more leverage against the Kim regime would be a futile and perhaps even dangerous misstep. Top Clinton foreign policy advisers have been open about their intention to apply to North Korea a version of the playbook the Obama administration used with Iran. They are promising to drastically increase sanctions on Pyongyang before sitting down at the table. They are also considering secondary sanctions on foreign firms that enable North Korea's illicit industries, which means punishing Chinese companies keeping Kim's nuclear and missile industries afloat. For the Chinese government, both of those ideas are seen as direct assaults on China's primacy over an issue it considers a core interest. Rather than respond to the threat of sanctions by leaning on its client state, Beijing is more likely to buck Washington and fight back against the new policy. "If the assumption of any new American administration is that China is the one to blame and we need to put pressure on or even punish China, that would be a big mistake," said Dong Wang, professor at the School of International Studies at Peking University. China may retaliate with punitive measures against the United States in other areas of the bilateral relationship, he said. Chinese officials at the conference warned that the proposed Clinton policy carries a risk of sparking a war on the Korean peninsula, and they expressed the suspicion that the unstated U.S. motivation was to spur regime change in Pyongyang. The Clinton team has a plan to allay Chinese fears about regime change. Her advisers intend to push for a new dialogue with Beijing to discuss what would happen if the sanctions inadvertently cause the regime to collapse or if the regime implodes on its own due to mounting internal tensions. "We are not talking about creating a regime change, but should something happen, China needs to know its interests are going to be protected," Wendy Sherman, a former undersecretary of state for political affairs and a top Clinton campaign foreign policy adviser, said last month at the Meridian Global Leadership Summit. "The South Koreans believe in tightening the noose around North Korea. . . . We believe in that as well." But the Chinese government has no intention of entering a dialogue with the United States about planning for the day after the Kim regime falls. For Beijing, preventing the fall of the regime is a must, and therefore coordinating plans for its collapse is off-limits. David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, said that addressing the North Korean nuclear threat will be the first serious test of the strategic relationship between the United States and China in the next administration, regardless of who wins. "China is really crucial to this and we'd like to get a paradigm shift in the thinking of the Chinese leadership," he said. "But if they continue to refuse to move into these discussions, the temptation for the American side is just to move unilaterally." Clinton's advisers are threatening to do just that, but they should have no expectation that China is going to comply. In fact, the North Korea issue could mean that the first foreign crisis of a potential Clinton presidency will come not in the Middle East or with Russia, but in



northeast Asia. (Josh Rogin, "The Coming Clash with China over North Korea," *Washington Post*, November 6, 2016)

11/7/16

Japan and Russia are discussing almost 100 economic co-operation projects as they prepare to negotiate over four disputed islands at a high stakes summit in December. In an interview with the *Financial Times*, Seko Hiroshige, Japan's minister for economy, trade and industry, said the Japanese side had put forward tens of projects and the Russian side had come forward with almost 70. "Right now, officials at various ministries are working with their Russian counterparts to firm these projects up, and check which ones are viable," said Seko, before a weekend trip to Moscow for talks with Russian ministries. "There's huge energy going into coordinating this." The intensity of discussions shows the weight Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is putting on his latest effort to resolve the long-running dispute over a group of islands Russia calls the Kuriles and Japan the Northern Territories. But it also raises the risk of a post-summit backlash in Japan if there is no progress on the islands. Last week, a Russian parliamentarian visiting Tokyo said there is "no discussion going on at all on things like the handover of the islands." Abe's new approach to Russia – launched at a Sochi summit with President Vladimir Putin in May – is aimed at building a broader relationship with Moscow to ease negotiations on the islands. The two men met again at Vladivostok in September and will hold a summit in Abe's home prefecture of Yamaguchi on December 15. Seko said his goal was to prepare economic co-operation projects by then. "We want a win-win relationship. Without thinking about the Northern Territories too much, we want to set up economic projects of benefit to Japan." "But if both countries can work together and develop a really good relationship, then it'll help make a better environment for Prime Minister Abe and Foreign Minister [Fumio] Kishida to conduct their Northern Territories negotiations." Seko declined to comment on specific projects, but among those mooted are upgrades to Khabarovsk airport, coal export terminals at Vanino and Vostochnyy as well as investments in fossil fuels and renewable energy. "The Japan-Russia economic relationship so far has been centered on energy," said Seko. "But there are areas where the Russian people have needs such as hospitals or urban development, promoting industry in the Far East, or co-operation in advanced technology. We want a menu of projects that makes Russians feel a real difference in their lives." Seko said he envisions private companies taking the lead, with Japan's government offering finance, and working with Russia to overcome regulatory hurdles. But he also vowed that "not violating sanctions is an absolute precondition". (Robin Harding, "Japan and Russia Talk Economics ahead of Summit over Disputed Islands," *Financial Times*, November 7, 2016)

11/8/16

A new modern-style corvette with low-observable radar characteristics has been spotted in North Korea's northeastern port of Rajin in Rason, high-resolution photos obtained exclusively by NK Pro have revealed. Two sets of photos taken during different periods in 2016 show a heavily armed, 77-meter long vessel with radar cross-section-reducing features docked adjacent to a helicopter-capable but minimally armed support ship. Equipped with two Kumsong-3 anti-ship cruise missile launchers, a short-range surface-to-air missile system, torpedo launchers and rotary canons, the reduced-RCS corvette also includes capacity for large caliber naval cannon, the NK Pro

analysis reveals. Together, the two vessels - combined with two similar types docked near North Korea's west coast port of Nampo - offer more evidence of a wider North Korean effort to build new naval assets in ways that could pose new threats to the U.S. and South Korea. "These ships are the culmination of over two decades of experimentation with new naval warfare concepts, and a clear indication of the direction that North Korean shipbuilding is headed in," said Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer, the NK Pro contributors said in their analysis of the vessels' capabilities. Alongside recently publicized ballistic missile submarines, stealthy surface effect ships, and a number of other smaller modern ship designs, the corvettes could bring "new capabilities to the table that represent a tangible threat to opposing navies in the region," the analysts said. But that will only be the case if the reduced-RCS corvettes are confirmed to be equipped with modern anti-ship cruise missiles, Joe Bermudez, a long-time North Korea watcher with expertise in Korean People's Army military capabilities, told *NK News*. With them, they "would present (the U.S. and South Korea) a...different threat altogether," he said. Kim Min Seok, a senior researcher at the Korea Defense and Security Forum (KODEF), described the photos of the low-observable corvette as "unprecedented and untold to the outside world ...a new type of battleship that is similar to the Myanmar Navy's frigate UMS Tabinshwehti." "Myanmar has built this ship, and equipped it with weapons from Italy, China, Russia, and North Korea," he continued about the Tabinshwehti, which, unlike the DPRK version, includes a helicopter hangar. "The fact that (the North Korean vessel) does not have a helicopter hangar tells us two things," Kim continued. "One is that this is not built to host an antisubmarine helicopter, and is only aimed at temporary landing and takeoff, in the case of VIP's visit to the ship." But while the photos present evidence that North Korea's naval capabilities are increasing, Bermudez told *NK News* that two potential issues undermine their combat effectiveness. "The challenge though is when you operate corvettes like this, even if they're cruise missile-armed, you have to operate them in cooperation with other vessels. North Korea hasn't had much experience in doing that - in fact, I'd say virtually none - and that presents a problem. It also requires a different level of officer training than they've done so far." Overall, though, the development of the reduced-RCS corvette is notable, said John Grisafi, *NK News* Director of Intelligence. "Despite continuing and new sanctions and presumptions of economic weakness by the outside world, North Korea has continued to make demonstrable progress in recent years at developing new and diverse weapons systems and platforms, showing capabilities - or steps toward them - previously thought to be many years away for North Korea, if not beyond its reach," he said. (Chad O'Carroll, "New Low-Visibility Corvette Spotted in North Korea," *NKNews*, November 8, 2016)

11/9/16

Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, did not take long to recover from the shock of Donald J. Trump's victory. By this evening Abe had called the president-elect and arranged to meet him in New York next week. In hustling to be one of the first world leaders to meet with Trump since the election, Abe is seeking to gauge the sincerity of Trump's campaign rhetoric on Japan. As a candidate, he repeatedly excoriated the country, along with other American allies, for not paying what he called its fair share to support American military bases, and he suggested he might withdraw troops unless Japan agreed to pay more. In their call today, Abe told Trump that "a strong Japan-U.S. alliance is an indispensable presence that supports peace and stability in the Asia-

Pacific region," according to Koichi Hagiuda, a deputy chief cabinet secretary. Hagiuda said the two leaders did not discuss the TPP or Trump's calls for Japan to shoulder more of the cost of hosting United States forces. It is not clear whether Abe will push to discuss such specifics in his meeting with Trump, scheduled for November 16, when the prime minister will be in New York on his way to Peru for a forum on economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Abe will seek to develop a personal relationship with the president. "It's really hard to imagine a political blue blood like Abe establishing a warm rapport with Trump," said Jeffrey Kingston, the director of Asian studies at Temple University's campus in Tokyo. "But it's sort of like your family. He's inherited the U.S. as an ally, so he's going to have to develop a working relationship." In an interview that aired Thursday on NHK, Maj. Gen. Bert K. Mizusawa, who was recently named one of Trump's advisers, said that as a businessman, Trump regards treaties with other countries as contracts, and he thinks they need to be reviewed to see whether they benefit the American people. Mizusawa added that the so-called nuclear umbrella that the United States provides to Japan and South Korea is costly, and he suggested that North Korea's increasing threat would make it even costlier. Abe is unlikely to broach the nuclear topic directly with Trump next week. South Korea's president, Park Geun-hye, also reached out to Trump with a 10-minute congratulatory call, emphasizing the importance of maintaining strong sanctions and pressure against North Korea. A statement from Park's office said Trump had assured her that he agreed "100 percent." "We are with you all the way, and we will not waver," the statement quoted him as saying. For South Korea and Japan, perhaps more worrying than any immediate action Trump might take is the action he might not take. "We should be aware that the U.S. will pay less attention to Asia," *Nikkei Shimbun* wrote in an editorial today. "During the transitional period, China could make a new move in the South or East China Sea. The Japanese government needs to be ready for such a situation." Since the election, many analysts have appeared on Japanese talk shows to discuss the effect of a Trump presidency. But as elsewhere, much of the talk is based on speculation about how literally to take Trump's campaign pledges. "It's not quite healthy to draw any conclusion from what he has said," said Mine Yoshiki, a former official with the Foreign Ministry in Japan and now head of the Institute of Peaceful Diplomacy, a research organization. "We have to wait to see whether he will get good briefings or whether he is flexible enough to look at things more squarely." (Choe Sang-hun, "Abe to Meet Trump to Press Case on Security and Trade," *New York Times*, November 10, 2016)

President-elect Donald Trump pledged his commitment to defending South Korea under an existing security alliance during a phone call with South Korean President Park Geun-hye on Thursday, her office said. Trump had said during the election campaign he would be willing to withdraw U.S. military stationed in South Korea unless Seoul paid a greater share of the cost of the deployment. Park said the alliance between the two countries had grown as they faced various challenges over the past six decades, adding she hoped the ties would develop further. She asked Trump to join in the effort to help minimize the threat from the North, which has carried out a series of nuclear and missile tests in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions. Trump agreed with Park and said: "We will be steadfast and strong with respect to working with you to protect against the instability in North Korea," the

presidential Blue House said. *Rodong Sinmun* said in a commentary today the U.S. wish for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program "is only a fantasy of a bygone era" and the policy of pressure and sanctions had failed. "The only accomplishment of the Obama administration is that it is leaving behind for the new administration coming next year the burden of having to deal with a strong nuclear power." It did not mention Trump by name. But *Choson Sinbo*, a pro-North newspaper published in Japan and controlled by Pyongyang, said: "Trump is well advised to learn the lesson of history from Obama's failure." Otherwise, the new owner of the White House will be met with the ashes of the calamity started by the previous owner." The call between Park and Trump lasted about 10 minutes and Park said she hoped Trump would be able to visit South Korea soon, according to the Blue House. (Jack Kim and Ju-min Park, "Trump Presidency Will Test Longstanding U.S.-South Korean Alliance," Reuters, November 10, 2016)

South Korea and Japan made progress in negotiations on a bilateral pact to share military intelligence on North Korea, Seoul officials said. "The two sides have thoroughly reviewed the wording of the pact and found a consensus on major terms," the Ministry of National Defense said in a statement after a second round of working-level talks at the ministry's headquarters in Seoul. They will continue to consult to arrange the next meeting, the ministry said, expressing hopes that they would finalize the pact's wording soon. Expectations have been growing that it won't take long before they conclude the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), since they resumed negotiations in Tokyo last week after a botched attempt four years ago in the face of public opposition in Seoul. In 2012 the two nations initialed the pact, but Seoul suspended its signing due to strong opposition from opposition parties and civic groups. They claimed the deal was arranged too hastily and behind the scenes. In December 2014, South Korea, the U.S. and Japan signed a preliminary deal that calls for voluntary sharing of military secrets on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. The deal paved the way for Seoul and Tokyo to share such intelligence via the U.S. after their bilateral pact fell through in 2012. Defense Minister Han Min-koo told lawmakers yesterday that the pact would help Seoul counter threats from North Korea's submarine-launched ballistic missiles. But opposition lawmakers said that it is still inappropriate to clinch the bilateral information-sharing accord, given Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has not sincerely apologized for Japan's wartime wrongdoings while moving to boost Japan's military power. (Yonhap, "S. Korea, Japan Make Progress on Intel Sharing Accord," November 9, 2016)

Will U.S. president-elect Donald Trump meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un? The question has become one of the most urgent reality check factors in Korea because the Republican candidate repeatedly mentioned how he will deal with the nuclear-armed communist state during his presidential campaign and before that. In 2000, when Trump first ran for the presidency, he said in his book "The America We Deserve" that he backed a surgical strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities. "What would I do in North Korea? Fair question. It's easy to point out the problem, but what should be done to solve it? Am I ready to bomb this reactor? You're damned right," Trump said. As he began his 2016 presidential campaign, he showed his animosity to Kim with vulgar expressions. "ISIS is a big problem, Russia's a problem, China's a problem.

We've got a lot of problems. By the way, the maniac in North Korea is a problem. He actually has nuclear weapons, right? That's a problem," Trump said, referring to Kim, during a campaign speech in South Carolina in December 2015. In January, Trump also referred to Kim as a "total nut job" and a "madman playing around with the nukes." (But he also said it was "amazing" for the young leader to keep control of the country.) Trump also identified North Korea as a problem for China, not the U.S. "I would get China to make that guy disappear, in one form or another, very quickly," Trump said in February on the CBS TV program "This Morning." "China has absolute control of North Korea. They won't say it, but they do. And they should make that problem disappear." Trump repeated the idea during his campaign in Virginia in September. "They're very belligerent," Trump said, referring to North Korea. "They have no respect for our country, none whatsoever. And we have a situation that's a potential catastrophe. We have somebody that truly does have nuclear weapons and nuclear capability. The carrier maybe is not there yet, but it soon will be. We have a man (Kim) who is, I mean, he took over -- 25 years old, I guess, or around that -- and now it looks like he's getting more and more hostile. And what I would do very simply is say, 'China, this is your baby. This is your problem. You solve the problem.' China can solve that problem."

Trump also showed his intention to talk to Kim in person if elected president. In his interview with Reuters in May, Trump said he would "speak to Kim" and "would have no problem speaking to him." In June, when he was campaigning in Redding, California, Trump reaffirmed his intention to talk to Kim, criticizing U.S. foreign policy experts for not negotiating with the North Korean leader. "They say if I have qualms about bargaining with North Korea," Trump said. "No problems at all. Who in the world cares about it? I may not go to North Korea but will negotiate with it. They (the critical experts) say 'we would never, ever, talk (with the North).' How foolish they are!" In his Atlanta campaign the same month, Trump said he was prepared to talk to Kim "over a hamburger" about giving up his nuclear weapons program. "I wouldn't go there, that I can tell you," Trump said. "If he came here, I'd accept him, but I wouldn't give him a state dinner like we do for China and all these other people that rip us off when we give them these big state dinners. We give them state dinners like you've never seen. We shouldn't have dinners at all. We should be eating a hamburger on a conference table, and we should make better deals with China and others." So Se-pyong, North Korea's ambassador to the United Nations mission and international organizations in Geneva, however, downplayed Trump's remarks about meeting Kim. "It is up to the decision of my supreme leader whether he decides to meet or not, but I think his idea of talk is nonsense," Reuters quoted So as saying in Geneva. "It's for utilization of the presidential election, that's all. A kind of a propaganda or advertisement ... This is useless, just a gesture for the presidential election." In June, North Korea endorsed Trump's comments about withdrawing U.S. troops from the South unless Seoul pays more of the cost of keeping the troops on the peninsula. Rodong Shinmun, the North Korean ruling party's official mouthpiece, said Trump's comments were causing anxiety in South Korea. It said the South Korean government "should stop living as a servant of foreign forces and come back to the side of the Korean nation." (Ko Dong-hwan, "Will Trump Meet N. Korean Leader?" *Korea Times*, November 9, 2016)

11/10/16

In a commentary released a day after Trump was elected president, *Rodong Sinmun* reaffirmed the communist country will not give up its nuclear weapons program. "Washington's hope for North Korea's denuclearization is an outdated illusion," *Rodong Sinmun* condemned President Barack Obama's "strategic patience" policy with North Korea, saying the policy has only left bigger burdens to his successor as Pyongyang has become a nuclear state. The U.S. focuses on applying pressure and sanctions against North Korea for its nuclear and missile provocations, saying that Pyongyang should first show sincere commitment to denuclearization if dialogue is to proceed. Experts said that North Korea may refrain from conducting another nuclear test or launching a long-range rocket until it can gauge the direction of Trump's North Korea policy. "North Korea would seek to have dialogue with Washington as long as the next U.S. administration does not take a hawkish stance toward the North's nuclear issue," said Kim Dong-yup, a professor at the Institute for Far East Studies of Kyungnam University. (Yonhap, "N.K. Vows Not to Give up Nuclear Weapons as Trump Becomes President," *Korea Herald*, November 10, 2016)

As the world adjusts to America's newest commander in chief, uncertainties about what policies Donald Trump will pursue – toward North Korea in particular – remain. "Trying to predict President Trump's policy toward Asia, or any global region for that matter, is difficult if not impossible," Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow of Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation, told *Business Insider*. "We are in uncharted territory because Trump has not articulated an Asian policy nor does he even have an identifiable cadre of Asian advisors," Klingner added. Echoing that sentiment, David Straub, former State Department Korea director and associate director of the Korea Program at Stanford University, told *Business Insider* that Trump knows "next to nothing" about the region. "He didn't say very much about North Korea during the campaign, and what he did say was incoherent," Straub told *Business Insider*. Notably, Trump said he would hold a summit with the North's reckless leader Kim Jong Un over hamburgers. "It's clear he knows next to nothing about the area and the problems there, and it will take him and his administration a long time to get up to speed," Straub said. "I can't see Trump negotiating a denuclearization agreement with North Korea," Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the California-based Middlebury Institute of International Studies, told *Business Insider*. "And after Libya and what I anticipate will be the collapse of the agreement with Iran, I don't see any appetite in North Korea either." Trump also said he would remove US troops from host nations throughout Asia and Europe if these countries did not pay their share of the costs. Straub added that Trump should focus on North Korean threats instead of "complaining about how much our allies South Korea and Japan are paying for the upkeep of US forces in their country." "The fact is that they already pay a great deal of those costs, and that it would cost more to move them to the US than keep them where they are, not to mention the fact that strategic stability in Northeast Asia is very much in US interests as well as in the interests of our allies," Straub said. In regards to China, Pyongyang's closest ally and the region's most powerful nation, Trump has said he would pressure Chinese president Xi Jinping to address North Korea's nuclear ambitions. "Given Trump's statements on trade policy with China, it is difficult to imagine how he can get China to do what he wants," Eric Gomez, a policy analyst for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,

told Business Insider. "Despite the instability North Korea causes, Beijing is willing to keep supporting it so long as it can be a hedge against US military power in the region. China probably has the best chance of pressuring North Korea on the nuclear weapons issue, but right now it's difficult to see how Trump would get Beijing to change its current position," Gomez added. Similarly, Melik Kaylan, co-author of "The Russia-China Axis," says that Trump will most likely be unable to adjust Beijing's stance. "China uses North Korea as a lever to distract its regional rivals," Kaylan said. "If Trump is true to his words, he will try to confront China on a series of issues. China will play the North Korea card." "Trump will ultimately fall back on the alliances as they exist," Kaylan added. Straub notes that Trump may even follow the same policy carried out by President Obama when dealing with North Korea. "If Trump is guided by our government experts and institutions, he will eventually follow roughly the same policy as President Obama, i.e. ratchet up US and international pressure on North Korea to give up nuclear weapons each time it commits a provocation, at the same time bolstering our missile and other defenses against the North and preparing for all manner of contingencies," Straub said. And while the current administration has slapped Pyongyang with several rounds of heavy sanctions, the Hermit Kingdom's brazen rocket launches and nuclear detonations continue. "This year, Pyongyang successfully conducted two nuclear tests, an intercontinental ballistic missile test, breakthrough successes with its road-mobile intermediate-range missile and submarine-launched ballistic missile, re-entry vehicle technology, a new solid-fuel rocket engine, and an improved liquid-fuel ICBM engine," Klingner told *Business Insider* in a previous interview. What's more, during one week in October, the North launched what are thought to be two Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles – one on October 15 and another on October 19. "This twice-in-a-week stuff also suggests that they must have an inventory of these things that they're willing and able to expend to advance the program," Thomas Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Business Insider in a previous interview. Looking to the future, experts agree that Trump's policies will not be known for many months after he transitions to the highest office in the land. "North Korea will of course seek to use that time to its own advantage, which will not be to ours," Straub said. "'Bewilderment' and 'uncertainty' will be the keywords for assessing the 2016 presidential election and the path ahead," Klingner said. (Amanda Macias, "North Korea Experts on Trump: 'It's Clear He Knows Next to Nothing,'" *Business Insider*, November 10, 2016)

