THE FINANCING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: A REVIEW OF RECENT RESEARCH AND ANALYSES

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ABOUT THE PROGRAM

Launched in March 2012, the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) supports independent African research on conflict-affected countries and neighboring regions of the continent, as well as the integration of high-quality African research-based knowledge into global policy communities. In order to advance African debates on peacebuilding and promote African perspectives, the APN offers competitive research grants and fellowships, and it funds other forms of targeted support, including strategy meetings, seminars, grantee workshops, commissioned studies, and the publication and dissemination of research findings. In doing so, the APN also promotes the visibility of African peacebuilding knowledge among global and regional centers of scholarly analysis and practical action and makes it accessible to key policymakers at the United Nations and other multilateral, regional, and national policymaking institutions.

ABOUT THE SERIES

“African solutions to African problems” is a favorite mantra of the African Union, but since the 2002 establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the continent has continued to face political, material, and knowledge-related challenges to building sustainable peace. Peacebuilding in Africa has sometimes been characterized by interventions by international actors who lack the local knowledge and lived experience needed to fully address complex conflict-related issues on the continent. And researchers living and working in Africa need additional resources and platforms to shape global debates on peacebuilding as well as influence regional and international policy and practitioner audiences. The APN Working Papers series seeks to address these knowledge gaps and needs by publishing independent research that provides critical overviews and reflections on the state of the field, stimulates new thinking on overlooked or emerging areas of African peacebuilding, and engages scholarly and policy communities with a vested interest in building peace on the continent.
Mobilizing the necessary financial, material, and logistical resources has been a major challenge to conducting peace operations in Africa that has often exposed the dependence of African states on the international community to act in their crises. Pan-Africanism has long called for Africans’ taking more responsibility for security and development. Nearly five decades ago, for instance, the Kenyan political scientist Ali Mazrui argued for the realization of a “Pax Africana,” a peace “that is protected and maintained by Africa herself” (Mazrui 1967, cited in Dersso 2013; cf. Murithi 2005). Beyond the urge to take responsibility is the realization that international organizations do not have the capacity, nor their member states the political will, to intervene in all the crises in Africa, and that African regional organizations might be better equipped to respond efficiently and effectively to threats to peace and security.

donor countries, and African states have emphasized the need for African institutional capacity to address crises and conflicts on the continent (Bujra and Solomon 2004; Murithi 2005; Curtis and Dzinesa 2012).

The financial challenges of such peace operations, however, have received much less attention. While more organizations than ever before are involved in providing resources for these efforts, evaluation of them and of the division of labor among the actors involved has been limited. Evaluations of recent peace operations, for instance, rarely discuss their financial details. A thorough analysis is needed of the duplication of resources resulting from the proliferation of institutions that address peace and conflict in Africa, of the neglect of certain issue areas, of the question of African responsibility for security, and of the capacity of regional organizations to resolve the continent’s crises.

The following represents a first attempt to address these issues by reviewing the evolution of financing peace operations in Africa. The goal is to provide a background for the evolution of financing mechanisms and to stir debate on the future of financing peace operations by evaluating current practices and ideas.

The analysis begins with a review of trends in financing peace operations, including the proliferation of actors; existing financing mechanisms used by the UN, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the World Bank; and the devolution of these operations to African regional organizations. Efforts of the past two decades to respond effectively to challenges to peace and security in Africa have produced various new programs and institutions, funds, and budgets and led to revisions of previous programs and financing mechanisms.

This proliferation of institutions and funds has also created challenges, however, which the analysis reviews next, placing particular emphasis on three: the inadequacy of UN reforms to overcome financing constraints; the insufficiency and unpredictability of voluntary contributions; and the limited capacity of African regional organizations. All are rooted in the demand for more integrated approaches to peace operations on the one hand and the lack of coordination, duplication of structures, and waste of resources on the other.
The analysis then assesses how new suggestions for international and regional financing mechanisms may address these challenges. While some new ideas have emerged, in particular for financing peace operations, most of the mechanisms proposed to enhance UN financial resources have been discussed repeatedly over the past few decades without any success in implementation. This suggests a lack of political will to implement reforms that provide considerable agency to organizations such as the UN and limit the decision-making power of member states. Innovative ideas that might overcome such challenges are also lacking.

In conclusion, a few recommendations underline the need for more research to fill the gaps in evaluations of existing financing mechanisms and for more attention to be paid to the duplication of resources that has resulted from the proliferation of actors involved in peace and security on the African continent.

DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE

To clarify the terms used and define the scope of this discussion, I briefly outline the major concepts of peace operations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. As will become clear, the theory and practice of peacekeeping has evolved significantly, constantly responding to the changing demands of peace operations. This has led to broader concepts of different types of peace operations, on the one hand, and broader demands of what operations should entail, on the other.

International organizations and states are in little agreement regarding the use of terms related to peace operations, as the UN Charter is very vague about such terms, and those used are politically loaded. International peace operations have come to encompass a wide spectrum of activities, including preventive diplomacy, “classic” peacekeeping (see below), peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacebuilding, and even postwar security sector reform and post-conflict reconstruction. They now concern the full conflict cycle from conflict prevention to conflict resolution, and new concepts such as human security have placed intervention in war in the context of more general efforts to build stable societies (Curtis and Dzinesa 2012, 5–6).

Among the various UN documents that have attempted to conceptualize activities related to the international maintenance of peace and security, the most important one produced after the end of the Cold War was the 1992 An
Agenda for Peace, by then UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The report emphasized the need to respond to the complexity of armed conflicts by addressing the full conflict cycle through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post-conflict peacebuilding (UN Secretary-General 1992). While the first two activities are limited to using diplomatic and peaceful means to intervene in (potential) armed conflicts, the latter three include the deployment of both civilian and military personnel. This section focuses on the conceptualization of the activities—peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post-conflict peacebuilding—that include military means to support peace.

Peacekeeping has become a particularly important concept, as much controversy about the UN’s role in the maintenance of peace and security has concerned the exact mandate the Security Council grants to peace operations. The type of mandate affects whether UN interventions may threaten state sovereignty, which is the main principle of international law. In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping as the “deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well” (UN Secretary-General 1992, sec. 20). The classic understanding of UN peacekeeping refers to the deployment of an impartial military force after a ceasefire has been reached to oversee the implementation of the agreement through non-coercive means. Thus, traditional peacekeeping is based on the “holy trinity” of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force (Bellamy et al. 2011, 174). It was designed to respond primarily to interstate conflicts and is often termed the first generation of peacekeeping (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 11).

The decline in the number of interstate wars and the simultaneous rise in (internationalized) intrastate wars since the end of the Cold War required an adaptation of the traditional peacekeeping model. Increasingly, UN missions were sent to countries where peace agreements were either absent or fragile, and ongoing violence required peacekeepers to be engaged in the delivery of humanitarian aid (Bellamy et al. 2011, 194–95). The deployment of an international force in an intrastate war is referred to as “wider peacekeeping” or “second-generation peacekeeping” and may also involve its receiving such tasks as separating forces, disarming combatants, organizing elections, and protecting humanitarian and UN personnel (Doyle et al. 1997).
These operations are often termed as falling under UN Charter Chapter 6 or “6 and 1/2,” as the Charter does not directly refer to “peacekeeping,” and these missions lie between the consensual provisions of Chapter 6 and the enforcement measures of Chapter 7 (Bailey and Daws 1995). This unclear status of wider or second-generation peacekeeping has created challenges for peacekeepers in the field because the means based on the principles of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force do not provide adequate tools to fulfill the desired ends, as was demonstrated by the failed UN operation in Rwanda (Bellamy et al. 2011, 195–97, 211–13).