11/12/16 President Barack Obama will not see Congress approve a sweeping Pacific free trade pact by the end of his administration's tenure, a senior White House official said. (Kyodo, "No Approval of Pacific Trade Deal during Obama's Tenure: Official," November 12, 2016)

11/13/16 The cumulative number of North Korean defectors in South Korea has topped 30,000, the Ministry of Unification said. The ministry said seven North Korean people arrived in South Korea via a third country Friday, raising the total of North Koreans defecting to the South to 30,005. The cumulative number of defectors exceeded 10,000 in February 2006 and 20,000 in November 2010. The annual number of defectors had steadily increased from 1,384 in 2005 to 2,914 in 2009 but fell between 2011 and 2015

due to the North's tighter border control and stronger punishment of those caught attempting to flee, according to the ministry data. In the first 10 months of this year, a total of 1,155 North Koreans entered the South, marking an on-year growth of 18 percent. Data showed 71 percent of defectors are women, with the ratio further rising to 80 percent this year. Ministry officials explained women tend to be less under the Pyongyang regime's supervision. By age, those in their 20s and 30s at the time of defection accounted for 58 percent of the total, the data showed. The unification ministry will soon come up with comprehensive measures to support the resettlement of the defectors in the South, which may include expansions of jobs and education opportunities. (Yonhap, "Number of N. Korean Defectors in South Tops 30,000," November 13, 2016)

11/14/16 The international community needs to exert all-out pressure on North Korea at present but also should not rule out an option for engagement with Pyongyang over the long haul, an ex-Korean point man on unification said. Former Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-Jae said dialogue with North Korea needs to be considered in the long term as the effect of sanctions will better materialize if there is some sort of parallel engagement policy. "For now, an all-out pressure on North Korea is inevitable since the regime refuses to talk and continues the path of nuclear armament," Ryoo said in a prepared speech text written in English for a forum on unification. "All things considered, however, we should not rule out the option of engagement on a mid- to long-term basis. Today's sanctions and pressure against the North will only bear fruit when engagement and its expansion run parallel," he said. Ryoo said history showed that neither unilateral pressure or engagement has been able to bring about real change in the North Korean regime. "Despite the North's nuclear ambitions and our strong sanctions against it, we shouldn't dismiss the prospects of limited or all-out engagement," he said. Christopher Hill, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state, said that North Korea's nuclear and missile tests are not aimed at gaining attention, but perfecting its military technical progress to build deliverable nuclear weapons. Touching on U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, the former U.S. top nuclear envoy said that he does not think that Trump as the U.S.' next president is going to be the same as Republican candidate Trump. In regard to Trump's demand for fair share-burdening, Hill said that the issue would not become a "source of friction" between Seoul and Washington. (Yonhap, "N.K. Sanctions Inevitable But Options for Negotiations Necessary: Ex-Minister," November 14, 2016)

South Korea tentatively signed an intelligence-sharing pact with Japan to better counter growing North Korean missile threats despite strong local objections, the defense ministry said. "South Korea and Japan held the third round of talks in Tokyo on Monday afternoon and initially signed the deal after reaching a consensus on overall terms of the pact," the Ministry of National Defense said in a statement. The two sides will continue consultations through defense and diplomatic channels and take follow-up steps to sign off on the formal pact as early as this month, a ministry official said. The signing comes as the ruling and opposition parties failed to reach a consensus on the agreement during a parliamentary meeting. The opposition parties submitted a resolution to scrap the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Foreign Minister Yoon Byung-se said in another parliamentary meeting that



the GSOMIA is "not subject to a ratification by the National Assembly as it does not carry any financial burden nor is it a security-related agreement." (Yonhap, "Seoul, Tokyo Tentatively Sign Intel-Sharing Pact," November 14, 2016)

11/16/16

John Bolton, considered a top candidate for secretary of state under the incoming administration of Donald Trump, said Wednesday the U.S. won't launch a preemptive strike against North Korea, according to Rep. Na Kyung-won of the ruling Saenuri Party. Bolton even said there is "zero" chance of a U.S. preemptive attack on the North, according to Na. "He said he's well aware of how much price South Korea should pay in that case," the lawmaker said. "He said the North Korean nuclear issue is being considered a top issue of concern due to the North's nuclear tests and missile launches." Bolton also stressed the need for thorough preparedness against attacks from the North, she said. "He said he understands the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear issue, and there should be more discussions with China," Na said. Bolton also reacted negatively to holding talks with the North, she said. "He said he has no intention of sitting there (at the negotiating table). He said he's not interested in holding talks," Na said. (Yonhap, "U.S.'s Preemptive Strike on N. Korea 'Zero': Trump Aide," *Korea Times*, November 17, 2016)

Kim Yong Ho, director of human rights and humanitarian issues, spoke to reporters after a U.N. General Assembly committee approved a draft resolution condemning "widespread and gross violations of human rights" in the Asian state. "We do not care about whoever becomes the president of the United States," Kim said. "The fundamental issue here is whether or not the United States has the political will to withdraw its hostile policy toward the DPRK [North Korea]." (Reuters, "DPRK 'Does Not Care' Who Is U.S. President," November 16, 2016)

During a recent stay in Japan, Michael Flynn, former director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency top U.S. security official and adviser to then-presidential candidate Donald Trump secretly met and gave assurances to Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, a high-ranking Japanese official has said. Flynn was visiting the head office of the Liberal Democratic Party in Tokyo on October 1, ostensibly to deliver a lecture on cybersecurity. During the secret meeting, Flynn assured Suga that Washington would not change its diplomatic emphasis on the military alliance with Japan, even if Trump was elected president, the official said. Suga found Flynn to be "a very respectable man," the official told a group of reporters from major media outlets, on condition of anonymity. The official appeared to be trying to assuage deep public concerns over the maverick businessman, who threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from Japan and let it defend itself against North Korea, possibly with its own nuclear weapons. "I don't think anyone would be able to drastically change the Japan-U.S. military alliance," the official said, echoing comments later repeated by other Japanese officials trying to ease the shock stemming from Trump's unexpected victory. (Yoshida Reiji, "Trump Security Adviser Sought to Reassure Suga on Japan Policy: Source," *Japan Times*, November 16, 2016)

South Korea approved three major defense projects, including a long-range rocket system, to help bolster its capabilities to better counter growing North Korean military

threats. During the 2017-2020 period, Seoul will develop and deploy an unguided projectile that can be mounted on a new 230mm multiple rocket launch system (MRLS) built locally to deal with the North's artillery threats, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said in a statement. "If deployed and launched, the new unguided projectile MRLS could wreck considerable havoc on exposed targets deep within enemy territory," DAPA spokesman Kim Si-cheol said in a press briefing. One such rocket could lay waste to an area roughly the size of three football fields. In another project, the government will inject about 18.4 billion won (US\$16 million) for 27 months through the end of 2019 to develop the country's 3,000-ton next-generation Batch-III frigates. The warships are a continuation of the Incheon and Daegu class of ships entering the Navy but will be larger and more capable, according to DAPA. The vessels in these classes are officially referred to as Ulsan ships, which is also the name given to nine frigates that were commissioned in the 1980s and 1990s and are in the process of being phased out of service. DAPA has selected Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., the world's biggest shipbuilder, as the preferred bidder. "We are planning to sign a contract with the shipbuilder by December to push the Batch-III project forward," its spokesman said. The final project involves Seoul's F-35 fighter jet purchase program reached with Lockheed Martin Corp. and a U.S.-built communications satellite to be used for South Korea's military, he said. In September, South Korea signed a US\$6 billion deal to purchase 40 F-35 fighter jets from Lockheed Martin on the condition that the U.S. defense and aerospace company will provide a satellite as part of the offset package. "The U.S. company, citing mounting costs, had put this project on hold for one and a half years, but agreed to build the satellite if Seoul did not press for damages brought on by the breach of contract," the spokesman said. He said if Lockheed Martin again fails to follow through on the agreement it will face penalties. (Yonhap, "S. Korea to Develop Long-Range Rocket to Counter North Threats," November 16, 2016)

North Korea replaced its deputy ambassador to the United Nations from An Myong-hun to Kim In-ryong early this month, although An's term fell far short of that of his predecessors, a U.S. broadcaster, monitored here, reported. "The replacement is unusual as An's tenure was less than two years, compared with his predecessors' four to five years on average," the Radio Free Asia (RFA) said, citing a U.N. source. An was appointed to the post in December 2014. Kim's relations with the North Korean U.N. Ambassador Ja Song-nam was behind the replacement, the broadcaster said. The new deputy ambassador is known to have been a maritime affairs councilor at the British Embassy in 2011, when Ja was the ambassador there, according the broadcaster. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Names New UN Deputy Ambassador," *Korea Times*, November 17, 2016)

11/17/16

Former U.S. officials are meeting with North Korean diplomats in Geneva in what is yet another round of informal talks known as Track 2. Joel Wit, editor of *38 North*, and Robert Einhorn, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, are to meet with North Korea's deputy ambassador to the United Nations and Pyongyang's director general for North American affairs at the foreign ministry, Yonhap reported. Wit served as senior advisor to former U.S. negotiator Robert Gallucci during the Clinton administration. Einhorn served as the State Department's special advisor for non-

proliferation and arms control under former State Secretary Hillary Clinton. The meeting marks the first time former U.S. officials have made contact with North Korean diplomats since the U.S. presidential election last week. Deputy Ambassador Jang Il Hun did not comment when asked by a Yonhap reporter on whether he had prepared a message for the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump. Wit also said he didn't want to take questions from the press. Seoul said Track 2 dialogues are not related to South Korea policy. (Elizabeth Shim, "Former U.S. Officials Meet with North Korea Diplomats for Informal Talks," UPI, November 17, 2016)

North Korea's top official in charge of dealing with the U.S. told prominent American figures in informal talks in Geneva that Pyongyang will "refrain from taking measures that could harm bilateral relations" until the Donald Trump administration's policies can be assessed. But Choe Son-hui, the director of North American affairs at the North Korean Foreign Ministry, warned annual joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea in February will be an exception. The Geneva meeting was the first contact between the two sides since the U.S. presidential election. Those at the meeting included Joel Wit, the editor of the 38 North website at Johns Hopkins University, and Robert Einhorn, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Also present was North Korea's deputy ambassador to the UN Jang Il-hun. According to documents related to the meeting, Choe said North Koreans were equally "surprised" by Trump's election win as the American public and added that she had to work late into the night to explain the results to her superiors. She conceded that she knows little about the U.S. president-elect and that it would be better to refrain from comments until she could assess him further. Choe repeatedly asked the Americans how long it would take for the Trump administration to work out its North Korea policies. They told her "at least a few months" and Choe replied Pyongyang will not take any action that would "shut the doors in relations with the U.S." Radio Free Asia said that seems to mean the North will refrain from additional nuclear tests or missile launches. Choe said North Korea's response would be "very tough" if Seoul and Washington go ahead their annual joint military drills in February. (*Chosun Ilbo*, "N. Korea Pledges to Refrain from Provocations - For Now," December 9, 2016)

The number of North Korean students studying in the US has more than doubled on-year, US-based Radio Free Asia reported. Citing data from an annual report by the US Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, RFA said there were currently 18 North Korean students in the US, while in the previous year there had only been eight. Among the identified students, 16 were enrolled in bachelor's degree programs, one in graduate school and one in a non-degree program.

The number of North Korean students in the US spiked in the year 2000, when the number hit 201. (Lim Jeong-yeo, "18 N. Korean Students Currently in U.S.," *Korea Herald*, November 17, 2016)

11/19/16

Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to engage in "joint economic activities" with Japan on four islands off eastern Hokkaido that are subject to a thorny territorial dispute. Putin revealed the proposal, made during bilateral talks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Lima with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, during a news conference held in Lima. Kunashiri, Etorofu, the Habomai islets and

Shikotan, collectively called the "Northern Territories" in Japan, were seized by Soviet forces at the end of World War II, but are claimed by Japan. In a news conference on November 20, Putin said, "In yesterday's meeting, we talked about what we can jointly do on the islands. It will become a solution for economic and humanitarian issues." He refused to divulge details, saying, "It is too early to speak about this. That is because a final agreement (with Japan) has yet to be reached." Putin emphasized the need for deeper trust between the two countries to resolve the territorial dispute, "One of the measures (toward that goal) is the expansion of cooperation." Putin referred to the lack of a peace treaty as "an anachronistic situation that lingers on from the past." He said that Russia is "hoping with all its heart to conclude a peace treaty." However, he again emphasized that Russia seized the four islands in a justifiable manner. According to Japanese government sources, Abe only listened to Putin's proposal and avoided making a reply. This was because Japan insists it cannot engage in joint economic activities in the Northern Territories based on Russian laws. (Komaki Akiyoshi, "Putin Proposes 'Joint Economic Activities' on Northern Isles," *Asahi Shimbun*, November 21, 2016)

11/20/16

President Park Geun-hye acted as a criminal accomplice for her longtime friend in extorting tens of millions of dollars from businesses, prosecutors said, dealing another blow to the South Korean leader, who faced a nationwide call to step down. "We have determined that President Park was an accomplice in many of the criminal acts" of Choi and the two former aides, Lee Yeong-ryeol, a senior prosecutor, said during a nationally televised news briefing. Under the Constitution, prosecutors cannot indict the president on criminal charges until after she leaves office. But their findings further weakened Park's authority, and prompted opposition leaders, as well as some members of Park's governing party, to demand that Parliament start a legal process to impeach her. Yesterday, huge crowds protested in Seoul and other major cities for the fourth straight weekend, demanding that she resign or face impeachment. Prosecutors identified Park as an accomplice and a "criminal suspect" while indicting her friend, Choi Soon-sil, on criminal charges including extortion and abuse of official power. A former presidential aide to Park was also indicted, on the same charges, as prosecutors accused him of helping Choi with the extortion. Another former presidential aide was indicted on charges of leaking confidential government documents to Choi. Although she had no experience in government or policy making, Choi was accused of meddling in a wide range of state affairs, like editing Park's speeches and helping her appoint key officials. Lee said prosecutors had based their determination partly on information they collected from the two former aides' notebooks, diaries and cellphones, which contained instructions from Park. Later today, her office accused prosecutors of losing their political neutrality. "The investigators' announcement today was completely untrue," said Jung Youn-kok, Park's spokesman. "It was nothing but a house of cards that ignored objective evidence." Choi, the president's friend, was accused of forcing Samsung, Hyundai and 51 other major businesses to donate a total of \$65 million to two foundations she controlled. The businesses feared tax inquiries and other governmental retaliation if they did not donate, Lee said. Choi was also accused of forcing businesses to give contracts amounting to \$12 million to companies controlled by her or her associates. They also tried in vain to wrest control of a lucrative public relations agency through

blackmailing, Lee said. And they forced Lotte, a South Korean conglomerate, to donate \$5.9 million for sports facilities under Choi's control, he said. (The money was later returned.) A key question that was not addressed by prosecutors on Sunday was whether Park and her office had tried to cover up the scandal. Officials who tried to raise alarms have been demoted, fired and even imprisoned. (Choe Sang-hun, "South Korean Leader Was Accomplice in Her Friend's Crimes," *New York Times*, November 20, 2016, p. A-13)

11/21/16

DPRK FoMin Memorandum: "The DPRK's Strengthening of its Nuclear Forces Is a Righteous Choice to Defend Itself from the Extreme Moves of the U.S. to Stifle It: Five years have gone by since the DPRK, after having lost its great leader, engaged itself in an all-out confrontation with the U.S. imperialists to cope with their ever-worsening hostile moves and increasing nuclear threat against it. The people of the DPRK have turned out in the struggle to implement the behests of the great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il, overcoming the pain and sorrow of having lost him. The U.S. has employed all kinds of means and methods in vicious moves to check the advance of the DPRK and tried to seize the opportunity to stifle it. However, the anachronistic hostile policy and nuclear threat that the U.S. has enforced with unprecedented recklessness against the DPRK have only provoked its just and righteous countermeasure for self-defense and ended up in total and complete failure. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK hereby issues this memorandum to disclose the criminal acts of the U.S. which has pushed the DPRK towards strengthening of its nuclear forces by making ceaseless hostile moves against it after it suffered the greatest loss of the nation. 1. Heinous hostile maneuvers against the DPRK aimed at political suffocation and system collapse. Since the year 2012, soon after the passing away of the great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il, the U.S. began to openly pursue the objective to politically stifle the DPRK and overthrow its system by all means. Blatant remarks denying the DPRK's government, system and policy were made by high-level officials of the U.S. and even Obama himself has constantly heaped malicious slander and criticism on the DPRK in his public appearances. The gravity of hostile maneuvers of the U.S. against the DPRK lies in the fact that they have grown extremely reckless and dangerous as to target the supreme leadership of our revolution. The Obama administration dared to defame the supreme dignity of the DPRK as an extension of their malicious slander on it. This is the gravest of all sins which will never be forgiven for eternity. This fully reveals the true nature of the policy of "strategic patience" pursued by the Obama administration, which is none other than an aggressive and heinous "strategic suffocation" policy against the DPRK. By this time, the "human rights" racket which the U.S. has long made against the DPRK has grown so reckless as to attempt to put their wild ambition of overthrowing the DPRK's system into practice. The U.S. has gone so far as to breach the basic principles of international laws and ditch its dignity of a superpower by pleading with other countries to join their pressure racket against the DPRK through downgrading or severing ties with it. The U.S. political acts of hostility against the DPRK find graphic accounts in the following record of events: On March 25, 2012, Obama clamored about "isolation" of the DPRK while condemning its strengthening of nuclear deterrent. In June 2012, the U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues disclosed the provision of funds by the State Department to anti-DPRK media entities. On August 16, 2012, Obama signed the "North Korea Human Rights Reauthorization

Act". From March to June 2013, the U.S. State Department released "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report", "DPRK Human Rights Report", "International Religious Freedom Report" and "Trafficking in Persons Report" to intensify its condemnation against the DPRK on baseless or fabricated data and allegations. On January 17, 2014, Obama signed the "Appreciation Act" for the 2014 fiscal year which allocated huge amount of funds for anti-DPRK "human rights" racket. On February 26, 2014, the U.S. Secretary of State Kerry, in a press interview, labeled the DPRK as an "evil place" and said they should "hold it accountable." On April 15, 2014, the U.S. State Department officially announced its provision of funds to anti-DPRK "human rights" groups. From April 23 to 26, 2014, during his visit to Japan and south Korea, Obama criticized the DPRK as the "worst violator of human rights." On September 23, 2014, the U.S. Secretary of State Kerry personally called a "High-Level Meeting on North Korea Human Rights" in New York and fanned the atmosphere of pressurizing the DPRK. On November 18, 2014, an anti-DPRK "human rights resolution" was coercively adopted at the meeting of the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly at the instigation of the U.S. On December 22, 2014, the U.S. pressed for a meeting of United Nations Security Council with the agenda item of the DPRK's "human rights situation." On January 22, 2015, Obama made malicious remarks about the "collapse" of the DPRK in an interview. From May 17 to 18, 2015, during his visit to south Korea, the U.S. Secretary of State Kerry provoked the supreme leadership of the DPRK by talking about "reckless disregard for human rights" and "the most egregious examples." On December 10, 2015, the U.S. has put the "human rights situation" of the DPRK on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council abusing its presidency of the Council. On February 18, 2016, Obama signed the "North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016" which included psychological warfare and "human rights" offensive against the DPRK to disintegrate it from within. On July 6, 2016, the U.S. State Department released a report, pursuant to the "North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016", that made impudent remarks about the supreme leadership of the DPRK while maliciously condemning the country. On September 20, 2016, Obama labeled the DPRK as a "wasteland" in his speech at the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly. On October 12, 2016, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs made vehement criticism of the supreme leadership of the DPRK. On October 28, 2016, during his visit to south Korea, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State condemned the policy of the DPRK government as "reckless and inhumane." The political acts of hostility committed by the U.S. against the DPRK since its great leader passed away was indeed the most vicious, frantic and despicable of all times.