The classic model of peacekeeping has evolved significantly. The “third generation” makes use of the provisions in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which grants a more robust mandate to peacekeeping forces to use force and bypass the consent of the parties in conflict if necessary. This generation of peacekeeping—which may include elements of “peace enforcement,” depending on the mandate—has become particularly important to intrastate wars, in which stable negotiating partners are difficult to find and intervention forces are often deployed before peace agreements have been reached (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 11).

With the evolution of “wider peacekeeping” and the growing demands on missions deployed to countries with no or fragile peace agreements between the belligerents, peace operations came to be linked to development efforts more generally. This is demonstrated by the creation by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the international financial institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—of special programs and units to assist in reconstruction. These efforts became particularly important in relationship to the socioeconomic reintegration of former combatants. Missions after 1998, such as those in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the DRC, integrated traditional peacekeeping with post-conflict reconstruction (Daudelin and Seymour 2002). Thus, the concept of “peacebuilding” emerged, referring to efforts with the goal not only of separating the conflict parties but also of assisting in creating the foundations for lasting peace (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000, sec. 14).

In this discussion, the term peace operations refers to international interventions involving civilian and military personnel in inter- and intrastate wars to assist countries in the transformation from war to peace. The scope is limited to largely short-term operations that include elements of peacekeep-
ing, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding by international organizations and states in the immediate aftermath of armed conflict. Their mandate may include support of a peace process, assistance in implementing or enforcing ceasefires or peace agreements, or help in building a stable peace (including transitional administrations; Bellamy et al. 2011). Medium- or long-term post-conflict reconstruction and development activities, as well as humanitarian relief, are excluded from the analysis. The focus is on operations conducted within the last two decades (post–Cold War) and limited to activities by the UN and regional organizations, including cooperation between the AU and NATO and between the AU and the EU, and World Bank activities in the immediate aftermath of war.

TRENDS AND EXISTING PRIORITIES

Two trends in financing peace operations in Africa are particularly notable: the actors involved have proliferated, but the options to fund the activities have remained limited. The following overview discusses the evolution of institutions, tackling issues of peace and security and the financing mechanisms for peace operations in Africa that are available to various actors—the UN, regional organizations in Africa, the EU, NATO, and the World Bank.

The Proliferation of Actors Involved in Peace Operations

To adapt better to the changing demands of peace operations and to their own increasing roles in these activities, many international organizations have created special policies and units within their agencies over the past two decades. For instance, the World Bank’s involvement in post-conflict reconstruction led to the establishment in 1997 of the Post-Conflict Fund to provide loans and grants quickly to conflict-affected countries (Harrison 2012). The EU established a Rapid Reaction Force and developed its civilian crisis management capacity; the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) created the Rapid Expert and Cooperation Team (REACT) to contribute to civilian crisis management; and, in 2002, NATO founded the NATO Response Force (Durch et al. 2003, 9).

African regional organizations also adapted to the new peacebuilding challenges by creating new institutions. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) [replaced by the AU in 2002] created a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution in 1993. In 2004, the AU established the Peace and Security Council and, in 2007, the Panel of the Wise. The New Part-

Many institutional reforms explicitly addressed the broadening focus of peace operations and the proliferation of international and regional actors involved in them (Curtis and Dzinesa 2012, 7–8). For instance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) created the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network in 1997 to coordinate the peacebuilding activities of international aid agencies. UNDP created the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in 2001 to connect activities of humanitarian agencies to long-term development strategies. Following a series of reforms related to peacekeeping within the UN, the UN Peacebuilding Commission was established in 2005 to develop integrated peacebuilding strategies for various actors in specific countries.

International agencies have only slowly adapted funding opportunities for peace operations to the shifts in the conceptual understanding of peace operations and the proliferation of actors involved, however. For instance, state and non-state actors still have separate budgets for peacekeeping operations, humanitarian aid, and post-conflict reconstruction (Griffin 2003). Moreover, the proliferation of actors responsible for the implementation of peace operations on the African continent has rendered coordination of activities and budgets more complicated (Curtis and Dzinesa 2012, 7). Much of the scholarly discussion on why funding for peace operations remains a challenge centers on the question of whether peacebuilding and peacekeeping are global public goods (Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Kocks 2005; Clunies-Ross and Langmore 2008). The concept matters for peace operations, as their provision depends on the collaboration of multiple actors, thereby strengthening the case for international cooperation. States tend to have specific priorities when it comes to their contributions, however, limiting their support to operations in their own regions, for instance, or to operations of special concern to them (Durch 1993).
Thus, while the proliferation of institutions and programs to address peace and security in Africa is a welcome development, it has not secured financing for peace operations; rather, it has made financing complicated and unpredictable. Moreover, insufficient coordination among actors and programs has led to a duplication of structures and waste of resources.

Contributions to UN Peace Operations

The financing of peace operations has been a source of controversy over the entire course of UN history, and the UN has experimented with various financing mechanisms over the decades (Mills 1989). According to the UN Charter, Article 17, paragraph 2, member states are responsible for financing the expenses of the organization, which means they are legally obligated to contribute to the financing of UN activities, including peace operations. Each member state contributes funds to the regular UN budget based on a scale of assessment.

After a peace operations financing crisis in the 1960s, during which many member states withheld their contributions, the General Assembly introduced in 1973 a peacekeeping budget separate from the regular UN budget. The controversy over financing intensified, however, especially when the peacekeeping budget increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s and developing states benefitted disproportionately from troop contributions (Bellamy et al. 2011, 62). Before 1988, the UN spent about US$300 million per year. The following year, this budget doubled and continued to rise, reaching US$3.6 billion in 1993, US$4.5 billion in 2005, and US$7.1 billion in 2008 (Bellamy et al. 2011, 62). The current budget allocates US$7.15 billion to thirteen operations, plus US$366.77 million for the new United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA; UN Department of Public Information 2013).5 In light of the increasing expenditures, many countries in the early 1990s—in particular the United States—threatened to cut contributions unless the UN underwent administrative reforms (Durch 1993, 40). In addition, a controversy emerged about the poorer troop-contributing countries receiving reimbursement in much greater amounts than the actual costs their lowest paid forces would have incurred (Durch 1993, 59).

Since 1973, UN peace operations have been funded alternatively by the regular UN budget, a separate peacekeeping budget based on the regular scale of assessments, a separate peacekeeping budget based on its own
scale of assessments, or voluntary contributions by member states. The following discussion describes the most common financing mechanism used over the past two decades—that is, the separate peacekeeping budget with its own assessment scale. Assessed contributions often finance missions along with voluntary contributions, which will be discussed next.

The new assessment scale for peacekeeping operations. In 1973, the General Assembly established a separate peacekeeping budget to which member states contributed based on an assessment scale different from that of the regular UN budget (Mills 1989, 14–15). Each member state contributed to a Peacekeeping Assessment Account based on the ability to pay, which was calculated on the basis of gross domestic product (GDP) and, in the case of smaller states, levels of external debt. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council were assessed at a higher rate due to their special responsibility for peace and security, and they paid for the discounts other states received according to the assessment scale.

As the initial assessment scale imposed a particular burden on the permanent five to finance peacekeeping operations, the General Assembly reformed it in 2000 in response to U.S.-led pressure. The current UN regulation concerning the financing of peacekeeping operations was thus established with UN General Assembly resolution 55/235 of December 23, 2000, “Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations.” The same principles apply as before—developed states carry a higher burden, and the permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility to finance operations, which leaves developed states still responsible for 95 percent of the overall peacekeeping budget (Kocks 2005, 43). The permanent five member states of the Security Council pay less than they did, however, based on the previous assessment scale (dropping their contribution from 63.15 percent of the peacekeeping budget in 1973 to 45.26 percent for 2004–6), while developed states in other assessment groups contribute more than previously (Kocks 2005, 43; for the top ten providers of the peacekeeping budget for 2013, see table 1).

The new assessment scale divides UN member states into ten different groups rather than four, as the previous scale of assessments had done. It can thus better account for different levels of economic development. In the first group are the permanent members of the UN Security Council (Level A), which pay assessments equivalent to their regular budget assessments plus a surcharge that covers the discounts for poorer countries. The sec-
Second group comprises developed countries that pay assessments equivalent to their regular budget assessments (Level B). The third group includes high-income developing countries that receive a 7.5 percent discount on their regular assessments. Groups D–I include developing countries that are assessed based on their average per capita GNI (gross national income) relative to the average per capita GNI of member states; these assessments are recalculated every three years. The last group (Level J) applies to the least developed countries, which receive a discount of 90 percent on their regular budget assessments.

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<th>TABLE 1. List of Top Ten Providers of the Peacekeeping Budget for 2013</th>
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<td>Member State</td>
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<td>1. United States of America</td>
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<td>2. Japan</td>
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<td>3. France</td>
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<td>9. Canada</td>
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<td>10. Spain</td>
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Administrative reforms. The major problem with the UN scale of assessment from its beginning was that member states did not pay their dues on time, and the withholding of funds resulted in deployments of peacekeeping troops being delayed for lack of start-up costs (Durch 1993). The UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali therefore established a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund in 1992 based on a proposition in his *An Agenda for Peace* (UN General Assembly 1992). Created as a cash-flow mechanism to provide start-up funding for new or expanded peace operations, the fund is currently set at US$150 million, and a maximum of US$100 million can be used for the start-up costs of a particular peacekeeping operation (UN General Assembly 2010). Proposals to increase the size of the fund and allow the secretary-general to use resources from it before the Security Council grants approval of a new operation have not yet been realized (UN 2000).
Other administrative reforms, such as the standardization of the budgetary process and the harmonization of budget cycles, were introduced in 1995 (UN General Assembly 1995). Although they improved the budgeting process, the approval process remains complicated. Each peace operation receives its own budget and account. These special accounts need to be set up before member states can make any payments. After the adoption of a Security Council Resolution, the UN Secretariat prepares a budget, which the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) examines. After the ACABQ makes a recommendation to the Fifth (Financial and Budgetary) Committee of the General Assembly, the General Assembly endorses the proposal.

These administrative reforms were unable to avert a crisis of UN peacekeeping at the end of the 1990s. In 2000, looking back at failed peace operations and facing new demands for peacekeeping, the UN secretary-general convened the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, headed by former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi. The panel made recommendations regarding the improvement of decision making at UN headquarters, the gulf between mandates and resources, rapid and effective deployment, and the effectiveness of deployed forces (United Nations 2000; Bellamy et al. 2011, 129–37). The sudden increase in peacekeeping missions had led to a number of ad hoc mechanisms, such as the use of “gratis military personnel” by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), whereby member states had provided the UN with more than 130 military officers free of charge (the General Assembly decided in 1997 to end this practice; Durch et al. 2003, 3). Facing a new wave of peacekeeping missions at the beginning of the 2000s, the UN needed to find adequate solutions to its past failures in Rwanda and Bosnia and conduct a thorough reform of peacekeeping within the UN system. The so-called Brahimi Report called for more “robust” mandates, which were welcomed by developed states; developing ones viewed them with skepticism, however, as they expected more challenges to states’ sovereignty (Durch et al. 2003, 8).

Although then secretary-general Kofi Annan embraced all the proposed reforms of the Brahimi Report, the September 2005 World Summit with representatives of all UN member states only adopted them in a weakened form. The most significant outcome was the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, supported by the Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund, which lacked adequate resources and staff. The number of peace operations increased steadily after the publication of the report, with
missions ranging from traditional monitoring to peace support operations with robust mandates (Bellamy et al. 2011, 143–46). The UN accomplished more successful operations, partly in cooperation with other actors such as the EU, which also contributed to the demand for more missions. Reforms did not overcome the problem, however, of a lack of political will to provide the necessary troops and resources to some regions in Africa, such as Sudan (Bellamy et al. 2011, 151).

Other significant challenges remain, as well. For instance, the budgetary approval process can be quite lengthy. In response, alternative sources of funding, such as the Peace Reserve Fund and voluntary contributions, have become important for financing peace operations during the lag time between UN Security Council mandate and the receipt of assessed contributions.

Voluntary contributions. In the context of UN peacekeeping operations, assessed contributions often go along with voluntary contributions, which finance activities that are part of the mission strategy but do not fall under the regular mission budget. These activities often concern rehabilitation and reconstruction projects, the conduct of elections, and the provision of emergency aid. Voluntary contributions to peacekeeping operations can take the form of transportation, supplies, personnel, or finances. Thirty-five countries voluntarily contributed $880 million to the UN mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC, 1991–92), while the UN mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ, 1992–94) received $400 million from the international community (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001, 43). The Holst Peace Fund, administered by the World Bank, was created to voluntarily finance support to the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Voluntary contributions sometimes supplement budget items usually paid for by assessed contributions when member states decide to withhold funds from special accounts due to political interests. This was the case with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL; Diehl and PharaohKhan 2000, 76). A UN General Assembly–created “Suspense Account for UNIFIL” was financed by voluntary contributions from member states, international organizations, and private sources and supplemented the special account two years after UNIFIL deployment.

Contributions are commonly mobilized by multilateral pledging conferences, such as UN-initiated consolidated appeals (CAPs), round tables (RTs) organized by countries interested in the situation in the affected country,
and World Bank–initiated consultative groups (CGs; Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001, 44).

The key instruments for coordinating voluntary contributions are trust funds, cost-sharing projects, and parallel financing (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001, 45). A trust fund is created for a specific purpose, theme, region, country, or project and can be organized in one of several ways (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001, 45). A donor can ask a fiduciary institution, which does not contribute any of its own funds, to administer the fund. One or multiple donors can be involved in the fund, and donors can demand their contributions be used for specific purposes. In the UN system, trust funds are set up by the General Assembly or the Security Council, and each is based on individual terms of reference (Fetterly 2006, 404). Cost sharing refers to contributions by governments, multilateral organizations, international financial institutions, nongovernmental organizations, or private sector entities to complement the funds of an agency administering a project. Parallel financing refers to the joint funding of a project by one or more multilateral organizations and other donors, with the resources administered separately.

Voluntary contributions have become important financing instruments in light of the difficulty of financing activities not eligible for assessed contributions and the need to overcome political impasses. As Diehl and PharaohKhan (2000, 76) point out, however, their disadvantage is that they can be quickly withdrawn; furthermore, pledges often exceed actual receipts, and many peace operations end up underfunded. Ultimately, “the financial and political sources of UN financial problems are directly a consequence (although not a necessary one) of a reliance on members’ contributions for funding” (Diehl and PharaohKhan 2000, 77). This is why the focus has shifted to other international organizations and regional organizations that can provide the funds in a more reliable manner.