2. Intensification of the extremely dangerous military hostility and nuclear threat and blackmail. During the last five years the U.S. revealed its intention to deliver a preemptive nuclear strike against the DPRK and intensified its military threats against us at a maximum pace. The U.S. consistently increased the scale and intensity of the aggressive joint military drills which it conducts on annual basis, creating extreme tension on the Korean peninsula and driving the situation into a brink of nuclear war and seriously endangered peace and security in the region. To take an example of the Key Resolve joint military exercise, one of the typical joint military drills of the U.S. and the south Korean puppets, 2 100 U.S. troops participated in the exercise in the year 2012, but the U.S. steadily increased the number of troops to 3 500 in 2013, 5 200 in 2014 and 8 600 in 2015, and in 2016, 27

000 troops participated in the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 joint military exercises. Beside the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises, the U.S. conducted over 40 provocative and aggressive military drills under various names on annual basis including Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military exercise, Max Thunder joint air force exercise, Double Dragon joint landing exercise and multilateral RIMPAC naval exercise, joint naval strike exercise, joint special force exercise, joint live firing exercise and so on. The total number of troops the U.S. has committed to these exercises reached over 500 000. Not only the scale of these war drills has increased, but also their character, purpose and contents became more and more provocative and frantic every year." (*Rodong Sinmun*, "Memorandum of DPRK Foreign Ministry, November 22, 2016)

11/22/16

North Korea seems to be testing the United States' policy direction toward Pyongyang ahead of the administration change in Washington, South Korea's foreign ministry said in reaction to Pyongyang's recent release of a foreign ministry memorandum. "Following the U.S.' recent presidential election, North Korea has attempted to indirectly put pressure on the incoming U.S. administration to alter its policy... this time the country seems to be testing the U.S. side in the form of the foreign ministry memorandum ahead of the launch of the new Trump administration," South Korea's foreign ministry spokesman Cho June-hyuck said in a press briefing. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Testing U.S. ahead of New Administration," November 22, 2016)

DPRK FoMin spokesman's "answer to a question raised by KCNA as regards the fact that Obama pulled up the DPRK over its legitimate bolstering of nuclear force: During a recent APEC summit in Peru, Obama again took issue with "provocation" by the DPRK and its "denuclearization." His string of rhetoric about provocation and outdated call for sanctions and pressure on the DPRK is the last-ditch efforts to evade the responsibility for compelling the DPRK to have access to nuclear weapons and cover up his failed DPRK policy. Explicitly speaking once again, the hideous hostile policy toward the DPRK and nuclear threat and blackmail against it pursued by the successive rulers of the U.S. have been a root cause of escalating the tension on the Korean peninsula and a fundamental factor that pushed the DPRK to have access to nuclear weapons. The U.S. undisguised moves aimed to violate the sovereignty and the right to existence of the DPRK will only bolster its spirit of self-development and its will to bolster nuclear force. The basic way of settling the issue of the Korean peninsula is for the U.S. to face up to the changed strategic position of the DPRK and the trend of the times and to make a bold decision to withdraw the hostile policy toward the DPRK. Should the U.S. fail to discard the anachronistic way of thinking, it will face more miserable and bitterer consequences than what it faced so far." (KCNA, "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts Obama for Pulling up DPRK," November 22, 2016)

President Park Geun-hye approved a military intelligence-sharing pact with Japan aimed at countering the North Korean threat, a move that angered South Korean opposition parties, which want to impeach Park over a corruption scandal. The United States, an ally of both South Korea and Japan, has pressed them to increase military cooperation so the three countries can more effectively monitor and confront threats from the North, whose development of nuclear arms and missiles has been

accelerating. Currently, Japan and South Korea use Washington as an intermediary when sharing intelligence on North Korea. But South Koreans are wary of cooperating too closely with Japan, which ruled Korea as a colony for 35 years until the end of World War II. The main opposition Democratic Party said that Park would be remembered as a "traitorous president" because of the deal with Japan. "We cannot restrain our anger at President Park's arrogance," the party said in a statement. "She is not satisfied with parlaying the government through her unprecedented scandal; now she is trying to ruin diplomacy and national security too." (Choe Sang-hun, "Pact with Japan Riles South Korean Opposition," *New York Times*, November 23, 2016, p. A-8)

Just before signing the bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan, the South Korean military abruptly delayed defensive exercises at the island of Dokdo, prompting criticism that the agreement represents a disgraceful capitulation to Japan. "The navy was planning to hold the Dokdo defensive exercises on Nov. 24. It was planning to brief Defense Minister Han Min-koo and others before proceeding with the exercises as planned, but they were abruptly postponed last week," a source in the government said on Nov. 22. "My understanding is that the navy's abrupt postponement resulted from orders from above," the source added. While the source did not specify what was meant by "above," this is presumably a reference to the Defense Ministry and the Blue House. "I've heard that there were concerns that the plan to hold the Dokdo defensive exercises might create tension with Japan if they were reported in the media before the agreement was signed. The government groveled on its own accord," the source said. The Dokdo defensive exercises are a regular event that have been held twice a year since 1986, based on the scenario of an attack by an external threat such as the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The exercises are led by the navy, with support from the marines and the coast guard. (Park Byong-su, "Before Signing GSOMIA with Japan, S. Korea Calls off Regular Dokdo Defensive Drills," *Hankyore*, November 23, 2016)

11/24/16

DPRK FoMin spokesman's statement "sniping at the agreement on protecting military intelligence concluded between Japan and south Korea despite the unanimous opposition and denunciation of Koreans and other people in the world. Terming the agreement hastily concluded by Japan and the south Korean puppet forces at the prodding of the U.S. under the absurd pretext of coping with "nuclear and missile threat" from the DPRK an intolerable act hostile to the DPRK, the statement said: Acute military confrontation and tensions linger on the Korean peninsula due to the hideous moves of the U.S., Japan and other hostile forces against the DPRK. Against this backdrop, Japan and the south Korean puppet forces concluded an agreement on military cooperation. This will only result in escalating the danger of war on the Korean peninsula as it is an act of the lackeys of the U.S. to do harm to the DPRK, pursuant to the U.S. hostile policy and nuclear threat and blackmail against the DPRK. The conclusion of the agreement is a blatant challenge to the Korean people and the international community aspiring after peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. The situation clearly proves that the U.S. and its vassal forces are chiefly to blame for harassing peace and stability and ratcheting up confrontation and tensions. Through the conclusion of the agreement Japan seeks to pave the way for emerging a military giant and realizing the wild ambition for launching reinvasion and



the south Korean puppet regime works hard to tide over the worst-ever ruling crisis. However, it will only precipitate their self-destruction." (KCNA, "Japan-S. Korea Agreement on Protecting Military Intelligence Termed Hostile to DPRK," November 25, 2016)

12/26/16

North Korea's deputy chief of mission to the United Nations is expected to be replaced next month, the Voice of America said. VOA cited multiple sources saying that Amb. Jang Il-hun will return to Pyongyang next month, and Pak Song-il, deputy director of the North Korean Foreign Ministry's American affairs bureau, will succeed him. Jang assumed the post in July 2013, succeeding Han Song-ryol, who later became deputy foreign minister. Pak previously served at the U.N. mission as a councilor for many years under then-Ambassador Pak Gil-yon and his successor, Sin Son-ho, who were in the job from 2001 to 2008 and 2008-2014, respectively. VOA reported that Pak was involved in sports and cultural exchanges between the North and the U.S., playing key roles in organizing two taekwondo demonstrations by a North Korea team in the U.S. and the New York Philharmonic's landmark concert in the North in 2008. (Yonhap, "N. Korea to Replace Deputy Chief of Mission at U.N.: Report," November 26, 2016)

During his November 22 visit to *The New York Times*, Trump referred obliquely to a "big problem for the country" that President Obama had mentioned during their 90-minute meeting at the White House after the election. Well-placed American officials believe that reference was to North Korea. Any solution to that problem must involve China, North Korea's patron, American and Chinese officials agree. Trump acknowledged as much during the campaign. So which tack will Trump take with China? Will he seek its support for a deal on North Korea, or will he start a trade war, putting such cooperation in doubt? American officials briefed the Chinese several months ago on their assessment that the North's nuclear capabilities had sharply increased, according to two Americans with knowledge of the briefings, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. But even before then, nuclear scientists from China and the United States had agreed for some time about the danger posed by the North's ambitions, said Siegfried S. Hecker, an American nuclear scientist at Stanford University who was the last outsider to visit the country's plutonium processing plant at Yongbyon, in November 2010. Several years ago, the Chinese tended to play down the North's nuclear capabilities, Hecker said in an email exchange. But since the mercurial Kim Jong-un, a young leader who has declined to listen to China and has provoked the United States, took over the country, the assessments of the two powers have been "pretty much in line," he said. Hecker and other scientists estimate that North Korea might develop the capacity to strike the West Coast of the United States with a nuclear warhead in about five years. But the real problem is here and now, in Asia, he said. "The greatest and most urgent threat comes not from a North Korean nuke being able to reach the U.S., but rather what they have already," he said. Specifically, Hecker wrote in a recent article, the North is now probably able "to put nuclear weapons on target anywhere in South Korea and Japan and even on some U.S. assets in the Pacific." Worse yet, he wrote, North Korea may have developed a "false sense of confidence" from a recent spate of successful nuclear and missile tests – one that could lead it to grave errors of judgment. By the end of this year, Hecker estimated, the country is likely to have enough fissile material for about

20 bombs. The danger would be exacerbated if the North decided "to field tactical nuclear weapons as its arsenal expands and its confidence in its nuclear arsenal grows." In short, Hecker said, more and better bombs make a catastrophic miscalculation by North Korea more likely. How much of this Trump knew before his victory is unclear, but he was certainly aware of the problem. Early on, he expressed a mixture of awe and dismay toward Kim. "If you look at North Korea, this guy, I mean, he's like a maniac, O.K.?" he said at a rally in Ottumwa, Iowa, in January. "And you've got to give him credit. How many young guys – he was like 26 or 25 when his father died – can take over these tough generals?" Mr. Trump was referring to Mr. Kim's execution of several generals, including his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, who was the main conduit between North Korea and China. "We can't play games with him," Trump said at the time, referring to Kim. "Because he really does have missiles, and he really does have nukes." Such considerations – and briefings that Trump presumably has received or will receive on the North's capabilities – could compel the new president to prioritize security over trade in his dealings with China. With the right approach, he could find a willing partner in Beijing, said Yang Xiyu, a former Chinese official who oversaw the so-called six-party talks on the North's nuclear program that collapsed in 2008. But Chinese officials say that approach would require removing a thorn in Beijing's side: an advanced missile defense system that the United States plans to install in South Korea. The Chinese view that system, known as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System, as an effort to contain its ambitions in Asia, though Washington and Seoul say it is intended purely to defend South Korea against the North. In the past year, China has rebuffed many of Washington's requests for sharper measures against North Korea, and the missile system is one reason. Whether Trump would consider scrapping it is another unknown. Washington and Beijing did cooperate on United Nations sanctions against the North this year – an encouraging sign, analysts said, though many doubt that economic punishment alone will be a deterrent. And on November 25, the Chinese state-run news media reported that Beijing would support a new round of sanctions being considered by the Security Council that would close loopholes allowing North Korea to sell coal. Yang said the Trump administration must take into account Beijing's worst fear, where the North is concerned: a collapse of Kim's totalitarian regime, followed by refugees from the North pouring into China and a unified Korean Peninsula under the protection of the American military. As president, Trump must understand that Kim's government has to stay, Yang said. "Remove the bombs, not the regime, is the key to a peaceful solution," Yang said. If the United States shares that goal, he said, "we can cooperate sincerely and substantively." (Jane Perlez, "Will Trump Rethink a China Showdown?" *New York Times*, November 26, 2016, p. A-14)

11/29/16

KCNA: "There are politicians in the U.S. who have still an unrealistic way of thinking about the DPRK. Antony Blinken, U.S. deputy secretary of State, claimed that "north Korea cannot be recognized as a nuclear weapons state and its access to nukes should not be allowed," negating the assertion made by the director of National Intelligence of the U.S. that the denuclearization of Korea is a failure. In this regard an expert on Korean affairs in an article contributed to NK News said that the man styling himself a politician is still claiming Pyongyang's denuclearization to be the goal of the U.S. because of little experience in the Northeast Asian issue, adding that Blinken seems to

live in the juvenile world. This is jeering at the anachronistic and trite way of thinking of the man who has no elementary ability to face up to the reality. It is long since the theory of "DPRK's possible dismantlement of its nukes" touted by the U.S. and some other countries went bust due to the world's recognition of the changed strategic position of the DPRK. The U.S. and many other Western media which had taken a hostile approach towards the DPRK are giving wide publicity to the public demands for the earliest possible drop of the bankrupt hostile policy towards the DPRK, asserting that it is not necessary to expect north Korea to dismantle its nukes. Recently Michael Hayden, former director of CIA, in an article contributed to the U.S. paper "The Hill" confessed to the fact about the denuclearization of Korea being an impossible goal was the view already unofficially shared among the U.S. intelligence authorities a decade ago. This created big sensation. All these facts objectively prove that the U.S. finds itself in such tight corner that it has no choice but to change its strategic option. It is great irony that Blinken is still sticking to the unrealistic way of thinking against this backdrop. The completely failed policy towards the DPRK being a stark fact, it is not only foolish but an extremely dangerous option to persistently resort to the completely failed strategy. The U.S. should not persist in something impossible. The successive U.S. administrations from Truman to Obama have squandered funds running into astronomical figures for pursuing their policy to stifle the DPRK for several decades. The U.S. needs to seriously reflect on what it gained from such policy. The pig-headed stand of persistently denying the strategic position of the full-fledged nuclear power in the East would only result in impairing the position of the superpower tight-cornered over the Korean issue. Washington would be well advised to face up to the reality. It can take a wise option only when it proceeds from a realistic way of thinking." (KCNA, "KCNA Commentary Advises U.S. to Think with Reason," November 29, 2016)

11/30/16

In an effort to tighten sanctions that largely failed to throttle North Korea's nuclear program, the United Nations Security Council imposed a cap on coal exports, the country's chief source of hard currency. The new penalties – adopted unanimously by the Council, including China – came as North Korea advances toward its goal of building a functional nuclear warhead. That presents a stark national security challenge to the incoming administration of President-elect Donald J. Trump, who called North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un, "a maniac" during the campaign, but has said nothing about how to contain Kim's nuclear ambitions. The new restrictions on North Korean coal were relatively easy for Beijing to approve. They serve the purpose of expressing China's displeasure with Mr. Kim's agenda, yet they fall short of inflicting crippling pain on North Korea. China's permanent representative to the United Nations, Liu Jieyi, called on North Korea to halt its nuclear tests, saying they undermine regional stability and Beijing's "strategic interests." He said the resolution demonstrated "the uniform stance of the international community." Samantha Power, the American ambassador to the United Nations, said that "the United States recognizes China in working closely with us." Negotiations lasted for three months, since Pyongyang's fifth and latest nuclear test in September. The original sanctions – which the United States at the time hailed as "comprehensive" – had sought to limit coal exports, unless it was for what the measure called "livelihood" reasons. In spite of the sanctions, exports to China increased. The new resolution aims to shave \$700 million from North Korea's coal revenues. The resolution says North Korea can sell no more than 7.5 million metric tons

of coal a year, or bring in no more than \$400 million in sales, whichever comes first. It also requires countries to tell the United Nations how much North Korean coal they are buying and expands the list of banned items for import by North Korea, including luxury goods like bone china worth more than \$100 as well as equipment with dual-use purposes. The measure also urges countries to allow North Korean diplomatic missions around the world to have only one bank account. That, the United States says, is intended to limit the country's penchant for using its envoys and embassies to further its nuclear program. How successful the new measures will be, of course, depends on the willingness of countries to abide by them. The United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, called the measures the "toughest" sanctions imposed by the Council. But he warned that the passage alone would be insufficient. "It is incumbent on all member states of the United Nations to make every effort to ensure that these sanctions are fully implemented," he said. American officials have warned for months that the North's nuclear capabilities have increased sharply. Its missile and nuclear tests, the most recent in September, have accelerated, despite the imposition of sanctions in March. The revised sanctions are aimed at cutting into North Korea's ability to profit from coal exports and to tighten the noose around individuals and companies involved in its nuclear program. The measure expands the list of people subject to asset freezes and travel bans; they include some envoys to countries like Egypt and Sudan. American officials said the new sanctions would also clarify that the "livelihood" exemption applies to North Korean citizens, and cannot be used to protect the livelihoods of Chinese importers. Publicly, China has defended its coal imports since the sanctions earlier this year. Even if statistics showed increased imports, the trade was legal under the livelihood exemption, the Foreign Ministry said. Chinese analysts point to conditions flourishing in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, and say rudimentary market trading in rural areas is keeping much of the population afloat. And even though some Chinese steel makers in northern China value North Korea's high-grade coal, the new curbs would have relatively little impact on China's industrial output, said Deng Shun, a coal market analyst with Success Futures, a trading company in Guangzhou. (Somini Sengupta and Jane Perlez, "U.N. Stiffens Sanctions on North Korea," *New York Times*, December 1, 2016, p. A-4)

New U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea, imposed after its fifth and largest nuclear test in September, are not intended to harm "normal" trade with the isolated country nor affect civilians, China's Foreign Ministry said. (Ben Blanchard, "China Says New North Korea Sanctions Not Meant to Harm 'Normal' Trade," Reuters, December 1, 2016) The key sanction against North Korea imposed by Resolution No. 2321, which the UN Security Council adopted is a quota system on North Korea's exports of coal. The resolution states that the volume and value of North Korea's yearly coal exports (which must be transactions aimed at improving the livelihood of the North Korean people) will be limited to either 7.5 million tons or just over US\$400 million (whichever is lower), starting on January 1, 2017. Virtually all of North Korea's coal exports go to China. The main importers are Liaoning and Jilin provinces across the Yalu and Tumen rivers and Shandong, Jiangsu and Hebei provinces across the West (Yellow) Sea. According to figures from China's General Administration of Customs, North Korea exported 19.6 million tons of coal to China last year, earning US\$1.05 billion. Thus, the new sanctions are aimed at reducing the volume and value of the North's coal exports

to about 38% or 39% of last year's figures. "By simply implementing a quota system for coal exports, we can expect North Korea's cash receipts to be reduced by about US\$600 or 700 million dollars a year," said an official from South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Lee Je-hun, "How Much Will New U.N. Sanctions Affect North Korea's Coal Exports to China?" *Hankyore*, November 30, 2016)

What if someone were to tell you that China and North Korea are allied with militant Islamists bent on imposing their religious ideology worldwide? You might not agree. After all, China and North Korea are officially secular Communist states, and China has blamed religious extremists for violence in Muslim areas of its Xinjiang region. But such an alliance is the framework through which retired Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, the pick of President-elect Donald J. Trump for national security adviser, views the two East Asian countries. The book, "The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global War against Radical Islam and Its Allies," published in July, is one of the few places where General Flynn has discussed his views on China and North Korea. The mentions are infrequent, but they give some clue as to how he views the Asian nations. Here are the most relevant passages. In the introduction, General Flynn says one of his goals in writing the book is: "to show you the war being waged against us. This administration has forbidden us to describe our enemies properly and clearly: They are Radical Islamists. They are not alone, and are allied with countries and groups who, though not religious fanatics, share their hatred of the West, particularly the United States and Israel. Those allies include North Korea, Russia, China, Cuba, and Venezuela." He tries to further explain that alliance through a vague mention of a common ideology: "There are many similarities between these dangerous and vicious radicals and the totalitarian movements of the last century. No surprise that we are facing an alliance between Radical Islamists and regimes in Havana, Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing. Both believe that history, and/or Allah, blesses their efforts, and so both want to ensure that this glorious story is carefully told." General Flynn goes on to discuss reports that North Korea has cooperated with Iran and Syria on nuclear programs and trade. He asserts that Iran is the "linchpin" of the global anti-Western network. He writes: "The mullahs have already established strategic alliances in our own hemisphere with Cuba and Venezuela, and are working closely with Russia and China; a victory over the 'Great Satan' in Iraq will compel the smaller Middle Eastern countries to come to terms with Tehran, and make the region much more inhospitable to us and our friends and allies." The appointment of General Flynn has caught the attention of some Chinese scholars and analysts. They appear to be wary. Last week, Shi Zehua, an associate professor of international relations at Beijing Foreign Studies University, wrote in an opinion piece in *The Beijing News* that General Flynn "has serious Islamophobia and is full of sympathy toward white supremacy." Shi added: "Along with his style of bigoted behavior, a strong desire for state power and being in charge, and a lack of sense of the big picture, will he destroy American political values and its foreign policy traditions, together with Trump the political illiterate? It is really hard to say." John Delury, a scholar of Chinese history and the Koreas at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea, shared these thoughts after reading General Flynn's book: "General Flynn seems to be all about one thing – fighting 'radical Islam' – and that means Asia goes on the back burner. Obama was trying to 'pivot' from costly wars in the Middle East to economic opportunity in Asia, a strategy that was still in-progress and that Hillary