**The Devolution of Peace Operations to Regional Organizations**

Maintaining cooperation between the UN and regional organizations is high on the UN’s agenda, as shown by a growing number of reports and resolutions on the issue (UN Secretary-General 2012; UN General Assembly 2005; UN Security Council 2005). Although this cooperation was long blocked by Cold War dynamics (Barnett 1995; Diehl and Cho 2005), the end of the Cold War, the limits of the UN’s financial and organizational capacity, and political
pressure from member states have led regional organizations increasingly to take over responsibilities for peace operations.

Since the 1990s, regional organizations have been expanding the deployment of missions both in their own member states and in other countries, and both with and without mandate from the UN Security Council. Between 1989 and 2005, regional organizations initiated thirty-one peace operations, as compared to five from 1972 to 1988 (Diehl and Cho 2005, 195). ECOWAS conducted five operations between 1975 and 2005, the OAU/AU twelve, and the SADC two (Diehl and Cho 2005, 196). Currently, the AU is in the process of developing an African Standby Force (ASF).

The involvement of regional organizations has increased for various reasons. First, the end of the Cold War created a vacuum in some regions that they could fill, and some states used them as a shield behind which they could pursue their own interests (Diehl 2007, 540). Second, the UN’s peacekeeping failures and NATO’s successful intervention in Kosovo led some states to believe regional organizations were better suited than the UN to respond effectively and efficiently to new security challenges (Bellamy et al. 2011, 308). Such organizations allow for faster deployment of troops and can provide local solutions to local problems, offer long-term commitments, and act where the UN declines to intervene. Third, the particular interest of regional organizations in maintaining peace in their regions and their greater knowledge of the regional context lend more legitimacy and sensitivity to their interventions.

In addition, with regard to the involvement of African regional organizations in peace operations on the continent, Africans no longer rely on interventions by the international community for important political reasons. European states prefer sending their troops to European rather than African countries, as demonstrated by the NATO force of 30,000 troops in Kosovo, compared to the 10,000 troops that were sent to the DRC—a country as large as Western Europe (Murithi 2005, 99).

The involvement of regional organizations in peace operations has not supplanted UN peace operations, however. Instead, it has raised questions about how UN and regional activities can be coordinated. Chapter 8 of the UN Charter provides guidance for cooperation, but it lacks specificity regarding the forms it should take. While many interventions on the African continent were either ignored or approved in retrospect, the NATO inter-
vention in Kosovo in 1999 without mandate from the UN Security Council sparked a heated debate about the relationship between the UN and regional organizations (Bellamy et al. 2011, 306–7). The DPKO’s Lessons Learned Unit subsequently developed several principles on which the partnership between the UN and regional organizations should be based. They emphasized the primary responsibility of the UN for peace and security, sufficient information sharing, and the importance of sufficiently trained and equipped personnel and long-term efforts to maintain peace after the end of an operation (UN 1999, cited in Bellamy et al. 2011, 307).

The report by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change as well as another by then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom, therefore called for more coordination between the UN and regional organizations to complement the activities of different agencies (United Nations 2004; UN Secretary-General 2005). Annan argued that the UN could benefit from the incorporation of the reserve force capacities of the EU and the AU into the United Nations Standby Arrangements System. He also suggested designing a ten-year plan for capacity building with the AU. Regarding the financing of peace operations, the report called for a change in the regulations so assessed contributions could be used to fund UN Security Council–authorized peace operations conducted by regional organizations, or so regional organizations could participate in UN-funded operations.

In terms of policies and coordination, several resolutions and reports have built on Kofi Annan’s report to further UN-AU cooperation. The DPKO designed principles of coordination and suggested some mechanisms to implement them, including improved communication channels, strategic planning groups, joint training, and international conferences (Bellamy et al. 2011, 307). In 2006, the UN and AU developed the ten-year plan Annan had recommended to enhance the peacekeeping activity of African states. Then, in 2010, the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) was established to serve as a liaison between the two organizations.

Since the elaboration of these suggestions, the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations has come a long way. Many different cooperation schemes have evolved, including consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, and joint operations (UN Secretary-General 1995). In some cases, the UN took over missions established by African regional organizations, such as those mounted by ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–3) and Liberia (2003) and by the AU in Burundi (2003–4). A hybrid
UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID) replaced the AU mission to Sudan in 2008. In addition, the UN has supported the AU mission in Somalia, worked alongside NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and taken over an EU mission in Chad.

Although the devolution of peace operations to regional organizations is usually seen in a positive light, several senior figures have voiced concerns. Boutros-Ghali, who had promoted the involvement of regional organizations in *An Agenda for Peace*, saw the exclusive deployment of regional troops in regional conflicts as undermining international solidarity (Boutros-Ghali 1999, 306). For some, the change also meant regional organizations would be left alone to intervene in crises of little strategic interest to the great powers (Diehl and Cho 2005, 198). On a more practical level, observers noted that regional organizations lacked the experience, expertise, structures, and resources necessary to intervene effectively in crises (Goulding 2002, 217).

The lesson to be drawn from this debate is that regional organizations suffer from the same problems as the UN: they lack adequate financial resources, efficient bureaucratic structures, and expertise. The underlying challenges are also the same as for any other international organization, in that member states need to reach a consensus and overcome the tendency to adhere to partisan interests (Diehl 2007). In addition, regional organizations lack the experience of the UN and the institutional structures to stage large-scale operations.

The mixed record of the intervention in Liberia by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)—the multilateral armed force of ECOWAS—testifies to these various challenges. Initially, most francophone member states of ECOWAS did not support the mission, as they suspected it served Nigeria’s hegemonic interests in the region. Nigeria provided 90 percent of the funding and an estimated 80 percent of the ECOMOG troops (Adebajo 2004). Moreover, ECOMOG was seen as suffering from capacity and institutional weaknesses, and some troops were accused of brutality and corruption (Obi 2009, 122).

ECOMOG also represented a challenge in terms of cooperation with the UN and the fulfillment of UN principles. The mission had no UN Security Council mandate and could not rely on the consent of all parties to the conflict. This strengthened the impression that rather than being a neutral and im-
partial force, ECOMOG furthered Nigerian interests (Bellamy et al. 2011, 316). Thus, the second ECOWAS mission to Liberia and its mission to Sierra Leone were eventually replaced by UN missions.

While African regional organizations have taken on more peacekeeping responsibilities, their institutional and financial capacities have remained limited. This has led Western regional organizations such as the EU and NATO to expand their support to them, allowing for better planning of operations and adequate equipment and training.

The Peace Facility of the EU

In response to the need for capacity building within the AU and at the AU’s request, the EU established the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004, which provides funds for peace operations conducted by the AU. The APF sought to address the insufficiency of the financing mechanisms for the AU’s expanded involvement on the African continent. The AU’s peace fund, which was mostly donor funded, could only pay for small observer missions, not larger peacekeeping operations (Cilliers 2005, 70). Moreover, after making some controversial attempts to launch its own operations in African countries, the EU wanted the AU to take over responsibility for peacekeeping so it could limit its own involvement on the continent (Olsen 2009, 252).

To support the AU in expanding its peace and security capacities, the EU approved an allocation of €250 million to the APF to which both the AU and subregional organizations would have access for peace operations. The only requirement for the use of the funds was approval of the operation by the AU and, for peacemaking operations, a UN Security Council mandate. The EU has generally followed the AU’s recommendations and released the funds (Cilliers 2005, 70).

So far, the APF has allocated €740 million to capacity building, peace support operations, early response mechanisms, and contingencies. It has financed four missions: the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the consolidation of peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) are ongoing, while the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the mission to support the elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) have been accomplished. The sources for the APF have been a mixture of development- and security-related funding. This is remarkable, as the peace facility represents one of the few attempts to integrate peacekeeping and development (Olsen
Initially, its funds came from the Ninth European Development Fund. They were limited, however, to development activities such as capacity building and training and could not be used for military equipment. From 2007 to 2013, the APF received funds from the EU Stability Instrument, which finances peace and security and anti-terror operations around the world (Cilliers 2005, 72).

Internal and external evaluations have drawn positive conclusions about the APF with respect to its political framework and basic principles (Mackie et al. 2006; EU Council Secretariat 2008). The integration of the support for peace operations with broader security and development support measures in coordination with other actors has not yet been achieved, however (Mackie et al. 2006; Poulton et al. 2010). Also lacking is a thorough evaluation of the operations financed under the APF and how it facilitates African responsibility for peace operations.

The APF is unique among the instruments available to African regional organizations. Other organizations, such as NATO, have focused their support primarily on logistics and capacity building or, in the case of the World Bank, on post-conflict reconstruction.

NATO Support to the AU

Since 2005, following the AU’s request, NATO has supported the African organization in peace operations and capacity building (Smith-Windsor 2013, 19). NATO’s first mission on the African continent provided airlift support and training for AU personnel for the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) from 2005 until the mission was replaced by the hybrid UN-AU mission (UNAMID) on January 1, 2008. Since then, NATO has provided planning and strategic air- and sealift support to AU member states involved in the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and was involved in capacity building for the African Standby Force (ASF) brigades.

The AU’s cooperation with NATO has not yet attained the same strategic outlook and predictable funding as the AU-EU partnership (Smith-Windsor 2013, 20). As the list of support operations above demonstrates, the military-technical aspect of the partnership has prevailed, evolving on a case-by-case basis. NATO’s new 2010 Strategic Concept explicitly mentions collaboration with other organizations, however, and the accompanying Lisbon Summit Declaration of Heads of State and Government mentioned the AU
as one of NATO’s main partners with respect to collaboration with other regional organizations (Smith-Windsor 2013, 19).

The World Bank’s Funding of Post-conflict Reconstruction

Officially, peace operations and emergency relief lie outside of the World Bank’s purview (Kreimer et al. 1998). The Bank has been involved in countries experiencing conflicts or in post-conflict situations, however, such as Sudan in 1978 and Uganda in 1981 (Harrison 2012, 159). In 1995, it established the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU), which focused on donor coordination rather than on the development of a distinct agenda for the Bank. Only with its Framework for Involvement in Post-conflict Reconstruction (World Bank 1997) and the establishment of the Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) in 1997, as well as the creation of the Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Trust Fund in 2004, did the Bank start to tailor its programs to post-conflict countries. Its research on the recurrence of conflict due to a “conflict trap” that links poverty and war (Collier 2003) supported its expansion of post-conflict activities. With an upgrade of the PCU to the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPRU) in 2001 and the inauguration of the State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF), with its own funding base of US$100 million for 2009–11, the Bank signaled its willingness to engage with a broader range of conflict-related issues (Harrison 2012, 166; Boyce 2004).

The World Bank’s activities encompass demobilization and reintegation, reconstruction, governance, and development. The SPF integrates statebuilding and peacebuilding and provides quick release grants and technical assistance, as well as grants for recovery projects and capacity building. These financing mechanisms are intended to normalize the situation in post-conflict countries as quickly as possible to enable socioeconomic development (Harrison 2012, 168). With this long-term focus, the Bank pursues a largely apolitical approach to peace operations (Kreimer et al. 1998). Its extensive involvement in demobilization has emerged as a comparative advantage for it, as the Bank has developed distinct expertise in this field (Kreimer et al. 1998, 30). Related activities have included the funding of the cantonment, disarming, auditing, and release of former soldiers after hostilities have formally ended and support for the reintegration of ex-combatants (Harrison 2012, 163). In addition, the Bank has been involved in repairing and modernizing destroyed infrastructure.
Reviews of the World Bank’s involvement in post-conflict reconstruction have been mixed. A 1998 evaluation of these activities concludes that some of the Bank’s core policies—privatization, exertion of pressure to improve a country’s ratio of tax collections to tax capacity (the tax effort), and downsizing of the public sector—have to be rethought in light of specific country histories and experiences, as applying them blindly might contradict peace accord arrangements or reignite past conflicts (Kreimer et al. 1998). A 2004 assessment of international financial institutions similarly found that programs needed to be better adapted to specific countries’ histories. Moreover, the evaluation did conclude that the Bank should focus on its core competencies (macroeconomic stability and rebuilding infrastructure) and seek partnerships with other agencies with more expertise in other areas (Boyce 2004).

While some evaluations call for more attention to country-specific conditions, others highlight the need for greater coherence among projects in different countries and criticize the World Bank for selecting “easy” cases. A 2004 evaluation of the PCF calls for the identification of best practices and cross-country lessons that were applicable to other contexts (Bahnson and Cutura 2004). The study also found the various projects funded under the PCF did not adhere to an overarching framework of strategies for peace and security on a global or regional scale. In a first quantitative assessment of the Bank’s assistance to post-conflict countries from 1963 to 2006, Flores and Nooruddin (2009) found that the Bank’s activities had no systematic effect (positive or negative) on its main goals of preventing conflict recurrence and promoting economic recovery. They attributed the lack of impact to the Bank’s selecting the countries in which it invests based on whether they are likely to return to war, thus failing to contribute in its own right to a commitment to peace and economic recovery because these commitments already exist.

In sum, while the World Bank’s efforts have made available more resources for peace and security efforts in Africa—in particular with respect to the demobilization and reintegration of combatants—its actual impact on postwar stability remains contested.
CHALLENGES

While many new financing instruments have been introduced and new actors have gotten involved in funding peace operations in Africa, the results have been mixed. The assessment of recent UN reforms, the evolution of voluntary contributions, and the devolution of peace operations to regional organizations demonstrates that while some problems have been addressed, many remain to be resolved.

Assessment of UN Reforms for Financing Peace Operations

UN financial reforms, along with administrative reforms necessary to streamline the budget approval process, have largely been seen as successful. Salomons and Dijkzeul argue that they have provided more operational flexibility and rapid response capacity. At the same time, however, the financial reforms have not brought solutions to the challenge of integrating peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, nor have they addressed the continuing ability of a few member states to block or delay the approval of operations, nor the delays by member states in paying their assessed contributions.