Clinton would have stuck with. But Flynn has no concept of the importance of Asia. For him, America needs to become single-minded in the top priority – destroying radical Islam, at home and abroad. “Flynn’s obsession with eliminating radical Islam is likely to color his view of everything else – including key strategic questions facing East Asia like the rise of China, resurgence of Japan and nuclear breakout of North Korea. Running the National Security Council is all about juggling priorities, keeping your eye on the ball while maintaining strategic balance. Flynn doesn’t come across as much of a juggler. For him, there is only one ball out there. “If Flynn is able to press his global war on radical Islam, America’s rivals in Asia will seize the opportunity to further their interests. China can speed up its march to displace the U.S. as the architect of Asian security. North Korea can finish its drive to joining the nuclear club. Life will also change for America’s Asian allies, who will no longer be able to count on U.S. commitment to their development and defense. And America’s role as a promoter of human rights and liberal values – a contested and problematic mission, albeit a noble one – could become a thing of the past. “Here’s an example of how Flynn’s global war on radical Islam could have unanticipated side effects on Asian security. In his book, Flynn links North Korea to his ‘enemy number one,’ the Islamists, by citing Pyongyang’s military and economic ties to Syria and Iran. Well, what if the North Koreans promised an envoy from Trump – who said he’s willing to talk to Kim Jong-un – that they would cut their links to radical Islam and even give the Americans some intell based on their years of cooperation? Nonproliferation guarantees, which the North Koreans put out as bait throughout the Obama years, to no effect, could serve as a starting point for resumed U.S.-D.P.R.K. negotiation under a Flynn foreign policy. The old dictum stands – my enemy’s enemy is my friend. Flynn is crystal clear who the enemy is, radical Islam. Anyone who shows eagerness to fight the Islamists buys a seat at Flynn’s national security table.” (Edward Wong, “Michael Flynn, a Top Trump Adviser, Ties China and North Korea to Islamists,” *New York Times*, November 30, 2016)

**Resolution 2321 (2016) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7821st meeting, on 30 November 2016**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), and resolution 2270 (2016), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006

(S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

*Reaffirming* that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

*Expressing* its gravest concern at the nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on September 9, 2016 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

*Underlining* once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

*Underlining* also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK, *Expressing* serious concern that the DPRK has continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated launches and attempted launches of ballistic missiles, and *noting* that all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond,

*Expressing* continued concern that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,

*Expressing* great concern that the DPRK's prohibited arms sales have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have unmet needs,

*Expressing* its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear-and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 9 September 2016 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;
2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches; shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;
3. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;
4. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in annex III of this resolution;
5. *Reaffirms* the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and *clarifies* that the term "luxury goods" includes also, but is not limited to, the items specified in annex IV of this resolution;
6. *Reaffirms* paragraphs 14 through 16 of resolution 1874 (2009), and paragraph 8 of resolution 2087 (2013), and *decides* that these paragraphs shall apply also with respect to any items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by this resolution;

7. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b), and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items listed in a new conventional arms dual-use list to be adopted by the Committee, *directs* the Committee to adopt this list within 15 days and to report to the Security Council to this effect, and further *decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adopt the list within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to update this list every 12 months;

8. *Decides* that paragraph 19 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall apply with respect to all leasing, chartering or provision of crew services to the DPRK without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;

9. *Decides* that paragraph 20 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall apply to registering vessels in the DPRK, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the DPRK flag, and owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel classification, certification or associated service, or insuring any vessel flagged by the DPRK, without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;

10. *Clarifies* that, for the purposes of implementing paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016), specialized teaching and training which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering;

11. *Decides* that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges unless:

(a) In the case of scientific or technical cooperation in the fields of nuclear science and technology, aerospace and aeronautical engineering and technology, or advanced manufacturing production techniques and methods, the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that a particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programs; or

(b) In the case of all other scientific or technical cooperation, the State engaging in scientific or technical cooperation determines that the particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programs and notifies the Committee in advance of such determination;

12. *Decides* that the Committee, if it has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessels are or have been related to nuclear-or ballistic missile-related programs or activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, may require any or all of the following measures with respect to vessels it designates pursuant to this paragraph: (a) the Flag State of a designated vessel shall de-flag the vessel; (b) the Flag State of a designated vessel shall direct the vessel to a port identified by the Committee, in coordination with the port State; (c) all Member States shall prohibit a designated vessel from entering their ports, unless in case of emergency, in case of return to the vessel's port of origination, or in case of direction by the Committee; (d) a vessel designated by the Committee shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006);

13. *Expresses concern* that the personal luggage and checked baggage of individuals entering into or departing from the DPRK may be used to transport items the supply,



sale or transfer of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, and *clarifies* that such luggage and baggage constitute “cargo” for the purposes of implementing paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016);

14. *Calls upon* all Member States to reduce the number of staff at DPRK diplomatic missions and consular posts;

15. *Decides* that all Member States shall take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of the DPRK, officials of that Government, and members of the DPRK armed forces, if the State determines that such members or officials are associated with the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), or this resolution;

16. *Decides* that all States shall take steps to limit the number of bank accounts to one per DPRK diplomatic mission and consular post, and one per accredited DPRK diplomat and consular officer, at banks in their territory;

17. *Recalls* that, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, a diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State practice for personal profit any professional or commercial activity, and *emphasizes* accordingly that DPRK diplomatic agents are prohibited in the receiving State from such practice of professional or commercial activity;

18. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the DPRK from using real property that it owns or leases in their territory for any purpose other than diplomatic or consular activities;

19. *Recalls* that a Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, and that the exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council;

20. *Recalls* that paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) requires all States to inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory, including their airports, that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, or by designated individuals or entities, or that is being transported on DPRK-flagged aircraft, *emphasizes* that this measure requires States to inspect DPRK-flagged aircraft when they land in or take off from their territory, *recalls* also that paragraph 31 of resolution 2270 (2016) requires all States to prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of aviation fuel, to the territory of the DPRK, and *calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance to ensure that no more fuel is provided to DPRK-flagged civil passenger aircraft than is necessary for the relevant flight, including a standard margin for safety of flight;

21. *Expresses* concern that prohibited items may be transported to and from the DPRK by rail and by road, and *underscores* that the obligation in paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) to inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory includes the cargo being transported by rail and by road;

22. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their

jurisdiction from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels owned, controlled, or operated, including through illicit means, by the DPRK unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that the vessel is engaged in activities exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue or exclusively for humanitarian purposes;

23. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals from procuring vessel and aircraft crewing services from the DPRK;

24. *Decides* that all Member States shall de-register any vessel that is owned, controlled, or operated by the DPRK, and further *decides* that Member States shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph;

25. *Notes* that, for the purpose of implementing resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution, the term “transit” includes but is not limited to the travel of individuals through a State’s international airport terminals en route to a destination in another State, regardless of whether such individuals pass through customs or passport control at that airport;

26. *Decides* that paragraph 29 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall be replaced by the following:

*“Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to:

(a) Coal that the procuring State confirms on the basis of credible information has originated outside the DPRK and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), provided that the State notifies the Committee in advance and such transactions are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

(b) Total exports to all Member States of coal originating in the DPRK that in the aggregate do not exceed 53,495,894 US dollars or 1,000,866 metric tons, whichever is lower, between the date of adoption of this resolution and 31 December 2016, and total exports to all Member States of coal originating in the DPRK that in the aggregate do not exceed 400,870,018 US dollars or 7,500,000 metric tons per year, whichever is lower, beginning 1 January 2017, provided that the procurements (i) involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions, and (ii) are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals *and* unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, and *decides* that each Member State that procures coal from the DPRK shall notify the Committee of the aggregate amount of the volume of such procurement for each month no later than 30

days after the conclusion of that month on the form in annex V to this resolution, *directs* the Committee to make publicly available on its website the volume of procurement of coal from the DPRK reported by Member States and value calculated by the Committee Secretary, as well as the amount reported for each month and with the number of States that reported for each month, *directs* the Committee to update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications, *calls upon* all States that import coal from the DPRK to periodically review this website to ensure that they do not exceed the mandatory aggregate annual limit, *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached, also *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 90 per cent of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached, further *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease procuring coal from the DPRK for the year, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources in this regard; and

(c) Transactions in iron and iron ore that are determined to be exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution."

27. *Directs* the Panel of Experts, following the end of each month, to determine and transmit to the Committee, in no more than 30 days, an estimate of the average (mean) price in US dollars of coal exported from the DPRK that month based on credible and factually accurate trade data, and *directs* the Committee Secretary to use this average price as the basis to calculate the value of the procurement of coal from the DPRK each month based on the volume reported by States for the purposes of notifying all member states and making publicly available DRPK export levels on the Committee website on a real-time basis as required in paragraph 26 of this resolution;

28. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, copper, nickel, silver and zinc, and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;

29. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, statues, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;

30. *Decides* that all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters and vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;

31. *Decides* that Member States shall take the necessary measures to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK within 90 days,

unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such offices, subsidiaries or accounts are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK or the activities of the United Nations or its specialized agencies or related organizations or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

32. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit public and private financial support from within their territories or by persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade), except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;

33. *Decides* that, if a Member State determines that an individual is working on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK bank or financial institution, then Member States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the individual's state of nationality, consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of the individual is required for fulfillment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), or this resolution;

34. *Expresses* concern that DPRK nationals are sent to work in other States for the purpose of earning hard currency that the DPRK uses for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and *calls upon* States to exercise vigilance over this practice;

35. *Reiterates* its concern that bulk cash may be used to evade measures imposed by the Security Council, and *calls upon* Member States to be alert to this risk;

36. *Calls upon* all Member States to report to the Security Council within 90 days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;

37. *Reaffirms* that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) obligates all States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials, and *notes* that these obligations are complementary to the obligations in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016) to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs;

38. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016), and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;

39. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in

paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2276 (2016), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;

40. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;

41. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

42. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide additional administrative and analytical support resources needed to increase the capacity of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) and strengthen its ability to analyse the DPRK's sanctions violation and evasion activities, to include additional funding allocated to the procurement of aerial imagery and analysis services, access to relevant trade and international security databases and other information sources, as well as support the resulting increased activities of the Committee by the Secretariat;

43. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to include findings and recommendations in its midterm reports, beginning with the midterm report due to be submitted to the Committee by no later than 5 August 2017;

44. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of its Panel of Experts, to hold special meetings on important thematic and regional topics and Member States' capacity challenges, to identify, prioritize, and mobilize resources to areas that would benefit from technical and capacity-building assistance to enable more effective implementation by Member States;

45. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK;

46. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270

(2016) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, and *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the Committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;

47. *Reaffirms* its support to the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, and that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;

48. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;

49. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;

50. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

#### **Annex I Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)**

1. PAK CHUN IL a. *Description*: Pak Chun Il has served as the DPRK Ambassador to Egypt and provides support to KOMID. b. *AKA*: n/a c. *Identifiers* DOB: 28 July 1954; Nationality: DPRK; Passport: 563410091

2. KIM SONG CHOL a. *Description*: Kim Song Chol is a KOMID official that has conducted business in Sudan on behalf of KOMID's interests. b. *AKA*: Kim Hak Song c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 26 March 1968, alt. DOB: 15 October 1970; Nationality: DPRK; Passport: 381420565, alt. Passport: 654120219

3. SON JONG HYOK a. *Description*: Son Jong Hyok is a KOMID official that has conducted business in Sudan on behalf of KOMID's interests. b. *AKA*: Son Min c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 20 May 1980; Nationality: DPRK

4. KIM SE GON a. *Description*: Kim Se Gon works on behalf of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry. b. *AKA*: n/a c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 13 November 1969; Passport: PD472310104; Nationality: DPRK

5. RI WON HO a. *Description*: Ri Won Ho is a DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID. b. *AKA*: n/a c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 17 July 1964; Passport: 381310014, Nationality: DPRK

6. JO YONG CHOL a. *Description*: Jo Yong Chol is a DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID. b. *AKA*: Cho Yong Chol c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 30 September 1973, Nationality: DPRK

7. KIM CHOL SAM a. *Description:* Kim Chol Sam is a representative for Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) who has been involved in managing transactions on behalf of DCB Finance Limited. As an overseas-based representative of DCB, it is suspected that Kim Chol Sam has facilitated transactions worth hundreds of thousands of dollars and likely managed millions of dollars in DPRK related accounts with potential links to nuclear/missile programs.

b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 11 March 1971; Nationality: DPRK

8. KIM SOK CHOL a. *Description:* Kim Sok Chol acted as the DPRK Ambassador to Myanmar and he operates as a KOMID facilitator. He was paid by KOMID for his assistance and arranges meetings on behalf of KOMID, including a meeting between KOMID and Myanmar's defense related persons to discuss financial matters. b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 8 May 1955; Passport 472310082; Nationality: DPRK

9. CHANG CHANG HA a. *Description:* Chang Chang Ha is the President of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS). b. *AKA:* Jang Chang Ha c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 10 January 1964; Nationality: DPRK

10. CHO CHUN RYONG a. *Description:* Cho Chun Ryong is the Chairman of the Second Economic Committee (SEC). b. *AKA:* Jo Chun Ryong c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 4 April 1960; Nationality: DPRK

11. SON MUN SAN a. *Description:* Son Mun San is the Director-General of the External Affairs Bureau of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE). b. *AKA:* n/a c.

*Identifiers:* DOB: 23 January 1951; Nationality: DPRK **Annex II Asset Freeze (Entities)**

1. KOREA UNITED DEVELOPMENT BANK a. *Description:* Korea United Development Bank operates in the financial services industry of the DPRK economy. b. *Location:* Pyongyang, North Korea; SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY

2. ILSIM INTERNATIONAL BANK a. *Description:* Ilsim International Bank is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC). Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions. b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT: ILSIKPPY

3. KOREA DAESONG BANK a. *Description:* Daesong Bank is owned and controlled by Office 39 of the Korea Workers' Party. b. *AKA:* Choson Taesong Unhaeng; *AKA:* Taesong Bank c. *Location:* Segori-dong, Gyongheung St. Potonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT/BIC: KDBKPPY

4. SINGWANG ECONOMICS AND TRADING GENERAL CORPORATION a. *Description:* Singwang Economics and Trading General Corporation is a DPRK firm for trading in coal. DPRK generates a significant share of the money for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs by mining natural resources and selling those resources abroad. b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Location:* DPRK

5. KOREA FOREIGN TECHNICAL TRADE CENTER a. *Description:* Korea Foreign Technical Trade Center is a DPRK firm trading in coal. DPRK generates a significant share of the funds needed to finance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs by mining natural resources and selling those resources abroad. b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Location:* DPRK

6. KOREA PUGANG TRADING CORPORATION a. *Description:* Korea Pugang Trading Corporation is owned by the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, DPRK's defense conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to Pyongyang's military related sales. b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Location:* Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

7. KOREA INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL JOINT VENTURE COMPANY a. *Description:* Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company is a subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation –DPRK’s defense conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to Pyongyang’s military related sales –and has engaged in proliferation-related transactions. b. *AKA:* Choson International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; AKA: Chosun International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; AKA: International Chemical Joint Venture Company c. *Location:* Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, DPRK; Location: Mangyongdae-kuyok, Pyongyang, DPRK; Location: Mangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK
8. DCB FINANCE LIMITED a. *Description:* DCB Finance Limited is a front company for Daedong Credit Bank (DCB), a listed entity. b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Locations:* Akara Building, 24 de Castro Street, Wickhams Cay I, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands; Dalian, China
9. KOREA TAESONG TRADING COMPANY a. *Description:* Korea Taesong Trading Company has acted on behalf of KOMID in dealings with Syria. b. *AKA:* n/a c. *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK
10. KOREA DAESONG GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION a. *Description:* Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation is affiliated with Office 39 through minerals (gold) exports, metals, machinery, agricultural products, ginseng, jewelry, and light industry products. b. *AKA:* Daesong Trading; Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Corporation c. *Location:* Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, Pyongyang City, DPRK

### **Annex III Items, Materials, Equipment, Goods and Technology**

#### **Nuclear-and/or Missile-usable Items**

1. Isocyanates (TDI (Toluene di-isocyanate), MDI (Methylene bis (phenyl isocyanate)), IPDI (Isophorone diisocyanate), HNMDI or HDI (Hexamethylene diisocyanate), and DDI (dimeryl diisocyanate) and production equipment.
2. Ammonium nitrate, chemically pure or in phase stabilized version (PSAN).
3. Non-destructive test chambers with a 1m or more critical internal dimension.
4. Turbo-pumps for liquid or hybrid rocket engines.
5. Polymeric Substances (Hydroxyl Terminated Poly-Ether (HTPE), Hydroxyl Terminated Caprolactone Ether (HTCE), Polypropylene glycol (PPG), Polydiethyleneglycol adipate (PGA) and Polyethylene Glycol (PEG)).
6. Inertial equipment for any application, particularly for civilian aircraft, satellite, geophysical survey applications and their associated test equipment.
7. Countermeasure Subsystems and Penetration Aids (e.g. jammers, chaff, decoys) designed to saturate, confuse, or evade missile defenses.
8. Manganese metal Brazing Foils.
9. Hydroforming machines.
10. Thermal treatment furnaces –Temperature >850 degrees C and one dimension >1m.
11. Electrical Discharge Machines (EDMs).
12. Friction stir welding machines.
13. Modelling and design software related to the modelling of aerodynamic and thermodynamic analysis of rocket or unmanned aerial vehicle systems.
14. High-speed imaging cameras except those used in medical imaging systems.
15. Truck chassis with 6 or more axles.

#### **Chemical/Biological Weapons-usable Items**

1. Floor-mounted fume hoods (walk-in style) with a minimum nominal width of 2.5 meters.
2. Batch centrifuges with a rotor capacity of 4 L or greater, usable with biological materials.



3. Fermenters with an internal volume of 10-20 L (.01-.02 cubic meters), usable with biological materials.

**Annex IV Luxury Goods**

(1) Rugs and tapestries (valued greater than \$500) (2) Tableware of porcelain or bone china (valued greater than \$100)

12/1/16

DRPK FoMin spokesman's statement: "The UN Security Council adopted a "sanctions resolution" faulting the nuclear warhead explosion test conducted by the DPRK in September last. ...The DPRK strongly censures and categorically rejects it as another excess of authority and violation of the DPRK's sovereignty by the UNSC acting under instructions of the U.S. The DPRK's successful test was one of practical steps taken by it to tackle the nuclear threat and sanctions by the U.S. and other hostile forces desperately taking issue with the exercise of the DPRK's right to self-defense and it is also a demonstration of the toughest stand of the service personnel and people of the DPRK that they are ready to launch a counterattack in case the enemy make a provocation, the statement said. Many countries including all the permanent member states of the UNSC have so far conducted thousands of nuclear tests and rocket launches but the UNSC has never prevented them from doing so. ... Obama and his lackeys are sadly mistaken if they calculate that they can force the DPRK to abandon its line of nuclear weaponization and undermine its status as a nuclear power through base sanctions to pressurize it. The DPRK will never deal with them but more dynamically advance along the road of justice chosen by it. The "sanctions resolution" that denied outright the sovereignty of the DPRK and its rights to existence and development will trigger off its tougher countermeasures for self-defense. Sanctions will inevitably escalate tensions and the U.S., chief culprit of the "sanctions resolution," will be held wholly accountable in case the situation on the Korean peninsula and in the region is pushed to an uncontrollable phase." (KCNA, "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hots out at 'Sanctions Resolution,'" December 1, 2016)

12/2/16

Vice Foreign Minister Han Song Ryol called a gathering of foreign diplomats in the capital to lay out his country's opposition to the sanctions, which are the harshest to date and have the support of China, North Korea's primary trading partner. "We categorically reject the U.N. Security Council resolution on sanctions against our country," Han said. "The adoption of the resolution is another open denial of our country's right to self-defense, which goes beyond the mandate of the U.N. Security Council – this is an abuse of power and an infringement upon the sovereignty of our country." North Korea's Foreign Ministry, in a statement issued soon after the sanctions in response to the North's nuclear test in September were announced, warned of tough countermeasures, but didn't say what they might be. "Sanctions will inevitably escalate tensions," the ministry said in the statement quoted by KCNA. Han said North Korea was being unfairly singled out by its political adversaries. "If a nuclear test is such a serious issue, why has the U.N. Security Council never imposed sanctions on the major powers that have carried out so many nuclear tests? And how can anyone understand these sanctions," he said. (Associated Press, "North Korea Rejects UN Sanctions, Briefs Envoys in Pyongyang," December 2, 2016)