One major limitation of the system of assessed contributions for peace operations is that they can only be used for military and administrative activities and not humanitarian and development efforts. Various expert panels have called for an integration of short- and long-term efforts to maintain peace. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the so-called Brahimi Report, discussed earlier) saw peacekeeping and peacebuilding as two sides of the same coin and called for the integration of conflict prevention into these activities (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000). The report did not, however, provide concrete recommendations for necessary organizational and financial reforms (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001, 36). For example, a closer coordination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities would have meant improving the cooperation between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the DPKO. With regard to funding, Salomons and Dijkzeul (2001, 36, 40) thought assessed contributions should have been made available to finance peacebuilding activities and therefore recommended the creation of a strategic recovery facility with its own funds and tasks and a standing trust fund to jump-start peacebuilding activities.
A second problem has resulted from the process of approval for the peace operations budget, which is influenced by the financial interest of member states in limiting the size and duration of operations (Fetterly 2006, 400). As developed states still overwhelmingly finance peace operations, their interest in influencing which operations get approved is particularly strong.

A third problem, which has been a constant challenge for UN peacekeeping operations, is the delay in the payments of member states’ assessed contributions. As of August 31, 2013, member states owed about $4.77 billion in current and back dues to the UN. In the past, member states have used the withholding of payments as a means of putting pressure on the UN to pursue administrative and structural reforms (Daudelin and Seymour 2002, 101).

Thus, while the reforms have addressed some administrative and financial difficulties, many longstanding problems of the available financing mechanisms have yet to be resolved.

**Assessment of the Evolution of Voluntary Contributions**

The difficulties with assessed contributions and the unreliability of the UN peacekeeping budget have resulted in a proliferation of trust funds (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001; Kocks 2005, 67), which do not solve all the financing problems and can even generate new ones. States contributing to trust funds can, for example, use their monetary power to influence the Terms of Reference (ToR) and earmark funds for specific purposes, which limits the flexibility of missions to determine certain needs (Kocks 2005, 67). Moreover, UN programs charged with administering the trust funds allocate 13 percent of the contributions to program support costs (Fetterly 2006, 404), which increases the overall costs of peace operations.

On the whole, the proliferation of various trust funds has raised the question of their coherence and compatibility, as they are rarely coordinated with one another (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001). This has led some to conclude that, while they are imperative to solving some of the financing limitations on peace operations, trust funds “do not represent an effective long-term substitute for assessed contributions; their creation rather represents another example of financial improvisations” (Kocks 2005, 67) and has provided a complement to other financing mechanisms.
Assessment of the Devolution of Peace Operations
to Regional Organizations

The devolution of peace maintenance tasks to regional organizations has generally been seen as a positive development, as regional organizations may be able to mobilize more resources in less time than international ones. Their greater knowledge about and concern with crisis situations in their member states may incline them to act faster and be more willing to contribute financial and material resources. Some states may also prefer the intervention of regional partners. In any case, as the Security Council only selectively approves interventions in crisis situations, operations conducted by regional organizations may be the only option, as it was in the 1990s in Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, and Liberia (Bellamy et al. 2011, 310–11).

Apart from the many political limitations of regional organizations, however—such as the influence of partisan interests of member states or lack of consensus on the form intervention should take—regional organizations are severely limited financially in their conduct of peace operations, particularly those organizations whose members are primarily developing states. Many do not have the necessary administrative, logistical, or command structures to manage large-scale peace operations (Goulding 2002, 217) or the capacity or resources to intervene effectively in a crisis situation. As Daudelin and Seymour (2002, 102) point out, African regional and subregional organizations “can neither mount the multifaceted operations necessary to effectively respond to complex emergencies nor pay for their costs.” For this reason, the programs developed by the AU in cooperation with the EU and NATO have focused much attention on capacity building, training, and the provision of funds for regional operations.

The involvement of regional organizations in peace operations and the division of labor among them, donor countries, and the UN has triggered a lively debate. US national security advisor Susan Rice (ambassador to the UN at the time) has pointed to the risk of regional organizations acting on their own without much cooperation with the UN, whose role would be reduced to providing the funding (Rice 2012). Rice’s comments reflect Brahimi’s concern, cited above, that international solidarity and the primacy of the UN in matters of peace and security are compromised when too much responsibility is deferred to regional organizations. Some analysts, in contrast, welcome this division of labor, as African countries are more capable of responding effectively to African conflicts, while they depend on
the funding to conduct peace operations (Tieku 2013). In fact, Susan Rice’s statement overlooks the considerable power the UN retains in defining the mandate of peace operations, as their financing by regional organizations often requires UN Security Council approval.

The devolution of peace operations to African regional organizations presents other problems, however, related to the capacity of their member states. Some commentators see in its ability to prevent conflicts and strengthen development the true test of whether the African Union can improve upon the performance of the Organization of African Unity (the OAU, which the AU replaced; Magliveras and Naldi 2002). Yet the AU and NEPAD will face severe constraints in implementing the ambitious programs they have developed if they do not identify priority areas (Khadiagala 2012, 114). Moreover, political will and national interests may hinder the strengthening of the AU’s conflict resolution capacities. As Vines (2013) points out, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), established by the AU in 2002, is based on a liberal peace model, but many African states are severely deficient with respect to democracy, human rights, and good governance, and the self-interest of elites constrains APSA’s success. While the AU’s mission to Somalia may have demonstrated its capabilities, the organization has not overcome challenges to its member states’ capacity for the effective deployment of forces.

The merits of involving regional organizations in peace operations have to be carefully weighed against such potential problems. EU and NATO support for the AU has improved upon the UN’s financing of peacekeeping, as it has helped provide financial and logistical assistance in a timely manner. The financial challenges of peace operations are not fully solved by their devolution to regional organizations, however. Apart from the exclusive provision of new financial, material, and logistical resources to African peace operations, the innovation in financial mechanisms has remained limited. African states remain dependent on donor support, which needs to change if the AU and other organizations are to tackle problems on the continent effectively. Yet Africa will never be able to solve all crises alone. International crises, such as the one that occurred in Mali in 2012–13, demonstrate the continuing need for partnerships between African and international organizations (Vines 2013).
POTENTIAL FINANCING MECHANISMS AND THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATION FUNDING

The limitations of reforms and adaptations of financing mechanisms for peace operations have led to a continuous debate on alternative sources of funding. In addition to demands for further reform of the UN’s assessed contributions and budgeting regulations, some innovative ideas have emerged that would render peace operation funding independent of UN member states or donor countries. The following sections review the most relevant suggestions, discussing first the proposals for new international financing mechanisms and second those for new regional ones.

International Financing Mechanisms

The suggestions regarding international financing mechanisms involve incremental changes in existing mechanisms and the establishment of new ones.

To make payment of assessed contributions by UN member states more timely, policymakers and commissions that advocate for more international solidarity—such as former UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali, the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing, and the Commission on Global Governance—have suggested the imposition of penalties on late payments (UN Secretary-General 1992; Ford Foundation 1993; Commission on Global Governance 1995). These penalties can take the form either of fees or the withdrawal of voting rights in the General Assembly (D’Orville and Najman 1994). The second option refers to a stricter reformulation of Article 19 of the UN Charter, which stipulates that states in arrears of two years’ dues may not vote in the General Assembly. Both proposals have met with considerable doubt as to whether they would bring the desired change in member states’ behavior, as penalties do not address the motivations behind their failure to meet payment deadlines (Diehl and PharaohKhan 2000, 79). Diehl and PharaohKhan (2000) even doubt the penalties would be properly implemented.

Another suggestion, intended to overcome the shortfalls in start-up costs for peace operations incurred by delayed payments (see above), has been for the UN to receive borrowing power or special drawing rights if countries do not pay their dues by a certain date (Ratner 1995; UN Secretary-General...
1992; D’Orville and Najman 1994, 141–42). However, as borrowed funds provide only short-term stability and need to be paid back, they do not solve the more fundamental problem of the shortage of funds (Diehl and PharaohKhan 2000: 85). Borrowing power may also worsen the UN’s financial problems, as without the payment of dues, the UN cannot repay loans.

To consolidate the various accounts that exist for different peace operations, scholars and policymakers have suggested the establishment of a single peace fund—a unified budget for peace operations with separate lines for each (Commission on Global Governance 1995; Kocks 2005, 44). Such a unified budget would have the advantages of streamlining the budget approval process, reducing the number of legislative decisions and assessments required, and facilitating planning for member states (United Nations 2003). The proposal has received considerable attention within the UN, but without result.

A similar, but more marginal and controversial idea, is the establishment of a fund with a more general purpose. To increase the level of funding available for development assistance, Clunies-Ross and Langmore (2008) suggest the creation of a fund for all humanitarian purposes, such as emergency relief, the combating of contagious diseases, primary schooling, clean water and sanitation, and UN peacekeeping. Being included in such a fund would be advantageous for peace operations in that it would make them more ambitious than previously possible. The disadvantage is that governments might feel less responsible for funding peacekeeping, or that the managing agency might be more familiar with development than with the demands of peacekeeping (Clunies-Ross and Langmore 2008, 113).

Furthermore, the proposal to combine expenses for common development and humanitarian assistance with peace operation expenses significantly challenges common understandings of foreign aid—or official development assistance (ODA)—as ODA usually excludes assistance to military operations. Some peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities can be classified as ODA, but military aid, military equipment, training of military personnel, and personal security are not ODA eligible (Kocks 2005, 75). Further discussion is needed on how the political goal of integrating peacekeeping and peacebuilding can be achieved, not only in terms of operations, but also with respect to the financing mechanisms available to both.
The ideas cited above have certain limitations. All would increase the ability of the UN to allocate funds faster and more efficiently. Because they would also give the UN greater agency and leave fewer options for member states to control or influence financing decisions, however, many have blocked reforms that go in this direction. Moreover, these ideas do not fundamentally address the problem of member states’ delaying payment of their dues.

A different approach, therefore, is based on looking for alternative funding sources beyond member states’ contributions. The abovementioned funds could, for example, be financed by international taxation based on current gross national product (GNP) data or by dues and levies on international air travel, telecommunications, postal services, financial transactions, maritime shipping, conventional arms trade, or international trade (D’Orville and Najman 1994, 140–41). Such taxes would be unlikely to have any economic impact on the transactions and are relatively easy and cheap to implement, and tax revenues would decrease the UN’s dependence on member states’ contributions. Taxes on arms transfers, for example, would generate an estimated US$1.2 billion (Binger 2003, cited in Kocks 2005). In light of the 2008 financial crisis, the idea of a tax on international financial flows has received renewed attention, and many European states, including France, have supported its establishment. On the negative side, the UN would still rely on member states to collect the tax, tax havens might emerge, and member states might be unwilling to grant such “supranational” capacity to the UN (Diehl and PharaohKhan 2000, 89, 92).

In sum, the ideas and suggestions for financing mechanisms at the international level remain largely limited to the incremental reform of existing financing regulations, which may not bring about the desired change. International taxes and levies, in contrast, promise to provide more independence from member states’ contributions and would thus also provide African states more flexibility in mounting their own peace operations, although they have their problems as well.

Regional Financing Mechanisms

To decrease the dependence of regional organizations on funding provided by the international community, several regional financing mechanisms have been suggested. These proposals seek to make use of local resources, such as natural resource wealth, or, similar to the international taxes discussed
above, a combination of local and international resources, raised by taxing regional communication and travel.

Although they are associated with an increased conflict risk, according to the scholarship on civil wars (Le Billon 2001; Ross 2006), Daudelin and Seymour (2002) propose using natural resources for the funding of peace operations. Natural or other local resources could contribute to the funding of peace operations in several ways. The UN could, for instance, assume a share of the revenues from natural resource exports and place a portion in trust funds for future allocation to peace operations. International agencies might collect revenue from taxes and customs, as they did in Kosovo, to finance operations, or trace and seize illegitimately earned assets. They might make warring parties or multinational companies that are involved in armed conflicts more accountable for their actions by holding them financially liable. Daudelin and Seymour propose these options as a “practical solution” to the problem of financing, with particular advantages over “lofty global governance schemes for independently funding the UN, and often its own standing UN army, by means of levies, taxes, bond issues, lotteries and such” (2002, 108).

The success of this financing mechanism is dependent on several conditions, however. Daudelin and Seymour point to some instances in which peace operations in Africa were “self-financing,” as intervening states pursued their own economic interests and became actively involved in the war economy. Strong institutions are needed to oversee the export of natural resources and mitigate the risk of corruption and the emergence of warlords (Daudelin and Seymour 2002, 107). Local resources should benefit the community from which they are drawn and only complement—not replace—international financing (Daudelin and Seymour 2002: 113). Lastly, private sector interests need to be prevented from distorting the implementation of the peace operation mandate.

While the suggestion to use natural resource wealth has had limited impact on debates on financing peace operations, the more general call to end corruption and control illicit flows of money from natural resource extraction has received more attention. Former South African president Thabo Mbeki is currently leading a UN High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, which also looks at financial flows from Africa.
More promising seem to be recent ideas and developments within the AU. During the past couple of years, the organization has come up with suggestions to generate revenue for peace operations locally. Its High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing recommended the following options: a US$2 hospitality levy per stay in a hotel; a US$.05 levy per text message sent; and a US$5 levy on international air travel to and from Africa. ECOWAS has had a good experience with levies on international travel. It established a community levy, which deducts a certain percentage from the customs income of member states derived from goods imported into the community from third countries and marketed for consumption. The levy has contributed significantly to ECOWAS’s income and provided the organization with resources in years in which member states did not fulfill their financial obligations (Ncube and Akena 2012). Whether the AU manages to implement similar policies remains to be seen. Representatives of the AU member states approved the High Level Panel’s report during this year’s AU summit and submitted it to the Conference of Ministers of Finance and Economic Planning for their consideration, and deliberations are in progress.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As the previous sections have made apparent, several challenges to the financing of peace operations on the African continent have arisen:

- The research on peace operations has tended to put much more emphasis on institutional than financial reform.
- Although many different financing mechanisms have been experimented with over the past decades, a thorough evaluation of each is still lacking.
- Much emphasis has been put on incremental reforms of existing mechanisms that do not address underlying problems and also do not necessarily reduce the dependence of African states on donor countries.
- Much of this emphasis has been put on generating new sources rather than consolidating budgets and administrative costs.
- The challenge of integrating peacekeeping and peacebuilding has not been sufficiently addressed in proposals for financial reform.
This section discusses these challenges with reference to areas in which more research is needed and to areas of duplication, waste, and neglect.

**Research Gaps**

To resolve the abovementioned challenges, research needs to pay more attention to the evaluation of the financing of peace operations, previously existing and new financing mechanisms, and innovative and more local forms of financing.

*Lack of attention to financing peace operations.* The financing aspects of international peace operations have not received as much attention as the institutional reform of international organizations or even the financial reform of international development. Many evaluations of international peace operations do not include reference to the impact of financing problems on their conduct. In general, therefore, more integrated research on the evaluation of peace operations and their financing is needed.