The U.S. has unveiled new targeted sanctions against North Korean financial, energy, labor exportation and transportation operations, the Department of the Treasury announced. The Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) latest blacklist includes seven North Korean officials, 16 entities and 16 aircraft and comes in response to the North's fifth nuclear test in September this year. "These sanctions aim to cut the flow of financial resources to North Korea and further counter the regime's destabilizing and provocative behavior," Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence said, according to an OFAC press release. "Treasury will continue to use all of its financial tools to intensify the pressure on North Korea and those supporting the regime's nuclear ambitions and WMD programs," he added. The designations were made under Executive Orders 13382, 13687 and 13722. North Korea's only commercial airline, Air Koryo, 16 of its aircraft and its foreign offices are also included on the list. The press release identifies previously discovered cases of the airline's involvement in a military parade and in transporting Scud-B missile parts, both in 2013. These cases were detailed in the reports of the UN Panel of Experts (PoE) pursuant to Resolution 1718. According to OFAC, a private jet with an Air Koryo logo also transported leader Kim Jong Un, who is designated by the treasury for human rights violations. North Korea's Mansudae Overseas Projects (MOP), the Korea General Corporation for External Construction, Namgang Construction and Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation are all listed for exporting North Korean labor overseas as a means of earning revenue for the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK). OFAC lists a reported 18 countries in which MOP operations were involved in this practice, 15 of them in Africa. MOP has also been linked in (PoE) reports for its involvement in military-related construction in Namibia, which was not mentioned in the OFAC listings. For "operating in the financial services industry in the North Korea economy," OFAC designated five North Korean banks and the Korean National Insurance Corporation (KNIC). The OFAC press release further mentions reported links between KNIC and Office 39, a previously sanctioned entity that is tasked with earning hard currency for the regime's leadership via illicit means. Daewon Industries and the Kangbong Trading Corporation were sanctioned for their involvement in the sale or purchase of "metal, graphite, coal, or software, where revenue or goods received may benefit the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Part of Korea." The Korea Oil Exploration Corporation was also sanctioned for working in North Korea's energy industry and OFAC also said it has reportedly tried "to establish contracts with Iranian oil entities, in part to supply crude oil to two refineries in North Korea." The seven individuals designated were tied to North Korea's Second Economic Committee, Second Academy of Natural Sciences, Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation, the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry (MAIE) and the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). These entities are already designated by the U.S. and KOMID is also designated by the United Nations for being North Korea's primary weapons dealer. (Hamish Macdonald, "U.S. Treasury Expands Unilateral Sanctions against North Korea," *NKNews*, December 2, 2016)

Japan announced it will impose new unilateral sanctions on North Korea in response to the country's fifth nuclear test in September, days after the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution strengthening its sanctions on Pyongyang. "We have decided to carry out further sanctions in coordination with the United States and South Korea to

comprehensively resolve the concerns of abductions (of foreign nationals) and nuclear and missile (development)," Prime Minister Abe Shinzo told a morning meeting of Cabinet ministers. "This year, North Korea went ahead with two nuclear tests and launched more than 20 ballistic missiles. This presents a new level of threat, and such outrageous acts are absolutely unacceptable." Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide said the new list includes certain Chinese organizations and individuals found to have been involved in the projects. "We want to reveal in the future the details of (the individuals and groups) that will be subject to asset freezes," the government's top spokesman told a news conference. The fresh sanctions also expand a list of people barred from re-entering Japan if they visit North Korea. The list includes officials of the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, more commonly known as Chongryon, and a number of foreign engineers with expertise in nuclear and missile technology living in Japan. The entity has effectively functioned as North Korea's embassy for decades in the absence of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang. The sanctions also prohibit ships registered in Japan that have stopped at North Korean ports from subsequently entering Japanese ports. This rule already applies to foreign-flagged vessels. They also include a ban on exporting new helicopters or vessels to North Korea or importing certain commodities from North Korea including copper, nickel and zinc. Abe hailed the U.N. resolution Friday, saying it "clearly demonstrates the international community's resolve to take a stringent response of a completely new dimension in response to the new level of threat presented by North Korea's nuclear testing." He also raised the unresolved issue of North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals as one of the threats presented by the country. **"Without closing the gateway to dialogue,** (Japan) will make its utmost efforts to realize the return of all the abductees at the earliest possible date under the principles of 'dialogue and pressure' and 'action for action,' based on our agreement in Stockholm," Abe said. (Kyodo, Associated Press, "Japan Announces New Sanctions on North Korea Days after UN Sanctions," *Japan Times*, December 2, 2016) Under the new measures, the range of asset freezes will be expanded to 54 entities and 58 individuals, the sources said. The list includes a trading company in Liaoning Province, China, that was sanctioned by the United States in September for its alleged involvement in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea. The reentry ban previously targeted 22 people – 17 executives of the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), including its head and deputy head, and five nuclear and missile technology engineers. The range will be significantly expanded, the sources said. All vessels that have made port calls in North Korea will be banned from entering Japanese ports, with those of Japanese registry also newly subjected to the measures. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, "Govt. Expands Unilateral Sanctions against N. Korea," December 2, 2016)

South Korea blacklisted several top aides of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as part of a fresh set of its unilateral sanctions aimed at helping curb the defiant neighbor's nuclear and missile programs. The package is also designed to tighten Seoul's squeeze on Pyongyang's financial and maritime networks and reinforce export controls. "By including for the first time North Korean institutions involved in coal and labor exports, which are a major source of their foreign currency revenue, we're looking to remind the international community that having transactions with them may

contribute to bolstering the North's weapons of mass destruction capabilities," Lee Suk-joon, minister of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, said at a news conference. "The measures are also anticipated to have an effect in cutting funding sources that might be siphoned off for WMD development." Under the plan, Seoul newly designated 36 high-profile North Korean officials and 35 entities subject to an asset freeze and ban on any financial transactions with South Koreans. Among the individuals are Hwang Pyong-so, director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army; Choe Ryong-hae, vice chairman of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party; Kim Won-hong, minister of state security; and Pak Yong-sik, minister of the People's Armed Forces. Speculation had persisted the names may include Kim himself and his younger sister Yo-jong. But Seoul officials appear to have opted for some of Kim's closest servants, who often accompany him on field inspections and other key events, leaving the possibility for a potential future blacklisting of the Kim dynasty. The sanctioned groups include top state organs such as the Workers' Party, the State Affairs Commission and the party's Central Military Commission, as well as Air Koryo, the nation's sole airline, which is suspected of transporting overseas laborers, cash and prohibited goods. Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development, a Chinese industry machinery wholesaler based in the North Korean border region, and four of its executives were added to the roster over allegations that they have provided financial services and illicit supplies to Pyongyang. In September, Washington sanctioned the company and Beijing launched an investigation into the charges. In total, the new designations brought South Korea's list to 79 persons and 69 organizations. In a move to further dismantle the regime's maritime network, Seoul decided to bar foreign-flag and flag-of-convenience ships from entering the South if they had stopped at the North within the previous year - doubling the time period set out in the existing rule. The government also plans to increase its watch list of sensitive items from the current 22 to 33 by adding 11 types of minerals under the UN ban, including coal, iron, iron ore, gold and rare earth metals. Given the almost complete halt to economic and people-to-people exchanges between the two Koreas, the blacklisting would bear more symbolic implications and the government's intention to rally other likeminded countries behind its sanctions campaign. "So far North Korea has not signaled any change in its course and any intent for a denuclearization, we have no option but to continue imposing sanctions and pressure together with the international community," Lee said when asked about the prospects for a reconciliation. **"Under the current circumstances, I would say it's inappropriate to speak of dialogue."** (Shin Hyon-hee, "Seoul Sanctions Top Aides of North's Kim," *Korea Herald*, December 2, 2016)

12/4/16

Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov agreed to continue talks on concluding a peace treaty to end World War II until the summit between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin takes place later this month. "It's not easy to bring closer the principal positions of the parties; the problem is complicated," Lavrov said at a joint news conference following the talks in Moscow, underscoring the difficulty in resolving a dispute over islands off Hokkaido that are held by Russia but claimed by Japan. Lavrov also said that there should not be excessive expectations for immediate progress in settling the issue and that bilateral work will continue and be reported to the two leaders, who will meet on Dec. 15 and 16 in Japan. In their third meeting this year and the final direct ministerial talks before

the Abe-Putin summit, Kishida also vowed efforts to “overcome the differences in positions of Japan and Russia and conclude the peace treaty by a mutually acceptable resolution.” The dispute over the islands has prevented the two neighbors from signing a peace treaty to formally end the war. (Kyodo, “Japan, Russia to Continue Talks Right up to Abe-Putin Summit,” *Japan Times*, December 4, 2016)

12/5/16

The United States and its partners should intensify sanctions and pressure on North Korea to force the communist regime to come back to the denuclearization negotiating table, the U.S. point man on Pyongyang said. Joseph Yun, special representative for North Korea policy, said at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), stressing that denuclearization is the No. 1 goal of the U.S., but the North has shown no willingness to resume negotiations on its nuclear program. “Of course, I’m very mindful that sanctions and defensive measures are not an end in themselves. They are tools to bring the North Koreans back to the negotiating table on denuclearization. Our goal, let me emphasize, is denuclearization. And we have made repeated overtures to North Korea,” Yun said. “I think you would all have to agree that so far response from Pyongyang has not shown any signs it is ready to undertake serious negotiations and that is why we believe we must continue on the pressure track,” he said. Yoon said it takes pressure, diplomacy and defensive measures to cope with the North Korea problem. Asked if it’s time for the U.S. to consider regime change in North Korea, Yoon repeated that denuclearization remains the top goal. “This was by far the most common and important objective of everyone we talked to there, Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo, and I think this is clearly the goal we all share. Denuclearization is the No. 1 priority,” he said of a recent trip to South Korea, Japan and China. Earlier in the same event, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage called openly for regime change in North Korea, saying he no longer believes it’s possible change Pyongyang’s behavior without a regime change. (Chang Jae-soon, “U.S. Nuclear Negotiator Calls for Continued Pressure on N. Korea,” *Yonhap*, December 6, 2016)

12/6/16

South Korea’s embattled president, Park Geun-hye, has offered to step down in April, leaders of her party said after meeting with her. But the offer was unlikely to prevent an impeachment vote on Friday over a corruption scandal that has turned the vast majority of the public against her. Park appeared to accept that a vote on impeachment was inevitable and said that she was bracing for it, Chung Jin-suk, the floor leader of Park’s governing party, Saenuri, said in a statement after meeting with the president for 55 minutes. Chung said that he told Ms. Park the party could not prevent the impeachment vote and that she nodded in response. Members of Saenuri loyal to Ms. Park suggested that she resign in April, and it seemed possible that some lawmakers leaning toward impeachment would accept that as a compromise. But a huge rally against the president on Saturday, the latest in a series of enormous weekly demonstrations, appears to have bolstered pro-impeachment sentiment in the National Assembly. It is uncertain what the outcome of an impeachment vote would be. But news outlets reported today that the pro-impeachment lawmakers were believed to have the 200 votes necessary to pass the bill in the 300-seat body. “I have always thought I would accept” the suggestion to resign in April, Chung quoted Park as saying. Leaving office in April would cut Park’s term short by 10 months. According

to Chung, Park said that if she were impeached, she would stay “calm and composed” during the next step in the process: waiting for the Constitutional Court to rule on whether her impeachment was warranted. The court has up to six months to decide. During that period, Park’s presidential powers would be suspended, and Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn would step in as acting president. If the court were to rule against her impeachment, she would immediately return to office. If not, South Korea would hold an election in 60 days to select her successor. Opposition lawmakers criticized Park for not resigning immediately. “She tries to hang on to the very last,” said Youn Kwan-suk, a spokesman for the main opposition Democratic Party. “We will fulfill the people’s will by impeaching her.” Some political analysts say an immediate departure by Park would give the opposition a better chance of winning the presidency, because the 60 days within which an election must be held would not give Saenuri much time to recover from the disgrace. In an impeachment motion submitted to the National Assembly over the weekend, opposition parties accused Park of conspiring with Ms. Choi to force large South Korean businesses, including Hyundai and Samsung, to donate tens of millions of dollars to two foundations Choi controlled. They also accuse her of illegally sharing confidential government documents with Choi, who had no official post. Prosecutors have also accused Park of those offenses. The opposition parties also assert that Park forced a newspaper that reported accusations of influence-peddling by Choi’s family in 2014 to fire its president, which they say undermined freedom of the press. Today, nine high-ranking South Korean executives, including Jay Y. Lee, the vice chairman of Samsung, and Chung Mong-koo, the chairman of Hyundai, were questioned in the National Assembly about money their companies had given to Choi’s foundations. They admitted giving the money, confirming that the requests had come from aides to Park and saying they could not say no to such a request from her office. But they said they had not asked anything of Park in return, thwarting opposition lawmakers who hoped to establish a quid pro quo in hopes of strengthening their case that the donations were bribes. Lawmakers have speculated that companies received, or hoped to receive, favors from Park in return for the money, including presidential pardons for company chairmen imprisoned for corruption or lucrative government licenses to run duty-free shops. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korean Leader’s Offer to Quit in April May Not Be Enough,” *New York Times*, December 7, 2016, p. A-10)

South Korea’s Defense Ministry said the military’s intranet had been hacked for the first time ever, presumably by North Korea, resulting in a number of military secrets being leaked. The military found that malicious code had been spread on its computers via its servers used to relay updates on Sept. 23. “The military formed a cyber investigative team to look into this matter and found that some military data -- including confidential information -- has been leaked. It appears to be a North Korean act,” the ministry said. Code used in the attack has certain similarities with that previously used by North Korean hackers, a ministry official explained. He added that the attack originated from Shenyang, China, where many North Korean hackers are believed to be based and which was the believed origin of a 2014 attack on Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. But the official refused to specify what data had been stolen. “We cannot give out details on what information was leaked, because it might give (North Korea) an advantage in the ongoing cyber warfare,” he said. He also refused to confirm how

many computers were hit by the cyberattack, but added that multiple servers in the intranet was infected. The military said that none of the data from other countries that has signed intelligence sharing agreements with South Korea has been stolen. The incident raised questions about the security of what the military had basically described as "unreachable." The military's manual states that no classified information can be saved on computers connected to the internet, and that the line must be cut off during the operation and any activity must be erased afterwards. But some of the computers -- located in one of the bases -- linked to the intranet was connected to the internet due to "administrative carelessness and violation of regulation," the ministry said. The connection opened a path to infection of malicious code, allowing hackers to remotely control the computers and steal the data. While the first large-scale activity took place on September 23, some of the code that allowed the attack had already been planted on August 8. During the hacking attack on the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. in 2014, officials had also claimed that a hacker could not infiltrate its intranet because it was cut off from outside. As follow-up measures for the attack, the military outlined 14 tasks to step up cyber security. This includes procuring a measure to monitor the section where the internet and the military intranet could be interlinked and replacing the current computer vaccine system. (Yoon Min-sik, "Military Intranet Hacked by North Korea," *Korea Herald*, December 7, 2016)

12/8/16

North Korea now has the capability to launch a nuclear weapon, a senior U.S. military official said, adding that while the U.S. believes Pyongyang can mount a warhead on a missile, it's not clear that it can hit a target. The official said it appears that North Korea can mount a nuclear warhead on a missile, but may not have the re-entry capabilities for a strategic strike. That would include the ability of the weapon to get back through the atmosphere without burning up and the ability to hit the intended target. The official said North Korea continues to try and overcome those limitations. U.S. officials have steadily expanded their assessments of Pyongyang's nuclear abilities. Adm. William Gortney, then-head of U.S. Northern Command, said in March that Pyongyang may have figured out how to make a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on a long-range missile. North Korea is now "fully equipped with nuclear attack capability," leader Kim Jong Un announced proudly after the August launch of a submarine-launched missile. He was exaggerating, but the strings of tests indicate that North Korea may have medium-range missiles capable of striking American military bases in the Pacific in the next couple years, experts say. Some believe Pyongyang may be able to hit the western United States as early as 2020. South Korean defense officials say North Korea doesn't yet have such a weapon, but some civilian experts have said they believe the North has the technology to mount warheads on shorter-range Rodong and Scud missiles that can strike South Korea and Japan. "I think that they're struggling with getting the (intercontinental ballistic missile) program up and operational," U.S. Gen. Vincent Brooks, the head of U.S. forces in Korea, said in Senate hearings earlier this year. But "over time, I believe we're going to see them acquire these capabilities if they're not stopped." (Lolita C. Baldor, "U.S. Official Warns of North Korean Nuclear Capability," Associated Press December 8, 2016)

12/9/16

The National Assembly impeached President Park Geun-hye this afternoon, suspending a second-generation Korean president brought low by a bizarre scandal

over the influence she gave a friend in state affairs. Lawmakers approved the impeachment motion 234-56 in a secret ballot vote. Of the 300 members of the National Assembly, 299 lawmakers cast votes and 234 supported the impeachment, 56 opposed it, while two abstained. Seven votes were invalid. Saenuri Rep. Choi Kyung-hwan did not participate in the voting. The motion to oust the president was sponsored by 171 lawmakers from three opposition parties and independents, and it passed with hefty support from representatives belonging to Park's own ruling Saenuri Party. The overwhelming support for the motion was an indication that many ruling party lawmakers - even the so-called Park loyalists - turned against the president. If all 172 opposition and independent lawmakers are assumed to have supported the motion, 62 out of the 128 Saenuri lawmakers also voted for it. Park's presidential powers were suspended immediately after the impeachment motion was delivered to the Blue House. Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn became acting president and will oversee state affairs as the Constitutional Court deliberates the legitimacy of the impeachment. The court has 180 days to decide whether to remove Park permanently. Six of its nine judges have to confirm the legislature's action. Park was impeached over alleged violations of the constitution and criminal laws. The opposition Minjoo Party of Korea, the People's Party and the Justice Party as well as independent lawmakers who sponsored the motion said Park committed a grave violation of the constitution by allowing her secret inner circle, including longtime friend Choi Soon-sil, to interfere in state affairs. The motion also accused Park of failing to properly respond to the sinking of the Sewol ferry in April 2014, in which 304 passengers died after a delayed government response. The motion said Park violated Article 10 of the Constitution, which demands she protect the lives of citizens. Last month, prosecutors indicted Choi on charges of abusing her ties with the president to influence state affairs and coerce conglomerates to donate about 80 billion won (\$69 million) to two foundations she controlled. They accused the president of being a co-conspirator in those crimes. Prosecutors could not press charges against Park because of her presidential immunity from criminal indictment. She can be indicted after she leaves the presidency. If the Constitutional Court decides to uphold the impeachment, Park will become the first Korean president to be dismissed before the end of her term. A presidential election for a successor will take place in two months. The National Assembly opened a plenary session at 3:02 p.m., and Speaker Chung Sye-kyun tabled the impeachment motion immediately. Rep. Kim Kwan-young, deputy floor leader of the People's Party, took the stand and explained the intention of the motion to lawmakers. "President Park has neglected her duty as the head of the state and the leader of the administration and violated the Constitution and laws in the line of performing her duty," he said. "From the perspective of protecting the Constitution, this is a grave, unacceptable violation. She fundamentally abandoned the people's confidence in the president." The voting began at 3:24 p.m. and ended at 3:53 p.m. Speaker Chung announced the outcome of the vote at 4:09 p.m. "The National Assembly, today, passed the motion to impeach President Park Geun-hye," he said, adding that the tragedy of presidential impeachment should never have to be repeated. Following the passage, Prime Minister Hwang telephoned Defense Minister Han Min-koo to increase military readiness against a possible North Korean provocation. Han issued the order and summoned a meeting of the major commanders from around the country. After Roh was impeached, Prime Minister Goh Kun served as acting president but he exercised



power in a limited way. Presidential powers include the right to command the nation's armed forces, diplomatic power, veto power and authority to appoint and fire public servants. The president also has the right to declare martial law and the right to issue pardons. Experts say that Hwang, as acting president, must refrain from exercising presidential powers that could have far-reaching consequences. "Appointing a constitutional court chief justice or a Supreme Court justice, whose tenures are six years, or signing a treaty with another country must not be done by the acting president," said Lee Jong-soo, a public administration professor of Yonsei University. While her powers are suspended, Park will maintain her title as president. She will also receive security protection and treatment as the head of state. The Blue House secretariat will also be maintained, but will assist the acting president. Park will be allowed to live in her residence inside the Blue House compound during the Constitutional Court's deliberation on the impeachment. She will also receive the presidential salary for the time being, but not special operations expenses. (Ser Myo-ja, "Park Impeached," *JoongAng Ilbo*, December 10, 2016)

North Korea's reported appointment of military officer Ri Son-gwon as the head of its state-level committee handling inter-Korean affairs was confirmed. *Rodong Sinmun* carried a story with confirmation that Ri is the chief of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK). An Chan-il, a North Korean defector, claimed on December 1 that Ri, a senior colonel of the North Korean military, has been named to lead the committee, citing his source who has recently visited North Korea. The source met with Ri when attending the funeral of Ryu Mi-yong, chairwoman of the Central Committee of the Chondoist Chongu Party, last month, he added. "The source said that Ri introduced himself as the head of the committee," said Ahn, the head of the private Seoul-based World Institute for North Korean Studies. At a parliamentary assembly held in June, North Korea decided to upgrade the CPRK to a state-level organization, which is presumed to be controlled by the newly created state apparatus State Affairs Commission. Ri served as a director dealing with policy affairs at the now-defunct National Defense Commission, the SAC's predecessor. He also has attended military talks with South Korea as the head of the North's delegation since 2006. (Yonhap, "N.K. Confirms Appointment of Ri Son-gwon as Head of Inter-Korean Affairs Agency," *Korea Herald*, December 9, 2016)

12/11/16

Since October, when the corruption scandal involving President Park Geun-hye of South Korea first erupted, North Korea has been uncharacteristically restrained. While the North, which had been accelerating the development of its nuclear program, has maintained a steady stream of sarcastic criticism of Park, it has not conducted ballistic missile or nuclear tests, even as the United Nations has tightened sanctions. Analysts and officials in South Korea say North Korea did not want to give political cover to Park, who had adopted a hardline approach to her volatile neighbor. She could have seized on further tests or military provocations to divert attention from her own disaster, they say. The North's relative silence underscores the deep uncertainty into which the region has been thrown – not only by South Korea's political crisis, whose denouement could still be months away after the South Korean National Assembly voted to impeach Park, but also by questions about how Donald J. Trump will deal with North Korea as president, given his contradictory remarks on the subject during his campaign. "I do

not think we have ever seen a time when you have had simultaneous uncertainty about governance in both Seoul and Washington,” said Duyeon Kim, a visiting senior fellow at the Korean Peninsula Future Forum, a think tank in Seoul. The profound unpopularity of Park, a conservative, increases the likelihood that South Korea’s next president will be a liberal who favors more dialogue and economic engagement with the North. But in the United States, with Trump yet to announce his choice for secretary of state, analysts and officials in the region are left guessing what American policy on North Korea might look like. “Trump right now looks like he’s running the whole spectrum from opening up talks in a serious way all the way to considering a military strike,” said John Delury, an associate professor of Chinese studies and a North Korea expert at Yonsei University in Seoul. “Either South Korean and U.S. policies could go into a new alignment based on a totally different approach or they could get completely out of whack.” North Korea has yet to comment officially on Park’s impeachment vote. But its propaganda website, *Uriminzokkiri*, reported that the South Korean National Assembly had voted overwhelmingly to punish the “traitor Park Geun-hye.” In South Korea’s fast-paced, rough-and-tumble political arena, it is something of a fool’s errand to try to predict who might win a presidential election several months away. Among the potential candidates, Ban Ki-moon, the departing United Nations secretary general, is the least likely to swerve from Park’s policies, though he has appeared more willing to pursue dialogue with the North, analysts said. A career diplomat, Mr. Ban is popular among conservatives. All the other top contenders are liberals. If one of them wins, several of Park’s key policies are likely to be scrutinized, including a recently signed agreement to share military intelligence with Japan and the planned deployment of an American missile defense system that has deeply upset relations with China. Analysts here said the next president was likely to return to a more open diplomatic approach with the North. The new leader might also try to cooperate economically by reopening a jointly run industrial park in the North Korean town of Kaesong, which Park closed in retaliation against the North’s nuclear test in January. Moon Jae-in, an opposition leader with the Democratic Party, who polls indicate is the most popular presidential contender, is critical of the current approach to North Korea, saying sanctions alone will not end its nuclear weapons program. Moon says he supports his country’s alliance with Washington, but has argued that South Korea needs a more “balanced diplomacy” between the United States, its primary military ally, and China, its biggest trade partner. “If North Korea is pronounced to be capable of hitting the West Coast of the United States, then it’s going to be hard, even for a liberal government, to reopen Kaesong and pursue other cooperation projects,” said Kim Sung-han, a professor of international relations at Korea University who was a vice foreign minister under Park’s predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, also a conservative. What Mr. Trump will do is even harder to predict. During the campaign, he said he was willing to have direct talks with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader. But he also referred to Kim as “a maniac,” and Mr. Trump’s selection for national security adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, has described North Korea as a country that harbors “hatred of the West,” suggesting that he would advise a hardline approach. “Let it play out and see if it brings them back to the table,” said Victor Cha, who served in President George W. Bush’s administration and is now a North Korea expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Left-leaning analysts in South Korea who support engagement with North Korea said a liberal president would

also consider backtracking on Park's agreement to host the advanced American missile defense system known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or Thaad. Park's decision was unpopular with many South Koreans and angered China, which sees the system as an effort to restrict its ambitions in Asia, though Washington and Seoul have said it is meant only to defend South Korea against the North. But a liberal South Korean president could be boxed in if the new system is deployed around the time he or she takes office. "The opposition leaders who run for president will be getting support from those Koreans who oppose the deployment of Thaad," said Moon Chung-in, emeritus professor of politics at Yonsei University. "And if they get elected, then they should respond to the people, and they would have to say to the U.S., 'Can you reconsider the deployment of Thaad?' Then Trump and others will be very angry and that can really hurt the alliance" with the United States. Other analysts, perhaps demonstrating that the many unknowns of Trump's views can lead to wild speculation, suggested that his pursuit of business deals could work in North Korea's favor. "If North Korea offers to Donald Trump that there is a lot of real estate that he can develop in North Korea – for example the Kumgang Mountain tourist region – I think Donald Trump would be very interested," said Geun Lee, a professor of political science at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. "And in return for these business opportunities, perhaps North Korea would give up its nuclear program temporarily." More likely is that North Korea will conduct further nuclear and missile tests, whose results could be more influential than anything else in deciding policy toward the North. "If they can demonstrate they can reach the United States, that's going to be a big deal," Cha said. "Often presidencies are not about what agenda you have coming in, but it's the crisis you have to deal with." (Motoko Rich, "U.S. and Seoul Turbulent, North Korea Holds Back" (*New York Times*, December 12, 2016, p. A-3)

President-elect Donald J. Trump, defending his recent phone call with Taiwan's president, asserted in an interview broadcast on Sunday that the United States was not bound by the One China policy, the 44-year diplomatic understanding that underpins America's relationship with its biggest rival. Trump, speaking on Fox News, said he understood the principle of a single China that includes Taiwan, but declared, "I don't know why we have to be bound by a One China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade." "I mean, look," he continued, "we're being hurt very badly by China with devaluation; with taxing us heavy at the borders when we don't tax them; with building a massive fortress in the middle of the South China Sea, which they shouldn't be doing; and, frankly, with not helping us at all with North Korea." (Mark Landler, "Defending Taiwan Call, Trump Suggests U.S. Isn't Bound by Longtime China Policy," *New York Times*, December 12, 2016, p. A-13) The next day China warned Donald Trump that their countries will have "nothing to discuss" if his incoming administration discards the four-decade-old "One China" policy. "Adherence to the One China policy is the political bedrock for development of [bilateral] relations," Geng Shuang, a foreign ministry spokesman, said on Monday. "If compromised, there will be nothing to discuss on co-operation in major fields." Geng was responding to comments that the president-elect made on Sunday in which he questioned whether his administration would continue to respect the One China policy and shun official contacts with Taiwan over which Beijing claims sovereignty. Both

incidents have sorely tested the Chinese government's patience. "We urge the new [US] leadership to recognize the sensitivity of the Taiwan question and to deal with it in a prudent manner," Geng said. "Upholding the One China policy was America's promise and we want them to fulfil this promise." Early today, a stinging editorial in the *Global Times*, an offshoot of the official *People's Daily*, urged Trump to "listen clearly, the One China policy cannot be traded." "China needs to wage resolute struggle against [Trump]," it added, warning the president-elect that China "cannot be bullied easily". (Tom Mitchell, Yuan Yang, Lucy Hornby, and Demetri Sevastopulo, "Trump Faces One China Policy Backlash," *Financial Times*, p. 2)

12/13/16

Russian President Vladimir Putin has signaled that a breakthrough is unlikely on the thorny Northern Territories issue during his visit to Japan starting December 15. Putin's hardline stand stems from Japan's decision two years ago to join other Group of Seven nations in imposing sanctions against Russia after it annexed Crimea in Ukraine. The Russian leader made clear that Japan's decision to impose sanctions remains a major barrier toward progress in negotiations as it shattered trust between the two countries. "Japan joined in the sanctions against Russia," he said. "How are we going to further economic relations at a higher level amid such sanctions?" Putin's comments, made during a December 7 interview with *Yomiuri Shimbun* and Nippon Television Network Corp., were released by the Kremlin on December 13. "We believe we have no territorial problems at all," Putin also said. "It is only Japan that feels it has a territorial issue with Russia." However, he softened his outburst by saying that Russia was still prepared to discuss the issue apparently within the context of the two nations first signing a peace treaty to formally end hostilities dating to World War II. Putin called the lack of a peace treaty outdated, adding that an agreement "on the conditions for signing a peace treaty should be based on trust." That is when Putin expressed displeasure with the Crimea issue. Putin also took issue with Japan's position on the Northern Territories. He reiterated his position that the 1956 joint declaration between Japan and the Soviet Union should serve as the foundation for any discussions. That agreement included a provision to have the Habomai islets and Shikotan handed over to Japan once a peace treaty was signed. With regard to Japan's demand that the two other islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu also be handed over, Putin said, "That exceeds the bounds of the 1956 declaration and is a quite different approach." While Putin welcomed the proposal for economic cooperation first made by Abe in May, the Russian president said the eight-point plan is not a condition for signing a peace treaty, but will only help to improve the atmosphere toward such an agreement. High-ranking officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry indicated meantime that no joint statement would likely be agreed to by the two leaders that sets out the resolve of the two nations or establishes a direction for resolving the territorial issue. It also appears unlikely that economic cooperation projects on the four islands of the Northern Territories would be conducted based on Japanese laws since Putin insists that Japanese law cannot be applied to those islands, which were seized by Soviet forces toward the close of World War II. At one time, Russia had hoped that improved ties with Japan would help to weaken the cooperation among the G-7 nations in implementing sanctions against Russia. However, with the prospect of ties between Russia and the United States improving once Trump takes office in January, Russian officials may now feel a weaker incentive to improve relations with Japan. (Komaki

Akiyoshi and Suzuki Takuya, "Putin Points to Sanctions As Reason for No Deal on Isles Row," *Asahi Shimbun*, December 14, 2016)

The top nuclear negotiators of South Korea and the US reaffirmed their commitment to sustaining the North Korea policy toward denuclearization despite the political transitions in both countries.

Kim Hong-kyun, special representative for Korean Peninsular peace and security affairs at Seoul's Foreign Ministry, hosted his US and Japanese counterparts, Joseph Yun and Kanasugi Kenji, to review new sanctions adopted at the UN and by the three nations. While acknowledging the changing circumstances, the envoys downplayed their impact on the three countries' united front against Pyongyang, vowing to continue ramping up pressure and sanctions until the Kim regime changes course. "There is, to be frank with you, an important domestic transition going on both in Washington and Seoul. I'm sure like everyone else, North Koreans are watching these transitions carefully," said Yun, special representative for North Korean policy at the US State Department. "It is also an opportunity for them to see what can be done for the ultimate goal of peaceful denuclearization. But so far we have not seen any signs that they want to engage in a meaningful way, so it's very important for us to impose costs on their behavior." The new ambassador said he was "confident" the incoming Trump administration would not change the US' approach toward North Korea's nuclear program, which he said had always garnered bipartisan support. "When a new administration or a new government takes power, it's always going to take a fresh look," Yun said. "Essentially, I would say the North Korean nuclear issues have always been a bipartisan issue. Nobody, whether they are republicans or democrats, has said anything but the goal of denuclearization." Kim Hong-kyun, who met with his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei last week, pledged to boost "strategic communications and cooperation" with Beijing and Moscow, calling for them to play a "constructive role" in intensifying pressure on the unruly regime. "2017 will likely be a watershed year for the North Korean nuclear issue," he said. "North Korea is rolling back the clock of history through nuclear blackmail against the whole international community. We warn that if it does not give up its nuclear ambition, the North will end up taking the path toward self-destruction and that denuclearization is the only choice it has." (Shin Hyon-hee, "Park's Downfall, Trump Will Have Little Impact on N.K. Policy: Envoys," *Korea Herald*, December 13, 2016)

12/15-16/16 With no progress made on resolving the territorial dispute between Japan and Russia after two days of meetings, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin released a statement that said, "the start of discussions about joint economic activities on the four islands of the Northern Territories can become an important first step" toward a peace treaty formally ending World War II. The statement said that the relevant ministries and agencies in the two nations would be instructed to enter into discussions about such topics as fishing, ocean farming, tourism, health care and the environment. The document added that consideration would also be given to issues related to a legal foundation for economic activities, including the signing of international agreements. The start of joint economic activities would also not run counter to the positions of the two nations related to issues connected to a peace treaty, according to the statement. It went on to say that the two leaders agreed to

establish positive conditions necessary for citizen exchanges between the two nations. Regarding visits to the Northern Territories by former residents so they can pay their respects at family graves, the statement instructed the foreign ministries of the two nations to consider as soon as possible the establishment of additional temporary transit points as well as a further simplification of entry procedures. (*Asahi Shimbun*, "Abe, Putin Agree Joint Economic Activity a Step toward Treaty," December 16, 2016) At their joint news conference at the Prime Minister's Office in Tokyo, Putin pointed out that bilateral trade between Russia and Japan shrank considerably this year. He attributed the fall to changes in currency exchange rates, declining prices for natural resources, and Japanese economic sanctions slapped on Russia for its annexation of Crimea in 2014. "First we need to improve the economic relationship," Putin said through a translator. He also argued that Russia and Japan should stop engaging in debates over the history of the territorial row and focus instead on economic cooperation, including on the disputed islands. "We should build up the joint economic mechanism that the prime minister has proposed. It's important to move forward to the conclusion of a peace treaty based on this foundation," Putin said. But a lack of tangible progress on the dispute is a major setback for Abe. Abe claimed to have a close rapport with Putin and was trying to win major concessions from Moscow. Still, Abe touted the agreement as a key first step toward building more trust with Moscow, which Japanese officials hope will promote progress in future talks. "I'm convinced of the legitimacy of Japan's position and Vladimir is convinced of Russia's own. We cannot resolve (the dispute) no matter how many times we argue over the cause with each other," Abe said. "We should not stick to the past only, and need to build up a win-win relationship" through economic cooperation first, Abe added. At the news conference, Putin invited Abe to visit Russia and Abe pledged to continue negotiations over the territorial issue. But time may not be on Abe's side, at least in the foreseeable future. Oil prices have recently rebounded and U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, who will take office in January, is expected to considerably improve the Russia-U.S. relationship. Both factors will strengthen Russia's position on the global stage and reduce any need for Putin to make major concessions and win more economic cooperation from Japan, experts say. Later the day, during a live interview on NHK, Abe confirmed the difficulty of the task by saying the territorial row is "not something you can resolve over (the next) couple of years," but revealed that he and Putin had agreed to settle the issue "within our own generation." (Yoshida Reiji, "Abe-Putin Summit Ends with Economic Deals But No Isle Steps," *Japan Times*, December 16, 2016) The joint declaration issued said only that the two countries will negotiate the legal mechanisms needed for holding joint economic activities, and that such agreements would not harm the political positions of the two countries. The issue of jurisdiction is important as it is intertwined with the issue of sovereignty. Yet Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov on the 15th, in comments made before the Tokyo agreement was announced, said joint economic activities will be conducted under the Russian legal system, according to TASS. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide said that Japan's position should not be violated. Still, the two leaders apparently left open the possibility of shelving the most challenging sovereignty issues. Abe said that the two countries should not dwell on the past, but seek a future-oriented way of thinking. "That approach is the only way to the final result," said Abe at the joint news conference after the talks. (Mie Ayako, "Putin Exits Onsen Drama Holding All the

Cards," *Japan Times*, December 16, 2016) The Japanese news media gave breathless coverage to President Vladimir Putin's two-day visit to Japan this week, training television cameras on the airport in Yamaguchi Prefecture where the Russian leader arrived more than two hours late. But in the end, the talks between the officials yielded little other than details of business deals that had already been announced and a commitment to continue discussions about economic cooperation on four islands that both countries claim. The dispute over what Russia calls the southern Kurile Islands and Japan calls the Northern Territories has prevented Japan and Russia from signing a peace treaty ending World War II. "We should not be bound by past negotiations," Abe said at a joint news conference in Tokyo on the 16th at which he repeatedly referred to Putin by his first name, striking an unusual note in formal Japan. "It is necessary to draw a new blueprint for the four northern islands in which Japanese and Russian people can live together and build a win-win relationship." Putin talked mostly of broader economic initiatives between the countries, including an investment fund for projects in Russia of 100 billion yen, about \$845 million, set up by the Russian Direct Investment Fund and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, which is controlled by the Japanese government. The unsigned peace treaty, Putin said, "is a negative legacy from the past." With Abe's proposals for joint economic development on the four islands, he said, "we were able to deepen our mutual trust before we sign a peace treaty." Abe decided to meet with Mr. Putin this week despite opposition from the Obama administration. Some commentators in Japan said that Abe had made progress just by keeping the talks going. "If we take the Yamaguchi meeting as one important step toward realizing the potential strengthening of bilateral relations, I think Abe and Putin achieved that purpose," said Togo Kazuhiko, a former Japanese diplomat who teaches international politics at Kyoto Sangyo University. While Japan has long sought the return of the islands, it is also eager to strengthen ties with Russia to counter China's rise. After the talks, the countries concluded a series of agreements to pursue economic cooperation in health care, energy, agriculture, fisheries and other projects in Russia. But Abe said the leaders had also discussed joint economic activities on the four disputed islands. For the Japanese, the most delicate part of such talks would be to establish a framework that does not recognize Russia's claim. "Getting the four islands back was a Cold War slogan for the Japanese," said Shimotomai Nobuo, a specialist in Russian-Japanese relations at Hosei University in Tokyo. "But after 60 years, we need a new approach towards Moscow. It could be some kind of shared sovereignty." Others saw the talks as a setback for Japan. "I think this has not been good at all for Japan," said James D.J. Brown, associate professor of political science at Temple University in Tokyo. "Some of those economic deals will be beneficial to both sides, but on the crucial territorial issue, there is nothing here." Brown said he expected the talks on joint economic development on the disputed islands to founder on legal disagreements. "Putin's statements show that on issues of historical memory, Russia is not willing to move," he said. "For them, these islands are theirs by right, and they seem very unlikely to compromise on them." On the website of *Weekly Gendai*, a newsmagazine, a headline called the talks a "miserable result for the Northern Territories negotiations," adding, "Abe was taken advantage of by Putin." (Mokoto Rich, "Meeting between Japan and Russia Ends with Stalemate on Islands," *New York Times*, December 17, 2016, p. A-6)

12/16/16

South Korean presidential hopeful Moon Jae-in would visit North Korea as a top priority should he win next year's presidential election, he said during an interview. Moon, who is hoping to run next year as the Minjoo Party's candidate, also highlighted the need for the immediate resumption of activities at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. "Let's assume that you (Moon) are elected as the next president! Let's also imagine that you can either choose to go to North Korea or the U.S. Which country would you visit first?" Kim Yong-ok, a well known South Korean philosopher, asked Moon, *JoongAng Ilbo* reported. "I can answer that without any hesitation," Moon said. "I will visit North Korea first. But before doing so, I will provide sufficient explanation to the U.S., Japan, and China on why I have to." During an extended interview, Moon discussed a variety of inter-Korean topics, including KIC and the deployment of the U.S.-made Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system to South Korea. "The KIC has to be resumed immediately, and the deployment of THAAD has to be left as a task for the next government," Moon continued. "We have to discuss (THAAD) with Washington and Beijing and reach a rational agreement." This is the third time this week that Minjoo, South Korea's main opposition party, has announced the need to postpone the deployment of the system, with Moon's comments coming after a Minjoo statement on the 13th a previous press briefing by the candidate yesterday. "When we can provide more practical and close information about the North - more than what U.S. satellite intelligence can - then we will be able to secure high diplomatic ground during the talks with Washington and Tokyo." Moon Jae-in served as the Chief Presidential Secretary under the late former President Roh Moo-hyun, who in 2007 visited North Korea and met Kim Jong Il. Moon hinted that he would continue the work of the Roh administration by working to rebuild trust with Pyongyang. "So what exactly has South Korea achieved from the Six-Party talks?" Kim Yong-ok asked Moon. "Overall, we can say that the meeting shifted the paradigm in international politics and the inter-Korean relations," Moon said. "The October 4 Peace Declaration (of 2007) wasn't written in a day... There were no military clashes during Roh's presidency, and that was the result of the accumulated trust between the two nations." Moon added that he regrets not being able to hold an inter-Korean summit earlier than October 2007, which came near the end of Roh's presidency. "If the North has adhered to the September 19 Joint Statement, then we could've held the summit far sooner," said Moon referring to a statement in 2005 where Pyongyang pledged to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. Moon's approval ratings have steadily risen since the beginning of the "Park-Choi gate" scandal in late October, which has resulted in millions of South Koreans taking to the streets against alleged nepotism and corruption in Park Geun-hye's administration. A Friday poll from Gallup saw the Minjoo Party's approval at 40 percent, the highest since 1998, the year President Kim Dae-jung was elected. Moon's approval is at 24 percent according to Realmeter's latest poll, 7.5 percent ahead of Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, who is also seen as a leading contender for the top job. Moon previously ran for the presidency in 2012 and was defeated by Park Geun-hye. (J.H. Ahn, "Leading ROK Presidential Candidate to Visit N. Korea If Elected," *NKNews*, December 16, 2016)