*Lack of evaluation of previously existing and new financing mechanisms.* Moreover, much of the discussion on financing mechanisms focuses on the reform and adaptation of existing mechanisms. It is surprising that the peace operations financed by the APF, the innovative fund for peace operations established by the EU, have not yet been independently evaluated by external experts. More generally, many of the financing mechanisms discussed have actually been experimented with in the long history of peace operations conducted by the UN. Few studies evaluate these early experiments, however, or analyze what kinds of lessons can be drawn from them with respect to future reliance on such mechanisms.

*Lack of attention to innovative and more local forms of financing.* The focus on the reform of existing UN financing mechanisms implies that few studies have explored innovative mechanisms that go beyond them and are successful in reducing African dependence on international donors. The AU’s High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing is a welcome exception, although it has not yet generated scholarly reports on the feasibility of the measures proposed in the panel’s report.
Areas of Duplication, Waste, and Neglect

To overcome the challenges of financing peace operations in Africa, a second step is to identify areas of duplication, waste, and neglect. These include the duplication of structures and waste of resources and the lack of sufficient integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Duplication of structures and waste of resources. The improvisation of financing mechanisms and the proliferation of actors involved in peace operations over the last decades has brought about a duplication of administrative and organizational structures. Trust funds, in particular, duplicate administrative structures, as each has its own regulations. The duplication of organizational structures comes to the fore particularly with regard to post-conflict reconstruction. Finally, no adequate solution has been found for the reimbursement of troop contributions, as the amounts of the reimbursements often still exceed the actual costs states pay for their troops.

Lack of sufficient integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As alluded to in the introduction, the financial integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding lags behind the institutional integration of the broad range of activities related to the maintenance of peace. This lag can be traced to problems at several levels. States still have separate budget lines for peace operations and reconstruction. Moreover, a financial integration of military and civilian activities would challenge the current understanding of ODA and would invite states to count military assistance to other countries toward their ODA contributions.

More generally, however, the integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding challenges the organizational structure of the UN, as security and socio-economic development have been two separate pillars since its founding. Improved financial coordination will more likely go further, therefore, than an actual financial integration. International efforts like those embodied by the UN Peacebuilding Commission or the OECD’s Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network will gain considerable importance in spearheading the required coordination.
IMPLICATIONS OF EXTERNAL FUNDING OF PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

The goal of this discussion was to review existing and potential financing mechanisms for peace operations on the African continent and to inquire how far the financial dependence of African states on international agencies and donors with respect to these operations can be reduced.

This question is relevant in light of the permanent financial problems within the UN system and the limited availability of additional funds through other international organizations or bilateral agreements. In addition to these financial considerations, an increase in African financial capacity to mount peace operations would translate into Africans having more political weight in decision making regarding such controversial interventions as the one in Libya (Smith-Windsor 2013).

While recent reforms have brought about some improvement, they have not fundamentally solved the problems that inhibit the adequate and rapid deployment of African resources, materials, and personnel to address crises on the continent. In addition to addressing the duplication of structures and waste of resources, significant efforts must be made to evaluate previous and potential financing mechanisms to come up with alternatives that reduce African dependence on international donors.
### ANNEXES

**Annex I: List of Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU/OAU</td>
<td>African Union/Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPRU</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit [World Bank]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LICUS</td>
<td>Low-Income Countries Under Stress Trust Fund [World Bank]</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCU</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Unit [World Bank]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>State and Peacebuilding Fund [World Bank]</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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## Annex II: UN Missions and Budgets, July 1, 2013–June 30, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Budget</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO (Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara)</td>
<td>US$61.69 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH (Stabilization Mission in Haiti)</td>
<td>US$609.18 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO (Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo)</td>
<td>US$1.53 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID (Hybrid Operation in Darfur)</td>
<td>US$1.41 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF (Disengagement Observer Force)</td>
<td>US$50.73 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP (Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)</td>
<td>US$58.51 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL (Interim Force in Lebanon)</td>
<td>US$520.44 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA (Interim Security Force in Abyei)</td>
<td>US$307.05 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK (Mission in Kosovo)</td>
<td>US$47.47 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL (Mission in Liberia)</td>
<td>US$503.18 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS (Mission in South Sudan)</td>
<td>US$976.62 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI (Operation in Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
<td>US$617.51 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOA (Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia)</td>
<td>US$460.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, excluding MINUSMA (Mission in Mali)</td>
<td>US$7.15 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Annex III: EU Operations in Support to Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Strength (Number of Personnel)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artemis</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Jun–Sept 2003</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Support to AMIS II</td>
<td>Sudan, Darfur</td>
<td>2005–6</td>
<td>Civilian and military</td>
<td>30 and 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>2005–7</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Since 2005</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Since 2007</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU NAVFOR-Atalanta</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Since Dec 2008</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>Chad, CAR</td>
<td>2008–9</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU SSR</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>2008–10</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Since Apr 2010</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to AU ASF</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Since 2008</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Annex IV: NATO Operations in Support to Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support to AMISOM</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Technical and logistical [no combat troops]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to AU ASF</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Since 2007</td>
<td>Technical [training and capacity building]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Provider</td>
<td>Coast of Somalia</td>
<td>Oct–Dec 2008</td>
<td>Military [counter-piracy operation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Provider</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>Mar–Aug 2009</td>
<td>Military [counter-piracy operation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Shield</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>Since Aug 2009</td>
<td>Military [counter-piracy operation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Endeavour</td>
<td>Mediterranean Sea</td>
<td>Since 2001</td>
<td>Military [maritime surveillance]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Protector</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Military [protecting civilians]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Smith-Windsor 2013, 220–21.
REFERENCES


Flores, Thomas Edward, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2009. “Financing the Peace:


NOTES

1. For an extensive discussion of the problem of defining peace operations and for reference to various policy and scholarly definitions, see the introduction in Bellamy et al. (2011).

2. The *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* (DPKO 2003) refers to the same list of “peace and security activities.” The definitions the DPKO uses of the different activities are not, however, mutually exclusive, and thus peacekeepers’ tasks include activities associated with peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding.

3. Bellamy et al. (2011) analyze these and other operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan whose mandates combine military and civilian personnel. These operations aimed at the social and political restructuring of society after war, and thus the authors categorize these missions as “assisting transitions,” “transitional administrations,” and “peace support operations.”

4. The so-called Brahimi Report on the future of UN peace operations uses the term “peace operations” in a similar manner (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000).

5. For an overview of current UN operations and their respective budgets, see annex II.

6. For an overview of EU support to African crises, see annex III.


8. The EU commissioned one evaluation of the APF’s procedures and possibilities for alternative sources of funding (Poulton et al. 2010). The second part of the evaluation, which focuses on the implementation of the APF and its results, is currently underway.

9. For an overview of NATO support to Africa, see annex IV. For a current evaluation of the NATO-AU partnership, see Smith-Windsor 2013.


13. Recent works on peace operations only discuss the financing aspects in a limited manner. See, for example, Bellamy (2011) and Curtis and Dzinesa (2012).
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Corinna Jentzsch is a PhD candidate in political science at Yale University. Her research focuses on informal institutions of security governance during and after civil wars, and she specializes in southern Africa. She will be joining the Institute of Political Science at Leiden University in the Netherlands as an assistant professor of international relations in fall 2014. This working paper was commissioned by the African Peacebuilding Network.