South Korea and Japan directly exchanged classified information on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs for the first time in line with their intelligence-sharing pact which came into force last month, the defense ministry said. Defense ministry



spokesman Moon Sang-gyun told reporters that the exchange was made during a meeting between the two countries' senior defense officials held in Seoul in conjunction with a three-way security dialogue which also includes the United States. "Under the recently-signed General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), Seoul and Tokyo have shared intelligence on Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs for the first time since the pact's signing last month," he said. (Yonhap, "S. Korea, Japan Militaries Directly Exchange Intelligence on N.K. for First Time," December 16, 2016)

12/18/16 North Korea is in the process of developing a long-endurance aerial drone with greater capabilities, the government said. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that is undergoing flight testing is larger than those currently in service in the North, an official source said. Last week the North's Chosun Central TV revealed that a new type of UAV is under development. The media outlet did not provide clear images of the actual drone but claimed it had real-time observation and tracking capabilities. It also said the machine can be used to check the atmosphere, detect forest fires and observe fishing grounds. "The North is building larger drones with greater range and with the capability to be flown remotely by flight controllers," an official from Seoul's defense ministry said. He declined to go into detail but said Seoul has detected numerous test flights by such aerial vehicles since early this year. (Yonhap, "N. Korea in Process of Building Long-Endurance Aerial Drone," December 18, 2016)

12/19/16 Japanese officials have been meeting secretly with North Korea's ruling party in recent months, according to sources. The back-channel meetings are an apparent attempt to make progress on pending issues through a different route than the previous dialogue between diplomats. For at least three meetings between September and November, Pyongyang sent members of the International Department of the Workers' Party of Korea who are close to leader Kim Jong Un, while Tokyo dispatched Foreign Ministry officials, the sources said. Japan's use of the North Korean political party as a conduit may have been primarily aimed at breaking the current stalemate on the abduction issue, the sources said. Tokyo and Pyongyang have no diplomatic ties. The move is thought to be the first time the party's department has become directly involved in negotiations with Japan since the summit in 2004 between Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Kim's father, the late Kim Jong Il. According to the sources, officials from both sides held a meeting in an inland city in northeastern China in early September. The talks continued even after North Korea carried out its fifth nuclear test that month, drawing international condemnation, with contact being made in a port city in southern China in early October and another location at the start of November. The October meeting was at a higher level than the other two, with Japan represented by a senior Foreign Ministry official with close knowledge of Abe's intentions and Pyongyang represented by a high-ranking party member able to pass on Kim's thoughts, the sources said. The government has denied that Foreign Ministry officials went to China or that contact was made with North Korea. (Kyodo, "Japan Held Secret Meetings in China with North Korean Ruling Party: Sources," *Japan Times*, December 20, 2016)

South Korea repatriated eight North Korean fishermen who were rescued last week while drifting in waters off the country's east coast, government officials said. The South sent the North Koreans on two vessels across the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the East Sea, according to Seoul's unification ministry. "Two North Korean patrol ships and two tugboats appeared near the NLL, and the sailors were sent to the North," Jeong Joon-hee, ministry spokesman, told a regular press briefing. The latest case marked the first repatriation since December last year when the South handed over three fishermen via the truce village of Panmunjom. The North Korean vessels showed up in the morning without any response to Seoul's repeated offer to repatriate them last week. All of the sailors expressed their desire to go home, sources said. Seoul used loudspeakers last week to contact North Korea as Pyongyang cut off the two main communication channels with South Korea in response to Seoul's decision to shut down the jointly run Kaesong Industrial Complex in February. The ministry said that the fishermen were drifting on three vessels for more than two months after presumably colliding with Chinese vessels in the East Sea. Because one ship was beyond repair it was abandoned with the consent of the North Korean crew. Citing the sailors' account, the spokesman said December 15 that fewer than 10 sailors starved to death, without elaborating. South Korea usually sends back North Korean sailors on the boats they used when they want to return home. (Yonhap, "S. Korea Sends 8 Rescued N. Korea Fishermen Back Home," December 19, 2016)

Bermudez: "Commercial satellite imagery from December 9 of North Korea's Sinpo South Shipyard suggests that the GORAE-class experimental ballistic missile submarine and submersible test barge may have recently been or are preparing to go to sea, although it is impossible to determine whether that would be related to an impending missile test or normal maintenance activities. Imagery is not yet available from after a recently reported "cold launch." The December 9 image indicates that previous work on the protective berm at the test stand is complete, making it capable of testing missiles larger than North Korea's KN-11 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) tested in August. As previously concluded, a shipbuilding program is possibly also underway in the construction halls. Commercial satellite imagery from December 9 indicates that netting previously covering the GORAE-class experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA) and submersible test barge is gone. Additionally, on the deck immediately aft of the GORAE's sail is what appears to be a small grouping of equipment or supplies. These two factors suggest that both craft may have recently been at sea or are preparing to go to sea in the near future. However, there is no activity on the dock adjacent to the submarine and none of the commonly seen support vessels are present in the secure boat basin. The reason for their absence is unknown but could include being out to sea with other submarines or getting serviced in a different area. Moreover, a floating security barrier is present at the basin entrance, meaning neither the submarine or barge was likely put to sea that day. There are numerous reasons why the GORAE or test barge would be put to sea other than testing missiles or their components, such as certification of personnel or validation of repairs. Therefore, based on satellite imagery alone, it is not possible to determine whether a SLBM test is imminent. A recent "cold launch" test, if reports are correct, would have taken place from the vertical test stand at Sinpo. Since no imagery from that time is yet available, no assessment can be made to corroborate that claim.

Imagery from December 9 does indicate that work on the western protective berm, which began in February, is now complete with a higher, more substantial, berm in place. This reconfiguration will allow the stand to test missiles with engines larger than the KN-11 SLBM last tested in August." (Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Simpo South Shipyard: Is the GORAE Set to Sail?" *38North*, December 19, 2016)

Schilling: "We note with bemused interest that the South Korean government is now claiming that North Korea's missiles pose a "direct threat to the US homeland" and that "Europe is also within range." European media has reported that the director-general of South Korea's North Korean Nuclear Affairs Bureau made the claim at a press briefing in Seoul last month. This claim is wholly unsubstantiated, and almost certainly not true - particularly where Europe is concerned. The "US homeland" might generously be interpreted to include the island of Guam. At 3,500 km from North Korean launch sites, it could be just within range of North Korea's Musudan missile. And the Musudan barely works, exploding in seven out of eight tests so far. But by a generous interpretation, North Korean missiles could possibly reach sovereign US territory that is home to some 125,000 US citizens. Not Hawaii or Alaska, and not the US mainland; one territory in the South Pacific. Europe, by any standard, is completely out of reach. Even the Ural Mountains, traditionally Europe's eastern border, are some 5,000 km from North Korea. And really, when the ROK talks about "Europe" being within reach, they don't mean nuking Perm or Chelyabinsk, they mean NATO. NATO's borders start at 7,000 km from North Korean launch sites, twice the distance North Korean existing missiles can reach. Seoul may be referring to the threat posed by North Korea's KN-08 and KN-14 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, which probably will be able reach Europe or the US West Coast. But those missiles don't exist, except as parade mock-ups and engineering test articles. When they are completed, they will require years of flight testing to reach operational status, with no doubt many more catastrophic failures. We've been watching closely for those tests, and seen only ground tests of isolated components. Seoul has been watching as closely as we have, understands that these missiles are a threat for 2020 or beyond, so why are they making this claim now?" (John Schilling, "North Korean Missiles Can't Actually Reach Europe," *38North*, December 19, 2016)

12/20/16

Joint Statement of the Republic of Korea and the United States: "The United States of America and the Republic of Korea (ROK) held the inaugural meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) in Washington, D.C., on December 20, 2016. The EDSCG, established by the U.S.-ROK Foreign and Defense Ministers' (2+2) Meeting on October 19, 2016, was led by vice ministerial-level officials from the ROK and the United States: ROK First Vice Foreign Minister Lim, Sung-nam; ROK Deputy Minister for Defense Policy Yoo, Jeh-seung; U.S. Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas Countryman; and Performing the Duties of Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy of the U.S. Department of Defense David Shear. Officials from both sides held comprehensive and in-depth discussions on strategic and policy issues regarding extended deterrence against North Korea, including how to better leverage the full breadth of national power - using diplomacy, information, military, and economic elements. The United States reiterated its ironclad and unwavering commitment **to draw on the full**

**range of its military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense**, to provide extended deterrence for the ROK, and reaffirmed the longstanding U.S. policy that any attack on the United States or its allies will be defeated, and any use of nuclear weapons will be met with an effective and overwhelming response. In particular, the United States emphasized that it remains steadfast in meeting these enduring commitments and providing immediate support to the ROK. In response to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, the officials reaffirmed the commitment of the United States **to regularly deploy U.S. strategic assets** for the defense of the ROK, as well as to enhance such measures and identify new or additional steps to strengthen deterrence. The officials also highlighted that the United States in 2016 demonstrated its commitment and resolve to the ROK by exercising extended deterrence through measures to enhance missile defense capabilities and through **clear demonstrations of the U.S. nuclear triad, including multiple B-52 strategic bomber flights as well as visits by ROK officials to observe a Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch (February 25) and board a nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) during its port visit to Guam** (November 1). Emphasizing the importance of the EDSCG as a high-level consultative mechanism and with a common understanding that such various measures to strengthen our combined defense are necessary to maintain effective deterrence of North Korea, the two sides expressed their intent to continue Alliance discussions through the EDSCG on how to best tailor our response to this evolving threat. The ROK and the United States will discuss the time and venue of future meetings through diplomatic channels." (DoS, Joint Statement of the Republic of Korea and the United States, December 20, 2016)

The U.S. Treasury Department tightened sanctions against North Korean diplomats to the United Nations, requiring banks to get special permission before granting them accounts, the agency said in a notice posted online. The United States removed an exemption in the broad economic sanctions against Pyongyang that had allowed U.S. banks to service North Korean diplomats without getting specific permission from the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Banks will now have to obtain a special license from OFAC before opening bank accounts, processing transactions or extending credit for North Korean diplomats or their family members, OFAC said. North Korea's U.N. mission did not immediately respond to a request for comment. U.S. officials have long said North Korea uses the bank accounts of diplomats to help Pyongyang conduct business around the world, despite economic sanctions. A U.S. intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said North Korea "seeks to alleviate its economic isolation" by bringing back currency from overseas "using all available avenues." For example, said another U.S. intelligence official, North Korea sells cigarettes and illegal drugs outside the country and use diplomatic packages to send the cash back home. Under new U.N. sanctions adopted last month in response to North Korea's fifth and largest nuclear test in September, countries are required to limit the number of bank accounts to one per North Korean diplomatic mission and one per diplomat. (Joel Schectman and John Walcott, "U.S. Tightens Sanctions against North Korea's U.N. Diplomats," Reuters, December 21, 2016)

Ralph Savelsberg and James Kiessling: "During a military parade in 2010, a mockup of a new North Korean ballistic missile was driven through Pyongyang on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). This missile has since been called by many names depending on the public source: North Korean labels correspond to "Hwasong-10," stories speculating about sales refer to the "BM-25" and US sources frequently refer to it as a "Musudan." Superficially, the missile looks like a lengthened version of the Soviet R-27 Zyb/SS-N-6 "Serb," a retired submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a listed range of 2,400 to 2,500 km. The first eight known Musudan flights took place in 2016, and all but one failed with the missile exploding on takeoff or shortly thereafter. After the single successful flight in June, Japanese sources said the missile reached an altitude of over 1,000 km before impacting approximately 400 km from the launch point; the DPRK claimed an apogee of 1,413 km. If the latter figure is accurate, the Musudan's demonstrated ground range indicates it could theoretically reach targets within 3,200 km on a minimum-energy trajectory. Published estimates of the maximum range for the Musudan span 2,500 to 4,000 km (sufficient to reach Guam) with asserted payloads between 1,000 kg and 1,250 kg. Yet such assertions are difficult to corroborate with the weapon's visual characteristics. ... The following assessment of the Musudan's ground range, conducted via computer simulation, attempts to address such limitations by considering properties of the weapon's fuel and oxidizer, its dead-weight mass fractions (weight other than warhead and expended propellant), its engine's effectiveness and its drag and payload. The findings indicate that the Musudan's design departures from the Soviet R-27 have reduced the missile's performance in every meaningful criterion. For every payload mass, the Musudan has a shorter range than the R-27, **placing Guam out of reach**. Innate stability losses due to the "stretch" likely make the missile less accurate with substantially decreased reliability. As such, **despite having a longer range than the Nodong, the Musudan does not clearly change the nature of the North's missile threat to either US or Japanese targets**. The stretch of the R-27 design may have been a political objective to convey a perception of threat, but the only significant change is that the Musudan brings Taiwan and most of mainland China under threat. Still, it does show that North Korea can adapt some of the R-27 technology, which has implications for Pyongyang's ability to develop longer-range multistage missiles, such as a potential militarized version of the Unha satellite launch vehicle. ... Estimating the Musudan's range requires knowledge of its propellant mass, which in turn necessitates an approximation of its tank dimensions. The R-27, as an SLBM, was volume optimized to accommodate submarine length restrictions. Based on the total propellant mass of 12,200 kg, oxidizer and propellant densities (1,450 kg/cubic meter and 793 kg/cubic meter, respectively) and an optimum mixing ratio of oxidizer over fuel volume of 1.2, the fuel volume is 4.82 cubic meters and the oxidizer volume is 5.78 cubic meters. Photographs show that the Musudan's tanks are longer than R-27 tanks. Rivet patterns suggest a ribbed structure between tanks, indicating an inter-tank section with two bulkheads similar to the first stage of the Unha-3 satellite launch vehicle. A Musudan missile with no re-entry vehicle appeared in a recent photograph of Kim Jong Un, showing the top of the oxidizer tank as a shallow dome. Knowing the complete tank shape, it becomes possible to estimate the Musudan's oxidizer mass. This process begins by adding and subtracting appropriate volumes to and from the R-27 tank volume. ... Multiplying the result by the IFRNA density (1,510 kg per cubic meter) and

by 0.93 yields the Musudan's rough oxidizer mass. Assuming an unchanged flow rate through the rocket engine injectors when substituting IFRNA for N<sub>2</sub>O<sub>4</sub>, the mixing ratio remains unchanged and we can calculate the propellant mass and burn time for the Musudan. This mixing ratio is lower than the optimum for IFRNA/UDMH, slightly reducing the fuel-rich propellant's specific impulse—one measure of its efficiency. Depending on the mixing ratio, the combustion chamber pressure and the expansion ratio of the nozzle, a given propellant combination can give a wide variety of values for the specific impulse. The specific impulse values for the R-27 were chosen such that its range with a payload is close to 2,500 km. Specific impulse values estimated for IFRNA/UDMH in the Musudan are appropriately smaller. We assume that 98 percent of the propellant in both missiles is usable. Unlike the R-27 and the Musudan mockups paraded in 2010, the missile launched in June 2016 was fitted with a set of eight grid fins, similar to those on retired Soviet ballistic missiles such as the SS-21 "Scarab." These increase drag. Our simulations used two different profiles of the modeled Musudan drag-coefficient as a function of the Mach number; these profiles ... consider the effect of the new fins. ... The simulations indicate that the Musudan's successful June launch most likely had a near-zero payload. The simulations also indicate minimal design margins and significant dynamic challenges in application to military payloads (as seen in the seven catastrophic failures in flight). Figure 6 uses this data to show the area that the baseline missile, with a 10 percent dead-weight mass fraction and a 650 kg payload, can cover when launched from Wonsan. The Musudan baseline model falls more than 1,200 km short of the range necessary to reach Guam. The Musudan, despite its longer range, does not clearly change the nature of the DPRK missile threat to either US or Japanese targets. The existing arsenal of R-17 (Scud) derived missiles or scaled Scud technology in the Nodong already threatens all of South Korea and most of Japan. The Musudan's 'stretch' of the R-27 design may have been a political objective to convey a perception of threat. The significant change, as seen in Figure 6, is that the Musudan brings Taiwan and most of the Chinese mainland under threat. However, it also shows that North Korea can adapt some of the technology of the R-27. This demonstrated adaptation has consequences for Pyongyang's development of longer-range multistage missiles, such as a potential militarized version of the Unha satellite launch vehicle. (Ralph Savelsberg and James Kiessling, "North Korea's Musudan Missile: A Performance Assessment," *38North*, December 20, 2016)

12/21/16

At least 35 Saenuri lawmakers outside the pro-Park Geun-hye faction said they will defect from the party en masse to create a new conservative party, a move that could complicate next year's presidential race, according to Rep. Hwang Young-cheul, who has been serving as spokesman for the anti-Park faction within the party. Hwang said of 33 party lawmakers who attended today's meeting at the National Assembly, 31 agreed on the need to defection. Hwang said four additional party members who did not attend the meeting also expressed their intention to join. "We will carry out our defections on December 27," said the three-term lawmaker following the meeting, "So far we have 35 lawmakers joining the cause for defection." He said the group expected more Saenuri members to join before December 27, the defection deadline. Today's meeting was attended by former Saenuri floor leader Yoo Seong-min and former Saenuri chairman Kim Moo-sung, both considered de facto leaders of the anti-Park movement within the Saenuri. The decision to defect came after the anti-Park faction

failed to win control of the party last Friday when Rep. Na Kyung-won lost an in-party race to become the party's floor leader to a pro-Park lawmaker, Chung Woo-taik. (Kang Jin-kyu, "Saenuri Splitting, 35 Reps to Defect," *JoongAng Ilbo*, December 22, 2016)

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon pledged to devote his life to the advancement of South Korea, sending the strongest signal yet that he might run in next year's presidential election. "If what I have learned, seen and felt during my 10-year service as UN secretary-general could help advance Korea, I am more than willing to sacrifice myself for this cause," said Ban during a farewell press meeting with Korean reporters. His term ends on December 31. When asked about which political party he would represent, Ban highlighted that he would not be bound by establishment political groups, saying that "political parties are not important" and that "political leaders must think beyond themselves." Such remarks added speculation that Ban -- once considered to be a favorite for President Park Geun-hye and her loyalists from the governing Saenuri Party -- would distance himself from the pro-Park faction whose approval ratings have plunged to a record-low amid the corruption and nepotism scandal tied to the president. Some centrist political groups, meanwhile, have been urging Ban to join them in the hopes that Ban would expand their pool of supporters and energize moderate voters. Among them are Saenuri bigwigs critical of Park and leaders from the centrist People's Party. "I think Ban could work with us," said Rep. Kim Dong-cheol, a leader of the People's Party today. "Ban has a sufficient amount of experience for dealing with state affairs. We agree with his plan to use such experience for the country." (Yeo Jun-suk, "Ban Sends Strong Signal about Presidential Bid," *Korea Herald*, December 21, 2016)

A South Korean state-run think tank said that North Korea may heighten tensions with new nuclear and missile tests early next year as the Donald Trump administration takes over. "The North is expected to intensify its push to deploy nuclear weapons for combat use through its sixth nuclear test and ballistic missile launches next year," the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), a think tank run by the National Intelligence Service, said in a report. "The likelihood is high that provocations including a nuclear test in the first half coupled with missile launches could prompt more confrontation and eventually send the inter-Korean relations into no visibility," it added. The INSS said that the North could conduct a nuclear test, in particular, in January and February when it is to celebrate major anniversaries such as birthdays of Kim Jong-un and his late father Kim Jong-il. (Yonhap, "N.K. Likely to Conduct Nuke Test Early Next Year: Think Tank," *Korea Herald*, December 21, 2016)

12/23/16

North Korea is capable of conducting another nuclear test at any time, South Korean spy agency chief said, citing activity at the country's nuclear site. "Human and vehicle activities remain active in the second shaft at the North's Punggye-ri test site even during the winter, and the third shaft is capable of further testing at any time," Lee Byoung-ho, director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), was quoted as telling the parliamentary intelligence committee by lawmakers. "North Korea is only weighing when to make another provocation based on political situations surrounding South Korea and the United States." Lee also said that the North conducted a land-based

ejection test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile at its Sinpo Shipyard earlier this month. He also said North Korean leader Kim Jong-un threatened to turn South Korea's presidential office of Cheong Wa Dae into "a sea of fire" during his recent inspection of a military drill. (Yonhap, "N. Korea Can Conduct Another Nuclear Test at Any Time: NIS," *Korea Herald*, December 23, 2016)

12/27/16

DPRK FoMin spokesman "answer to a question raised by KCNA Tuesday in connection with the fact that the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces held discussion on "extended deterrence strategy" against the DPRK: There was a meeting of U.S.-south Korea "group for discussion on extended deterrence strategy" in Washington shortly ago. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces agreed to set up the "group" in October and held its first meeting recently. This is a serious provocation aggravating the situation on the Korean peninsula and increasing the danger of a nuclear war there. At the recent meeting the U.S. examined the rotation deployment of the U.S. strategic assets in south Korea under the pretext of "threat" from the DPRK. This is an extremely dangerous attempt to put nuclear threat and blackmail against the DPRK on a regular and institutional basis and stifle it by force. By holding closer to it the south Korean puppet forces who are now foundering in the worst ruling crisis, and making them increasingly dependent on it in military field on one hand and by forming the U.S.-Japan-south Korea triangular military alliance and setting up NATO of Asian version on the other hand, the U.S. seeks to contain its rival nations and maintain its military edge in Asia-Pacific and thus realize its hegemonic ambition. The south Korean puppet forces recently clamored for the building of a nuclear-powered submarine at the instigation of the U.S., a clear revelation of their intention to act a shock brigade and servants in executing the U.S. strategy for invasion and domination of Asia-Pacific. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces are branding the DPRK's bolstering of its nuclear deterrence as "threats" but they can never cover up their criminal nature of threatening the DPRK with nukes and rendering the situation in the region instable through the introduction of huge strategic assets. The present situation clearly proves that the DPRK was absolutely just and right when it made the decision and opted for the line to put a definite end to the danger of a nuclear war being imposed by the U.S. and defend peace in the region and the rest of the world in reliance on the powerful nuclear deterrence. We will in the future, too, **hold fast to the Workers' Party of Korea's idea and line on simultaneously developing the two fronts and further bolster the nuclear force for self-defense in quality and quantity as long as the U.S. persists in its hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK.**" (KCNA, "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts U.S.-S. Korea Discussion on 'Extended Deterrence Strategy,'" December 27, 2016)

A senior North Korean official who defected to the South told reporters that the North viewed 2017 as the best time to advance its nuclear program because it could take advantage of leadership changes in the United States and South Korea. The official, Thae Yong-ho, North Korea's No. 2 diplomat in London, is the most senior North Korean official to defect in nearly two decades. At a news conference with South Korean reporters – his first meeting with outside journalists since his defection in August – he cautioned that as a diplomat, he was not privy to the status of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Yet he said North Korea was also confident that



China would not punish it too harshly for its nuclear program, out of fear that the North's collapse would create a pro-American, unified Korea on its border. "North Korea knows this weakness of China," Thae said. "As long as Kim Jong-un is in power, North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons, even if it's offered \$1 trillion or \$10 trillion in rewards." The foreign news media was not allowed into Thae's 150-minute news conference in Seoul with local reporters. But a transcript revealed Thae's thoughts on his home country and its leader. He said Kim did not consider his nuclear weapons program a bargaining chip but rather sought to deal with the United States after being recognized as a nuclear power, a status Washington has pledged not to grant. Thae, a career diplomat, served in Denmark and Sweden before he was assigned to the North Korean Embassy in London about 10 years ago. In London, he was spotted delivering speeches at far-left events, including meetings of the British Communist Party, where he would speak passionately in defense of North Korea. He said that North Korea paid its ambassadors only \$900 to \$1,100 a month, making its diplomats desperate for an extra income through work outside the embassy. The diplomats live a communal life inside their embassy to save costs, he added. But he said they enjoyed one luxury the elites back in the North could not: They had access to the internet and could read news from South Korea, including updates about the lives of North Korean defectors. Thae said that back in the North, the totalitarian regime was so paranoid about outside information affecting its people that it kept surveillance on diplomats who had returned home for fear they might spread outside news, even though DVDs smuggled in from China have made South Korean movies and soap operas increasingly popular in the North. Thae himself was an avid fan of South Korean soap operas. Thae said his disillusionment with Kim had deepened after the execution of many officials, including the leader's uncle, Jang Song-thaek, in an attempt to tighten his control through a reign of terror. The North Korean government requires its diplomats to leave some of their family members back home, holding them as hostages against potential defections. Thae said he was lucky because he could defect to the South with his wife and two children. North Korean diplomats are also required to monitor one another to thwart treason. But Thae said there were holes in the surveillance, although he declined to divulge details of how he had defected. "It's a human world, and it's impossible to monitor someone constantly," he said. (Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea's Nuclear Hopes Have Surged, Defector Says," New York Times, December 28, 2016, p. A-6)

1/1/16

North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un, said that his country was making final preparations to conduct its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile – a bold statement less than a month before the inauguration of President-elect Donald J. Trump. In his annual New Year's Day speech, which was broadcast on the North's state-run KCTV on Sunday, Mr. Kim spoke proudly of the strides he said his country has made in its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. He said that North Korea would continue to bolster its weapons programs as long as the United States remained hostile and continued its joint military exercises with South Korea. "We have reached the final stage in preparations to test-launch an intercontinental ballistic rocket," he said. Analysts in the region have said that Kim might conduct another weapons test in coming months, taking advantage of leadership changes in the United States and South Korea. Kim's speech indicated that North Korea may test-launch a long-range

rocket several times this year to complete its ICBM program, said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute of South Korea. "We need to take note of the fact that this is the first New Year's speech where Kim Jong-un mentioned an intercontinental ballistic missile," he said. Doubt still runs deep that North Korea has mastered all technology needed to build a reliable ICBM. But analysts in the region said that the North's launchings of three-stage rockets to put satellites into orbit in recent years showed that the country had cleared some key technological hurdles. (Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea Says It's Close to Long-Range Missile Test," *New York Times*, January 2, 2016, p. A-3)

New Year's Day Address: "Dear Comrades, Having seen out 2016, in which we glorified each and every day with gigantic struggle, creating a new history of great prosperity unprecedented in the history of the Juche revolution, we are seeing in the new year 2017. ...Last year, amid the soaring revolutionary enthusiasm of all the Party members, service personnel and other people and great interest of the world, the Seventh Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea was held in a meaningful and splendid way as a grand political festival. The congress proudly reviewed our Party's glorious history of advancing the revolutionary cause of Juche along the victorious road under the wise leadership of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and unfolded an ambitious blueprint for accomplishing the socialist cause under the banner of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism. Through this historic congress, the iron will of our service personnel and people to continuously march along the road of Juche following the Party was fully demonstrated, and lasting groundwork for the Korean revolution was laid. It will be etched in the history of our country as a meeting of victors that demonstrated the invincible might of the great Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist party, as a glorious meeting that set up a new milestone in carrying out the revolutionary cause of Juche. **Last year an epochal turn was brought about in consolidating the defense capability of Juche Korea, and our country achieved the status of a nuclear power**, a military giant, in the East which no enemy, however formidable, would dare to provoke. **We conducted the first H-bomb test, test-firing of various means of strike and nuclear warhead test successfully to cope with the imperialists' nuclear war threats, which were growing more wicked day by day, briskly developed state-of-the-art military hardware, and entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of intercontinental ballistic missile; we achieved other marvellous successes one after another for the consolidation of the defense capability.** This provided **a powerful military guarantee for defending the destiny of the country and nation and victoriously advancing the cause of building a powerful socialist country.** Our valiant People's Army reliably defended the security of the country and the gains of the revolution by resolutely frustrating the enemy's reckless moves for aggression and war, and gave perfect touches to its political and ideological aspects and military and technical preparations, as befits an invincible army. The brilliant successes achieved in the sector of national defense instilled a great national dignity and courage in our people, drove the imperialists and other reactionary forces into an ignominious defeat, and remarkably raised the strategic position of our country. Last year we achieved proud successes in the 70-day campaign and 200-day campaign organized for glorifying the Seventh Congress of the Party. These campaigns were a do-or-die struggle in which all the people smashed to smithereens the enemy's vicious

schemes to isolate and suffocate our country and brought about a turning point on all fronts where a powerful socialist country is being built, a massive struggle of creation that gave birth to a new Mallima era. Thanks to the heroic struggle of the Kim Il Sung's and Kim Jong Il's working class and all other people, the ambitious goals the Party set for the 70-day campaign and 200-day campaign were attained with success and a fresh breakthrough was made in the development of the national economy. **Our resourceful, talented scientists and technicians, following the successful launch of the earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong 4, succeeded in the static firing test of new-type high-thrust motor of the launch vehicle for a geostationary satellite. By doing so, they have opened up a broad avenue to the exploration of outer space.** Also, they established fully-automated, model production systems of our own style, bred high-yielding strains with a view to ramping up agricultural production and achieved other laudable scientific and technological breakthroughs one after another. All this will be of great significance in developing the country's economy and improving the people's livelihood. **The electric-power, coal-mining, metallurgical, chemical and building-materials industries, rail transport and other major sectors of the national economy attained their respective production and transport goals,** thereby demonstrating the potential of our self-supporting economy and giving a powerful impetus to the building of a socialist economic giant. Numerous industrial establishments and cooperative farms registered the proud success of surpassing the peak-year level. The People's Army stood in the vanguard in adding lustre to the history of "gold seas" and in creating a legendary speed at important construction sites. The sectors of education, public health and sports, too, made admirable achievements. When some areas in North Hamgyong Province were devastated by a sudden natural calamity, the whole country turned out in the restoration effort in hearty response to the Party's appeal and achieved a miraculous success in a short span of time. During the 70-day campaign and 200-day campaign we created a new spirit of the times for building a powerful socialist country, and our people's trust in the Party and confidence in socialism grew firmer. Last year, in which the whole country kept on seething with vigor day and night, all the Party members and other working people, youth and service personnel gave full scope to the indomitable attacking spirit of braving ordeals and difficulties, the death-defying mettle of answering the Party's call with devotion and practice in any adversity, and the collectivist might of helping one another and leading one another forward to advance by leaps and bounds. ...We should wage a vigorous all-people, general offensive to hit the targets of the five-year strategy on the strength of self-reliance and self-development. The strength of self-reliance and self-development is that of science and technology, and the shortcut to implementing the five-year strategy is to give importance and precedence to science and technology. The sector of science and technology should concentrate efforts on solving scientific and technological problems arising in modernizing factories and enterprises and putting their production on a regular footing with the main emphasis on ensuring the domestic production of raw materials, fuel and equipment. Production units and scientific research institutes should intensify cooperation between themselves, and enterprises should build up their own technological development forces and conduct a proactive mass-based technological innovation drive, propelling economic development with valuable sci-tech achievements conducive to expanded production and the improvement of business operation and management. The

electric-power, metallurgical and chemical industries should take the lead in the efforts to hit the targets of the economic strategy. The electric-power industry should carry out its production plan without fail by ensuring good maintenance of generating equipment and structures and stepping up its technical upgrading. It should run the nationwide integrated power control system effectively and organize alternated production scrupulously to ensure balance between power production and consumption; it should also develop the various sources of power to create a new generating capacity on a large scale. The metallurgical industry should introduce advanced technologies to lower the iron production cost and ensure normal operation of Juche-based production lines to turn out iron and steel in larger amounts. The state should take stringent measures to supply raw materials, fuel and power to the Kim Chaek and Hwanghae iron and steel complexes and other metallurgical factories. The chemical industry is a basis for all other industries and plays an important role in consolidating the independence of the economy and improving the people's living standards. This sector should revitalize production at the February 8 Vinalon Complex, expand the capacity of other major chemical factories and transform their technical processes in our own way, thus increasing the output of various chemical goods. It should direct efforts to establishing a C1 chemical industry to carry out the tasks at every stage promptly and satisfactorily. The coal-mining industry and the rail transport sector should meet the demands for coal and its transport by power stations and metallurgical and chemical factories on a top priority basis. The machine-building industry should be rapidly developed. Machine factories should step up their modernization, perfect the processes for the serial production of new-type tractors, vehicles and multi-purpose farm machines, and produce and supply different kinds of high-performance and quality machinery and equipment. This year light industry, agriculture and fishing industry should be radically developed to make greater progress in improving the people's living standards. Light industry should work out proper management strategies, regarding use of domestically available raw and other materials as their core, so as to revitalize production and bring about a turn in diversifying the range and types of consumer goods and improving their quality. It should normalize production in the mines and enterprises in the Tanchon area, so that they can prove effective in improving the people's living standards. The agricultural front, the major thrust in building an economic giant, should raise a strong wind of scientific farming and push forward the movement for increasing crop yield. It should widely introduce seeds of superior strains and scientific farming methods, whose advantages have been proved in practice, expand the area of land under two-crop farming, and be proactive in inventing and introducing high-performance farm machines. By doing so, it can attain the production goal of grains. It should adopt measures to run the livestock farming base in the Sepho area on a normal basis and increase the production of fruits, mushrooms and vegetables, so that the people can enjoy benefits from them. The fishing sector should conduct a dynamic drive for catching fishes and push perseveringly ahead with aquatic farming. It should build modern fishing vessels in a greater number and lay out a comprehensive fishing equipment production base in the east coast area, so as to consolidate the material and technical foundations of the fishing industry. The construction sector should complete the construction of Ryomyong Street at the highest level and concentrate its forces on the major construction projects including the building of the Tanchon Power

Station, modernization of the Kim Jong Thae Electric Locomotive Complex and the development of the Wonsan area. It should also build more educational and cultural facilities and houses in an excellent way. ...Upholding the slogan of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, every field and every unit of the national economy should launch a dynamic struggle to increase production and practice economy to the maximum, and thus carry out the plan for this year on all indices. The whole country should turn out in land administration. We should further transform the appearance of the land of our country by building modern tree nurseries in provinces, perseveringly pressing on with the forest restoration campaign and conducting river management, road repair and environmental conservation on a planned basis. In order to bring about a turnabout in implementing the five-year strategy for national economic development, it is imperative to carry on economic guidance and business management with clear objectives and in an innovative way. The Cabinet and other economic guidance organs should work out tactics to ensure the sustainable economic development by putting the overall national economy definitely on an upward track, and implement them with an unflinching perseverance. ...The political and military position of socialism should be further cemented so that it can be an impregnable fortress. Single-hearted unity is the precious revolutionary legacy the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il bequeathed to us, and herein lies the invincible might of our style of socialism. All the service personnel and people should establish the ties of kinship with the Party, their hearts pulsating to the same beat as it, and unite closely behind it in ideology, purpose and moral obligation, so as to struggle staunchly to achieve the prosperity of the country. We should thoroughly apply the people-first doctrine, the crystallization of the Juche-oriented view on the people, philosophy of the people, in Party work and all the spheres of state and social life, and wage an intensive struggle to root out abuses of power, bureaucratism and corruption that spoil the flower garden of single-hearted unity. We should resolutely thwart the enemy's sinister and pernicious schemes to check the warm and pure-hearted aspiration of our people who follow the Party single-heartedly and to alienate the Party from them. In this year of the 85th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army, we should raise the fierce flames of increasing the military capability. The People's Army should conduct the Party's political work in a proactive manner, so as to ensure that it is pervaded with the ideology and intentions of the Party alone. It should designate this year as another year of training, another year of perfecting its combat preparedness, and ensure that all its units of different arms, services and corps raise a hot wind of perfecting their combat preparedness in order to train all its officers and men as a-match-for-a-hundred combatants, tigers of Mt Paektu, who are capable of annihilating any aggressor force at a stroke. Officers and men of the Korean People's Internal Security Forces and members of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and Young Red Guards should prepare themselves politically and militarily and maintain full combat readiness to firmly defend the socialist system and the people's lives and property. Officials, scientists and workers in the defense industry, burning their hearts with the "Yongil bomb spirit" of the days of the anti-Japanese struggle and the revolutionary spirit of the workers of Kunja-ri of the days of the Fatherland Liberation War, should develop and produce larger quantities of powerful military hardware of our own style. By doing so, they can build up the arsenal of the Songun revolution. ...The current stirring era demands that our officials, standard-bearers in carrying out the Party's policies, improve their working style and

attitude in a revolutionary way. Last year, in reflection of the national desire for reunification and the requirements of the times, we put forward the Juche-oriented line and policy of reunification at the Seventh Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea and made strenuous efforts to this end. However, the south Korean authorities turned a deaf ear to our patriotic appeal and ignored our sincere proposal. Instead, they clung to their sanctions-and-pressure schemes against the DPRK and persisted in clamoring for a war against it, thus driving inter-Korean relations towards the worst catastrophe. **Last year, south Korea witnessed a massive anti-“government” struggle spreading far and wide to shake the reactionary ruling machinery to its foundations. This resistance involving all south Korean people, which left an indelible mark in the history of their struggle, was an outburst of pent-up grudge and indignation against the conservative regime that had been resorting to fascist dictatorship, anti-popular policy, sycophantic and traitorous acts and confrontation with their compatriots. This year we will mark the 45th anniversary of the historic July 4 Joint Statement and the 10th anniversary of the October 4 Declaration. This year we should open up a broad avenue to independent reunification through a concerted effort of the whole nation. Positive measures should be taken to improve inter-Korean relations, avoid acute military confrontation and remove the danger of war between north and south.** The improvement of inter-Korean relations is the starting-point for peace and reunification, and it is a pressing demand of the whole nation. Any politician, if he or she remains a passive onlooker to the current deadlock between the two sides, can neither claim to be fully discharging his or her responsibility and role for the nation nor enjoy public support. Every manner of abuses and slanders aimed at offending the other party and inciting confrontation cannot be justified on any account, and an immediate stop should be put to the malicious smear campaign and other acts of hostility towards the DPRK, all designed for the overthrow of its system and any other “change.” **We are consistent in our stand to safeguard the security of the compatriots and peace of the country without fighting with the fellow countrymen. The south Korean authorities should not aggravate the situation by finding fault with our exercise of the right to self-defense thoughtlessly, but respond positively to our sincere efforts to prevent military conflict between north and south and ease the tension. They should also discontinue arms buildup and war games.** The whole nation should pool their will and efforts to usher in a heyday of the nationwide reunification movement. All the Korean people in the north, in the south and abroad should achieve solidarity, make concerted efforts and unite on the principle of subordinating everything to national reunification, the common cause of the nation, and revitalize the reunification movement on a nationwide scale. They should promote active contact and exchange with each other irrespective of differences in their ideologies and systems, regions and ideals, and classes and social strata, and hold a pan-national, grand meeting for reunification involving all the political parties and organizations including the authorities in the north and south, as well as the compatriots of all strata at home and abroad. We will readily join hands with anyone who prioritizes the fundamental interests of the nation and is desirous of improving inter-Korean relations. It is necessary to frustrate the challenges of the anti-reunification forces at home and abroad who go against the aspiration of the nation for reunification. **We must put an end to the moves for aggression and intervention by the foreign forces including**

**the United States that is occupying south Korea and tries to realize the strategy for achieving hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and wage a dynamic pan-national struggle to thwart the moves of the traitorous and sycophantic anti-reunification forces like Park Geun Hye who, failing to see clearly who is the real arch-enemy of the nation, is trying to find a way out in confrontation with the fellow countrymen. Well aware of the will of the Korean nation to reunify their country, the United States must no longer cling to the scheme of whipping up national estrangement by inciting the anti-reunification forces in south Korea to confrontation with the fellow countrymen and war. It must make a courageous decision to roll back its anachronistic policy hostile towards the DPRK.** The international community that values independence and justice should oppose the moves of the United States and its vassal forces aimed at wrecking peace on the Korean peninsula and checking its reunification, and the neighboring countries should act in favor of our nation's aspiration and efforts for reunification. All the fellow countrymen in the north, in the south and abroad should do something to make this year a meaningful year of a new phase in independent reunification by stepping up a nationwide grand march towards reunification through the concerted effort of the nation. Last year the imperialist reactionary forces' moves for political and military pressure and sanctions against our country reached an extreme. But they failed to break the faith of our service personnel and people in victory, and could not check the vigorous revolutionary advance of Juche Korea. **We will continue to build up our self-defense capability, the pivot of which is the nuclear forces, and the capability for preemptive strike as long as the United States and its vassal forces keep on nuclear threat and blackmail and as long as they do not stop their war games they stage at our doorstep disguising them as annual events. We will defend peace and security of our state at all costs and by our own efforts, and make a positive contribution to safeguarding global peace and stability. Our Party and the government of our Republic will remain committed to the ideals of our foreign policy of independence, peace and friendship, expand and develop the relations of good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation with those countries championing independence, and make concerted efforts with them to ensure genuine international justice.** Comrades, As I am standing here to proclaim the beginning of another year, I feel a surge of anxiety about what I should do to hold our people in greater reverence, the best people in the world who have warmly supported me with a single mind out of their firm trust in me. My desires were burning all the time, but I spent the past year feeling anxious and remorseful for the lack of my ability. I am hardening my resolve to seek more tasks for the sake of the people this year and make redoubled, devoted efforts to this end. Previously, all the people used to sing the song We Are the Happiest in the World, feeling optimistic about the future with confidence in the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. I will work with devotion to ensure that the past era does not remain as a moment in history but is represented in the present era. On this first morning of the new year I swear to become a true servant loyal to our people who faithfully supports them with a pure conscience. And I will push the effort to set up across the Party a revolutionary climate of making selfless, devoted efforts for the good of the people. As long as the great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism is illuminating the road ahead of us and we have the single-hearted unity of all the service personnel and people around the Party, we are sure to emerge

victorious. Let us all march forward dynamically towards a bright future, holding up the splendid blueprint unfolded by the Seventh Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea to develop ours into a powerful socialist country." (Kim Jong Un's New Year Address, *Rodong Sinmun*, January 2, 2017)